Etienne v. Edmark

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1946

Opinion Date: October 21, 2024

Judge: LYNCH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a jury in New Hampshire state court for the first-degree murder of Larry Lemieux. The petitioner admitted to shooting Lemieux but claimed he acted in self-defense or in defense of another, arguing he did not act with premeditation. After his conviction, the prosecution disclosed a proffer letter recommending a suspended sentence for drug charges against Jose Gomez, a key prosecution witness. The petitioner argued that the failure to disclose this letter violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland.

The state trial court denied the petitioner's motion for a new trial, finding that the nondisclosure of the proffer letter did not prejudice the petitioner. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the petitioner was not prejudiced under New Hampshire law, which sets stricter standards than Brady. The court found that the undisclosed evidence would not have altered the defense strategy or the trial's outcome, given the overwhelming additional evidence of premeditation presented by other witnesses.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The First Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, concluding that the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasonably determined that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure of the proffer letter. The court noted the overwhelming evidence of premeditation from multiple witnesses, which supported the jury's verdict independent of Gomez's testimony.

United States v. Bruno-Cotto

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1224

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: AFRAME

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Domingo Emmanuel Bruno-Cotto, pleaded guilty to two counts of carjacking and one count of kidnapping following a multi-day crime spree in Puerto Rico. The spree included carjacking an Uber driver, kidnapping an airport passenger, and committing multiple sexual assaults on a woman at a beach. The district court sentenced Bruno-Cotto to 208 months in prison, which was 20 months above the advisory guideline range, citing the unusual cruelty of his actions.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Bruno-Cotto did not contest the facts in the presentence report but requested a lower sentence based on his difficult childhood and mental health issues. The government argued for a high-end guideline sentence, emphasizing Bruno-Cotto's leadership role and the premeditated nature of his crimes. The district court ultimately imposed a higher sentence, highlighting the severity and cruelty of Bruno-Cotto's actions, particularly the repeated sexual assaults.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. Bruno-Cotto argued that the sentence was procedurally flawed due to the district court's reliance on unreliable hearsay and that it was substantively unreasonable compared to his co-defendant's sentence. The appellate court found no plain error in the district court's reliance on the presentence report, noting that the hearsay information had sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, given the egregious nature of Bruno-Cotto's conduct and the differences in culpability between him and his co-defendant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's 208-month sentence.

United States v. Santana-Aviles

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1654

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: SELYA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Miguel Santana-Avilés, who was convicted of assaulting a correctional officer at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. On August 20, 2020, during an inmate count, Officer Efrén Rosario found an extra pillow in the cell shared by Santana-Avilés and two other inmates, which violated prison policy. When Officer Rosario attempted to remove the pillow, one of the cellmates, Héctor Maldonado-Maldonado, attacked him. Santana-Avilés then grabbed Officer Rosario from behind, allowing Maldonado to continue the assault. Santana-Avilés also encouraged the attack by shouting "Hit him." The officers eventually subdued both inmates with the help of reinforcements.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico presided over the initial trial. Santana-Avilés did not testify but sought to introduce statements he made during the incident, claiming they were excited utterances. The court excluded these statements as hearsay. Additionally, the court admitted an email from a prison technician explaining the lack of video evidence due to technical issues, despite Santana-Avilés's objections. The jury found Santana-Avilés guilty of aiding and abetting the assault of a correctional officer, and he was sentenced to eighty-seven months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Santana-Avilés argued that the district court made erroneous evidentiary rulings by excluding his statements and admitting the email. The appellate court found that even if the exclusion of Santana-Avilés's statements was an error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against him. The court also held that the email was properly admitted to rebut an implied charge of fabrication or improper motive. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.

State Farm Mutual v. Tri-Borough

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1318

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Lynch

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Criminal Law, Insurance Law, White Collar Crime

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, “State Farm”) provide automobile insurance in New York and are required to reimburse individuals injured in automobile accidents for necessary health expenses under New York’s No-Fault Act. State Farm alleges that several health care providers and related entities engaged in a scheme to fraudulently obtain No-Fault benefits by providing unnecessary treatments and services, and then pursued baseless arbitrations and state-court proceedings to seek reimbursement for unpaid bills.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted State Farm’s motion for a preliminary injunction in part, enjoining the defendants from proceeding with pending arbitrations and from initiating new arbitrations and state-court proceedings, but denied an injunction of the pending state-court proceedings. The district court found that State Farm demonstrated irreparable harm due to the fragmented nature of the proceedings, which obscured the alleged fraud, and the risk of inconsistent judgments and preclusive effects.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction in part. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that State Farm demonstrated irreparable harm, serious questions going to the merits, a balance of hardships tipping in its favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court also concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act did not bar the injunction of the arbitrations because the arbitrations would prevent State Farm from effectively vindicating its RICO claims.

Additionally, the appellate court reversed the district court’s decision not to enjoin the pending state-court proceedings, finding that the Anti-Injunction Act’s “expressly-authorized” exception applied. The court determined that the state-court proceedings were part of a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims that furthered the alleged RICO violation, and that enjoining these proceedings was necessary to give RICO its intended scope. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

USA v. Peperno

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1389

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: Rendell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves James Peperno, Jr., who was found guilty by a jury of nine counts of conspiracy to commit bribery and wire fraud, among other related charges. Peperno devised a scheme to solicit bribes from Walter Stocki, who was involved in zoning litigation with the borough of Old Forge, Pennsylvania. Peperno, along with Robert Semenza, Jr., the Old Forge Borough Council President, planned to influence the litigation in Stocki's favor in exchange for bribes. Peperno initially approached Stocki in January 2019, asking for a $20,000 upfront payment and a monthly retainer. Stocki recorded their conversations and later contacted the FBI, which led to further recorded interactions and payments facilitated by the FBI.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania presided over the case. At trial, Peperno was found guilty on all counts except for two counts of money laundering. The Presentence Report (PSR) recommended sentencing enhancements for multiple bribes and for the total value of the bribes exceeding $15,000. Peperno objected to these enhancements, but the District Court overruled his objections, finding the recommendations supported by the evidence. The court sentenced Peperno to 72 months’ imprisonment, considering his intent and financial motivations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Peperno appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on entrapment and in applying the sentencing enhancements. The Third Circuit held that the District Court correctly denied the entrapment instruction, as Peperno failed to show government inducement or lack of predisposition. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding of multiple bribes and that the total value of the bribes exceeded $15,000. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment of sentence.

United States v. Lightfoot

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-7447

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: RUSHING

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2000, Antonio Lamont Lightfoot was convicted by a jury in the District of Maryland for bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The government identified two prior convictions for serious violent felonies: a 1985 armed bank robbery in Virginia and a 1990 armed bank robbery in Michigan. Consequently, Lightfoot was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment under the federal "three-strikes" law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), and an additional seven years for the firearm charge. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and subsequent collateral challenges were unsuccessful.

Following the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) as unconstitutionally vague, Lightfoot sought to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that the residual clause of the "serious violent felony" definition in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) was similarly void for vagueness. The district court denied his motion, holding that Michigan bank robbery is a divisible offense and that Lightfoot was convicted of the assaultive version, which qualifies as a serious violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Michigan's bank robbery statute is divisible into assaultive and non-assaultive offenses. Lightfoot was convicted of the assaultive version, which involves taking from another by force or intimidation. The court held that this offense qualifies as a serious violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause of the federal three-strikes law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). Therefore, Lightfoot's life sentence was upheld.

