Miranda v. Kennedy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1652

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In June 2013, Fagbemi Miranda was convicted of first-degree murder in Massachusetts state court. The defense aimed to discredit the government's key witness, suggesting Miranda's brother was responsible for the shooting. However, Miranda wanted to testify that he shot the victim in self-defense. This disagreement in defense strategy is central to the habeas case. The incident occurred on October 10, 2005, when Miranda and Christopher Barros argued outside Miranda's home. Miranda's brother, Wayne, joined the argument with a handgun. After a chase, Wayne handed the gun to Miranda, who then shot Barros. Barros was found unconscious and later died. Initially, Wayne was arrested, but a neighbor's later testimony implicated Miranda.

Miranda was indicted in 2008 and convicted in 2013. He filed a notice of appeal and a motion for a new trial, which were denied. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial in 2020. Miranda's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. He then sought habeas relief in the District of Massachusetts, which was denied in 2022, but a certificate of appealability was granted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. Miranda argued that his counsel interfered with his right to set the defense objective, that his due process rights were violated by the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense, and that he was deprived of his rights to testify and to effective assistance of counsel. The court found that the SJC's rulings were not unreasonable applications of federal law. The court concluded that Miranda's counsel's errors did not prejudice the outcome of the trial, as Miranda's self-defense claim was not viable. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the habeas petition.

USA v. Cuomo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1799

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Amalya Kearse

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The defendant, Guy Cuomo, was convicted of multiple offenses, including conspiracy to commit computer fraud, accessing a protected computer without authorization, aggravated identity theft, misuse of a social security number, and conspiracy to misuse social security numbers. Cuomo, along with his co-defendant, operated companies that engaged in skip tracing, which involved obtaining debtors' place of employment (POE) information by impersonating them and initiating fraudulent unemployment insurance applications using their personal information.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, following a jury trial, found Cuomo guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to 45 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Cuomo appealed, arguing that his conduct did not violate the relevant statutes, the jury instructions were deficient, and the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Cuomo accessed a computer without authorization and obtained information for financial gain. The court also upheld the jury instructions, stating they were not erroneous. Additionally, the court found no merit in Cuomo's arguments regarding the misuse of social security numbers and aggravated identity theft, noting that the evidence supported the convictions.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Cuomo's contentions were without merit and that the district court did not err in its findings or sentencing.

U.S. v. Luong

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4360

Opinion Date: January 8, 2025

Judge: DeAndrea G. Benjamin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Thuy Tien Luong, was convicted of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Luong used threats and coercion to force the victim, a nail technician, to continue working against her will. The victim, who had a limited education and poor English skills, was subjected to physical abuse and threats of reputational harm and legal consequences by Luong. The victim was coerced into writing checks for alleged mistakes and a fabricated debt of $180,000. The abuse included physical violence, such as beatings and threats, which led to visible injuries and scars on the victim.

The case was initially reviewed by the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. After a five-day trial, the jury found Luong guilty of forced labor. At sentencing, the district court applied several enhancements, including a two-level vulnerable victim enhancement and a four-level permanent scarring enhancement, resulting in a final offense level of 37. Luong was sentenced to 180 months in prison. She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing insufficient evidence for her conviction and errors in the application of sentencing enhancements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Luong's conviction, finding substantial evidence that she knowingly coerced the victim into forced labor through threats and physical abuse. However, the court vacated and remanded her sentence for resentencing. The court found that the district court did not provide sufficient findings to support the application of the two-level vulnerable victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). The court upheld the four-level permanent scarring enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1(b)(1)(A), finding sufficient evidence that the victim's scars were permanent.

