US v. Donovan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1328

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: Montecalvo

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Federal agents executed a search warrant at Corey Donovan's rural property in New Hampshire, discovering a shotgun, ammunition, and modified oil filters suspected to be homemade silencers. Donovan, a convicted felon, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. His girlfriend, Kelley Finnigan, claimed ownership of the shotgun but invoked her Fifth Amendment right when called to testify.

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denied Donovan's motion to grant Finnigan immunity and allowed her to invoke a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege. The court also permitted the introduction of evidence related to Donovan's prior arrest and possession of non-firearm weapons, offering to provide limiting instructions if requested during the trial. Donovan did not object to the lack of contemporaneous limiting instructions or the final jury instructions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Donovan's appeal, which challenged the district court's decisions on Finnigan's Fifth Amendment invocation, the lack of limiting instructions, and the application of a sentencing enhancement for the modified oil filters. The appellate court found no clear or obvious error in allowing Finnigan to invoke her Fifth Amendment right, as her testimony could reasonably incriminate her. The court also determined that Donovan waived his right to challenge the lack of limiting instructions by failing to object during the trial.

Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the appellate court upheld the district court's finding that the modified oil filters qualified as homemade silencers under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25). The court affirmed Donovan's conviction and sentence, concluding that the evidence supported the application of the sentencing enhancement.

United States v. Maxwell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1426

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Cabranes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ghislaine Maxwell was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and sex trafficking of a minor. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 60 months, 120 months, and 240 months, respectively, followed by concurrent terms of supervised release. Maxwell appealed her conviction on several grounds, including the applicability of Jeffrey Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), the statute of limitations, jury impartiality, constructive amendment of the indictment, and the reasonableness of her sentence.

The District Court denied Maxwell’s motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that Epstein’s NPA with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida did not bar her prosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. The court also found that the second superseding indictment complied with the statute of limitations, as the relevant statute extended the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for offenses committed before its enactment. Additionally, the District Court denied Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in its handling of a juror’s erroneous answers during voir dire. The court also rejected Maxwell’s claim that its response to a jury note resulted in a constructive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the indictment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Epstein’s NPA did not bind the Southern District of New York, the indictment was timely, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, and the response to the jury note did not result in a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance. The court also found Maxwell’s sentence to be procedurally reasonable.

United States v. Suquilanda

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1197

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: LEE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.

United States v. Smith

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4508

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: KING

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves defendants Aghee William Smith II and David Alcorn, who were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for their roles in fraudulent schemes that defrauded investors of millions of dollars. The schemes included marketing and selling phony investments in a dental services marketing program and fraudulent spectrum investments. The fraudulent activities primarily targeted elderly victims, resulting in significant financial losses.

In the district court, Smith and Alcorn were tried together before a jury in February 2022. They raised three main issues on appeal: a joint constitutional challenge to the district court’s COVID-19 trial protocol under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Smith’s separate challenge to the admission of videotaped depositions under the Confrontation Clause, and Alcorn’s challenge to the imposition of supervised release conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Smith and Alcorn’s joint contention that the COVID-19 trial protocol violated their rights under the Public Trial Clause, finding that the protocol did not constitute a partial courtroom closure and was justified by substantial public health reasons. The court also rejected Smith’s Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding that the government had made a good faith effort to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial and that the witnesses were unavailable due to health concerns.

However, the court found merit in Alcorn’s challenge regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions. The district court had failed to properly incorporate the standard conditions of supervised release during the oral pronouncement of Alcorn’s sentence, leading to a Rogers error. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.

In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences, affirmed Alcorn’s convictions, but vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.

US v. Vane

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 24-4257

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: Albert Diaz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In April 2024, Russell Richardson Vane, IV, was arrested and charged with attempting to produce a biological agent or toxin, specifically ricin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 175(a). The FBI found castor beans and equipment for producing ricin in his home. Vane had previously been involved with a militia group, the Virginia Kekoas, and had shared information on making explosives. The group expelled him, suspecting entrapment, and reported him to the FBI. Vane was detained pending trial based on the government's evidence, including proffered information.

A magistrate judge granted the government's motion for pretrial detention, and the district court affirmed this decision. Vane argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) only allows the defendant, not the government, to introduce information by proffer. The district court disagreed, noting that other circuit courts have allowed the government to use proffers in detention hearings. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including the proffered evidence, justified Vane's detention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3142 does not prohibit the government from making evidentiary proffers during detention hearings. The court emphasized that the statute's text and context support allowing both parties to present information by proffer, promoting efficiency in detention proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order, concluding that the government met its burden to justify Vane's pretrial detention.

United States v. Day

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50636

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Judge: Andrew S. Oldham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Ethan Sturgis Day was involved in a fraudulent scheme that purported to sell shipping containers converted into housing units. The scammers, including Day, misrepresented their credentials and affiliations to lure customers, collected payments, and never delivered the promised container homes. Day managed employees and the scammers' bank accounts. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) identified 41 victims and assessed a loss amount of $2,563,123.72, but only detailed the financial circumstances of eight victims.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Day to 101 months of incarceration and three years of supervised release. The court enhanced Day's offense level based on the loss amount and for causing substantial financial hardship to 25 or more victims, as well as for his role as an organizer or leader. Day objected to these enhancements, but the district court overruled his objections and adopted the PSR. After a restitution hearing, the court lowered the loss amount by nearly $1 million and re-sentenced Day to 101 months, maintaining the same enhancements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in applying the six-point enhancement for substantial financial hardship to 25 or more victims, as the record did not support that 25 or more victims experienced substantial financial hardship. However, the court upheld the two-point enhancement for Day's role as an organizer or leader, noting that he exercised control over other participants and managed significant assets of the fraud. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Day's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

United States v. Diaz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50452

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Wiener

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On November 4, 2020, San Antonio police officers stopped a car driven by Ronnie Diaz, Jr. They detected a strong odor of marijuana and found empty baggies commonly used for narcotics. Diaz admitted to having ammunition in his pocket and being a convicted felon. A search of the vehicle revealed a .45 caliber pistol, methamphetamine, counterfeit Xanax, and heroin. Diaz had prior convictions, including theft of a vehicle and evading arrest in 2014, and possession of a firearm as a felon in 2018.

Diaz was charged in the Western District of Texas with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possessing firearms during a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge, arguing it violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Diaz was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 120 months for counts one and three, to run concurrently, and 60 months for count two, to run consecutively.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Diaz raised two claims: that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied, and that the statute exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The court dismissed the Commerce Clause argument as foreclosed by precedent. Applying the historical analysis required by New York Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the court found that the regulation of firearm possession by felons is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Diaz and facially. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Diaz’s conviction.

USA v. Perez-Gorda

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50218

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Ho

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Josephine Perez-Gorda was convicted of fraud after she and her husband, Justin, misrepresented his medical condition to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Justin, who suffered a brain injury while on duty, and Perez-Gorda claimed he was unable to walk or care for himself, leading to the receipt of various government benefits, including a new home, car, and caregiver stipend. However, evidence showed Justin was more mobile and self-sufficient than they had represented. After Justin's death in 2022, Perez-Gorda was indicted on multiple counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, health care fraud, conspiracy to commit health care fraud, and aiding and abetting offenses.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas convicted Perez-Gorda on all counts, and she was sentenced to forty-six months in prison. Perez-Gorda appealed, arguing that the jury instructions on wire and mail fraud were erroneous based on intervening circuit precedent. She did not object to these instructions at trial. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the instructions for plain error and found them erroneous but concluded that the error did not affect Perez-Gorda’s substantial rights, as there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted her under the correct instructions.

Perez-Gorda also challenged statements made during the grand jury proceedings and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdicts. The Fifth Circuit found that the statements did not influence the grand jury’s decision and that a rational jury could have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, Perez-Gorda contested her sentence, specifically the two-level upward adjustment for her role as an organizer or leader. The Fifth Circuit reviewed this factual finding for clear error and upheld it, noting evidence that Perez-Gorda supervised Justin in the fraudulent activities. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

USA v. Bowyer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-3169

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Andre Bowyer, a Jamaican national, pleaded guilty to re-entering the United States without permission after being previously removed. During his sentencing, Bowyer attempted to highlight his ties to a family he had formed in the U.S. The district judge interrupted him frequently, characterizing Bowyer's account as lacking insight and unconvincing. Bowyer received a below-guidelines sentence.

Bowyer appealed, arguing that his right to make his own statement at sentencing was violated. He conceded that he did not object during the district court proceedings, so the review was limited to the plain-error standard. Bowyer did not specify what additional arguments he would have made if given more time. The district court had read a letter from Bowyer detailing his background and his relationship with the family, but the judge found this information irrelevant to the sentencing factors.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that while the district judge's interruptions were frequent, they did not completely prevent Bowyer from speaking. The judge also solicited further comments from Bowyer at the end of the allocution. The court found that even if there was an error, it was not plain because there was no unambiguous case law against such interruptions. Additionally, Bowyer's arguments were already considered by the judge, and there was no indication that further allocution would have led to a different sentence.

The Seventh Circuit concluded that Bowyer did not meet the plain-error test for reversal and affirmed the district court's decision.

United States v. Villanueva

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3549

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Native American Law

The case involves a criminal prosecution for a murder in Indian country. Francisco Villanueva and Adan Corona were convicted of first-degree murder and other offenses related to the killing of Vincent Von Brewer III, who owed money to members of the Eastside Oldies gang. Villanueva organized a group, including Corona and Estevan Baquera, to collect the debt. They confronted Brewer at a community center in Pine Ridge, South Dakota, where Villanueva and Corona fatally shot him. Baquera, who acted as an accessory after the fact, helped disguise a getaway car.

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota convicted Villanueva and Corona on all counts, sentencing them to life imprisonment. Baquera pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact and received the statutory maximum sentence of 180 months, which was an upward variance from the advisory guideline range of 78 to 97 months. The district court found that Baquera pointed a firearm at the crowd to protect the gang members during the attack.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Villanueva challenged the admissibility of an eyewitness identification and the exclusion of a defense expert's testimony. The court found no reversible error, ruling that the identification was not arranged by law enforcement and that the exclusion of the expert's testimony was consistent with precedent. Corona contested the denial of his motion to suppress statements made during a traffic stop, but the court held that the Miranda warnings were not required during the initial detention. Baquera appealed his sentence, arguing it was based on erroneous facts and was unreasonable. The court found no clear error in the district court's findings and upheld the sentence as reasonable.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court for all three defendants.

United States v. Ruiz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2027

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Judge: BALDOCK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Customs and Border Patrol officers seized Sergio Ruiz at the Columbus, New Mexico port of entry with 20.8 kilograms of methamphetamine and an active GPS tracker hidden in his truck’s spare tire. The government used testimony from a confidential informant, Eric Weaver, who identified Ruiz as “Tire Man,” a known narcotics courier. Ruiz argued that the identification should be suppressed due to a suggestive pretrial photo array.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Ruiz’s motion to suppress the identification. The court found that although the photo array leaned toward not being impermissibly suggestive, Weaver’s identification was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Weaver had multiple opportunities to observe Ruiz closely and provided consistent and accurate descriptions of him before the photo array. The jury subsequently convicted Ruiz on all counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied a two-part test to determine if the identification violated Ruiz’s due process rights. First, it assessed whether the photo array was unduly suggestive. Second, it evaluated the reliability of the identification using the Biggers factors. The court concluded that even if the photo array was suggestive, Weaver’s identification was reliable. Weaver had multiple encounters with Ruiz, paid close attention to his appearance, provided accurate descriptions, and expressed confidence in his identification. The court found no substantial likelihood of misidentification and affirmed the district court’s denial of Ruiz’s motion to suppress.

Meshal v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Public Safety

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10128

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Judge: JILL PRYOR

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Amir Meshal, a professional truck driver, was stopped by Georgia State Police officers for a minor traffic infraction. During the stop, the officers discovered Meshal was on the FBI’s No Fly List. Despite instructions not to detain him based solely on this status, the officers handcuffed Meshal, placed him in a patrol car, and searched his truck. They questioned him about his religion and international travel while waiting for guidance from the FBI. After 91 minutes, the FBI cleared Meshal, and he was released with a warning citation for the traffic infraction.

Meshal sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to the extended detention and the search of his truck. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that Meshal failed to allege a violation of clearly established law. The district court denied the motion, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the officers detained Meshal without arguable reasonable suspicion and searched his truck without arguable probable cause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, holding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. The court found that the officers lacked even arguable reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete tasks related to the traffic infraction. Additionally, the court held that the search of Meshal’s truck was not supported by arguable probable cause. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

United States v. Butler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12798

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: JORDAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Andrew Butler III was convicted by a jury of knowingly and intentionally possessing five grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Butler appealed, arguing that the district court wrongly revoked his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Initially, the district court appointed Assistant Federal Public Defender Elizabeth Vallejo to represent Butler, but he expressed dissatisfaction, leading to her replacement by Robert A. Morris. Butler continued to file pro se motions disparaging Morris, resulting in Morris’s replacement by Richard A. Greenberg. Butler then requested to represent himself, and after a Faretta hearing, the court allowed it, appointing Greenberg as standby counsel. However, Butler’s disruptive behavior, including refusing to attend hearings and threatening not to attend the trial, led the court to revoke his self-representation right and appoint Mutaqee Akbar as his counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in revoking Butler’s right to self-representation due to his repeated and serious obstructionist misconduct, which spanned months and disrupted the trial schedule. The court emphasized that the right to self-representation is not a license to disrupt court proceedings and that the district court had given Butler multiple warnings and opportunities to comply.

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence presented at trial, including the methamphetamine found in the safe in Butler’s hotel room and his incriminating post-arrest recorded call, was sufficient to support the conviction. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Butler’s conviction and sentence.

MCNEIL-LEWIS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 127

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Rhonda K. Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Sir Jeffery McNeil-Lewis was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree battery, eight counts of terroristic threatening, and firearm enhancements, resulting in a life sentence plus fifteen years. The convictions stemmed from a shooting at an abandoned house in West Memphis, where McNeil-Lewis and an accomplice fired at Jarvis Moore and Stacy Abram. Moore died, and Abram survived, identifying McNeil-Lewis as a shooter. Additional evidence, including eyewitness testimony and gunshot residue, linked McNeil-Lewis to the crime.

The Crittenden County Circuit Court denied McNeil-Lewis's petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that McNeil-Lewis failed to prove both deficient performance by his counsel and resulting prejudice. Specific claims included strategic decisions not to object to 911 calls on hearsay grounds, not to pursue self-defense, and not to object during sentencing. The court also found no prejudice from the failure to suppress evidence or from juror misconduct, as no actual bias was shown. Additionally, the court ruled that a Batson challenge would have been meritless and that not calling witnesses during sentencing was a strategic decision. Lastly, the court credited defense counsel's testimony that McNeil-Lewis was informed of and rejected a plea offer.

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, finding no clear error in its conclusions. The court held that McNeil-Lewis's arguments on appeal did not adequately address the circuit court's findings, particularly regarding strategic decisions and lack of prejudice. The court also upheld the circuit court's credibility determinations and strategic decisions made by defense counsel, concluding that McNeil-Lewis failed to meet the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

SEGERSTROM V. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 130

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Webb

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Christopher Segerstrom was convicted of capital murder for the 1986 killing of a four-year-old and was initially sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He was 15 years old at the time of the crime. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders, Segerstrom's sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing. The Washington County Circuit Court resentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after thirty years without a hearing, which was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, mandating a hearing to consider mitigating factors.

Upon remand, Segerstrom's fitness to proceed was contested. The circuit court initially found him unfit due to schizophrenia but later deemed him fit after a year of treatment, based on a forensic evaluation by Dr. Melissa Wright. Segerstrom's defense presented conflicting expert testimony, but the court credited Dr. Wright's findings. On the day of the resentencing hearing, Segerstrom's counsel requested a continuance, claiming he was unresponsive due to medication, which the court denied.

During the resentencing, the court admitted prior testimony from Dr. Joseph Halka, who performed the autopsy, over Segerstrom's objection. The court also rejected a nonmodel jury instruction proposed by Segerstrom, which emphasized the differences between juvenile and adult offenders as per Miller. The jury ultimately sentenced Segerstrom to life imprisonment.

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decisions, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of Segerstrom's fitness to proceed, the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion, the admission of Dr. Halka's testimony was proper, and the rejection of the proposed jury instruction was appropriate given the sentencing options.

Wyles v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 128

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Womack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Bobby Wyles was convicted of two counts of capital murder for killing Susie Fuller and Jerry Drinkwater in the presence of two children. The incident occurred on January 5, 2019, at the victims' home, where Wyles, Fuller, and Drinkwater were using drugs. An argument ensued, leading Wyles to stab Fuller and Drinkwater multiple times, resulting in their deaths. Fuller was stabbed thirty-two times, and Drinkwater twenty-eight times. Wyles claimed he was in a blacked-out state of rage due to drug use and alleged sexual assault by Drinkwater. Eyewitness testimony and DNA evidence supported the prosecution's case.

The Perry County Circuit Court denied Wyles's motions for a directed verdict, and a jury found him guilty of capital murder. Wyles was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without parole, plus two five-year sentences for the presence-of-a-child enhancements. Wyles appealed, arguing that he lacked the culpable mental state for capital or first-degree murder.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether substantial evidence supported the capital murder convictions. The court noted that premeditation and deliberation could be inferred from the circumstances, such as the nature and extent of the wounds and the conduct of the accused. The court found that the evidence, including the number and nature of the stab wounds and the prolonged struggle, supported the jury's conclusion of premeditation and deliberation. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Wyles's directed-verdict motion and upheld the capital murder convictions. The court also reviewed the record for any prejudicial errors and found none. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

People v. Nadey

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S087560S

Opinion Date: September 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Giles Albert Nadey, Jr. was convicted of unlawful sodomy and first-degree murder for the killing of Terena Fermenick. The jury found that both offenses involved the use of a knife and that the murder occurred during the commission of unlawful sodomy. After the first jury deadlocked on the penalty, a second jury sentenced Nadey to death. The case involved significant DNA evidence linking Nadey to the crime, and the prosecution theorized that Nadey killed Fermenick shortly after she signed a work order for carpet cleaning services he provided.

The Alameda County Superior Court handled the initial trial, where Nadey was convicted and sentenced to death. During the trial, the defense challenged the DNA evidence and the credibility of the state's expert, but did not call their own DNA expert, Dr. Edward Blake, to testify. The defense's failure to present Blake as a witness became a point of contention, with the prosecution arguing that this indicated the defense had no evidence to contradict the state's findings.

The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the evidence of Blake's involvement was properly admitted and that the prosecutor's comments on the defense's failure to call Blake did not constitute misconduct. The court also found that any error in the trial court's handling of a juror's note regarding the defense's access to a DNA expert was harmless. Additionally, the court concluded that the admission of testimony from a pathologist who did not conduct the autopsy did not violate Nadey's confrontation rights, as much of the testimony was proper and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

P. v. Martinez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D083424(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Laurence D. Rubin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Luis Alfonso Martinez was convicted of multiple counts of sexual abuse against a minor, Jane Doe, who was the daughter of his long-term girlfriend. The abuse began when Doe was around seven years old and continued for several years. Martinez was found guilty of attempted sexual penetration of a child under 10, sexual penetration of a child under 10, continuous sexual abuse of a child, lewd acts upon a child under 14, and lewd acts upon a child under 14 by use of force, duress, and fear. The jury also found aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability and Martinez's abuse of a position of trust.

The Superior Court of Riverside County sentenced Martinez to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, plus a determinate term of 21 years and four months. Martinez appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the charges were in the alternative, leading to multiple convictions that violated Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (c). He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction of lewd acts by force, fear, or duress, and claimed the trial court abused its discretion in responding to a jury question about the definition of "sexual penetration."

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, agreed that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on alternative charges was prejudicial error. The appellate court decided to remand the case for a hearing to determine which counts to vacate, rather than ordering a new trial or deciding which counts to dismiss itself. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction for lewd acts by force, fear, or duress, noting Martinez's position of authority and the victim's fear. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's response to the jury's question, as the response correctly stated the law and did not prejudice Martinez.

The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

People v. Hughey

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B325796(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: GILBERT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Marquishon Hughey and Dequon Dillard were convicted of kidnapping and second-degree robbery after they, along with an accomplice, entered an AT&T store in Camarillo, California, and forced three employees to move to a back safe room at gunpoint. The employees were then ordered to load phones into bags. The defendants were sentenced to 12 years in state prison, including a two-year, out-on-bail enhancement.

The Ventura County Superior Court found the defendants guilty of simple kidnapping, a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping, and second-degree robbery. The court determined that the movement of the victims was more than incidental to the robbery, as it increased the risk of physical and psychological harm by removing the victims from public view and placing them in a confined space.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and affirmed the kidnapping convictions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the movement of the victims was not merely incidental to the robbery. The movement increased the risk of harm and psychological trauma, as the victims were moved to a hidden area, which decreased the likelihood of detection and increased the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape. The court also noted that the defendants could have committed the robbery without moving all the employees to the back room.

However, the appellate court stayed the two-year, out-on-bail enhancements because there was no evidence that the defendants were convicted of the primary offense in Tulare County, which is required to impose such an enhancement. The judgments were otherwise affirmed.

People v. J.S.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B336233(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Yegan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In 2018 and 2019, a minor, J.S., committed a series of serious crimes, including seven street robberies, two burglaries, an attempted robbery resulting in murder, and the drugging and sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl. J.S. was 16 and 17 years old at the time of these offenses. The People filed an 18-count petition against J.S., including charges of murder, robbery, burglary, and sexual assault, and sought to transfer him to adult criminal court.

The juvenile court in Ventura County conducted a transfer hearing and found that J.S. was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system's jurisdiction, which would expire when he turned 25. The court considered J.S.'s criminal sophistication, previous delinquent history, and the gravity of the offenses. Despite evidence of J.S.'s participation in rehabilitation programs and expert testimony suggesting potential for rehabilitation, the court concluded that the severity and premeditated nature of his crimes, along with his behavior in custody, indicated a need for prolonged treatment and supervision beyond the juvenile system's capacity.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the juvenile court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the transfer order, agreeing that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings. The appellate court emphasized that it does not reweigh evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. The court found that the juvenile court had appropriately considered the statutory criteria and expert testimony, and its conclusion that J.S. was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

People v. Jones

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081131(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: Rubin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Wayne Jones was convicted of first-degree murder for the beating death of Michael Robinson. On January 11, 2020, Jones and Robinson were at a shopping center. Jones retrieved a stick attached to his bicycle, followed Robinson, and struck him in the head multiple times, causing severe injuries. Robinson was placed in a medically induced coma and underwent surgery. Despite initial signs of potential recovery, Robinson's family decided to withdraw life support based on his predicted quality of life and limited resources. Robinson died on January 16, 2020, and the medical examiner determined the cause of death was blunt force injuries to the head.

The Superior Court of San Diego County found Jones guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to 25 years to life, plus one year for a weapon enhancement. Jones appealed, arguing that the withdrawal of life support broke the chain of legal causation, the prosecutor committed misconduct, there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, and the trial court applied the wrong standard in denying his motion to reduce the verdict.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the withdrawal of life support was a dependent intervening cause of death, not an independent one, and thus did not absolve Jones of liability. The court found sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, noting Jones's actions before and during the attack. The court also determined that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments did not constitute misconduct and that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on causation. Finally, the court found no error in the trial court's denial of Jones's motion to reduce the verdict, affirming the conviction and sentence.

People v. Kelly

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062071(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Bedsworth

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2006, the defendant and other gang members robbed two men at gunpoint in a Denny’s restroom. During the robbery, a friend of the victims, Armand Jones, entered and resisted, leading to a chase outside. Shots were fired, resulting in Jones' death and another person being wounded. The defendant was charged with murder, attempted murder, robbery, and other related offenses. The prosecutor conceded the defendant did not shoot the victims but argued he was guilty of felony murder for participating in the robbery and attempted murder as a natural consequence of the robbery.

The jury convicted the defendant on all charges, including special circumstances that the murder was committed during a robbery and to further gang activities. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole, and the convictions were affirmed on appeal. In 2022, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the jury's findings did not meet the new requirements for felony murder liability under Senate Bill 1437, which narrowed the scope of vicarious liability for murder.

The Superior Court of Orange County summarily denied the petition, citing the jury's finding that the defendant acted with intent to kill. The defendant appealed, arguing that the record did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for resentencing. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in its denial. The appellate court held that the defendant must have assisted the actual killer in committing the murderous act, not just the underlying felony, to be liable under the revised felony murder rule. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's entitlement to resentencing.

People v. Valle

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A169080(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 18, 2024

Judge: Siggins

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with three felonies related to firearm and ammunition possession. During a traffic stop, police officers discovered a loaded handgun in his vehicle. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the traffic stop was unduly prolonged and pretextual, and dismissed the case.

The Sonoma County Superior Court found that the traffic stop was pretextual and unduly prolonged, as the officers could have issued the citation at the gas station where they first observed the defendant. The court also noted that new legislation would make pretextual stops illegal, although this law was not yet in effect. The court concluded that the stop was designed to allow time for a canine unit to arrive and conduct a search, which it deemed unreasonable.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court's finding of an unduly prolonged stop was unsupported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the traffic stop began when the vehicle was pulled over, not when the officers first observed the defendant. The court found that the time taken to write the citation and conduct the canine search was within the normal duration for such activities. Additionally, the court clarified that the new Vehicle Code section 2806.5, which prohibits pretextual stops, was not in effect at the time of the stop and does not alter the federal constitutional analysis regarding pretextual stops. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Vaughn v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B334060(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: MARTINEZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Kavonte Amarion Vaughn sought a writ of mandate to vacate an order denying his request for mental health diversion under California Penal Code sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. Vaughn was charged with two counts of second-degree robbery and one count of second-degree attempted robbery. The trial court found that Vaughn met the eligibility and suitability requirements for mental health diversion, including that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. However, the court denied the diversion, citing Vaughn's failure to make a "serious enough effort" to be deemed suitable for mental health diversion.

The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case. Vaughn posted bail and underwent a psychological evaluation, which confirmed his mental health issues, including schizoaffective disorder and PTSD. Despite the trial court's acknowledgment of Vaughn's eligibility, it denied the motion for diversion, focusing on Vaughn's perceived lack of seriousness about his mental health treatment, particularly his failure to bring his medication bottles to the evaluation.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the legislative goals of the mental health diversion law. The appellate court noted that Vaughn had made a prima facie showing of eligibility and suitability for diversion and that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the trial court's discretion must align with the legislative intent to broadly apply mental health diversion to reduce recidivism and support public safety.

The appellate court granted Vaughn's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and to grant the motion, barring any evidence of changed circumstances affecting Vaughn's suitability. The trial court must ensure that the recommended mental health treatment program meets Vaughn's specialized needs.

BROCK v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0669

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Wesley Brock was convicted of malice murder and other related crimes following the shooting death of Ronald Williams. On November 26, 2021, Williams borrowed his cousin's car and did not return, prompting a missing persons report. The car was later found with bloodstains and a foul odor. Brock was linked to Williams through phone records and security footage. During a police interview, Brock gave multiple conflicting accounts of the events, eventually admitting to shooting Williams in self-defense, placing his body in the car trunk, and later disposing of it in a wooded area.

The Paulding County Superior Court jury found Brock guilty on all charges, including malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder, with additional consecutive sentences for the other charges. Brock's motion for a new trial was denied.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, rejecting Brock's self-defense claim. The court also found no merit in Brock's argument that the prosecutor's closing argument misstated the law on self-defense, as no objection was raised during the trial. Additionally, the court dismissed Brock's claim that the use of an outdated jury list violated his rights, noting that the jury was impartial and complied with the relevant legal standards.

GALLEGOS-MUNOZ v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24G0214

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Gallegos-Munoz, was arrested after his girlfriend’s 12-year-old daughter, J.R., accused him of sexual misconduct, including rape and molestation. Before trial, Gallegos-Munoz sought to introduce evidence that J.R. had previously made false accusations of sexual abuse against her biological father. The trial court held a hearing and determined that there was no reasonable probability that J.R.’s prior accusation was false, thus excluding the evidence.

The trial court denied Gallegos-Munoz’s motion for a new trial, which argued that under the precedent set by State v. Burns, the prior-accusation evidence should have been admitted under OCGA § 24-4-403 (Rule 403). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on the outdated probable-falsity threshold test from Smith v. State, which required a trial court to find a reasonable probability of falsity before admitting such evidence.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and clarified that the 2013 Evidence Code governs the admissibility of prior-accusation evidence, not the outdated probable-falsity threshold test. The Court held that the rules set forth in the 2013 Evidence Code, including Rule 403, should be applied to determine the admissibility of such evidence. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and directed it to vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand the case for reconsideration under the applicable evidentiary standards.

GONZALEZ v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0913

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Jesus Olvera Gonzalez, who was convicted of malice murder for the stabbing death of Jesus Arizaga. The incident occurred on September 8, 2019, when a 911 call reported a stabbing at a residence. Gonzalez and Arizaga had been drinking and arguing, leading to Gonzalez stabbing Arizaga. When officers arrived, they found Gonzalez with blood on his hands and shirt. He was handcuffed and asked about the location of the knife, which he indicated was inside the house. Arizaga was found with multiple stab wounds and later died. Gonzalez was arrested, and evidence, including photographs and DNA swabs, was collected.

A Forsyth County grand jury indicted Gonzalez on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. In May 2022, a jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Gonzalez filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in March 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Gonzalez argued that his statement to police about the knife should have been suppressed because it was made before he received Miranda warnings. The court held that the public safety exception to Miranda applied, as the officer's question was necessary to secure the scene and ensure safety. Gonzalez also challenged the admission of photographs and DNA evidence, claiming they were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and his right against self-incrimination. The court found no error, ruling that the evidence was lawfully obtained as part of a search incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate his rights.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decisions, upholding Gonzalez's conviction and sentence.

JONES v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0647

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2019, Christopher Lane Jones was living with several individuals, including Steven James Ward and Kristian Bell, in a house in Nicholls, Georgia. After receiving an eviction notice, the residents began moving out. Dedrick Johnson and Joseph Burch assisted with the move. One night, while Johnson and Burch were away, Jones remained at the house with Ward and Bell. Upon their return, Jones showed them the bodies of Ward and Bell, claiming he had killed them. Jones directed Johnson and Burch to help dispose of the bodies, which they buried under a firepit. Jones later fled to California, where he was arrested.

Jones was indicted by a Coffee County grand jury on two counts of malice murder and two counts of concealing the death of another. In September 2021, a jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole for each murder count, to be served consecutively, and additional consecutive sentences for the concealment charges. Jones's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court in January 2024.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the evidence, including multiple confessions by Jones and corroborating witness testimonies, was sufficient to support the convictions for malice murder and concealing the deaths. The court also found that Jones's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were unsubstantiated, as he failed to demonstrate how his counsel's performance was deficient or how it prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court concluded that there was no cumulative prejudice warranting a new trial.

MELANCON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23G1128

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Sidrick Raymone Melancon, Sr. was convicted of second-degree murder after his ex-girlfriend, Sadai Higgenbotham, inflicted fatal head trauma on their nine-month-old daughter, Laura Higgenbotham. Melancon was not present during the incident but had previously instructed his girlfriend, Gerallyn Long, not to cooperate with a Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS) investigation into Higgenbotham, which Long had initiated after observing injuries on Laura. The State argued that Melancon's instruction to Long "caused" Laura's death by effectively ending the DFCS investigation, which could have prevented the fatal abuse.

The jury found Melancon guilty of second-degree murder, second-degree child cruelty, and two counts of influencing a witness. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison for the murder conviction and two consecutive 10-year probation terms for influencing a witness. The second-degree child cruelty count merged with the murder count. Melancon appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he caused Laura's death. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that Melancon's interference with the DFCS investigation led to the continuation of Higgenbotham's abuse, which ultimately resulted in Laura's death.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and clarified the standard for proving causation under the murder statute, which requires both cause in fact and legal cause. The court found that the evidence did not support the theory that Melancon's instruction to Long was a cause in fact of Laura's death, as there was no evidence showing that DFCS would have taken action to prevent the fatal abuse. Additionally, the court determined that Laura's death was not a reasonably foreseeable result of Melancon's instruction. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further consideration of other potential theories of causation.

PYNE v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0670

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Jacob Pyne was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Gerard Foster on July 6, 2016. Pyne, along with two women who worked as prostitutes for him, was in a car near an apartment complex. After an argument, Pyne and one of the women, Christoyna Section, walked to the complex. Section testified that Pyne began acting aggressively and, after an altercation with Foster, she ran away and heard gunshots. Foster was found dead with multiple gunshot wounds, and surveillance footage linked Pyne to the scene. Pyne was arrested in Tennessee three days later.

A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Pyne on multiple counts, including malice murder and felony murder. After a jury trial, Pyne was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for firearm possession. Pyne's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Pyne's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Pyne argued that his trial counsel failed to object to the State's allegedly inconsistent theories and that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments improperly shifted the burden of proof and commented on his right to remain silent. The court found no merit in these claims, concluding that the State did not present inherently contradictory theories and that the prosecutor's comments were within the bounds of proper argument. The court affirmed Pyne's convictions, holding that his trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that the trial court did not err in its rulings.

Davis v. Yenchko

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129751

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Aaron and Charles Davis were charged with felony reckless discharge of a firearm in July 2016, leading to the revocation of their Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) cards by the Illinois State Police under section 8(n) of the FOID Card Act. They later pleaded guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges and had their FOID cards reissued in 2017. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that section 8(n) is unconstitutional as applied to individuals charged but not convicted of a felony, and an injunction to prevent future suspensions of FOID cards under similar circumstances.

The Circuit Court of Madison County granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring section 8(n) unconstitutional as applied to individuals charged but not convicted of a felony, and issued a permanent injunction against the suspension of FOID cards under this section. The court found the case moot but applied the public interest exception to mootness, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing. The defendant's motion to stay the order was denied, and the plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees and costs.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and found that the plaintiffs lacked standing when they filed the action because their FOID cards had already been restored. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were moot and that the public interest exception to mootness did not apply to standing. Consequently, the court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint. The order granting attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was also vacated.

People v. Clark

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 130364

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves amendments to the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically the SAFE-T Act, which abolished monetary bail in favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance or with conditions. Carlos Clark was charged with aggravated vehicular hijacking, and a warrant for his arrest was issued with bail set at $100,000. Clark was arrested on September 16, 2023, and brought before a judge on September 18, 2023, the day the Act's enforcement began. The State filed a petition to detain Clark, which the Cook County circuit court granted, ordering his pretrial detention.

A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the circuit court's order, holding that the State's petition was untimely. The majority interpreted section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code to mean that the State should have filed its petition at its ex parte appearance on August 23, 2023, when it sought the arrest warrant. The dissent argued that the "first appearance" should mean the first time the defendant is present before a judge, not the State's ex parte appearance.

The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The Court held that the term "first appearance" in section 110-6.1(c)(1) refers to the defendant's first appearance before a judge, not the State's ex parte appearance. The Court reasoned that this interpretation ensures the defendant's presence and the opportunity to challenge the State's evidence, aligning with the legislative intent to provide procedural safeguards and make informed, individualized decisions regarding pretrial detention. The case was remanded to the appellate court to consider other issues raised by the defendant.

People v. Redmond

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129201

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Neville

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ryan Redmond was stopped by Illinois State Police Officer Hayden Combs for speeding and having an improperly secured license plate. Upon approaching the vehicle, Combs detected a strong odor of burnt cannabis. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed one gram of cannabis in the center console. Redmond was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis and unlawful possession of cannabis by a driver.

Redmond filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the odor of burnt cannabis alone did not provide probable cause for a warrantless search. The Henry County Circuit Court granted the motion, noting the absence of signs of impairment, paraphernalia, or loose cannabis. The court found that the odor of burnt cannabis, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the search. The Appellate Court affirmed, emphasizing the lack of additional evidence supporting the search and dismissing the relevance of the vehicle's travel route and Redmond's living arrangements.

The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the odor of burnt cannabis alone provides probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search. The court held that, given the legalization and regulation of cannabis in Illinois, the odor of burnt cannabis alone is insufficient to establish probable cause. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances must be considered, and in this case, the additional factors cited by the State did not provide sufficient probable cause. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower courts' decisions to suppress the evidence obtained from the search.

People v. Turner

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129208

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Rochford

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, conspiracy to commit aggravated discharge of a firearm, and two counts of perjury following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The charges stemmed from a shooting incident in which the defendant was injured and subsequently treated in a hospital trauma room. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing his clothing from the trauma room without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the clothing was in plain view and that the defendant had consented to the seizure.

The Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress but vacated the defendant's conspiracy and one perjury conviction. The appellate court addressed the defendant's new argument that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trauma room, ultimately finding that he had forfeited this issue by raising it for the first time in his motion for a new trial. However, the court chose to address the issue and concluded that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trauma room.

The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the defendant did not meet his burden of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trauma room. The court considered factors such as ownership, legitimate presence, possessory interest, prior use, ability to control or exclude others, and subjective expectation of privacy. The court found that the defendant had no ownership or possessory interest in the trauma room, did not introduce evidence of the ability to exclude others, and failed to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was upheld.

State v. Collins

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125681

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: STEGALL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2019, Mia Marie Collins attempted to flee from police in a stolen vehicle in downtown Wichita, resulting in a collision that killed two people and injured three others. Collins was charged with multiple offenses, including two counts of felony murder. She pled guilty to the felony murder charges, one count of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, and three counts of aggravated battery, while other charges were dismissed. The plea agreement recommended concurrent sentences except for one aggravated battery count, which was to run consecutively based on the victim's severe injuries.

The Sedgwick District Court, presided over by Judge Tyler J. Roush, held a hearing on Collins' motion to withdraw her plea. Collins argued that the State failed to disclose a news article about a civil settlement involving one of the victims, which she claimed would have influenced her decision to accept the plea deal. The district court found that the State did not have the information about the settlement at the time of the plea agreement and had no duty to know it. The court denied Collins' motion, stating that the State had not suppressed evidence and that the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that there was no Brady violation because the State did not suppress any evidence, willfully or inadvertently. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins' motion to withdraw her plea, as the plea was made with full knowledge of the circumstances. Additionally, the court dismissed Collins' appeal regarding jail time credit as moot, since she had already been awarded the credit she sought.

State v. Zongker

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125449

Opinion Date: September 13, 2024

Judge: STEGALL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Adrian N. Zongker was a customer at a restaurant in Wichita, Kansas, owned by Oscar and Amelia Acosta. After finishing his meal, Zongker left the restaurant but returned shortly after, searching for a missing receipt and a bag of coins. Oscar helped Zongker search outside, but Zongker shot Oscar in the chest, killing him. Zongker was arrested nearby and confessed to the shooting, claiming the restaurant owners had stolen from him. At trial, Zongker was found competent to stand trial and rejected a plea deal for second-degree murder, opting to go to trial for first-degree murder.

The Sedgwick District Court convicted Zongker of premeditated first-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. Zongker moved for a downward durational departure at sentencing, citing his mental illness, but the court denied the motion and imposed a hard 50 life sentence. Zongker appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of premeditation, improper jury instructions, prosecutorial error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence in part. The court found sufficient evidence of premeditation, noting Zongker's conduct before and after the shooting and his statements indicating intent. The court upheld the additional jury instructions on premeditation, finding them appropriate given the temporal questions in the case. While the court identified prosecutorial errors in misstating facts, it deemed them harmless. The court declined to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as it was not preserved for review. The court also found no cumulative error warranting reversal. However, the court vacated the sentence for criminal possession of a weapon, finding it illegal, and remanded for resentencing on that count.

Commonwealth v. Rogers

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13450

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: DEWAR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2007, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on a felony-murder theory, with armed robbery as the predicate felony, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The incident involved the defendant shoplifting, being confronted by store employees, and subsequently stabbing two employees, resulting in one death. The defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in 2011.

In 2018, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not employing a neuropsychologist to support a mental impairment defense. He also renewed a motion to reduce the verdict. A Superior Court judge held an evidentiary hearing in 2021, where expert testimony suggested the defendant's intent was impaired by panic during the incident. The motion judge denied the new trial motion but reduced the verdict to second-degree murder, citing a sense of injustice and referencing a recent legal standard requiring actual malice for murder convictions.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the new trial motion, agreeing that the failure to present the mental impairment defense did not deprive the defendant of a substantial ground of defense. However, the court found that the motion judge abused his discretion in reducing the verdict. The reduction was improperly based on the sentence for first-degree murder and the judge's interpretation of a recent legal standard not applicable to the case. The court reversed the reduction of the verdict, reinstating the first-degree murder conviction.

Fluker v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-CT-00692-SCT

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: CHAMBERLIN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Laquon Fluker was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. The incident involved Fluker and others allegedly attacking James Bryant in a prison cell, resulting in Bryant being stabbed. Fluker requested a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of conspiracy to commit simple assault, which the trial court denied. The jury found Fluker not guilty of aggravated assault but guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.

The Forrest County Circuit Court denied Fluker's request for the lesser-included-offense instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, reasoning that the presence of shanks and the nature of the attack indicated an intent to commit aggravated assault. The appellate court held that the evidence did not support a finding of negligence, which would be necessary for a simple assault instruction.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the lesser-included-offense instruction. The Supreme Court held that, based on the testimony of a co-conspirator, a reasonable jury could have found Fluker guilty of conspiracy to commit simple assault rather than aggravated assault. The court emphasized that the jury should have been allowed to consider whether the agreement among the conspirators was to commit simple assault. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Forrest County Circuit Court and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. O'Howell

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 209

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: Shea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Garrett Michael O’Howell was arrested following a traffic stop on May 4, 2020. Broadwater County Sheriff’s Deputy Tony Cordova observed a vehicle in a parking lot and found the behavior of its occupants suspicious. The vehicle was registered to Kaitlyn Smock, whose driver’s license was revoked. After Smock drove the vehicle away, Cordova stopped it for speeding and because of Smock’s revoked license. None of the passengers, including O’Howell, had a valid driver’s license. Cordova discovered that O’Howell had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

The First Judicial District Court denied O’Howell’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the stop was justified and that Cordova’s actions were lawful. The court found that Cordova had a particularized suspicion to stop the vehicle and that the questioning of the passengers was within the scope of the stop. O’Howell was convicted by a jury of criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Cordova’s questioning of the passengers did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop, as it was necessary to determine if any of them could legally drive the vehicle. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, including testimony from Smock and Laird, corroborated by O’Howell’s own statements and the physical evidence found in the vehicle. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding O’Howell’s convictions.

State v. Powers

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 211

Opinion Date: September 17, 2024

Judge: SHEA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ariel Jonae Powers was charged with arson in September 2020. In August 2021, her attorney informed the court that an evaluator found her unfit to proceed. The court ordered the evaluation to be filed under seal and allowed the State to respond. The State agreed with the unfitness finding and requested Powers be committed to the Montana State Hospital (MSH) for evaluation and treatment. In December 2021, the court stayed the proceedings, committed Powers to the Department of Public Health and Human Services, and she was transferred to MSH.

Powers moved to dismiss the charge in March 2022, arguing the court failed to review her fitness within 90 days as required by law. Six days later, she was released from MSH after being found fit to proceed. The evaluators' report was filed with the court in March 2022. The District Court denied her motion to dismiss in May 2022, stating her commitment duration was less than 90 days from her admission to MSH. Powers then pled no contest to misdemeanor negligent endangerment and was sentenced to one year in the Park County Detention Center, all suspended, with fines and fees totaling $175.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. Powers argued that the failure to review her fitness within 90 days required dismissal of the charges. The court held that while the statute mandates a review within 90 days, it does not automatically compel dismissal if the review is delayed. The court emphasized that dismissal is required only if the defendant remains unfit and unlikely to become fit in the foreseeable future. The court found that Powers regained fitness within a reasonable time, and thus, the District Court did not err in denying her motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed Powers's conviction.

Labbe v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 99

Opinion Date: September 19, 2024

Judge: Fenn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On January 12, 2023, Officer Kevin Valentine of the Buffalo Police Department responded to a report of a suspicious vehicle at a gas station. The vehicle, a white Toyota Camry with Montana plates, had been parked at a pump for 30-45 minutes with its windows covered. Upon arrival, Officer Valentine observed Robert Labbe exiting the vehicle and asked him to return to the car for questioning. Labbe did not have his driver’s license, and a check revealed his license was suspended. The passenger, Elizabeth Davison, also had a suspended license and an active warrant.

Officer Dustin Matthews arrived to assist, and after arresting Davison, the officers requested a canine unit. Deputy Quinn Maddox and his drug detection dog, Lucy, arrived 18 minutes later. Lucy alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search that uncovered marijuana, paraphernalia, and suspected fentanyl pills. The vehicle was towed for a more thorough search, revealing significant quantities of methamphetamine, fentanyl pills, marijuana, and THC. Labbe was charged with multiple counts of possession of controlled substances.

Labbe filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the drugs were found as a result of an illegal detention. The District Court of Johnson County denied the motion, stating the vehicle was in a public parking lot and law enforcement did not need reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or consent for a canine sniff. Labbe entered conditional guilty pleas to two felony counts, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the canine sniff was lawful as it occurred in a public place, and the dog’s alert provided probable cause for the search. The court found the evidence was not obtained as a result of an unlawful detention, making the search and subsequent seizure of drugs lawful.