United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1289

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Menashi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rickey Johnson was convicted of making threatening interstate communications and threatening U.S. officials. He posted videos and sent messages on Instagram threatening Fox News hosts Greg Gutfeld and Laura Ingraham, Senator Joe Manchin, and Representative Lauren Boebert. Johnson was indicted on four counts, including making threatening interstate communications and threatening U.S. officials. During the trial, the district court dismissed three jurors, reducing the jury to eleven members. The jury found Johnson guilty on three counts and not guilty on one count. Johnson was sentenced to twenty-four months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York handled the initial trial. Johnson appealed, arguing that the district court made five errors: proceeding with eleven jurors without stipulation, dismissing two jurors without good cause, admitting hearsay evidence, delivering an "uncalled witness charge," and improperly admitting expert testimony as lay testimony.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in proceeding with eleven jurors without stipulation but deemed the error harmless. The dismissals of the jurors were found to be within the district court's discretion. The admission of Gutfeld’s email was upheld as an excited utterance and not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The "uncalled witness charge" was deemed appropriate, and Kelley’s testimony was found to be permissible lay opinion.

The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that any errors were either not present or harmless, and Johnson’s convictions were upheld.

United States v. Sullivan, Bilda, Rankin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6559

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Lynch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

In this case, three defendants, officers and executives of the Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative (CMEEC), were convicted of theft involving a program receiving federal funds. The defendants misappropriated funds from CMEEC in 2015 to pay for personal vacations disguised as corporate retreats. These trips included visits to the Kentucky Derby and the Greenbrier Resort, with expenses charged to CMEEC's accounts.

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut oversaw the trial, where the jury found the defendants guilty of one count of theft involving a program receiving federal funds. The jury determined that CMEEC received more than $10,000 in federal benefits in 2015, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). The defendants were acquitted on other counts, including conspiracy and theft for the years 2014 and 2016. The district court sentenced the defendants to imprisonment and ordered restitution for the misappropriated funds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting the defendants' claims of insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The appellate court held that CMEEC received federal benefits exceeding $10,000 in 2015, as the funds were provided under a federal grant program. The court also found no merit in the defendants' argument that the government misled the grand jury or that the district court erred in setting the restitution amount. Additionally, the court denied CMEEC's petition for mandamus, concluding that the district court did not err in finding that the legal fees advanced to the defendants lacked a sufficient causal relationship to their offense of conviction.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and restitution order, and denied CMEEC's petition for mandamus.

Lumumba v. Kiser

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-7512

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: RICHARDSON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1999, a Virginia state court jury convicted Askari Lumumba of second-degree murder and other related charges, sentencing him to fifty-eight years in prison. While serving his sentence, Lumumba engaged in communications that led to disciplinary action. He spoke on the phone about organizing inmates and sent emails discussing potential group actions within the prison. As a result, he was charged with attempting to garner support for a group demonstration, violating Disciplinary Offense Code 128, which prohibits participating in or encouraging work stoppages or group demonstrations.

Lumumba's disciplinary hearing concluded with a finding of guilt, resulting in 30 days of disciplinary segregation and a loss of 180 days of good-conduct sentence credits. His appeals to the Warden and Regional Director were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, Lumumba filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Offense Code 128 was void for vagueness and violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed his petition, finding the regulation clear and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Offense Code 128 is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it reasonably relates to maintaining order and security in prisons. The court also found that the regulation is not void for vagueness, as it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lumumba's petition.

United States v. Elboghdady

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4194

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Makel Elboghdady, who was convicted of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (e). The conviction stemmed from an undercover operation where a West Virginia State Police officer posted an ad on Craigslist to attract child predators. Elboghdady responded to the ad and engaged in a series of communications with the undercover officer, which led to his travel from Ohio to West Virginia for a face-to-face meeting. Upon arrival, he was arrested and charged.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Elboghdady was denied an entrapment defense and subsequently convicted by a jury. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment, applying an enhancement and cross-reference for crimes involving a victim under the age of 12. Elboghdady appealed, arguing that he was entitled to an entrapment defense and that his sentence was unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the entrapment defense, finding no evidence of government overreach or inducement. However, the appellate court vacated Elboghdady’s sentence, determining that the district court improperly applied sentencing enhancements that required evidence of intent to engage with a minor under 12 years old. The appellate court found that the district court’s factual findings did not support the application of these enhancements. Consequently, the case was remanded for resentencing without the improper enhancements.

Holmes v. Reddoch

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30424

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Jacques Loeb Wiener, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

In September 8, 2018, Michael Holmes attended a public fair in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, to test a new camera lens. While taking photos, Holmes was approached by Deputy Sheriff Corbett Reddoch, who asked for his identification. Holmes questioned the request, leading to a physical altercation where Reddoch arrested Holmes, claiming he was taking pictures of children. Holmes was charged only with resisting arrest.

Holmes filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law. The jury found in favor of Holmes on his Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim but granted qualified immunity to Reddoch for the investigatory stop. The jury also found for Holmes on state-law claims of battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Reddoch's post-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial were denied by the district court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Reddoch's motions, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Reddoch did not have probable cause to arrest Holmes. The court also found that Reddoch forfeited his qualified immunity defense for the false arrest claim by not raising it in his Rule 50 motion. Additionally, the court held that the jury's verdicts on the investigatory stop and arrest were not inconsistent, as they involved different legal standards. The court also upheld the jury's award of punitive damages, finding that Reddoch's actions demonstrated reckless or callous indifference to Holmes's constitutional rights. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Senn v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10661

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Andrew S. Oldham

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Ray Senn was convicted in a Texas state court of sexual assault and prohibited sexual conduct with his intellectually disabled daughter, Brenda, who has an IQ of 64 and the competence of a preteen. In 2011, Senn raped Brenda, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child in January 2012. DNA testing confirmed Senn as the biological father. A Texas jury found Senn guilty and applied a sentencing enhancement under Texas Penal Code Section 22.011(f), which increased the maximum sentence to life imprisonment because Senn was already married at the time of the assault.

Senn's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the initial appellate decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Arteaga v. State. On remand, the appellate court initially found insufficient evidence for the enhancement but was later overruled by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Lopez v. State, which clarified that the enhancement applied if the defendant was married to someone other than the victim at the time of the assault. Senn's subsequent appeals, including an equal protection challenge, were rejected by the Texas courts.

Senn then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the application of the sentencing enhancement violated the Equal Protection Clause. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied his petition, holding that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Senn failed to demonstrate that the state court's application of the law was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law, specifically noting that the enhancement had a rational basis in protecting children and vulnerable individuals from sexual exploitation.