US v. Bright

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4624

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Stephanie Thacker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Between September 2021 and January 2022, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, along with local law enforcement in Sanford, North Carolina, coordinated controlled buys of narcotics using a confidential informant (CI). The CI purchased drugs from various individuals, including the appellant, Brian Thomas Bright. The CI primarily interacted with Keyonta McDougald, who facilitated drug buys from Bright. Bright also directed William Samuel Pergerson to assist in drug transactions. Bright and seven others were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Bright to 97 months of imprisonment after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated Bright’s base offense level as 26, with a three-point enhancement for a managerial role under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) § 3B1.1(b). Bright objected to the enhancement, arguing that his criminal activity involved fewer than five participants. The district court overruled the objection, finding that the three-level enhancement was appropriate due to the extent of Bright’s involvement in the conspiracy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court committed procedural error by not making the necessary findings regarding the scope of the criminal activity and the number of participants involved, as required by Guidelines § 1B1.3 and United States v. Evans. The Fourth Circuit vacated Bright’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to make the requisite particularized findings or determine if the criminal activity was "otherwise extensive."

US v. Mayberry

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4051

Opinion Date: January 7, 2025

Judge: Barbara Keenan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cornelius Mayberry was involved in a narcotics sting operation where he was arrested at a Red Roof Inn in Gaffney, South Carolina. Mayberry was found with a backpack containing over four pounds of methamphetamine. He entered a conditional guilty plea to charges including possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and assault and resistance to official search or seizure. Mayberry reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from his backpack and his post-arrest statements, as well as the court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing.

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Mayberry’s motions to suppress, finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest him and that he had abandoned his backpack. The court also denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Mayberry had not provided a fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Mayberry was sentenced to 414 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mayberry’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court also found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Mayberry based on the information provided by a cooperating individual and the real-time observations of Mayberry’s actions. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Mayberry had abandoned his backpack, thus relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Consequently, the search of the backpack was deemed lawful.

Davis v. USA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-10150

Opinion Date: January 8, 2025

Judge: James Wesley Hendrix

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law

Christian N. Davis, a former Army corporal, was convicted by a general court-martial in 1993 of multiple offenses, including attempted premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit murder, premeditated murder, arson, and adultery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. After his conviction, Davis sought clemency and parole but was denied. He was later transferred to a federal civilian prison, where his parole was again denied.

Davis filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, citing his age, health conditions, low risk of recidivism, and rehabilitative efforts. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, as § 3582 requires such motions to be filed in the sentencing court, and Davis's sentence was imposed by a military court. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's findings, dismissed Davis's motion for compassionate release for lack of jurisdiction, and denied his habeas claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 does not apply to sentences imposed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and that such motions must be filed in the sentencing court. Since Davis's sentence was imposed by a general court-martial, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion for compassionate release. The court also rejected Davis's arguments based on 10 U.S.C. § 858(a) and the case Bates v. Wilkinson, concluding that neither authorized civilian courts to modify military sentences.

Fry v. Shoop

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3270

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Jeffrey Sutton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Clarence Fry was convicted by a jury of the aggravated felony murder of his girlfriend, Tamela Hardison, and was sentenced to death by an Ohio trial court. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio courts on direct appeal, and Fry's request for collateral relief was denied. Fry then petitioned for a writ of federal habeas corpus, which the district court denied.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Fry's conviction and sentence. The Ohio Court of Appeals denied state collateral relief, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined additional review. Fry filed a habeas petition in federal court, raising 24 grounds for relief. The district court denied his petition and granted a certificate of appealability on five claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, trial-court error, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Fry's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during plea bargaining, as the state court reasonably found no prejudice. The court also held that Fry's counsel did not prevent him from testifying, as the state court's finding that Fry knowingly waived his right to testify was reasonable. Additionally, the court found that Fry's waiver of mitigation evidence was knowing and voluntary, and thus, there was no prejudice from counsel's performance.

The court also addressed Fry's claims of trial court error. It held that the trial court did not violate Fry's right to testify by failing to independently inquire about his decision, as there was no Supreme Court precedent requiring such an inquiry. Lastly, the court found that the trial court did not err in accepting Fry's mitigation waiver, as the extensive colloquy showed that Fry's waiver was knowing and voluntary.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Fry's habeas petition.