United States v. Abdullah

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-3093

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: GRIFFIN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Tamir Abdullah, a federal prisoner convicted of crack-cocaine offenses, sought to reduce his life sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. This act made the Fair Sentencing Act's provisions retroactive, aiming to reduce sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine offenses. Abdullah argued that his conviction for conspiring to distribute between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine qualified as a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, making him eligible for a sentence reduction.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially failed to address the merits of Abdullah's motion. Instead, it construed the motion as one for "compassionate release" due to the COVID-19 pandemic and denied it, citing the low number of COVID-19 cases in Abdullah's prison. Abdullah appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of Abdullah's motion. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion based on intervening case law. The court held that Abdullah was not entitled to a sentence reduction under the Fair Sentencing and First Step Acts because the changes in drug quantity thresholds did not affect his mandatory life sentence. Specifically, the Fair Sentencing Act increased the threshold for a mandatory life sentence from 50 grams to 280 grams of crack cocaine, but Abdullah's conviction involved quantities well above this new threshold.

Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Abdullah's motion for a sentence reduction, concluding that the district court had no discretion to reduce his sentence under the applicable laws.

USA v. Peoples

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2847

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jerry Peoples and three associates planned to rob a marijuana dealer, unaware that the police were monitoring their conversations via a wiretap. The police intervened and arrested the group before the robbery could take place. Peoples was subsequently charged with conspiring and attempting to interfere with commerce by robbing a drug dealer, in violation of the Hobbs Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Peoples' trial. The jury found him guilty on both counts. Peoples then filed post-trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal and Rule 33 for a new trial, arguing that the government’s evidence was insufficient. The district court denied both motions, stating that the evidence against Peoples was overwhelming. Peoples was sentenced to concurrent terms of 110 months’ imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court’s decision, finding that the evidence presented at trial, including wiretap recordings and testimony, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The court noted that the wiretap revealed detailed plans for the robbery, and the actions taken by Peoples and his associates demonstrated a substantial step toward committing the crime. The court also found that the evidence satisfied the Hobbs Act’s interstate commerce element, as the robbery targeted drugs and drug proceeds. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Peoples' motions and upheld the jury’s guilty verdicts.

United States v. Ahmed

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3449

Opinion Date: October 21, 2024

Judge: Arnold

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A jury found Arjune Ahmed guilty of two counts of kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). The charges stemmed from incidents involving two women, O.B. and A.J. O.B. reported being forcibly taken from a casino in Sioux City, Iowa, to South Sioux City, Nebraska, where she was sexually assaulted. DNA evidence linked Ahmed to the crime. A.J. reported a similar incident where she was taken to a park and sexually assaulted. Ahmed's DNA was also found at the scene of A.J.'s assault.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Ahmed's motion to sever the counts into separate trials, arguing that a single trial would prejudice him. The court also allowed the introduction of evidence of a prior similar offense committed by Ahmed. Ahmed was convicted and sentenced to 480 months' imprisonment. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to sever, the admission of prior offense evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the consideration of uncharged conduct at sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that severance was not required because evidence of each kidnapping would have been admissible in separate trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which allows evidence of prior sexual assaults to show propensity. The court also found that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of a prior sexual assault under Rule 413 and that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of Ahmed's motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the evidence sufficient to support the convictions. The court also upheld the district court's consideration of uncharged conduct at sentencing, noting that current law permits such consideration. Finally, the court found no clear error in the district court's findings regarding additional sexual assaults by Ahmed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Garner

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3012

Opinion Date: October 21, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Joseph Garner pleaded guilty to Receipt/Distribution of Child Pornography, acknowledging a statutory five-year mandatory minimum sentence, which could increase to fifteen years if he had a prior conviction for certain sexual offenses. The government dismissed a second count of Attempted Production of Child Pornography. Garner's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) noted a 2015 Texas conviction for Indecency with a Child, which the PSR determined qualified as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). Garner objected to this enhancement.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas overruled Garner's objection, referencing the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Sonnenberg. The court adopted the PSR without change, determining an advisory guidelines range of 135 to 168 months, adjusted to 180 to 188 months due to the enhanced statutory minimum. Garner was sentenced to 240 months followed by a lifetime of supervised release. Garner appealed, arguing that his Texas conviction should not trigger the fifteen-year mandatory minimum.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation and application of statutory sentencing provisions de novo. The court employed the categorical approach, examining whether the Texas statute criminalized conduct that qualifies for the enhancement. The court referenced prior decisions, including United States v. Weis and Sonnenberg, which interpreted similar statutes. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Garner's Texas conviction for indecent exposure with a child categorically related to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor, affirming the district court's judgment. The court denied the government's motion to dismiss the appeal and Garner's motion to file a pro se supplemental brief.

USA V. LE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-1495

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Bress

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 1996, Hoang Ai Le and his co-conspirators planned to steal computer chips from Diamond Flower Electric Instruments (DFI). The plan involved two teams: an "entry" team to invade the home of a DFI employee to obtain alarm codes, and a second team, led by Le, to use those codes to access DFI and steal the chips. The entry team invaded the home of Zhou Shi Wen, mistakenly believing he had the codes. They tortured Wen and tied up his family and a friend, but Wen did not have the codes. The plan was abandoned, but the entry team still stole $1,500 in valuables from Wen's home.

A jury convicted Le in 2007 of Hobbs Act conspiracy and a related firearm offense. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. Le appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, which governs inchoate offenses, rather than § 2B3.1, which governs completed robberies. The Ninth Circuit agreed and remanded for resentencing. On remand, Le sought a three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2), which applies to incomplete conspiracies. The district court denied the reduction, finding that the conspirators were "about to complete" the robbery and that the failure was due to circumstances beyond their control.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the conspirators were "about to complete" the robbery, as they had already taken significant steps, including torturing Wen and positioning themselves to proceed to DFI. The court also found that the failure of the robbery was due to Wen's lack of knowledge of the alarm codes, which was beyond the conspirators' control. Therefore, Le was not entitled to the three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2). The sentence was affirmed.

United States v. Crosby

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2155

Opinion Date: October 23, 2024

Judge: McHUGH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law

Federal agents executed a search warrant on the home of an Air Force serviceman, Mr. Crosby, in 2018, seizing electronic devices that contained over 4,000 files of child pornography. Mr. Crosby admitted to possessing the material and was administratively separated from the Air Force. In 2020, he was indicted in New Mexico for possession of child pornography and arrested in Pennsylvania, where he continued to download such material. A subsequent search found additional illicit content. Mr. Crosby was held in custody for five days before being released on pretrial conditions. He was later indicted in Pennsylvania, and the cases were consolidated in New Mexico.

The District Court of New Mexico accepted Mr. Crosby's guilty plea and calculated a Guidelines range of 78–97 months based on various offense enhancements. The government requested a 78-month sentence, while Mr. Crosby argued for a non-custodial sentence, citing his autism spectrum disorder (ASD) diagnosis and low risk of recidivism. The district court ultimately sentenced Mr. Crosby to five days' time served, emphasizing his ASD, potential for rehabilitation, and low recidivism risk, while noting his compliance with pretrial conditions and employment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The court found that the district court failed to adequately consider several § 3553(a) factors, including retribution, general deterrence, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the established sentencing range. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's explanation was insufficient to justify the significant downward variance from the Guidelines range. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Mercado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11903

Opinion Date: October 21, 2024

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Louis Mercado was charged with three counts of capital sexual battery in Florida. During his trial, the court granted judgments of acquittal on two counts and declared a mistrial on the third count due to prosecutorial error. The trial court then barred a retrial, citing the Double Jeopardy Clause. The State appealed this decision, but Mercado's attorney, mistakenly believing he had withdrawn from the case, failed to file a response brief. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, leading to Mercado's retrial, conviction, and life sentence.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarily denied Mercado's state habeas petition, in which he argued ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to file a response brief. Mercado contended that this failure should be presumed prejudicial under United States v. Cronic, rather than requiring proof of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The appellate court's decision was based on the reasoning that the failure to file a brief did not constitute a complete denial of counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Mercado's federal habeas petition. The court held that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has never applied the Cronic presumption of prejudice to a situation where counsel failed to file an appellee's brief. Therefore, the state court's requirement for Mercado to prove actual prejudice under Strickland was deemed reasonable.

