Musaid v. Kirkpatrick

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-264

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: Guido Calabresi

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2007, Mohamed Musaid was arrested for the murder of a relative and confessed to the crime. However, his trial was delayed for over eight years due to repeated findings of incompetence to stand trial, attributed to his long history of mental illness. Musaid was found incompetent on ten occasions and competent on five, with his competency dependent on his compliance with antipsychotic medication. Each time he was found competent and transferred to Rikers Island, he would refuse medication and regress to incompetence.

The trial court eventually allowed Musaid's trial to proceed nearly ten months after a final finding of competency, without re-evaluating his mental state. During the trial, Musaid exhibited erratic behavior, raising questions about his competency. Despite this, the trial court did not conduct a further inquiry into his mental state. Musaid was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life for second-degree murder and five years for criminal possession of a weapon.

Musaid appealed, arguing that the trial court's failure to reassess his competency before trial violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating there was no indication that Musaid was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. Musaid then sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which was denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's failure to conduct a minimal inquiry into Musaid's competency just before trial was objectively unreasonable, given his history of mental illness and the time elapsed since the last competency evaluation. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, allowing the state courts to determine whether it is possible to reconstruct Musaid's competency at the time of trial based on evidence proximate to the trial.

USA v. Hughes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-1756

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Michael Hughes and Nashadeem Henderson committed two armed robberies in 2016. In the first incident, they robbed a drug dealer, with Hughes pulling a gun and demanding drugs and cash. When the dealer resisted, Henderson shot him in the leg. Four days later, they robbed a pizza delivery driver, with Henderson shooting the driver in the leg while Hughes took cash from his pockets. Hughes was convicted of two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and two gun charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania instructed the jury that Hughes could be convicted under § 924(c) if he had either completed or attempted the robberies. Hughes did not object to this instruction at trial. The jury found Hughes guilty on all counts. Hughes appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were incorrect and that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court acknowledged that the District Court erred by instructing the jury that attempted Hobbs Act robbery could support a § 924(c) charge, as the Supreme Court had later clarified in United States v. Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. However, the Third Circuit found that this error did not prejudice Hughes because the evidence overwhelmingly showed that he completed the robberies. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Hughes's involvement in both robberies and the impact on interstate commerce.

The Third Circuit held that the erroneous jury instruction did not affect the trial's outcome and affirmed Hughes's convictions and sentence.

Williams v. District Attorney Lebanon County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2076

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Restrepo

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2015, Eddie Williams was prosecuted in Pennsylvania for crimes related to a dispute over illegal drug profits, resulting in one death and one serious injury. Williams, along with Rick Cannon and Akeita Harden, was implicated in the incident. Cannon pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including homicide, and Williams was tried jointly with Harden. During the trial, the judge read Cannon's Criminal Information, which included charges naming Williams as a co-conspirator, to the jury. Williams was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment plus additional years.

Williams filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition in 2017, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to object to the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information. The PCRA court denied the petition, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further appeal. Williams then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted relief, finding a violation of the Confrontation Clause and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information, which included testimonial statements implicating Williams, violated the Confrontation Clause. The court also found that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the reading, which prejudiced Williams's defense. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to grant habeas relief, concluding that the errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. The case was remanded for the District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

United States v. Freitekh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4735

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: THACKER

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves Izzat and Tarik Freitekh, who were convicted of various offenses related to a fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan scheme. They received $1.75 million in PPP loan funds through false representations and fabricated documents. Izzat owned several businesses, and with Tarik's help, they submitted fraudulent loan applications. The funds were deposited into accounts controlled by Izzat, and he distributed some of the money to family members under the guise of payroll.

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. Both defendants were indicted for bank fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and other related charges. During the trial, the court admitted testimony from their former attorneys, who had received and submitted falsified documents to the government. The jury found Izzat guilty of conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and making false statements, while Tarik was found guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and falsifying material facts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that sufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including emails and checks, was enough to prove Izzat's involvement in the money laundering conspiracy. The court also upheld the district court's reliance on acquitted conduct to calculate the sentencing enhancements, noting that the evidence presented at trial proved Izzat's participation in the fraudulent scheme by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found no error in the district court's application of the "intended loss" definition in the sentencing guidelines. Tarik's arguments regarding the calculation of the loss amount and the application of the sophisticated means enhancement were also rejected. The court concluded that the district court had properly considered the relevant sentencing factors and affirmed the sentences imposed.

USA v. Quintanilla

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40033

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, White Collar Crime

Two defendants, Arturo Cuellar ("AC") and Ricardo Quintanilla, were involved in a scheme to bribe city commissioners in Weslaco, Texas, to secure contracts for an infrastructure project. The bribes were intended to influence the awarding of contracts to Camp Dresser & McKee (CDM) and Briones Consulting and Engineering, Ltd. Quintanilla bribed Commissioner Gerardo Tafolla, while AC bribed Commissioner John Cuellar (JC). Leo Lopez, a consultant for CDM and Briones, facilitated the bribes. The scheme involved multiple meetings and payments, with both commissioners taking actions to favor CDM and Briones. The city paid approximately $42.5 million to CDM, Briones, and LeFevre, with Lopez distributing funds to AC and Quintanilla.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas convicted Quintanilla and AC of various federal offenses, including conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, honest-services wire fraud, federal program bribery, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and money laundering. Quintanilla was sentenced to 200 months in custody, while AC received 240 months. Both were also ordered to pay fines, special assessments, restitution, and forfeiture amounts. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court addressed several issues raised by the defendants, including claims of constructive amendment of the indictment, sufficiency of the indictment, recusal of the district judge, and evidentiary rulings. The court found that the government did not constructively amend the indictment and that the evidence supported the convictions. The court also held that the district judge did not need to recuse herself and that the evidentiary rulings were within the court's discretion. The court concluded that the defendants' arguments were either forfeited, not meritorious, or both.

United States v. Perry

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1543

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: Chad A. Readler

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Chadrick Perry was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. After pleading not guilty, he was detained pending trial. Concerns about his competency led to evaluations by two forensic psychologists, who reached different conclusions. The district court committed Perry to the custody of the Attorney General for competency restoration. Perry experienced significant delays in being transported to a federal facility for treatment. Eventually, he was deemed competent, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition, and was sentenced to 57 months in prison.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Perry's motion to dismiss the indictment based on alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act. Perry argued that the 152-day delay between his designation for treatment and his arrival at the facility should count against the Act's 70-day clock. The district court ruled that the entire period from when Perry was deemed incompetent until his competency was restored was excludable under the Act.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the entire period of delay resulting from Perry's mental incompetence was excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4). This exclusion applied even during the transportation delay, thus not violating the Speedy Trial Act. Additionally, the court upheld Perry's sentence, determining that his prior conviction for aggravated domestic violence qualified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), justifying the increased Guidelines range. The court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.

