United States v. Andruchuk

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1551

Opinion Date: November 25, 2024

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Ronald Andruchuk, purchased 169 firearms over five months in 2021 while struggling with drug addiction. He falsely attested on federal forms that he did not use illicit drugs. Neighbors complained about bullets flying dangerously close to their homes, and on February 24, 2022, police witnessed bullets flying above their heads from Andruchuk's property. He was arrested for violating a state law against firing ammunition in a compact area. A federal investigation led to a search of his home, where agents found 219 unsecured firearms, gun paraphernalia, and over 25,000 rounds of ammunition. Andruchuk was charged with making false statements during firearms purchases and possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance.

The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island accepted Andruchuk's guilty plea to two counts of making false statements and one count of possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range. Andruchuk waived his right to appeal if the sentence was within or below the guideline range determined by the court. The court calculated a guideline range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months and sentenced him to sixty-three months.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Andruchuk argued that the district court erred in calculating the guideline range and that this error invalidated his appellate waiver. The Court of Appeals upheld the waiver, finding it was knowing and voluntary, and dismissed the appeal. The court also dismissed Andruchuk's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as premature, noting it could be raised in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

United States v. Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-639

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Andrew Davis was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Davis trafficked large quantities of marijuana in Bridgeport, Connecticut, using a method involving shipping marijuana from California via FedEx. Upon his arrest, he was found with over 136 pounds of marijuana, numerous handguns, and approximately $412,000 in cash. A co-conspirator cooperated with the government, leading to Davis's conviction.

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut sentenced Davis to 295 months’ imprisonment. Davis appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. He also raised ten additional arguments in pro se supplemental briefs, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for his other convictions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Davis’s conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court found that the government provided ample circumstantial evidence linking the cash used in financial transactions to Davis's drug trafficking operations. The court also determined that Davis's pro se arguments either lacked merit, were forfeited, or were premature. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Kouyate v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1960

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.

An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied.

US v. Bullis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4184

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Berner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Stephen Bullis was convicted of six federal crimes, including two counts of using a firearm during and in relation to other crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After serving twenty-three years in prison, the United States Supreme Court struck down the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as unconstitutional. This led the district court to set aside Bullis’s two Section 924(c) convictions and resentence him on the remaining four counts. Bullis argued that the resentencing violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had fully served his sentence on these counts at the time of the resentencing.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially sentenced Bullis to 235 months of imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, all to run concurrently. On Count 3, Bullis was sentenced to 360 months, and on Count 6, he received a lifetime sentence, both to run consecutively to the 235-month concurrent sentences. After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the district court vacated Counts 3 and 6 and resentenced Bullis to 450 months on Count 2 and 240 months on Counts 1, 3, and 5, all to run concurrently.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Bullis’s resentencing did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his sentences for Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 were part of a consecutive sentence package that had not been fully served. However, the court found that the district court committed reversible errors by imposing a special condition of supervised release that differed materially from the court’s oral pronouncement and by failing to incorporate clearly the Standard Conditions of Supervision as adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case for resentencing.

US v. Nsahlai

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4675

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Judge: G. Steven Agee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Rose-Marie Nsahlai was convicted for her involvement in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. Nsahlai and her husband, Didier Kindambu, applied for two PPP loans using false information and then used the loan proceeds for unauthorized purposes. The fraudulent applications included fabricated payroll documentation created by Nsahlai, which falsely represented that the Papillon companies had substantial payroll expenses. The loans, totaling over $2.5 million, were approved and deposited into their accounts, and the funds were subsequently used for personal expenses, including the purchase of a new residence.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia convicted Nsahlai on charges of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and unlawful monetary transactions. Before trial, the district court excluded evidence related to Nsahlai's claims of domestic abuse by Kindambu, ruling it irrelevant and prejudicial. Nsahlai argued that this evidence was necessary to explain her actions and lack of intent to commit fraud. The court allowed her to testify that she felt compelled by her relationship but prohibited specific references to abuse.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court found no reversible error in the exclusion of the domestic abuse evidence, concluding that it was not relevant to the charges and that any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Nsahlai's guilt. The court also rejected Nsahlai's challenge to the jury instructions, determining that the instructions, when read as a whole, did not mislead the jury or affect her substantial rights. The court held that the instructions properly required the jury to find the elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Nsahlai's convictions.

Gardner v. U.S.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1388

Opinion Date: November 25, 2024

Judge: Larsen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Michael Gardner was convicted of sex trafficking a minor and production of child pornography. He prostituted his 17-year-old girlfriend, B.H., and recorded himself having sex with her. Gardner was sentenced to 240 months in prison. After an unsuccessful appeal, Gardner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not introducing B.H.'s prior advertisements for sex work as evidence and for not seeking an evidentiary hearing.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Gardner's habeas petition but granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: whether Gardner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the minor victim’s prior advertisements for sex work and whether Gardner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Gardner’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce the prior advertisements because they were irrelevant to the charges and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The court also found that the advertisements would not have impeached B.H.'s testimony, as her statements were focused on the period after she reconnected with Gardner. Additionally, the court ruled that Gardner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he did not present a factual dispute that would warrant such a hearing.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Gardner’s § 2255 petition and the denial of an evidentiary hearing.

