Segrain v. Duffy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1854

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: MONTECALVO

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Joseph Segrain, an inmate at Rhode Island's Adult Correctional Institutions, filed a civil lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and several correctional officers, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and various state laws. Segrain claimed that on June 28, 2018, officers used excessive force by executing a leg-sweep maneuver, spraying him with pepper spray, and delaying his decontamination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims, leading Segrain to appeal.

The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island initially reviewed the case. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers' conduct constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. It granted summary judgment on the basis that the force used was minimal and necessary to maintain order. The court also dismissed the state law claims, concluding that the officers' actions did not meet the legal standards for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or excessive force under Rhode Island law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Officer Walter Duffy's use of pepper spray violated Segrain's Eighth Amendment rights. It found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Duffy's use of pepper spray was excessive and not in good faith. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the Rhode Island Constitution Article I, Section 8 claim regarding Duffy's use of pepper spray and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on all other claims, including the leg-sweep maneuver and the delayed decontamination, granting qualified immunity to the officers on those issues.

St. Jean v. Marchilli

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1846

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: SELYA

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the petitioner, a state prisoner, challenged the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, which alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The petitioner, along with two accomplices, planned and executed a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pizza delivery driver. The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and breaking and entering, and was sentenced to life in prison without parole.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the petitioner's conviction, rejecting his claims of insufficient evidence, improper admission of redacted statements from a co-defendant, and errors in jury instructions. The SJC found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction under theories of felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty. It also held that the redacted statements did not violate the petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights and that the trial court's jury instructions were appropriate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the habeas petition de novo. The court applied the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which requires deference to state court decisions unless they are contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or are based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the SJC's rulings were not unreasonable. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction, the redacted statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and the jury instructions were proper. The court also concluded that any errors in the trial court's rulings were harmless and did not prejudice the petitioner.

United States v. Acevedo-Osorio

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1610

Opinion Date: September 24, 2024

Judge: LIPEZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of coercion and enticement of a minor. The plea agreement included a joint recommendation for a 120-month sentence, which is the statutory minimum, despite the calculated Guidelines sentencing range being significantly higher. The government did not provide an explanation for this recommendation at the sentencing hearing. The district court sentenced the defendant to 292 months in prison, imposed a condition of supervised release prohibiting unsupervised contact with any minor, including his children, and ordered a special assessment and restitution.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by not adequately supporting the recommended sentence and that the sentence and conditions imposed were unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the government breached the plea agreement by failing to provide a minimal explanation for the recommended sentence, which was necessary given the significant downward variance from the Guidelines range. However, the court concluded that this breach did not constitute plain error and affirmed the length of the sentence as reasonable.

The court also upheld the restriction on the defendant's unsupervised contact with his children, finding it reasonably related to the nature of the offense and necessary to protect the community and minors. However, the court vacated the special assessment and restitution orders, remanding these issues to the district court for further consideration. The special assessment was vacated because the district court did not make a finding regarding the defendant's indigency, and the restitution order was vacated because the district court did not find that the victim's mother was a victim within the statutory definition.

United States v. Martinez-Hernandez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-2098

Opinion Date: September 24, 2024

Judge: LIPEZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In February 2013, a correctional officer named Osvaldo Albarati was murdered while driving home from the federal prison where he worked. Oscar Martínez-Hernández, an inmate at the prison, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for orchestrating the murder. The prosecution argued that Martínez-Hernández, along with another inmate, planned the killing in retaliation for Albarati's efforts to confiscate contraband, including cellphones, from inmates. The defense contended that the evidence was insufficient and that the government had manipulated evidence and allowed false testimony.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico oversaw the trial, which lasted twelve days and included testimony from twenty government witnesses. The defense presented two witnesses. The jury found Martínez-Hernández guilty on all counts, including aiding and abetting the murder of a federal officer, conspiracy to commit murder, murder for hire, and related firearms charges. The defense's motion for a new trial, based on the late disclosure of a prison logbook and other alleged errors, was denied by the district court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that the late disclosure of the prison logbook did not warrant a new trial, as the logbook's contents did not significantly undermine the overwhelming evidence of Martínez-Hernández's guilt. The court rejected the defense's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and improper admission of hearsay statements, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. The court affirmed Martínez-Hernández's conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial.

United States of America v. Lefebvre

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6485

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: MYRNA PÉREZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant-Appellant Varian Lefebvre pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl and possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The case began when Vermont State Police responded to a 911 call reporting an assault at a Holiday Inn in Rutland, Vermont. Officers located Lefebvre at the hotel and transported him to the nearby Vermont State Police barracks for identification by the purported victims, where he was then arrested. Lefebvre argued that all physical evidence seized from his backpack after his arrest should have been suppressed, claiming that his seizure ripened into a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause when he was transported to the police barracks.

The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied Lefebvre’s motion to suppress the physical evidence. The court found that the seizure did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest and was supported by probable cause. Lefebvre entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Lefebvre’s seizure did not become a de facto arrest when he was transported to the police barracks because the transportation was a reasonable and non-dilatory investigative step given the unique circumstances. The court also found that even if the transportation did rise to the level of an arrest, it was supported by probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances, including the 911 call, witness descriptions, and Lefebvre’s behavior. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Tompkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-599

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: Debra Ann Livingston

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eric Tompkins was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and possessing child pornography. During his arrest, a Samsung cellular phone with an SD card was seized. A search warrant was obtained to examine the phone for evidence related to his failure to register. During the search, child pornography was found on the SD card. A second warrant was then obtained to search the phone and SD card specifically for child pornography, leading to the discovery of additional images.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Tompkins's motion to suppress the images found on the SD card, ruling that the search was conducted in good faith. Tompkins argued that the initial search warrant did not specifically authorize the search of the SD card, making the search unlawful and tainting the subsequent search.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the initial search warrant, which authorized the search of the cellular phone for electronically stored information, included the SD card as it is a form of electronic storage. The court concluded that the search of the SD card fell within the scope of the warrant. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting Tompkins's argument that the search was unauthorized.

United States v. Trasacco

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6344

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: NATHAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

In this case, the defendant was involved in a scheme to defraud the City of West Haven, Connecticut, of COVID-19 relief funds. The defendant, along with co-conspirators, submitted fraudulent invoices for equipment and services that were never provided. The City paid over $400,000 based on these false invoices. The defendant was the only one among his co-defendants to go to trial, while the others pled guilty.