U.S. v. Nelson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50449

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Christopher Dallas Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) revealed that Nelson possessed 3,699 images, including 196 images of his seven-year-old daughter and 25 images of his five-year-old daughter. Nelson admitted to downloading child pornography and taking images of his older daughter but denied producing images of his younger daughter. He also attempted to obstruct justice by hiding a laptop and cellphone containing evidence. Nelson's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 43, and he filed objections to the PSR.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Nelson to 240 months in prison, a $250,000 fine, additional restitution and special assessments totaling $10,100, and supervised release for life. The court imposed mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release and added discretionary special conditions barring Nelson’s access to the Internet. Nelson objected to these special conditions, and the court’s written judgment contained less severe versions of the Internet-related conditions. Nelson timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility, finding no abuse of discretion. The court also found that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding Internet restrictions, holding that the oral pronouncement controls. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a lifetime Internet ban without exceptions, as it was not narrowly tailored. The court affirmed Nelson’s sentence except for the special conditions of supervised release, vacated the Internet-related conditions, and remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Gonzales

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-51077

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Christopher Gonzales, was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the district court erred by not applying Section 5G1.3(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines and by imposing a sentence that did not clearly reflect its judgment. Specifically, there was a discrepancy between the district court’s oral statements at the sentencing hearing and the written judgment regarding whether the 43 months Gonzales spent in state detention should count toward his federal sentence.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially sentenced Gonzales without reducing his sentence by the 43 months he spent in state detention. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals identified this inconsistency and authorized a limited remand for the district court to clarify its intent regarding Gonzales’s sentence. On remand, the district court added language to the judgment stating that Gonzales’s federal sentence would run concurrently with any term imposed by the State of Texas but did not reduce the sentence by 43 months.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the supplemental briefs and the record, concluding that the amended judgment fully clarified the district court’s intent and resolved all issues on appeal. The court found that the district court’s decision not to reduce Gonzales’s sentence by 43 months was consistent with its statements during sentencing and the decision to impose an upward variance. The Fifth Circuit also reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that Gonzales’s constitutional challenge to his Section 922(g)(1) conviction failed under plain error review. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s amended judgment.

United States v. Holt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3106

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Johnathan Holt, just weeks before his eighteenth birthday, shot and killed a drug dealer, Quincy Battle, on behalf of the Short North Posse gang. Holt was later paralyzed from the chest down due to gun violence. A federal jury convicted him of murder in aid of racketeering and murder with a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime. The district court initially sentenced him to life imprisonment, but this was later vacated as it violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life sentences for juveniles. Holt was resentenced to 900 months in prison.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially sentenced Holt to life imprisonment, which was later vacated due to the Eighth Amendment violation. The district court then resentenced him to 900 months in prison. Holt appealed, arguing that his new sentence still violated the Eighth Amendment and was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had adequately considered Holt’s youth, as required by Miller v. Alabama, and that the Eighth Amendment did not require a more lenient sentence based on his medical condition. The court also found that Holt’s procedural claims, including the district court’s handling of the presentence report and his right to allocute, did not demonstrate plain error. Finally, the court held that the 900-month sentence was substantively reasonable given the severity of Holt’s crime and the district court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing factors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.

United States v. Mireles

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1505

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: PRYOR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Tax Law

José Mireles was involved in a drug distribution conspiracy that transported large quantities of cocaine and heroin from Los Angeles to Chicago. Mireles's role included retrieving drug shipments, delivering them to customers, and laundering the proceeds back to Los Angeles. The Drug Enforcement Agency eventually dismantled the network, arresting Mireles and other conspirators. Mireles escaped custody while being transported to court but was re-arrested 18 months later. He was convicted and sentenced to 342 months in prison.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois handled the initial trial. Mireles challenged the admission of certain evidence and the calculation of his sentence. The district court admitted evidence of Mireles's failure to file tax returns, his escape from custody, and a conversation about procuring a firearm. The court also calculated the drug quantity attributable to Mireles and applied sentencing enhancements for obstruction of justice and reckless endangerment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Mireles's conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the admission of the challenged evidence. However, the court ordered a limited remand for resentencing. The appellate court could not discern the factual basis for one of the sentencing enhancements related to obstruction of justice. The court upheld the enhancement for reckless endangerment but required further proceedings to clarify the obstruction enhancement. The court vacated Mireles's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

U.S. v. Begay

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1830

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Stras

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Descart Begay, Jr. was convicted by a jury of sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse of S.S., a former coworker. After reconnecting via Facebook, Begay visited S.S. at her home on the Red Lake reservation in Minnesota. During his visit, he forcibly raped her twice, once in her bedroom and again near the front door as she tried to escape with her son. S.S. managed to flee and reported the incident to her mother and the police. Begay was arrested shortly after attempting to hide from the officers.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota conducted a five-day trial, after which the jury found Begay guilty of two counts each of sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse. The district court sentenced him to 200 months in prison. Begay appealed, challenging the evidence presented at trial and the sentence imposed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Begay argued that the jury heard too much from the government and too little from him, particularly objecting to the admission of S.S.'s prior consistent statements. The court found that these statements were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut charges of recent fabrication and to rehabilitate S.S.'s credibility. The court also addressed Begay's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by limiting cross-examination about S.S.'s sexual history, concluding that any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

Regarding sentencing, the court upheld the district court's application of enhancements for causing serious bodily injury and physically restraining the victim. The court found that S.S.'s lasting psychological damage justified the serious bodily injury enhancement and that the physical restraint enhancement did not constitute double counting.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Clark

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2320

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Drew Clark committed a series of crimes on May 26, 2021, including three car thefts, home invasions, and brandishing a stolen firearm. He was convicted by a jury of possessing a stolen firearm, three counts of carjacking, and three counts of brandishing a firearm during the carjackings. The district court sentenced him to 339 months in prison. Clark appealed his conviction on two carjacking and associated brandishing charges.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially reviewed the case. At trial, Clark moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the district court denied. After the jury convicted Clark on all counts, the court considered supplemental briefs regarding two specific counts and denied Clark’s motion for acquittal in a written post-trial order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the jury’s verdict, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Clark guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that Clark’s actions during the carjackings, including brandishing a firearm to gain control of the vehicles, met the legal requirements for carjacking and brandishing charges. The court distinguished this case from others by noting that Clark’s use of force was necessary to complete the carjackings. The court also found that Clark’s intent to cause harm was evident from his actions, even if he did not explicitly threaten to kill or seriously harm the victims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Collier