Hale v. Cool

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3265

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2005, Delano Hale was sentenced to death by an Ohio court for the murder of Douglas Green. Green was found dead in a motel room, wrapped in plastic bags, and had been shot multiple times. Hale was arrested driving Green's stolen vehicle and later admitted to the shooting, claiming it was in self-defense against Green's sexual advances. Hale was convicted of aggravated murder and other charges, and the jury recommended the death penalty.

Hale's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio Court of Appeals. Hale filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. He then sought federal habeas relief, raising multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing errors under Blakely v. Washington.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Hale's habeas petition. The court denied Hale's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that his trial counsel's decision not to call a forensic expert was a reasonable strategic choice. The court noted that Hale's counsel had considered hiring an expert but ultimately chose a different strategy, which did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington.

The court also denied Hale's claim regarding his noncapital sentences, which were enhanced based on judicial factfinding in violation of Blakely. The Ohio Supreme Court had reviewed this claim for plain error and found no prejudice, concluding that a jury would have reached the same sentencing conclusions. The Sixth Circuit found this determination reasonable and upheld the Ohio Supreme Court's decision.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Hale's habeas petition, concluding that Hale's claims did not warrant relief under the deferential standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

USA v. Offutt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2211

Opinion Date: November 25, 2024

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In late 2020, the FBI began investigating Tyron Offutt for narcotics trafficking in Centralia, Illinois. A confidential informant conducted three controlled purchases of methamphetamine from Offutt, which were recorded. Based on these buys, a search warrant was obtained and executed on February 3, 2021. Offutt attempted to flee during a traffic stop but was eventually apprehended. The search of his residence revealed methamphetamine, firearms, marijuana, cash, and drug paraphernalia.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois appointed Dan Cronin as Offutt’s attorney, but he was later replaced by Rebecca J. Grosser due to a conflict of interest. Offutt was indicted on multiple counts related to drug distribution and firearm possession. Offutt requested new counsel multiple times, citing communication issues, and eventually, Bobby Edward Bailey was appointed as his third attorney. Offutt’s trial commenced on December 6, 2022, and he was found guilty on three counts but the jury could not reach a verdict on one count.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Offutt challenged his conviction and sentence, arguing that the district court erred in instructing the jury that his flight could be considered evidence of guilt and that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when his request for counsel at sentencing was denied. The Seventh Circuit held that the flight instruction did not affect the trial's outcome and that Offutt had constructively waived his right to counsel by refusing to work with appointed attorneys and failing to retain private counsel. The court affirmed Offutt’s conviction and sentence.

United States v. Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3353

Opinion Date: November 25, 2024

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lester Brown was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit cyberstalking, cyberstalking resulting in death, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Brown, who dealt marijuana in Kansas City, had a history of conflict with his associates, including the disappearance and murder of Ryan Cobbins. In 2018, Brown sent threatening messages to Christopher Harris and Antwon Tolefree, including demands for money and threats of violence. Brown used tracking devices to monitor Harris's movements, ultimately leading to Harris's murder in front of his daughter.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced Brown to life plus 180 months in prison. Brown appealed, challenging several evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence for two of his convictions. He argued that certain hearsay statements were improperly admitted and that evidence of his prior wrongful conduct should have been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contested hearsay statements, as they either fell under exceptions or were not hearsay. The court also determined that evidence of Brown's prior wrongful conduct was intrinsic to the charged crimes and highly probative, thus not subject to exclusion under Rule 404(b) or Rule 403. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support Brown's convictions for conspiracy to commit cyberstalking and cyberstalking resulting in death, given the threats, use of tracking devices, and the fatal shooting of Harris.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Brown's convictions and sentence.

United States v. Lemicy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2901

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Anthony Lemicy was convicted by a jury on four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e). The district court sentenced him to consecutive 30-year terms for each count, totaling 120 years. Lemicy appealed, raising several claims including improper waiver of his right to counsel, violation of his right to a fair trial due to appearing in an orange jumpsuit and restraints, improper jury instructions, insufficient evidence, incorrect calculation of criminal history points, and an unreasonable sentence.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially appointed a federal public defender for Lemicy, but after conflicts, he chose to represent himself with standby counsel. The court repeatedly informed him of the risks and limitations of self-representation, which he acknowledged. During the trial, Lemicy appeared in jail-issued clothing by choice, despite the court offering him the opportunity to change. The jury was instructed to disregard his appearance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Lemicy knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and the district court did not err in its handling of standby counsel. The court also determined that Lemicy was not compelled to wear the orange jumpsuit and any error was invited by him. The jury instructions were deemed appropriate, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court upheld the calculation of criminal history points and found the sentence reasonable, given the severity of the offenses and the involvement of multiple victims.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that there were no violations of Lemicy’s constitutional rights and that the sentence imposed was within the court’s discretion.

United States v. Pinder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-4154

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: ROSSMAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A police officer stopped Taylor Pinder for speeding. Pinder provided a driver's license that did not match his appearance. The officer arrested Pinder for providing false identification, a misdemeanor in Utah. During a search of the car incident to the arrest, the officer found methamphetamine and a handgun. Pinder was charged federally and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Pinder pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied Pinder's motion to suppress, concluding the search was justified under Arizona v. Gant, which allows vehicle searches incident to arrest if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. The court also suggested the search might be justified based on Pinder's supervised release conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit held that Pinder's real driver's license was relevant to the crime of providing false identification, even after the officer verified his identity. The court did not address the district court's alternative reasoning regarding supervised release conditions or the government's good faith argument raised for the first time on appeal.