USA v. Michael Porter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2184

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: KOLAR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Michael Porter was investigated and indicted on ten counts related to child pornography, including receipt, possession, and production. He pleaded guilty to three counts, with a conditional plea on the production charge, reserving the right to appeal whether his conduct fell under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Porter argued that he did not "use" minors or record them in "sexually explicit conduct" as defined by the statute and contested the district court's calculation of his offense level at sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Porter's motion to dismiss the production charges. Porter then entered a plea agreement, admitting to placing a hidden camera in a gym locker room and recording prepubescent boys in various states of undress and sexual activity. The district court calculated his total offense level at 43, including several enhancements, and sentenced him to 22 years in prison, followed by 15 years of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Porter's conduct fell within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), as he "used" minors by recording them in sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of the genitals. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements, finding that Porter's actions constituted a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of minors. The court rejected Porter's arguments, noting that his conduct was clearly distinguishable from cases where mere nudity was involved, and reaffirmed the established legal standards for determining lasciviousness and "use" under the statute.

United States v. Fisher

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2738

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anthony Fisher, while burglarizing a home, encountered the homeowner and shot him multiple times. Fisher, a felon at the time, was charged by the federal government with unlawful possession of ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The jury found Fisher guilty. On appeal, Fisher argued that he lacked knowledge of his prohibited status when he possessed the ammunition, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa oversaw the trial. Fisher contended that he did not know he was a felon when he possessed the ammunition. The jury, however, found sufficient evidence to convict him. Fisher was sentenced to 120 months in prison, the statutory maximum, despite the Sentencing Guidelines suggesting a longer term.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether the evidence supported the jury's finding that Fisher knew of his felon status when he possessed the ammunition. The court noted that Fisher had pleaded guilty to an Iowa felony in 2020, signed documents acknowledging his felony status, and had a probation agreement that explicitly stated his crime was a felony. Additionally, Fisher's probation officer testified that his felony status affected his employment opportunities. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Fisher knew he was a felon based on this evidence.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's finding that Fisher knew of his prohibited status when he possessed the ammunition.

United States v. Millsap

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2396

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Marcus Millsap was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), aiding and abetting attempted murder in aid of racketeering, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Millsap was involved with the New Aryan Empire, a white-supremacist organization engaged in drug trafficking. He assisted the organization's president, Wesley Gullett, in drug operations and attempted to retaliate against Bruce Hurley, a police informant, by offering money to have him killed. Gullett attempted to kill Hurley but failed, and Hurley was later murdered by an unknown perpetrator.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas sentenced Millsap to life imprisonment. Millsap appealed, arguing that his indictment should have been dismissed due to a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, and that the district court made several errors regarding evidentiary issues and juror intimidation. He also challenged his sentence if the convictions were upheld.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act did not apply because Millsap was transferred to federal custody via a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum before a detainer was lodged. The court also held that there was no sufficient showing of juror intimidation to justify a mistrial. The court found the evidence sufficient to support Millsap's convictions on all counts, including his association with the drug-trafficking enterprise and his involvement in the attempted murder of Hurley.

The court also ruled that the district court did not err in admitting co-conspirator statements and other evidence, and that any potential errors were harmless. The court upheld the district court's application of sentencing enhancements and the calculation of Millsap's criminal history points. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

USA V. GOMEZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-435

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: Desai

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jesus Ramiro Gomez was sentenced to 188 months in prison for distributing methamphetamine. The district court applied a career offender enhancement, which significantly increased his sentence. This enhancement was based on Gomez's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the district court classified as a "crime of violence."

The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially reviewed the case. The court found that Gomez's prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence, thus applying the career offender enhancement. This decision was based on previous rulings that had classified California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) as a crime of violence. Gomez did not object to this classification at the time of sentencing but raised the issue on appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated Gomez's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) does not qualify as a crime of violence. The court reasoned that the statute includes reckless uses of force, which do not meet the elements clause of the career offender guideline requiring a mens rea more culpable than recklessness. The court also rejected the government's argument that the conviction could be classified as aggravated assault under the enumerated offenses clause, as this too requires a mens rea greater than extreme recklessness. Consequently, the district court's application of the career offender enhancement was deemed improper.

USA V. OVSEPIAN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-55515

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: Wardlaw

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Artak Ovsepian participated in a healthcare fraud scheme at Manor Medical Imaging, Inc., a sham clinic in Glendale, California. The clinic generated prescriptions for unnecessary medications, which were billed to Medicare and Medi-Cal. Manor employees used the identifying information of Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries, often without their knowledge, to fill these prescriptions. Ovsepian joined the conspiracy in 2010, managing drivers who transported beneficiaries to pharmacies to fill fraudulent prescriptions.

The government charged Ovsepian with conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). At trial, the government narrowed the aggravated identity theft charge to the possession of one victim’s identifying information. The jury found Ovsepian guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 180 months, including a mandatory 24-month sentence for aggravated identity theft. Ovsepian’s direct appeals were unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.

Ovsepian filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his aggravated identity theft conviction, arguing actual innocence. The district court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit initially denied a certificate of appealability. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Dubin v. United States, which clarified the interpretation of the aggravated identity theft statute.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Ovsepian’s § 2255 motion. The court held that a petitioner convicted under a divisible statute must demonstrate actual innocence only for the prong under which they were convicted. The court found that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not convey that possession of another’s identifying information must be central to the healthcare fraud to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Ovsepian’s conviction and sentence for aggravated identity theft.

U.S. v. McFadden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-1089

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Two boys from Grand Junction, Colorado, were sexually abused by Michael Tracy McFadden over several years. McFadden, who was distantly related to one boy (J.W.) and a close family friend to the other (K.W.), provided necessities and luxuries to the boys, ingratiating himself with their families. The boys frequently stayed at McFadden’s house, where he assaulted them during the night. McFadden also took the boys on interstate trucking trips, during which he continued the abuse.

