Justia Daily Opinion Summaries

Criminal Law
January 31, 2025

Table of Contents

United States v. Castillo

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

United States v. Perez-Segura

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

United States v. Oladokun

Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Bryant v. Stirling

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

US v. Johnson

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Carmona v. Olvera

Civil Rights, Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Chandler v. Brown

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Clardy v. Pounds

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

United States v. Drake

Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

United States v. Hale

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Lee v Harris

Civil Rights, Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

United States v. White

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

DOERR V. SHINN

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated July 21, 2023

Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics, Tax Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY

Criminal Law, Immigration Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

U.S. v. Bruce

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

USA v. Webster

Criminal Law

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

State v. The Estate of Harry Powell

Criminal Law

Alaska Supreme Court

People v. Hamilton

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

California Courts of Appeal

People v. Martinez

Criminal Law

California Courts of Appeal

People v. Rogers

Criminal Law

California Courts of Appeal

State v. Ziolkowski

Criminal Law

Connecticut Supreme Court

Caylor v. State

Criminal Law

Florida Supreme Court

BLALOCK v. THE STATE

Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Supreme Court of Georgia

BRUNDAGE v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

BURKE v. THE STATE

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

CHAMBERS v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

GARCIA-SOLIS v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

MITCHELL v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

REDDICK v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

SINGLETON v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

WILSON v. THE STATE

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Georgia

State v. Smith

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

People v. Watkins-Romaine

Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Illinois

People v. White

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Supreme Court of Illinois

State of Iowa v. Brown

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Iowa Supreme Court

Commonwealth v. Fayad F.

Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Commonwealth v. Vasquez

Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

State v. Clausen

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Nebraska Supreme Court

State v. Bowman

Criminal Law

Oregon Supreme Court

State v. Gonzalez

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Oregon Supreme Court

State v. Carter

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

South Carolina Supreme Court

Torres v. The State of Wyoming

Criminal Law

Wyoming Supreme Court

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Criminal Law Opinions

United States v. Castillo

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1599

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Seth R. Aframe

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Mario Rafael Castillo was charged with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under twelve and one count of abusive sexual contact of a child under twelve. He pleaded guilty to the second count, which involved his younger granddaughter, while the government dismissed the first count. The plea agreement allowed Castillo to seek a 78-month sentence, and the government could argue for up to 180 months. Castillo was initially sentenced to 235 months by the district court, which applied a sentencing guidelines cross-reference that increased the advisory guideline range.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the initial sentence due to a procedural error in applying the cross-reference. On remand, the district court acknowledged the lower guideline range but reimposed the 235-month sentence. Castillo appealed again, arguing that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by not genuinely recommending the 180-month sentence and instead undermining it.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Castillo. The court found that the prosecutor's statements, although technically recommending 180 months, effectively undermined the plea agreement by emphasizing the district court's authority to impose a harsher sentence and suggesting that Castillo was a danger to society. The court held that the prosecutor's actions constituted a breach of the plea agreement.

The First Circuit vacated Castillo's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing before a different judge, emphasizing the importance of prosecutors upholding their end of plea agreements to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.

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United States v. Perez-Segura

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1925

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Gustavo Gelpí

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anlert Perez-Segura pled guilty to conspiring to import cocaine into the United States. In exchange for a specific term of imprisonment, he waived his right to appeal any aspect of his conviction and sentence. He was caught captaining a boat carrying cocaine off Puerto Rico's western coast. A grand jury indicted him on four counts, and he agreed to plead guilty to one count in exchange for the government dropping the remaining counts and advocating for a 120-month sentence, the mandatory minimum. The plea agreement included a supplement acknowledging that the court could impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum if he qualified for the "safety valve" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held a change-of-plea hearing and later a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, Perez-Segura's counsel indicated that he did not qualify for the safety valve because he was uncooperative. The court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment, and he appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Perez-Segura argued that the district court erred by not inquiring further into his eligibility for the safety valve and that his counsel was ineffective for not advocating for it. The appellate court found that his waiver of the right to appeal was enforceable and that he did not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice. The court also noted that his ineffective assistance claim was better suited for a collateral proceeding due to the lack of a developed record on why his counsel acted as she did and whether her actions were prejudicial.

The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, allowing Perez-Segura to raise his ineffective assistance claim in a collateral proceeding.

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United States v. Oladokun

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6141

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: Joseph Bianco

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Oladayo Oladokun was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. His involvement included directing others to open bank accounts to receive stolen or forged checks and launder money. He was sentenced to 125 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.

Oladokun appealed, challenging the district court's calculation of his offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. He argued against the application of an eighteen-level enhancement based on the loss amount, a two-level enhancement for ten or more victims, and a four-level enhancement for his role in an offense involving five or more participants. Additionally, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not requesting a Franks hearing to suppress evidence obtained from his residence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not err in its factual basis for the Guidelines enhancements. It upheld the eighteen-level enhancement for the intended loss amount, the two-level enhancement for ten or more victims, and the four-level enhancement for Oladokun's role in the offense. The court also rejected Oladokun's ineffective assistance claim, noting that even if his counsel had been ineffective, Oladokun failed to show the requisite prejudice because the warrant application was supported by probable cause without the challenged evidence.

The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

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Bryant v. Stirling

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4

Opinion Date: January 27, 2025

Judge: Toby Heytens

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Stephen Bryant was sentenced to death by a South Carolina state court. During postconviction proceedings, Bryant filed a new application for relief, claiming his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment due to his intellectual disabilities, as defined in Atkins v. Virginia and Hall v. Florida. Later, Bryant sought to amend his application to include a claim that he suffers from fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) and that executing individuals with FASD should also be prohibited under the Eighth Amendment. The state postconviction court denied this request, ruling it was both impermissibly successive and filed too late.

Bryant's initial appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which focused on a single claim of evidentiary error, was denied. He then sought post-conviction relief on several grounds, none of which included the Eighth Amendment claim. The state trial court denied these claims, and the South Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Bryant subsequently filed for federal habeas corpus relief, which was stayed to allow him to exhaust state remedies. He filed two new applications in state court, one of which was allowed to proceed on the intellectual disability claim but not on the FASD claim. The state trial court ultimately denied the intellectual disability claim on its merits.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state trial court's refusal to permit Bryant to amend his application to add the FASD claim rested on state procedural grounds that were independent of federal law and adequate to bar federal habeas review. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief, concluding that Bryant's FASD claim was procedurally defaulted and could not be considered on its merits.

