U.S. v. Millette

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1819

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2016, Kevin Millette was charged with possession of child pornography, having 24,277 images and 1,022 videos. He admitted to a lifelong problem with child pornography and pleaded guilty, receiving a 120-month prison sentence followed by seven years of supervised release. In December 2020, after serving about sixty-one months, he was granted compassionate release with several special conditions, including a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. In August 2023, a probation officer found Millette's teenage daughter in his bedroom while his approved supervisor, his mother, was outside. Millette initially lied about the sleeping arrangements but later admitted to sleeping in the same room as his daughter without supervision.

The United States District Court for the District of Maine held a revocation hearing in September 2023. The court found that Millette violated the condition prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors, noting that his conduct was a clear violation given his criminal history and the purpose of the condition. The court sentenced him to two months' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release, reimposing the same special condition.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Millette argued that the phrase "in the presence of" in the special condition was ambiguous and that the district court erred in finding a violation and reimposing the condition. The Court of Appeals found no error, holding that the condition was clear and that Millette's conduct constituted a violation. The court also found that reimposing the condition was justified given Millette's history and ongoing risk to minors. The court affirmed the revocation of Millette's supervised release and the reimposition of the special condition.

United States v. Bailey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1685

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: AFRAME

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Dominick Bailey, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This was Bailey's third conviction for the same offense, with previous convictions in 1997 and 2006. In 2019, Bailey was involved in a guns-for-drugs transaction, where he admitted to possessing firearms despite his felon status. He was arrested in Boston with multiple firearms in his possession. Bailey pleaded guilty without a plea agreement during a virtual proceeding.

The District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Bailey to eighty-seven months of imprisonment, departing upward from the advisory sentencing guideline range due to Bailey's extensive criminal history. Bailey objected to the sentencing departure in the district court.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Bailey challenged the indictment, the voluntariness of his guilty plea, the procedural aspects of his sentencing, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The appellate court reviewed Bailey's claims, applying plain error review to unpreserved claims and abuse of discretion to preserved claims.

The First Circuit found no plain error in the district court's determination that Bailey's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, despite Bailey's mental health conditions and medication use. The court also found that the district court did not err in its explanation for the upward departure, noting that Bailey's criminal history was extensive and warranted a higher sentence for public protection and deterrence. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the eighty-seven-month sentence was reasonable given Bailey's persistent criminality and the seriousness of the offense.

USA v. Soto

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1827

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Theodore Alexander McKee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jose Soto was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, two counts of bank robbery, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. At sentencing, the District Court set his offense level at 29 and sentenced him to 289 months in federal prison, including two mandatory and consecutive seven-year terms. The offense level included a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on allegations that Soto improperly interacted with jurors, a witness's brother, and victims.

The District Court for the District of New Jersey imposed the obstruction of justice enhancement based on three incidents: Soto stepping onto an elevator with jurors and asking one to press a button, interacting with a testifying witness's brother, and greeting victims at the courthouse. Soto's counsel argued that these interactions were not intended to obstruct justice and that Soto had not been instructed to avoid such interactions. The District Court, however, focused on the consequences of Soto's conduct rather than his intent, leading to the enhancement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court's application of the obstruction of justice enhancement was not supported by adequate evidence. The appellate court noted that the District Court did not explicitly adopt the findings of the presentence report and that the record lacked sufficient evidence to support the allegations of obstruction. The court emphasized that the enhancement requires a willful intent to obstruct justice, which was not demonstrated by Soto's actions. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the obstruction of justice enhancement.

United States v. Chang

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4615

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

David Chang participated in a drug-trafficking conspiracy from March to October 2021, supplying large quantities of cocaine from California to Harold Campbell, a mid-level distributor in Virginia Beach, Virginia. After an investigation, Chang and Campbell were indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release. Both pleaded guilty, and Chang was initially sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found Chang eligible for the safety valve under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) but erroneously applied the statutory minimum sentence. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. At the resentencing, the district court imposed a sentence of 69 months’ imprisonment and ten years’ supervised release, citing Chang’s significant role in the drug conspiracy and his criminal history.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the increased term of supervised release, despite a slight reduction in imprisonment, constituted a harsher sentence. The court held that this harsher sentence raised a presumption of vindictiveness under North Carolina v. Pearce, which was not adequately rebutted by the district court. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated Chang’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, emphasizing the need to avoid any appearance of vindictiveness in the sentencing process.

US v. Russell Laffitte

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4509

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Banking, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Russell Lucius Laffitte, who was convicted of bank and wire fraud in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The government alleged that between 2006 and 2021, Laffitte, as CEO of Palmetto State Bank, conspired with Alex Murdaugh, a disbarred attorney, to defraud Murdaugh’s clients. Laffitte was accused of using his position to access settlement accounts, collecting fees, and extending unsecured loans to Murdaugh, resulting in nearly two million dollars being stolen from the accounts. Laffitte was charged with conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and misapplication of bank funds.

During the trial, the government presented fifteen witnesses, and Laffitte called eight witnesses and testified in his own defense. After the jury began deliberations, the court received notes from jurors indicating issues, including one juror needing medication and another feeling pressured. The district court decided to remove two jurors, Juror No. 88 and Juror No. 93, and replaced them with alternates. The jury then returned a guilty verdict on all counts.

Laffitte appealed, arguing that the removal of the jurors violated his Fifth Amendment right to be present and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the removal of Juror No. 88 violated Laffitte’s Sixth Amendment right because there was a reasonable and substantial possibility that her removal was related to her views on the case. The court also found that the removal violated Laffitte’s Fifth Amendment right to be present, as he was not present during the in camera interview when the decision to remove Juror No. 88 was made. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and vacated Laffitte’s convictions and sentence, remanding the case for a new trial.

USA v. Minor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-51083

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Edgar Hermosillo Minor pled guilty to four drug charges in 2022, including importing and possessing methamphetamine and fentanyl with intent to distribute. His presentence report calculated a base offense level of 34, adjusted for his minimal role and acceptance of responsibility, but added five levels due to a career-offender enhancement based on three prior federal marijuana-related convictions from 2000 and 2010. This enhancement placed him in a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months, whereas without it, the range would have been 121 to 151 months. Minor objected to the enhancement, arguing that a 2018 amendment to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) excluded hemp from the definition of marijuana, making his prior convictions no longer qualify as "controlled substance offenses." The district court overruled his objection and applied the enhancement, sentencing him to 180 months.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas overruled Minor's objection and applied the career-offender enhancement based on the CSA's definition of marijuana at the time of his prior convictions. Despite this, the court imposed a downward variance, sentencing Minor to 180 months, which he timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the CSA's definition of "controlled substance" in effect at the time of sentencing for the current offense should be used to determine whether prior convictions qualify for the career-offender enhancement. The court found that the district court erred by applying the enhancement based on the outdated definition of marijuana. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless, as the district court did not explicitly state that it would impose the same sentence regardless of the correct Guidelines range. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing.

USA v. Qureshi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20328

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Priscilla Richman Owen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Parvez Qureshi was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and four counts of distribution of controlled substances. Qureshi, a physician, had partnered with Rubeena Ayesha, an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse, to operate a pain management clinic. The clinic saw a high volume of patients, many of whom paid cash for prescriptions of controlled substances like Norco and Oxycodone. The Government alleged that Qureshi pre-signed blank prescriptions, which Ayesha used to prescribe these substances when Qureshi was not present.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially tried Qureshi, resulting in a mistrial. In a subsequent trial, Qureshi was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to sixty months for each count, to run concurrently. Qureshi appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ruan v. United States, which clarified the mens rea requirement for convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the jury instructions for the substantive counts under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) were erroneous because they did not require the jury to find that Qureshi knew he was acting in an unauthorized manner. This omission was not harmless, as Qureshi's knowledge was a contested issue at trial. However, the court held that the conspiracy instruction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 was not erroneous, as it required the jury to find that Qureshi knew the purpose of the agreement was to distribute controlled substances without authorization.