In re Nguyen

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B329158(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Edmon

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was convicted in 2003 of attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole. While incarcerated, Nguyen earned various credits, including good conduct and educational merit credits. These credits were applied to his minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) and youth parole eligible date (YPED), respectively.

Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2022, arguing that he should be able to use all types of credits to advance his YPED, not just educational merit credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the appellate court to vacate its order, and issued an order to show cause.

The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and held that Nguyen's right to equal protection was not violated. The court found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged regulations, as youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED) while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court also determined that there is a rational basis for the regulation that limits the types of credits that can advance a youth offender's YPED, as it aligns with the legislative intent to provide a fixed and relatively stable parole eligibility date for youth offenders. Consequently, the court denied Nguyen's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

P. v. Multani

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B332945(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Annette Abbott Adams

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Fahim Anthony Multani appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Multani, diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer in 2014, had his cancer metastasize to his brain by 2017. Despite this, his cancer, caused by a specific gene mutation, has been successfully treated with targeted medication for seven years, showing no evidence of disease progression. Multani argued that his illness should be considered as having an end-of-life trajectory, making him eligible for compassionate release.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Multani’s petition, concluding that his illness did not currently have an end-of-life trajectory. The court noted that while Multani’s cancer was incurable, it was perfectly suppressed by his current treatment, and there was no evidence of disease progression. The court found that the term “end-of-life trajectory” required the illness to be actively progressing toward death, which was not the case for Multani.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the term “end-of-life trajectory” in section 1172.2 requires that the illness be progressing toward death, not merely incurable or expensive to treat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Multani’s cancer, while serious and advanced, was not currently on an end-of-life trajectory due to its successful suppression by targeted medication. The court also noted that the legislative intent behind the statute did not support extending compassionate release to those whose illnesses are effectively managed and not actively progressing toward death.

People v. Canales

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B328388A(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 25, 2024

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Santiago Gonzalo Canales was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Canales on all counts and found true the multiple victims allegations. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of four consecutive sentences of 15 years to life.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Canales challenged two jury instructions: CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, stating it correctly reflected the statutory requirements for continuous sexual abuse, which did not necessitate a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. Canales's argument regarding the unanimity instruction was forfeited as he did not raise it during the trial.

The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that his sentence violated ex post facto principles because the One Strike law, which enhanced his sentence, did not apply to his offenses against his stepdaughter, which occurred before the law was amended to include continuous sexual abuse. Consequently, the court vacated Canales's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law.

Creech v. Randy Valley

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 52373

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Thomas Eugene Creech, sentenced to death in 1995, faced a failed execution attempt earlier this year due to the inability to establish reliable peripheral intravenous access. The execution team spent nearly an hour attempting to establish venous access in various parts of Creech’s body, but each attempt resulted in vein collapse, leading to the procedure being halted. Following this, Creech sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the district court and affirmed on appeal.

While his post-conviction appeal was pending, Creech applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that any further attempt to carry out his death sentence would violate his constitutional rights. The district court summarily dismissed Creech’s application with prejudice. Creech appealed, contending that the State’s revised standard operating procedure and execution protocols constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court noted that the Idaho Department of Correction had modified its standard operating procedure for executions to allow a qualified physician to establish a central line if peripheral vein access is not attainable. Creech’s application for a writ of habeas corpus included three claims, but only Claim Two, which challenged the use of a central venous line as cruel and unusual punishment, was before the court on appeal.

The court held that Creech failed to establish a prima facie challenge to the State’s method of execution. The court found that the use of a central line catheter is a common medical procedure and does not rise to the level of indecency or cruelty prohibited by the United States Constitution. Additionally, Creech failed to propose an alternative method of execution, as required to assert a “method of execution” challenge. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s order of dismissal.

State v. Mansfield

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49742

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Dustin Mansfield was convicted of introducing contraband into a correctional facility. In January 2021, Mansfield was charged after suboxone strips were found in his mail at the Bannock County jail. The State filed an Information against him, and he was arraigned in March 2021. Mansfield filed a motion to suppress evidence, which delayed the trial initially set for August 2021. The trial was rescheduled multiple times due to Mansfield's motions and the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to emergency orders prohibiting jury trials.

The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of Idaho denied Mansfield's motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation, citing the pandemic and emergency orders as good cause for the delay. Mansfield entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.

The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the related emergency orders constituted good cause under Idaho Code section 19-3501(2). The court also applied the Barker v. Wingo factors to assess the constitutional speedy trial claim. It found that while the fourteen-month delay was significant, the reasons for the delay, including the pandemic and Mansfield's own motions, were justified. Mansfield's late assertion of his right to a speedy trial and the lack of specific prejudice to his defense further supported the court's decision. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Mansfield's statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated, and his conviction was affirmed.

State v. Rodriguez

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50513

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Fernando Rodriguez, an inmate at an Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) facility, was involved in a disturbance in April 2021. During the incident, inmates threw objects, barricaded doors, and started fires. Rodriguez was identified as one of the inmates who dumped soap on the floor near a door. The State charged Rodriguez with riot and arson, alleging he created a disturbance of the peace and caused property damage.