United States v. Hanson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-3442

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Julia Gibbons

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant Shefiu A. Hanson, serving a 46-month sentence for wire fraud, appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Hanson had pled guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy for creating fraudulent bank and email accounts to induce businesses to wire money to his accounts. The total loss to 30 victims was $1,122,805.74. Hanson, with no prior convictions, had a Criminal History Category of I and an Offense Level of 22, resulting in a Guidelines Range of 41 to 51 months. He was sentenced to 46 months in May 2023.

Hanson moved for a sentence reduction under the newly created U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which applies retroactively. The government opposed, arguing Hanson was ineligible because he caused substantial financial hardship to his victims. The district court agreed, finding Hanson caused substantial financial harm to multiple victims, making him ineligible under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(6). The court also concluded that a sentence reduction would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense or provide just punishment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in determining Hanson was ineligible for a sentence reduction. The court noted that the financial hardship caused by Hanson did not need to fall perfectly within the factors listed in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 n.4F, as the list is non-exhaustive. The district court reasonably concluded that the financial hardship to at least one victim was substantial, citing specific examples of individual victims' hardships. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hanson’s motion for a sentence reduction.

United States v Harris

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1163

Opinion Date: January 8, 2025

Judge: Thomas L. Kirsch II

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Taibian Harris and his cousin Treveon Smith robbed a cell phone store in South Bend during a blizzard. Harris acted as the getaway driver while Smith stole items from the store. Unbeknownst to them, one of the stolen phones was a bait phone that sent GPS signals to the police. The police tracked them to a gas station, and after a brief encounter, Harris led the police on a high-speed chase through snowy, icy streets, running stop signs and red lights. The chase ended when Harris collided with a police car. Both were apprehended after attempting to flee on foot.

Harris and Smith were indicted for robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and both pled guilty. The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a two-level enhancement for Harris for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury while fleeing law enforcement. Harris objected, arguing there was no reliable evidence of reckless driving and that no police officer was in actual pursuit. The government called Smith as a witness, who described the high-speed chase in detail. The district court credited Smith’s testimony and overruled Harris’s objection, applying the two-level enhancement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Harris drove recklessly, as his actions met the recklessness standard under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. The court also found that Harris was knowingly fleeing from law enforcement, as evidenced by his erratic driving and attempts to evade police. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the two-level enhancement to Harris’s sentence.

USA v Sheffler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1557

Opinion Date: January 8, 2025

Judge: Michael B. Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Correctional officers at an Illinois state prison brutally beat inmate Larry Earvin, who later died from his injuries. Todd Sheffler and two others were charged with various federal crimes related to the killing and its cover-up. After a mistrial, Sheffler was retried and found guilty by a jury.

In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Sheffler was convicted on five counts, including conspiracy to deprive civil rights, deprivation of civil rights, conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, obstruction-falsification of documents, and obstruction-misleading conduct. Sheffler argued that there was no reasonable likelihood that his incident report and interview with state police would reach federal officials, challenging his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1519. He also contended that the district court erred in ruling he breached a proffer agreement and allowed a biased juror to sit on his trial. Additionally, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported Sheffler’s convictions, as it was reasonably likely that his false statements would reach federal officials, given the severity of the crime and the cooperation between state and federal authorities. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Sheffler breached the proffer agreement by making false statements during FBI interviews. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the juror bias issue or in denying Sheffler’s motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sheffler’s motion for a new trial and upheld his convictions.

United States v. Harper

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-1168

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Bobby Shepherd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

George Harper, Jr. was indicted for being a felon in possession of ammunition following a shooting incident in Davenport, Iowa. After two unsuccessful suppression motions, he pled guilty. At sentencing, the district court applied the attempted murder cross-reference and sentenced Harper to 67 months’ imprisonment. Harper appealed the application of the cross-reference and the denial of one of his suppression motions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Harper’s motion to suppress A.H.’s eyewitness identification, concluding that A.H. knew Harper before the incident and that his reluctance to identify Harper initially was due to fear of involvement in a police investigation. The court also found that Detective Reeves’s thumb placement on Harper’s photograph was not impermissibly suggestive. Harper pled guilty but preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and the district court’s sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the identification procedure did not create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, as A.H. knew Harper and identified him from surveillance footage before the photo array. The court also found that the district court did not err in applying the attempted murder cross-reference, as Harper fired multiple rounds at X.B., demonstrating an intent to kill or callous disregard for human life. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

