Cockerham v. Boncher

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1722

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: David Barron

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Joel Anthony Cockerham, the petitioner, is confined at a federal facility in Massachusetts after being civilly committed under 18 U.S.C. § 4243 by a federal district court in the Northern District of Mississippi. Cockerham filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking discharge from his commitment and compensation for damages. He argued that his continued confinement was unlawful and sought non-conditional release.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Cockerham's habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that he should have sought relief from the committing court under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h). The court also denied Cockerham's motion to amend his petition, concluding that amendment would be futile because the amended petition also sought relief from confinement, which should be addressed by the committing court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Cockerham's original habeas petition, agreeing that § 4247(h) provides a mechanism for seeking discharge and that Cockerham had not shown that this remedy was inadequate or unavailable. However, the court vacated and remanded the District Court's ruling on the motion to amend. The appellate court found that Cockerham's proposed amended petition, which challenged the suitability of his confinement at FMC Devens and sought transfer to a less restrictive facility, was distinct from a claim for discharge and could potentially be addressed under § 2241. The court instructed the District Court to reconsider whether the amended claims could be heard under § 2241 or if they must be brought under § 4247(h).

US v. Turner

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 23-1848, 23-1849

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: Seth R. Aframe

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Donald Turner pleaded guilty to bank robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the time of these offenses, Turner was on supervised release and admitted to related violations. Due to his history of violent felonies, Turner was designated an armed career criminal, resulting in an advisory sentencing guideline range of 180 to 210 months. The district court sentenced him to 210 months for the new offenses and an additional 24 months for the supervised release violations, to be served consecutively.

Previously, Turner had been convicted of multiple bank robberies. In 2006, he committed two bank robberies in Maine, leading to a 60-month sentence. In 2011, while on supervised release, he committed another bank robbery and was sentenced to 72 months, plus 24 months for the supervised release violation. In 2020, while again on supervised release, Turner committed another bank robbery, leading to his current charges.

Turner appealed, arguing that his felon-in-possession conviction violated his Second Amendment rights, that the district court committed procedural and substantive errors in sentencing, and that the court misapprehended its discretion regarding the consecutive supervised release sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed these claims.

The First Circuit held that Turner waived his Second Amendment claim by not timely moving to dismiss the felon-in-possession count as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12. The court found that the district court imposed a procedurally sound and substantively reasonable sentence. The court also determined that the district court did not believe it was required to impose a consecutive revocation sentence but chose to do so based on sentencing considerations. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the judgments.

Pitchford v. Cain

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-70009

Opinion Date: January 2, 2025

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Terry Pitchford was convicted of capital murder in 2006 by a Mississippi jury for his role in an armed robbery during which the store owner was killed by Pitchford’s accomplice. During jury selection, the prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove four black potential jurors. Pitchford’s counsel objected under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing racial discrimination. The trial court required the State to provide race-neutral reasons for the strikes, which it did, and the court accepted these reasons without further objection from Pitchford’s counsel.

Pitchford appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, arguing that the State’s reasons were pretextual. The court ruled that Pitchford waived his Batson claims by not challenging the State’s race-neutral reasons during voir dire or in post-trial motions. Consequently, the court found no Batson violation and upheld the conviction and death sentence.

Pitchford then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, which granted the writ. The district court found that the state trial court failed to conduct the third step of the Batson inquiry and that Pitchford’s counsel had sufficiently objected to the State’s reasons. The court also suggested that the Mississippi Supreme Court should have considered the history of Batson violations by the prosecutor in the Flowers litigation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court did not omit Batson’s third step and that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Batson. The appellate court also found that Pitchford waived his pretext argument by not raising it during voir dire and that the Mississippi courts were not required to consider the Flowers litigation. The Fifth Circuit rendered judgment dismissing Pitchford’s habeas corpus petition.

U.S. v. Trevino

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-11180

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Andrew Oldham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

John Gabriel Trevino, a 32-year-old man, engaged in a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old child. He was charged with production of child pornography, enticement of a minor, and possession of child pornography. Trevino pled guilty to one count of production of child pornography and was sentenced to 235 months in prison followed by 25 years of supervised release. The district court included 13 standard conditions of supervised release in the written judgment, which were not orally pronounced at sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially sentenced Trevino. Trevino appealed, arguing that the standard conditions were discretionary and should have been pronounced orally. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the district court to remove the unpronounced conditions. The district court issued an amended judgment omitting the standard conditions. Later, Trevino’s probation officer petitioned to reimpose the standard conditions, leading to a hearing where Trevino objected on several grounds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the conditions of supervised release before the term began, as 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) allows such modifications. The court also found that the district court complied with the mandate rule by issuing an amended judgment and that the reimposition of the standard conditions did not violate the mandate. Additionally, the court rejected Trevino’s objections to Standard Condition No. 10, which prohibits firearm possession, finding it reasonably related to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and not a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