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US v. Johnson

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4319

Opinion Date: January 27, 2025

Judge: Paul Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ikeviaun Johnson, a passenger in a black Ford Explorer, fired eight shots at a white Hyundai sedan, which was actually an unmarked car occupied by federal law enforcement officers. The incident occurred in Greenville, North Carolina, during an investigation. Johnson was charged and convicted of assaulting federal officers and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court sentenced him to 198 months’ imprisonment, an above-Guidelines sentence.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina handled the initial trial. Johnson was convicted by a jury on both counts. At sentencing, the court calculated a Guidelines range of 150 to 157 months but imposed a 198-month sentence, citing the severity of Johnson's actions and his lack of remorse.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Johnson appealed on three grounds: a defective indictment, insufficient evidence of assault, and an inadequately justified above-Guidelines sentence. The Fourth Circuit rejected all three arguments. The court held that the indictment, despite omitting the word "forcibly," provided sufficient notice of the charges. The court also found ample evidence that Johnson's actions caused the officers to apprehend immediate bodily harm, satisfying the assault element. Lastly, the court ruled that the district court had adequately justified the upward variance in Johnson's sentence, considering the seriousness of the offense and Johnson's conduct.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Johnson's conviction and 198-month sentence.

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Carmona v. Olvera

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-40209

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Rhesa Barksdale

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Ignacia Carmona, representing herself and the estate of Veronica Carmona, filed a lawsuit against the City of Brownsville and several officers, claiming that the officers failed to provide necessary medical care to Veronica Carmona, who died while in pretrial detention. Veronica had been involved in multiple car accidents on the same night and exhibited visible injuries. Despite this, the officers did not seek medical attention for her, and she was later found dead in her cell due to internal bleeding from liver lacerations.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims against the officers, granting them qualified immunity. The court concluded that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the officers had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Veronica Carmona. The court found that the officers' failure to seek medical care did not amount to deliberate indifference because the injuries were not visibly apparent, and there were no complaints from Carmona that revealed the full extent of her injuries.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the officers were subjectively aware of the risk of internal bleeding. The court emphasized that actual knowledge of the risk is required for liability, and mere negligence or the fact that the officers should have known about the risk is insufficient. As a result, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and the dismissal of the deliberate-indifference claims was upheld.

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Chandler v. Brown

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1270

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: Helene White

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Louis Chandler, a Michigan prisoner, was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five to seventy-five years in prison. Chandler filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that the trial court infringed his right to present a complete defense. The district court denied the petition, and Chandler appealed.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially reviewed the case and denied Chandler's habeas corpus petition. Chandler argued that the trial court's refusal to delay the trial, exclusion of key witnesses, and prevention of presenting critical evidence violated his constitutional rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying Chandler's requests for an adjournment, barring his witnesses, and excluding evidence of the victim's prior false allegations. However, the appellate court affirmed Chandler's conviction, concluding that the errors were not outcome determinative under the state's non-constitutional error standard.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's actions significantly undermined Chandler's ability to present a complete defense. The court held that the exclusion of evidence and witnesses critical to Chandler's defense violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded that the errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, creating grave doubt about the trial's fairness.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, conditionally granted Chandler's habeas corpus petition, and remanded the case with instructions to order Chandler's release unless the State of Michigan grants him a new trial within ninety days.

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Clardy v. Pounds

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5676

Opinion Date: January 27, 2025

Judge: Joan Larsen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2005, Thomas Clardy was identified by Kent Clouatre as one of the shooters in an incident at Kent's auto-repair shop, which resulted in the death of Kent's brother, Kirk, and injuries to Kent and Kirk's wife, Melissa. Clardy was charged with murder, attempted murder, and reckless endangerment. The primary evidence against Clardy was Kent's eyewitness identification. Clardy's trial counsel did not call an expert on eyewitness identification due to financial constraints and the inability to find an expert willing to work for the fees the state would pay. Clardy was convicted on all counts.

Clardy filed a petition for postconviction review in state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call an eyewitness expert. The state trial court denied the petition, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed, concluding that Clardy had not suffered prejudice because the expert could not negate Kent's identification. The TCCA did not evaluate whether counsel's performance was deficient.

Clardy then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the writ, finding that trial counsel's performance was deficient for not seeking expert funding and that the TCCA unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in concluding that Clardy was not prejudiced.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Clardy's counsel's performance was not deficient. The court noted that counsel made reasonable efforts to secure an expert and, when unsuccessful, used cross-examination and argument to highlight the weaknesses in the eyewitness identification. The court concluded that these efforts were sufficient to meet the standard of reasonably effective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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United States v. Drake

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3304

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Eric Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

Nashaun Drake pleaded guilty to several drug offenses after police found significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and drug trafficking tools in his apartment. He was charged with five counts of possessing illegal drugs with intent to distribute. At sentencing, the district court classified Drake as a "career offender" based on a prior marijuana conviction, resulting in a 200-month prison sentence.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio determined that Drake's prior marijuana conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the career-offender enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. This classification led to a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months, and the court imposed a 200-month sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Drake argued that his prior marijuana conviction should not have triggered the career-offender enhancement and that his sentence was unreasonable. The court held that binding precedent required the use of a time-of-conviction approach to determine whether a prior offense qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Since hemp was included in the drug schedules at the time of Drake's 2016 conviction, his marijuana offense qualified as a controlled substance offense. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 200-month sentence, considering Drake's extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence and public protection.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding both the career-offender enhancement and the 200-month sentence.

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United States v. Hale

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-5362

Opinion Date: January 30, 2025

Judge: Joan Larsen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

John Hale pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery by unlawful sexual contact in 2010 and was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and lifetime supervision in Tennessee state court. He was required to register as a sex offender. In 2011, Hale was indicted in the Middle District of Tennessee for traveling out of state and failing to update his sex-offender registration, violating the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his state sentence, and ten years of supervised release with special conditions. Hale began his supervised release in June 2018 and violated a condition in January 2020 by consuming alcohol.