McFadden was initially convicted in Colorado state court on nineteen counts of child-sex abuse, but the Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed the charges due to a violation of his speedy-trial rights. Subsequently, a federal grand jury charged McFadden with five counts related to his sexual abuse of J.W. and K.W. across state lines. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado admitted a video recording of K.W.’s 2013 forensic interview under Rule 807, despite McFadden’s objections. The jury convicted McFadden on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent life sentences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed McFadden’s appeal, which argued that evidentiary errors and a mistake in his Guidelines calculation warranted a new trial and resentencing. The court found that the district court erred in admitting the 2013 forensic-interview video under Rule 807 but deemed the error harmless. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of an audio recording of K.W.’s 2018 interview and rejected McFadden’s claims of improper vouching by witnesses. Finally, the court affirmed the application of a two-level undue-influence enhancement to McFadden’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). The Tenth Circuit affirmed McFadden’s conviction and sentence.

United States v. Pena

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2047

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Carson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Jose Pena, was accused of inducing his minor daughter to engage in sexual activity and recording it. Using a Facebook alias, "Jaime Peres," Pena initiated an online relationship with his daughter, Jane Doe, and later coerced her into recording sexual acts with him by threatening her with fabricated cartel violence. Jane reported the incidents to her school, leading to Pena's arrest and confession during a police interview.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Pena's motion to suppress his confession, finding it voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that law enforcement did not overbear Pena's will despite using various interrogation tactics. A jury subsequently convicted Pena of inducing a minor to engage in sexual activity and producing child pornography.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, agreeing that the confession was voluntary. The court found that law enforcement's conduct, while at times troubling, did not critically impair Pena's capacity for self-determination. The court also determined that any potential error in admitting the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of Pena's guilt, including DNA evidence, video recordings, and digital forensic evidence linking him to the alias "Jaime Peres."

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Pena's confession was voluntary and that the evidence against him was sufficient to uphold the conviction.

U.S. v. Ostrander

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-14160

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Marcus

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In August of 2020, Matthew Ostrander, a homeless fugitive, was arrested in Gainesville, Florida, for failing to register as a sex offender following a 2007 child pornography conviction. At the time of his arrest, Ostrander possessed four electronic devices, three of which contained 480 computer-generated images (CGI) of children involved in sexual activity. These images did not depict real children. Ostrander was charged with knowing possession of an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1), (d)(4).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Ostrander's motion to dismiss the possession charge, ruling it was untimely and without merit. After a two-day trial, a jury found Ostrander guilty. Ostrander appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statute and the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging prosecutorial misconduct.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional, as it was neither overbroad nor vague. The court found that the statute's legitimate sweep outweighed any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Ostrander's conviction, as a reasonable jury could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. Finally, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct that would have affected the jury's verdict. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Ostrander's conviction.

USA v. Armstead

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3052

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: Katsas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Terrell Armstead was convicted of sex trafficking through coercion. During jury deliberations, a juror was dismissed for failing to disclose her father's criminal history during voir dire. The district court then instructed the jury to return any partial verdicts due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which made future deliberations impossible. Armstead argued that the juror's dismissal and the instruction to return a partial verdict were improper.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the juror for lack of candor during voir dire, noting multiple instances where she failed to disclose her father's convictions. The court found this misconduct sufficient to justify her removal, independent of her views on the evidence. The jury, after the dismissal, returned a guilty verdict on one count and no verdict on the remaining counts. Armstead was sentenced to 276 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror, as her lack of candor during voir dire constituted good cause under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3). The appellate court also found that the instruction to return a partial verdict was not coercive and did not violate the Sixth Amendment. The instruction was neutral and did not pressure the jury to reach a verdict. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment.

STATE OF ARIZONA v STRONG

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-17-0201-AP

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: Beene

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Preston Strong was convicted of six counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Strong had a history of financial troubles and was friends with one of the victims, Luis Rios, who often loaned him money. An argument between Strong and Luis occurred about a month before the murders, with Luis refusing to loan Strong more money. On the day of the murders, Luis and Adrienne Heredia, along with her four children, were found dead in their home. Evidence included Strong’s fingerprints on plastic bags found at the scene and his DNA on the steering wheel of Luis’s vehicle.

The Superior Court in Yuma County denied Strong’s motions to change the venue, suppress evidence, and dismiss the case due to preindictment delay. The jury found Strong guilty and determined that the State had proved the alleged aggravating circumstances. The trial court later instructed the jury to disregard one of the aggravating factors during the penalty phase. Strong’s motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, based on alleged juror misconduct and other grounds, were denied.

The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed Strong’s convictions and sentences. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings on preindictment delay, change of venue, and the admission of evidence. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in its handling of juror misconduct allegations, the admission of DNA evidence, and the consideration of victim impact statements. The court held that the erroneous instruction regarding the cold-and-calculating aggravating factor did not constitute fundamental error, as the jury was instructed to disregard it. The court also found that the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the death penalty were supported by reasonable evidence and did not violate constitutional standards.

DiMaggio v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H051516(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: Danner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Nathaniel DiMaggio filed a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone and tablet. DiMaggio argued that the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office exceeded the scope of the search warrant and that the trial court erred in finding the sheriff’s office acted in good faith. The Monterey County District Attorney contended that the sheriff’s office properly executed the search warrant and acted in good faith.

The Monterey County Superior Court issued a search warrant authorizing the search of DiMaggio’s cellphone and tablet for evidence related to a sexual assault within a specific date range. During the search, the sheriff’s office found images of suspected child pornography, which were outside the specified date range. DiMaggio filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that the sheriff’s office exceeded the scope of the warrant but denied the motion to suppress, applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and agreed with DiMaggio. The court found that the sheriff’s office knowingly exceeded the scope of the search warrant by including items without timestamps, which were not authorized by the warrant. The court held that the good faith exception did not apply because the actions of the sheriff’s office were not objectively reasonable and were part of a standard protocol that disregarded the warrant’s limitations. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress and to enter a new order suppressing any evidence obtained outside the date and time limitations set forth in the search warrant.

In re Brown

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F087367(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: LEVY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2000, the petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus an additional four years for a firearm enhancement. While serving this sentence, he was convicted in 2008 of aggravated assault by a prisoner and received a four-year determinate sentence under the Three Strikes law, to be served consecutively. In 2022, the petitioner was considered for parole under the Elderly Parole Program, which applies to inmates over 50 who have served at least 20 years. The parole board found him suitable for parole, but the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) required him to serve his four-year determinate sentence first.

The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Kings County Superior Court, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release and that his determinate sentence should not apply. The superior court denied the petition, ruling that the petitioner was ineligible for parole under the Elderly Parole Program because he had been sentenced under the Three Strikes law.