U.S. v. Wilkerson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50626

Opinion Date: December 30, 2024

Judge: Don Willett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Elroy Wilkerson was convicted by a jury of producing and possessing child pornography for secretly taking photographs and videos of a 14-year-old girl in various stages of undress. The evidence included images and videos from Wilkerson’s cell phones showing the minor nude or partially nude in her bedroom and bathroom. Wilkerson admitted to taking some of the photos but claimed the girls were aware of it. The minor testified about her living situation and the layout of her bedroom and bathroom.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed the case, where the jury found Wilkerson guilty of both counts. The district court sentenced him to 118 months’ imprisonment. Wilkerson appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the jury was improperly instructed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, applying the definition of "lascivious exhibition" from United States v. Grimes and the six Dost factors. The court found that the images and videos met the criteria for "lascivious exhibition" based on their content and context, including the setting, poses, and Wilkerson’s comments in the videos. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in using the pattern jury instruction, which accurately reflected the statutory definitions and the relevant legal standards. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Wilkerson’s convictions.

USA v. Muhammad

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60352

Opinion Date: January 2, 2025

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rasheed Ali Muhammad was convicted and subsequently appealed his conviction. His appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. Muhammad then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition, which the district court denied as untimely. Later, the Fifth Circuit recalled the mandate in Muhammad’s direct appeal, reasserted jurisdiction, and affirmed the conviction after full briefing and oral argument. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and a rehearing. Muhammad then filed another § 2255 habeas petition.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi concluded that Muhammad’s new habeas petition was a “second or successive” petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and transferred it to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit clerk denied authorization to file the petition due to procedural non-compliance. Muhammad appealed the district court’s order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the habeas petition was “second or successive” under AEDPA. The court held that because Muhammad’s initial § 2255 petition was not adjudicated on the merits and the mandate in his direct appeal was recalled, the subsequent habeas petition was not “second or successive.” The court emphasized that the procedural history reset the count of Muhammad’s habeas petitions to zero. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

USA v. Stinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-60014

Opinion Date: December 30, 2024

Judge: Cory Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

Leon Stinson pled guilty to conspiracy to engage in bank fraud and was ordered to pay over $3.6 million in restitution. The Government sought to garnish assets, including retirement accounts solely in the name of Leon’s wife, Ellen. The district court concluded that Ellen’s accounts were marital property in which both Leon and Ellen had a “100% undivided interest” and ordered the liquidation of the accounts to satisfy the restitution order.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment, asserting that Leon had no property interest in her accounts. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Ellen’s retirement accounts were marital property under Mississippi law, as defined in Hemsley v. Hemsley, and thus subject to garnishment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under Mississippi law, property is only classified as marital property during the equitable distribution process in a divorce. Until then, a person does not have an interest in property titled solely in their spouse’s name. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that Ellen’s accounts were marital property subject to garnishment. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s orders and remanded with instructions to grant Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment as to her retirement accounts.

USA v. Uhlenbrock

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50664

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Jerry Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Mark Uhlenbrock was convicted by a jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) by posting nude images and videos of his ex-girlfriend, YT, on Reddit, along with explicit stories written in her name. Some of the images were taken with her consent during their relationship, while others were recorded without her knowledge. Uhlenbrock's posts included personal details about YT, such as her occupation and employer, and invited men to proposition her. YT discovered the posts through a family friend and reported Uhlenbrock to the FBI.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Uhlenbrock's motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment and vagueness grounds. During the trial, the court allowed testimony about Uhlenbrock's prior similar conduct, which included a 2016 guilty plea for cyberstalking YT. The jury found Uhlenbrock guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and restitution. The court also revoked his supervised release from the 2016 case and sentenced him to an additional 12 months in prison. Uhlenbrock appealed both the new conviction and the revocation of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Uhlenbrock's posts constituted unprotected defamation and that the application of § 2261A(2)(B) did not violate the First Amendment. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Uhlenbrock's prior conduct. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Uhlenbrock intended to harass or intimidate YT and that his conduct caused her substantial emotional distress. The court also rejected Uhlenbrock's claims of constructive amendment of the indictment and double jeopardy.

USA v. Vazquez-Alba

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-11135

Opinion Date: December 30, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Elrod

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Lorenzo Vazquez-Alba, a Mexican citizen, lawfully entered the United States in 1986 and became a legal permanent resident in 1987. In 2008, he was arrested in Dallas, Texas, for using a juvenile as a paid prostitute and supplying her with drugs. He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 and was sentenced to eight years in prison for both the 2008 and 2011 offenses. He lost his permanent resident status and was deported to Mexico in 2017. He later unlawfully reentered the U.S. and was arrested in 2022 for driving a stolen vehicle and failing to register as a sex offender.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas indicted Vazquez-Alba for illegal reentry and failure to register as a sex offender. He pleaded guilty to both counts. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated an advisory guideline range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. Vazquez-Alba objected to the PSR’s grouping determination and the indictment’s failure to allege a prior aggravated felony. The district court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 45 months’ imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Vazquez-Alba argued that his 2011 conviction was not an aggravated felony and that his counts should be grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The court held that his 2011 conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The court also found that the district court correctly declined to group the counts and properly treated his state-court sentences separately. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence.

United States v. Adams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3524

Opinion Date: December 30, 2024

Judge: Rachel Bloomekatz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Mario Adams, a defendant with a history of mental health issues, was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the terms of his supervised release. Adams argued that the district court improperly considered his mental health as an aggravating factor in its sentencing determination.

In 2014, Adams was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was initially found incompetent to stand trial due to mental health issues but was later deemed competent and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 87 months in prison followed by 36 months of supervised release. After his release in 2020, Adams violated the terms of his supervised release multiple times, including missing drug tests, failing to allow home visits, and committing new state crimes.

The district court for the Northern District of Ohio revoked Adams’s supervised release based on these violations and sentenced him to 24 months in prison, an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months. The court emphasized Adams’s conduct, including his absconding from a halfway house and committing violent crimes, as the basis for the sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not improperly rely on Adams’s mental health status as an aggravating factor but rather based its decision on Adams’s conduct and the failure of previous interventions to prevent further offenses. The court concluded that the district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable and based on permissible factors.

Patterson v. Adkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2700

Opinion Date: January 2, 2025

Judge: Diane Sykes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ricky Patterson was convicted by an Illinois jury in 2003 for first-degree murder, arson, and felony concealment of a homicide related to the 2002 death of Derrick Prout. Patterson had arranged to buy marijuana from Prout, who went missing after their meeting. Evidence showed Patterson killed Prout, attempted to clean the crime scene, set his house on fire, and later burned Prout’s car with the body inside. DNA evidence linked Prout’s blood to Patterson’s home. Patterson was sentenced to 55 years in prison, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Patterson filed a petition for state postconviction relief and a motion for additional DNA testing, which led to protracted state court proceedings. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial of his postconviction petition but remanded for further DNA testing, which confirmed the initial DNA match. Patterson’s subsequent appeals were denied, and his motion to file a late petition for leave to appeal was also rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Patterson’s federal habeas petition, which was filed more than six years after the one-year limitation period had expired, even accounting for tolling. Patterson argued for an exception based on actual innocence, but the court found his evidence insufficient to meet the demanding standard required to bypass the time bar. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Patterson’s habeas petition as untimely, concluding that the new evidence presented did not establish a probability that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty.

USA V. DEFRANCE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-2409

Opinion Date: December 30, 2024

Judge: Morgan Christen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Blake DeFrance was convicted of assaulting his girlfriend in 2013 under Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-206(1)(a), a misdemeanor. In 2018, he was found in possession of three firearms, leading to a federal indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied DeFrance's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the Montana statute could be violated without the use of physical force. DeFrance was subsequently convicted and appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction under Montana's PFMA statute qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The court concluded that because the Montana statute can be violated by inflicting emotional distress rather than physical injury, it does not have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force as required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Consequently, the court held that DeFrance's conviction under the Montana statute does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

The Ninth Circuit reversed DeFrance's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing or other proceedings consistent with their opinion.

USA V. IN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-2917

Opinion Date: December 30, 2024

Judge: Ronald Gould

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Larry Seng In was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after a gun was found in his car during a traffic stop. In moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officers' actions, particularly handcuffing him, escalated a valid Terry stop into an unlawful de facto arrest because they handcuffed him before having probable cause to believe he was prohibited from possessing the gun.

The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who held an evidentiary hearing and recommended denying the motion, concluding that the handcuffing was justified. However, the district court rejected this recommendation and granted In's motion to suppress, holding that the gun was obtained as a result of an unlawful de facto arrest without probable cause. The Government's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the traffic stop did not turn into a de facto arrest. The officers had a sufficient and reasonable basis to fear for their safety, justifying their decision to handcuff In during their investigation. The court noted that the presence of an unsecured gun in the car, In's initial dishonesty about the gun, and the location of the stop near a densely populated area contributed to the reasonableness of the officers' actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order granting the suppression motion and remanded the case for trial.

United States v. Ness

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-7051

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Justin Ness, who was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition after a felony conviction. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) investigated Ness based on evidence from his public Facebook page, which included photos of him with firearms. A search warrant for his private Facebook page revealed further evidence, leading to a search of his trailer, where a firearm and ammunition were found. Ness was indicted for possessing the firearm and ammunition on or about September 8, 2021.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held a two-day trial in March 2022. The government presented evidence from Ness's Facebook account and testimony from ATF agents. Ness's defense included testimony from a friend, Geoff Irwin, who claimed ownership of the firearm, and Ness himself, who denied knowing about the firearm and ammunition in his trailer. The jury was instructed that the government needed to prove the crime occurred "reasonably near" the alleged date. During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification on the timeline, but the court responded that they had all the evidence needed to render a verdict.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Ness argued that the district court erred by not clarifying the "on or about" instruction, which he claimed could have led to his conviction for uncharged conduct from several months earlier. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err in its response to the jury's question and that Ness failed to show plain error or that his substantial rights were affected. The court affirmed Ness's conviction.

Stalley v. Lake Correctional Institution Warden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10881

Opinion Date: December 30, 2024

Judge: Barbara Lagoa

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Jose Villegas, a 39-year-old inmate at Lake Correctional Institution (LCI) in Florida, died following a physical confrontation with correctional officers. The incident began when officers found Villegas unconscious in his cell. Upon regaining consciousness, Villegas resisted the officers' attempts to restrain him. The officers eventually subdued Villegas and transported him to a medical unit, but he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The autopsy reported that Villegas died from restraint asphyxia, with excited delirium as a contributing factor, and noted the presence of synthetic cannabinoids in his system.

Douglas B. Stalley, representing Villegas's estate and his minor children, filed a lawsuit against the officers, their supervisors, and the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) for negligence, wrongful death, excessive force, deliberate indifference, and supervisory liability. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law wrongful death claim, remanding it to state court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Stalley appealed the district court's decision regarding the deliberate indifference and supervisory liability claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' decision to transport Villegas to a medical unit rather than provide on-scene care did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Consequently, the supervisory liability claim also failed, as it was contingent on the underlying constitutional violation.

USA v. Munafo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3187

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Cornelia T. L. Pillard

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jonathan Joshua Munafo pleaded guilty to two charges related to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The district court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 33 months in prison, within the agreed U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 30-37 months. Munafo appealed, arguing that the government breached his plea agreement by not dismissing a pending misdemeanor assault charge in D.C. Superior Court and by referring to his past statements and affiliations during sentencing.

The district court for the District of Columbia had accepted Munafo's guilty plea and sentenced him based on the agreed guidelines. Munafo did not raise the issue of the pending misdemeanor charge until after his sentencing, and the court did not rule on it, suggesting instead that Munafo's counsel discuss it with the U.S. Attorney's Office. Munafo also objected to the government's sentencing presentation, claiming it breached the plea agreement by including information beyond the agreed-upon Statement of Offense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Munafo forfeited his objection regarding the dismissal of the misdemeanor charge by not pressing it before the district court. Additionally, the court found that the plea agreement did not support Munafo's interpretation that the government was required to dismiss the pending charge. The court also held that the government's references during sentencing did not breach the plea agreement, as the agreement allowed both parties to describe fully the nature and seriousness of Munafo's misconduct.

Munafo's claim that his sentence appeared to be based on his constitutionally protected political speech and affiliations was also rejected. The court noted that Munafo had waived his right to appeal his sentence unless it exceeded the statutory maximum or guidelines range, and he did not make a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice. The court affirmed Munafo's sentence.

USA v. Neely

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3166

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: Robert Leon Wilkins

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On January 6, 2021, Darrell Neely, a radio host, entered the U.S. Capitol building during the riot that disrupted the certification of the 2020 presidential election. Neely spent over an hour inside the Capitol, during which he stole items belonging to the U.S. Capitol Police. He was later indicted and convicted of five misdemeanor offenses, resulting in a 28-month prison sentence. Neely appealed, challenging the denial of three pretrial motions on statutory and constitutional grounds.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Neely's motions to dismiss certain charges, transfer venue, and suppress a confession. Neely argued that the statute under which he was charged did not apply to his conduct, that he could not receive a fair trial in the District of Columbia, and that his confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The District Court rejected these arguments, leading to Neely's conviction and sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Neely's appeal. The court held that the statute in question did apply to Neely's conduct, as it did not specify that only the Secret Service could restrict the relevant areas. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court determined that Neely's Miranda rights were not violated, as there was no evidence of a deliberate two-step interrogation strategy by the FBI. Finally, the court upheld the denial of the motion to transfer venue, finding no presumption of jury prejudice. Consequently, the court affirmed Neely's convictions and sentence.

P. v. Garcia

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082237(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Richard Huffman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Angel Garcia and Armando Alvarado, members of the Logan Red Steps gang in San Diego, were convicted by a jury of murdering Eduardo S., attempting to murder Ruben T., and committing robbery. Alvarado was also found guilty of shooting at an occupied structure, and Garcia of an additional robbery. The jury found true various firearm allegations and a robbery murder special circumstance. The trial court sentenced both to life without parole for the murder and special circumstance.

The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted gang-related evidence despite bifurcating the gang enhancements. The court excluded evidence that Eduardo had stolen a BB gun and refused to instruct on lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Garcia argued cumulative errors required reversal, and both appellants claimed their sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Alvarado also contended errors regarding a firearm enhancement and concurrent sentencing for shooting at an occupied dwelling. The People conceded Alvarado was entitled to additional custody credit and correction of the abstract of judgment.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting gang-related evidence, which was more prejudicial than probative and not relevant to proving the substantive crimes. The court concluded this error likely influenced the jury's verdict, particularly affecting the credibility contest between Ruben and Alvarado. Consequently, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the instructional error claims, as they were moot given the reversal of the convictions.

P. v. Hodge

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B337339(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: Elwood G. Lui

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jason Robert Hodge filed a notice of appeal from a trial court order denying two requests for relief: a motion under the Racial Justice Act and a request for resentencing under section 1172.1. Hodge had pleaded no contest in 2012 to three felony counts of battery and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 21 years. On January 5, 2024, Hodge filed a motion for relief due to discrimination and a request for recall of sentence and resentencing. The trial court denied both requests in a single order dated February 6, 2024.

The trial court declined to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence under section 1172.1. Hodge appealed, and appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, raising no arguable issues. Hodge filed his own supplemental brief but did not address the issue of appealability. The appellate court requested briefing on the appealability of the trial court’s denial of Hodge’s request for resentencing in light of People v. Loper. The parties subsequently briefed the issue.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, concluded that neither component of the trial court’s order was appealable. The court held that the trial court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence did not affect Hodge’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on Hodge’s request. Additionally, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Hodge’s motion under the Racial Justice Act, as incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

P. v. Quintero

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165276(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Teri L. Jackson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Two defendants, Fredi Analberto Lopez-Flores and Christian Alejandro May Quintero, were convicted of multiple sex crimes, including forcible rape, sodomy, and oral copulation in concert, after they abducted an inebriated woman, Jane Doe, from the streets of San Francisco, drove her 50 miles away, and assaulted her. The prosecution used terms like "monsters" and "predators" during closing arguments, which the defendants later claimed violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) and constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

In the lower court, the jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. Lopez-Flores was also found to have a prior conviction, which was considered during sentencing. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d), finding that the offenses occurred on separate occasions. The court also stated that even if this finding was incorrect, it would impose consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), based on the nature of the crimes and aggravating factors.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the prosecution's use of the terms "monsters" and "predators" did not violate the RJA, as these terms were race-neutral and based on the defendants' conduct. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct, determining that the comments were within the permissible range of descriptive commentary based on the evidence. The court held that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), and any potential error under subdivision (d) was harmless because the court provided adequate reasons for its discretionary decision. The judgments were affirmed.

Cooke v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 12, 2023

Opinion Date: January 2, 2025

Judge: Gary Traynor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In 2005, James E. Cooke, Jr. was convicted of the rape and murder of Lindsey Bonistall, a University of Delaware student. Cooke's first conviction was overturned in 2009 due to his defense counsel's strategy, which conflicted with Cooke's plea of not guilty. Cooke was retried in 2012, where he represented himself initially but was later replaced by standby counsel due to his disruptive behavior. He was again convicted and sentenced to death, which was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2014.

Cooke filed a motion for postconviction relief in 2015, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and other errors. The Superior Court denied his motion, leading to this appeal. Cooke argued that his second-trial counsel failed to explore his competency to stand trial, did not adequately investigate the case, and failed to object to the State's peremptory challenges during jury selection. He also claimed cumulative errors and procedural issues with the court's denial of his continuance requests and discovery limitations.

The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the claims and found that Cooke's counsel acted reasonably given Cooke's insistence on testifying and his refusal to cooperate with mental health evaluations. The court also found that Cooke was competent to stand trial, and his counsel's decisions were within the bounds of reasonable professional assistance. The court held that Cooke's claims of cumulative error and procedural issues were without merit and affirmed the Superior Court's denial of postconviction relief.

State v. Cook

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 126288

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: Marla Luckert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Brenton S. Cook fired three shots and killed Dean Endsley in Endsley's Salina residence while attempting to collect on a drug debt. A jury convicted Cook of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and criminal possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Cook to a hard 25 life sentence for premeditated first-degree murder, plus 60 months on the remaining counts. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal.

Cook later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his convictions were multiplicitous and violated the double jeopardy clause because insufficient time passed for him to form the required mental state to premeditate murder. He requested a new trial or resentencing. The State responded that Cook's arguments focused on his convictions rather than his sentences and that he failed to address the statutory definition of an illegal sentence. The Saline District Court agreed with the State, noting that Cook did not challenge the legality of his sentence under the statutory definition and characterized his motion as complaining of trial errors that should have been asserted in his direct appeal. The district court also concluded that Cook's claims were barred under res judicata principles.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The court found that Cook's arguments did not suggest his sentences fell under the statutory definition of an illegal sentence. Cook did not argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction, that the sentence was ambiguous, or that it did not conform to the applicable statutory provisions defining the crime, assigning the punishment, or involving the criminal history classification. The court concluded that Cook's motion did not properly invoke an applicable statutory provision that might afford him relief under the illegal sentence statute, K.S.A. 22-3504. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Cook's motion.

State of Maine v. Kelley

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2025 ME 1

Opinion Date: January 1, 2025

Judge: Catherine Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Richard W. Kelley was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs after a stop and search of a friend's vehicle in which he was a passenger. Law enforcement conducted the search as part of an investigation into the vehicle's owner for drug trafficking, using a search warrant and two tracking warrants to monitor the vehicle's location. Kelley moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the warrants, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

The trial court (Penobscot County, A. Murray, J.) denied Kelley's motion to suppress on the grounds that he lacked standing to challenge the search. Kelley argued that the court should not have reached the question of his standing because the State had stipulated that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. However, the court concluded that standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed, and Kelley did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the State's stipulation regarding Kelley's standing was not binding on the court and that Kelley lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The court noted that Kelley did not own the vehicle, had never driven it, and had only stored personal items in it for a short period. Therefore, Kelley did not have standing to challenge the search warrants, and the judgment of conviction was affirmed.

State of Maine v. Sheppard

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 84

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Andrew Mead

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Ramel L. Sheppard was convicted of domestic violence aggravated assault after a jury trial in which the victim did not testify. The conviction was based in part on the victim's hearsay statement to a police officer identifying Sheppard as her attacker. Sheppard appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statement as an excited utterance and that its admission violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The trial court (Androscoggin County) admitted the victim's statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, finding that the statement was made spontaneously and while the victim was still under the stress of the assault. The court also determined that the statement was nontestimonial, as it was made in the context of an ongoing emergency and not for the primary purpose of creating evidence for prosecution. The jury found Sheppard guilty on two counts, but the court later merged one count into the other and sentenced Sheppard to seven years' imprisonment, with all but forty months suspended, and three years of probation.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim's statement as an excited utterance, as the statement was made spontaneously and under the stress of the assault. The court also held that the statement was nontestimonial, as it was made in the context of an ongoing emergency and not for the primary purpose of creating evidence for prosecution. Therefore, the admission of the statement did not violate Sheppard's rights under the Confrontation Clause.

People of Michigan v. Fredell

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 164098

Opinion Date: December 26, 2024

Judge: David Viviano

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2015, the defendant drove his vehicle on a freeway while speeding and under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances. He struck the back of another vehicle, resulting in the deaths of two individuals and serious injuries to three others. The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Genesee Circuit Court of multiple charges, including two counts of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of reckless driving causing death.

On direct appeal, the defendant argued for the first time that his convictions violated the multiple-punishments strand of double jeopardy, specifically challenging the convictions for both involuntary manslaughter and reckless driving causing death. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions.

The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under Michigan common law, the mens rea requirement for reckless driving causing death (willful or wanton disregard) is the same as the mens rea requirement for involuntary manslaughter (criminal gross negligence). Therefore, when an involuntary manslaughter charge is based on a theory of gross negligence, the offense does not have an element that reckless driving causing death does not have. Consequently, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit convicting a defendant of both offenses. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the double-jeopardy violation.

People of Michigan v. Mckewen

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 158869

Opinion Date: December 26, 2024

Judge: Brian Zahra

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

During an altercation at a party, the defendant pushed the victim in the chest, causing the victim's chest to bleed. Although no one saw the defendant with a knife, the victim's treating physicians concluded that the victim had been stabbed. The defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to do great bodily harm (AWIGBH) and felonious assault.

The Isabella Circuit Court sentenced the defendant to concurrent prison terms of 5 to 10 years for AWIGBH and 2 to 4 years for felonious assault. The defendant appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated the felonious assault conviction, reasoning that convictions for both AWIGBH and felonious assault were inconsistent because the offenses are mutually exclusive. The prosecutor then applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted the application.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that the defendant's convictions for both AWIGBH and felonious assault did not violate double-jeopardy protections because the AWIGBH statute authorizes multiple punishments for the same conduct. The court noted that the AWIGBH statute explicitly states that it does not prohibit a person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished for any other violation of law arising out of the same conduct. Therefore, the conflicting intent requirements of the two statutes did not render the convictions mutually exclusive. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent it addressed the mutually exclusive verdicts doctrine and reinstated the defendant's conviction of felonious assault.

People Of Michigan v. Oslund

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 165544

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: Richard Bernstein

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The defendant, a 16-year-old student, was charged with assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH) under an aiding and abetting theory. The incident involved two other students, TI and CB, who attacked the victim by hitting and kicking him. The defendant did not participate in the physical attack but recorded the incident on his cell phone and shared the video with other students. The prosecution argued that the defendant's recording of the attack encouraged the assailants. Instead of filing a juvenile petition, the prosecution sought to try the defendant as an adult under the automatic waiver statute, arguing that the shoes worn by the assailants were used as dangerous weapons.

The 53rd District Court found probable cause to believe that the defendant had aided and abetted the assault and bound him over to the criminal division of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and dismiss the charges, concluding that a shoe could be used as a dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the shoes did not constitute dangerous weapons and that the defendant was not armed with a dangerous weapon.

The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that for the criminal division of the circuit court to have jurisdiction under the automatic waiver statute, the juvenile defendant must be armed with a dangerous weapon. The Court found no evidence that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during the assault. Consequently, the statutory requirements for automatic waiver were not met, and the criminal division of the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court to grant the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and transfer the case to the family division of the circuit court.

State v. Mason

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 324N

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Justin Guy Zeno Shawn Wolf Mason, was convicted of felony Partner and Family Member Assault (PFMA), misdemeanor Unlawful Restraint, and misdemeanor Resisting Arrest. He received a suspended five-year sentence for the PFMA charge, with probationary conditions, and concurrent six-month suspended sentences for the misdemeanors. Mason was required to comply with all laws and maintain contact with probation and parole.

The Tenth Judicial District Court, Fergus County, revoked Mason's suspended sentence after he failed to report to probation and parole and was charged with misdemeanor assault following an altercation with a security guard. Mason argued that the court erred in finding him in violation of his probation terms, denying his motion to introduce video evidence, and revoking his suspended sentence.

The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the State had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Mason violated the conditions of his suspended sentence by being charged with misdemeanor assault. The court noted that a single violation is sufficient to support revocation. The court also held that the exclusion of the body camera footage was not prejudicial to Mason, as his testimony established conduct meriting revocation. Additionally, the court declined to exercise plain error review regarding the banishment provision, as it was part of a separate pre-trial diversion agreement and not directly related to the conditions Mason was accused of violating.

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of Mason's suspended sentence, concluding that the State met its evidentiary burden, the exclusion of the video was not prejudicial, and the District Court did not commit plain error.

State v. Welch

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 321

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The State of Montana charged Matthew Jason Welch with six counts of Deceptive Practices and four counts of Theft by Deception. Welch faced varying prison terms depending on the value of the property involved. On January 20, 2022, Welch entered a non-binding plea agreement, pleading guilty to all counts. The agreement recommended a sentence of 10 years with five suspended for each count, with some sentences running concurrently and others consecutively. However, the District Court rejected this recommendation and sentenced Welch to 10 years for each count, all running consecutively, resulting in a net sentence of 50 years with 50 suspended. Welch appealed the four illegal sentences, leading to a remand for resentencing within statutory limits.

The District Court resentenced Welch to three years for each of the four counts, all running consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of 30 years with 30 suspended and 12 years DOC. Welch then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to the illegal sentence, but the District Court denied the motion.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Welch was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the State accepted a reduced sentence within legal limits, and Welch received the benefit of his bargain. The court also noted that Welch was aware the court was not bound by the plea agreement. The court affirmed the denial of Welch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea but remanded to correct the restitution amounts in the amended judgment to reflect the court's oral pronouncement.

State v. Wood

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 318

Opinion Date: December 31, 2024

Judge: Dirk M. Sandefur

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Danielle Wood was charged with deliberate homicide for the shooting death of Matthew LaFriniere. The State alleged that Wood purposely or knowingly caused LaFriniere's death by shooting him with a firearm. The case involved a tumultuous relationship between Wood and LaFriniere, including a custody battle over their child. On the evening of May 2, 2018, Wood received a text message purportedly from LaFriniere, stating he was delayed and instructing her to keep their child. Later that evening, LaFriniere was found dead with multiple gunshot wounds.

The Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court, Sanders County, convicted Wood of deliberate homicide. Wood appealed, raising several issues, including the sufficiency of evidence for the State's alternative theory of accountability for deliberate homicide and the clarity of the jury verdict form. The District Court had allowed the State to amend the Information to include an alternative theory of accountability, which Wood contested. The jury was instructed on both direct deliberate homicide and accountability for deliberate homicide, but the verdict form did not distinguish between the two theories.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The Court found that the District Court erroneously submitted the State's alternative theory of accountability to the jury without sufficient supporting evidence. The Court also found that the verdict form provided to the jury was ambiguous and did not allow the jury to unambiguously declare Wood's guilt or innocence regarding each of the charged offenses or theories of criminal liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed Wood's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Rippey

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 45

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: Matthew Durrant

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Stephen Rippey pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of object rape of a child. He was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of fifteen years to life. Ten years after his conviction, a district court reinstated Rippey’s time to file a direct appeal. On appeal, Rippey challenged several aspects of his plea, conviction, and sentence, leading the Supreme Court of Utah to address whether the Plea Withdrawal Statute (PWS) is constitutional.

The Third District Court in West Jordan initially accepted Rippey’s guilty plea after a colloquy and a signed plea form. Rippey did not move to withdraw his plea before sentencing. He later filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), listing seventeen claims. The district court dismissed eight claims as frivolous and the remaining claims for failure to state a claim. Rippey’s requests for appointed counsel were denied. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal, concluding that Rippey’s claims were unpreserved except for ineffective assistance of counsel, which lacked merit.

The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the constitutionality of the PWS, specifically subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c). The court held that subsection (2)(b)’s preservation rule and the corresponding waiver in subsection (2)(c) violate the separation of powers under the Utah Constitution. These provisions were deemed procedural, not substantive, and thus beyond the legislature’s authority to enact. The court concluded that the PWS does not bar Rippey’s challenge to his guilty plea, and his appeal is now governed by standard rules of preservation. The court instructed the parties to brief the merits of Rippey’s challenges under these standards.

State v. Torres-Orellana

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 46

Opinion Date: December 27, 2024

Judge: Paige Petersen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves William Torres, who was convicted by a jury of one count of rape. The district court had concerns about the performance of Torres's trial counsel and appointed post-trial counsel to investigate potential errors. Torres, through his new counsel, moved for a new trial, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

The district court granted Torres a new trial, finding that his trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable in several respects and that these errors cumulatively prejudiced Torres. The court concluded that Torres received ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered a new trial under rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The State appealed, and the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. The court of appeals reviewed the district court's determination of ineffective assistance of counsel for correctness, as per existing precedent. The court concluded that Torres had failed to show that his trial counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland.

On certiorari, Torres argued that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard of review and that the district court's ruling should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, affirming that legal decisions embedded in a district court's new trial ruling are reviewed for correctness. The court also declined to overrule its precedent in Menzies v. Galetka, which holds that ineffective assistance is a law-like mixed question reviewed for correctness.

The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that Torres had not established a reasonable probability of a different result at trial absent counsel's alleged errors. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, reversing the district court's grant of a new trial and remanding for sentencing.