Hale moved for early termination of his supervised release after serving four years and four months of his ten-year term, citing his compliance with supervision conditions, sex-offender treatment, and support letters. His federal probation officer could not recommend early termination due to office policy, but the United States did not oppose the motion. The district court denied Hale’s motion, commending his behavior but finding it insufficiently exceptional to warrant early termination. Hale appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court found that the district court had relied on an incorrect legal standard by requiring “exceptionally good behavior” for early termination of supervised release. The correct standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) does not mandate such a threshold. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper legal standard. The appellate court did not address Hale’s argument regarding the district court’s factual findings about his state supervision terms.

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Lee v Harris

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1053

Opinion Date: January 27, 2025

Judge: Michael B. Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In February 2018, two men invaded a home in Rockford, Illinois, resulting in the death of Julian Young, Jr. and the escape of Jasmine Meneweather. Meneweather initially provided general descriptions of the assailants but no specific identities. Later, she sent a photo of one perpetrator to Detective Eric Harris, but the person was not identified. Over a year later, Harris received another photo from Young’s aunt, identifying the assailants as brothers Cortez and Shawnqiz Lee. Meneweather later identified Shawnqiz Lee in a photo array. Despite Lee’s alibi of being at work during the crime, he was arrested in November 2019 based on a criminal complaint and a judge-issued arrest warrant. A grand jury indicted Lee, but subsequent DNA evidence did not match him. Lee was released in December 2020 after the charges were dismissed.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to the police officers, reasoning that probable cause existed based on Meneweather’s identification, which is an absolute defense to Lee’s claims. Lee appealed, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause and that they recklessly withheld material facts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that probable cause existed based on Meneweather’s identification, which was sufficient to support the arrest warrant. The court also found that the officers did not recklessly withhold material facts that would have negated probable cause. Additionally, the grand jury indictment provided prima facie evidence of probable cause, which Lee failed to rebut. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the police officers, concluding that probable cause was an absolute defense to Lee’s Fourth Amendment and state-law claims.

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United States v. White

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1228

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Michael B. Brennan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Wesley K. White, Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range as part of a plea agreement. However, while awaiting sentencing, White violated federal law again, leading the government to seek release from its sentencing recommendation. The district court granted this motion and sentenced White to a prison term exceeding the guidelines range.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois initially handled the case. White had previously pleaded guilty to a felony firearms offense in Illinois state court and was on probation when further violations occurred. During a compliance check in 2018, authorities found a semiautomatic rifle and other firearm accessories in his residence. In 2020, White was seen in a Facebook Live video handling firearms at a shooting range. He admitted to firing the guns but claimed they were not at his residence. Subsequent searches revealed ammunition and a gun case. White was indicted for his 2018 and 2020 conduct and pleaded guilty.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that White breached the plea agreement by violating federal law through marijuana use and firearm possession. The district court did not err in its factual findings or in allowing the government to withdraw from its sentencing recommendation. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an above-guidelines sentence, considering White's history and the § 3553(a) factors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full.

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DOERR V. SHINN

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 09-99026

Opinion Date: January 29, 2025

Judge: William Fletcher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eugene Allen Doerr was convicted in 1996 by a jury for the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of Karen Bohl, and was sentenced to death by an Arizona state court judge. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court, Doerr filed a federal habeas petition, which was partially denied by the district court. Doerr then moved for a stay and abeyance to present new claims in state court, including ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia.

The district court initially denied Doerr’s federal habeas petition, finding his claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing procedurally defaulted. The court held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel did not constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. Doerr appealed, and while his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel could excuse procedural default. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to reconsider Doerr’s ineffective assistance claim in light of Martinez. On remand, the district court again denied relief on the ineffective assistance claim but granted relief on another claim. Doerr appealed the partial denial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Doerr’s motion to remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey the federal habeas petition. The court held that the criteria for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber were met, allowing Doerr to present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins to the state court. The court found that Doerr had good cause for not previously bringing these claims, that the claims were potentially meritorious, and that there was no indication of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

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In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated July 21, 2023

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-2506

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Michelle T. Friedland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics, Tax Law

An individual, referred to as "Client," became the target of a criminal investigation into alleged tax evasion. The grand jury issued a subpoena to Client, who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to produce documents. Subsequently, the grand jury subpoenaed the law firm that had represented Client in tax matters, requesting documents related to that representation and instructing the firm to provide a privilege log if any documents were withheld. The law firm declined to produce certain documents or provide a privilege log, citing attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and Client’s Fifth Amendment rights.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California ordered the law firm to provide the Government with a privilege log, rejecting the firm's assertion of Client’s Fifth Amendment rights. The district court temporarily stayed enforcement of its order, and Client filed an interlocutory appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an attorney cannot be compelled to provide the Government with a privilege log of documents protected under Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The court explained that providing a privilege log would reveal the existence, authenticity, and Client’s custody of the documents, thus undermining Client’s Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege. The court determined that to assess whether the documents are indeed protected under Fisher, the district court should conduct an in camera review.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct an in camera review to determine the applicability of the Fisher privilege.

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VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-3558

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: Timothy Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.

Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied.

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U.S. v. Bruce

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-7061

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Harris Hartz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant Stetson Bruce was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country for sexually abusing his five-year-old son, R.W. The trial included testimony from R.W. and his half-sister, E.R., who witnessed one of the acts. After their testimonies, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma admitted recordings of their forensic interviews, which were consistent with their trial testimonies. These recordings were not played in the courtroom but were available to the jury during deliberations.

The district court denied Defendant's pretrial motion to exclude the recordings as hearsay, ruling they would be admitted upon proper foundation testimony. During the trial, the defense suggested that R.W. had been coached by the prosecutor and that E.R.'s memory was faulty. The district court admitted the recordings under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, allowing prior consistent statements to rebut charges of recent fabrication or to rehabilitate credibility when attacked on another ground. The jury found Defendant guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent life terms.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings as prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). The court found that the defense's suggestions of coaching and faulty memory opened the door for the government to use the prior consistent statements to rebut these charges. The court also rejected Defendant's arguments that the district court ruled prematurely on the admission of the recordings and that it committed structural error by sending the recordings to the jury room rather than playing them in court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

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USA v. Webster

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-11526

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: William Pryor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Clevon Webster and his brother used stolen social security numbers to apply for government benefits from September 2014 until June 2015. The government had until June 3, 2020, to bring charges against Webster due to the five-year statute of limitations. However, the Southern District of Florida suspended grand jury sessions from March 2020 until November 2020 because of the coronavirus pandemic. Unable to obtain an indictment, the government filed an information against Webster on May 26, 2020, but did not obtain a waiver of indictment from him. After grand juries resumed, a grand jury indicted Webster on January 21, 2021, for the same offenses.