The Fifth Circuit vacated Qureshi's convictions for the four substantive counts and remanded for a new trial on those counts. The court affirmed Qureshi's conspiracy conviction but vacated his sentence on all counts and remanded for resentencing on the conspiracy count.

United States v. Joseph Gray

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1828

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law, White Collar Crime

Joseph Scott Gray, a decorated U.S. Army veteran, was convicted of defrauding the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) by lying about his health to obtain benefits. After leaving the military in 2003, Gray falsely claimed severe disabilities to receive increased benefits, including "individual unemployability" and "aid and attendance" benefits. His fraudulent activities were exposed when investigators videotaped him performing daily activities without assistance, contradicting his claims of severe disability.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan convicted Gray of several fraud-related offenses. The jury found him guilty, and the district court sentenced him to five years in prison and ordered him to pay $264,631 in restitution, covering benefits received from 2004 onward. Gray appealed, challenging the exclusion of an expert witness, the calculation of his criminal history score, the reasonableness of his sentence, and the restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the exclusion of Gray's expert witness, Dr. Ennis Berker, as the proposed testimony was deemed irrelevant to the issues at trial. The court also found no procedural error in the calculation of Gray's criminal history score and deemed the five-year sentence substantively reasonable, considering the severity and duration of his fraudulent conduct.

However, the court vacated the restitution order, ruling that it should not cover losses before January 2015, as the indictment only charged Gray with a conspiracy beginning in 2015. The case was remanded for recalculation of the restitution amount, limited to the period specified in the indictment.

United States v. Taylor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5344

Opinion Date: November 15, 2024

Judge: MATHIS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Nathaniel Taylor was stopped by a police officer for speeding on an interstate in Knoxville, Tennessee. During the stop, the officer requested a K-9 unit based on Taylor’s suspicious activities, including his movements in the car, his criminal history, and the presence of multiple air fresheners. The K-9 unit indicated the presence of drugs, leading to a search of Taylor’s vehicle, which uncovered a firearm. As a felon, Taylor was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Taylor was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the time necessary to issue a traffic citation.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied Taylor’s motion to suppress. Taylor then conditionally pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. The court found that the factors cited by the officer, including Taylor’s travel plans, criminal history, air fresheners, and movements, did not collectively amount to reasonable suspicion. The court held that the officer’s extension of the stop to conduct a dog sniff was not justified. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

United States v. Bonds

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1576

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Clarence Bonds, serving a 71-month sentence for transporting a firearm in interstate commerce as a felon, sought a reduced sentence based on Amendment 821 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This amendment, which applies retroactively, reduced Bonds's criminal history category from IV to III, thereby lowering his advisory Guidelines range from 57–71 months to 46–57 months. Bonds requested the district court to reduce his sentence accordingly. The district court acknowledged the amendment's impact but declined to reduce his sentence, citing the need for deterrence, incapacitation, public protection, and Bonds's extensive criminal history, which included numerous violent crimes with firearms.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The court recognized the amendment's effect on Bonds's criminal history category and advisory range but exercised its discretion to maintain the original sentence. The court emphasized Bonds's long criminal history and the serious nature of his offenses as reasons for not reducing the sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The appellate court agreed that the district court had adequately considered the relevant factors under 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and provided a sufficient explanation for its decision. Additionally, the appellate court addressed whether the Criminal Justice Act authorized the appointment of appellate counsel for Bonds in his effort to challenge the district court's ruling. The panel was divided on this issue, with each judge providing a separate opinion. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Bonds's motion on the merits.

United States v. Maluoth

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3685

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Mar Maluoth was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a machinegun in violation of federal law. During a police surveillance operation, officers observed suspicious behavior involving Maluoth, leading to a traffic stop. During the stop, officers found a loaded Glock handgun modified to be a machinegun under the front passenger seat where Maluoth was sitting. Maluoth denied placing the gun there and claimed his movements were due to searching for his lighter and cigarettes. However, the jury found him guilty based on the evidence presented.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska sentenced Maluoth to 70 months in prison, which was an upward variance from the advisory guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The court considered factors such as the obliterated serial number on the firearm and Maluoth's history of obstructing justice. Maluoth appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Maluoth guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that Maluoth's furtive movements and the location of the firearm supported the jury's verdict. Regarding the sentence, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors, including the obliterated serial number and Maluoth's criminal history. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

United States v. Virrueta

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3370

Opinion Date: November 15, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eric Virrueta pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in a warrantless search of his vehicle after a traffic stop. The evidence included methamphetamine and marijuana. Virrueta challenged the validity of the traffic stop, the extension of the stop, and the search of the vehicle, arguing that the search was not supported by probable cause and that the consent given by his parole agent was invalid.

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied Virrueta's motion to suppress. The court found that the initial traffic stop was valid based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause, as Corporal Fischer had identified Virrueta driving without a valid license. The court also concluded that the extension of the stop was justified by the strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle, which provided probable cause for the search. Additionally, the court upheld the search based on the consent given by Virrueta's parole agent, who had been informed of multiple parole violations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court's rulings, agreeing that the traffic stop was valid, the extension of the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, and the search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause. The court also held that the parole agent's consent provided an independent basis for the search. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

U.S. v. Porter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-10286

Opinion Date: November 15, 2024

Judge: Bress

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Charles Porter, a Yosemite National Park employee, was charged with various sexual assault offenses after attempting to anally rape T.D., another male park employee, in April 2020. T.D. testified that Porter, heavily intoxicated, forced himself on T.D. in his cabin. Neighbors corroborated T.D.'s account. Porter claimed T.D. was the aggressor. The district court allowed testimony from Porter’s ex-girlfriend, A.H., under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which permits evidence of prior sexual assaults. A.H. testified that Porter had previously engaged in nonconsensual sex with her.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California admitted A.H.'s testimony after evaluating its probative value against potential prejudice under Rule 403. The jury found Porter guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 148 months in prison. Porter appealed, arguing that Rule 413 violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by allowing propensity evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rule 413 is constitutional, referencing its decision in United States v. Lemay, which upheld the analogous Rule 414 for child molestation cases. The court emphasized that Rule 413, like Rule 414, is subject to Rule 403, which allows district courts to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence. The court found that the district court had properly applied Rule 403 and provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding A.H.'s testimony.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Porter’s conviction, concluding that the admission of A.H.'s testimony under Rule 413 did not violate due process.

Martinez v. Quick

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-6001

Opinion Date: November 19, 2024

Judge: MORITZ

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Mica Martinez was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Martinez sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim about his trial counsel’s inadequate investigation and presentation of testimony from his grandfather, mother, and uncle. He also claimed that his sentencing was fundamentally unfair due to witness testimony about his use of a racial slur and argued for reversible cumulative error.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Martinez’s conviction and sentence, finding sufficient evidence of malice aforethought and holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently. The OCCA also rejected Martinez’s claim that the introduction of a racial slur during sentencing denied him a fair proceeding, concluding that any error was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the comment. The OCCA denied Martinez’s applications for postconviction relief, including his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of trial counsel’s investigation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The court held that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law or rely on an unreasonable factual finding in rejecting Martinez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court also found that Martinez failed to point to any clearly established federal law regarding the introduction of inflammatory evidence, and the OCCA did not base its decision on an unreasonable factual finding. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of relief on the cumulative error claim as well.