The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Three Strikes exclusion under section 3055, subdivision (g), applies to prisoners who were convicted and sentenced under the Three Strikes law, even if they had already commenced serving a prison sentence. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments, stating that his "current sentence" included the term imposed under the Three Strikes law, making him ineligible for early parole release under the Elderly Parole Program. The court also found that the legislative history confirmed this interpretation and that the case of In re Hoze did not apply because it did not address the Three Strikes exclusion. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied.

People v. Mejia

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B320116(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Flor de Maria Mejia was involved in a hit-and-run accident where she struck a bicyclist, William McGill, with her van and fled the scene. The collision caused significant damage to her vehicle and injuries to herself. Shortly after the incident, a parking control officer observed Mejia driving the damaged van and later identified her as the driver. Mejia and her boyfriend subsequently burned the van. Mejia sought medical attention, claiming her boyfriend had assaulted her, but refused a rape examination. Evidence from the burned van and Mejia's social media messages linked her to the crime.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Mejia of fleeing the scene of an injury accident, resulting in a three-year prison sentence. The jury found her guilty of violating Vehicle Code § 20001, subd. (b)(2), and imposed a restitution obligation of $7,500. Mejia's defense included multiple inconsistent statements to the police and an attempt to shift blame to her boyfriend, Carter, who also testified at trial.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Mejia challenged the identification process, the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments, and the sentencing enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury. The court found the identification process was not unduly suggestive, and any assumed Griffin error (prosecutor's comment on Mejia's failure to testify) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also addressed the prosecutor's improper comment during rebuttal, concluding that the trial court's immediate and forceful admonition to the jury mitigated any potential prejudice.

The court upheld the jury's finding of the sentencing enhancement, stating substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Mejia's failure to render aid exacerbated McGill's injuries. The court affirmed the trial court's restitution order, finding no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

People v. Ruiz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062596(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: MOORE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2008, Ignacio Ruiz, Jr., participated in an attack on rival gang members, resulting in one death. Ruiz, who was 16 at the time, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism, with several gang and firearm enhancements. In August 2010, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder charge, among other consecutive terms. Ruiz was resentenced in 2016, but his sentence remained nearly the same.

Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing in March 2023 under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), which allows individuals sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as minors to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the petition, calculating Ruiz’s incarceration period from his sentencing date in August 2010, and found he had not been incarcerated for 15 years.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Ruiz’s argument that his period of incarceration began in January 2008 when he was taken into custody, not from his sentencing date. The court interpreted the term "incarcerated" in section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) to mean the time when Ruiz was first placed in jail, which was January 29, 2008. Since Ruiz had been continuously incarcerated since that date, he had been incarcerated for more than 15 years by the time he filed his petition in March 2023.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of Ruiz’s petition for resentencing, instructing the lower court to consider the petition based on the correct interpretation of the statute.

THE STATE v. HARRIS

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0623

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Fifteen-year-old Bjorn Harris was arrested on April 30, 2023, for murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Jaylan Major. He was detained at the Regional Metro Youth Detention Facility. On May 5, 2023, the Superior Court of Fulton County found probable cause for the charges, appointed counsel for Harris, and denied bond. Harris was indicted on July 28, 2023, for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On November 16, 2023, he was reindicted for murder, felony murder, and additional charges. The initial indictment was nolle prossed on November 21, 2023.

Harris filed a motion on December 1, 2023, to transfer his case to juvenile court, arguing that the State failed to indict him within 180 days as required by OCGA § 17-7-50.1. The Superior Court held a hearing on December 7, 2023, and granted the motion on December 11, 2023, relying on the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Armendariz. The court concluded that the reindictment outside the 180-day period necessitated the transfer to juvenile court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that OCGA § 17-7-50.1 requires a grand jury to return a true bill of indictment within 180 days of detention, which was met with the July 2023 indictment. The statute does not prohibit reindictment outside the 180-day period. Therefore, the Superior Court retained jurisdiction, and the transfer to juvenile court was not authorized. The Supreme Court clarified that the timely return of a true bill on any charge within the superior court's jurisdiction suffices to retain jurisdiction, regardless of subsequent reindictments.

WYATT v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0487

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In April 2015, Donte Wyatt was involved in a series of violent incidents, including the strangulation death of Catherine Montoya. Wyatt was married to Heather Duffy, who had moved out with their children. On April 13, 2015, Wyatt lured Duffy to a diner under the pretense of returning her car keys. During the meeting, Wyatt attacked Duffy, stabbing her multiple times and threatening to kill her. Duffy managed to escape, and Wyatt fled the scene in a rental truck. Later that day, Wyatt was found outside Montoya’s house, where he had murdered her. Montoya’s body was discovered with multiple injuries and evidence of sexual assault.

Wyatt was indicted by a DeKalb County grand jury on multiple charges, including malice murder, aggravated assault, and rape. In October 2016, a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to multiple life sentences, some without the possibility of parole. Wyatt filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in September 2023. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Wyatt’s appeal, which argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his attack on Duffy, claiming it was unfairly prejudicial. The court held that the evidence was highly probative in rebutting Wyatt’s insanity defense, as it demonstrated his awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions and his ability to act with deliberation. The court found that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence and upheld Wyatt’s convictions.

Roy v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 50830

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the appellant, Chitta Roy, challenged the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's (the "Department") denial of her criminal history background clearance during her certified family home (CFH) recertification. Roy had a 2008 conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which was dismissed in 2011 under Idaho Code section 19-2604 after she successfully completed probation. Despite this, the Department denied her 2021 application for background clearance, citing the conviction as a disqualifying crime under its updated rules.

The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho upheld the Department's decision, rejecting Roy's arguments that the dismissal of her conviction should preclude the Department from denying her clearance and that the Department should be bound by its 2009 decision to grant her an exemption. The district court also determined that Roy failed to show substantial prejudice from the denial, as the Department could still approve her CFH recertification through a separate process.

The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its conclusions. The Supreme Court held that the Department improperly based its denial on the dismissed conviction, which, under Idaho Code section 19-2604, should be treated as if it never existed. The Court also determined that the case was ripe for adjudication and that Roy's substantial rights were prejudiced by the Department's denial. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Roy was awarded costs on appeal.

Wurdemann v. State

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 50403

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

John David Wurdemann was charged and convicted of seven felonies related to a 2000 attack on a woman in Canyon County, Idaho. Sixteen years later, a district court granted his petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his convictions due to ineffective assistance of counsel. This decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2017. Wurdemann has not been retried since.