Webster moved to dismiss the indictment as untimely, arguing that filing an information without a waiver of indictment did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court denied his motion, adopting the magistrate judge's report that concluded filing an information was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations and that the later indictment related back to the date of the timely filed information. Webster then pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to commit access device fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that filing an information without a waiver of indictment tolls the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). The court reasoned that the statute's text, structure, and history support this interpretation and that the statute does not require a waiver of indictment to toll the limitations period. The court also held that the January 2021 indictment related back to the timely filed May 2020 information, making the indictment timely.

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State v. The Estate of Harry Powell

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18076

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: Jennifer S. Henderson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Harry Powell was indicted by a grand jury in 2018 on charges of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and second-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance, involving two minors, A.S. and A.O. During the grand jury proceedings, the State presented video recordings of interviews with the minors conducted at a child advocacy center. Powell moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the video recordings were inadmissible hearsay. The superior court agreed and dismissed the counts involving A.S., finding that the foundational requirements of Alaska Evidence Rule 801(d)(3) could not be met at the grand jury stage.

The State appealed, and while the appeal was pending, Powell died. The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that the recorded statements could not be admitted as non-hearsay under Evidence Rule 801(d)(3) at grand jury proceedings because the foundational requirements could not be met at that stage. The court of appeals also referenced a Nevada Supreme Court decision, Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial District Court, which held that similar hearsay exceptions did not apply at grand jury proceedings in Nevada.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under Alaska Criminal Rule 6(s), evidence that would be admissible at trial may be presented to the grand jury, even if the foundational requirements cannot be met at the grand jury stage. The court emphasized that the rule allows for a forward-looking assessment and that the prosecutor's good faith, reasonable judgment about the evidence's admissibility at trial is sufficient for grand jury proceedings. The court concluded that the recorded statements of minor crime victims could be admitted before the grand jury if they would meet the requirements of Evidence Rule 801(d)(3) at trial.

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People v. Hamilton

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B330995(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 29, 2025

Judge: Mark Hanasono

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Christopher Hamilton was convicted of federal felony possession of child pornography. After a federal district court terminated his federal sex offender registration requirement, the California Attorney General notified him of his lifetime obligation to register under California law, pursuant to Penal Code section 290.005(a). The Attorney General determined that the state law equivalent of Hamilton’s federal offense required lifetime registration, placing him in the highest tier of California’s three-tier scheme.

Hamilton petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to terminate his state registration requirement. The Superior Court denied his petition and a subsequent amended motion. Hamilton appealed the denials, arguing violations of equal protection and due process.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Attorney General’s classification of Hamilton’s offense as a felony with a lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection. The court reasoned that the federal offense’s classification as a felony, based on custodial exposure, justified the equivalent state offense’s classification as a felony. Additionally, the court found that the federal offense’s requirement of interstate or foreign commerce provided a rational basis for the different treatment.

The court also rejected Hamilton’s due process challenge, concluding that he received notice and had opportunities to contest his tier designation through his petition and amended motion. Lastly, the court dismissed Hamilton’s vagueness challenge, finding that the term “equivalent” in section 290.005(a) was sufficiently clear when considered in context with other statutory provisions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s orders denying Hamilton’s petition and amended motion.

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People v. Martinez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B335936(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 27, 2025

Judge: Helen Bendix

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Roger Martinez appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Martinez argued that it was an error for a judge other than the one who originally sentenced him to rule on his petition. The case involved a shooting incident on July 10, 2006, where Martinez was identified as the driver of a car from which shots were fired, resulting in the death of Ezekiel Gonzalez and injuries to others. Martinez initially denied involvement but later admitted to being present during the shooting.

Martinez was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted premeditated murder, with gang and firearm allegations. He was sentenced to 120 years to life by Judge Hayden Zacky. Martinez filed a petition for resentencing in December 2021, which was assigned to Judge Kathleen Blanchard. The prosecution conceded a prima facie case for resentencing, leading to an evidentiary hearing.

At the evidentiary hearing, Martinez testified that he acted in self-defense during the shooting. However, Judge Blanchard found his testimony not credible, citing inconsistencies with his previous statements. The court denied the petition, concluding that Martinez could still be convicted of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Martinez contended that he was entitled to have Judge Zacky preside over his resentencing petition. The appellate court held that Martinez forfeited this argument by not raising it earlier. Even if the argument was preserved, the court found no prejudice from Judge Blanchard's assignment, as there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the resentencing petition.

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People v. Rogers

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H051665(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 27, 2025

Judge: Allison M. Danner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1997, Robert Wayne Rogers committed multiple robberies and was subsequently charged with four counts of robbery and one count of false imprisonment. The charges included allegations of firearm use and prior serious or violent felony convictions, qualifying as strikes under California's Three Strikes law. In 1998, a jury convicted Rogers of three counts of robbery and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court found the prior conviction allegations true and sentenced Rogers to three consecutive terms of 25 years to life, plus additional time for enhancements. Rogers's appeal was denied.

In 2014, Rogers filed a petition under the Three Strikes Reform Act (Proposition 36) for resentencing, which was denied because his current offenses included robbery. In 2023, Rogers filed a motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that his prison priors were invalid and requesting a full resentencing, including the striking of his strike priors under section 1385(a) and Romero.

The trial court agreed to resentence Rogers, striking six of his seven strike priors and invalidating his prison priors. The court imposed a new determinate sentence of 39 years. The district attorney appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to strike the strike priors and that the court abused its discretion by not providing adequate reasons for its decision.

The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court had the authority to strike the strike priors under section 1385(a) and Romero during a resentencing under section 1172.75. However, the appellate court found that the trial court erred by failing to state its reasons for striking the strike priors, as required by section 1385(a). The appellate court reversed the trial court’s resentencing order and remanded the case for a new resentencing hearing where the trial court must provide its reasons for any decision to strike the strike priors.

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State v. Ziolkowski

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20801

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Raheem L. Mullins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of the murder of her minor son, E, and arson in the second degree. The case arose from an incident where the defendant sedated E with a substantial amount of diphenhydramine, set two fires in their home, and was found unconscious alongside E, who was later pronounced dead. The medical examiner determined E's cause of death to be homicidal asphyxia, with diphenhydramine intoxication as a contributing factor. The defendant's social media posts prior to the incident indicated distress and potential premeditation.