United States v. Martinez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2193

Opinion Date: November 19, 2024

Judge: FEDERICO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the early hours of November 13, 2021, DeAnna Suazo was found dead outside her home on the Taos Pueblo, New Mexico, under her running vehicle, showing signs of being run over. Her boyfriend, Santiago Martinez, after a failed polygraph test, admitted to pushing Suazo to the ground and running her over. Martinez was indicted for second-degree murder in Indian Country. Several pretrial motions were adjudicated, leading to three separate appeals.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted Martinez's motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements to the FBI, ruling that he should have been re-Mirandized before the post-polygraph interview. The court also ruled inadmissible certain text messages between Suazo and Martinez, which the Government argued were not hearsay but showed their effect on Martinez. Additionally, the court excluded witness testimony of a prior incident where Martinez allegedly assaulted Suazo, ruling it inadmissible under Rule 404(b).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's suppression of Martinez's post-polygraph statements, holding that the initial Miranda waiver was valid and did not require re-advisement before the post-polygraph interview. The court also reversed the exclusion of the text messages, agreeing with the Government that they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to show their effect on Martinez. Lastly, the court reversed and remanded the exclusion of the prior assault testimony for reconsideration, given the changed evidentiary landscape with the admissibility of Martinez's statements. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion.

TURNER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 171

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Womack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ke’von Turner was convicted of two counts of felony-capital murder for his involvement in the 2021 murders of Roger Shelby and Andrea Verser in North Little Rock. Turner was sentenced to two concurrent life terms without parole. Evidence showed that Turner orchestrated the ambush, where three gunmen fired twenty-three bullets into the victims' vehicle, killing them instantly. Turner had communicated with the gunmen multiple times before the shooting and was implicated as the primary organizer of the murders, motivated by a large sum of money stored in Shelby’s apartment from their criminal activities.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Division, presided over the trial. Turner challenged his convictions on three grounds: insufficient evidence of his participation as an accomplice, the limitation on voir dire questioning regarding the range of punishment, and the admission of Snapchat evidence via testimony from a State witness. The circuit court denied Turner’s motion for a directed verdict, finding sufficient evidence of his involvement through accomplice liability. The court also limited voir dire questioning on sentencing considerations but allowed general inquiries about mandatory minimums. Additionally, the court admitted testimony about a Snapchat message despite Turner’s objection based on the best-evidence rule.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The court held that substantial evidence supported Turner’s convictions as an accomplice in the aggravated robbery and related felony-capital murders. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s limitation on voir dire questioning or in admitting the Snapchat testimony, as the message was automatically deleted and treated like a phone conversation. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed Turner’s convictions and sentences.

Garcia v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B334806(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: FEUER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the LAPD for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.

Previously, the trial court had found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, with the jury finding true various firearm and gang-related enhancements. On appeal, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and Garcia's sentence was adjusted to 120 years to life. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied until the current petition was found to state a prima facie case for relief.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court reasoned that denying such discovery would hinder the petitioner's ability to defend against new theories of liability that the prosecution might present at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena, as it prevented Garcia from obtaining potentially relevant evidence. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion.

P. v. Bagsby

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D083358(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: DO

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.

The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also contended the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed section 1170(d) despite amendments and that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and outside juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also found the stay order would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes.

P. v. Ibarra

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D084309(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Kelety

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Francisco Carlos Ibarra was charged with the attempted murders of A.U. and R.M., and two counts of attempted robbery. The incident occurred on a rural property used for illegal marijuana cultivation, where A.U. and R.M. were present. Ibarra and others, wearing black clothes and ski masks, arrived in a truck and began shooting at a shed where A.U. and R.M. had taken cover. A.U. was severely injured, and R.M. was shot in the back. Ibarra was convicted of both counts of attempted premeditated murder and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury found true the arming allegations but not the allegations of personal firearm discharge or infliction of great bodily injury.

The Superior Court of Riverside County sentenced Ibarra to a total of six years determinate plus 14 years to life indeterminate. Ibarra appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions regarding the "kill zone" theory, self-defense, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory for the attempted murder of R.M., as there was no evidence that Ibarra knew R.M. was present in the shed. Consequently, the conviction for count 2 was reversed. However, the court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, as there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. The court also affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences, finding substantial evidence that the attempted murders were not incidental to the robberies.

The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction for the attempted murder of R.M. and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to allow the prosecution to retry Ibarra on that count or dismiss it. The judgment was otherwise affirmed.

P. v. Jones

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168930(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Humes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jovan Jones was convicted by a jury of multiple felonies, including rape, sexual penetration, and assault with intent to commit a sex offense during a first-degree burglary, after he attacked a woman, C.M., in her apartment and stole her backpack. The jury also found true the allegations under the One Strike law that Jones committed two of the sex offenses during a burglary with intent to commit a sex offense and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.

The trial court dismissed one count of attempted rape at the prosecution's request after the close of evidence. The jury convicted Jones of aggravated burglary, sexual penetration standing in the kitchen, rape in the bedroom, and robbery. The jury found true the burglary and weapon circumstances for the sexual penetration count and the burglary circumstance for the rape count. Jones was also found guilty of attempted sexual penetration and attempted rape, with the jury finding true the lesser allegation that he was armed with a deadly weapon during these offenses. The trial court sentenced Jones to a total term of 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court agreed that a full resentencing was required due to an unauthorized three-year enhancement. The court rejected Jones's other claims, including the argument that the prosecution's alternative theory of burglary based on his entry into the bedroom was an "ambush" and that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly suggested the presumption of innocence was over. The court struck the unauthorized enhancement, remanded for resentencing, ordered certain clerical errors corrected, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

P. v. Martinez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B330041(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 19, 2024

Judge: Hanasono

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The defendant, Eliseo Martinez, restrained Nicasio Calixto Pascual while his cousin, Valente Martinez, stabbed Calixto 18 times. During an interview with detectives, Martinez admitted his participation in the stabbing. Martinez claimed the trial court improperly denied an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, arguing it was not supported by the evidence and was prohibited under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) due to the victim’s sexual orientation. Martinez also contended that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the court found him voluntarily absent from the trial.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Martinez guilty of attempted murder and determined several aggravating circumstances, including that the crime was a hate crime. Martinez was sentenced to 23 years in state prison. Martinez appealed, arguing the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter and in proceeding with the trial in his absence.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence that Martinez acted in the heat of passion due to sufficient provocation. The court also found that Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) rendered any provocation related to the victim’s sexual orientation objectively unreasonable. Additionally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Martinez voluntarily absented himself from the trial, and thus, his right to be present was not violated. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

P. v. Robinson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098299(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 18, 2024

Judge: Earl

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted on multiple felony charges, including attempted murder, for crimes committed between January and February 2011. Robinson pleaded no contest to several charges, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, which was denied by the trial court. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by considering grand jury testimony, which he claimed was inadmissible hearsay.

The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially handled the case, where Robinson pleaded no contest and was sentenced. In 2022, Robinson sought resentencing, but the trial court denied his petition after considering grand jury transcripts. Robinson contended that the grand jury testimony should not have been considered, as it constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the grand jury testimony was admissible under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), which allows for the consideration of evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial if it remains admissible under current law. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and thus fell within the scope of "any prior hearing." The court also determined that Robinson's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, as the section 1172.6 hearing is a postconviction collateral proceeding, not a new criminal prosecution, and thus does not afford the same constitutional protections.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the grand jury testimony was properly considered and that Robinson's due process rights were not violated.