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3255

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

While patrolling Interstate 40 in Lonoke County, Arkansas, State Police Corporal Travis May stopped Tommy Collier for drifting into the shoulder. May noticed Collier's shaking hands, a disorderly car interior, and an unusual travel itinerary, which aroused his suspicion. Collier, a resident of Mississippi, was driving a car rented in Las Vegas with a Utah license plate. After Collier declined a search request, May called a K-9 unit. The drug-detection dog, Raptor, alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search that uncovered ten bundles of cocaine. Collier was arrested and later indicted for unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas conducted the trial, where Collier was found guilty by a jury. The court imposed a statutory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment. Collier appealed, raising several issues, including the reliability of the drug-detection dog, the admission of expert testimony, the standard for a motion to suppress, and the adequacy of Rule 16(a) disclosures.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on all issues. It held that the drug-detection dog, Raptor, was reliable and that its alert provided probable cause for the search. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony from Major Roby Rhoads and Senior Forensic Chemist Dan Hedges. The court rejected Collier's argument regarding the standard for a motion to suppress, stating that the district court's evaluation for reasonableness was appropriate. Additionally, the court found no prejudice in the government's Rule 16(a) disclosures and upheld the district court's denial of Collier's motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the cocaine isomer defense. Finally, the court ruled that a curative instruction was sufficient to address the government's brief comment on Collier's post-Miranda silence, and there was no plain error in the instruction given. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Topete

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1603

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Stras

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Christian Carrillo Topete was convicted of possessing child pornography, with some images involving minors under 12 years old. The key issue was whether his prior conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse under Iowa law triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years under federal law, which applies if the prior conviction "relates to sexual abuse."

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa reviewed Carrillo Topete's criminal history and determined that his prior conviction did indeed relate to sexual abuse. Consequently, the court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, which was three years more than he would have received without the prior conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court applied the categorical approach, focusing on the statutory definition of the prior offense rather than the specific facts of the case. The court found that the Iowa statute for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse fits within the federal definition of sexual abuse, which includes physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment for sexual gratification. The court also noted that the phrase "relating to" in the federal statute allows for a broader interpretation, encompassing a wider range of prior convictions.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Carrillo Topete's prior conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse under Iowa law qualifies as a conviction relating to sexual abuse under federal law, thereby justifying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.

FRYE V. BROOMFIELD

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-99008

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Murguia

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 1988, a California jury sentenced Jerry Grant Frye to death for the first-degree murders of Robert and Jane Brandt. Frye and his girlfriend, Jennifer Warsing, had moved to Amador County to grow marijuana. Warsing testified that Frye, after seeing the devil and feeling threatened, forced her to accompany him to the Brandts' cabin, where he shot and killed them. They then stole the Brandts' valuables and fled to South Dakota, where Frye was later arrested and confessed to the murders. The prosecution's case relied heavily on Warsing's testimony, corroborated by physical evidence and Frye's own statements.

The California Supreme Court affirmed Frye's conviction and sentence in 1998. Frye filed a state habeas petition in 2000, claiming his due process rights were violated when jurors saw him shackled during the trial. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on the merits in 2001. Frye then sought federal habeas relief, and in 2022, the district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the shackling claim, concluding that the shackling prejudiced Frye at both the guilt and penalty phases.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit held that Frye did not overcome the significant deference owed to an unreasoned state court decision on the merits under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court rejected the argument that the right to be free from unjustified guilt-phase shackling was not clearly established federal law at the time of the state court's decision. However, given the limited shackling evidence and the guilt evidence before the state court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that every fairminded jurist would not agree that the state court's harmlessness decision was objectively unreasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Frye's remaining claims.

LOPEZ V. GARLAND

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-870

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Thomas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Christian Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, was brought to the United States by his mother at the age of two to escape domestic violence from his father. Lopez lived in the U.S. without lawful status for thirteen years before obtaining T-5 nonimmigrant status in 2013. In 2017, he inadvertently allowed his T-5 status to expire. In 2019, Lopez was arrested and later convicted of multiple offenses, including four counts of petit larceny under the Reno Municipal Code (RMC) § 8.10.040. Following his release from prison, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him.

An immigration judge (IJ) found Lopez removable for committing crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that Lopez's asylum application was untimely and that he failed to demonstrate a nexus between his fear of future harm and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that Lopez's municipal convictions involved CIMTs and that he did not qualify for an exception to the asylum filing deadline.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Lopez's petition for review. The court held that Lopez's petit larceny convictions under RMC § 8.10.040 are CIMTs, making him removable. The court also concluded that the BIA's interpretation of the statute regarding CIMTs was entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. Additionally, the court found that the lack of availability of a pardon for a conviction does not render the conviction an improper basis for removal. Finally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the denial of withholding of removal, as Lopez did not demonstrate that he would face future persecution in Mexico based on his identity as his mother's son.

RODNEY V. GARRETT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-15624

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Márquez

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Kyle J. Rodney was convicted in Nevada state court of multiple charges, including burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon, and battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The convictions stemmed from an incident where Rodney and an accomplice attacked and severely injured Ralph Monko after Monko won a significant amount of money at a casino. Monko's injuries were severe, including head trauma and long-term physical and cognitive impairments.

Rodney's convictions were affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. He then filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, which was denied without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. A second post-conviction petition was also denied on procedural grounds. Rodney subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims. The federal district court found these claims procedurally defaulted. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for the district court to determine if the procedural default could be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, which allows for such an excuse if the IAC claims are substantial.

The United States District Court for the District of Nevada, on remand, initially allowed new evidence and discovery but later ruled that it could not consider new evidence due to the Supreme Court's decision in Shinn v. Ramirez. The district court concluded that Rodney's IAC claims were not substantial based on the state-court record alone and denied relief.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Rodney did not fail to develop the state-court record within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) and that the district court erred in limiting its analysis to the state-court record. However, the Ninth Circuit found that even considering the new evidence, Rodney's IAC claims were not substantial. The court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Rodney's trial or sentencing would have been different but for counsel's alleged errors. Thus, the procedural default of Rodney's claims could not be excused, and the denial of his habeas petition was affirmed.

United States v. Avendano-Soto

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-281

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant attempted to enter the United States at the Nogales, Arizona port of entry. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, suspicious due to his prior detentions for smuggling and assault, asked him for documentation. Instead of complying, the defendant tried to walk past an officer, who then blocked his path. The defendant responded by slamming the officer to the ground, causing her to suffer a traumatic brain injury with lifelong impairments. He was indicted and charged with assaulting a federal officer resulting in bodily injury.

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona accepted the defendant's guilty plea without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the court incorporated by reference the supervised-release conditions set forth in the presentence report (PSR) and District of Arizona General Order 17-18. The defendant was sentenced to 51 months in prison, the bottom of the guideline range. He appealed, arguing that the plea colloquy violated his due process rights and that the district court failed to properly pronounce all conditions of supervised release as required by United States v. Montoya.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had adequately informed the defendant of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and that he entered his plea with full awareness of these rights. The court also held that the district court satisfied Montoya’s pronouncement requirement because the defendant had reviewed and understood the PSR, which incorporated the conditions in General Order 17-18. The Ninth Circuit found no plain error in the district court’s explanation of its reasoning for the sentence and concluded that the 51-month sentence was substantively reasonable. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.