The trial court, after a competency hearing, found the defendant competent to stand trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. The defendant appealed, claiming her amnesia deprived her of a fair trial, the trial court improperly admitted social media posts, and the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.

The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the defendant's claim of amnesia affecting her right to a fair trial failed under the first prong of State v. Golding because she did not request a posttrial determination regarding the fairness of the trial, making the record inadequate for review. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the social media posts, as they were properly authenticated through testimony.

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of murder. The jury could reasonably find that the defendant caused E's death with intent, based on the cumulative evidence, including the circumstances of the fire, the sedative found in E's system, and the defendant's behavior and social media posts. The evidence was also sufficient to support the arson conviction, as the jury could reasonably find that the defendant set the fires with the intent to damage the home and conceal the murder. The court affirmed the judgment.

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Caylor v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0338

Opinion Date: January 30, 2025

Judge: Renatha Francis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Matthew Lee Caylor was convicted of the 2008 first-degree murder, sexual battery, and aggravated child abuse of thirteen-year-old Melinda Hinson. Caylor, who was on the run from felony probation in Georgia for molesting a fourteen-year-old girl, committed the crimes at the Valu-Lodge Motel in Panama City, where Melinda was living with her family. Caylor confessed to the crimes, stating he murdered Melinda to avoid arrest and out of anger from his previous conviction. Physical and DNA evidence corroborated his confession.

The jury convicted Caylor and recommended the death penalty by an eight to four vote. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal but granted a new penalty phase due to the nonunanimous jury recommendation, pursuant to Hurst v. State. During the new penalty phase, Caylor vacillated on waiving his rights to a jury, mitigation evidence, and his presence. Ultimately, he waived these rights, primarily to spare the victim’s family a lengthy process. The trial court accepted his waivers after a full colloquy.

The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court found that Caylor's post-penalty phase request to withdraw his jury waiver was untimely and made in bad faith to delay proceedings. The court also rejected Caylor's argument that his waiver was based on misinformation about the victim's mother's death, stating that his understanding of his rights at the time of the waiver was not affected by this information. Additionally, the court found no error in the trial court's handling of the mitigation waiver and upheld the trial court's findings on the aggravating factors. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and affirmed Caylor's death sentence.

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BLALOCK v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1303

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Charlie Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Damone Blalock and Rodalius Eugene Ryan, Jr. were convicted of the malice murder of Jamari Holmes, aggravated assaults of two other individuals, and related crimes. The crimes occurred on February 23, 2019, and the appellants were indicted in May 2019. They were tried together before a jury from September 21 to October 1, 2021, and found guilty on all presented counts. The trial court sentenced them to life in prison for malice murder, with additional consecutive and concurrent sentences for other charges. Their motions for a new trial were denied, leading to this appeal.

The appellants argued that their trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in several ways, including failing to object to a witness invoking the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury, not introducing certain evidence, and not objecting to the prosecutor's comments on their silence during closing arguments. Ryan also claimed his counsel failed to investigate his alibi. The trial court found that while counsel was deficient in not reviewing certain evidence, the appellants failed to show that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the trial.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial counsel's strategic decisions, including not objecting to the witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment and not pursuing the alibi defense, were reasonable. The court also found that the appellants did not demonstrate that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the alleged deficiencies had not occurred. The cumulative effect of the assumed deficiencies did not warrant a new trial. Thus, the convictions and sentences were affirmed.

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BRUNDAGE v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1369

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Nels Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rondriques Brundage was convicted of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the shooting death of Rodrell Matthews. The incident occurred on July 10, 2018, and Brundage was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. At trial, Brundage was found not guilty of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, and aggravated assault, but guilty of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and concealing the death of another. He was sentenced to life without parole for felony murder, plus additional consecutive prison terms for the other charges.

Brundage filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied except for the merger of the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count into the felony murder count. He appealed, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's incorrect explanation of self-defense as it applied to felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession and for failing to request a jury charge on the defense of habitation.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and agreed with Brundage that his trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to the State's incorrect explanation of self-defense. The court found that this deficiency prejudiced Brundage, as it was reasonably probable that an objection would have led to a different outcome regarding the felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony charges. Consequently, the court reversed Brundage's convictions on those counts, allowing for the possibility of retrial. The court affirmed Brundage's conviction for concealing the death of another, which was not challenged on appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.

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BURKE v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1318

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Andrew Pinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Dontarious Burke was convicted of malice murder and armed robbery for the shooting death of Kentrell Jones. The incident occurred on November 27, 2019, and Burke was indicted on March 1, 2021. His trial was severed from his brother DeMarcus Burke's trial. Burke was tried by a jury from October 19 to 20, 2021, and found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and an additional 20 years for armed robbery. Burke filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court on May 6, 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.

The trial court denied Burke's motion for a new trial, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Burke raised several claims, including a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the cumulative effect of errors requiring a new trial. The trial court had admitted testimony from police officers about information obtained from non-testifying witnesses, which Burke argued violated his Confrontation Clause rights. However, because Burke did not raise this objection at trial, the Supreme Court reviewed it for plain error and found none.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Burke's claims and found that none of them warranted a reversal of his convictions. The court held that Burke's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated, as the testimony in question did not clearly and obviously violate established law. Additionally, the court found that Burke's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance, as the decisions made by counsel were within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy. Finally, the court determined that there was no cumulative error that would require a new trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Burke's convictions.

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CHAMBERS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1005

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Michael P. Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jerry Chambers was convicted of three counts of felony murder and reckless driving following a high-speed chase in Savannah that resulted in the deaths of a pedestrian, Scott Waldrup, and two passengers in Chambers' vehicle, Spencer Stuckey and Gabriel Magulias. The incident occurred on July 5, 2017, and Chambers was indicted by a Chatham County grand jury on multiple charges, including felony murder and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. Chambers was reindicted in 2018 with additional charges, but his case was severed for trial. In 2020, a jury found him guilty of all counts except for aggravated assault and street gang charges. He was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences for felony murder and 12 months for reckless driving.