Wurdemann filed a petition under the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act, seeking compensation and a certificate of innocence. The State opposed the petition and moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded that Wurdemann had not established that the basis for vacating his conviction was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence, as required by the Act.

The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and interpreted the statutory language of the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act. The Court held that the phrase “not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence” means “legal error related to his factual innocence.” The Court concluded that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which led to the reversal of Wurdemann’s convictions, did not establish his factual innocence. The reversal was based on the improper admission of lineup evidence, not on evidence showing Wurdemann was actually innocent. Therefore, Wurdemann could not satisfy the statutory requirement, and the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State was affirmed.

Cramer v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-LW-00019

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Mark S. Massa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Mathew Cramer was convicted of murdering and dismembering Shane Nguyen. Cramer, who lived in a storage unit, accepted a ride from Nguyen, and after a series of interactions, Cramer decided to kill Nguyen. He lured Nguyen to the storage unit, choked him, and then further assaulted him until he was dead. Cramer and an accomplice then dismembered Nguyen's body, placed the parts in trash bags, and attempted to dispose of them. They were apprehended after a police chase.

The Allen Superior Court found Cramer guilty of murder, abuse of a corpse, and resisting law enforcement. The jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP), which the trial court imposed. Cramer appealed, requesting a revision of his sentence to a term of years under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), arguing that his actions and character did not warrant LWOP.

The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The court found that the nature of Cramer’s offense was extremely brutal, involving premeditated murder and grotesque dismemberment of the victim. Additionally, Cramer’s criminal history and lack of mitigating factors supported the LWOP sentence. The court concluded that Cramer’s sentence was appropriate given the heinous nature of the crime and his character, and thus declined to revise it.

Finnegan v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-MI-00068

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: MASSA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Russell Finnegan was held in indirect contempt by a judge for sending vulgar and offensive communications to the court. Finnegan's counsel requested a mental health evaluation under Indiana Code section 35-36-2-2(b), which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding the denial to be an error. The appellate court held that the statutory procedures for asserting an insanity defense in criminal proceedings should apply to indirect criminal contempt actions.

The Pulaski Circuit Court initially found Finnegan in contempt for his communications, which included vulgar language and disrespectful remarks directed at the judge. During the contempt hearing, Finnegan's counsel mentioned that he was undergoing mental health evaluations in an unrelated criminal case and requested a continuance for these evaluations. The trial court denied the continuance and did not act on the request to appoint mental health experts. Finnegan was found in contempt and sentenced to 170 days in jail. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that Finnegan was entitled to the same statutory protections as other criminal defendants, including the right to a mental health evaluation.

The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the statutory procedures for asserting an insanity defense in criminal cases do not apply to indirect criminal contempt actions because such actions are not considered "criminal cases" under the relevant statute. The court emphasized that indirect contempt is a sui generis proceeding, distinct from both criminal and civil cases. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the insanity defense statutes do not apply to indirect contempt proceedings.

State v. Daniels

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124626

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In March 2021, Bryan Curtis Daniels Jr. pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of domestic battery. The court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report, which indicated Daniels had a criminal history score of "C," including a 2003 Georgia burglary conviction classified as a person felony. Daniels did not dispute his criminal history at sentencing and admitted its accuracy. Consequently, the court sentenced him based on this history.

Daniels appealed, arguing for the first time that his 2003 Georgia burglary conviction should not have been classified as a person felony, thus rendering his sentence illegal. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Daniels had the burden to prove his criminal history was incorrect. The panel interpreted K.S.A. 21-6811(e)(3)(B) and concluded that the district court had not committed an error of law in classifying the Georgia conviction as a person felony.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether Daniels' Georgia burglary conviction was misclassified. The court held that Daniels' admission to his criminal history, including the classification of the Georgia burglary as a person felony, relieved the State from producing additional evidence. The court also clarified that under K.S.A. 21-6814(c), an offender challenging their previously established criminal history must prove their claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Daniels failed to provide evidence to refute his admission or to show that the district court's classification was incorrect. Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court, upholding Daniels' sentence.

State v. Huggins

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125573

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: Eric S. Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Larry D. Huggins III was convicted of felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery following a series of events that led to the deaths of two young men. Huggins and his accomplices planned to rob O.H., a minor who sold marijuana, but the plan went awry, resulting in a shootout. Huggins was injured and later arrested. At trial, Huggins testified, denying any intent to rob and claiming he was merely trying to buy marijuana.

The Shawnee District Court found Huggins guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to a hard 25 life sentence for felony murder, with additional consecutive sentences for the other charges, totaling a minimum of 25 years plus 103 months. Huggins was also ordered to pay $2,500 in attorney fees.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed several issues on appeal. Huggins argued that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not match the charging document, which listed two victims for the attempted aggravated robbery. The court found the instructions legally appropriate as they included all statutory elements of the crime. Huggins also claimed insufficient evidence for his convictions, but the court held that the State did not need to prove he intended to rob both victims named in the charging document.

Huggins challenged the voluntariness of his statements to police, arguing he was under the influence of medication and fatigued. The court found his statements voluntary, noting he was coherent and calm during the interview. Huggins also contested the admissibility of Facebook messages obtained via a search warrant, but the court ruled he failed to preserve this issue for appeal.

The court found no prosecutorial error in the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments and rejected Huggins' claim of cumulative error. However, the court vacated the imposition of attorney fees, remanding the case for reconsideration of Huggins' ability to pay. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated and remanded the fee imposition.

State v. Nunez

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125141

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Williams Nunez was charged with rape for engaging in sexual intercourse with a person unable to consent due to intoxication. He admitted to the act but claimed the victim was not too intoxicated to consent. A jury convicted him, and the district court sentenced him to 155 months in prison with lifetime postrelease supervision, based on the finding that he was 18 years or older at the time of the crime.

Nunez appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey were violated because his age was not determined by the jury. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, concluding that Nunez had sufficiently admitted his age through various documents and statements, and any Apprendi error was harmless.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if Nunez's rights under Apprendi were violated. The court held that for a sentencing court to rely on a defendant's admission to increase a sentence, the admission must follow a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right. Since Nunez did not waive his jury trial rights regarding his age, the court found an Apprendi violation. The court also determined that the error was not harmless because the jury was not presented with evidence of Nunez's age.

The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated the district court's sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. The court directed that Nunez be sentenced to 60 months of postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(ii), as this was the appropriate term given the lack of a jury finding on his age.

State v. Z.M.

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123216

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2019, Z.M. drove a vehicle from which a passenger shot at another car, killing the driver, J.M. Z.M. was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle. He was sentenced to a hard 50 life sentence.

The Shawnee District Court denied Z.M.'s request for new counsel, finding no conflict of interest or breakdown in communication. Z.M. was found competent to stand trial. At trial, the State presented 34 witnesses, and Z.M. did not present any. The jury found Z.M. guilty on all counts. The court sentenced Z.M. to concurrent sentences for premeditated first-degree murder and criminal discharge of a firearm.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. Z.M. alleged five errors: denial of new counsel, abandonment by trial counsel at sentencing, prosecutorial misstatements of law, inappropriate jury instructions, and cumulative errors denying a fair trial. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying new counsel, as the district court conducted an adequate inquiry and found no conflict or breakdown in communication. The court also found no Cronic violation at sentencing, as counsel did advocate for concurrent sentences.

The court determined the prosecutor did not misstate the law on aiding and abetting, premeditation, or first-degree murder. The aiding and abetting instruction was legally appropriate, and the phrase "mental culpability" was comprehensible. However, the court acknowledged the jury instructions on first-degree murder and its lesser included offense were not legally appropriate, but this did not rise to the level of clear error. The jury's unanimous verdicts on both premeditated and felony murder indicated the errors did not affect the outcome.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Z.M.'s convictions and sentence, finding no cumulative error that denied him a fair trial.

Syed v. Lee

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 7/23

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: Biran

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of the murder of Hae Min Lee and sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. In 2022, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City moved to vacate Syed’s conviction, citing new evidence and alleged Brady violations. Young Lee, the victim’s brother, was given less than one business day’s notice of the vacatur hearing, which he attended remotely. The court granted the motion to vacate and ordered the State to either retry Syed or enter a nolle prosequi (nol pros) within 30 days. The State later entered a nol pros, effectively dismissing the charges against Syed.

Young Lee appealed the vacatur order, arguing that his rights as a victim’s representative were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the circuit court’s order, reinstated Syed’s convictions, and remanded for a new hearing, holding that the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal and that Lee had the right to reasonable notice and to attend the hearing in person.

The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal. The court ruled that a victim has the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing under CP § 11-403, which includes hearings where the alteration of a sentence is considered. The court also held that Lee’s rights were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings, starting from the point immediately after the State’s Attorney filed the motion to vacate.

Commonwealth v. Gaines

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13446

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In December 1974, Peter Sulfaro was shot and killed during an armed robbery at his shoe repair shop. His son, Paul Sulfaro, was the only witness. Three men, including Raymond Gaines, were convicted of the crime. Decades later, Gaines filed a motion for a new trial, citing new evidence and issues with the original trial.

Gaines's convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1978. He made several unsuccessful attempts for postconviction relief. In 2021, he filed his fourth motion for a new trial, which was granted by a Superior Court judge. The Commonwealth appealed this decision to the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and upheld the decision to grant a new trial. The court found that new scientific research on eyewitness identification, which was not available at the time of the original trial, could have significantly impacted the jury's deliberations. Additionally, the court found that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, including a note about a leg injury Gaines sustained before the crime and the arrest of a key witness, David Bass, which could have been used to challenge his credibility. The court also noted that the Commonwealth had an ethical duty to disclose any witness recantations, regardless of their credibility or timing.

The court concluded that the combination of these factors indicated that justice may not have been done in the original trial, and therefore, a new trial was warranted. The decision to grant a new trial was affirmed.

State v. Garding

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1436

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On August 10, 2021, Jeron Garding was arrested for first-degree narcotics charges after a drug-dog sniff of his parked car led to the discovery of approximately 410 grams of methamphetamine. Garding moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that law enforcement lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the drug-dog sniff. The district court held a contested omnibus hearing where State Trooper Jacob Bredsten testified about his observations, including the suspicious behavior of Garding and his passenger, signs of the passenger’s recent drug use, and a plastic bag in the backseat that appeared to contain drugs.

The district court denied Garding’s motion to suppress, finding that Trooper Bredsten had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the drug-dog sniff based on the totality of the circumstances. Garding was subsequently convicted of first-degree possession of narcotics after a stipulated facts trial, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that the trooper lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the drug-dog sniff.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Bredsten had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the drug-dog sniff. The court emphasized that the combination of the passenger’s signs of recent drug use, the appearance of the plastic bag in the backseat, and Garding’s flight to the woods provided sufficient grounds for the suspicion. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Garding’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search.

State vs. Balsley

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-0133

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2015, the appellant sexually assaulted a 9-year-old girl, but the crime was not reported until 2021. In the interim, the appellant committed an unrelated second-degree assault in 2016, for which he was convicted in 2017. After the 2015 sexual assault was disclosed in 2021, the appellant was charged and convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.

The district court found the appellant guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. During sentencing, the court applied a sentencing enhancement under Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455, subdivision 3a, classifying the appellant as an engrained offender due to his prior conviction for second-degree assault. This resulted in an upward durational departure of 250 months in prison with a lifetime conditional release term. The appellant appealed, arguing that the term "previously committed" in the statute should mean a predatory crime committed before the commission of the present offense, not before the sentencing determination.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the statute required only that the predatory crime be committed before the sentencing determination. The appellant then sought review from the Minnesota Supreme Court.

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that for enhanced sentencing under Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455, subdivision 3a, a predatory crime is considered "previously committed" if it is committed before the fact-finder's sentencing-related determination that the offender is a danger to public safety. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute supports this interpretation, and thus, the appellant's 2017 assault conviction qualified as a "previously committed" predatory crime for the purposes of sentencing enhancement.

State vs. Moore

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1570

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: PROCACCINI

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the late evening of January 24, 2022, Brandon Moore was driving a car with expired registration tabs when he was pursued by police. After a brief chase, Moore was arrested. During the search, officers found over six grams of methamphetamine in Moore's pockets, $3,400 in cash in the car's center console, and a handgun along with more than 110 grams of methamphetamine in the locked glove compartment. The key to the glove compartment was in the ignition.

Moore was charged with aggravated first-degree controlled substance crime (sale and possession) and ineligible possession of a firearm. The jury found Moore guilty on all counts. The district court entered convictions for ineligible possession of a firearm and aggravated first-degree controlled substance crime for sale, sentencing Moore to 98 months in prison. Moore appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove the firearm was "within immediate reach" as required by the statute because it was in a locked glove compartment.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, interpreting "within immediate reach" to include both spatial and temporal proximity, meaning the firearm was accessible without delay and close at hand. Moore then petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court, which reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the firearm was "within immediate reach."