United States v. Hayward

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3251

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Bobby Shepherd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Larry Hayward was convicted by a jury of five counts related to heroin offenses. He subsequently filed a motion for acquittal or a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, Hayward contended that the district court erred by admitting evidence of an uncharged controlled buy involving heroin and fentanyl and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for conspiracy to distribute drugs and aiding and abetting drug distribution.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri oversaw Hayward's trial. The court admitted evidence of an uncharged controlled buy from August 2019, which involved fentanyl, over Hayward's objections. Hayward was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 240 months in prison. He then appealed the district court's decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of the uncharged controlled buy. The court found that the evidence was relevant to Hayward's intent, was sufficiently similar to the charged crimes, was supported by sufficient evidence, and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

The appellate court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Hayward's convictions. The court noted that multiple witnesses testified about Hayward's involvement in a heroin distribution operation with his partner, Jasmine Steed. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could infer that Hayward was part of a conspiracy to distribute heroin and that he aided and abetted the distribution of heroin by Steed and another individual, Demario Brown.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Hayward's convictions and sentence.

United States v. Rose

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3560

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: L. Steven Grasz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In January 2020, Detective Josh Winter of the Clinton, Iowa, Police Department stopped Johnathon Lawrence Rose for having heavily-tinted windows, which violated Iowa law. During the stop, Rose's behavior made Winter nervous, prompting him to request a canine unit. The drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search of Rose's car, where officers found drug paraphernalia and suspected drug residue. Rose was arrested, and further searches at the police department and his residence revealed more drugs, ammunition, and firearms. Rose was indicted for possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa held an evidentiary hearing and denied Rose's motion to suppress the evidence. Rose entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court determined Rose was a career offender and sentenced him to 210 months of imprisonment. Rose appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed his sentence. Rose then filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court agreed, vacated his sentence, and reimposed it, allowing Rose to appeal again.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, finding no constitutional violations in the traffic stop, searches, or Rose's incriminating statements. However, the court reversed Rose's sentence, agreeing with the government's concession that the case must be remanded for resentencing in light of a recent decision in United States v. Daye, which impacted the classification of Rose as a career offender. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State v. Spreitz

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-94-0454-AP

Opinion Date: January 6, 2025

Judge: Bill Montgomery

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1994, Christopher Spreitz was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, sexual assault, and kidnapping of Ruby Reid. Reid was last seen leaving a bar in Tucson, and her body was found days later in a desert area. Spreitz admitted to hitting Reid with a rock to stop her from yelling. The medical examiner identified multiple injuries on Reid's body, including broken ribs, internal bleeding, and a skull fracture.

The trial court found one aggravating circumstance: that Spreitz murdered Reid in an especially cruel manner. The court also considered several non-statutory mitigating factors, such as Spreitz's sub-normal home environment, emotional immaturity, lack of prior felonies, and potential for rehabilitation. The court determined that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Spreitz to death. This sentence was affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal.

Spreitz's petition for habeas corpus was denied by the federal district court, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding that the Arizona Supreme Court had applied an unconstitutional "causal nexus" test and did not properly consider evidence of Spreitz's longstanding alcohol and substance abuse as non-statutory mitigation. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to correct the constitutional error or impose a lesser sentence.

The Arizona Supreme Court conducted a new independent review of the entire record, including the mitigation evidence presented at the original sentencing. The court considered the mitigating factors without requiring a causal nexus to the murder and reweighed them against the established especially cruel aggravating circumstance. The court concluded that the mitigation evidence was insufficient to warrant leniency and affirmed the sentence of death.