Chambers appealed his felony murder convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the officer who signaled him to stop was "in uniform prominently displaying his or her badge of office," as required by Georgia law. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial, and Chambers filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that an essential element of the offense of fleeing or attempting to elude is that the officer giving the signal to stop must be in uniform with a prominently displayed badge. The court found that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the court reversed Chambers' felony murder convictions predicated on fleeing or attempting to elude. The court also remanded the case for sentencing on the three counts of vehicular homicide, which no longer merged with the reversed felony murder convictions.

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GARCIA-SOLIS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0042

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Shawn Ellen LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Hector Garcia-Solis was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Hall County Deputy Sheriff Blane Dixon on July 7, 2019. Garcia-Solis, along with co-defendants Brayan Cruz, Eric Velazquez, and London Clements, was involved in a series of burglaries and thefts leading up to the fatal shooting. The group stole vehicles and firearms, and during a police chase, Garcia-Solis shot and killed Deputy Dixon. Garcia-Solis was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus additional consecutive years for other charges.

The case was initially reviewed by a Hall County grand jury, which indicted Garcia-Solis and his co-defendants on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and various theft-related charges. Cruz pleaded guilty to some charges and testified for the State. Garcia-Solis, Velazquez, and Clements were tried together, and the jury found Garcia-Solis guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder and additional consecutive years for other charges. Garcia-Solis filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed Garcia-Solis's convictions and sentences. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the malice murder conviction, as Garcia-Solis intentionally shot Deputy Dixon, demonstrating an "abandoned and malignant heart." The court also found no merit in Garcia-Solis's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, as the jury selection process did not show actual prejudice. Lastly, the court upheld the life without parole sentence, noting that the trial court properly considered Garcia-Solis's age and the egregious nature of his crimes.

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HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0892

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Charlie Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tico Holloway was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Mercedes Dejesus Antunez-Flores and violent crimes against N.H. and M.H. The crimes occurred on August 17, 2019. Holloway was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A jury found Holloway guilty of all counts except armed robbery. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional concurrent sentences for other charges. Holloway's motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed.

The trial court, Cobb County, denied Holloway's motion for a new trial. Holloway argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction and that the trial court made errors. He claimed the evidence did not disprove his self-defense argument beyond a reasonable doubt. Holloway also contended that the trial court erred by allowing the medical examiner to testify remotely via videoconference, which he argued violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Additionally, he claimed that errors in the Spanish-to-English interpretation of M.H.'s testimony violated his right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Holloway's malice murder conviction, as the jury was entitled to reject his self-defense claim. The court also found no plain error in allowing the medical examiner to testify remotely, noting that Holloway had consented to this procedure. Finally, the court concluded that Holloway waived his claim regarding the interpretation errors by agreeing to the procedure used during the trial.

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HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0882

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: John Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Malcolm Holloway was convicted of felony murder and related crimes following the fatal shooting of Javontay Carr during an attempted armed robbery of Harshvadan, Sumitra, and Kumar Patel on June 27, 2018. Holloway, along with co-defendants Anthony O’Neal, Anthony Morris, Christopher Jacobs, and Sellus Colvin, planned to rob the Patels, who owned a gas station and check-cashing business. The group drove from Columbus, Mississippi to LaGrange, Georgia, where they met Holloway and planned the robbery. They intended to ambush the Patels on a roadside, with Carr pretending to change a tire to lure the Patels into stopping their car. During the attempted robbery, Morris accidentally shot Carr, who was part of the group.

A Troup County grand jury indicted Holloway and his co-defendants on multiple charges, including felony murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The co-defendants entered plea agreements conditioned on their truthful testimony at Holloway’s trial. The jury found Holloway guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder and additional consecutive sentences for firearm possession during the commission of a felony. Holloway’s motion for a new trial was denied.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Holloway’s conviction for felony murder, as the predicate felonies were inherently dangerous and the shooting was a foreseeable result of the attempted armed robbery. The court also found no plain error in the trial court’s jury instructions and determined that the evidence of the group’s trip to Alabama was intrinsic to the charged crimes and admissible. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holloway’s motion to exclude evidence of other criminal acts.

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MITCHELL v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1181

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Andrew Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kenyatta Mitchell was convicted of the malice murder of Carey Von Moss, the aggravated assault of Marcell Greene, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of these felonies. The shootings occurred on September 5, 2016. A Chatham County grand jury indicted Mitchell on November 30, 2016. After a jury trial in April 2021, Mitchell was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional consecutive sentences for the firearm possession and aggravated assault charges. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Mitchell filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

Mitchell appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in several respects: admitting a surveillance video and still images that he claimed were not properly authenticated, allowing a witness to identify him in the video and screenshot, denying his motion to suppress Greene’s identification of him, and denying a motion for mistrial after hearsay was not redacted from a recorded witness interview. He also argued that the cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the surveillance video and screenshots were properly authenticated. The court ruled that the witness's identification of Mitchell in the video and screenshot was permissible due to the witness's familiarity with Mitchell and the poor quality of the images. The court also found no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification in Greene’s identification of Mitchell. Additionally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, as a curative instruction was sufficient to address the hearsay issue. Since no errors were found, there were no cumulative errors to consider. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Mitchell’s convictions.

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REDDICK v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1313

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: John Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Pascal Lorenzo Reddick was found guilty by a Grady County jury of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, related to the shooting death of Antavius Robinson. The incident occurred when Robinson went to Reddick's home, where Reddick was with Robinson's wife, Lakeisha. Robinson banged on the door and shouted threats. Reddick fired two shots, one from inside the home and another from the porch, hitting Robinson as he retreated.

The trial court sentenced Reddick to life in prison for felony murder and a consecutive five-year term for the firearm charge. Reddick's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to disprove his self-defense and defense of habitation claims, that the trial court erred in denying his immunity motion, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Reddick guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that Robinson was unarmed and retreating when he was shot, and the forensic evidence supported the State's theory that Reddick fired the fatal shot from the porch. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Reddick's immunity motion, as the evidence did not support his defense of habitation claim.

Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded that Reddick failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The court found that counsel's decisions were within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment.

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SINGLETON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1357

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Verda Colvin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Raiem Singleton was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Luz Selene Velazquez and the aggravated assault of David Montes-Ponce. The crimes occurred on May 5, 2017, when Montes-Ponce and Velazquez arranged to buy a phone from a seller named "Tom Li" through a mobile app. When they met the seller at an apartment complex, the seller, accompanied by two other men, shot at Montes-Ponce's car, killing Velazquez. Montes-Ponce identified Singleton as the shooter.

