United States v. Chaney

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30454

Opinion Date: November 8, 2024

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Devin Chaney pleaded guilty to two counts from an eleven-count indictment: Hobbs Act Robbery and Armed Bank Robbery. As part of his plea agreement, Chaney waived his right to appeal except for a sentence above the statutory maximum or to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Chaney was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 due to prior convictions for controlled substance offenses. He received a sentence of 188 months for each count, to be served concurrently, followed by four years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay restitution. Chaney appealed, arguing that the district court improperly sentenced him as a career offender.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana determined that Chaney qualified as a career offender based on his prior convictions. Chaney objected, claiming that one of his prior convictions did not qualify as a predicate offense because Louisiana's definition of marijuana was broader than federal law. The district court overruled his objection and imposed the sentence. Chaney then appealed the sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The government moved to dismiss the appeal, citing the waiver-of-appeal provision in Chaney's plea agreement. The Fifth Circuit conducted a two-step inquiry to determine the validity of the waiver, concluding that Chaney knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and that the waiver applied to his claims. The court noted that Chaney's sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, and his waiver was explicit and unambiguous. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss the appeal, affirming that Chaney's waiver was enforceable.

United States v. Hernandez Velasquez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-11170

Opinion Date: November 8, 2024

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In October 2022, Jose Guadalupe Hernandez Velasquez was found unlawfully present in the United States for the fifth time. Previously, in 2019, he had signed a written stipulation waiving his rights and agreeing to his removal, which led to his deportation. Upon his reentry in 2022, he was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Hernandez Velasquez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his waiver of rights in the 2019 removal was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, making the removal order fundamentally unfair.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied his motion to dismiss, placing the burden on Hernandez Velasquez to prove the invalidity of his waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. The court found that he did not meet this burden and also failed to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 1326(d)(1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that when the government produces a written and signed stipulation and waiver, the burden rests on the defendant to prove its invalidity. The court found that the district court's burden allocation was proper and that Hernandez Velasquez's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court also noted that even if the burden had been on the government, the outcome would not have changed, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the validity of the waiver. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

Jones v. Naert

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1056

Opinion Date: November 12, 2024

Judge: Bloomekatz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Ronda Jones was arrested by Officer Steven Naert after attempting to walk to the scene of her son's car accident. Jones had been drinking at home and was suspected by Naert of having driven the car while intoxicated due to her prior DUI arrest. When Jones tried to leave her home to check on her son, Naert arrested her for disorderly conduct, citing a Michigan statute that prohibits such behavior. The statute does not criminalize public intoxication alone; it requires probable cause to believe that the individual would pose a danger to others.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted Officer Naert qualified immunity on Jones's false arrest claim, holding that he had probable cause for the arrest. The court also granted summary judgment on Jones's malicious prosecution claim, concluding that Naert did not participate in the decision to prosecute her. Jones appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Officer Naert lacked probable cause to arrest Jones for disorderly conduct. The court found that Jones's actions did not indicate she would pose a danger to others by walking a short distance while intoxicated. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant Naert qualified immunity because Jones failed to show that the unlawfulness of the arrest was "clearly established" at the time. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, as there was no evidence that Naert influenced the decision to prosecute Jones.

Fields v. Gilley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2762

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Sherman Fields, a federal prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which was dismissed by the district court. Fields was previously convicted of multiple crimes, including murder and carjacking, after escaping from federal custody. He was sentenced to death on one count and to imprisonment on others. Fields sought relief through various motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which were denied, and his convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Fifth Circuit.

Fields later filed a habeas petition under § 2241 in the Southern District of Indiana, where he was imprisoned. The district court stayed the proceedings pending Supreme Court decisions in related cases. Following these decisions, Fields filed another § 2255 motion, which led to the vacating of his death sentence and resentencing to life imprisonment. The district court then dismissed his § 2241 petition, holding that Fields failed to demonstrate that § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention, as required by § 2255(e).

On appeal, Fields argued that § 2255 was inadequate to address his claim of judicial bias. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Hendrix, which clarified the relationship between § 2241 and § 2255. The court held that § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective simply because a prisoner cannot meet the standards for a successive motion under § 2255(h). The court found that Fields had already presented his claims of judicial bias in his § 2255 motions, which were denied on the merits.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Fields could not pursue his claims under § 2241 because he failed to meet the requirements of the saving clause in § 2255(e). The court emphasized that the inability to meet the standards for a successive § 2255 motion does not render § 2241 available for such claims.