People v. Collins

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S279737

Opinion Date: January 6, 2025

Judge: Kelli M. Evans

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Brittney Collins was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of her two-month-old son, Abel James Norwood, who was killed by his father, Matthew Norwood. Norwood committed the fatal act while Abel was under his care, and Collins was in another room. Collins and Norwood had a history of drug use, and Norwood had previously expressed not wanting the baby and had been abusive towards Collins during her pregnancy. On the day of the incident, Collins was recovering from childbirth complications and was in the front room while Norwood was caring for Abel in the back bedroom. Collins heard a bang but did not check on Abel immediately. Later, she found Abel in a state of medical emergency, and he was taken to the hospital, where he later died from blunt force trauma.

The Kern County Superior Court convicted Collins of second-degree murder and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The Court of Appeal affirmed the murder conviction, reasoning that Collins knew of Norwood’s abuse and intentionally failed to protect Abel, including on the day of the fatal act.

The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that the evidence was insufficient to convict Collins of second-degree murder. The court clarified that for implied malice murder based on a failure-to-protect theory, the evidence must show that the parent knew to a substantial degree of certainty that a life-endangering act was occurring or about to occur and failed to act in conscious disregard for life. The court found that Collins did not have the requisite mens rea to support a conviction under either a direct aider and abettor theory or a direct perpetrator theory. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded with instructions to vacate Collins’s conviction for second-degree murder and resentence her accordingly.

P. v. Corbi

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081490M(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: William S. Dato

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Freddy Rivera Corbi was bullied by gang members in his community for years. In the summer of 2019, a gang member stabbed him in the wrist with a broken beer bottle, causing serious injuries. A month later, Corbi encountered another member of the same gang, Lazaro Orozco, and fatally shot him after an argument. The main issue at trial was whether the shooting was in self-defense or an act of revenge by Corbi, who was alleged to be a member of a rival gang. The jury convicted Corbi of second-degree murder.

The Superior Court of San Diego County sentenced Corbi to 15 years to life for the murder, plus an additional 10 years for a firearm enhancement. Corbi appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing certain expert testimony, that the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) during closing arguments, and that the court improperly imposed the firearm enhancement.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, as it was based on the expert's experience and relevant to the case. The court also held that Corbi forfeited his RJA claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Finally, the court determined that the trial court had the discretion to impose the firearm enhancement, even though it resulted in a sentence exceeding 20 years, and that the court properly considered the mitigating factors and the nature of the offense.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding Corbi's conviction and sentence.

P. v. Hodge

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B337339M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Elwood G. Lui

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2012, Jason Robert Hodge pleaded no contest to three felony counts of battery and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 21 years in prison. On January 5, 2024, Hodge filed two requests in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County: a motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act and a request for resentencing under section 1172.1. The trial court denied both requests in a single order on February 6, 2024, stating it declined to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence.

Hodge appealed the trial court's decision. His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, raising no arguable issues, and Hodge filed a supplemental brief without addressing the appealability issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, requested briefing on the appealability of the trial court’s denial of Hodge’s request for resentencing under section 1172.1, considering the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Loper.

The Court of Appeal concluded that neither component of the trial court’s order was appealable. The court held that the trial court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence did not affect Hodge’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on Hodge’s request. Additionally, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hodge’s motion under the Racial Justice Act, as incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

People v. Bravo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168580(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 7, 2025

Judge: Marla J. Miller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2008, Eddie Arturo Bravo pleaded no contest to multiple charges, including rape and sex offenses involving a minor, in exchange for a 20-year prison sentence. The original judgment included a stayed enhancement for a prior prison term. In 2023, Bravo sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 after the Legislature eliminated certain sentencing enhancements. The trial court resentenced Bravo, striking the prison prior enhancement and other enhancements, but maintained the 20-year aggregate sentence.

The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially imposed the agreed-upon 20-year sentence, which included upper terms for specific counts and concurrent middle terms for others. Bravo was paroled in 2022. Following legislative changes, Bravo requested resentencing, arguing for a reduced sentence based on his rehabilitation and lack of public safety risk. The trial court held a hearing, considered the arguments, and ultimately struck the stayed enhancement but maintained the original sentence length.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the fact the enhancement was originally stayed did not preclude resentencing under section 1172.75. The court found no reversible error in the trial court's resentencing decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Bravo received a lesser sentence as required by section 1172.75 because the stayed enhancement was eliminated, even though the aggregate term remained the same. The court also found no error in the trial court's application of section 1385 or section 1170, and it upheld the decision to impose upper terms for certain counts. The judgment was affirmed.