A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Singleton on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Singleton was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional concurrent and suspended sentences for other charges. Singleton filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court after a hearing.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Singleton's appeal, where he argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress identification evidence from a photo lineup. The court employed a two-step process to evaluate the identification procedure, considering whether it was impermissibly suggestive and whether there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The court found that even if the lineup was suggestive, there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification due to Montes-Ponce's significant opportunity to view Singleton during the crime and his high degree of certainty in identifying Singleton.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identification evidence and denying Singleton's motion to suppress.

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WILSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0056

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Nels Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Shamar Dequan Wilson was convicted for his involvement in the robbery and death of Rashawn Mays and the attempted armed robbery of Adrian Bennett. The crimes occurred on January 22, 2020. Wilson was indicted by a Lowndes County grand jury on April 30, 2021, and charged with felony murder, armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At his trial in January 2022, the jury found Wilson guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for felony murder, along with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for the other charges. Wilson filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, and subsequently appealed.

Wilson's appeal focused on the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions of attempted armed robbery and the associated possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He argued that the evidence did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for these specific counts. The trial court had denied his motion for a new trial, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Wilson's convictions. The court noted that Bennett's testimony indicated Wilson pointed a gun at him and demanded money, which Bennett interpreted as a demand for his own money. Although Wilson did not take Bennett's wallet and phone, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could infer that Wilson's intent was to avoid being seen by Bennett. Therefore, the court affirmed Wilson's convictions for attempted armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The judgment was affirmed, and all justices concurred.

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State v. Smith

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49909

Opinion Date: January 30, 2025

Judge: Cynthia Meyer

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Chadlen Dewayne Smith was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child by possession of sexually exploitative material. The case began when Smith was arrested for stalking a police dispatcher. Following his arrest, law enforcement impounded his vehicle and conducted an inventory search, during which they seized electronic devices containing sexually exploitative materials. Smith challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found on these devices.

The District Court of the First Judicial District, Kootenai County, denied Smith's motion to suppress, concluding that there was probable cause for his arrest for stalking and that the impoundment and inventory search of his vehicle were reasonable and conducted according to police procedures. Smith was subsequently convicted by a jury of sexual exploitation of a child but acquitted of distributing obscene material. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence obtained from the inventory search should have been suppressed.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the State did not meet its burden to show that the police officer's decision to impound Smith's vehicle served a community caretaking purpose. The impoundment was deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, making the subsequent inventory search unconstitutional. As a result, the evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible, leading to the vacating of Smith's conviction.

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People v. Watkins-Romaine

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2025 IL 130618

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: P. Scott Neville

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the transition from a pretrial system with monetary bail to one without it, as per amendments to the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. Damarco Watkins-Romaine, charged with multiple serious offenses, was ordered released pending trial with a $350,000 bail, which he could not pay. After the amendments abolishing monetary bail took effect, he petitioned for release, arguing that the financial condition was improper. The State responded with a petition to detain him under the new Code.

The Cook County circuit court denied Watkins-Romaine's petition for release. The appellate court reversed this decision, holding that the legislature did not intend to allow the State to file a petition for pretrial detention under these circumstances and that the State's petition was untimely.

The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the State may file a petition to detain a defendant pretrial in response to a defendant’s petition to remove the condition of monetary bail, even if the defendant had been ordered released but could not satisfy the previously set monetary bail. The court found that the procedures followed in the circuit court were fair and consistent with the amended Code. The case was remanded to the appellate court to consider Watkins-Romaine's remaining contentions.

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People v. White

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2025 IL 129767

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: Lisa Holder White

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1999, Sedrick White, then 20 years old, entered a blind guilty plea to one count of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 40 years in prison by the Cook County circuit court. Over 20 years later, White filed a pro se petition for postjudgment relief under section 2-1401(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that his 40-year sentence constituted a de facto life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court denied the petition, stating that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the proportionate penalties clause.

White appealed the circuit court's decision, arguing that his 40-year sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that White's guilty plea waived any potential constitutional claim regarding his sentence. The appellate court also found that the circuit court did not err in failing to recharacterize White's section 2-1401 petition as a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the parties that White's blind guilty plea did not waive his constitutional challenge to his sentence. The court clarified that a defendant who enters a blind guilty plea, with no agreement as to the sentence, does not waive the right to challenge the sentence. However, the court found that White's 40-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence and was not "wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." The court concluded that White failed to state a meritorious claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause and affirmed the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court.

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State of Iowa v. Brown

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0023

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: Matthew McDermott

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

An officer on patrol stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction after receiving information that the vehicle’s occupants might have been involved in a drug sale. After initially interacting with the driver, the officer waited for backup before removing the occupants and conducting a search with a drug-sniffing dog, which led to the discovery of a gun. The passenger, Tyre Brown, admitted ownership of the gun and was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. Brown argued that the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop beyond the time necessary to address the traffic infraction, violating his constitutional rights.

The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Brown’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. Brown was found guilty after stipulating to a trial on the minutes of testimony. Brown appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court of appeals concluded that the extension of the stop was permissible under the shared-knowledge doctrine and that the officer had smelled marijuana, justifying further investigation.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the shared-knowledge doctrine allowed the officer to act on information provided by another officer who had observed a potential drug transaction, thus justifying the extension of the stop. The court found that the extension of the stop to investigate for drugs did not violate Brown’s constitutional rights. Consequently, the district court’s ruling denying Brown’s motion to suppress was affirmed.

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Commonwealth v. Fayad F.

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13625

Opinion Date: January 27, 2025

Judge: Scott L. Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

A juvenile was involved in an altercation at the Barnstable District and Juvenile Court, where he was charged with disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The incident was captured on video, showing the juvenile and the victim engaging in a physical fight. The juvenile had a prior continuance without a finding (CWOF) after admitting to sufficient facts for an assault and battery charge.

The Juvenile Court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on both charges and sentenced him to one year of probation for each. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge because a CWOF after an admission to sufficient facts should not count as a prior offense under G. L. c. 119, § 52. The Appeals Court did not review the case as it was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court held that a CWOF entered after an admission to sufficient facts is sufficient to establish a first offense under § 52. Therefore, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency for both disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The court affirmed the adjudications, concluding that the juvenile did not act in self-defense and that his actions met the criteria for disorderly conduct.