United States v. Brewster

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-329

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Cenious Brewster led officers on a high-speed chase, which was recorded on the officers’ dashcam. Brewster crashed into a building shortly after the chase began. He was arrested, and a firearm was found in his vehicle. Brewster pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to 46 months’ imprisonment. Brewster challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying the reckless endangerment during flight enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, misunderstood his request for a downward departure based on circumstances that allegedly justified his flight, and violated his due process rights by finding that data from the Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing INformation (JSIN) online tool was sufficiently reliable to consider at sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Brewster’s objections to the reckless endangerment enhancement, finding that his flight created a substantial risk of injury to at least one specific person. The court also rejected Brewster’s request for a downward departure or variance, characterizing it as a request for a variance only, which Brewster’s counsel confirmed. Additionally, the court found the JSIN data reliable and used it to determine Brewster’s sentence, noting that the data was consistent with information from another Sentencing Commission tool, the Interactive Data Analyzer (IDA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Brewster’s flight put at least one motorist at substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The court also found that Brewster forfeited his argument regarding the downward departure and failed to show plain error. Finally, the appellate court held that the district court did not err in finding the JSIN data reliable, as it came from a reliable source and was corroborated by other unchallenged evidence. The court denied Brewster’s motion for supplemental briefing on a Second Amendment challenge, as he could have raised it in the district court but did not. The sentence was affirmed.

USA V. SHEN ZHEN NEW WORLD I, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-972

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law, White Collar Crime

A real estate development company, Shen Zhen New World I, LLC, owned by Chinese billionaire Wei Huang, was involved in a scheme to bribe Los Angeles City Councilmember Jose Huizar. Over nearly four years, Huang provided Huizar with extravagant Las Vegas trips, gambling chips, and prostitutes, seeking Huizar's support for redeveloping the L.A. Grand Hotel into Los Angeles's tallest skyscraper. Huang's strategy was to "give, give, give" to later make a "big ask" for Huizar's support on the project.

A federal jury in the Central District of California convicted Shen Zhen on three counts of honest-services mail and wire fraud, one count of federal-program bribery, and four counts of interstate and foreign travel in aid of racketeering. The district court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, rejecting Shen Zhen's argument that the Government failed to establish an agreement or official action by Huizar. The court also denied Shen Zhen's proposed jury instruction on quid pro quo, finding it legally unsound.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings, noting that bribery under federal law does not require an explicit agreement with the public official. The court also upheld the district court's jury instructions, which correctly required the jury to find that Shen Zhen provided benefits intending to receive official acts in return. Additionally, the court found that California's bribery statutes, although broader than the Travel Act's generic definition, were proper predicates for the Travel Act convictions because the jury convicted Shen Zhen based on elements conforming to the generic definition of bribery. The court also concluded that any evidentiary errors were harmless and did not affect the verdict.

United States v. Hicks

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-7017

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Baldock

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Elijah Dewayne Hicks, shot and killed his cousin, Timothy Ray Buckley, in the middle of a residential street. Buckley, who had a history of violence when intoxicated, was drunk at the time. Hicks claimed self-defense, stating that Buckley had knocked out his girlfriend and charged at him. The government argued that Hicks intentionally murdered Buckley due to a personal grudge, highlighting that Hicks had non-lethal alternatives available.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma tried the case. The jury found Hicks guilty on all counts: second-degree murder, use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and causing death in the course of a § 924(c) offense. Hicks was sentenced to concurrent 240-month sentences for the murder and causing death charges, plus a mandatory 120-month consecutive sentence for the firearm charge. Hicks appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jury instructions, particularly by not instructing the jury that he had no legal duty to retreat or exhaust alternatives before acting in self-defense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the lack of a duty to retreat or exhaust alternatives deprived the jury of critical legal guidance, thereby prejudicing Hicks' self-defense claim. The Tenth Circuit found that the jury instructions were inadequate and reversed the convictions, remanding the case for a new trial. The court emphasized that Hicks was entitled to an instruction clarifying that he had no legal duty to retreat or consider alternatives before using deadly force in self-defense.

United States v. Lewis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-3125

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two defendants, Kevin Lewis and Otis Ponds, were involved in a large-scale drug trafficking conspiracy in Wichita, Kansas. Lewis was convicted at trial, while Ponds pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal on specific issues. Both defendants challenged the government's actions, including alleged violations of their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the validity of wiretap evidence used against them.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially set Lewis's trial for May 2020, but delays ensued due to the complexity of the case and the COVID-19 pandemic. The court declared the case complex, which extended the timeline for discovery. A significant delay was attributed to the FBI's use of a pole camera that recorded over 10,000 hours of footage, which defense counsel had to review. Ponds was arrested later and joined the case in March 2021. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds, which the district court denied, citing the complexity of the case and lack of specific prejudice to the defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that while the delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was not unreasonable given the case's complexity. The court held that the government was responsible for some delay due to the extensive pole-camera footage but noted that the defendants failed to show specific prejudice from the delay. The court also upheld the district court's denial of the motions to suppress wiretap evidence, finding that the wiretap application was properly authorized by a statutorily approved DOJ official, despite challenges to the legibility of the signature.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, including Lewis's 420-month sentence, finding it substantively reasonable given his significant role in the drug conspiracy and criminal history.

United States v. Wall

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-10730

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: BRASHER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Three members of the Gangster Disciples, Vertuies Wall, Lawrence Grice, and Lewis Mobley, were indicted on charges including conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and drug trafficking. The indictment included notice of enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Mobley was found competent to stand trial despite a defense expert's testimony about his mental illness. The trial lasted five weeks, with over sixty witnesses testifying about the gang's criminal activities, including murder and drug trafficking. The jury found all three defendants guilty of RICO conspiracy, with Grice also convicted of drug trafficking conspiracy.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the jury found Mobley and Wall guilty of RICO conspiracy involving murder, which subjected them to enhanced sentencing. Mobley was also convicted of attempted murder and related firearms offenses. Grice was convicted of RICO conspiracy and drug trafficking conspiracy. The district court sentenced Mobley to 480 months and Wall to 360 months, both under the enhanced sentencing provision. Grice received a sentence based on his convictions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's findings, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the enhanced sentences. The court found no error in the jury instructions or the special verdict form regarding the enhanced sentencing provision. The court also held that any potential error in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court rejected challenges to the admission of testimony about non-testifying coconspirators' convictions and found no cumulative error affecting the defendants' substantial rights. The court affirmed the defendants' convictions and sentences.