Wilkerson v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 47, 2024

Opinion Date: January 7, 2025

Judge: N. Christopher Griffiths

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant, while under the influence of illegal drugs, killed a police officer and assaulted several others. He claimed that his behavior was due to someone substituting bath salts for his methamphetamine, and sought to use a statutory involuntary intoxication defense. The Superior Court granted a motion in limine, preventing the presentation of this defense and deemed the defendant’s evidence inadmissible.

The Superior Court of Delaware reviewed the case. The court examined whether a person who knowingly introduces an unlawful intoxicating substance into their body can present an involuntary intoxication defense if the substance or its effects differ from what was anticipated. The court concluded that this was not allowed.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court held that the statutory language was unambiguous and that a person who knowingly introduces an unlawful intoxicating substance into their body cannot claim involuntary intoxication unless specific statutory exceptions are met. The court did not address the admissibility of the defendant’s evidence under Rule 702 and 11 Del. C. § 303, as the defense was unavailable as a matter of law. The court also found that precluding the defense did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense.

State v. Ortiz

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50127

Opinion Date: January 8, 2025

Judge: Colleen Zahn

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Daniel Ruiz Ortiz was convicted of second-degree murder and violating a no contact order (NCO). Ortiz appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his home and a subsequent search conducted with a warrant. The district court relied on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Rebo, which held that Ortiz lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the warrantless search because the NCO prohibited him from being within 300 feet of the residence.

The district court found that Ortiz did not have standing to challenge the search, as he was prohibited by the NCO from being near the home. Ortiz's case proceeded to a jury trial, where he was found guilty of second-degree murder and violating the NCO. He was sentenced to life in prison, with the first thirty years fixed. Ortiz appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the Rebo decision should be overruled or that his case was distinguishable from Rebo.

The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and declined to overrule Rebo, finding that Ortiz failed to demonstrate that the decision was manifestly wrong. The court also found that while Ortiz's case was factually distinguishable from Rebo, he still lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the warrantless search. The court held that Ortiz did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home due to the NCO and that law enforcement's entry into the home was justified by exigent circumstances, as they were concerned for Ruiz's safety.

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Ortiz did not have standing to challenge the warrantless search of his home.

State of Maine v. Lowery

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2025 ME 3

Opinion Date: January 9, 2025

Judge: Andrew Horton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Dennis W. Lowery was convicted of gross sexual assault after a jury trial in Cumberland County. The incident occurred on December 19, 2021, when Lowery entered the victim's room at a Portland inn without her knowledge or permission and sexually assaulted her while she was asleep. The victim identified Lowery to the police, who found him nearby. DNA evidence linked Lowery to the crime.

The trial court denied Lowery's motions to dismiss and for a new trial, which were based on alleged discovery violations by the State. Lowery argued that the State failed to disclose information about certain witnesses and evidence handlers in a timely manner. The court allowed the testimony of these witnesses, reasoning that Lowery was aware of their roles and had the opportunity to cross-examine them. The court also denied Lowery's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the gross sexual assault charge but granted it on a burglary charge due to a defect in the indictment.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in handling the alleged discovery violations, as Lowery was not prejudiced to the extent that it deprived him of a fair trial. The court also found no obvious error in the admission of evidence regarding Lowery's pre-arrest silence, as Lowery did not invoke his right to remain silent before being questioned by the police. The court concluded that the trial court's actions were appropriate and did not violate Lowery's due process rights.