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut convicted the defendant of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court sentenced him to 96 months in prison, which was above the recommended guidelines range. The defendant appealed, challenging the sentence as substantively unreasonable, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had provided a detailed explanation for the above-guidelines sentence, emphasizing the severity of the crime, the defendant’s financial gains, and the need for deterrence. The court also noted that the defendant did not receive a trial penalty, as the district court had explicitly stated that the sentence was not influenced by the defendant’s decision to go to trial. The court further found that the evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction.

The Second Circuit concluded that none of the defendant’s challenges had merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

McKay v. LaCroix

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30775

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

A senior trooper with the Louisiana State Police (LSP), August McKay, committed suicide at his home after learning he was being reassigned and that a search warrant was to be executed on his residence. His widow, Brandy McKay, sued several LSP officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law, alleging their actions contributed to his death. The district court denied qualified immunity to two officers, Sergeant Rohn Bordelon and Trooper David LaCroix, leading to this appeal.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially dismissed Brandy’s Eighth Amendment claim but allowed her to amend her complaint. She then limited her claims to the Fourteenth Amendment and state laws. The district court found that Brandy had sufficiently stated § 1983 claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix, concluding they had subjective knowledge of August’s suicide risk and responded with deliberate indifference. The court dismissed the claims against other defendants and allowed the state law claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix to proceed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no constitutional duty to protect August from self-harm, as he was not in state custody or otherwise restrained. The court emphasized that the officers did not attempt to arrest or confine August, and Brandy’s complaint focused on their failure to restrain him. Without a constitutional duty, there could be no violation, and thus, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court’s decision regarding qualified immunity and dismissed the appeal concerning the state law claims without prejudice, remanding the case for further proceedings.

United States v. Crittenden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50007

Opinion Date: September 24, 2024

Judge: Willett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Federal agents received a tip about methamphetamine being stored at a house in El Paso, Texas. An informant arranged a controlled buy with Carla Dominguez, who confirmed she had methamphetamine for sale. Dominguez and her husband, Samuel Crittenden, were observed by agents; Crittenden retrieved a bag from the house and handed it to Dominguez, who was later intercepted by police with ten pounds of methamphetamine. Crittenden admitted to storing items at the house and giving a bag to Dominguez, claiming he thought it contained marijuana. Additional drugs were found in the attic of the house.

Crittenden and Dominguez were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine and marijuana. The government raised a potential conflict of interest with Crittenden’s attorney, Leonard Morales, who also represented another individual involved in drug activities. The district court held a Garcia hearing, where Crittenden waived his right to conflict-free counsel. The court accepted the waiver, and the trial proceeded. Crittenden was convicted on all counts, but the district court later granted a new trial due to insufficient evidence. The Fifth Circuit reinstated the conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and remanded for sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Crittenden’s appeal, where he argued that the district court erred in accepting his waiver of conflict-free counsel and in denying a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession. The Fifth Circuit found that Crittenden’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that the district court did not err in accepting it. The court also held that the evidence overwhelmingly indicated intent to distribute, making a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession inappropriate. The court affirmed the district court’s decisions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

United States v. Ritchey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60468

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Duncan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, White Collar Crime

Kenneth Bryan Ritchey, the defendant, operated Gulf Coast Pharmaceuticals Plus, LLC, a wholesale distributor of pharmaceutical products. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ritchey directed his employees to acquire large quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE) and resell them at inflated prices to various healthcare providers, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA was charged significantly higher prices than the market value, resulting in Ritchey and his company receiving over $2 million, including more than $270,000 from the VA.

Ritchey was charged with six counts, including conspiracy to defraud the United States. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi calculated Ritchey’s offense level based on the estimated pecuniary loss caused by his actions, which included a significant enhancement for the amount of loss. The court determined the fair market value (FMV) of the PPE based on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, leading to a higher offense level and a 60-month prison sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in calculating the FMV by relying on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, which did not reflect the actual market conditions during the pandemic. The appellate court held that the district court’s method of determining the FMV was not based on a realistic economic approach. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Ritchey’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing the need for a more accurate calculation of the FMV that reflects the market conditions at the time of the transactions.

United States v. Castillo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2577

Opinion Date: September 20, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rodrigo Castillo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court, adopting the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), determined Castillo’s advisory guidelines sentencing range to be 135 to 168 months and sentenced him to 140 months imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Castillo’s co-defendant, Roberto Nava, received a 120-month sentence under a binding plea agreement. Castillo appealed, arguing that the 20-month disparity between his and Nava’s sentences created an unwarranted sentencing disparity, making his sentence procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska accepted Castillo’s guilty plea and sentenced him based on the PSR’s recommendations. Castillo objected to the PSR’s base offense level calculation and the two-level increase for the importation of methamphetamine but withdrew these objections at sentencing. He also moved for a downward variance to match Nava’s 120-month sentence, which the court denied, citing the seriousness of Castillo’s offense and the differences in the co-defendants' conduct and plea agreements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Castillo’s appeal, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. The court found no procedural error, noting that the district court had considered the sentencing disparity and the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court also held that Castillo’s sentence was substantively reasonable, given the legitimate distinctions between the co-defendants and the presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Castillo’s 140-month sentence.

HYER V. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-15335

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: Paez

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves an encounter between the Hawai'i Police Department (HPD) and Steven Hyer, which resulted in Hyer's death. On June 22, 2018, HPD officers responded to calls about Hyer's erratic behavior. Hyer, who had a history of mental illness, barricaded himself in his apartment. After several hours of failed negotiations and attempts to subdue him, including the use of a Taser and chemical munitions, HPD officers deployed a police dog. When Hyer allegedly threatened the officers with a compound bow, Corporal Torres shot and killed him.

The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the City and County of Honolulu, and several HPD officers. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert reports, finding them speculative, unreliable, and containing legal conclusions. The court ruled that the use of force was objectively reasonable and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and various state law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in excluding the entirety of the plaintiffs' expert reports, as the reports were based on sufficient facts and data. The Ninth Circuit found that the exclusion of these reports was prejudicial because they created genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the use of deadly force and chemical munitions, as well as potential ADA violations. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on these claims but affirmed the grant of qualified immunity regarding the use of the police dog, as the law was not clearly established. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Lowe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-1156

Opinion Date: September 20, 2024

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Scott Lowe was convicted of drug trafficking and unlawful possession of a firearm. He argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Denver Police Department officers searched a storage unit in his apartment building without a warrant. The search revealed evidence linking him to drug trafficking. Lowe moved to suppress the evidence, claiming a possessory interest in the unit that required a warrant. The district court denied the motion.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. Lowe had previously pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and was on supervised release. His probation officer received tips from a confidential informant about Lowe using a storage unit for hiding narcotics and firearms. Despite Lowe's denials and the property manager's confirmation that he did not rent a storage unit, officers found incriminating evidence in a storage unit on the eighth floor of his apartment building. Lowe was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute MDMA, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Lowe's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the storage unit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Lowe failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the storage unit. The court found sufficient evidence to support his conviction and found no legal error in his sentencing. The court also addressed Lowe's challenges regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the reasonableness of his sentence, ultimately affirming the lower court's rulings.