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Commonwealth v. Vasquez

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13578

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Kimberly S. Budd

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant was on trial for murder. During jury deliberations, an argument between two jurors led to allegations of racial bias. The judge conducted a limited inquiry into the matter but did not fully investigate the allegations. The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.

The case was initially tried in the Superior Court Department, where the defendant was found guilty. The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court then granted further appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and found that the trial judge's limited inquiry into the allegations of racial bias was insufficient. The court held that the judge should have conducted a more thorough investigation to determine whether the alleged racial bias affected the jury's impartiality. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring a fair and impartial trial, free from racial bias.

As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The court's main holding was that the trial judge's failure to adequately investigate the allegations of racial bias created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, warranting a new trial.

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State v. Clausen

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 318 Neb. 375

Opinion Date: January 24, 2025

Judge: Jonathan Papik

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Chad R. Clausen was charged with violating Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) after an investigation revealed he had been intermittently staying at his fiancé’s house without notifying authorities. Clausen was registered under SORA at an address in Douglas County, Nebraska, but law enforcement received an anonymous tip that he was residing at a Washington County address. Evidence showed that Clausen had been staying at his fiancé’s residence in Washington County for several months. Clausen admitted to staying there for three days and then returning to his registered address for three days. The district court found Clausen guilty of violating SORA, determining that he had established a habitual living location and temporary domicile at his fiancé’s house without registering.

Clausen appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove he established a habitual living location or temporary domicile and that the definitions of these terms were unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, interpreting the definitions in line with a federal district court decision in Doe v. Nebraska, which required a person to stay at a location for three consecutive weekdays to establish a temporary domicile. The Court of Appeals found that Clausen’s admission of staying at the Washington County residence “most nights” allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude he stayed there for three consecutive weekdays.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. The Supreme Court held that “working days” in the context of SORA refers to Mondays through Fridays, excluding legal holidays. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove Clausen stayed at the Washington County residence for three consecutive weekdays or more than three consecutive days. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed Clausen’s conviction and vacated his sentence, concluding that the State failed to prove he violated SORA’s registration requirements.

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State v. Bowman

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070412

Opinion Date: January 30, 2025

Judge: Meagan A. Flynn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A law enforcement officer, qualified as an expert in evaluating impaired driving, testified in a criminal case that babies have limited peripheral vision and that a person impaired by alcohol could be said to be seeing just like a baby. The defendant objected to this testimony as hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that the officer was explaining the basis for his opinion. The defendant was subsequently convicted of DUII, reckless driving, and reckless endangerment.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony about baby vision as it was hearsay and beyond the officer's expertise. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the testimony was not hearsay because it did not recount a particular statement made by the ophthalmologist and was offered to explain the officer's expert opinion.

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the officer's testimony about baby vision was inadmissible hearsay because it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and merely repeated information beyond the officer's personal or specialized knowledge. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless, as the testimony was central to the state's theory of impairment and was qualitatively different from other evidence presented. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

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State v. Gonzalez

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070433

Opinion Date: January 30, 2025

Judge: Chris Garrett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant who intentionally set a fire in her apartment building, resulting in property damage and serious injuries to another resident. The defendant was convicted of first-degree arson after the trial court found that she had intentionally caused the fire and recklessly placed others in danger of physical injury. During sentencing, the trial court considered various mitigating circumstances related to the defendant's mental health and personal history and concluded that the mandatory 90-month prison sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Instead, the court imposed a 60-month term of probation.

The state appealed the trial court's decision, and the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in relying on the defendant's personal characteristics and circumstances in its proportionality analysis. The appellate court concluded that the 90-month mandatory minimum sentence required by ORS 137.700(2)(b)(A) was not constitutionally disproportionate as applied to the defendant.

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence violated the proportionality clause of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the 90-month mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree arson was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. The court reasoned that the defendant's conduct was egregious and caused significant harm, and that there was no societal consensus or objective evidence indicating that individuals with mental health issues similar to the defendant's are less morally culpable for their crimes. Therefore, the mandatory minimum sentence did not shock the moral sense of reasonable people.

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State v. Carter

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28257

Opinion Date: January 29, 2025

Judge: John C. Few

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Rashawn Vertez Carter was involved in a violent home invasion and robbery in Aiken, South Carolina, on May 9, 2015. After the crime, law enforcement officers used Carter's real-time cell-site location information from his cell-service provider, T-Mobile, to track him down without obtaining a search warrant. Carter was subsequently arrested and made incriminating statements during interviews with the police.

At trial, Carter moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his real-time cell-site location information, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and the South Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the information gathered did not constitute a search under either constitution. The jury convicted Carter of burglary, armed robbery, kidnapping, and illegal possession of a weapon, but acquitted him of the alleged sexual assault. Carter appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule also justified the officers' actions.

The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed Carter's convictions. The court did not address whether a search occurred or if the exigent circumstances exception applied. Instead, it focused on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, concluding that the officers acted in good faith reliance on the federal Stored Communications Act, which allowed the disclosure of customer records in emergencies. The court held that the good-faith exception precluded the suppression of evidence obtained through Carter's real-time cell-site location information, as the officers reasonably believed their actions were lawful under the statute.

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Torres v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 WY 12

Opinion Date: January 28, 2025

Judge: Robert Jarosh

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anthony Torres was convicted by a jury of twelve counts of sexual abuse of a minor. He appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to amend its Information to add three additional charges of sexual abuse ten days before trial and by admitting three excerpts of a videotaped forensic interview of one of the minors into evidence.

The District Court of Sweetwater County initially charged Torres with ten counts of sexual abuse involving his stepson, GT. Later, the State added a charge involving another minor, LT. Shortly before trial, the State moved to amend the Information to include three more charges based on new disclosures by LT. The district court granted the motion and continued the trial to a later date, which Torres' counsel agreed to. Torres was ultimately tried on fourteen counts and convicted on twelve.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to amend the Information. The court noted that the trial was continued to a date agreed upon by Torres' counsel, providing sufficient time to prepare a defense. The court also found that the amendments did not change Torres' defense strategy, which was to argue that the minors were influenced to fabricate their stories.

Regarding the admission of the videotaped forensic interview excerpts, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The excerpts were admitted as prior consistent statements under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence. The court found that the statements were sufficiently consistent with the minors' trial testimony and that their admission was not unduly prejudicial.

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Torres' convictions.

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