United States v. Driskill

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3162

Opinion Date: November 12, 2024

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

Ethan Driskill and Marchello Oliver were charged with multiple drug-related offenses, including distribution of fentanyl and possession of firearms. Driskill was charged with distribution resulting in death, among other counts, while Oliver faced charges including possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine. Both defendants entered plea agreements; Oliver pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, and Driskill pleaded guilty to distribution resulting in death.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas sentenced Oliver to 168 months, an above-guidelines sentence, and Driskill to 456 months, a within-guidelines sentence. Both defendants appealed, arguing their sentences were substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sentences for procedural errors and substantive reasonableness. For Oliver, the court found no procedural errors in the district court's application of an upward departure under USSG § 5K2.1, which was based on the finding that Oliver's distribution of fentanyl resulted in a death. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting that the district court had appropriately considered the relevant factors and the extent of the departure.

For Driskill, the court noted that his within-guidelines sentence was presumed reasonable. The court found that the district court had properly considered mitigating factors and the significant differences between Driskill and Oliver, including their criminal histories and the specific charges to which they pleaded guilty. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Driskill.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentences imposed on both Oliver and Driskill.

U.S. v. Holmes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-10266

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: Forrest

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a child-pornography investigation initiated by two CyberTipline Reports forwarded to the FBI by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Special Agent Emily Steele viewed two images from Facebook without a warrant, one of which matched a previously reported child exploitation image. This led to a search warrant for Aaron Holmes's residence, where incriminating statements and numerous illicit images were found on his cellphone. Holmes moved to suppress this evidence, arguing it was obtained unlawfully.

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Holmes's motion to suppress, concluding that the good-faith exception applied to Agent Steele’s viewing of the hash-matched image and that the inevitable-discovery exception applied because Agent Rose would have inevitably discovered the same evidence through routine procedures.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the good-faith exception did not apply because the existing precedent was contradictory and only plausibly supported Agent Steele’s warrantless viewing of the images. The court also rejected the inevitable-discovery exception, finding that the Government failed to prove that Agent Rose would have inevitably discovered the same evidence through lawful means. The court noted that Agent Rose’s investigation was not as urgent or thorough as Agent Steele’s, and there was no certainty that Holmes would have been present during a hypothetical search by Agent Rose. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Holmes’s motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Sanchez v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E083015(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 8, 2024

Judge: Fields

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order that directed the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after the current deputy public defender made remarks during plea negotiations that invoked Sanchez's race, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the reassignment.

The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate a conflict of interest after the deputy public defender made racially charged comments. During a closed hearing, Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court ordered the reassignment of the deputy public defender, citing potential issues under the RJA and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the court found that the trial court's decision to prevent a potential future RJA claim was within its discretion to avoid substantial impairment of the proceedings.

The appellate court concluded that Sanchez's arguments regarding constitutional violations and the necessity of an actual conflict were without merit. The court emphasized that the trial court's order was narrowly tailored and did not violate Sanchez's rights. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated.

State v. Daren Y.

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20725

Opinion Date: November 12, 2024

Judge: MULLINS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child based on allegations of sexual abuse involving his children, B, J, and D. The charges included sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence, statute of limitations issues, improper admission of sexual misconduct evidence, and violations of his confrontation rights.

The trial court joined the cases for trial, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court vacated some convictions as lesser included offenses and sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-five years, suspended after fifteen years, followed by twenty years of probation.

On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of sexual assault in the first degree and the vacated conviction of sexual assault in the fourth degree involving J. The court noted that the state failed to prove that the defendant touched J’s genitals with his mouth, lips, or tongue, a necessary element for these charges.

The court also agreed with the defendant that his convictions of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child involving B should be reversed under the plain error doctrine. The trial court failed to obtain the defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the statute of limitations, which had expired before the charges were filed.

The court rejected the defendant’s claims regarding the improper admission of sexual misconduct evidence and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court’s decision not to conduct an in camera review of J’s and B’s psychiatric records and in declining to release D’s psychiatric records.

The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the convictions related to B and the conviction of sexual assault in the first degree related to J, remanding the case for resentencing on the remaining convictions. The judgments were affirmed in all other respects.