USA v. Griffin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3042

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant who entered the U.S. Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021, during the certification of the Electoral College votes. The grounds were restricted to protect Vice President Pence, who was present. The defendant, along with others, breached the security perimeter and remained in the restricted area for about two hours. He was charged with knowingly entering and remaining in a restricted area without lawful authority, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1).

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a bench trial and found the defendant guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1). The court held that the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew the specific reason for the restriction, only that he knew the area was restricted. The court sentenced the defendant to fourteen days of incarceration and one year of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the statute requires only that the defendant knowingly entered or remained in a restricted area, not that he knew the specific reason for the restriction. The court emphasized that requiring proof of knowledge of the specific reason would undermine the statute's purpose of protecting Secret Service protectees. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant knew the area was restricted when he entered and remained there.

STATE OF ARKANSAS v. CLARKS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 158

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Rhonda K. Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lee Earnest Clarks, 2nd was stopped by police for running a stop sign. During the stop, the officer smelled marijuana and found marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. A firearm was also found in a passenger’s purse. Clarks was charged with multiple felonies, including possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm by a felon. Clarks filed a motion for discovery, including a request to preserve evidence. Upon learning that the State did not preserve video evidence from the stop, Clarks moved to dismiss the charges.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court held a hearing where it was revealed that the video evidence was overwritten after 60 days due to standard police procedures. The court granted Clarks’s motion to dismiss, finding that the State’s failure to preserve the evidence amounted to bad faith. The State appealed the decision, arguing that the burden of proof was incorrectly placed on it and that the destruction of evidence was unintentional.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was proper for ensuring the correct administration of criminal law. The court clarified the legal standards for destruction-of-evidence cases, referencing Brady v. Maryland, California v. Trombetta, and Arizona v. Youngblood. The court held that the burden of proving a due process violation due to lost or destroyed evidence lies with the defendant. The defendant must show that the evidence had apparent exculpatory value before its destruction and that comparable evidence could not be obtained by other means. Additionally, if the evidence is only potentially useful, the defendant must prove that the State acted in bad faith.

The Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in its application of the law by shifting the burden of proof to the State and by equating unintentional destruction of evidence with bad faith. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

P. v. Alazar

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B331710(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 21, 2024

Judge: BALTODANO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2008, Juan Alazar was charged with attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The charges included allegations of premeditation and personal use of a firearm causing great bodily injury. At a preliminary hearing, a witness testified that Alazar shot at a new tenant, Rutilio Navarro Hernandez, hitting him in the arm. Alazar pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted to personally and intentionally discharging a firearm in exchange for a 29-year sentence, with other charges dismissed. His counsel stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript contained a factual basis for the plea.

The trial court denied Alazar's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which allows for resentencing if a conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court found that Alazar was the sole perpetrator and thus ineligible for relief. Alazar argued that the court improperly engaged in judicial factfinding at the prima facie stage.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in its prima facie determination. The appellate court found that the record did not conclusively establish that Alazar harbored the intent to kill, as required under the current versions of sections 188 and 189. The court noted that Alazar's West plea allowed him to maintain his innocence while accepting a plea bargain, and his stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript did not equate to an admission of the facts therein.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate Alazar's attempted murder conviction, recall his sentence, and resentence him. The court emphasized that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the resentencing petition.

Price v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C100920(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 23, 2024

Judge: EARL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2006, the petitioner was admitted to the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator (SVP). In 2022, the superior court found him suitable for conditional release. However, before placing him in the community, the court reconsidered its decision, held a new hearing, and found him unsuitable for release. The petitioner argued that the superior court erred by denying him the assistance of experts during the contested hearing and that the ruling was not supported by sufficient evidence. The real party in interest conceded that the court erred in denying expert assistance but maintained that the court had the authority to reconsider its order.

The superior court initially found the petitioner suitable for conditional release in October 2022, but difficulties in securing housing led to multiple placement hearings. In July 2023, Liberty Healthcare expressed concerns about the petitioner’s readiness for release and requested additional time for further review. The court granted a six-month continuance. In November 2023, the court reconsidered its previous order based on new circumstances and found the petitioner unsuitable for conditional release, citing his behavior and a report from the Department of State Hospitals.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court erred in finding the petitioner unsuitable for conditional release without providing him the assistance of experts, as required by law. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing with the procedural protections outlined in section 6608, including the appointment of experts. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and, if reconsideration is sought, to conduct a new hearing consistent with the statutory requirements.

Bates v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-1683

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Couriel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1983, Kayle Barrington Bates was convicted of kidnapping, attempted sexual battery, armed robbery, and first-degree murder of Janet White. Bates attacked White in her office, forced her into the woods, and murdered her. He was found at the crime scene with the victim’s blood on his clothing, and other physical evidence linked him to the crime. Bates gave inconsistent confessions, and the jury recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed.

Bates's case has undergone multiple appeals. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction but remanded for reconsideration of the death sentence. After resentencing, Bates was again sentenced to death, which was affirmed. In 1989, the Governor signed Bates’s death warrant, but the trial court stayed his execution and ordered a new sentencing hearing due to ineffective counsel. The jury again recommended the death penalty, and the circuit court imposed it, which was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. Bates later petitioned for habeas corpus, raising issues about jury selection, but relief was denied.

Bates recently sought to interview a juror from his 1983 trial, claiming to have learned that the juror was related to the victim’s family. The postconviction court denied his motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.575, which requires such motions to be filed within 10 days of the verdict unless good cause is shown. Bates did not specify when he discovered the relationship, failing to establish good cause for the delay.

The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the postconviction court’s denial, holding that Bates did not meet the burden of showing good cause for the 40-year delay in seeking the juror interview. The court emphasized the importance of timely motions to ensure that facts are fresh and readily ascertainable.

Dettle v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2022-0417

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Couriel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Matthew Dettle was charged and convicted of three felonies in Florida: using a computer to solicit a child for unlawful sexual conduct, traveling to meet a minor after such solicitation, and using a two-way communications device to facilitate a felony. His conviction for the third offense was vacated. Dettle argued that his remaining two convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.

The First District Court of Appeal found that Dettle's convictions for traveling to meet a minor and unlawful use of a two-way communications device violated double jeopardy and vacated the latter conviction. However, it affirmed his convictions for solicitation and traveling, as they were based on separate illegal acts. Dettle's convictions became final in 2017. After the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. State, which held that courts should only consider the charging document to determine double jeopardy violations, Dettle sought retroactive relief under this new rule.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed whether the rule in Lee should apply retroactively. The court concluded that Lee does not apply retroactively to cases that were already final when it was decided. The court reasoned that the rule in Lee is procedural, not substantive, and does not meet the high bar for retroactive application under either the Witt or Teague standards. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the First District Court of Appeal, denying Dettle's request for postconviction relief.

BAKER v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S24A0560, S24A0582

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Prentice Baker and Verlaine Laguerre were convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the shooting death of Matthew Hardeman. The evidence showed that Hardeman and Laguerre had a fistfight earlier in the day, which Hardeman won. Later, Laguerre returned with Baker and others to Hardeman’s neighborhood, where they encountered Hardeman and shot him multiple times, resulting in his death.