United States v. Holland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-14219

Opinion Date: September 25, 2024

Judge: BRASHER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves John Holland, William Moore, and Ed Cota, who were accused of participating in an illegal healthcare kickback scheme. The government alleged that Holland and Moore, hospital executives for Tenet Healthcare, paid the Cotas to refer Medicaid or Medicare-covered pregnant women to Tenet hospitals. The payments were purportedly disguised as contracts for translation services. Tracey Cota, Ed Cota's wife, pleaded guilty to violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by participating in this scheme. However, the other defendants argued that their business relationship did not violate the AKS because they lacked the requisite mental state or mens rea.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held a pretrial "paper" hearing to determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by the defendants' alleged coconspirators. The district court concluded that the government needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants' conduct was illegal to admit the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The court found that the government failed to prove the defendants' knowledge of illegality and thus excluded the coconspirator statements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred in requiring proof of an illegal conspiracy to admit coconspirator statements. The court clarified that under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), it is sufficient to show that the statements were made during and in furtherance of a joint venture, regardless of the venture's legality. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

United States v. Moore

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10579

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Criminal Law

John Moore, Jr., and Tanner Mansell, who worked as boat crew for a shark encounter company in Jupiter, Florida, were involved in an incident on August 10, 2020. During a trip with the Kuehl family, they found a long fishing line attached to a buoy, which they believed was illegal. They hauled the line into the boat, cut sharks free from the hooks, and reported the incident to a Florida Fish and Wildlife Officer. However, the line was legally placed by Scott Taylor, who had the proper permits for shark research. Moore and Mansell were later indicted for theft of property within special maritime jurisdiction, as the line and gear belonged to Taylor.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Moore and Mansell requested a jury instruction that required the jury to find they stole the property for their own use or benefit to convict them under 18 U.S.C. § 661. The district court rejected this request, instead instructing the jury that to steal means to wrongfully take property with the intent to deprive the owner of its use. The jury found both defendants guilty, and they were sentenced to one year of probation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed jury instruction. The appellate court found that the term "steal" in 18 U.S.C. § 661 does not require the intent to convert the property for personal use, aligning with the broader interpretation of theft under federal law. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

BAREFIELD v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 141

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Hiland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2017, a jury in Pope County convicted Tyler Joseph Barefield of two counts of capital murder for the premeditated killings of Aaron Brock and Beau Dewitt. Barefield was sentenced to life without parole for each count and received an additional 180-month term for using a firearm in the commission of the murders. The murders occurred after Barefield, suspecting trespassers at his salvage yard, lay in wait with a rifle and ambushed Brock and Dewitt. Their bodies were later found crushed in vehicles at the salvage yard. Barefield's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.

Barefield subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Pope County Circuit Court denied the petition, adopting the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Barefield appealed this decision, arguing that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and applied the two-step analysis from Strickland v. Washington, which requires showing that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. The court found that Barefield’s claims were unsubstantiated and conclusory. It held that decisions regarding trial strategy, such as not consulting a ballistics expert or not seeking a mistrial for prosecutorial statements, fell within the realm of reasonable professional judgment. The court also upheld the circuit court’s decision to exclude Colonel Arthur Alphin’s testimony on the victims’ cause of death, as Alphin was not a qualified medical expert.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the Pope County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief, finding no clear error in its judgment.

P. v. Gallardo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D084179(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: McConnell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2009, the defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including two counts of robbery, attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, two counts of assault with a firearm, discharging a firearm at an occupied building, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and actively participating in a criminal street gang. He was sentenced to a total of 90 years and four months in prison. The judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2010.

In October 2023, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows for retroactive relief for certain convictions under amended murder laws. The Superior Court of Riverside County held a status conference and a hearing on the petition. The defendant was not present, but counsel was appointed to represent him. During the hearing, the prosecutor argued that the jury instructions from the original trial, which were based on direct aiding and abetting, precluded the defendant from relief. The defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor's recitation of the jury instructions. The court summarily denied the petition without reviewing the record of conviction or any documentary evidence.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court failed to conduct the necessary inquiry mandated by section 1172.6, subdivision (c), which requires a review of the record of conviction to determine a petitioner's eligibility for relief. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's summary denial of the petition was inadequate and that the appellate court should not perform the trial court's function of reviewing the record in the first instance.

The appellate court reversed the order denying the petition and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct the requisite proceedings under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). The court did not take a position on whether the defendant ultimately made a prima facie claim for relief.

P. v. Reid

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G064127(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 25, 2024

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.

The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.

People v. Briscoe

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167964(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 25, 2024

Judge: DOUGLAS

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1998, Khyle Armando Briscoe, then 21, participated in a robbery with Shaun P. During the robbery, Briscoe and Shaun P. both had guns. A struggle ensued, resulting in Ben P., the robbery victim, fatally shooting Shaun P. Briscoe was charged with first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with firearm-use enhancements and a special circumstance of murder during a robbery and burglary. A jury convicted Briscoe on all counts, and he was sentenced to life without parole.

Briscoe filed a motion in 2022 for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which allows certain youth offenders to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. He argued that this exclusion violated equal protection under the California and U.S. Constitutions. The trial court denied his motion, adhering to the majority view that section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Briscoe appealed.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder was previously upheld in People v. Hardin. However, Briscoe raised a narrower challenge, arguing that excluding youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for special circumstance murder, while including those convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. The court agreed, finding no rational basis for treating these equally culpable offenders differently.

The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for a Franklin proceeding and a section 3051 parole hearing, holding that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary violated equal protection.

People v. Gallegos

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F086151(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 25, 2024

Judge: DETJEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The petitioner sought resentencing on his voluntary manslaughter conviction under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. He had entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019, after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which eliminated certain theories of murder liability. The petitioner argued that his plea should be reconsidered because he could have faced attempted murder liability under a now-invalid theory had he gone to trial.