State of Iowa v. Schooley

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1117

Opinion Date: November 8, 2024

Judge: Oxley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Reuben Schooley was convicted of child endangerment causing bodily injury after an incident where he slapped his nine-year-old daughter, spanked her, yanked her by the shirt, and told her to leave the house. The child was found with marks on her collar and bruising on her buttocks. Schooley admitted to spanking her frequently and acknowledged that his actions were inappropriate. The jury found him guilty based on the evidence presented.

The Iowa District Court for Emmet County sentenced Schooley to five years of incarceration. Schooley appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that his sentence was improperly influenced by a victim-impact statement from the guardian ad litem (GAL). He contended that the GAL was not authorized to provide such a statement and that it contained unproven allegations.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. The court noted that the reasonableness of corporal punishment is generally a question for the jury and that the evidence showed Schooley's actions were excessive and abusive. The court also addressed Schooley's challenge to the GAL's victim-impact statement, concluding that Schooley had waived this issue by not raising it in the district court. Additionally, the court found no affirmative showing that the district court relied on improper information from the GAL's statement when sentencing Schooley.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Schooley's conviction and sentence, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the GAL's statement.

State v. Fenton

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1681

Opinion Date: November 8, 2024

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant engaged in online conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a fifteen-year-old girl. He arranged to meet the girl for sex at a gas station shower room. Upon arrival, he was arrested and charged with solicitation of commercial sexual activity under Iowa Code section 710A.2A. The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge because he did not offer or promise anything of value in exchange for sexual activity. The district court rejected these arguments, and a jury convicted him.

The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to five years in prison. The Iowa Court of Appeals conditionally affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the motion for a new trial under the correct standard. The defendant sought further review.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant was attempting to engage in commercial sexual activity. The court noted that while the defendant's behavior was reprehensible, he did not give or promise the undercover officer any item of value in exchange for a sex act. The court concluded that the statutory definition of "commercial sexual activity" requires an express or implied quid pro quo, which was not present in this case. Consequently, the court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for dismissal.

Commonwealth v. Colina

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13260

Opinion Date: November 7, 2024

Judge: Georges

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Carlos Colina, killed Jonathan Camilien in his Cambridge apartment by strangling him in a chokehold and subsequently dismembered the body. The dismembered torso was found in a duffel bag on a nearby walkway, leading investigators to the defendant's apartment where they discovered rap music lyrics describing similar acts. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and improper disposal of human remains. He appealed, arguing that the admission of rap lyrics and other evidence was prejudicial and that the search warrants were deficient.

The Superior Court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from search warrants, and the trial judge admitted the rap lyrics and records of the defendant's online purchases. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder and six months for improper disposal of human remains.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the rap lyrics were admissible as they were relevant to the defendant's state of mind and intent, and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The search warrants were found to be supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular. The court also concluded that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were proper and that any errors in the prosecutor's closing argument or the exclusion of certain jury instructions were not prejudicial. The court found no basis for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and affirmed the judgments.

Childress v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-01323-SCT

Opinion Date: November 7, 2024

Judge: Beam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In August 2021, Jeremy Childress was involved in an incident where he threatened to commit suicide with a handgun. After being disarmed by a sheriff's deputy, Childress admitted to killing his girlfriend, Michelle Hester, by shooting her in the head. Hester's body was found in a utility room at her residence, with no weapons nearby. Childress claimed the shooting was accidental during an argument.

The Harrison County Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, where Childress was convicted of first-degree murder. Childress moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence for deliberate-design murder, but the motion was denied. He testified that the shooting was accidental, occurring during a heated argument where Hester allegedly threatened him with a knife and a gun. The jury was instructed on various charges, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, but ultimately found Childress guilty of first-degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case, focusing on the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The court held that the evidence supported the jury's verdict of deliberate-design murder. The court noted that Childress's own admissions and the physical evidence contradicted his claim of an accidental shooting. The court also found that the jury's verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as the jury had reasonably rejected Childress's version of events. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Childress's conviction for first-degree murder.

Obert v State

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 270

Opinion Date: November 12, 2024

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.

Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.

The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement.

State v. Clark

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-0451

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: James P. Bassett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant, Matthew Clark, is charged with a felony count of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon. The complainant recorded a conversation with the defendant without his consent, in which he made potentially incriminating statements. The complainant later reported the incident to law enforcement and provided them with the recording.

The defendant moved to suppress the recording, arguing it was made without his consent in violation of RSA chapter 570-A, which he claimed required suppression of any such recording. The State objected. The Superior Court denied the motion, concluding that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only for felony violations of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court determined that the complainant's recording constituted a misdemeanor violation since she was a party to the communication, and thus, suppression was not warranted.