A Fulton County grand jury indicted Baker and Laguerre on multiple counts, including malice murder and firearm possession. Their first trial ended in a mistrial, but a second joint trial in April 2018 resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts. Both defendants were sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and an additional five years for firearm possession. Their motions for a new trial were denied by the trial court in March 2022, leading to their appeals.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration, as the evidence did not clearly indicate that Ellis was an accomplice. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Baker’s convictions, including Ellis’s identification of Baker as one of the shooters. Laguerre’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected because his counsel’s decision not to object to certain testimony was deemed a reasonable strategic choice. Finally, the court dismissed Laguerre’s claim of cumulative error due to the lack of any established errors. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences of both Baker and Laguerre.

CAMPBELL v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S24A0578, S24A0580, S24A0581, S24A1180

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2018, four defendants were convicted of various crimes related to two separate incidents. Jordan Campbell and Roderick Parrish were convicted of felony murder and other charges related to the death of Rebecca Foley in January 2013. Shacqeal Sanders and Henry Speaks were convicted of malice murder and other charges related to the death of James Pastures and the aggravated assault of Maurice Harris in January 2015. All four were also convicted of gang-related charges.

The case was initially tried in October 2018, but a mistrial was declared after a juror was threatened. The retrial took place from October to November 2018. The jury found Campbell and Parrish guilty on all counts except malice murder and related gang charges. Sanders was found guilty on all counts except criminal attempt to commit a felony and two gang violations. Speaks was found guilty on all counts except criminal attempt to commit a felony, one count of aggravated assault, two counts of firearm possession during a felony, and three gang counts. The trial court sentenced each defendant to life without parole plus additional years for other counts.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the trials of the defendants and counts related to the two murders. The court also found that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of juror intimidation and in giving a deliberate ignorance instruction, but these errors were deemed harmless. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not err in disqualifying Sanders’s counsel or in its jury instructions. The cumulative effect of the errors did not affect the jury’s verdicts.

MOORE v. WHITE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A1326

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Alfred Moore was convicted in 2016 of first-degree burglary and other crimes, resulting in a total sentence of 45 years. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Moore then filed a habeas corpus petition, later amended, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the first-degree burglary count in the indictment. Moore contended that the indictment did not allege an essential element of first-degree burglary, specifically that he entered a "dwelling house" or a building "designed for use as [a] dwelling."

The habeas court denied Moore's petition, concluding that the indictment was sufficient because it referenced the first-degree burglary statute. Moore appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which granted his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, focusing on whether the habeas court erred in its ruling.

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the indictment failed to allege all essential elements of first-degree burglary, as it only mentioned that Moore entered a "business." The court determined that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a special demurrer to challenge the indictment. This failure was not a reasonable trial strategy, and it was reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the indictment had been challenged. The court also found that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the habeas court's denial of relief regarding Moore's first-degree burglary conviction and remanded the case with directions to vacate that conviction and grant appropriate relief.

People v. Harvey

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129357

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: Cunningham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anthony Harvey was arrested and charged with misdemeanor unlawful use of a weapon for possessing a firearm on a public street without a concealed carry license (CCL). During a traffic stop, police officers observed Harvey making furtive movements and later found a firearm in the van where he was seated. Harvey admitted to the officers that he did not possess a CCL or a Firearm Owner Identification card (FOID card).

The Circuit Court of Cook County found Harvey guilty based on the evidence of his constructive possession of the firearm and his admission of not having a CCL. Harvey was sentenced to 30 days in jail. On appeal, Harvey argued that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense because his lack of a CCL was only proven by his own out-of-court statements. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence of constructive possession and corroboration of Harvey’s lack of a CCL through his behavior during the traffic stop.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the State was required to prove that Harvey did not have a valid CCL to sustain the conviction under the unlawful use of a weapon statute. The court found that Harvey’s admission to the police officers that he did not have a CCL was sufficient evidence, and it did not require independent corroboration under the corpus delicti rule. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Harvey’s conviction.

State of Iowa v. Berg

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-0819

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: Oxley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Sarah Berg, an employee at Casey’s General Store, activated three gift cards without paying for them and used one to purchase gas the next day. She was arrested for fourth-degree theft. The county attorney did not file a trial information for this charge within the required 45 days. Instead, a trial information was later filed for unauthorized use of a credit card.

The Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County denied Berg’s motion to dismiss the trial information for unauthorized use of a credit card, despite the missed speedy-indictment deadline for the theft charge. Berg was found guilty following a trial on the minutes. She was sentenced to 120 days in jail (suspended), a fine (suspended), court costs, probation, and potential restitution. Berg appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that fourth-degree theft and unauthorized use of a credit card are not the same offense for speedy-indictment purposes. The court reasoned that the charges relied on distinct underlying facts: the theft charge required proof of taking property valued between $300 and $750, while the unauthorized use charge required proof of using a credit card to obtain property or services. Therefore, the State was not precluded from filing the new charge after the 45-day period had elapsed.

State v. Willis

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123451

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: Eric S. Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

James A. Willis was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The incident occurred outside a nightclub in Overland Park, where Willis shot Jurl Carter multiple times as Carter was backing his car out of a parking lot. The chaotic scene involved numerous witnesses, some of whom provided inconsistent accounts. However, surveillance footage and witness testimonies generally supported the prosecution's narrative. Willis admitted to shooting Carter but claimed he acted in self-defense.

The Johnson District Court, presided over by Judge Thomas Kelly Ryan, found Willis guilty on both counts. Willis was sentenced to a hard 50 life sentence for the murder conviction and an additional 19 months for the firearm conviction. Willis appealed, arguing prosecutorial misconduct and instructional errors, particularly regarding his self-defense claim.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. Willis contended that the prosecutor improperly inferred motivations not supported by evidence and misstated the law on self-defense. The court found that the prosecutor's inferences about the culture of respect and retaliation were reasonable and within the wide latitude allowed. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's statements about self-defense, when viewed in context, did not mislead the jury.

Willis also argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The Kansas Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that such instructions would have been appropriate. However, the court concluded that the jury would not have reached a different verdict even if those instructions had been given.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Willis's convictions, finding no reversible error in the prosecutorial conduct or the jury instructions.

MANNING V. COMMONWEALTH

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0144-MR

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the early morning of October 13, 2020, Calvin Taylor was found dead in his home in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, with duct tape on his mouth and arm, and three gunshot wounds. A neighbor, Treesha Shelton, heard gunshots and saw a light-colored vehicle outside Taylor’s home. Surveillance footage showed a silver minivan and a silver Saturn near Taylor’s home around the time of the murder. Larayna Manning and her son, Anthony, were known to frequent Taylor’s home, where Taylor sold crack cocaine. Manning was interviewed by police but provided limited information. A search of a minivan at Manning’s home revealed a large amount of crack cocaine. DNA evidence linked Manning to duct tape found at the crime scene.

The Christian Circuit Court convicted Manning of complicity to murder and complicity to first-degree robbery, sentencing her to life imprisonment. Manning appealed, arguing that her right to a speedy trial was violated, that evidence of a prior home invasion was improperly admitted, that the Commonwealth improperly used her son’s Alford plea as substantive evidence of her guilt, and that her right to remain silent was infringed upon.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. It found that the delay in Manning’s trial was largely due to valid reasons, such as the need for DNA evidence, and that her right to a speedy trial was not violated. The court also held that the Commonwealth provided reasonable notice of its intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence and that any error in admitting this evidence was not palpable. The court acknowledged that the Commonwealth improperly used Anthony’s Alford plea as substantive evidence of Manning’s guilt but concluded that this did not result in a substantial possibility of a different outcome. Finally, the court found no improper comment on Manning’s right to remain silent.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Manning’s convictions and sentence.