The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "within immediate reach" does not require instant accessibility. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove the firearm was within Moore's immediate reach because he was in the driver’s seat and the key to the glove compartment was in the ignition. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

Chatman v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-00583-SCT

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Beam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Derrick Chatman was convicted of two counts of sexual battery by a jury in the Adams County Circuit Court. The jury was also instructed on the lesser-included offense of gratification of lust for both counts. Chatman appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was ambiguous and not fully responsive to the verdict forms, which included the lesser-included offense. He claimed the trial court erred by not directing the jury to retire for further deliberations.

The Adams County Circuit Court sentenced Chatman to thirty years for each count, with fifteen years suspended and fifteen years to serve consecutively. Chatman filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Chatman raised the issue of the ambiguous verdict for the first time, arguing that the trial court should have directed the jury to deliberate further under Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.3.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and agreed that the jury’s verdict was ambiguous regarding the sexual battery charges. The court found that the trial court should have directed the jury to retire for further deliberations. The court noted that the jury’s general verdicts of guilty did not clarify whether they found Chatman guilty of sexual battery or the lesser-included offense of gratification of lust. Consequently, the court reversed Chatman’s convictions for sexual battery.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed and remanded the case for either a new trial on the sexual battery charges or for resentencing on two counts of gratification of lust, at the option of the State. The court emphasized that the ambiguity in the jury’s verdict required this remedy to ensure a fair and just outcome.

State v. Baldwin

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 199

Opinion Date: September 3, 2024

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Joshua Allen Baldwin was arrested by Officer Daniel Beasley on July 22, 2021, at Lucky Lil’s Casino in Anaconda, Montana, for allegedly violating his pre-release conditions by being in a casino. Beasley confirmed with dispatch that Baldwin was under court conditions prohibiting him from being in such establishments. After Baldwin was arrested, officers observed suspicious items in his car, including a butane refill bottle, burnt pliers, and a Ziploc baggie with a white crystalline substance. A subsequent search of Baldwin’s car, conducted after obtaining a warrant, revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

The Third Judicial District Court, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, denied Baldwin’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, ruling that the arrest was lawful. Baldwin then pleaded guilty to felony drug possession while reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The misdemeanor charge for drug paraphernalia was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Beasley did not have probable cause to arrest Baldwin for contempt of court based on the alleged violation of pre-release conditions. The court determined that pre-release conditions do not constitute an independent mandate of the court under Montana law, and thus, Baldwin’s arrest was unlawful. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the search of Baldwin’s car, which was conducted as a result of the unlawful arrest, should have been suppressed. The court found no applicable exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such as good faith or independent source exceptions, and concluded that the evidence was directly tied to the unlawful arrest.

State v. Moore

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 493

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Gregory Moore was convicted of second-degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony after a jury trial. The incident occurred in November 2020, when Moore was living in an apartment building in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. Early one morning, a tenant heard noises and a man yelling for help from Moore’s apartment. Later, the building manager and police found Moore with blood on him and the body of Fernando Camacho-McBride inside the apartment. Moore claimed someone had entered illegally and was looking at his "inventory." Camacho-McBride had multiple stab wounds, including a fatal one to his arm. Moore was charged with second-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon.

The Scotts Bluff County District Court admitted evidence of a prior assault by Moore in March 2020, where he attacked his landlord with a knife, claiming he was protecting his "inventory." Moore objected, arguing this evidence was prejudicial and only showed his propensity for violence. The court allowed the evidence, finding it relevant to Moore’s motive, intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident. The jury was instructed to consider the evidence only for these limited purposes.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the lower court’s decision. The court found that the evidence of the prior assault was relevant for purposes other than showing Moore’s propensity for violence. It was pertinent to proving Moore’s motive, intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident. The court also determined that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, especially given the limiting instruction provided to the jury. Consequently, Moore’s convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen.

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0578

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.

The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.

The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases.

State V. Heer

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 54

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Cody Heer was convicted of multiple drug-related offenses after selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant in a Walmart parking lot in Sioux Falls, with his child present. Heer was indicted on charges of distributing a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, and causing a child to be present where methamphetamine is distributed. The State also filed a habitual offender information due to Heer’s prior felony convictions.

Initially represented by court-appointed counsel, Heer moved to represent himself after his request for substitute counsel was denied. The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County granted his motion for self-representation but appointed his former attorney as standby counsel. Heer did not object to this arrangement or to the presence of standby counsel at trial. Heer conducted his defense, including making motions, cross-examining witnesses, and delivering closing arguments. The jury found Heer guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for the distribution conviction, with additional suspended sentences for the other charges.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed Heer’s appeal, where he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was violated by the appointment and presence of standby counsel. Heer also claimed that the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments constituted improper vouching, amounting to plain error. The court held that the appointment of standby counsel was permissible and did not violate Heer’s rights, as standby counsel did not interfere with his control over the case. The court also found no merit in Heer’s claims of improper vouching, concluding that the prosecutor’s statements were fair characterizations of the evidence and did not affect the trial’s outcome. The court affirmed Heer’s convictions and sentences.

State v. O’Brien

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 52

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

R.M., a minor, reported that Troy O’Brien, her mother’s boyfriend, had inappropriately touched her breasts and genital area on multiple occasions. O’Brien was charged with multiple counts of rape, sexual contact with a child under sixteen, and sexual exploitation of a minor. A jury found him guilty on all charges. O’Brien appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of sexual penetration and that the rape charges were duplicitous, claiming the court erred by not instructing the jury to unanimously agree on each act of rape.

The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, heard the case. During the trial, R.M. testified about multiple instances of inappropriate touching by O’Brien, describing the touching in detail and indicating that it occurred in various rooms of their homes. Despite her difficulty in recalling specific details, R.M. consistently described the nature of the touching. The jury found O’Brien guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to fifty years for second-degree rape, with additional concurrent sentences for other charges.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that sexual penetration occurred, based on R.M.’s testimony and drawings. The court also addressed the issue of the unanimity instruction, noting that although the charges were duplicitous, O’Brien failed to show that the lack of a specific unanimity instruction affected his substantial rights or the trial's fairness. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding O’Brien’s convictions and sentences.