The defendant moved for reconsideration, reasserting his argument that any violation of RSA chapter 570-A requires suppression. The trial court denied the motion and certified three interlocutory questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The Supreme Court held that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only when the information is part of or derived from a communication intercepted in violation of the felony provision of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court clarified that a one-party recording can be either a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the mental state of the person making the recording. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the complainant's recording constituted a felony violation due to her subsequent disclosure to law enforcement.

FLOYD v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0148-23

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: McClure

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves James Earnest Floyd, Jr., who was charged with aggravated robbery after an incident on March 28, 2017, where he shot Diane Porter and her husband John during a robbery at their home. Floyd demanded the PIN for their debit card and threatened to return and kill them if the number was incorrect. Diane identified Floyd as the intruder both at the hospital and in court. Floyd was charged under Texas Penal Code sections 29.02 and 29.03 for aggravated robbery by threat and causing bodily injury.

The trial court instructed the jury that they could convict Floyd if they found he committed either form of aggravated robbery. The jury found Floyd guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Floyd appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous in deciding whether he committed aggravated robbery by threat or by causing bodily injury. The Second Court of Appeals held that the two methods of committing aggravated robbery are different means of committing a single offense, and thus, a special unanimity instruction was not required.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the different methods of committing aggravated robbery (by threat or by causing bodily injury) are merely different manners and means of committing the same offense. Therefore, the jury did not need to be unanimous on the specific method used, as long as they unanimously agreed that Floyd committed aggravated robbery. The court concluded that there was no jury unanimity problem and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

STATE v. JOHNSON

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0665-23

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the appellee, Sedrick Johnson, who was arrested on outstanding warrants. Before being given Miranda warnings, Johnson stated, "I need to talk to a lawyer." Later, after receiving Miranda warnings and waiving his rights, he was questioned by the police about a missing child, Junior, who lived with Johnson and his girlfriend. Johnson eventually led the police to Junior's body, and he was charged with injury to a child by omission and capital murder of a child under ten years of age. Johnson moved to suppress his statements and evidence obtained as a result.

The trial court granted Johnson's motion to suppress, finding that his statement, "I need to talk to a lawyer," was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Johnson was subjected to custodial interrogation and that his right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after his invocation.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the right to counsel under Miranda cannot be invoked anticipatorily, meaning it cannot be invoked before custodial interrogation begins. Since Johnson was not in custody when he initially requested a lawyer and was given Miranda warnings before any custodial interrogation commenced, his subsequent waiver of rights and statements to the police were valid. The court emphasized that the police complied with Miranda by providing the warnings before the custodial interrogation and that Johnson had the opportunity to invoke his right to counsel at that time but chose not to. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STATE v. VILLA

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0756-23

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Whitney S. Villa, who was cited for Class C assault following an incident at a youth football game in Mesquite, Texas. Villa pleaded not guilty but was convicted by a jury in the Municipal Court of the City of Mesquite, a municipal court of record (MCOR), and fined $331. Villa filed a pro se motion for a new trial, citing jury charge error, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing the municipal court erred by not providing a self-defense instruction. The County Court of Criminal Appeals No. 1 for Dallas County reversed the municipal court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.

The State of Texas sought further review in the Dallas Court of Appeals. After initial briefings and oral arguments, the court of appeals requested additional briefing on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, the court of appeals dismissed the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Section 30.00027 of the Texas Government Code did not provide the State the right to appeal to the court of appeals from an intermediate appellate court's decision.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals' dismissal. The court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the State's appeal. The court reasoned that the State's right to appeal is governed by Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows the State to appeal an order granting a new trial. Since the County Court of Criminal Appeals' decision effectively granted a new trial, the State was entitled to appeal that decision. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the court of appeals to address the merits of the State's appeal.

Frame v. White

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-839

Opinion Date: November 12, 2024

Judge: WALKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2001, Barry White was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his four minor stepchildren. The children did not testify at trial due to their young age and psychological evaluations indicating they were not capable of doing so. Instead, their statements were admitted through the testimony of professionals who had interviewed them. White was sentenced to a minimum of 100 years in prison. His direct appeal and several habeas corpus petitions were denied.