Shenefield v. Kovtun

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D083018(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Irion

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.

The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer.

State v. Mebane

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20750

Opinion Date: November 19, 2024

Judge: Ecker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of murder, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. The case involved the shooting death of the victim, Eric Diaz, who was selling drugs when he was approached by a man, later identified as the defendant, and a fight ensued in a black car, resulting in the victim being shot in the abdomen. The victim died from the gunshot wound. The police identified the car as a Nissan Maxima with a broken rear vent window, registered to Frank Bridgeforth but driven by the defendant. Forensic evidence and eyewitness testimonies linked the defendant to the crime.

The trial court asked questions to three witnesses, including a police officer and two defense experts, which the defendant claimed were biased and prejudicial. The trial court’s questions aimed to clarify the preparation of a photographic array and the presence of gunshot residue in the car. The defendant did not object to these questions during the trial. The jury was instructed that the court’s questions should not influence their judgment.

The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s questioning did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. The court held that the questions were not extensive or adverse enough to impair the jury’s function or the judge’s impartiality. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s intent to kill, given the close-range shooting in a vital area and the defendant’s flight from the scene.

The defendant’s claims of improper jury instructions were deemed waived because defense counsel had a meaningful opportunity to review and did not object to the instructions. The court concluded that the instructions, when viewed as a whole, were not clearly erroneous and did not constitute plain error. The judgment was affirmed.

Mosley v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-1091

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2004, John F. Mosley was convicted of the first-degree murders of his ten-month-old son, Jay-Quan, and the boy’s mother, Lynda Wilkes. Evidence presented at Mosley’s 2005 trial established that he strangled Wilkes, asphyxiated Jay-Quan in a garbage bag, and disposed of their bodies. Wilkes’s remains were recovered, but Jay-Quan’s body was never found. Mosley received a life sentence for Wilkes’s murder and a death sentence for Jay-Quan’s murder.

The Florida Supreme Court twice vacated Mosley’s death sentence, most recently in 2022, due to procedural errors, including the trial court’s failure to address Mosley’s motion to represent himself. The case was remanded for a new Spencer hearing and sentencing. Upon remand, Mosley requested counsel, and the trial court again imposed a death sentence. Mosley appealed, raising two issues.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case. Mosley’s first claim, seeking a new penalty phase due to alleged jury nullification, was deemed procedurally barred as it was not raised in his previous appeal. The second claim, regarding newly discovered evidence of the medical examiner’s impairment, was dismissed as untimely. The court noted that even if the claim were timely, it would not succeed because the evidence was not likely to produce an acquittal on retrial.

The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Mosley’s death sentence, concluding that the issues raised were not properly before the court and did not warrant relief.

People v. Brown

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129585

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In October 2019, Alvin Brown pleaded guilty to driving while his license was revoked, a Class 2 felony, and was sentenced to nine years in prison as a Class X offender due to his criminal history. Brown later filed a postplea motion, which was denied by the Boone County circuit court. The appellate court affirmed the decision.

Brown appealed, arguing that he should benefit from a new Class X recidivism provision that took effect after his sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his postplea motion. He also claimed that his defense counsel failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). The appellate court found that the doctrine of invited error precluded Brown's claim regarding the new statute and that his counsel was not ineffective. The court also found that defense counsel's Rule 604(d) certificate was facially compliant and that Brown had been afforded a full and fair opportunity to present his motion for reconsideration of his sentence.

The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the legislature clearly intended the amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b) to apply prospectively, as indicated by the delayed implementation date. Therefore, Brown was not entitled to be sentenced under the amended statute. The court also found that Brown's counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue for the application of the new statute. Additionally, the court determined that Brown had been given a full and fair opportunity to present his postplea claims, and further postplea proceedings were unnecessary.

People v. Harris

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129753

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: WHITE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2012, Kyjuanzi Harris was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder for the shooting deaths of Derrick Armstrong and Bernadette Turner. He was sentenced to life in prison by the Cook County circuit court. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2018, Harris filed an initial postconviction petition, which was dismissed. In 2021, he sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition, presenting an affidavit from Wynton Collins, who claimed to have witnessed the shooting and identified a different person as the shooter. The circuit court denied the motion, questioning the credibility and timing of Collins's affidavit.

The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding that Harris failed to demonstrate that Collins's testimony could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The court noted that Harris did not allege he only discovered Collins's testimony in prison and that Collins did not state he was unavailable or unlocatable earlier. The court concluded that Harris did not make a colorable claim of actual innocence.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and found that Harris sufficiently alleged that Collins's affidavit was newly discovered evidence. The court determined that Collins's affidavit, which identified a different shooter and explained his fear of coming forward earlier, was new, material, noncumulative, and could likely change the outcome of a retrial. The court emphasized that factual and credibility determinations should not be made at the leave-to-file stage. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction proceedings.

People v. Haynes

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129795

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Rochford

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Victor Haynes was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to 31 years in prison after a bench trial. The incident occurred on a party bus where Haynes, after an argument, shot Jerome White in the chest during a physical altercation. White had intervened when Haynes was choking Virgetta White. Haynes argued that the gun fired accidentally during the struggle. The trial court found Haynes guilty of the attempted murder of White, noting that Haynes was the aggressor and had knowingly discharged the firearm.

The appellate court affirmed Haynes' conviction but vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing. The appellate court found that Haynes' counsel was ineffective for not seeking a reduced sentence under section 8-4(c)(1)(E) of the Illinois Criminal Code, which allows for a lesser sentence if the defendant acted under sudden and intense passion due to serious provocation and would have negligently or accidentally caused death if the victim had died. The appellate court believed there was a reasonable probability that the trial court could have found serious provocation and that the gunshot was accidental.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that Haynes was not eligible for a reduced sentence under section 8-4(c)(1)(E) because he could not prove serious provocation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court found that White's actions were a response to Haynes' aggression towards Virgetta and that the fight was not on equal terms, as Haynes used a deadly weapon. Therefore, Haynes' counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a reduced sentence, and the original sentence was affirmed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

People v. Johnson

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 130191

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Overstreet

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated domestic battery for strangling Lacey S., a family or household member. The circuit court of Logan County sentenced the defendant to an extended-term of 10 years’ imprisonment after considering statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation. The appellate court found that the defendant forfeited his argument on appeal that the circuit court considered improper factors in aggravation when imposing the sentence. The appellate court concluded that although a clear or obvious error occurred, plain error was not established because the evidence was not closely balanced, nor was the error so egregious that it denied the defendant a fair sentencing hearing. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case to determine whether the forfeited error of the circuit court’s consideration of an improper factor in aggravation at sentencing is subject to plain error review under the second prong of the plain error rule. The court found that the circuit court committed a clear or obvious error by considering the defendant’s position of trust in relation to the victim as a statutory factor in aggravation. However, the court concluded that this error did not constitute structural error, which would render the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair and undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the forfeited error of considering the improper factor in aggravation is not subject to review under the second prong of the plain error rule but is subject to first prong plain error analysis. The court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which had affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

People v. Mikolaitis

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 130693

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: WHITE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Christian P. Mikolaitis, was charged with attempted first-degree murder and aggravated battery after allegedly stabbing Alec Geibel multiple times. The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, arguing that Mikolaitis posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community. The petition included details of the incident, witness statements, and Mikolaitis's arrest. Pretrial services completed a risk assessment, but it contained limited information as Mikolaitis declined to participate.

The circuit court of Will County held a pretrial detention hearing and found that the proof was evident that Mikolaitis committed a detainable offense, posed a real and present threat to Geibel, and that no release conditions could mitigate this threat. The court noted Mikolaitis's failure to take prescribed antipsychotic medication as a significant concern. The court subsequently entered a written detention order. Mikolaitis appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any threat he posed.