USA v. Riley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3057

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Michael Riley, a former Capitol Police officer, was convicted of obstructing a federal grand jury investigation into the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The day after the attack, Riley advised a rioter, Jacob Hiles, to delete a Facebook post admitting he had been inside the Capitol. When Riley learned that his communications with Hiles might be investigated, he deleted their direct messages and call logs. A jury convicted Riley of one count of obstruction of an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for these deletions but could not reach a verdict on another count related to his advice to Hiles.

The District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Riley to probation and a fine. Riley appealed, arguing that the government failed to prove that a grand jury proceeding was foreseeable or that he intended to obstruct such a proceeding. He also claimed various trial errors.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the indictment sufficiently alleged that Riley intended to obstruct a foreseeable grand jury proceeding. The evidence showed that Riley, an experienced officer, knew that felony charges were likely for those involved in the Capitol breach and that a grand jury would be convened. The court also held that Riley's deletion of messages had a clear nexus to the foreseeable grand jury investigation.

Riley's claims of constructive amendment and prejudicial variance were rejected, as the evidence at trial matched the indictment's allegations. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's partial denial of Riley's discovery requests and rejected his claim of judicial bias.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed Riley's conviction, holding that the government had sufficiently proven that Riley intended to obstruct a foreseeable grand jury proceeding by deleting his communications with Hiles.

In re Montgomery

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D083970(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Irion

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2008, a jury convicted Travis Lanell Montgomery of multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced him to 61 years to life, which was later reduced to 26 years to life on appeal. In January 2024, Montgomery filed a declaration alleging racial bias under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) and requested discovery of evidence to support his claims. The trial court treated this as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied it for failing to state a prima facie case for relief. The court also denied the discovery motion, citing lack of jurisdiction.

Montgomery appealed the trial court's denial of his discovery motion, arguing that it was appealable as an order affecting his substantial rights. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, dismissed the appeal, stating that the trial court's order was not appealable. The court explained that a trial court order denying relief that it has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).

The Court of Appeal held that the RJA does not authorize a freestanding discovery motion; such a motion must be ancillary to an ongoing action or proceeding. Since Montgomery's petition for writ of habeas corpus was summarily denied, there was no pending proceeding in which the discovery motion could be considered. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the discovery motion for lack of jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, but Montgomery retains the option to file a new petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal, where he can renew his discovery motion.

People v. Brannon-Thompson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097565M(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: WISEMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2018, the defendant was sentenced to 12 years in state prison for multiple offenses, including shooting at an occupied vehicle and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. In 2022, the trial court recalled the sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, struck a prior prison term enhancement, and resentenced the defendant to 11 years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to this.

The Superior Court of Butte County initially sentenced the defendant to 12 years, citing multiple aggravating factors such as the defendant's prior criminal record and unsatisfactory performance on probation. Upon resentencing in 2022, the trial court struck the prior prison term enhancement but reimposed the upper term, resulting in an 11-year sentence. The defendant did not object to the reimposition of the upper term during resentencing.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), the trial court was not required to find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was previously imposed. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in reimposing the upper term and that the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, as there was no sound legal basis for such an objection. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's resentencing order.

People v. Hall

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062749(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: SANCHEZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Two defendants, Phalon Amad Hall and Patrick Redman, were convicted of home invasion robbery and kidnapping, with additional gang-related sentencing enhancements. Hall was identified as one of the robbers, while Redman was accused of aiding and abetting by recruiting a robber, providing a firearm, and acting as the getaway driver. The case involved a violent home invasion where the victim, A.T., was beaten, forced to open a safe, and tied up while the robbers looted his house.

In the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, both defendants were found guilty of home invasion robbery and kidnapping. The jury also found multiple sentencing enhancements to be true, including gang-related enhancements. Hall received a sentence of 15 years to life for robbery, while Redman was sentenced to 60 years to life. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the kidnapping convictions, ruling that the movement of the victim within his home was not substantial enough to constitute kidnapping. The court also reversed the gang-related sentencing enhancements due to legislative changes that retroactively altered the definition and proof requirements for establishing a criminal street gang. The court affirmed the robbery convictions and other aspects of the judgment but remanded the case for complete resentencing in light of the reversals.

People v. Ingram

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098000(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, Michael Ingram was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committed to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2020, he filed a petition for conditional release, arguing he was not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if released under supervision and treatment in the community. The trial court denied his petition, and Ingram appealed, challenging both the trial court’s decision and the constitutionality of the SVPA’s conditional release provisions.

The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially handled the case, where a jury found Ingram to be an SVP. Ingram then filed a petition for conditional release, which the trial court denied. The court found that Ingram had not made significant progress in his treatment program and that his risk to the community remained unchanged. The court also noted that while Ingram might receive better treatment in the community, the issue before the court was whether he could be safely released, not whether he could receive better treatment elsewhere.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that substantial evidence supported the denial of Ingram’s petition. The appellate court noted that all experts agreed Ingram continued to meet the definition of an SVP and that he had not yet learned to control his sexually violent behavior. The court also found that Ingram’s proposed alternative conditional release program, which included 24/7, one-on-one supervision, was neither reasonable nor required by the SVPA. Additionally, the court rejected Ingram’s constitutional challenges, noting that these issues were not properly raised in the lower court and that Ingram lacked standing to challenge potential delays in finding housing for conditionally released SVPs.

Bock v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 23SC97

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Hart

Areas of Law: Construction Law, Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Jamie Edward Bock was charged with nine counts of theft for actions occurring between November 2014 and November 2016. He was accused of taking initial payments from homeowners for construction work, some of which he started but did not complete, and others he did not begin at all. Bock requested and received additional funds for four projects but failed to complete any of them or return the money.

The trial court joined five cases into a single trial and instructed the jury that Bock could not be convicted of four counts unless the prosecution proved multiple acts of theft within six months of each other. Bock argued that this instruction constructively amended his charges, which were originally under a statute punishing single acts of theft, and claimed this amendment was a structural error requiring reversal. The jury convicted Bock on all counts, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the jury instructions constituted a constructive amendment but held that it did not require reversal, applying plain error review.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and agreed that the jury instructions constructively amended the charges. However, the court held that such an amendment is not a structural error and should be reviewed for plain error. The court concluded that Bock did not demonstrate plain error because he had sufficient notice to mount a defense, and the prosecution's burden of proof was not materially lessened. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and upheld Bock's convictions.

Niemeyer v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 23SC117

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Rachel Ann Niemeyer was questioned by police after her husband suffered a gunshot wound to the head. During the interrogation at the police station, Niemeyer made incriminating statements. She was charged with murdering her husband and moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court denied her motion, concluding she was not in custody when she made the statements. A jury convicted her of second-degree murder and other offenses.

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The majority held that a reasonable person in Niemeyer's position would not have considered herself in custody, as her freedom of action was not curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The court reasoned that the hand-bagging procedure did not convert the situation into a custodial one. However, a dissenting judge argued that the police's actions and statements indicated that Niemeyer was in custody, as they would not consider taking her to the hospital until completing unspecified tasks.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Niemeyer was in custody for Miranda purposes during the interrogation. The court found that a reasonable person in her position would have believed they were deprived of their freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. The court noted that Niemeyer was alone in an interrogation room late at night, repeatedly asked to go to the hospital, and was physically restrained with zip-tied bags on her hands. The court concluded that the trial court's error in admitting her statements was not harmless and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, remanding for further proceedings.

People v. Eugene

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 22SC952

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: William W. Hood, III

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Police officers questioned Terrence Kenneth Eugene about his involvement in a road-rage incident without informing him of his Miranda rights. During the encounter, Eugene admitted to pushing the other driver but denied using a weapon. His statements were used at trial, leading to his conviction for second and third-degree assault.

The trial court denied Eugene's motion to suppress his statements, finding he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. The court noted that Eugene's movement was not restricted, the officers did not use coercive tactics, and Eugene was not formally arrested. A jury subsequently convicted Eugene.

On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that Eugene was in custody during the interrogation and that the trial court erred in not suppressing his statements. The appellate court found that the circumstances of the interrogation, including the officers' tone and the duration of the encounter, indicated a custodial situation.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that Eugene was not in custody for Miranda purposes, emphasizing the public and non-coercive nature of the encounter. The court noted that Eugene was questioned outside his apartment in broad daylight, was not physically restrained, and the officers did not use force or threats. Consequently, the court reinstated the trial court's suppression ruling and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

People v. Lewis

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 24SA75

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Monica M. Márquez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Richard Lewis was convicted of four misdemeanors, including two counts of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of unlawful sexual contact on a client by a psychotherapist. Initially, he was on a personal recognizance bond, but after his conviction, the county court revoked this bond, citing the seriousness of the case and Lewis's potential danger to the community. The court set a new cash bond of $5,000, which Lewis posted. At sentencing, the court denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond, finding that he posed a danger to the community.

The County Court, City and County of Denver, denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond under section 16-4-201.5(2)(a), which requires denial of bail if the defendant poses a danger to the community. Lewis argued that his appeal should be governed by section 16-2-114(6), which mandates a stay of execution and an appeal bond. The county court disagreed, finding that Lewis posed a danger to the community and thus denied the appeal bond.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and upheld the county court's decision. The court clarified that section 16-2-114(6) requires a stay of execution but does not mandate the granting of an appeal bond. The court found no conflict between section 16-2-114(6) and section 16-4-201.5(2), which prohibits bail if the defendant is deemed a danger to the community. The Supreme Court concluded that the county court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appeal bond and discharged the order to show cause. The case was remanded to the county court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

People v. Romero

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 22SC845

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Samour

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The defendant, Phillip Romero, was charged with multiple offenses, including assault and false imprisonment, after threatening and attacking his romantic partner. During jury selection, the prosecution used a peremptory strike to excuse Prospective Juror F, one of two Hispanic jurors in the pool. Romero raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The prosecution explained that the juror appeared disinterested and unfocused. The trial court denied the Batson challenge, finding the prosecution's reason credible and race-neutral.

The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had clearly erred in denying the Batson challenge. The appellate court held that the prosecution's reason lacked specific factual justification and objective evidence, and thus, the trial court should not have credited it. The appellate court ordered a new trial for Romero.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court misapplied the clear error standard of review by not deferring to the trial court's credibility determinations. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court is in the best position to assess demeanor and credibility. It found that the trial court had implicitly found the prosecution's reason credible and that the record supported this finding. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for consideration of other issues raised by Romero on appeal.

Sexton v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0079

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Couriel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

John Sexton was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ann Parlato, a 94-year-old woman he knew from cutting her lawn. The crime was particularly brutal, involving severe physical trauma and post-mortem mutilation. A jury initially recommended the death penalty by a 10-2 vote, and the Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction but remanded for a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida. On remand, Sexton waived his right to a jury, and the trial court sentenced him to death again.

In the lower courts, Sexton moved for the recusal of Judge Mary Handsel, citing a contentious pretrial exchange. Judge Handsel denied the motion but delegated funding decisions to Chief Judge Anthony Rondolino, who granted some requests and denied others, including funding for a PET scan and travel expenses for mitigation specialists. Sexton also waived his right to a jury trial and limited the mitigation evidence presented. The trial court took judicial notice of the original trial transcripts and sentenced Sexton to death, citing three aggravating factors and giving little weight to the mitigating factors.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and addressed eight issues raised by Sexton. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying funding for a PET scan and travel expenses, noting that Sexton failed to show a particularized need or prejudice. The court also held that the trial court erred in calling Sexton's mitigation specialist as a witness but deemed the error harmless. The court found no violation of Sexton's rights in the trial court's judicial notice of prior proceedings, denial of the motion to disqualify, or comments on Sexton's silence. The court concluded that the trial court properly considered mitigating evidence and understood its discretion in sentencing. Finally, the court rejected Sexton's constitutional challenge to Florida's capital sentencing scheme. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Sexton's death sentence.

Syed v. Lee

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 7/23

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Biran

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of the murder of Hae Min Lee and sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. In 2022, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City moved to vacate Syed’s conviction, citing new evidence and alleged Brady violations. Young Lee, the victim’s brother, was given less than one business day’s notice of the vacatur hearing, which he attended remotely. The court granted the motion to vacate and ordered the State to either retry Syed or enter a nolle prosequi (nol pros) within 30 days. The State later entered a nol pros, effectively dismissing the charges against Syed.

Young Lee appealed the vacatur order, arguing that his rights as a victim’s representative were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the circuit court’s order, reinstated Syed’s convictions, and remanded for a new hearing, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal and that Lee had the right to reasonable notice and to attend the hearing in person.

The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal. The Court concluded that a victim has the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing under CP § 11-403, which applies to hearings where the alteration of a sentence is considered. The Court also held that Lee’s rights were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings, starting from the point immediately after the State’s Attorney filed the motion to vacate.

Commonwealth v. Dilworth

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13547

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves the defendant, who was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm and related offenses after Boston police officers monitored his Snapchat account and observed him brandishing firearms in several videos. The police used an undercover Snapchat account to send a friend request to the defendant, who accepted it, allowing the officers to view his posts. The defendant was arrested twice, once in January 2018 and again in May 2018, each time after posting videos showing him with firearms.

In the Superior Court, the defendant filed multiple discovery motions seeking information about the Boston Police Department's (BPD) use of undercover social media monitoring, arguing that it was relevant to an equal protection claim of discriminatory enforcement. The court granted these motions, ordering the Commonwealth to disclose various pieces of information, including the usernames and profile images used by undercover officers. The Commonwealth refused to comply, citing concerns about compromising ongoing investigations and endangering informants.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the Commonwealth did not properly assert a privilege to withhold the requested information, as it failed to demonstrate a legitimate need to protect ongoing investigations or the safety of informants. The court also affirmed the lower court's application of the equal protection standard from Commonwealth v. Long, which applies to claims of discriminatory law enforcement practices beyond traffic stops.

The court concluded that the Superior Court judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing the indictments with prejudice as a sanction for the Commonwealth's deliberate non-compliance with the discovery order. The dismissal was deemed appropriate because the Commonwealth's refusal to provide the requested discovery denied the defendant the opportunity to develop his equal protection claim, thus preventing a fair trial.

Johnson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-CA-00117-SCT

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1998, Michael Johnson, then 17, conspired with Aaron Johnson to murder Aaron’s roommate, Dustin Sean Parker. They planned the murder for hours, eventually deciding to bludgeon Parker to death with a metal barbell. After killing Parker, they wrapped his body in plastic bags and buried it in the woods. Johnson later bragged about the murder, leading to his arrest and conviction for deliberate-design murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

The Rankin County Circuit Court initially sentenced Johnson to life without parole. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which deemed mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles unconstitutional, Johnson sought post-conviction relief. The trial court vacated his sentence and held a new hearing, considering the Miller factors. Despite this, the court reinstated Johnson’s life sentence, ruling that the parole statute's application was not unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the trial court misapplied the law and facts and that Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101 required jury sentencing for juveniles. The court found that recent statutory amendments did not entitle Johnson to jury sentencing, as he was convicted before July 1, 2024. The court also upheld the trial court's application of the Miller factors, noting Johnson’s age, the premeditated nature of the crime, and the lack of evidence suggesting his immaturity or inability to understand the consequences of his actions. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, maintaining Johnson’s life sentence without parole.

State v. Barnes

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 517

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Kolton Barnes, who was convicted of first-degree murder, intentional cruelty to an animal, two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, two counts of negligent child abuse, and evidence tampering. The charges stemmed from the death of his fiancée, Kayla Matulka, and his dog, both found in their home. Barnes claimed self-defense, stating Matulka attacked him after killing the dog. The prosecution argued Barnes killed Matulka after she broke up with him.

In the District Court for Saunders County, Nebraska, Barnes sought access to Matulka’s mental health records to support his defense. The court granted partial access but denied a motion to compel further records from an out-of-state insurer, citing jurisdictional issues and the sufficiency of already provided records. Barnes also moved to exclude evidence of prior threats he made to a former girlfriend, which the court allowed, finding it relevant to motive and intent. At trial, the jury found Barnes guilty on all counts except for the two counts of intentional child abuse, where he was found guilty of the lesser charge of negligent child abuse.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel further records, as Barnes had ample evidence of Matulka’s mental health issues. The court also upheld the admission of prior threat evidence, finding it relevant to Barnes' motive and intent. The court found no error in the exclusion of a document about demonic possession or in the admission of a timeline of cell phone activities. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and due process violations were dismissed, as the court found no plain error. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the murder conviction, and the sentences for use of a deadly weapon were not excessive. The court affirmed Barnes' convictions and sentences.

State v. Jones

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 559

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law

A self-described "lay midwife" was charged by the State of Nebraska with practicing a profession without a credential after being ordered to cease and desist. The midwife, who did not hold a state-issued credential, provided prenatal and postnatal care and assisted with childbirth. The charges were based on her alleged violation of the Uniform Credentialing Act (UCA).

In Madison County, the district court sustained the midwife's plea in abatement, finding that "nurse midwives" were not required to hold credentials under the UCA. The court also suggested that the UCA would be unconstitutionally vague if it required a credential for practicing "nurse midwifery." Similarly, in Douglas County, the district court sustained a plea in abatement on the same grounds, dismissing the charges against the midwife.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district courts had misconstrued the UCA. The court held that the UCA requires individuals to hold a credential to engage in practices such as attending childbirth and providing related care, which fall under the scope of medicine and surgery, advanced practice registered nursing, and certified nurse midwifery. The court also found that the evidence presented was sufficient to show probable cause that the midwife had committed the charged crime.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district courts' orders sustaining the pleas in abatement and dismissing the charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including consideration of the midwife's motions to quash and demurrers.

State v. Rolland

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 175

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Trent Rolland was involved in a traffic accident with a minor, who later alleged that Rolland had been communicating with her via SnapChat, sending explicit messages and photographs, and had sexual contact with her. Rolland was charged with luring a minor and other related offenses. During his arrest, his smartphone was seized, and he was taken to the Richland County jail, where he was read his Miranda rights and subsequently made several incriminating admissions during an interview. Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search his phone, leading to additional charges.

The District Court of Sargent County, Southeast Judicial District, presided over by Judge Nicholas D. Thornton, denied Rolland's motions to suppress evidence and his motion to dismiss based on his competency to stand trial. Rolland had undergone multiple psychological evaluations, with conflicting opinions on his competency. The court overruled Rolland's objection to the timeliness of one of the competency reports and found him competent to stand trial. Rolland entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the judgment, arguing errors in the competency determination and the denial of his motions to suppress evidence.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not provide adequate findings to support its decision on Rolland's competency. The Supreme Court noted that the district court's statements were merely a recitation of the legal standard without explaining the basis for its decision. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case for 60 days for the district court to determine whether Rolland was fit to proceed before entering his conditional guilty plea, based on the record at the time of his motion to dismiss. The district court must conduct an additional competency hearing to assess the evaluators' testimony and credibility.

State v. Sheckles

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-3339

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Brunner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2020, Sontez Sheckles was indicted in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court for attempted murder, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under a disability, stemming from an alleged shooting at a bar. The prosecution intended to call a former federal prosecutor, Zachary Kessler, as a witness and present an edited video of the incident. However, the trial court excluded Kessler's testimony due to the absence of a Touhy letter authorizing him to testify and excluded the video because the bar owner could not authenticate it.

The State appealed these rulings to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court's decisions had weakened its case to the point of destroying any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution. The First District affirmed the trial court's rulings, agreeing that the absence of a Touhy letter justified excluding Kessler's testimony and that the video could not be authenticated by the bar owner.

The State then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which reviewed whether the Touhy regulations should have been used to prevent Kessler from testifying and whether the trial court's pretrial evidentiary rulings should have been considered preliminary. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Touhy regulations do not create rights for criminal defendants and cannot be used to exclude testimony from a willing and authorized federal employee. The court reversed the First District's judgment on the Touhy issue and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The court did not address the finality of the trial court's pretrial evidentiary rulings, vacating that portion of the First District's judgment.