CRUZ V. TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0628-23

Opinion Date: September 4, 2024

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In August 2021, the appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to 30 years in prison, along with an $8,000 fine and $325 in court costs. The trial court's judgment noted that an inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay was conducted, but no such inquiry appears in the record, nor did the appellant request it or object to its absence. The appellant argued that the trial court failed to conduct an ability-to-pay inquiry as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.15(a-1), and he claimed that he did not need to object to preserve this complaint.

The 14th Court of Appeals in Houston reviewed the case and agreed with the appellant that the trial court had a duty to conduct the inquiry sua sponte, making it a non-forfeitable right under Marin v. State. However, the court upheld the trial court's judgment, citing a previous decision that the amendment requiring the inquiry to be on the record was not retroactive.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and focused on whether the right to an ability-to-pay inquiry is a forfeitable right under Marin. The court concluded that the ability-to-pay inquiry is not fundamental to the adjudicatory process and is therefore a forfeitable right. The court noted that the inquiry is a post-trial procedure and does not affect the fairness or accuracy of the trial. Additionally, the court highlighted that relief from fines and costs is available after sentencing through other means. Consequently, the appellant forfeited his right to the inquiry by not objecting at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgments of the lower courts.

State v. Willden

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 37

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: Matthew B. Durrant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2021, Derek Willden was charged with multiple counts of physical and sexual assault. During trial preparations, the State requested that Willden disclose certain information under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b), specifically audio recordings of interviews conducted by Willden’s counsel with witnesses. Willden objected, claiming the recordings were protected as attorney work product and that compelled disclosure would violate both Rule 16(b)(4) and his constitutional rights. The district court disagreed and ordered Willden to turn over the recordings within thirty days. Willden then sought an interlocutory appeal, which the court of appeals granted, and the case was recalled for direct review.

The district court, presided over by the Honorable Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills of the Third District, Salt Lake County, initially ruled in favor of the State’s discovery motion. The court reasoned that the recordings could be redacted to exclude any attorney’s opinions, analysis, or strategy, thus not constituting protected work product. Willden was given thirty days to comply with the order. Before the deadline, Willden petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the court of appeals, and the case was subsequently recalled for direct review by the Utah Supreme Court.

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the interpretation of Rule 16(b) following its 2021 amendment. The court held that the recorded interviews were indeed attorney work product and thus protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 16(b)(4). The court emphasized that the amended rule explicitly protects attorney work product from disclosure, without distinguishing between "core" and "factual" work product. Consequently, the district court’s order was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address Willden’s constitutional arguments, as the case was resolved based on the interpretation of Rule 16(b).

State v. Ettore

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 52

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: COHEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In March 2022, a police officer arrested the defendant on suspicion of DUI. At the stationhouse, the officer read the defendant her implied-consent rights from a standard form, including the right to a second breath test after receiving the results of the first. The defendant waived her right to speak with an attorney and agreed to provide a breath sample. Before providing the test result, the officer asked if she wanted a second test, which she declined. The officer then informed her that her blood alcohol content was .121, above the legal limit.

The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Criminal Division, denied the defendant's motion to suppress the breath-test result. The court found that the officer had informed the defendant of her rights and that she had declined the second test before knowing the result of the first. The court concluded that the defendant's ability to elect a second test did not change between the request and the opportunity to elect.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that under 23 V.S.A. §§ 1202(d)(5) and 1203(c), law enforcement must provide the results of the first breath test before requiring a suspect to decide on a second test. The officer's failure to do so violated the defendant's statutory rights, making her decision uninformed. The court ruled that the breath-test result should be suppressed and remanded the case for further proceedings in the criminal matter and for entry of judgment in the defendant's favor in the civil-suspension proceedings.

Vargas v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 95

Opinion Date: August 30, 2024

Judge: GRAY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jarrett Gage Vargas was convicted of aggravated child abuse after his three-month-old foster child, RW, suffered severe injuries while in his care. On October 15, 2021, RW began seizing, prompting Vargas to call 911. Medical examinations revealed both acute and chronic subdural hematomas, a brain contusion, and retinal hemorrhages. Vargas admitted to handling RW roughly and bouncing him aggressively. The State charged Vargas with aggravated child abuse, arguing that RW’s injuries were caused by nonaccidental trauma.

The District Court of Natrona County presided over the trial. The State presented medical experts who testified that RW’s injuries were consistent with abusive head trauma. Vargas countered with his own medical expert, who suggested that RW’s injuries could have been caused by a preexisting condition called external hydrocephalus, which could lead to subdural hematomas from benign activities. The jury found Vargas guilty of aggravated child abuse, and he was sentenced to 10-15 years in prison. Vargas filed a direct appeal and a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, and Vargas appealed that denial as well. The appeals were consolidated, but Vargas did not pursue the ineffective assistance claim further.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the district court erred in rejecting Vargas’ proposed theory of defense jury instruction. Vargas argued that the jury should have been instructed that if RW’s injuries could be explained by a preexisting medical condition, the State had not met its burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that Vargas’ proposed instruction was not a proper theory of defense, as it essentially argued a failure of proof rather than presenting a recognized legal defense. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the jury was adequately instructed on the State’s burden of proof and that Vargas was able to present his arguments during the trial.

Thompson v. United States

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Dockets: 20-CO-0294, 22-CO-0312

Opinion Date: September 5, 2024

Judge: EASTERLY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2002, the appellant was convicted of armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon. He later filed two motions for post-conviction relief under D.C. Code § 23-110. The first motion, filed in 2017, claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel and alleged that he was beaten by U.S. Marshals during his trial, rendering him unable to participate meaningfully in his defense. He attached an affidavit and medical records to support his claims. The second motion, filed pro se, argued ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel during a 2016 sentence reduction hearing.

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the first § 23-110 motion after an evidentiary hearing. The court found that the appellant's absence from the hearing meant his affidavit was inadmissible hearsay and that the medical records did not sufficiently demonstrate that he was unable to participate in his trial. The court concluded there was no evidence, aside from the inadmissible affidavit, to support the claim that the appellant was too emotionally or physically impaired to assist in his defense.

The appellant's second § 23-110 motion was also denied by the Superior Court. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated prejudice from his post-conviction counsel's performance during the Rule 35 sentence reduction hearing. The appellant appealed both denials.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the first § 23-110 motion, agreeing with the lower court that the appellant's affidavit was inadmissible and that the medical records did not prove his inability to participate in his trial. The court dismissed the appeal of the second § 23-110 motion as moot because the appellant had already completed his term of imprisonment, and his term of supervised release was statutorily unalterable.