The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order, finding that the State provided sufficient evidence regarding the factors set forth in section 110-5 of the Code, which supported the denial of pretrial release. The court noted that the State's burden does not require addressing every conceivable condition but rather presenting sufficient evidence to allow the court to determine whether pretrial release is appropriate. A dissenting opinion argued that the State failed to meet its burden by not presenting evidence related to specific conditions of release.

The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that the State met its burden by presenting evidence regarding the statutory factors and that the circuit court properly considered all relevant evidence in determining that no conditions could mitigate the safety threat posed by Mikolaitis's release.

People v. Ratliff

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129356

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Earl Ratliff, was indicted for robbery after allegedly taking a woman's purse by force. During his arraignment, he was informed of the charges, the sentencing range, and his right to counsel, and a public defender was appointed. Later, Ratliff expressed a desire to represent himself, and the court allowed this without providing the required admonishments under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a). Ratliff eventually entered an open guilty plea and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. He later filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and requested a private attorney. The court reappointed the public defender, who filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which was denied.

The appellate court affirmed Ratliff's conviction and sentence, despite his argument that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 401(a) before accepting his waiver of counsel. The appellate court acknowledged the trial court's omission but concluded that the defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary, and any deficiency in the court's admonishment was harmless.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and found that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court's order entering judgment on the guilty plea, as the defendant's notice of appeal only specified the order denying the motion to reconsider the sentence. The Supreme Court held that Ratliff waived any Rule 401(a) claim by pleading guilty and failing to raise the issue in his postplea motions. Additionally, the court determined that a Rule 401(a) violation is not akin to structural error and is not cognizable as second-prong plain error. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the circuit court's judgment.

People v. Rothe

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129906

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Cunningham

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Joseph Rothe was convicted of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment, arguing that his conviction violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because the elements of armed robbery with a weapon other than a firearm and armed violence with a Category III weapon are identical, but the penalties are different. The Madison County circuit court dismissed his petition as untimely.

The appellate court affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds. It held that the petition was timely because constitutional challenges can be raised at any time. However, it rejected Rothe’s claim on the merits, ruling that the offenses do not have identical elements because they define "dangerous weapon" differently. The appellate court concluded that the armed robbery statute's broad definition of dangerous weapons is distinct from the specific list of Category III weapons in the armed violence statute.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the definition of "dangerous weapon" under the armed robbery statute is broader than the defined list of Category III weapons in the armed violence statute. Therefore, the two statutes do not contain identical elements, and Rothe's claim that his conviction violated the proportionate penalties clause was without merit. The court concluded that the armed robbery and armed violence statutes are not identical offenses, and there was no violation of the proportionate penalties clause. The dismissal of Rothe’s petition was affirmed.

People v. Sloan

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129676

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Matthew Sloan was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder for the shooting death of his brother, David Sloan. The incident occurred after a physical altercation between the brothers, during which Matthew claimed self-defense. The Jefferson County circuit court denied Matthew's request for a jury instruction on the duty to retreat, which led to an appeal.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the trial court had improperly resolved a factual matter that should have been decided by the jury. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's refusal to give the duty to retreat instruction was an abuse of discretion and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case to determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the duty to retreat instruction. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as there was no evidence to support that David was the initial aggressor, which is necessary for the duty to retreat instruction to apply. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly served as a gatekeeper in determining the necessity of the jury instruction and that the appellate court had erred in its decision.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's judgment, affirmed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case to the appellate court to address the unresolved issues raised by the defendant on appeal.

People v. Smollett

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 130431

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Rochford

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves Jussie Smollett, who was initially indicted on 16 counts of felony disorderly conduct for allegedly falsely reporting a hate crime to the Chicago police. On March 26, 2019, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (CCSAO) moved to dismiss the charges via nolle prosequi, citing Smollett’s community service and bond forfeiture as reasons. The trial court granted the motion, and Smollett’s bond was released to the City of Chicago.

A retired appellate court justice later filed a motion to appoint a special prosecutor, questioning the resolution of the charges and the manner in which the Cook County State’s Attorney, Kim Foxx, had recused herself. Judge Michael Toomin appointed Dan Webb as special prosecutor, who then indicted Smollett on six counts of felony disorderly conduct. Smollett moved to dismiss the new indictment on double jeopardy grounds and argued that the appointment of the special prosecutor was invalid. The trial court denied these motions, and Smollett was convicted by a jury and sentenced to probation, jail time, a fine, and restitution.

The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the second prosecution violated due process. The court found that the initial dismissal by nolle prosequi was part of a bilateral agreement between Smollett and the CCSAO, in which Smollett performed his part by forfeiting his bond and completing community service. The court ruled that the State must honor such agreements, and a second prosecution under these circumstances was fundamentally unfair and a due process violation. The court reversed Smollett’s conviction and remanded the case with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal.

Murillo v. State of Iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1967

Opinion Date: November 15, 2024

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Daniel Murillo, a registered sex offender, sought to modify his registry requirements under Iowa Code section 692A.128. Murillo had pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree in 2005 and was required to register as a sex offender. He completed a sex offender treatment program (SOTP) while incarcerated and received a certificate of completion in 2009. In 2022, Murillo applied to be removed from the sex offender registry, citing his completion of the SOTP and a low-risk assessment for recidivism.

The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Murillo's application, determining that he had not "successfully completed" the SOTP because he only admitted guilt to avoid a longer sentence. The court also found that Murillo posed an ongoing risk to the community. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in determining that Murillo had not successfully completed the SOTP, as he had a certificate of completion from the Department of Corrections. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Murillo's application for modification. The court concluded that the district court properly considered relevant factors, including Murillo's inconsistent admissions of guilt and the need for further treatment, in determining that he posed an ongoing risk to the community.

The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals but affirmed the judgment of the district court, maintaining Murillo's registration requirements.

State of Iowa v. Flynn

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1448

Opinion Date: November 15, 2024

Judge: McDonald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jeffrey Flynn was stopped by Dubuque County Deputy Sheriff Rob Freund for speeding. Freund suspected Flynn was intoxicated after smelling alcohol and hearing Flynn admit to drinking. Flynn performed poorly on field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test indicated a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Flynn was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and transported to the law enforcement center. Freund requested Flynn submit to a chemical breath test without providing a written request or advising Flynn of the consequences of refusal or submission. The test showed a blood alcohol concentration of .110, and Flynn was charged with OWI first offense.

The Iowa District Court for Dubuque County granted Flynn’s motion to suppress the chemical breath test evidence. The court reasoned that the statutory requirements for a written request and advisories were mandatory and not followed by Freund. The court concluded that the failure to comply with these requirements rendered the test results inadmissible.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the implied consent statute requires a peace officer to make a written request and provide advisories when requesting a motorist to submit to a chemical test under certain conditions, which were present in this case. The court rejected the State’s argument that the statute was not invoked and that actual consent was sufficient. The court concluded that the failure to follow the statutory procedures rendered the chemical breath test results incompetent for prosecution purposes. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State v. Staton

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0380

Opinion Date: November 15, 2024

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Chad Allen Staton was convicted by a jury of incest and sexual abuse of his daughter. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient, the district court erred by allowing his daughter to testify about a prior uncharged incident, and his right to allocute was violated when the sentencing court disallowed discussion of rejected plea offers. Staton contended that the rejected plea offers demonstrated his sincerity in professing innocence, which should mitigate his lack of remorse at sentencing.

The Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, presided over by Judge Linda M. Fangman, sentenced Staton to indeterminate prison sentences totaling forty years with a mandatory minimum of seventeen and a half years. Staton appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, finding the evidence sufficient and the admission of the prior incident appropriate. The court also concluded that Staton’s right to allocute was not violated as he and his counsel had opportunities to address mitigation.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case to address whether the defendant’s right to allocute was violated by disallowing discussion of rejected plea offers. The court held that the district court correctly cut off discussion of rejected plea offers during allocution, as such offers are inadmissible under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(5). The court reasoned that allowing discussion of rejected plea offers could deter prosecutors from making plea offers. The court affirmed the decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals and the judgment of the district court, concluding that Staton’s right to allocute was not violated since he and his counsel were allowed to argue his professed innocence to explain his lack of remorse.

Commonwealth v. Tse

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13344

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On August 14, 2018, Yashua Amado, Darrell Smith, and Jerome Smith were shot while sitting in Amado's car on Deering Road in Mattapan. Amado was killed, and Darrell and Jerome sustained non-life-threatening injuries. The shooter was never identified. Dewane M. Tse was indicted for first-degree murder and two counts of armed assault with intent to murder, accused of participating in a joint venture by following the victims and driving the shooter to and from the crime scene.

In the Superior Court, a jury convicted Tse of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation regarding Amado and armed assault with intent to murder Darrell. Tse was acquitted of the charge related to Jerome. Tse's motions for required findings of not guilty were denied by the trial judge, who sentenced him to life without parole for the murder and a concurrent term for the armed assault. Tse appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly participated in the shooting or shared the shooter's lethal intent.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tse knew of or shared the shooter's lethal intent. The court noted that the Commonwealth's reliance on the manner in which Tse maneuvered the vehicle was speculative and did not establish the necessary intent. Consequently, the court reversed Tse's convictions for first-degree murder and armed assault with intent to murder, set aside the verdicts, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of required findings of not guilty.

State of Minnesota vs. Baker

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1283

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Robert Lee Baker, III, was charged with second-degree intentional murder after he shot and killed Maurice Anderson. The incident occurred after Anderson and an accomplice robbed Baker and his girlfriend at gunpoint while they were in a car. As the robbers were leaving with Baker's property, Baker exited the car with a firearm and demanded the return of his belongings. Anderson raised his gun in response, and Baker shot him multiple times, resulting in Anderson's death.

At trial, Baker claimed self-defense and defense of others, but the district court refused to instruct the jury on these defenses. The court concluded that Baker was not entitled to the instructions because he failed to establish that he was not the initial aggressor and that he did not have a reasonable means to retreat. The jury found Baker guilty of second-degree intentional murder, and he was sentenced to 438 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, but on different grounds, concluding that Baker's use of deadly force was unreasonable as a matter of law.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others. The court held that the proper standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense or defense of others is whether the defendant produced reasonable evidence to support their claim. The court concluded that Baker presented sufficient evidence to support his claims of self-defense and defense of others, and that the district court's failure to give these instructions was not harmless. Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new trial.

State of Minnesota vs. Cotton

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-0213

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: MOORE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Almanzo Cotton was found guilty by a jury of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree unintentional murder for beating his girlfriend, Kim Laen Theng, to death. The district court sentenced Cotton to 306 months imprisonment and ordered him to pay $2,362 in restitution to the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board (the Board) to cover the cremation expenses paid by Theng’s daughter, S.T. S.T. had paid for the cremation using her personal credit card and later received funds from a GoFundMe campaign. She also submitted a claim to the Board, which awarded her the full amount of $2,362.

Cotton challenged the restitution order, arguing that the GoFundMe proceeds should be considered a collateral source that offset the economic loss. The district court, however, concluded that the GoFundMe funds did not constitute recoupment of the cremation expenses from a collateral source and affirmed the restitution order. The court of appeals upheld the district court’s decision but remanded for the inclusion of a payment schedule.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court may not consider collateral sources when awarding restitution to the Board under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a). The court concluded that the exclusive factors for determining restitution are the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim and the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant. The collateral-source provision of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act does not apply in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

State of Minnesota vs. White

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-0126

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: MOORE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Dontae White was convicted of second-degree intentional murder for the shooting death of Kevin Beasley. Beasley's mother, H.T., requested restitution for funeral expenses totaling $15,778.68. White argued that the life-insurance proceeds H.T. received should be subtracted from the restitution amount. The district court disagreed and ordered White to pay the full amount requested, reasoning that life insurance is intended to provide financial security and not just cover funeral expenses.

The district court's decision was appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order. The court of appeals found that life insurance proceeds should not be considered when determining the amount of economic loss sustained by a family member of a deceased person for restitution purposes. The court distinguished life insurance from other types of insurance, noting that life insurance provides financial assistance beyond specific expenses like funeral costs.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether life-insurance proceeds should be considered in calculating economic loss for restitution under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1). The court held that life-insurance proceeds paid to a family member of the deceased should not be considered in determining the amount of economic loss sustained by the family member as a result of the murder. The court reasoned that life insurance is an investment contract intended to provide financial security, not merely to cover specific expenses. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the full restitution order.

Ratcliff v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-CT-00690-SCT

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Judge: Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lyncoya Ratcliff was convicted of possession of a weapon by a felon and possession of a stolen firearm. He was pulled over by police for a broken headlight, and during the stop, officers found a stolen firearm in the vehicle. Ratcliff denied knowledge of the firearm but admitted ownership of a bag containing ammunition matching the stolen weapon. He was subsequently arrested and convicted on both charges.

The Forrest County Circuit Court denied Ratcliff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Ratcliff then filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted, focusing solely on his conviction for possession of a stolen firearm.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo, considering whether the evidence was sufficient to support Ratcliff's conviction for possession of a stolen firearm. The court found that the evidence presented did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Ratcliff hid the weapon because he was a convicted felon, not because he knew it was stolen. The court noted that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of Ratcliff's guilty knowledge that the firearm was stolen, as required by precedent cases such as Barton v. State.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed and rendered Ratcliff's conviction for possession of a stolen firearm, finding that the State did not meet its burden of proving guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. The court did not address Ratcliff's conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon, as it was not raised in the petition for certiorari.

Toler v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-00712-SCT

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Judge: Michael K. Randolph

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rudy Toler fired his handgun at four youths while traveling on Highway 90 between Pass Christian and Gulfport in 2021. This led to a high-speed chase during which Toler fired two more shots at pursuing officers. A Harrison County grand jury indicted Toler on ten felony charges, including multiple counts of aggravated assault and failure to stop for law enforcement. In 2023, a jury found Toler guilty on most counts, except for one count of aggravated assault against an officer.

The Harrison County Circuit Court sentenced Toler to a total of forty years in prison. Toler appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support several of the convictions and that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of his peaceful character.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for aggravated assault against the officers and one count of aggravated assault against the youths. However, the court determined that the indictment was multiplicitous regarding the four counts of aggravated assault against the youths, as they were based on a single act of firing one shot. The court held that these counts should be merged into one.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the convictions in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the sentences for the four multiplicitous counts, merge them into one count, and resentence Toler accordingly. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Toler’s peaceful character.

State v. Stanley

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 271

Opinion Date: November 19, 2024

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

David Stanley was convicted in the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, for felony criminal possession of methamphetamine. Stanley appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence found during a post-arrest jail intake search. The key issue was whether the police had the requisite particularized suspicion to justify the investigative stop that led to Stanley's arrest and the subsequent discovery of the drugs.

In the lower court, the District Court found that the police lacked particularized suspicion to justify the stop. However, it ruled that the "attenuation doctrine" exception to the exclusionary rule applied, meaning the drug evidence did not need to be suppressed despite the initial unlawful stop. Stanley then pled guilty under a plea agreement that reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the police had a reasonable particularized suspicion to stop Stanley. The court noted that the police received an anonymous tip about a fugitive, Daniel Sobrepena, who was reportedly wearing a distinctive red curly wig to avoid arrest. When Officer Ahmann saw Stanley wearing a similar wig in the area described, it was reasonable to suspect he might be Sobrepena or have information about him. The court found that the initial stop and subsequent questioning were justified and conducted within a reasonable scope and duration.

The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the District Court reached the correct result in denying the motion to suppress, albeit for different reasons. The court affirmed Stanley's conviction, holding that the investigative stop was lawful and the resulting drug evidence was admissible.

DAWSON VS. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 72

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On January 18, 1997, C.V. was sexually assaulted by a man holding a knife who approached her at a bus stop, walked her to a vacant lot, and assaulted her. The perpetrator then dumped out her purse and left. A sexual assault examination was conducted, but no suspect was identified at the time. Over 20 years later, Clifton Dawson's DNA matched the DNA from the examination kit. Dawson was charged with one count of sexual assault and found guilty in 2022 after a six-day jury trial. At sentencing, the State sought an enhancement based on Dawson's habitual criminal status.

The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County applied the habitual criminal statute in effect at the time of the offense, which required three prior felony convictions for a large habitual criminal adjudication. The court found three qualifying convictions and sentenced Dawson to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. Dawson argued that the enhancement should be based on the statute in effect at the time of sentencing, not the time of the offense. The court disagreed, holding that the statute in effect at the time of the offense applies unless the legislature clearly states otherwise. The court found that the 1995 version of the habitual criminal statute was correctly applied.

However, the court concluded that the district court erred in adjudicating Dawson as a habitual criminal because the State did not prove the requisite number of prior convictions. Only two of the prior convictions predated the charged offense. The court vacated Dawson's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, emphasizing that the State must prove that prior convictions predate the charged offense for habitual criminal adjudication.

People v. Castillo

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05817

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: GARCIA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a shooting that occurred during a dispute over a drug transaction at a barbershop in the Bronx. The barbershop owner and the victim had several confrontations, including a fistfight and threats from the victim. The victim returned to the shop, and the owner called the defendant, a friend. When the defendant arrived, the victim confronted him with a razor blade, and the defendant shot and killed the victim. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree criminal weapon possession. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of justification.

During the trial, the court heard testimony from an eyewitness and the medical examiner. The trial court denied the defendant's request for a justification charge, concluding it was not appropriate based on the evidence. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the defendant was not justified in firing additional shots into the victim's back after stepping back and not being cut by the victim.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in not providing a justification instruction for the second-degree murder charge. The court found that there was a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant was justified in his actions, given the rapid unfolding of events and the imminent threat posed by the victim. The court also noted that the failure to provide the justification instruction could have affected the jury's verdict on the possession count, as the jury might have concluded that the defendant lacked the intent to use the weapon unlawfully if they found the shooting justified. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and ordered a new trial.

People v Robles

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05819

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: GARCIA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon after police recovered a handgun from him following a report of shots fired. Before being read his Miranda rights, the defendant made an incriminating statement to the police. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress both the handgun and his statement. Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, and the defendant accepted a plea deal. During the plea colloquy, the defendant, representing himself, expressed his desire to appeal the suppression ruling. The court accepted the plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, agreed that the defendant's statement should have been suppressed but deemed the error harmless, concluding that the gun's admissibility at trial meant there was no reasonable possibility the error influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the erroneous suppression ruling could have contributed to the defendant's decision to plead guilty. The court emphasized that harmless error analysis in the context of guilty pleas is challenging and requires evaluating whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the plea decision. The court found the record ambiguous regarding the defendant's motivation for pleading guilty and noted the defendant's concern about appealing the suppression ruling. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order, vacated the defendant's guilty plea, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings on the indictment.

Chase v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 215

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Tufte

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2014, Lorry Van Chase was convicted of gross sexual imposition and sentenced to forty years in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Chase filed three applications for postconviction relief. In his first application, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and a conflict of interest, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. His second application was dismissed as barred by res judicata and misuse of process. The third application was initially dismissed but later remanded for proper procedure.

The District Court of Rolette County held an evidentiary hearing on Chase’s third application, which included claims of newly discovered evidence and improper jury contact. Chase conceded that his trial attorney had received the medical record before trial, thus it could not be considered newly discovered evidence. Regarding the jury contact, a juror testified that a uniformed person entered the jury room and stated that a unanimous decision was required. However, the juror could not definitively identify the person, and no other jurors corroborated the claim.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court found that the medical record was not newly discovered evidence as it was available before the trial. The court also upheld the district court’s finding that the juror’s testimony about improper jury contact was not credible, noting inconsistencies and lack of corroboration. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Chase’s application for postconviction relief based on these grounds.

State v. Villazana

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 211

Opinion Date: November 21, 2024

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jorge Villazana was charged with reckless endangerment, terrorizing, and attempted murder following an incident on May 4, 2022, where he allegedly pointed a firearm at two individuals and shot one of them in the face. The State filed notices to use prior acts of domestic violence and threatening text messages as evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b). Villazana moved to exclude this evidence, but the district court deferred ruling until trial. During the trial, the court admitted the text messages without objection and allowed testimony about prior domestic violence over Villazana's objection.

The District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, presided over the trial. The jury found Villazana guilty of reckless endangerment with the use of a firearm and terrorizing without the use of a firearm, but acquitted him of attempted murder. Villazana appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting the 404(b) evidence, causing juror confusion and an inconsistent verdict.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimonial evidence of domestic violence under Rule 404(b) because the third prong of the test was not met at the time of admission. However, the error was deemed harmless as sufficient evidence of the crimes charged was later presented. The court also found that Villazana waived any argument regarding the text messages' admissibility by not objecting at trial.

Regarding the alleged inconsistent verdict, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's findings were not legally inconsistent. The jury could rationally find Villazana guilty of terrorizing without the use of a firearm based on the evidence presented. The court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Commonwealth v. Saunders

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 20 EAP 2023

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On November 18, 2020, Officer Matthew Ibbotson and his partner stopped a silver Honda with heavily tinted windows in a high-crime area of Philadelphia for traffic violations. The driver, Omar Saunders, made suspicious movements, and Officer Ibbotson saw the handle of a gun under the driver’s seat. Saunders admitted he did not have a permit for the gun, which was later found to be stolen. Saunders was arrested, and the gun was seized.

The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied Saunders’s motion to suppress the gun, ruling that the seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine and the automobile exception, which requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Saunders was convicted of firearms offenses and sentenced to three and a half to seven years in prison. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine the legality of the warrantless seizure. The court held that the seizure was constitutional under the plain view doctrine. It found that the police had a lawful vantage point, the incriminating nature of the gun was immediately apparent, and the police had a lawful right of access to the gun. The court emphasized that the unexpected development of probable cause during a lawful traffic stop justified the seizure without a warrant. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s order upholding the denial of suppression of the firearm.

State V. Waldner

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 67

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Two defendants, Michael Waldner, Jr., and Mark Waldner, were indicted in Brule County, South Dakota, on charges of rape and sexual contact involving a minor, E.H. During the investigation, law enforcement obtained a journal written by E.H. detailing the alleged misconduct. The defendants sought additional journals and diaries written by E.H. through a subpoena duces tecum. E.H. moved to quash the subpoena, but the circuit court denied the motion and ordered an in-camera inspection of the journals. E.H. then filed a petition for an intermediate appeal to the South Dakota Supreme Court.

The circuit court initially granted the defendants' motion for further discovery, ordering the State to acquire the journals for an in-camera inspection. E.H. filed a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting her right to privacy under Marsy’s Law. The court vacated its initial discovery order but allowed the defendants to reissue the subpoena. E.H. again moved to quash, but the court denied her motion, leading to her appeal.

The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under SDCL 15-26A-3(4), as the circuit court’s order was a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding. The court concluded that E.H.’s right to privacy under Marsy’s Law is not absolute and must be balanced against the defendants’ constitutional rights. However, the court found that the circuit court erred by not applying the Nixon factors (relevancy, admissibility, and specificity) when denying E.H.’s motion to quash. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

NIXON v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0556-23

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Yeary

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the early hours of January 21, 2016, the appellant shot and killed Tylene Davis and Debra Echtle at Echtle’s residence in Medina County. The appellant was later indicted for capital murder and put to trial in July 2021. Over his objection, the trial was held in an auxiliary courtroom housed in the same building as the Medina County Jail and Sheriff’s Department. The jury found the appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the appellant’s conviction, deciding that the trial court setting in the jail courtroom created an unacceptable risk that the presumption of innocence was eroded. The State then petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to review the decision.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed whether the location of the courtroom was inherently prejudicial to the appellant’s presumption of innocence and whether the use of that courtroom was justified by an essential state interest. The court concluded that the location of the trial was not inherently prejudicial because the jurors need not have interpreted the setting as a sign that the appellant was either culpable or dangerous. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the cause to that court to consider the appellant’s remaining issues on appeal.

SWENSON v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0589-22

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, a member of the anti-government "Boogaloo" movement, posted messages on social media expressing his intent to kill a police officer. On April 11, 2020, he drove around Texarkana, Texas, armed with three loaded firearms, searching for a police officer to kill. He spotted Officer Jonathan Price's patrol car, expressed his intent to kill, and drove to the location where he had seen the vehicle. Officer Price, who was watching the appellant's livestream, drove away to avoid being targeted. The appellant continued to search for Officer Price and later fled from pursuing police officers before being apprehended.

The Sixth Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to support the conviction for attempted capital murder, ruling that the appellant's actions amounted to "mere preparation" rather than an attempt. The court held that the appellant's threats and plans, as well as his actions of driving around armed and searching for a police officer, did not cross the line from preparation to attempt. The court reversed the conviction and rendered an acquittal on the charge of attempted capital murder.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the appellant's actions did cross the line between "mere preparation" and attempt. The court held that the appellant's conduct of driving around searching for a police officer, driving to the location where he had seen Officer Price's vehicle, and having loaded firearms within easy reach constituted more than mere preparation. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Bista v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230721

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Dilliraj Bista, who was accused of sexually assaulting an 11-year-old child, R.P., who has autism spectrum disorder. Bista, a close family friend, stayed with R.P.'s family in Fairfax County, Virginia, during which the assault occurred. R.P.'s mother discovered Bista in a compromising position with R.P. and, upon questioning, R.P. described the assault in detail. Bista initially denied but later admitted to some misconduct. The incident was reported to the police months later, leading to a forensic interview where R.P. provided a detailed account of the assault.

The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County held a preliminary hearing where R.P. testified, and Bista cross-examined her. The court certified the charges, and Bista was indicted. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County admitted R.P.'s out-of-court statements under Code § 19.2-268.3, finding them inherently trustworthy despite inconsistencies. The court also found R.P. incompetent to testify at trial due to her inability to understand the difference between truth and falsehood. Bista was convicted of forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual battery but acquitted of rape. His post-conviction motion to set aside the verdict was denied.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting R.P.'s statements and that Bista had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine R.P. at the preliminary hearing. The court held that R.P.'s statements were inherently trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence, including Bista's admission and DNA evidence. The court also found that Bista's cross-examination at the preliminary hearing was constitutionally adequate, addressing the same allegations of sexual abuse.

The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and that Bista's constitutional rights were not violated.

State of West Virginia v. Keith Jason Walker

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-0013

Opinion Date: November 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of Barbour County, West Virginia, of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual abuse, and displaying obscene material to a minor. The charges stemmed from disclosures made by an eight-year-old girl, C.M., who described being sexually assaulted by the petitioner, her mother's boyfriend. The petitioner was sentenced to an effective term of 115 to 375 years in prison.

The trial was initially set for January 2020 but was continued multiple times, with the final trial date set for July 2021. The petitioner moved for a continuance to investigate new disclosures by C.M. and to conduct a psychological evaluation of her, which the court denied. During the trial, the court admitted evidence of the petitioner’s internet search history for child pornography under Rule 404(b) without giving a limiting instruction to the jury. The jury convicted the petitioner on all counts.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court found that the Rule 404(b) evidence was properly admitted after thorough consideration and that the failure to give a limiting instruction was not plain error. The court also held that the denial of the continuance for a psychological evaluation was not an abuse of discretion, as the petitioner failed to show a compelling need for it. The court declined to address the petitioner’s claims regarding the jury questions and due process violations due to the lack of a complete record and suggested these issues could be developed in post-conviction proceedings.

The court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial court’s decisions.

Bray v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 120

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Fenn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Everett Bray was convicted of felony stalking his ex-wife, MS, in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-506(b)(iv) and (e)(iv). After being released from prison for a prior domestic violence offense against MS, Bray went to MS’s residence in June 2022, despite being warned by the sheriff’s department not to trespass. He threatened MS and her mother, leading to his arrest and a no-contact order. In January 2023, Bray returned to MS’s property, violating the protection order, and attempted to take her dog, resulting in another arrest.

The District Court of Converse County sentenced Bray to 42-84 months in prison after a jury found him guilty of felony stalking. Bray appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove he had the specific intent to harass MS.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying the standard that assumes the State’s evidence is true and gives the State the benefit of every favorable inference. The court found that Bray’s actions, including his threats and repeated visits to MS’s property despite warnings and a protection order, demonstrated a continuity of purpose and intent to harass. The court held that a rational jury could find Bray’s conduct showed specific intent to harass MS, affirming the conviction.

Fredrick v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 121

Opinion Date: November 20, 2024

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Joseph Lyle Fredrick was charged with multiple counts of possession of controlled substances and misdemeanor theft in June 2021. He pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of heroin, leading to the dismissal of other charges. The district court sentenced him to 117 days for the misdemeanor, with credit for time served, and three to five years for the felony, suspended for three years of supervised probation. His probation was transferred to Oregon.

In September 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke Fredrick’s probation, alleging he absconded and had no contact with his probation officer after July 2023. He was arrested in Oregon in November 2023, transported to Wyoming in December, and remained in custody. The district court held an initial appearance on December 19 and set an adjudication hearing for December 27. The State moved to allow the probation officer to testify by video, which the court granted. The hearing was continued to January 5, 2024, due to discovery issues and the probation officer’s failure to appear.

At the January 5 hearing, the probation officer testified by video, and Fredrick moved to dismiss the revocation petition due to discovery violations. The court denied the motion but continued the hearing to January 19 to resolve the discovery dispute. On January 19, the court denied Fredrick’s motion to dismiss, found certain documents privileged, and concluded there was good cause for the continuances. The court revoked Fredrick’s probation and reinstated his three- to five-year sentence, with credit for time served.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in extending the revocation hearing beyond the 15-day limit, allowing the probation officer to testify by video, and determining that certain probation records were privileged. The court also found that the discovery dispute did not warrant dismissal of the petition.