State v. Rose

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 56

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Joshua Jay Rose was charged with simple assault of his son, C.R., and faced trial in magistrate court. The first jury trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was deadlocked. During the second trial, the State moved for a mistrial due to defense counsel's references to the previous trial, mention of a no-contact order, and questions about how the trial's outcome could affect where C.R. lived. The magistrate court granted the mistrial, citing the cumulative effect of these issues. Rose's motion to dismiss the charges based on double jeopardy was denied, and he was convicted in a third trial.

Rose appealed to the circuit court, arguing that the magistrate court abused its discretion by granting the second mistrial and that double jeopardy should have precluded his retrial. The circuit court affirmed the magistrate court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in granting the mistrial, considering the cumulative effect of the references to the previous trial, the no-contact order, and the questions about the trial's impact on C.R.'s living situation. The court found that these issues could have affected the jury's impartiality, justifying the mistrial and subsequent retrial.

EX PARTE CHARETTE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0522-21

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).

The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette.

State v. Olsen

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,131-3

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: STEPHENS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2003 and 2006, Christopher Lee Olsen pleaded guilty to several offenses, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Following the Washington Supreme Court's decision in State v. Blake, which declared the state's strict liability drug possession statute unconstitutional, Olsen sought to withdraw his guilty pleas to all charges. The trial court vacated his drug possession convictions but denied his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

The trial court vacated Olsen's drug possession convictions but denied his request to withdraw his guilty pleas, distinguishing between the invalidation of the convictions and the voluntariness of the pleas. The court also rejected Olsen's argument that his plea agreements were indivisible package deals. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that Olsen's pleas were to valid charges at the time and that Blake did not render them involuntary. The court also found that Olsen failed to demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that Olsen's claims to withdraw his guilty pleas were time-barred. The court determined that while Blake invalidated Olsen's drug possession convictions, it did not entitle him to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court emphasized that a guilty plea that was valid when entered does not become involuntary due to a subsequent change in the law. Therefore, Olsen's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas were denied, and the Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed.

State v. Smith

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,402-9

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: STEPHENS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Nathan Scott Smith was charged with first-degree rape of a child. During jury selection, Smith sought to remove three potential jurors for cause, including one who expressed that she might agree with other jurors if she was "on the fence" about the verdict, citing her non-confrontational nature. The trial judge denied Smith's challenge, and the juror in question sat on the jury, which returned a unanimous guilty verdict.

Smith appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that the juror exhibited actual bias and should have been removed. The Court of Appeals agreed with Smith, finding that the juror's statements indicated a likelihood of actual bias, and reversed Smith's conviction. The State then sought review from the Washington Supreme Court.

The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Smith's for-cause challenge to the juror. The court emphasized that trial judges are best positioned to evaluate potential jurors' ability to serve impartially, given their ability to observe demeanor and tone. The Supreme Court found that the juror's statements were equivocal and did not unequivocally demonstrate actual bias. The court held that the trial judge acted within her discretion in concluding that the juror's answers reflected honest caution rather than actual bias.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Smith's conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the for-cause challenge to the juror.

State v. Willyard

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,325-1

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Owens

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2003, Nicole Willyard pleaded guilty to three charges in two separate cases: obstruction, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and bail jumping. The bail jumping charge was due to her failure to appear for a hearing on the unlawful possession charge. Following the Washington Supreme Court's decision in State v. Blake, which declared the strict liability drug possession statute unconstitutional, Willyard sought to withdraw her guilty pleas for all charges.

The trial court vacated her conviction for unlawful possession but denied her motions to withdraw the other guilty pleas. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that her motions to withdraw were time-barred. The court found that while Blake invalidated her unlawful possession conviction, it did not affect the validity of her other guilty pleas. The court also determined that the guilty pleas were part of an indivisible plea agreement, but the time bar applied to the obstruction and bail jumping charges.

The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Willyard's motions to withdraw her guilty pleas were time-barred. The court ruled that Blake did not open the door to untimely challenges to her guilty pleas, as subsequent changes in the law do not affect the validity of a plea that was knowing and voluntary at the time it was made. The court also concluded that unlawful possession under the former statute was not a "nonexistent crime," and thus, Willyard was not entitled to withdraw her guilty pleas on this basis. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the trial court's denial of Willyard's motions to withdraw her guilty pleas.

Lee v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 97

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On March 4, 2023, Officer Brandon LaPointe stopped Antonio Kaye Lee's vehicle for illegally tinted windows. After confirming the tint violation, Officer LaPointe called for a canine unit, which alerted to narcotics. A search revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. When informed of his arrest, Mr. Lee resisted, leading to a struggle during which officers claimed he attempted to grab their firearms. Mr. Lee was charged with multiple offenses, including two counts of attempting to disarm a peace officer.

The District Court of Sweetwater County presided over the trial. Mr. Lee admitted to the drug-related charges but denied attempting to disarm the officers, asserting he was merely trying to escape. The officers testified that Mr. Lee grabbed their firearms during the struggle. The jury found Mr. Lee guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms for the misdemeanors and the attempted disarming charges.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the district court erred by not instructing the jury on all elements of attempting to disarm a peace officer, specifically the requirement of a "substantial step" toward committing the crime. The court found that the district court's failure to include this element in the jury instructions constituted plain error. The Supreme Court held that this omission materially prejudiced Mr. Lee because the jury might not have found he took a substantial step toward disarming the officers, given the conflicting testimonies. Consequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision.

Ransom v. United States

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 22-CM-0692

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: MCLEESE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant was convicted of two counts of simple assault and one count of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. The incidents involved an altercation with his girlfriend, Ms. Williams, and her daughter, M.W. Ms. Williams testified that the appellant slapped her at a Metro station, and later, after an argument, he kicked in her apartment door, punched her, and hit M.W. with a belt. Ms. Williams also claimed the appellant had a gun, which he used to hit her. The police arrived shortly after the incident, and body-worn camera footage captured Ms. Williams's statements and visible injuries.

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found the appellant guilty of both counts of simple assault and attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. The court credited Ms. Williams's testimony and found the video evidence, particularly Exhibit 7, significant in showing the appellant holding his belt while running out of the building. The court did not credit the appellant's testimony and found the injuries on Ms. Williams consistent with being hit rather than a fall.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court accepted the United States' concession that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted possession of a prohibited weapon and reversed that conviction. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the assault convictions but held that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 7, which was harmful error regarding the conviction for assaulting M.W. Consequently, the court vacated that conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the conviction for assaulting Ms. Williams, finding any error in admitting the video exhibits harmless concerning that conviction.