The magistrate court found probable cause for the riot charge but not for the arson charge, binding Rodriguez over to the district court. Rodriguez moved to dismiss the riot charge, arguing that his actions did not meet the statutory requirements for a riot under Idaho Code section 18-6401. The district court agreed, concluding that dumping soap did not cause property damage and that the disturbance of the public peace provision did not apply to a prison setting. The district court dismissed the riot charge.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court held that the term "public peace" in Idaho Code section 18-6401 unambiguously refers to the exterior or sensory peace of the public writ large, which can be disturbed by conduct occurring inside a prison. The court also found that there was probable cause to believe Rodriguez committed the crime of riot by acting together with other inmates to disturb the public peace and cause property damage. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the riot charge against Rodriguez.

State v. Mendez

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125241

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Francisco Alejandro Mendez, who was charged with multiple crimes following a crime spree in Topeka, Kansas, in April 2019. Mendez and his accomplices stole a car at gunpoint, shot at a group of Washburn University students, killing one, and robbed several people at gunpoint. Mendez was convicted by a jury of premeditated first-degree murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and aggravated robbery.

The Shawnee District Court sentenced Mendez to a life sentence plus 492 months in prison. Mendez appealed, raising nine claims of error, including insufficient evidence of premeditation, erroneous jury instructions, unconstitutional vagueness of the premeditated murder statute, insufficient evidence for some aggravated robbery convictions, multiplicity of charges, denial of a motion to suppress, prosecutorial error, erroneous jury instructions on "knowingly," and cumulative error.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found sufficient evidence to support the premeditation finding, noting that the time between the initial encounter and the shooting was enough for Mendez to form premeditation. The court also found that the aiding and abetting instruction, while legally inappropriate, was not clearly erroneous. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the premeditated murder statute as it was not raised in the lower court.

The court reversed three of Mendez's aggravated robbery convictions due to insufficient evidence, as there was no proof that property was taken from those victims. However, it upheld the conviction for the aggravated robbery of Clark, finding that as a passenger, he had possession and control of the car. The court also found that the traffic stop leading to Mendez's arrest was lawful and that the prosecutorial error in stating premeditation could be formed in one second was harmless. The court concluded that the cumulative error doctrine did not apply as only one error was identified.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Mendez's convictions for premeditated first-degree murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and the remaining aggravated robbery convictions, while reversing three aggravated robbery convictions.

State of Maine v. Desrosiers

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 77

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Trevor I. DesRosiers was convicted by a jury in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket on three counts of sexual abuse of a minor and three counts of furnishing liquor to a minor. DesRosiers appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to prove he and the victim were not married during the sexual acts and to establish the victim’s age for Counts 1-4. He also claimed prosecutorial errors in closing arguments deprived him of a fair trial.

The trial court denied DesRosiers’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms of forty-two months for sexual abuse and three months for furnishing liquor, with all but twenty months suspended. DesRosiers appealed the conviction.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that DesRosiers and the victim were not married, based on the victim’s age, living situation, and the nature of their relationship. The court also found sufficient evidence to establish the victim’s age during the offenses, as she was fifteen throughout the relevant period.

Regarding prosecutorial errors, the court determined that most of the prosecutor’s comments did not constitute error. However, the prosecutor’s comment on DesRosiers’s invocation of his Fourth Amendment right was deemed error but not obvious error. The court concluded that this isolated comment did not undermine the trial’s integrity or affect the verdict.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Commonwealth v. Tse

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13344

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On August 14, 2018, Yashua Amado, Darrell Smith, and Jerome Smith were shot while sitting in Amado's car on Deering Road in Mattapan. Amado was killed, and Darrell and Jerome sustained non-life-threatening injuries. The shooter was never identified. Dewane M. Tse was indicted for first-degree murder and two counts of armed assault with intent to murder, accused of participating in a joint venture by following the victims and driving the shooter to and from the crime scene.

In the Superior Court, a jury convicted Tse of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation regarding Amado and armed assault with intent to murder Darrell. Tse was acquitted of the charge related to Jerome. Tse's motions for required findings of not guilty were denied by the trial judge, who sentenced him to life without parole for the murder and a concurrent term for the assault. Tse appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly participated in the shooting or shared the shooter's lethal intent.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tse knew of or shared the shooter's lethal intent. The court noted that the evidence, including GPS data, cell site location information, and video footage, did not establish Tse's knowledge or intent to kill. The court emphasized that the Commonwealth's argument relied on speculative assertions about Tse's maneuvering of the vehicle, which was insufficient to prove shared lethal intent.

The court reversed Tse's convictions for first-degree murder and armed assault with intent to murder, set aside the verdicts, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of required findings of not guilty.

Commonwealth v. Vince V.

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13566

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

A juvenile was seen masturbating in a parked car and was charged with open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, a felony. At trial, the jury was also instructed on the lesser included offense of indecent exposure, a misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months in jail. The jury found the juvenile delinquent only of the lesser included offense. The juvenile, who had no prior offenses, argued that the delinquency adjudication must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Juvenile Court judge denied the motion to dismiss and sentenced the juvenile to a continuance without a finding until his nineteenth birthday, after which the charge was dismissed. The juvenile appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court to address whether the Juvenile Court retained jurisdiction over a first offense of a minor misdemeanor after a jury trial.