SLOSS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0012-MR

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant was convicted of murder, abuse of a corpse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, resulting in a fifty-year prison sentence. The case involved the death of Amanda Berry, who had moved in with the appellant after meeting him through a pen pal program while she was incarcerated. Amanda struggled with substance use disorder and was living in a dilapidated house with the appellant. Neighbors testified about the couple's tumultuous relationship, frequent arguments, and instances of physical abuse by the appellant. Amanda was last seen in January 2020, and her body was found weeks later in the basement of the house she shared with the appellant.

The Jefferson Circuit Court handled the initial trial. The appellant was absent from the trial and sentencing phases, having refused to attend despite being informed of his right to be present and the consequences of his absence. The trial court proceeded in his absence, finding that he had waived his right to be present. The appellant's defense included arguments that there was no direct evidence linking him to the murder and that the body found was not definitively identified as Amanda's. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced accordingly.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the appellant had waived his right to be present at trial through his conduct. The court also found no error in the trial court's denial of the appellant's motions for a mistrial and directed verdict, the admission of prior bad acts evidence, and hearsay statements under the state of mind exception. The court concluded that no cumulative error occurred, and the appellant's conviction and sentence were upheld.

Commonwealth v. Jeune

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13447

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On the night of July 1, 2015, the defendant and his accomplice attempted to rob three women working as escorts at different hotels. The first woman denied them entry, the second was robbed at gunpoint, and the third was shot and killed. The defendant and his accomplice were tried jointly, and a jury convicted them of first-degree murder based on felony-murder, among other charges.

The Superior Court found the defendant guilty on all charges, including murder in the first degree, attempted armed robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm, armed robbery, home invasion, and armed assault in a dwelling. The defendant appealed, arguing errors in jury selection, improper identification by a police officer, erroneous jury instructions, and the denial of an accident instruction. He also contended that his firearm conviction should be vacated based on a recent court decision.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in dismissing two jurors for cause due to their lack of comprehension. The court found that the police officer's identification of the defendant in surveillance footage was admitted in error but did not prejudice the defendant due to the overwhelming evidence against him. The court also ruled that the jury instructions were consistent with legal standards and that the defendant was not entitled to an accident instruction due to lack of evidence. The court vacated the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and remanded for a new trial on that charge. The conviction for attempted armed robbery was vacated as duplicative, but the remaining judgments were affirmed.

State v. Flynn

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 236

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On December 12, 2022, Joseph Benton Flynn was convicted of misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence (DUI) in Helena Municipal Court after pleading no contest. Prior to his plea, Flynn's motions to suppress evidence due to lack of particularized suspicion for the initial stop and to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial were denied. Flynn appealed these denials to the First Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Municipal Court's decisions.

Flynn's appeal to the Montana Supreme Court raised two issues: whether there was particularized suspicion to stop him for speeding and whether his right to a speedy trial was violated. The court found that Officer Jessica Cornell had particularized suspicion to stop Flynn based on her training, experience, and the RADAR sign indicating Flynn was speeding. The court also held that the RADAR sign did not constitute an automated enforcement system prohibited by Montana law. Therefore, the initial stop and subsequent DUI investigation were justified, and the motion to suppress was correctly denied.

Regarding the speedy trial claim, the court applied the four-factor balancing test from State v. Ariegwe. The total delay was 742 days, with 480 days attributed to Flynn due to his motions for continuances and waivers of his right to a speedy trial. The court found Flynn's responses to the delays did not demonstrate a desire for a speedy trial, and he failed to show prejudice from the delay. Consequently, the court concluded that Flynn's right to a speedy trial was not violated.

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, upholding Flynn's conviction.

People ex rel. Neville v Toulon

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05178

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Singas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law

In 2006, an individual was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and later subjected to civil management under New York's Mental Hygiene Law due to a "mental abnormality." Initially confined, he was released to a strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) program in 2016. In 2019, he violated SIST conditions by tampering with an alcohol monitoring bracelet, leading to his temporary confinement based on a psychologist's evaluation and a probable cause finding by the court.

The Supreme Court initially found probable cause to believe he was a "dangerous sex offender requiring confinement" and ordered his detention pending a final hearing. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory scheme violated procedural due process by not providing an opportunity to be heard at the probable cause stage. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, ultimately declaring the statute constitutional.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court held that the statutory scheme under Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4) appropriately balances individual and state interests. It concluded that the statute provides sufficient procedural safeguards, including a prompt judicial probable cause determination and a full hearing within 30 days, to mitigate the risk of erroneous confinement. The court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to him. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed without costs.

People v. Baque

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05244

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jorge Baque's five-month-old daughter was found unresponsive in her crib on July 30, 2016, and was later declared dead. An autopsy revealed injuries consistent with abusive head trauma and violent shaking. Baque was charged with manslaughter in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. At trial, the prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence, including testimony that Baque was the last person with the victim and that the injuries would have caused death within minutes. The jury was instructed on circumstantial evidence and convicted Baque of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of a child.

Baque appealed, arguing that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction, referencing weight of the evidence precedent and concluding that the jury's inference of guilt was reasonable. A Judge of the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Appellate Division properly conducted a weight of the evidence review. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, noting that the lower court had applied the correct legal principles. The Court emphasized that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the jury must ensure that the inference of guilt is the only reasonable conclusion and that all other hypotheses of innocence are excluded beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found no basis for reversal, as the Appellate Division had appropriately considered the circumstantial evidence and the jury's inferences. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

People v Blue

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05175

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anthony Blue was convicted of five counts of second-degree burglary. He argued that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the trial judge did not inform him of his maximum sentencing exposure. Blue also contended that his indictment should have been dismissed on statutory speedy-trial grounds, asserting that the time between his indictment and arraignment should not be excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.

The Supreme Court denied Blue's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the time between his co-defendant's request for an adjournment and Blue's arraignment was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (d). The court also determined that Blue's waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, despite not being informed of the maximum sentencing exposure in years. The Appellate Division affirmed these decisions, concluding that the 57 days between the co-defendant's adjournment request and Blue's arraignment were properly excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's order. The court held that a defendant can be joined for trial with a co-defendant at the time of indictment, and the exclusion under CPL 30.30 (4) (d) applies to pre-arraignment time. The court also found that Blue's waiver of counsel was valid, as he was adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation and understood the potential sentencing exposure. The court concluded that the 57-day period was excludable, leaving the speedy-trial clock at 180 days, within the statutory limit. Blue's remaining challenges were deemed unpreserved or meritless.

People v Dixon

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05176

Opinion Date: October 22, 2024

Judge: Troutman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting three minors between 2007 and 2009. The police obtained a search warrant and found child pornography on the defendant's computers, including an encrypted file they could not access. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including sexual conduct against a child and possession of child pornography. He posted bail and was released but was later remanded to jail for allegedly posting a blog that intimidated a witness.

The trial court assigned counsel and experts to assist the defendant, who later chose to represent himself. During the trial, the defendant's daughter testified about a recorded conversation in which one of the victims allegedly recanted her accusations. The prosecution used recorded jail phone calls to challenge the daughter's testimony, revealing that the defendant had discussed trial strategies with her. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of sexual conduct against a child and all child pornography counts but deadlocked on other charges. The defendant entered an Alford plea to the deadlocked counts.

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The primary issue was whether the defendant's right to present a defense was violated by the prosecution's monitoring of his jail phone calls. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's right to present a defense was not violated. The court noted that the defendant had ample time to prepare his defense while out on bail and had other means to communicate with witnesses. The court also found that the defendant's request to proceed pro se was unequivocal and that the trial court had conducted a proper inquiry into the risks of self-representation. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

People v Hayward

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05243

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Troutman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to sell and possession of cocaine after police recovered drugs and paraphernalia during a search of an apartment where he and others were arrested. Defense counsel sought to suppress the seized items, arguing the warrant was inaccurate and unreliable but did not claim the warrant was executed without notice, violating CPL 690.50 (1). Defendant argued on appeal that this omission constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reviewed the case and rejected the ineffective assistance claim, noting that the record did not conclusively show a knock-and-announce violation. The court found that the defendant's argument was speculative and unsupported by the record, which was silent on whether the officers announced themselves before entry. The Appellate Division concluded that the defendant failed to establish a no-knock violation.

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that defense counsel's failure to raise the knock-and-announce issue did not constitute ineffective assistance because the argument was not so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense attorney would have failed to assert it. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan, which held that a knock-and-announce violation does not require the exclusion of evidence, had not been contradicted by any New York appellate decision. Therefore, the issue was not sufficiently clear to mandate its assertion by defense counsel. The court also found that the defendant's legal sufficiency contention was unpreserved for appellate review and upheld the trial court's admission of evidence regarding an uncharged drug sale. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

People v McGovern

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 05242

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Jenny Rivera

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of third-degree larceny and second-degree forgery after a jury trial. The case involved a scheme where the defendant falsely represented himself as Joe Basil Jr. to steal tires from Exxpress Tire Delivery Company. The defendant instructed the delivery driver to bring the tires to a location adjacent to the Basil Ford Truck Center, where he falsely signed an invoice as Joe Basil Jr. The real Joe Basil Jr. testified that he did not authorize the purchase and that the signature was not his.

The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of 3½ to 7 years for the larceny and forgery convictions, explaining that the crimes were separate and distinct acts. The court noted that the forgery occurred during the larceny but constituted a successive act. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that consecutive sentences were permissible because the larceny and forgery were not committed through a single act or omission, nor was one offense a material element of the other. The court explained that the larceny was completed when the tires were loaded onto the defendant's trailer, which occurred before the forgery of the invoice. Additionally, the statutory definitions of the crimes did not overlap in a way that would require concurrent sentences under Penal Law § 70.25 (2). Therefore, the consecutive sentences were lawful.

State v. King

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 119A23

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: Allen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted in District Court, Buncombe County, of driving while impaired (DWI), reckless driving, possession of marijuana, and possession of marijuana paraphernalia. The court found an aggravating factor but balanced it with a mitigating factor, sentencing the defendant to Level IV punishment, which included 120 days of imprisonment (suspended), twelve months of supervised probation, seven days in custody, a $100 fine, and court costs. The defendant appealed to the Superior Court, Buncombe County, where a jury found him guilty of DWI and reckless driving but acquitted him of the other charges. The superior court judge found three aggravating factors and imposed Level III punishment, which included six months of imprisonment (suspended), thirty-six months of supervised probation, three days in custody, a $500 fine, and court costs.

The defendant appealed the superior court's judgment, arguing that the trial court erred by finding aggravating factors without a jury. The Court of Appeals agreed, citing Blakely v. Washington, and held that the trial judge's finding of aggravating factors violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The court noted that the General Assembly amended the DWI sentencing statute in 2006 to require that juries, not judges, find aggravating factors. The Court of Appeals majority concluded that resentencing is required whenever a trial judge finds aggravating factors in violation of the statute, regardless of whether the error was harmless.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply harmless error review to the trial judge's finding of aggravating factors. The Supreme Court concluded that the finding of aggravating factors by a trial judge contrary to N.C.G.S. § 20-179(a1)(2) does not constitute reversible error if the error was harmless. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether the error was harmless. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and remanded.

State v. Eggers

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070458

Opinion Date: October 17, 2024

Judge: JAMES

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves the interpretation of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 166.255, which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition if they have been convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor" involving the use or attempted use of physical force against a family or household member. The defendant, Richard Darrel Eggers, was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) for subjecting his brother to offensive physical contact during a domestic altercation.

The Lane County Circuit Court concluded that the harassment conviction constituted a "qualifying misdemeanor" under ORS 166.255, thereby prohibiting Eggers from possessing firearms. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment did not meet the "physical force" requirement of ORS 166.255(3)(e).

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment qualifies as "physical force" under ORS 166.255(3)(e). The court concluded that the Oregon legislature intended to align ORS 166.255 with the federal firearms prohibition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted to include even minimal offensive touching as "physical force" in United States v. Castleman.

The Oregon Supreme Court held that the "physical force" requirement in ORS 166.255(3)(e) includes the degree of force necessary to complete a common-law battery, which encompasses offensive physical contact. Therefore, harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) is a "qualifying misdemeanor" for the purposes of ORS 166.255. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the firearms prohibition against Eggers.

Commonwealth v. Jones

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 31 EAP 2021

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Jones was convicted of attempted murder and related charges after an incident where he and his codefendants, Syheed Wilson and Keirsten Carroll, were involved in a shooting of a cab driver, Alex Destin. Jones directed the cab driver and then shot him, while Wilson also shot the driver. The three were identified through surveillance footage and arrested. Wilson gave a statement to the police implicating Jones as the shooter.

At trial, Jones objected to the admission of Wilson’s statement, arguing it violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause as established in Bruton v. United States. The trial court overruled the objection, and the jury was instructed to consider each defendant’s statement only against the one who made it. Jones was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to twenty to forty years in prison. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the redacted statement, which referred to Jones as “my friend,” did not violate the Confrontation Clause because it did not explicitly name him and required linkage with other evidence to be incriminating.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the admission of Wilson’s redacted statement violated Bruton. The court noted that the statement, though redacted to refer to Jones as “my friend,” still directly incriminated him by describing him in a way that the jury could easily identify him, especially since the jury was shown surveillance footage and still images identifying Jones. The court concluded that the statement violated Bruton’s prohibition against admitting a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that directly implicates the defendant.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for the Superior Court to determine whether the Bruton violation amounted to harmless error.

Commonwealth v. Lear

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 90 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Jason Andrew Lear, who faced criminal charges for theft and assault in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. The charges were filed in May, June, and July 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas suspended criminal trials and implemented strict protocols, delaying Lear's trial. His trial was eventually scheduled for November 1, 2021, well beyond the 365-day limit set by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600.

The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas denied Lear's motion to dismiss based on Rule 600, reasoning that the delay was due to the judicial emergency caused by the pandemic. Lear was convicted and sentenced to five to twelve years in prison. He appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated his sentence and remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the Commonwealth had acted with due diligence during the delay.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether Rule 600 requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate due diligence during a judicial emergency. The Court held that the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and related court closures do not fall under the "judicial delay" category requiring a due diligence assessment. Instead, these delays are considered "other periods of delay" under Rule 600(C)(1) and are excludable from the 365-day computation without assessing the Commonwealth's diligence. The Court reversed the Superior Court's decision, ruling that no Rule 600 violation occurred and no hearing was necessary.

Commonwealth v. Smith

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 92 MAP 2021

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Lisa Smith, the appellant, lived with her boyfriend, Keiff King, and her four-year-old son, Tahjir, in a home in Abington Township, Pennsylvania. On January 22, 2018, after Tahjir spilled cereal, he was subjected to severe punishment by Smith and King, including being forced to hold difficult positions and being beaten. Tahjir was also placed in a hot shower, resulting in severe burns. Later, when Tahjir showed signs of severe distress, Smith and King delayed seeking medical help. Eventually, Smith called 911, but Tahjir was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy revealed that Tahjir died from "crush syndrome" due to severe beatings and burns.

Smith and King were charged with first-degree murder, endangering the welfare of a child, and criminal conspiracy. Smith's motion to suppress her statements to the police was partially granted, excluding statements made before receiving Miranda warnings. At trial, King's redacted statement, which replaced Smith's name with feminine pronouns, was admitted. The trial court instructed the jury to consider King's statement only against him. Both Smith and King were convicted, and Smith was sentenced to life in prison without parole, plus additional years.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether Smith's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by admitting King's redacted statement. The court held that there was no violation, as the redacted statement did not directly or powerfully implicate Smith in the crime. The court emphasized that the statement did not identify Smith as a participant in the abuse and that the jury was properly instructed to consider the statement only against King. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, upholding Smith's conviction and sentence.

Commonwealth v. Strunk

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 96 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Seamus P. McCaffery

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Michael L. Strunk, who was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a minor, including unlawful contact with a minor. The victim testified that Strunk assaulted her on three separate occasions, each time while she pretended to be asleep. During these assaults, Strunk engaged in various forms of physical contact, such as fondling her and removing her clothing, but there was no evidence of verbal or non-verbal communication to facilitate the assaults.

Strunk was convicted in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas and sentenced to an aggregate term of 17 to 35 years’ incarceration. He filed post-sentence motions challenging the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, which were denied. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the physical contact beyond the assaults themselves was sufficient to establish a violation of Section 6318 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which criminalizes unlawful contact with a minor.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and focused on whether the term "in contact with" under Section 6318 includes non-communicative conduct. The Court concluded that the statute is intended to criminalize communicative behavior aimed at facilitating sexual exploitation, not merely physical contact. The Court found that the Superior Court erred in its interpretation by equating physical contact with communication. Since there was no evidence that Strunk communicated with the victim to facilitate the assaults, the Supreme Court vacated his conviction for unlawful contact with a minor. This decision did not affect the aggregate sentence, as the sentence for this conviction was imposed concurrently with other sentences.

In Re: The Thirtieth County Investigating Grand Jury

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 15 EM 2022

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves a petition challenging the public release of a grand jury report by the 30th County Investigating Grand Jury. The petitioner argued that the report did not meet the statutory definition of an "investigatory grand jury report" under the Investigatory Grand Jury Act (IGJA) and that the supervising judge erred in ordering its release. The petitioner also contended that the report's criticism of named, unindicted individuals violated their due process rights and the fundamental right to reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas initially accepted the report and ordered its public release. The supervising judge provided notice and an opportunity to respond to some, but not all, named, unindicted individuals criticized in the report. The petitioner, along with others, sought to have the report permanently sealed or redacted. The supervising judge made some redactions but ultimately ordered the report to be unsealed.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that the report did not satisfy the IGJA's definition of an "investigatory grand jury report" because it neither related to organized crime or public corruption nor proposed recommendations for legislative, executive, or administrative action in the public interest. The court found that the report focused on punishing specific individuals and providing answers to the deceased-accused's family, rather than addressing broader public concerns.

The court also determined that due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond for all named, unindicted individuals criticized in a grand jury report. The supervising judge's failure to provide such notice to all criticized individuals was deemed an error. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the supervising judge's order and remanded the case with instructions to permanently seal the report.

Schocker v. Fluke

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 65

Opinion Date: October 23, 2024

Judge: Myren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Christopher Schocker was convicted of aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer. The incident occurred when Officer Blake Swanson, a Game, Fish, and Parks conservation officer, received a tip about a poached deer and went to investigate. At the scene, Schocker, his mother Doris, and two other individuals were present. During the encounter, Schocker picked up a knife and moved towards Officer Swanson, who then arrested him. Schocker claimed he intended to cut a tag off the deer, not assault the officer.

The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Roberts County, South Dakota, found Schocker guilty. Schocker appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His attorney, Robert Doody, did not interview key witnesses or adequately prepare for trial. The court-appointed new counsel for Schocker, who then filed for habeas corpus relief. The habeas court found that Doody’s performance was deficient and prejudicial, as he failed to interview witnesses who could have supported Schocker’s defense.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the habeas court’s decision, agreeing that Doody’s failure to interview witnesses, particularly Jeffry Hopkins, who could testify that Schocker intended to cut the tag off the deer, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This failure was deemed prejudicial because it deprived Schocker of a fair trial. The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had heard Hopkins’s testimony.

State v. Washington

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 64

Opinion Date: October 23, 2024

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Danny Washington was convicted by a jury on multiple charges, including first-degree kidnapping, injury to personal property, and several counts of aggravated and simple assault. The charges stemmed from incidents involving his then-girlfriend, J.B., in October 2021. Washington allegedly assaulted J.B., damaged her vehicle, and forcibly confined her with a firearm, leading to his arrest and subsequent indictment on eight counts.

The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, presided over the trial. Washington filed several pretrial motions, including motions to exclude references to his parole status and to prevent the use of the term "victim" in court. The court granted these motions but denied his request for a personal copy of the discovery. During the trial, the jury found Washington guilty on all counts. Washington later filed a motion for a new trial, citing ineffective assistance of counsel and other trial errors, which the court denied. He was sentenced to 100 years for kidnapping, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. Washington argued ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficient evidence for the kidnapping conviction, cumulative trial errors, discrepancies between the oral and written sentences, and improper multiple convictions for aggravated assault. The court declined to address the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, noting the need for a more developed record. It found sufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction and determined that the alleged trial errors did not cumulatively deny Washington a fair trial. The court clarified that the written sentence, which suspended 60 years of the 100-year kidnapping sentence, controlled over any ambiguous oral pronouncements. Finally, the court held that entering multiple convictions for a single statutory offense arising from the same act violated double jeopardy principles, but found no plain error due to the lack of clear precedent. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

STRICKLAND v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0616-23

Opinion Date: October 23, 2024

Judge: McClure

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was placed on deferred adjudication probation. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to adjudicate, citing the appellant's custody on other charges. The trial court adjudicated the appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment, ordering the sentence to run consecutively with sentences from a prior case involving possession of child pornography. The appellant objected to the cumulation of sentences, but the objection was overruled.

The appellant appealed to the 7th Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to stack the sentences was insufficient. The appellate court agreed, noting that the record lacked necessary details such as the cause number, court of conviction, date of conviction, term assessed, and nature of the conviction. Consequently, the appellate court reformed the judgment to reflect that the sentences should run concurrently.

The State then petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, arguing that the appellate court erred in deleting the cumulation order and that the proper remedy should be a remand for further development of the record. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State, holding that if a cumulation order is not sufficiently specific, a remand may be permitted to allow the trial court to remedy the order. The court sustained the State’s grounds, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court as reformed.

ZAPATA v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0800-23

Opinion Date: October 23, 2024

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant was charged with assault causing bodily injury. The information did not specify any relationship between the appellant and the complainant, and the plea paperwork only listed the offense as "assault bodily injury." The appellant pled "no contest" to the charge. During the plea hearing, the trial court included a family-violence finding in the deferred adjudication order, despite the lack of evidence or admissions regarding the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the complainant.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's inclusion of the family-violence finding. The appellate court agreed that an order of deferred adjudication is not a "judgment" and thus Article 42.013 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply. However, it held that the trial court had discretion to enter the family-violence finding based on Articles 42A.104(a) and 42A.504(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which allow the imposition of reasonable conditions of community supervision and fines for offenses involving family violence.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and found that there was no admissible evidence to support the family-violence finding. The court noted that the appellant's plea to ordinary assault bodily injury did not include any allegations of a family or dating relationship. The only possible evidence, a hearsay statement in the officer's probable cause affidavit, was insufficient to establish a dating relationship under the statutory definitions. Consequently, the court held that the trial court lacked discretion to enter the unsupported family-violence finding. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and struck the family-violence finding from the trial court's deferred adjudication order.