Commonwealth v. Cronin

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13598

Opinion Date: January 7, 2025

Judge: Serge Georges Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In July 2019, the defendant was charged with one count of possession of child pornography. While at a supermarket, a mother observed the defendant pointing his cell phone at an unusual angle towards her and her daughters. The defendant denied taking photos and showed the mother his phone, which contained several images of clothed women from the waist down. The mother reported the incident to the police. Officer Columbus, who was present at the store, investigated and found numerous images of clothed women on the defendant's phone. Upon further inspection, with the defendant's consent, Columbus discovered images she believed to be child pornography. The defendant admitted to possessing child pornography but claimed he took screenshots to report them to website administrators, though he had not done so.

The defendant was found guilty in a bench trial in the District Court and sentenced to six months in a house of correction, suspended for two years. He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by allowing a lay witness to testify about the technology used to extract data from his cell phone, which he contended required expert testimony.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court agreed that the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing some of the contested testimony from Officer McLaughlin, who explained the Cellebrite system used to extract data from the defendant's phone. However, the court concluded that the error was nonprejudicial. The court found that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, including testimony from multiple officers and the defendant's own admission. Additionally, the images were properly admitted through McLaughlin's lay testimony. Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction.

State v. Rieker

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 318 Neb. 238

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Stephanie Stacy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves Benjamin D. Rieker, a Lincoln Police Department officer, who was working off-duty as a security guard at a hospital. On October 31, 2020, Jan Noch, a patient, became disruptive and was asked to leave the hospital. Rieker encountered Noch in a hallway and instructed him to leave through the ambulance bay exit, but Noch insisted on leaving through the main lobby. Rieker claimed Noch threatened him and made aggressive movements, prompting Rieker to push Noch, causing him to fall. Security footage and eyewitnesses provided conflicting accounts of the incident.

The county court for Lancaster County convicted Rieker of third-degree assault and false reporting after a bench trial. Rieker was sentenced to 18 months’ probation for each conviction, to be served concurrently. Rieker appealed to the district court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his motion to suppress certain statements should have been granted. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court found that the evidence, including security footage and eyewitness testimony, supported the conclusion that Rieker’s use of force was not justified under the defense of property statute. The court also found that Rieker knowingly provided false information in his reports and during an interview with law enforcement, intending to impede the investigation of an actual criminal matter.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Rieker’s convictions and sentences, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support both the assault and false reporting convictions. The court did not find it necessary to address the suppression issue, as any potential error in admitting the ACI form was deemed harmless given the other competent evidence supporting the convictions.

People v Brisman

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 00123

Opinion Date: January 9, 2025

Judge: Shirley Troutman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

While incarcerated for manslaughter, the defendant engaged in a fight with another inmate, resulting in the defendant cutting his finger and the opponent sustaining a face wound. Correction officers found a bloody, sharpened porcelain shard near the defendant. The defendant was convicted of promoting prison contraband in the first degree and sentenced as a second felony offender to 3½ to 7 years in prison.

The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting the defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence. The court stated that there were no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the Appellate Division applied an erroneous standard by requiring extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion for a sentence reduction. The Court of Appeals clarified that the intermediate appellate courts have broad, plenary power to reduce a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe without deference to the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals reversed the order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the defendant's excessive sentence claim under the proper standard.

State v. Curry

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: W2022-00814-SC-R11-CD

Opinion Date: January 8, 2025

Judge: Roger A. Page

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2022 for unlawful possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony crime of violence. The State introduced a certified judgment of conviction for the defendant’s 2017 robbery conviction, and the trial judge instructed the jury that robbery is a crime of violence. However, robbery is not included in the statutory definition of crimes of violence under Tennessee law. The defendant received a ten-year sentence.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that robbery is a crime of violence despite its absence from the statutory definition. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish that robbery was a crime of violence.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case to determine whether robbery is encompassed within the statutory definition of “crime of violence” and whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction. The Court concluded that the statutory list of crimes of violence is illustrative, not exhaustive, and that robbery can be considered a crime of violence. However, the Court held that whether a specific robbery is a crime of violence is a question for a properly instructed jury, not the trial judge.