The Tulare County Superior Court initially charged the petitioner with murder and attempted murder, along with firearm and gang allegations. In 2019, as part of a plea deal, the petitioner pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter, and the remaining charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison. In 2022, the petitioner filed for resentencing under section 1172.6, but the trial court denied the petition, stating that he was ineligible because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437.

The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the petitioner was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which had already eliminated the imputed malice theories of murder liability. The court noted that section 1172.6 is intended to provide relief for specific convictions obtained under now-invalid theories of liability, not for dismissed charges. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the petitioner could not show he could not presently be convicted of murder due to changes in the law, as required by section 1172.6.

People v. Hersom

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168129(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Humes

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of felony vehicle burglary, being a felon in possession of tear gas, and misdemeanor receiving stolen property. During jury selection, the defendant, who was in jail, did not appear in court. The bailiff reported that the defendant refused transport, leading the court to find his absence voluntary and proceed with jury selection. The defendant missed another day but was present for the rest of the trial. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in county jail, with part of the sentence suspended for mandatory supervision.

The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco handled the initial trial. The defendant argued that his constitutional right to be present was violated due to insufficient evidence of voluntary absence and the denial of a continuance. The court found substantial evidence of voluntary absence based on the bailiff's testimony and denied the continuance. The defendant was convicted on most counts, and the court later modified his sentence.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant was voluntarily absent, including the bailiff's report and jail procedures. The court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, considering the potential manipulation by the defendant and the inconvenience to jurors and court resources. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions but accepted the Attorney General's concession that the defendant was entitled to four additional days of presentence custody credits.

People v. Zavala

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098684(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 25, 2024

Judge: Wiseman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In March 2010, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder and actively participating in a criminal street gang, resulting in a 22-year prison sentence. Approximately 12 years later, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court admitted statements the defendant made during a parole risk assessment interview and testimony from a parole hearing, ultimately denying the petition.

The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially handled the case, where the defendant's petition for resentencing was reviewed. The trial court admitted the parole hearing transcript and the defendant’s statements from the comprehensive risk assessment, despite objections from the defense counsel on grounds of hearsay and constitutional violations. The court found that the defendant’s statements demonstrated an intent to kill and denied the petition for resentencing.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant argued that his statements and testimony from the parole proceedings should be subject to use immunity and were involuntary. The appellate court held that statements made in preparation for, and during, a parole hearing are not subject to use immunity under the reasoning of People v. Coleman and related authorities. The court also found that the statements were not involuntary, as the defendant was advised of his rights and chose to participate. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the statements and testimony, affirming the order denying the petition for resentencing.

State v. Cardona

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-23-0000013

Opinion Date: September 20, 2024

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, the defendant was involved in an altercation in Waikiki that resulted in the death of another individual. The defendant, who claimed to have poor vision, was called to the scene by a friend who was being harassed by two men. The situation escalated into a physical fight, during which the defendant stabbed one of the men, who later died from his injuries. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury.

The Circuit Court of the First Circuit convicted the defendant of second-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing prosecutorial misconduct and instructional errors. The ICA affirmed the conviction, concluding that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury instructions were appropriate.

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA) committed prosecutorial misconduct by characterizing the defendant as a liar and an "enforcer" during closing arguments, which denied the defendant a fair trial. The court also noted that the DPA improperly inserted personal opinions and new evidence regarding the defendant's eyesight. The court held that this misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and vacated the ICA's judgment, as well as the Circuit Court's judgment of conviction and sentence. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

State v. Garrett

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124329

Opinion Date: September 20, 2024

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Phillip Jason Garrett was accused of inappropriately touching a minor, L.A., who was under 14 years old. During a police interview, Garrett confessed to some of the allegations. The district court suppressed his statements, concluding they were involuntary due to deceptive police practices, including the use of a computerized voice stress analysis (CVSA) test, which officers falsely claimed was 100% accurate.

The Saline District Court initially denied Garrett's motion to suppress, finding his statements voluntary. However, the court later reversed its decision, emphasizing the deceptive nature of the CVSA and the officers' tactics. The State appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court's suppression order, holding that the district court had placed undue weight on the deceptive practices and failed to consider the totality of the circumstances.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the deceptive practices by law enforcement, including the exaggerated claims about the CVSA's accuracy, did not constitute misconduct under the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that Garrett was a mature adult of average intelligence, fluent in English, and that the interrogation was not unduly prolonged or aggressive. The court concluded that the officers' tactics did not overbear Garrett's will, and thus, his confession was voluntary. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

State v. Peters

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 126016

Opinion Date: September 20, 2024

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

On the evening of February 11, 2018, Deizmond C. Peters and three accomplices allegedly committed a series of crimes at a Wichita home, resulting in the death of Donte Devore. The group, armed with handguns, entered the home after assaulting Devore on the porch. During an altercation inside, Devore was shot and killed. Peters was later charged with first-degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of a weapon, and four counts of aggravated assault.

The Sedgwick District Court held a jury trial where Peters was convicted on all charges. Peters filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 618 months plus an additional 332 months. Peters appealed his convictions, raising several claims of trial and sentencing errors.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found merit in two of Peters' arguments. First, the court agreed that the evidence did not support his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon due to an error in the stipulation used to prove this charge. Second, the court noted that the sentencing journal entry of judgment improperly omitted Peters' jail credit award of 1,437 days. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, finding no error in the jury selection process, prosecutorial conduct, jury instructions, or the cumulative error doctrine. The court also upheld the method of determining Peters' criminal history under the Kansas Criminal Sentencing Guidelines, rejecting his constitutional challenge.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to vacate Peters' sentence for criminal possession of a weapon, resentence him without the reversed conviction, and issue a nunc pro tunc order correcting the sentencing journal entry to include the jail credit award.

BITTER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0382-MR

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: THOMPSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On December 5, 2020, Covington Police Officer Kevin Igo received a letter alleging that Scott Bitter, a convicted felon, was involved in drug trafficking and had assaulted someone. Officer Igo and other officers went to Bitter's residence to investigate. They conducted a "knock and talk" without announcing themselves as police officers. When Bitter's companion, Susan Hornsby, opened the door, Officer Igo observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, including a scale, baggies, and pills. The officers then conducted a protective sweep of the apartment and later obtained a search warrant, which led to the discovery of drugs and a firearm.

The Kenton Circuit Court denied Bitter's motion to suppress the evidence, which argued that the initial entry and subsequent search were unconstitutional. The court found that the officers' actions were lawful, as the drug paraphernalia was in plain view and the protective sweep was justified for officer safety. Bitter was convicted by a jury of two counts of trafficking in controlled substances and being a persistent felony offender, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. The court concluded that Officer Igo's observation of the drug paraphernalia from the doorway was lawful and that the protective sweep was reasonable under the circumstances. The search warrant obtained based on these observations was valid, and the evidence collected was admissible. The court affirmed Bitter's conviction and sentence.

Commonwealth v. Hinds

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13538

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: DEWAR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of two counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon after attacking two victims with a hammer. The defendant admitted to hitting the victims but claimed self-defense. During the trial, the prosecution introduced a text message and social media posts to demonstrate the defendant's animosity toward the victims. The defendant sought to call an expert to dispute the authenticity of these posts, but the trial judge excluded the expert's testimony due to untimely disclosure.

The case was first tried in the Superior Court, where the defendant was found guilty of more severe charges. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial due to the improper exclusion of expert testimony. In the retrial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The Appeals Court later reversed these convictions, finding errors in the admission of the social media posts and the exclusion of the expert testimony. The Supreme Judicial Court then granted further appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the text message and social media posts were admissible as they were probative of the defendant's animus and intent, and their probative value was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding the expert testimony, as the late disclosure prejudiced the Commonwealth and the testimony was minimally material to the case's outcome. The judgments were affirmed.

Commonwealth v. Oliver

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13486

Opinion Date: September 24, 2024

Judge: Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of uttering after cashing a forged check drawn on an account of a person who did not know her. On January 19, 2019, the defendant cashed a personal check for $3,600 at a bank, presenting her driver's license. The check was drawn from an account belonging to an individual named Eileen, whose first name was misspelled on the check. The account holder later discovered unauthorized checks drawn on her account and contacted the police. The defendant was charged with larceny by check and uttering.

The case was initially tried in the Malden Division of the District Court Department, where the defendant was found guilty of uttering but not guilty of larceny. The defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty was denied. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted further appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the check was forged. The court found that the evidence, including the account holder's unfamiliarity with the defendant, the misspelled signature, and the amount of the check, was insufficient to establish the defendant's knowledge of the forgery. The court emphasized that the evidence must be more than conjecture or inference piled upon inference. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the District Court, set aside the verdict, and ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant.

Wells v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-00670-SCT

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the early morning of April 29, 2020, Davonta Wells went to his former girlfriend Taharika Smith's home and, after being denied entry, fired six shots into the residence. Wells was identified as the shooter by Smith, a guest named James Rice, and a neighbor, Pierre Beard. Wells was charged with shooting into an occupied dwelling and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, and convicted on both counts. Wells was sentenced as a nonviolent habitual offender to ten years for shooting into an occupied dwelling and ten years with four years suspended for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to run consecutively.

Wells appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the stipulation of his prior felony was not formally admitted into evidence. The State contended that Wells waived this argument by not objecting at trial and that the stipulation, along with a limiting jury instruction, was sufficient.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Wells was procedurally barred from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. The court also applied the invited error doctrine, noting that Wells had made a tactical decision to stipulate to his prior felony conviction and did not object at trial. The court declined to adopt Wells's proposed requirement for written stipulations to be admitted into evidence, affirming that the current law, which allows for stipulations to be presented through jury instructions, was sufficient. The court held that the stipulation and the limiting instruction provided to the jury met the evidentiary requirements, thus affirming Wells's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Prosecuting Attorney, 21st Judicial Circuit, ex rel. Williams v. State of Missouri

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Dockets: SC 83934, SC83934, July2024, SC100764

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: Hilton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1998, the defendant fatally stabbed the victim during a burglary. The victim's belongings were found in the defendant's vehicle, and two witnesses testified that the defendant confessed to the crime. In 2001, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and other charges, sentencing him to death. Over the next 23 years, the defendant's claims of actual innocence and constitutional errors were repeatedly rejected by state and federal courts.

The defendant's direct appeal was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court in 2003, and his post-conviction relief appeal was denied in 2005. The federal district court initially granted habeas relief, but the Eighth Circuit reversed this decision in 2012. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2013. Subsequent habeas petitions and requests for DNA testing were also denied by the Missouri Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court found no clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence or constitutional error that would undermine confidence in the original judgment. The court noted that recent DNA testing did not support the defendant's claim of innocence and that the evidence showed the killer wore gloves, which aligned with the trial testimony. The court also rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and Batson violations, as these issues had been previously adjudicated and found to be without merit.

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, denying the motion to vacate or set aside the conviction and sentence. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate actual innocence or constitutional error by clear and convincing evidence. The motion for a stay of execution was overruled as moot.

Main v. State

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 215

Opinion Date: September 24, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In November 2006, Lloyd Kvelstad was murdered at a house party in Havre, Montana. Evidence showed that James Main was involved in a physical altercation with Kvelstad, during which Main choked Kvelstad multiple times. Kvelstad was later found severely beaten and unresponsive. Main was arrested and charged with deliberate homicide by felony murder. At trial, various testimonies and forensic evidence linked Main to the crime, leading to his conviction in February 2009.

Main appealed his conviction, but the Montana Supreme Court upheld it in 2011, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Main later filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that the State violated his Brady rights by failing to disclose certain crime scene photos. He argued that these photos were crucial for determining the time and cause of Kvelstad's death. The District Court denied Main's petition without holding a hearing, taking judicial notice of findings from a co-defendant's postconviction case.

The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court found that even if the missing photos had been disclosed, they would not have changed the outcome of the trial. The evidence already presented was sufficient to establish Main's guilt for deliberate homicide by felony murder. The Court also found that Main's petition did not present newly discovered evidence but rather a new theory of the crime. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition without a hearing.

State v. Cleveland

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 214

Opinion Date: September 24, 2024

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jay Le Cleveland was approached by Polson police officers for a welfare check after a 911 caller reported him slumped over the steering wheel of his running car. Upon interaction, Cleveland explained he was fine but had burning eyes. When asked for his driver’s license, Cleveland stated he did not have it. The officer then verified Cleveland’s probation status and, with authorization from Cleveland’s probation officer, conducted a search of Cleveland’s car, finding drugs and a digital scale. Cleveland was charged with felony possession with intent to distribute.