White filed a new habeas petition in 2017, claiming newly discovered evidence. He presented transcripts of interviews with three of the now-adult victims, who either denied remembering the abuse or stated it did not happen. The Circuit Court of Mercer County granted White's petition, finding that the new testimonies constituted recantations and warranted a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court noted that the circuit court's analysis was overly simplistic, focusing mainly on the fact that the victims did not testify at the original trial. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a thorough analysis of the credibility and reliability of the recantations, considering the victims' prior inconsistent statements and the other evidence presented at trial, such as physical evidence of abuse and White's incriminating jail letters.

The Supreme Court found that the circuit court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by West Virginia Code § 53-4A-7(c). The court vacated the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to conduct a detailed analysis of the newly discovered evidence in accordance with the established legal standards.

State ex rel. Cross v. Wilmoth

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 24-384

Opinion Date: November 12, 2024

Judge: BUNN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Stephen Cross, the defendant in the underlying action, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Randolph County from enforcing its order denying the State’s motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with murder and using a firearm during the commission of a felony. The State’s motion to dismiss asserted that Cross’s actions were justified by self-defense and that there was no evidence to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that the case must proceed to trial to avoid public misconception and because a grand jury had returned the indictment.

Previously, the Randolph County Prosecuting Attorney recused himself due to a conflict of interest, and the court appointed Brian Hinkle as special prosecuting attorney. Hinkle later sought to withdraw, citing a conflict of interest and his belief that prosecuting Cross would result in a manifest injustice. The court allowed Hinkle to withdraw and appointed John Ours as the new special prosecutor. Ours filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, citing insufficient evidence to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court denied this motion, emphasizing the need for a jury trial to address public perception and the grand jury’s indictment.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ of prohibition in part, finding that the circuit court clearly erred and exceeded its legitimate powers by denying the State’s motion to dismiss. The court held that when the State seeks a dismissal and the defendant consents, the court must determine whether the dismissal is consistent with the public interest in the fair administration of justice. A dismissal meets this standard if the State acts in good faith at the time it seeks dismissal. The court found that the State acted in good faith and that the circuit court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the prosecution. The writ was denied in part regarding the circuit court’s orders sealing certain documents and precluding public discussion of the case.

State of West Virginia v. Schober

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 23-68

Opinion Date: November 12, 2024

Judge: Bunn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Kyle John Schober was convicted of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver after a traffic stop revealed marijuana, THC extract, and cocaine in his vehicle. He was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years imprisonment, suspended in favor of five years of probation, with conditions including drug treatment and random drug screens.

Schober later obtained a medical cannabis identification card under the West Virginia Medical Cannabis Act and sought to modify his probation conditions to allow the use of medical cannabis. The Circuit Court of Berkeley County denied his initial motion, finding insufficient evidence of a valid PTSD diagnosis and treatment. Schober filed a renewed motion with additional documentation, but the court again denied the motion, questioning the validity of his medical cannabis card and finding that his use of cannabis would not support his rehabilitation or community safety.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the West Virginia Cannabis Act does not supersede West Virginia Code § 62-12-9, which allows courts to impose conditions on probation, including prohibiting the use of marijuana. The court found no conflict between the statutes and concluded that probation conditions can restrict otherwise lawful conduct to support rehabilitation and public safety. Additionally, the court noted that Schober's possession of marijuana would violate federal law, specifically the Controlled Substances Act, and thus violate the conditions of his probation under West Virginia Code § 62-12-9(a)(1).

State v. McCauley

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-0467

Opinion Date: November 13, 2024

Judge: Wooton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the defendant, Andrew Jackson McCauley, Jr., who was convicted of first-degree murder, death of a child by a custodian, and concealment of a deceased human body. The victim, R.C., a fifteen-year-old girl, lived with her mother, brothers, and the defendant. R.C. was last seen alive on May 7, 2019. Her body was discovered on May 16, 2019, in a rural area. Evidence included blood and saliva found in her bedroom, and circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the crime scene, such as drywall mud and roofing screws found near the body and in the defendant's truck.

The Circuit Court of Morgan County denied the defendant's motion for a change of venue, finding that an impartial jury could be seated despite pretrial publicity. The court also admitted expert testimony from a cadaver dog handler, which the defendant challenged on the grounds of reliability and potential prejudice. The court found the testimony admissible, noting the handler's extensive qualifications and the corroborative circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that pretrial publicity created a hostile sentiment that would prevent a fair trial. The court also upheld the admission of the cadaver dog evidence, finding it met the reliability and relevance standards under Rule 702 and Daubert. Finally, the court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, including the defendant's erratic behavior, false statements, and physical evidence linking him to the crime. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.