The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that once the jury found the juvenile delinquent only of a minor misdemeanor and it was undisputed that it was his first offense, the Juvenile Court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the delinquency adjudication should have been dismissed and recorded only as a Wallace W. determination. The court vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded the matter to the Juvenile Court with instructions to make the appropriate entry.

Myers v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-01083-SCT

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Michael K. Randolph

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Diamante Myers was charged with shooting into a dwelling and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The incident occurred on November 2, 2020, in Picayune, Mississippi, where Myers approached Abasi Bolden, who was cooking in his yard. After a verbal altercation, Myers threw an object at Bolden, leading to a physical fight. Myers later returned with a gun and fired shots, hitting a nearby house and shattering a window. Myers was wearing an ankle monitor, and data from the monitor placed him at the scene. He was arrested nearby, and gunshot residue was found on his hands.

The Pearl River County Circuit Court tried Myers in June 2023. The jury found him guilty on both charges. Myers appealed, arguing that the trial court committed plain error by granting jury instruction S-3, which he claimed constituted an impermissible constructive amendment to his indictment. The trial court had denied Myers's motion for a directed verdict after the prosecution rested its case.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court held that the language used in jury instruction S-3 did not constitute an impermissible constructive amendment to Myers's indictment. The court found that the instruction did not materially alter the essential elements of the offense or any defense Myers had. Therefore, the trial court's decision to grant the instruction was not plain error. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding Myers's convictions.

State v. McClellan

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 276

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Jim Rice

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

An employee of Lucky Lil’s Casino in Missoula, Montana, called 911 after failing to wake a man, McClellan, who was slumped over in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle. Officer Champa responded and, after waking McClellan, observed signs suggesting impairment. McClellan could not produce identification, and a search revealed a broken methamphetamine pipe. Further investigation confirmed McClellan’s driver’s license was suspended, and a subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. McClellan was charged with Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute.

The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, denied McClellan’s motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the officer had particularized suspicion to expand the welfare check into an investigatory stop. McClellan pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, focusing on whether the District Court erred in concluding that the officer had particularized suspicion to expand the welfare check into an investigatory stop. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the officer’s actions were justified under the community caretaker doctrine and that particularized suspicion arose during the interaction, allowing the investigatory stop to proceed lawfully. The court found that the officer’s observations and McClellan’s behavior provided sufficient grounds for the investigatory stop and subsequent search.

State v. Rymal

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 277

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On January 1, 2019, Missoula police were surveilling suspected illegal drug activity outside a casino. Officers observed two vehicles, a Honda and a Volkswagen, leave the casino together and head to a nearby grocery store parking lot. Officer Griffith parked his patrol car behind the Honda, where Catherine Marie Rymal was a passenger. Without activating his lights or siren, Griffith approached the Honda and asked Rymal not to dig around in the car. Rymal explained she was looking for her dog’s leash. Griffith then asked if he could talk to her and inquired about their activities at the casino. Rymal mentioned they were waiting for a friend and had been gambling. Griffith asked for her ID, and Rymal disclosed she might have a warrant for a speeding ticket.

The Montana Fourth Judicial District Court denied Rymal’s motion to suppress the drug evidence found during a subsequent search, ruling that her interaction with Officer Griffith was consensual and did not constitute an unlawful seizure. The court found that Rymal’s disclosure of her possible warrant was voluntary and provided reasonable suspicion for her detention.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Rymal was not seized at any point before she voluntarily disclosed her possible warrant status. The interaction between Rymal and Officer Griffith was deemed consensual, and Griffith’s conduct did not amount to a show of authority that would make a reasonable person feel they were not free to leave. Therefore, the evidence obtained was not the result of an unlawful seizure, and the motion to suppress was correctly denied.

People v Shader

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05873

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: TROUTMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1977, the defendant, then 19 years old, committed a series of serious sexual offenses, including rape and sodomy, after breaking into a stranger's home. He had a history of sexual misconduct dating back to 1968, including incidents of sexual abuse and attempted rape. He was convicted of multiple charges, including rape in the first degree, and sentenced to 8⅓ to 30 years in prison. After serving 21 years, he was released on parole in 1998 and classified as a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).

The defendant petitioned the County Court in 2021 to modify his risk level classification from level three to level one, citing his rehabilitation, stable employment, and supportive family relationships. The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders did not oppose the modification to level one. However, the People opposed any modification, emphasizing the seriousness of his past crimes. The County Court partially granted the petition, reducing his classification to level two but denying the request for level one, citing the seriousness of his 1977 crimes and his criminal history, including a 2003 misdemeanor conviction.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the County Court's decision. The Court held that the County Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the defendant's classification to level two but denying further modification to level one. The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the defendant's past crimes and his criminal history were relevant factors in assessing his risk of reoffense. The Court concluded that the defendant had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he was so unlikely to reoffend as to warrant a level one classification.

People v Vaughn

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05874

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: TROUTMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Two men entered a Brooklyn warehouse on May 9, 2016, one displaying a badge and the other remaining outside an office door. The man with the badge, a Black man, drew a firearm and forced an Asian victim to surrender $3,000. The robbers fled, and the victims called 911 and pursued them. Surveillance footage captured the robbery, but the robbers' facial features were unclear. Four days later, the first victim identified the defendant, who was wearing the same clothes as during the robbery. The defendant was arrested, and his sweatshirt, which was later destroyed by mold, was vouchered as evidence.

The defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree and proceeded to a jury trial. After jury selection and opening statements, the defense counsel indicated an intention to call an expert on cross-race effect. Later, the defense sought to expand the expert testimony to include other factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The trial court requested case law to support the additional factors but received none. The court allowed expert testimony only on cross-race effect, citing the late application and potential trial delay. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 20 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, noting sufficient corroborating evidence.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the expert testimony to cross-race effect. The court emphasized that the trial court properly weighed the probative value of the testimony against potential trial delay and other factors. The court clarified that corroborating evidence should not be the sole basis for admissibility decisions and affirmed the Appellate Division's order.

State v. Dietz

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 70

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Zachary C. Dietz pleaded guilty to two counts of counterfeiting lottery tickets in two separate cases. The circuit court imposed five-year suspended sentences on each conviction. Later, the State filed petitions to revoke Dietz’s suspended sentences for violating probation terms. Dietz admitted to the violations, and the court executed the entire five-year sentence on one conviction while leaving the other five-year sentence suspended. Dietz appealed, arguing the circuit court erred by not finding aggravating circumstances before revoking the suspended sentences. The State challenged the Supreme Court of South Dakota’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. Dietz was indicted for counterfeiting lottery tickets and pleaded guilty to both charges. The court imposed suspended sentences with probation. When Dietz violated probation terms, the State filed petitions to revoke the suspended sentences. Dietz admitted to the violations, and the court executed one of the five-year sentences while keeping the other suspended.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under SDCL 15-26A-3(4), which allows appeals from final orders in special proceedings. The court determined that probation revocation proceedings are special proceedings separate from the original criminal prosecution. The court also held that SDCL 22-6-11, which requires a finding of aggravating circumstances for certain sentences, applies only at the time of the original sentencing and not during probation revocation proceedings. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in revoking Dietz’s probation without finding aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision.

State V. Fuller

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 72

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Matthew Fuller was convicted of possessing more than two ounces but less than one-half pound of marijuana, a felony, and was placed on supervised probation. After two subsequent arrests, the State petitioned to revoke his probation. The court appointed two attorneys for Fuller, both of whom withdrew. The court did not appoint a third attorney and conducted the revocation hearing with Fuller representing himself. Fuller was found to have violated his probation and was sentenced to a previously suspended two-year prison term.

The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Codington County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. Fuller was arrested following a traffic stop and charged with marijuana possession. He was released on bond and represented by multiple attorneys who withdrew. Fuller pled guilty to a lesser charge, and the court imposed a suspended sentence with probation. After his subsequent arrests, the court ordered him held without bond pending the revocation hearing. Fuller’s attorneys withdrew due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, and the court did not appoint new counsel.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that while Fuller was entitled to appointed counsel under state law, he did not demonstrate that the lack of counsel prejudiced the outcome of the revocation hearing. The court found sufficient evidence to support the probation violation, including Fuller’s use of methamphetamine. The court also rejected Fuller’s claims of judicial bias and due process violations, affirming the lower court’s decision to revoke his probation and execute the suspended sentence.

State v. Pfeiffer

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 71

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Maxton Pfeiffer shot and killed his friend Ty Scott while they were at their friend Cody Siemonsma’s apartment. Pfeiffer admitted to sweeping Siemonsma’s .45 caliber pistol in Scott’s direction and discharging it, believing it was unloaded after checking it. Pfeiffer was charged with first-degree manslaughter. He argued that the circuit court erred by not instructing the jury that the State had to prove criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt, by refusing a mistake of fact instruction, and challenged an evidentiary ruling and the sufficiency of the evidence.

The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, held a seven-day trial. The jury found Pfeiffer guilty of first-degree manslaughter. Pfeiffer appealed, asserting errors in jury instructions, the exclusion of a deputy state’s attorney’s statement, and the sufficiency of the evidence.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the jury instructions, when viewed as a whole, correctly stated the law and adequately informed the jury of the State’s burden to prove criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mistake of fact instruction, as the instructions given sufficiently allowed Pfeiffer to present his defense. Additionally, the court ruled that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the deputy state’s attorney’s statement, as it was minimally relevant and potentially confusing to the jury. Finally, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Pfeiffer’s conviction, as a rational jury could find that Pfeiffer acted recklessly. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

BITTICK v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0013-24

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and engaging in organized criminal activity (EOCA). He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his EOCA conviction, arguing that it required proof of multiple crimes. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a single predicate crime was sufficient for an EOCA conviction.

The appellant was identified as a member of the Vagos gang, which moved into Texas around 2018. In 2019, he and other Vagos members assaulted David Perez at a 7-Eleven. The appellant and his accomplices, wearing Vagos colors, punched and kicked Perez before fleeing. The police identified the appellant and another Vagos member, William Canida, from store video footage. A high-ranking Vagos member, Christopher Vick, was also observed at the scene.

The Second Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the state needed to show only the appellant's individual participation in crime. The court noted that the EOCA statute enhances the severity of already-criminalized acts and does not require proof of multiple crimes. The appellant argued that the court misinterpreted a previous case, Martin v. State, which he claimed required proof of continuous criminal conduct for EOCA convictions.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the EOCA statute requires proof that a defendant, as a member of a criminal street gang, committed a single predicate crime. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to show that the appellant committed aggravated assault as a member of the Vagos gang. The court distinguished this case from Martin, noting that the EOCA statute does not criminalize otherwise lawful conduct and requires proof of individual participation in crime.

ELSIK v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0703-23

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A deputy sheriff in McMullen County, Texas, stopped a U-Haul truck driven by the appellant, Steven James Elsik, and discovered 13 individuals hiding in the truck bed. These individuals, including two minors, were identified as Mexican citizens and were taken into custody by U.S. Border Patrol. The appellant was indicted on multiple counts of human smuggling, including two counts of smuggling minors.

At trial, the prosecutor claimed the witnesses were unavailable because they had been deported, but admitted he had not verified their deportation or attempted to secure their testimony. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's statements and admitted the hearsay testimony of the witnesses' names, birthdates, and nationalities under the "Statement of Personal or Family History" exception to the hearsay rule.

The Fourth Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the hearsay testimony without evidence of the witnesses' unavailability. The court held that the error was harmful regarding the two second-degree felony convictions for smuggling minors, as the hearsay was necessary to prove the victims' ages, but not harmful for the third-degree felony convictions. Consequently, the court reversed the two second-degree felony convictions and remanded for a new trial on those counts.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the Fourth Court of Appeals. It held that the prosecutor's statements were insufficient to demonstrate the witnesses' unavailability under Texas Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5). The court emphasized that the State must show it made reasonable efforts to secure the witnesses' attendance or testimony, which it failed to do in this case.

FINLEY v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0634-22

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Barbara Hervey

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The appellant was charged with misdemeanor assault in County Criminal Court during the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court allowed the complainant to testify while wearing a surgical mask that covered her nose and mouth, over the appellant’s objections. The appellant argued that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him. The trial court overruled the objection, and the complainant testified with the mask. The jury convicted the appellant, and he was sentenced to 300 days’ confinement and fined $4,000.

The Second Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because the trial court did not make case-specific, evidence-based findings to justify the complainant wearing a mask while testifying. The appellate court found that the trial court’s general pronouncements about the COVID-19 pandemic were insufficient to meet the requirements set forth in Maryland v. Craig, which allows for the denial of face-to-face confrontation only if it furthers an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation was denied because the complainant’s mask covered a significant portion of her face, affecting the ability to observe her demeanor. The court found that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to justify the denial of face-to-face confrontation, as they did not provide a case-specific reason why the complainant needed to wear a mask. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the complainant was the sole witness to the alleged assault, and her testimony was crucial to the prosecution’s case.

GERLMAINE v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0302-24

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and pled guilty. The trial court accepted the plea and set sentencing for a later date. However, before sentencing, the appellant raised a question concerning punishment, leading the trial court to withdraw the plea and set the case for a jury trial. The appellant's counsel failed to file a timely election for jury punishment, and the trial court proceeded with the trial without the election. The appellant's counsel later filed an untimely election and a motion for recusal of the trial judge, both of which were denied.

The appellant appealed to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to timely elect jury punishment. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part and remanded the case for a new punishment trial. The court of appeals found that the counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that the appellant suffered prejudice as a result, concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the deficient performance caused the waiver of the appellant's right to have the jury assess punishment.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The court held that the record did not firmly establish that the appellant desired jury punishment at the time the election was required. The court noted that the only evidence of the appellant's intention came from an untimely-filed election and unsworn statements by trial counsel, which were insufficient to prove prejudice. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

OCHOA v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0746-23

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2021, a 14-year-old named Emanuel Ochoa was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 6, injury to a child causing serious mental injury, and kidnapping, all related to the sexual assault of a five-year-old girl. The key issue in this case was whether Ochoa's statements to law enforcement were made voluntarily. The court concluded that they were not.

The trial court denied Ochoa's motion to suppress his statements, ruling that they were voluntary. The Second Court of Appeals upheld this decision, finding that Ochoa was not in custody during the pre-warnings portion of the interview and that his post-warnings statements were voluntary. The court noted that Ochoa and his mother went to the interview voluntarily, he was told he could leave at any time, and his freedom of movement was not restricted. The court also found that the statements made by the magistrate and the Texas Ranger did not render Ochoa's confession involuntary.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. The court held that Ochoa's confession was involuntary under due process principles. The court emphasized that Ochoa's youth, lack of maturity, and inexperience with the legal system made him particularly vulnerable to coercive interrogation tactics. The court found that the combined effect of the Texas Ranger's misleading statements and the magistrate's incorrect information about Ochoa's rights overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a harm analysis.

State v. L'Esperance

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 74

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Judge: Eaton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with attempted second-degree murder for allegedly stabbing his roommate in the neck with a fillet knife in November 2019. The defendant admitted to the stabbing but claimed self-defense. The roommate testified that they had a good relationship and were drinking buddies, but a scuffle at a bar led to the incident. The bartender corroborated the roommate's account, adding that the defendant was angry and mentioned having a knife. The defendant testified that he acted in self-defense because the roommate threatened to kill him.

The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division, conducted the trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder. The defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in handling a discovery violation, denying judicial notice of the bartender's dismissed DUI charge, and failing to ensure the jury could hear defense counsel's questions due to COVID-19 mask protocols. The court denied the motion, finding no prejudice from the discovery violation and offering remedies the defendant declined. It also found no error in denying judicial notice and attributed any hearing issues to defense counsel's failure to speak up.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not commit plain or structural error by failing to sua sponte inquire if jurors could hear defense counsel's questions. It found no prejudice from the discovery violation, as the defendant declined offered remedies. The court also upheld the trial court's decision not to take judicial notice of the bartender's dismissed DUI charge, finding the proposed method appropriate. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

Johnson-Bey v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230619

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Kelsey

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2003, Stanley Edward Johnson-Bey was convicted of a drug offense and received a suspended sentence. Over the next seventeen years, he repeatedly violated the conditions of his probation and suspended sentence, leading to multiple revocations and resuspensions. In 2022, following his fifth violation, the sentencing court imposed a portion of his remaining suspended sentence. Johnson-Bey appealed, arguing that a 2021 amendment to Code § 19.2-306(A) stripped the court of jurisdiction to enter the revocation order.

The circuit court conducted a revocation hearing in May 2022 and found that Johnson-Bey had violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. The court rejected his argument regarding the 2021 amendment, agreeing with the Commonwealth that the amendment did not retroactively apply to his 2003 conviction or subsequent revocation orders. Johnson-Bey appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the 2021 amendment operated prospectively and did not affect sentencing orders entered before July 2021.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the 2021 amendments to Code §§ 19.2-303.1 and 19.2-306 did not retroactively apply to Johnson-Bey's 2003 conviction or any subsequent revocation orders. The court emphasized the presumption against retroactive legislation and concluded that the amendments did not limit the court's sentencing options at the May 2022 revocation hearing. The court also rejected Johnson-Bey's argument that the amendments should be applied prospectively to withdraw the court's jurisdiction, finding that the changes were substantive rather than procedural. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, maintaining the validity of the 2022 revocation order.

State v. Harris

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,311-1

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Barbara Madsen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2011, 17-year-old Darren Harris fatally stabbed an acquaintance and stole his wallet. Harris was charged with first-degree murder with a deadly weapon. After negotiations, Harris pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and first-degree robbery, with a joint sentence recommendation of 244 months. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed the recommended sentence.

Harris later filed a personal restraint petition, arguing for resentencing based on the State v. Houston-Sconiers decision, which requires courts to consider the mitigating qualities of youth. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as frivolous but later granted Harris an extension to appeal. The Court of Appeals found that Harris had agreed not to seek a lesser sentence and concluded that any resentencing would breach the plea agreement. The court held that Houston-Sconiers applied retroactively but did not require resentencing, suggesting Harris could withdraw his guilty plea instead.

The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and held that when a trial court accepts a plea agreement with a joint sentence recommendation, it is not required to independently consider mitigating evidence of youth under Houston-Sconiers. The court emphasized the importance of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system and concluded that no error occurred when the trial court did not inquire into Harris's youth before accepting the plea agreement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, affirming Harris's sentence and holding that resentencing was not required.

Olson v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 125

Opinion Date: November 22, 2024

Judge: Fenn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Matthew Justin Olson was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Olson was incarcerated in the Platte County Detention Center on federal charges and had pending state charges for domestic violence against his ex-wife, SK, who was a key witness. Olson asked his cellmate, Danny Hendershott, to kill SK in exchange for a government stimulus check. Hendershott initially agreed but later reported the plot to law enforcement, leading to an undercover operation by the ATF. Olson was subsequently charged with conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

The District Court of Uinta County allowed the State to introduce evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, indicating Olson had other serious charges pending. Olson objected, arguing this evidence was prejudicial. The court limited the State to stating Olson had four serious charges pending and SK was an important witness. Olson was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed, claiming the district court erred in its pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the 404(b) evidence.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the word "serious" was never actually introduced during the trial. The State's evidence was limited to stating Olson had pending charges without categorizing them as serious. The court held that Olson's substantial rights were not affected by the district court's pretrial ruling since the evidence presented at trial was in line with what Olson deemed appropriate. Consequently, any potential error in the pretrial ruling was deemed harmless. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed Olson's conviction.

Russell v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 126

Opinion Date: November 26, 2024

Judge: GRAY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Joseph W. Russell entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of a warrantless search conducted as he entered the Uinta County Courthouse. The search, performed by Deputy Dan Jensen, involved a magnetometer alerting to metal in Russell's waist area, leading to a pat-down and the discovery of a snus can containing methamphetamine. Russell was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance.

The district court denied Russell's motion to suppress the evidence, finding the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Russell entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the suppression order. He was sentenced to one to three years of imprisonment, suspended in favor of two years of supervised probation. Russell timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court applied a three-part test to determine the reasonableness of the search: the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern, the efficacy of the search in addressing that concern, and the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes. The court found that courthouse security is a compelling governmental interest, the use of a magnetometer and follow-up searches are effective in addressing this concern, and the privacy interest in the snus can was minimal given the context of courthouse security.

The court concluded that the search was reasonable and affirmed the district court's denial of Russell's motion to suppress. The holding emphasized that the search was justified under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment, balancing the government's interest in courthouse security against the minimal intrusion on Russell's privacy.