State v. Parker

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 64

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. The charges stemmed from allegations made by J.P., the son of the defendant’s girlfriend, who claimed that the defendant had sexually abused him over several years. The abuse allegedly began when J.P. was around four or five years old and continued intermittently until early 2018. The allegations surfaced after a physical altercation between the defendant and J.P.’s mother, which led to the defendant moving out of the home. J.P. disclosed the abuse to his mother and school employees shortly after the defendant left.

The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, initially tried the defendant, resulting in an acquittal on one count and a mistrial on the remaining counts. Before the second trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of J.P.’s “concerning behavior,” including possession of pornography, arguing it was relevant to show an alternative motive for J.P.’s allegations. The court excluded this evidence under Vermont’s Rape Shield Law, which prohibits evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct. The court also found that the evidence was not probative and would likely confuse the jury. The second trial resulted in convictions on the remaining counts.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court held that the exclusion of evidence regarding J.P.’s “concerning behavior” was proper under the Rape Shield Law and that the evidence was not relevant to the case. The court also found that the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments, which the defendant claimed were prejudicial, did not amount to plain error. The statements did not violate the “golden rule” prohibition, as they were aimed at supporting the credibility of J.P.’s testimony rather than asking the jurors to place themselves in J.P.’s position. The convictions were affirmed.

King v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230483

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: RUSSELL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kevin Thomas King was convicted of felony unauthorized use of another’s vehicle after a bench trial. The incident occurred on December 31, 2020, when King attended a party at Isaac Robertson, Jr.'s home. King asked Robertson if he could drive Robertson’s Volkswagen Jetta, but Robertson refused. Despite this, King took the car while Robertson was asleep and was later found unconscious and inebriated near the heavily damaged vehicle. Robertson confirmed he owned the car, which his brother had given him in 2020, although he had not registered it with the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) due to a suspended driver’s license.

The trial court denied King’s motion to strike the evidence, which argued that Robertson was not the legal owner since he had not registered the car with the DMV. The court found that Robertson was the owner based on his possession and control of the vehicle and his testimony that his brother had given it to him. Consequently, King was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle.

King appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, reiterating his argument that Robertson was not the legal owner due to the lack of DMV registration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the definition of “owner” in Code § 18.2-102 does not require DMV registration and that Robertson’s testimony and possession of the car were sufficient to establish ownership.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Robertson’s testimony and the circumstances of his possession and control of the vehicle were sufficient to establish that he was the owner, even without DMV registration. Thus, the evidence supported King’s conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle.

State v. McGee

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,134-8

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: Debra Stephens

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

On June 3, 2017, Deputy Alexander Hawley of the King County Sheriff’s Office conducted an illegal stop of Malcolm Otha McGee, suspecting a drug transaction. During the stop, Hawley obtained McGee’s identity, phone number, and seized drugs. McGee agreed to become a confidential informant but never followed up. The next day, a 911 caller reported gunfire, and a month later, the body of Keith Ayson, who had a drug dealing relationship with McGee, was found. Police used evidence from the illegal stop to obtain warrants for McGee’s phone records, which linked him to the crime scene.

The trial court ruled the June 3 stop was illegal and suppressed the drug evidence, dismissing the drug charge. However, it allowed the State to use evidence from the stop to establish McGee’s motive for murder. McGee’s first trial ended in a mistrial. Before the second trial, McGee moved to suppress evidence obtained from subsequent warrants, arguing they were based on the illegal stop. The trial court denied the motion, finding the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop. McGee was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 298 months plus a 60-month firearm enhancement.

The Washington State Court of Appeals reversed McGee’s conviction, holding that the evidence obtained from the illegal stop should have been suppressed, as it was not sufficiently attenuated. The court found that subsequent warrants relied on tainted evidence, necessitating suppression of all derived evidence and McGee’s statements to police.

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the attenuation doctrine did not apply because the new criminal act did not sever the causal connection between the illegal stop and the discovery of evidence. The court emphasized the strong privacy protections under the Washington State Constitution and rejected the State’s argument to expand the attenuation doctrine. The case was remanded for a new trial.

Cox v. United States

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 19-SP-0787

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: MCLEESE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1993, the appellant was convicted in Wisconsin of third-degree sexual assault and was required to register as a sex offender for fifteen years. After relocating to the District of Columbia, the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA) notified him in 2019 that he must register as a sex offender for life under the District of Columbia Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The appellant filed a motion in Superior Court challenging this determination, arguing that his Wisconsin conviction was not substantially similar to any lifetime-registration offense under SORA.

The Superior Court initially scheduled a hearing beyond the statutory sixty-day deadline set by SORA. At the hearing, the appellant contended that the United States had not proven that his Wisconsin conviction involved conduct substantially similar to first-degree or second-degree sexual abuse in the District, which require lifetime registration. The court granted the United States a continuance to obtain additional records from Wisconsin, over the appellant's objection. The additional evidence included transcripts from the preliminary hearing and sentencing, which detailed the appellant's use of force during the assault. The trial court found that the United States had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant's conduct involved the use of force, thus requiring lifetime registration.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The appellate court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the continuance and that the failure to meet SORA's sixty-day deadline did not warrant reversal. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the appellant's Wisconsin offense involved the use of force, justifying the lifetime registration requirement.

Machado v. United States

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 19-CF-0818

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: BECKWITH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Dagoberto Machado was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses related to the inappropriate touching of I.A., his girlfriend’s young niece. The incidents allegedly occurred during the summers of 2016 and 2017 when I.A. was staying with Machado and his girlfriend. I.A. testified that Machado touched her inappropriately on several occasions, including at a public pool and in their home. She did not immediately report the incidents due to uncertainty and fear of affecting family relationships. The government introduced expert testimony from Dr. Stephanie Wolf, a child psychologist, to provide context for I.A.'s delayed reporting, including cultural barriers within Latino communities.

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia admitted Dr. Wolf’s testimony over Machado’s objections. Machado argued that Dr. Wolf’s statements about “machismo” in Latino culture were prejudicial. The trial court qualified Dr. Wolf as an expert and allowed her to testify about cultural norms that might impede a child from disclosing abuse. Dr. Wolf mentioned that in Latino culture, men might have a higher standing, which could impact how sexuality and abuse are viewed. The jury found Machado guilty on all counts.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Wolf’s testimony about Latino culture. The court held that the testimony had minimal probative value and was substantially outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury against Machado based on ethnic stereotypes. The court emphasized that such testimony could lead the jury to view Machado as more likely to have committed the abuse simply because of his ethnicity. Consequently, the court reversed Machado’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Oji Fit World, LLC v. District of Columbia

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 22-CV-0821

Opinion Date: October 24, 2024

Judge: EASTERLY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves Amaka Oji and Oji Fit World, LLC (OFW), who were approved as Medicaid providers by the D.C. Department of Health Care Finance (DHCF) in 2011. Between 2012 and 2015, they submitted over 24,000 claims for reimbursement for wellness services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries. Investigations by DHCF, the Office of the Inspector General for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the FBI revealed that Oji and OFW regularly overbilled Medicaid, often charging for a full hour of service regardless of the actual time spent or whether the service was provided at all.

The District of Columbia filed a lawsuit in April 2021 under the D.C. False Claims Act and the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the District, finding that Oji and OFW had submitted false claims and falsified records. The court awarded the District $1,001,362.50 in treble damages and $497,000 in civil penalties. Oji and OFW's various procedural defenses, including claims of laches and statute of limitations, were deemed waived due to their failure to raise them in a timely manner.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment order. However, the court remanded the case for further consideration of the damages and penalties. The appellate court found that the Superior Court had not provided sufficient explanation or analysis for the awarded amounts, making it difficult to review the decision. The appellate court emphasized the need for the trial court to explain its reasoning in detail to permit adequate appellate review.