The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied Cleveland’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, ruling that the officer had particularized suspicion to expand the welfare check into a drug investigation. Cleveland entered a plea agreement, pleading no contest to one count and agreeing to pay a $300 prosecution fee, while reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that the officer had reasonable cause to continue the interaction beyond the initial welfare check based on Cleveland’s behavior and responses. The Court also found that the probation officer had reasonable suspicion to authorize the search of Cleveland’s car. Additionally, the Court upheld the $300 prosecution fee, noting that Cleveland had agreed to it in his plea deal and did not object at sentencing.

State v. Rush

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 622

Opinion Date: September 20, 2024

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Deontae Rush appealed from convictions of first-degree murder and using a firearm to commit a felony. He had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and 25-35 years for the firearm offense, to be served consecutively. Rush challenged various evidentiary rulings made by the district court. He also argued that the lower court should have granted his motion for a mistrial due to statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Rush further alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on numerous grounds. He also argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that he used a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decisions. It found no merit in most of the assignments of error, while it concluded that it could not resolve certain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The court noted that any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the weapons offense based on the evidence presented. It also noted that a trial court has significant discretion over matters such as evidentiary determinations and whether to grant a motion for a mistrial. Since it found no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court did not disturb these decisions by the district court.

CHASING HORSE VS. DIST. CT.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 63

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Herndon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Nathan Chasing Horse, who was indicted on multiple felony charges, including sexual assault, by a grand jury. The charges stem from allegations by two victims, C.C.H. and S.B., who claimed that Chasing Horse used his position within the Lakota Tribe to manipulate them into sexual relationships under the guise of spiritual and healing practices. C.C.H. alleged that Chasing Horse coerced her into sexual acts to heal her mother’s cancer, while S.B. claimed she was similarly manipulated due to her fear of spiritual consequences.

The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada denied Chasing Horse's pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the indictment on the grounds that the State improperly instructed the grand jury on the concept of "grooming" and failed to present exculpatory evidence. The district court dismissed one count but upheld the remaining charges, leading Chasing Horse to seek relief from the Nevada Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the State had provided an improper instruction on "grooming" to the grand jury, which was unsupported by evidence and not necessary for the elements of the charged offenses. Additionally, the court determined that the State failed to present exculpatory evidence, specifically statements made by C.C.H. that could indicate consent, which is a critical element in sexual assault charges. The court concluded that these errors prejudiced Chasing Horse and undermined the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.

The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ petition, directing the district court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. The State may seek a new indictment, but it must correct the errors identified by the court in its presentation to the grand jury.

State v. Roller

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 180

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Thomas Roller was charged with multiple offenses, including terrorizing an adult victim, reckless endangerment, criminal mischief, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and domestic violence. The unauthorized use of a vehicle charge was dismissed before trial. The jury found Roller guilty of the remaining charges. Roller contested the jury instruction on criminal mischief, arguing it allowed for a non-cognizable offense, and also challenged his sentence as a habitual offender, claiming the court improperly considered his prior convictions.

The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over the trial. The jury instructions defined criminal mischief as willfully damaging property and intentionally causing pecuniary loss over $100. Roller did not object to these instructions during the trial. The jury convicted Roller on all counts. At the presentencing hearing, the court took judicial notice of Roller’s prior convictions, despite his initial objection, which he later withdrew. The court found Roller met the criteria for habitual offender status and sentenced him accordingly.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the jury instructions did not constitute obvious error, as the terms "willfully" and "intentionally" were not legally incongruent. The court also found that the district court did not err in taking judicial notice of Roller’s prior convictions for sentencing purposes, as the rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing procedures. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and did not impose an illegal sentence. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

State v. Mays

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-4616

Opinion Date: September 25, 2024

Judge: Fischer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, Mario D. Mays, was charged with multiple offenses, including violating a protection order under Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2919.27(A) and (B), a fifth-degree felony. The trial evidence showed that Mays had a prior conviction for violating a protection order. The jury found Mays guilty, and the verdict form specified the violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(3). Mays did not object to the verdict form, which, due to his prior conviction, elevated the offense to a fifth-degree felony under R.C. 2919.27(B)(3).

The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed Mays’s conviction and sentence. Mays argued on appeal that the verdict form was insufficient to convict him of a fifth-degree felony because it did not reference the offense level or any aggravating factors, as required by R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). The appellate court, relying on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Pelfrey, concluded that a statutory reference within the verdict form is sufficient to comply with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). The court noted that the statutory reference provided adequate notice of the offense degree.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine if a verdict form’s reference to the statutory section mandating a higher-level offense complies with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). The court held that such a reference does satisfy the statutory requirement. The court concluded that the verdict form’s citation to R.C. 2919.27(B)(3) was sufficient to state the degree of the offense, thus complying with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). Additionally, the court applied plain-error review, as Mays did not object to the verdict form at trial, and found no plain error affecting Mays’s substantial rights. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals.

State v. Giron-Cortez

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069941

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: MASIH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant who brought a loaded handgun to a crowded bar, displayed it in the palm of his hand without touching the trigger, and accidentally discharged it while putting it back in his waistband. The bullet hit his leg and ricocheted into his cousin's foot, causing injury. The defendant was charged with third-degree assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and multiple counts of reckless endangerment.

The Marion County Circuit Court, after a bench trial, found the defendant guilty of third-degree assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and eight counts of reckless endangerment. The court concluded that the defendant acted recklessly with "extreme indifference to the value of human life." The defendant appealed, arguing that his conduct did not meet the legal standard for "extreme indifference." The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the meaning of "extreme indifference" in the context of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(c). The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for all reckless use of a deadly weapon to constitute "extreme indifference." Instead, it associated "extreme indifference" with conduct presenting a greater risk to human life than ordinary recklessness, such as shooting a firearm in the direction and range of others or materially increasing the risk of accidental discharge.

The court found that the defendant's conduct did not meet this standard. The defendant's actions, while reckless, did not materially increase the risk of accidental discharge beyond the inherent risk of handling a loaded gun in public. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of conviction for third-degree assault. The case was remanded to the circuit court for entry of conviction for the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree assault and for resentencing.

Commonwealth v. Anderson

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 801 CAP

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree murder of an unborn child, and two counts of endangering the welfare of children. The crimes occurred in July 2020, when the appellant fatally shot Sydney Parmalee and Kaylee Lyons. Sydney was found dead in an apartment with a gunshot wound to her head, and Kaylee was found dead under similar circumstances later that month. The appellant was the father of both women’s children and was present at the scenes of both murders. He initially claimed Sydney’s death was a suicide but later admitted to killing both women.

The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death for Kaylee’s murder, life imprisonment for Sydney’s murder, and life imprisonment for the murder of Kaylee’s unborn child. The jury found one aggravating circumstance for Kaylee’s murder, which was that the appellant had been convicted of another offense punishable by death (Sydney’s murder). The appellant’s post-sentence motion was denied, leading to this direct appeal.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of sentence. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for first-degree murder, as the appellant used a deadly weapon on vital parts of the victims’ bodies, demonstrating malice and specific intent to kill. The court also upheld the conviction for endangering the welfare of a child, noting that the appellant left his son alone in the apartment after killing Kaylee.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that his spontaneous confession should have been suppressed, ruling that it was a voluntary statement not prompted by police questioning. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. Finally, the court concluded that the death sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and was supported by the evidence of the aggravating circumstance.

Commonwealth v. Berry

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 17 EAP 2023

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

James Berry was convicted of sexually abusing two young family members. The court found that Berry had no prior convictions or juvenile adjudications, resulting in a prior record score of zero. However, the sentencing court imposed a sentence significantly above the standard range, citing Berry’s arrest record as a factor. Berry appealed, arguing that considering his arrest record, which did not result in convictions, was improper.

The Superior Court affirmed the sentencing court’s decision, stating that a sentencing court may consider prior arrests as long as it recognizes that these arrests did not result in convictions. The court believed that Berry’s arrest record was relevant to his amenability to rehabilitation and the protection of the public.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that a sentencing court may not consider a defendant’s prior arrests that did not result in convictions. The court emphasized that prior arrests are not probative of a defendant’s character or likelihood of recidivism and are not relevant under the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code. The court noted that allowing prior arrests to influence sentencing would undermine the intent of the sentencing guidelines and the defendant’s prior record score.

The Supreme Court vacated Berry’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without considering his prior arrest record. The court did not address the constitutional question of due process, as the case was resolved based on existing legal precedents regarding the irrelevance of prior arrests in sentencing.

Commonwealth v. Thomas

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 808 CAP

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In September 2007, Donte Thomas was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of Tyreese Gaymon. Thomas was also convicted of carrying a firearm on public streets, recklessly endangering another person, and conspiracy, though no sentences were imposed for these convictions. The murder occurred in February 2006, while Gaymon was standing on a street corner. Multiple witnesses identified Thomas as the shooter. Thomas was arrested in April 2006 and admitted to knowing Kareem Glass, who was awaiting trial for the murder of Gaymon’s cousin. Thomas denied shooting Gaymon but admitted to smuggling a cell phone into prison for Glass.

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Thomas’ conviction and sentence. Thomas then filed a timely petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) in October 2013, which he amended multiple times. The PCRA court held several hearings over two and a half years and ultimately dismissed Thomas’ petition in May 2023. Thomas appealed this dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed Thomas’ claims, which included allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Thomas argued that his trial counsel failed to consult with him adequately, investigate potential alibi witnesses, and object to prejudicial statements. He also claimed that the prosecution induced false testimony and withheld exculpatory evidence. The court found that Thomas’ counsel had met with him multiple times and that the potential alibi witnesses were either not credible or unavailable. The court also determined that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not deprive Thomas of a fair trial.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of Thomas’ petition, concluding that Thomas failed to prove his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The court found no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s rulings.

Commonwealth v. Walters

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 102 MAP 2022

Opinion Date: September 23, 2024

Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On December 30, 2018, Phillip Walters reported his girlfriend, Hayley Lorenzen, missing. Lorenzen had recently moved into Walters' apartment. Walters claimed that after staying up late the previous night, he found Lorenzen missing the next morning. He contacted her father and then the police. On January 9, 2019, Gabel Bell, who had a prior relationship with Walters, informed the police that Walters had killed Lorenzen. Bell detailed that Walters had strangled Lorenzen and disposed of her body in a river. Lorenzen's remains were found on July 20, 2019, leading to Walters being charged with first-degree murder, strangulation, and abuse of a corpse.

The Wyoming County Court of Common Pleas convicted Walters, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Walters appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Gary Ross, the pathologist, who concluded that Lorenzen's cause of death was "strangulation by history" based solely on Bell's account, without physical evidence. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the pathologist's reliance on case history was permissible.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and found that Dr. Ross' testimony did not meet the requisite standard of being offered to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Dr. Ross admitted that his conclusion was based solely on Bell's statements and not on any objective medical findings due to the advanced decomposition of Lorenzen's body. The court held that this testimony improperly bolstered Bell's credibility, encroaching on the jury's role in determining witness credibility. Consequently, the court vacated Walters' judgment of sentence and remanded the case for a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Yard

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 11 MM 2023

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: MUNDY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In August 2021, Michael Yard’s infant son died from blunt-force trauma to the head while Yard was the sole caregiver. The child had also suffered broken ribs weeks earlier. Yard was charged with first-degree murder and other offenses in April 2022 and was denied bail by a Magisterial District Judge. At a preliminary hearing, evidence including an autopsy report and a 911 call was presented, and all charges were bound over to the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas.

Yard petitioned for bail, citing a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Commonwealth v. Talley, which established a unique standard of proof for denying bail under the state Constitution. The bail court initially set bail at $200,000 with conditions but later vacated this decision, interpreting Talley to require live testimony rather than a "cold record." The Superior Court vacated the bail order and remanded for further proceedings. Yard then filed for nominal bail under Rule 600, which was granted by the bail court, setting bail at $1.00 with conditions.

The Commonwealth appealed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction. The Court held that the proof/presumption limitation in Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not apply to the life-offense exception to the right to bail. Therefore, when a defendant is charged with an offense carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, the Constitution categorically precludes release on bail. The Court vacated the bail court’s order granting nominal bail and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The State v. Rowell

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28215

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: HILL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Adam Rowell was convicted by a jury of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164 had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the hearing.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, stating that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing with Juror 164. The appellate court agreed with the circuit court's finding that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional and that no further inquiry was necessary.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment of information during voir dire should be abandoned. Instead, the focus should be on whether the concealed information suggests bias and whether it would have been material to the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause. The court emphasized the importance of a hearing to determine if the juror's nondisclosure indicated potential bias.

The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to examine Juror 164. The circuit court is instructed to determine if the concealed information suggests bias and if it would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or a challenge for cause. The standard for materiality is whether a reasonable party would have exercised a strike had the information been disclosed.

EX PARTE CHRISTIAN

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-39,987-04

Opinion Date: September 25, 2024

Judge: Newell

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2009, the applicant was convicted of possessing more than one but less than four grams of cocaine and sentenced to two years and nine months in prison following a guilty plea. The conviction involved former Houston Police Department Officer Gerald Goines, who has been found to have provided false information and testimony in other drug cases. In 2019, the Harris County District Attorney’s Office informed the applicant that Goines was under criminal investigation. The applicant then filed for a writ of habeas corpus, initially on four grounds, but later amended it to focus solely on the claim that his guilty plea was involuntary due to not knowing about Goines’s misconduct.

The 184th District Court of Harris County recommended granting relief, finding that the applicant’s guilty plea was involuntary and that the conviction was obtained through the use of false evidence. The court concluded that the applicant had established an inference of falsity under the Coty-Mathews framework, which applies to cases involving police officers with a history of falsifying evidence. The court found that the false evidence was material to the applicant’s guilty plea.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine whether Goines’s conduct warranted an inference of falsity. The court concluded that the record did not support the habeas court’s conclusion because Goines was not the sole officer involved in the applicant’s arrest, and the evidence did not establish that Goines was the first to find the contraband. Therefore, the court held that an inference of falsity did not apply and remanded the case to the habeas court to consider the applicant’s involuntary plea claim without applying an inference of falsity.

Durkin v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 101

Opinion Date: September 24, 2024

Judge: JAROSH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

William R. Durkin, III, pled guilty to felony theft and felony property destruction and was sentenced to concurrent terms of five to eight years in prison, which were suspended in favor of a split sentence of one year in county jail followed by four to five years of supervised probation. After moving to Michigan, Durkin violated his probation by using alcohol and cocaine. As a sanction, Michigan Probation required him to complete the Tri County Community Adjudication Program (TRICAP), a probation residential center. Durkin spent 107 days at TRICAP but later violated probation again by drinking alcohol and absconding. Wyoming authorities filed a motion to revoke his probation, and Durkin was arrested in 2023.

The District Court of Converse County revoked Durkin's probation and imposed his suspended prison sentences, reducing them to concurrent terms of four to six years. The court credited him for 413 days served in official detention in Wyoming but denied credit for the 107 days spent at TRICAP. Durkin appealed the revocation order and filed a motion to correct his sentences, arguing that the court erred by not crediting his time at TRICAP. The district court denied his motion, and Durkin appealed this decision as well.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Durkin was not in "official detention" while at TRICAP, as it was not an approved Wyoming Adult Community Corrections (ACC) program and did not subject him to escape charges under Wyoming law. Consequently, Durkin was not entitled to credit against his prison sentences for the time spent at TRICAP. The court concluded that the district court's sentences were legal and properly denied Durkin's motion to correct his sentences.

Schaub v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 100

Opinion Date: September 20, 2024

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the early morning of July 8, 2022, Officer Luke Thorp of the Mills Police Department responded to a report of an unconscious male in a truck with syringes on the ground nearby. Upon arrival, Officer Thorp found Travis Dean Schaub in the vehicle, appearing disoriented and exhibiting signs of intoxication. After a slow and difficult exit from the vehicle, Schaub refused consent to a search, but Officer Thorp proceeded to search him, finding methamphetamine. Schaub was then handcuffed, placed in the patrol vehicle, and read his Miranda rights.

The District Court of Natrona County reviewed Schaub’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing it exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop and lacked a warrant. The State contended that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest for public intoxication. The district court agreed with the State, finding that Officer Thorp had probable cause to arrest Schaub for public intoxication under the Mills Municipal Code, and thus the search was lawful.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Officer Thorp had probable cause to arrest Schaub based on his observed intoxication and the presence of syringes. The court further held that the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest, even though it preceded the formal arrest by a few minutes. The court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment does not require the arrest to precede the search, as long as the arrest follows quickly and there is probable cause. Therefore, the denial of Schaub’s motion to suppress was upheld.

G.W. v. United States

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 23-CM-0334

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: EASTERLY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

G.W. was convicted of simple assault in 2019 after allegedly grabbing the jacket of a Metropolitan Transit Police Department officer outside the Anacostia Metro Station. G.W. filed a notice of appeal, and the case was remanded to allow the trial court to set aside his conviction under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA). Following the trial court's set-aside order and issuance of a new judgment and commitment order, G.W. filed a new notice of appeal, challenging his conviction.

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially convicted G.W. of simple assault. G.W. timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was stayed pending the outcome of the en banc decision in Perez Hernandez v. United States, which addressed the elements of an offensive touching assault. After the decision in Perez Hernandez, the stay was lifted, and G.W. sought an indicative ruling for a YRA set-aside. The trial court issued an indicative set-aside order, and the case was remanded. The trial court then issued a set-aside order and an amended judgment and commitment order, which G.W. appealed.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that G.W.'s appeal was properly before the court. The court determined that the trial court had not applied the correct elements of an offensive touching assault as defined in Perez Hernandez. Specifically, the trial court did not consider whether G.W.'s actions would offend a person's reasonable sense of personal dignity and whether G.W. acted with the purpose of causing offense or knowing that his actions would cause offense. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to make the necessary findings regarding G.W.'s mens rea and the nature of the touch. The court did not reach G.W.'s Rule 16 claim due to the decision to remand.

Nelson-White v. United States

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 23-CM-0172

Opinion Date: September 26, 2024

Judge: DEAHL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Corey Nelson-White was barred from Rhode Island Row, a mixed-use development in Northeast D.C., which includes two buildings at 2300 and 2350 Washington Place NE. The barring notice directed him to stay off the property and grounds of Rhode Island Row. Officers explained the barring notice to Nelson-White, but did not provide him with a copy. Six days later, Nelson-White was found inside a parking garage attached to one of the Rhode Island Row buildings and was arrested for unlawful entry.

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Nelson-White of unlawful entry, finding that he knew or should have known he was barred from the premises, including the parking garage. The trial court based its decision on the barring notice and the officers' instructions, despite Nelson-White's argument that the garage was not clearly marked as part of Rhode Island Row.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the evidence insufficient to sustain Nelson-White's conviction. The court noted that there was no clear indication that the parking garage was part of the barred premises. The court highlighted the lack of signage or other markers that would inform a reasonable person that the garage was part of Rhode Island Row or 2350 Washington Place. The court concluded that a rational fact-finder could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Nelson-White knew or should have known the garage was included in the barring notice.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed Nelson-White's conviction for unlawful entry, holding that the evidence did not support the conclusion that he was aware or should have been aware that the parking garage was part of the premises he was barred from entering.