The Court found that the State did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant’s prior robbery was a crime of violence. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed, in part, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals, vacated the trial court’s judgment on Count 1, and remanded the case for entry of a new judgment reducing the conviction to a Class E felony and for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

State v. Lyddy

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 VT 1

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: William Cohen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and one count of felony unlawful mischief. The charges stemmed from an incident where the defendant allegedly slapped the complainant's arm, pushed her into a wall, and slammed her onto the floor, causing her head to hit the ground. Additionally, the defendant was accused of damaging the complainant's laptop and phone.

The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, admitted a 911 caller's statement that the defendant was beating the complainant, excluded a statement by an investigating officer that the situation was "a wash," and did not strike the complainant's testimony that police had to tell her she had been assaulted. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to one-to-three years, suspended except for 120 days to serve, and five years of probation.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court upheld the admission of the 911 caller's statement, finding it admissible as a present sense impression and rationally based on the caller's perception. The court also upheld the exclusion of the officer's statement, agreeing that it was an opinion on the defendant's guilt, which was for the jury to decide. The court found no plain error in the trial court's failure to strike the complainant's testimony about the police chief's explanation.

However, the court found that the jury instruction on the intent required for the unlawful mischief charge was erroneous. The instruction allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty if he acted knowingly, which is a lower standard than the statute's requirement of intent. This error was not harmless, as the defendant's intent was the central issue. Consequently, the court reversed and remanded the unlawful mischief conviction for a new trial but affirmed the other convictions.

Hammell v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 WY 4

Opinion Date: January 3, 2025

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Clint Wayne Hammell pled guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine in May 2023 and was sentenced to four to five years of imprisonment, suspended in favor of three years of supervised probation. His probation was revoked twice in November 2023 and February 2024, with his sentence resuspended each time. After the second revocation, he was ordered to apply for and complete an adult community corrections (ACC) program, which he did at the Casper Re-Entry Center (CRC).

In April 2024, the State petitioned to revoke Hammell's probation again, alleging he failed to report to a scheduled appointment with his probation agent on March 26, 2024, and did not return to the CRC, leading to his classification as an escapee. At the evidentiary hearing, his probation agent testified about his absence and subsequent arrest on March 28. The CRC case manager supervisor and a Casper Police Department officer also testified about his failure to report and his arrest.

The district court found that Hammell violated his probation conditions and that his violations were willful, noting his failure to use his phone to arrange transportation back to the CRC. Consequently, the court revoked his probation and imposed the underlying sentence of four to five years with credit for time served. Hammell appealed the decision.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case, focusing on whether the district court abused its discretion in finding Hammell's violations willful. The court upheld the district court's decision, stating that the evidence supported the finding of willfulness, as Hammell did not make efforts to contact his probation agent or return to the CRC. The court affirmed the revocation of Hammell's probation.

Sullivan v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 WY 5

Opinion Date: January 8, 2025

Judge: Kari Jo Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Monique Huia Sullivan was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the stabbing death of her fiancé, Andrew Moore. The couple, both sheep shearers from Australia and New Zealand, respectively, were part of a shearing crew working in Wyoming. On February 20, 2023, after a series of arguments and a difficult couple of days, Sullivan stabbed Moore once in the left side with a large kitchen knife. Sullivan was charged with second-degree murder, but the trial focused on whether she acted maliciously or in self-defense.

The District Court of Lincoln County allowed John Moore, the victim's father, to testify and admitted a photograph of Moore while he was alive. Sullivan objected to both, arguing they were irrelevant and prejudicial. The court overruled her objections, and the jury found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter. She was sentenced to 12 to 17 years in prison.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and addressed two main issues: whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the father's testimony and the photograph, and whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by advocating for their admission. The court found that the father's testimony about Moore's demeanor, favorite vacation spots, and the family dog was irrelevant and should not have been admitted. Similarly, the photograph was deemed irrelevant and should not have been admitted in the State's case-in-chief.

However, the court concluded that the admission of this evidence was harmless error and did not materially prejudice Sullivan. The State's case was strong, with multiple witnesses and Sullivan's own admissions undermining her self-defense claim. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct, as Sullivan failed to establish material prejudice from the prosecutor's actions. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision.