United States v. Burgos-Balbuena

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1660

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: LIPEZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Esmeraldo Burgos-Balbuena, a Dominican Republic citizen, who was arrested after a high-speed boat chase off the coast of Puerto Rico. Burgos was charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after a previous removal. He accepted responsibility and agreed to plead guilty, with both parties recommending an 18-month prison sentence. However, the court sentenced him to 37 months, citing his repeated unlawful entries and dangerous evasion of arrest.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reviewed the case. Burgos's plea agreement included a joint recommendation for an 18-month sentence, but the presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a sentencing range of 30 to 37 months due to a higher total offense level and a criminal history category of III. The district court accepted the PSR's calculations and sentenced Burgos to 37 months, emphasizing his criminal history and the dangerous nature of his recent offense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Burgos argued that the government failed to comply with the plea agreement and challenged his sentence on procedural and substantive grounds. The court found that the government adhered to the plea agreement by recommending the 18-month sentence and did not implicitly repudiate it. The court also found no procedural error in the district court's sentencing, noting that the court considered all relevant factors and provided a thorough explanation for the sentence. The court further held that the 37-month sentence was substantively reasonable given Burgos's criminal history and the dangerous nature of his conduct.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Burgos's 37-month sentence.

United States v. Rodriguez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 22-1807, 23-1256

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The case involves Juan Rodriguez and Junito Melendez, who were convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. Melendez was identified as the front man of the operation, interacting with customers and suppliers, while Rodriguez managed backend operations from his residence. The operation involved acquiring cocaine from suppliers, cooking some into crack cocaine, and selling it. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) began investigating the defendants in 2018, leading to the seizure of Melendez's iPhone and subsequent wiretaps that provided evidence of their drug activities.

In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, a jury found both defendants guilty of the conspiracy charges. Melendez was also found guilty of distributing 500 grams or more of cocaine and had a prior conviction for a serious drug felony. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. The district court sentenced Rodriguez to 52 months and Melendez to 156 months in prison. Melendez's sentence included enhancements for drug quantity and his role as an organizer or leader in the conspiracy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, finding no error in the denial of motions to suppress evidence from Melendez's iPhone and wiretaps, the admission of certain evidentiary testimony, and the jury instructions. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements for Melendez, concluding that the evidence supported the drug quantity attributed to him and his role as an organizer in the conspiracy. The court found that any potential errors were harmless and did not affect the overall outcome of the case.

US v. Elliott

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1939

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2021, a police officer in Goffstown, New Hampshire, observed a vehicle driving without headlights. When the officer attempted to stop the vehicle, the driver, later identified as Brian Elliott, fled, leading to a high-speed chase. Elliott eventually stopped and fled on foot, during which he allegedly pointed a firearm at the officer and threatened to shoot. Elliott was later apprehended, and a search revealed firearms, ammunition, and fentanyl in his possession.

A federal grand jury in the District of New Hampshire indicted Elliott on four counts, including drug and firearm charges. Elliott pled guilty to three counts in exchange for the dismissal of one count and a sentencing recommendation within the guideline range. The district court accepted the plea agreement and, after a hearing, applied a six-level enhancement for assaulting a police officer during the offense. The court found the officer's testimony credible and calculated a guideline range of 108 to 135 months, ultimately sentencing Elliott to 120 months.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Elliott's appeal, which challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Elliott argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit found no clear error in the district court's credibility determination regarding the officer's testimony and upheld the application of the enhancement. The court also held that the 120-month sentence was substantively reasonable, given the seriousness of the offense and Elliott's criminal history. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

US v. Gonzalez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 24-1070

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: Rikelman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Carlos Gonzalez's residence was searched by the government for evidence of an illegal pill-making operation. Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing that the search warrant was based on stale information and lacked probable cause. The district court agreed, finding that the facts supporting the search warrant were too old and that the affidavit was so bare bones that no reasonable officer could have relied on it. The court noted that the mastermind of the operation had moved out months earlier, there was little suspicious activity afterward, and the equipment was portable.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Gonzalez's motion to suppress the evidence. The court concluded that the information in the affidavit was too stale to support probable cause and that the connection between the residence and any recent criminal activity was extremely thin. The court also determined that the good-faith exception did not apply because the affidavit was too conclusory and lacked sufficient detail to justify reliance on the warrant.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court decided to bypass the probable-cause determination and focused on whether a reasonable officer could have relied on the warrant in good faith. The court found that a reasonable officer could have believed that the pill-making operation was still ongoing at the residence, given the long-standing nature of the operation, the continued ownership of the house by the mastermind, and the involvement of Gonzalez and his girlfriend. The court vacated the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Pannell v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2849

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: Menashi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2005, Derrek Pannell and accomplices robbed a United States Post Office in Brooklyn, New York. Pannell, an employee of the Post Office, used his knowledge of the keypad lock to gain entry. The robbers restrained five employees and held them at gunpoint while demanding money from a safe. They fled with over $65,000 and assaulted a supervisor outside. Pannell was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, aggravated robbery, and brandishing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence.

Following his conviction, Pannell's direct appeal was unsuccessful. He then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his conviction for aggravated postal robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied his motion, concluding that both the base and aggravated offenses of § 2114(a) robbery qualified as crimes of violence. Pannell appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Pannell argued that his § 924(c) conviction was invalid because aggravated postal robbery under § 2114(a) is not a crime of violence, especially when based on a Pinkerton theory of liability. The court rejected this argument, citing precedent that a conviction under a Pinkerton theory does not alter the nature of the substantive offense. The court also held that the base offense of § 2114(a) robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, and thus, the aggravated offense does as well. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Pannell's § 2255 motion.

Rega v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 18-9002

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: KRAUSE

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2001, the Commonwealth charged Robert Gene Rega with first-degree murder and other crimes for shooting a security guard, Christopher Lauth, during a robbery at the Gateway Lodge in Jefferson County, Pennsylvania. Rega, along with Shawn Bair, Raymond Fishel, and Stanford Jones, planned the robbery, while Jones’s wife, Susan, stayed at Rega’s home. During the robbery, Lauth was killed. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimonies of Bair, Fishel, and the Joneses, who identified Rega as the shooter. Additional evidence included a video of Rega purchasing ammunition and testimony from a friend that Rega asked for a false alibi.

The Pennsylvania state court convicted Rega of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Rega's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal and in a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) proceeding. Rega then filed a federal habeas petition. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied his guilt-phase claims but granted relief from his death sentence, ordering a new sentencing hearing or life imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Rega raised claims that the prosecutor withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and presented false testimony in violation of Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on these claims, concluding that the evidence and testimony in question were not material to Rega’s murder conviction. The court found that the prosecutor’s noncommittal statements to witnesses about considering their cooperation in future plea deals did not significantly undermine their credibility, as the jury was already aware of their potential motives. Additionally, evidence of Susan Jones’s memory problems was deemed not material, as it did not sufficiently undermine her testimony or the overall case against Rega.

USA v. Clark

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1413

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Roth

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A man was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a police officer. The incident occurred during a traffic stop, where the officer was shot multiple times. The defendant was apprehended shortly after the shooting, and a firearm matching the bullets found at the scene was recovered from his vehicle. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense, believing the officer was about to shoot him.

The trial court, the Superior Court of California, found the defendant guilty and imposed the death penalty. The defendant appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial court made several errors, including improper jury instructions and the exclusion of certain evidence that could have supported his self-defense claim. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting the defendant's arguments. The defendant then sought review from the California Supreme Court.

The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court found that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions and that the exclusion of the evidence in question did not prejudice the defendant's case. The court also held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. The court concluded that the defendant's actions were not justified as self-defense and that the killing of the officer was premeditated and deliberate. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed.

USA v. Green

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-2476

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: D. Michael Fisher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cornelius Green, a member of the Infamous Ryders motorcycle club, was involved in an incident where Ishmael Snowell, who had declined membership in the club, was allegedly kidnapped. Green, along with co-defendant William Murphy and Steven Wong, met Snowell at the club's clubhouse. A fight ensued between Snowell and Murphy, with Green refereeing. Wong discovered photos of money on Snowell’s phone and demanded to know its location. Snowell claimed the money was at his aunt’s house in Reading, Pennsylvania. Murphy drove Snowell and Green, who was armed, to the house. Testimonies diverged on whether Murphy and Snowell could have escaped during a stop at a gas station. Upon arrival, they searched for the money, and Snowell claimed Wong ordered Green to shoot him. Snowell attempted to escape, leading to a fight with Green, which ended when neighbors called the police.

The grand jury indicted Green, Murphy, and Wong for kidnapping and robbery. Green moved to sever his trial from Murphy and Wong, but the District Court denied the motion. Wong’s trial was later severed due to a change in attorneys, and he was acquitted. During the joint trial of Green and Murphy, Murphy testified that Wong coerced him into the kidnapping and that Green threatened Snowell with a gun. Green renewed his motion to sever, arguing that Murphy’s defense was antagonistic to his own, but the District Court denied it.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that Green and Murphy presented mutually antagonistic defenses, which prejudiced Green’s right to a fair trial. The court held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Green’s motion to sever. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to sever, vacated Green’s conviction and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings.

USA v. Stimpson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-3333

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Restrepo

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2020, Christopher Lamont Stimpson, Jr. contacted Benuel Stoltzfus, an Amish man in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, to purchase five French bulldog puppies for $23,500. On the day of the sale, Stimpson and his associate, Wilbert Artis, visited the Stoltzfus home. After inspecting the puppies, Stimpson agreed to the purchase, but before the money count was complete, Artis took the puppies to their vehicle. A struggle ensued when Stimpson attempted to leave with the cash, during which he allegedly brandished a handgun. Stimpson and Artis fled with the puppies and most of the cash, leaving the Stoltzfus family with $4,140.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania convicted Stimpson of Hobbs Act robbery and interstate transportation of stolen goods. Stimpson filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from search warrants on social media accounts, arguing they were overbroad and lacked probable cause. The District Court denied the motion, but the government did not use the evidence obtained from the warrants at trial. Stimpson was convicted by a jury without the suppressed evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Stimpson appealed the denial of his suppression motion and the application of a sentencing enhancement under USSG §2B3.1(b)(2)(D) for using a dangerous weapon. The Third Circuit found the suppression issue moot since the evidence was not used at trial. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancement, concluding that the District Court did not err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Stimpson used a dangerous weapon during the robbery.

The Third Circuit affirmed Stimpson’s conviction and sentence.

United States v. Boler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4352

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Thacker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime

Maggie Anne Boler was convicted of six counts of presenting false claims against the United States by submitting fraudulent tax returns to the IRS and one count of making a false statement on a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan application. Boler submitted six fraudulent tax returns, receiving refunds on four, totaling $116,106. Additionally, she falsely claimed a $20,833 PPP loan. She was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina calculated Boler's sentencing range based on the total intended financial harm, including the two denied tax returns, amounting to $180,222. Boler objected, arguing that only the actual loss should be considered, not the intended loss. The district court overruled her objection, holding that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines could include both actual and intended loss.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines is genuinely ambiguous and can encompass both actual and intended loss. The court deferred to the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary, which defines "loss" as the greater of actual or intended loss. The court found that the district court correctly included the full intended loss in Boler's sentencing calculation. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Boler's 30-month sentence.

Terrell v. Allgrunn

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30723

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Curtis Terrell, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol, pain pills, and methamphetamine, began running erratically in a residential neighborhood. His wife, Angela Terrell, called 911, requesting an ambulance. Officer Jason Allgrunn arrived and arrested Mr. Terrell. When Mrs. Terrell began filming the incident, she was also arrested. The Terrells filed multiple federal and state claims against Allgrunn and other officers involved.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, rejecting their qualified immunity defense. The defendants appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment for the defendants on the Terrells' false arrest claims, finding that Officer Allgrunn had probable cause to arrest both Mr. and Mrs. Terrell. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment on Mrs. Terrell's excessive force claim, concluding that there was no clearly established law prohibiting the officer's conduct. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding Mr. Terrell's excessive force claim for lack of jurisdiction, as there were genuine disputes of material fact about what occurred when Mr. Terrell was out of the video frame.

Additionally, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment on the Terrells' malicious prosecution and First Amendment retaliation claims, citing the presence of probable cause. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment for Officers Henderson and Banta on the failure-to-intervene claims, as there were no violations of clearly established constitutional law.

Finally, the court vacated the district court's denial of summary judgment on the Louisiana state law claims and remanded for reconsideration in light of the appellate court's opinion.

United States v. Connelly

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50312

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Paola Connelly, a non-violent marijuana user, was charged after El Paso police responded to a "shots fired" call at her home. Her husband, John, was found firing a shotgun at a neighbor's door and was arrested. Paola admitted to occasionally using marijuana for sleep and anxiety. A search of their home revealed drug paraphernalia and several firearms, including a pistol owned by Paola. She was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing firearms as an unlawful user of a controlled substance and 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) for providing firearms to an unlawful user.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Paola's motion to dismiss the charges. However, after the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Rahimi, the District Court reconsidered and found that §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3) were facially unconstitutional and that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to Paola under the Second Amendment. The government appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while historical and traditional regulations may support some limits on a presently intoxicated person's right to carry a weapon, they do not support disarming a sober person based solely on past substance usage. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the charges against Paola as applied to her but reversed the facial challenges to §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3). The court concluded that there are circumstances where these statutes could be constitutionally applied, such as banning presently intoxicated individuals from carrying firearms.

USA v. Medina-Cantu

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40336

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jose Paz Medina-Cantu was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition as an illegal alien, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(2), and illegal reentry into the United States, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). He moved to dismiss the firearm possession charge, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The district court denied his motion, referencing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Portillo-Munoz, which held that the Second Amendment does not extend to illegal aliens.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Medina-Cantu’s motion to dismiss, holding that Bruen did not abrogate the precedent set by Portillo-Munoz. Medina-Cantu then pleaded guilty to both counts without a plea agreement but preserved his constitutional argument for appeal. He was sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. Medina-Cantu argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bruen and United States v. Rahimi abrogated Portillo-Munoz. However, the Fifth Circuit held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi unequivocally overruled Portillo-Munoz. The court emphasized that under its rule of orderliness, it could not overturn another panel’s decision unless there was an unequivocal change in the law by the Supreme Court or an en banc decision. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) under the Second Amendment.

Wooten v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10924

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Christopher Wooten was arrested in February 2016 for driving while intoxicated (DWI) with a blood alcohol level of .265. Due to his prior DWI convictions, he was charged with felony DWI under Texas law, which escalates penalties for repeat offenders. Wooten had a history of DWI and other felony convictions, including a 1983 DWI for which he received a probationary sentence. This 1983 DWI was used as an element of the 2016 felony DWI charge, and his other felonies were used to justify a habitual offender enhancement, leading to a potential sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison.

Wooten initially agreed to plead guilty in exchange for an eight-year sentence, but the state trial judge rejected this agreement. He then agreed to a thirteen-year sentence and waived one of the felony enhancements. Despite this, Wooten attempted to appeal, but the state appellate court dismissed his appeal due to the waiver in his plea agreement. Wooten filed multiple state habeas applications, all of which were denied. He also filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied, finding that his claims could not overcome the relitigation bar under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Wooten's habeas petition. The court held that any error by the state court in using the 1983 DWI as an element of the felony DWI charge was harmless because Wooten had other felony convictions that could have satisfied the requirements for the felony DWI and habitual offender enhancement. The court also found that Wooten's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not warrant relief because he failed to show that he would not have pleaded guilty if his counsel had advised him differently.

Ayers v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3735

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: MATHIS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2012, Kayla Ayers was convicted by an Ohio jury of aggravated arson and child endangerment following a fire in her basement. In 2019, Ayers obtained an expert report suggesting that the prosecution's key witness, a fire inspector, was unqualified. Ayers argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating the fire inspector's qualifications or retaining an arson expert to challenge his testimony.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed Ayers's habeas corpus petition as time-barred, concluding that she failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining the expert report sooner. The court found that Ayers could have discovered the factual basis for her claim within the statutory period.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the expert report, which questioned the fire inspector's qualifications and methods, constituted the factual predicate for Ayers's ineffective-assistance claim. The court determined that Ayers, an indigent prisoner, could not have discovered this information without the assistance of the Ohio Innocence Project, which secured the expert report in 2019. The court concluded that Ayers exercised due diligence under the circumstances and filed her habeas petition within one year of obtaining the report. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

United States v. Harvel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5416

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Michael Harvel, a county official, was convicted by a jury for sexually assaulting seven women he supervised, violating their constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242. Harvel appealed, raising issues about the timeliness of the charges, the indictment's sufficiency, and the admission of certain evidence.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee initially handled the case. Harvel argued that the most serious charges were not brought within the five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). However, the court found that these charges were "punishable by death" under 18 U.S.C. § 3281, thus not subject to the five-year limit. Harvel also claimed that the introduction of "other crimes" evidence violated the Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court allowed this evidence, finding it relevant and not overly prejudicial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, holding that the charges were timely under § 3281 because the crimes included kidnapping and aggravated sexual abuse, which are punishable by death under § 242. The court also rejected Harvel's due process challenge to Rule 413, which allows the admission of other sexual assaults to show propensity, and found no abuse of discretion in the district court's Rule 403 balancing. Additionally, the court upheld the denial of Harvel's motion for a mistrial, concluding that the district court's limiting instructions were sufficient to mitigate any potential prejudice from the inadmissible testimony.

In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Harvel's convictions and the 204-month sentence, finding no merit in his arguments regarding the statute of limitations, the indictment's sufficiency, or the evidentiary rulings.

United States v. Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-6115

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Erick Williams was stopped by Memphis police for speeding and erratic driving. Officers smelled marijuana and saw an open beer can, leading them to search the car after a canine alert. They found a loaded pistol in the trunk. Williams, a convicted felon for aggravated robbery, was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion, and Williams pled guilty while reserving the right to appeal.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied Williams's motion to dismiss the indictment. Williams then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court's decision. The court held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that historical precedent supports the disarmament of individuals deemed dangerous, and Williams's criminal record, including convictions for aggravated robbery and attempted murder, demonstrated that he was dangerous. Therefore, the statute was constitutional as applied to him. The court also noted that while individuals must have an opportunity to show they are not dangerous, Williams failed to do so. The court affirmed the district court's decision, maintaining Williams's conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Jones v. Anderson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2929

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Brian Jones, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued several correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The claims arose from an incident where Jones caused a disturbance in the prison dayroom, refused to return to his cell, and was subsequently placed in a restraint chair and transported to a restrictive-housing cell. Jones alleged that the officers used excessive force, conducted an unlawful strip search, and confined him in a dirty cell.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims. Jones, who represented himself during the lower court proceedings, argued on appeal that the magistrate judge should have granted his request for pro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The magistrate judge had denied this request, concluding that Jones was competent to litigate the straightforward case on his own.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the magistrate judge applied the correct legal standard and reasonably concluded that Jones was capable of handling the case himself. The court also determined that the video evidence conclusively showed that Jones's claims lacked merit. The video demonstrated that the officers used only minimal force, conducted the strip search in a professional manner, and that Jones's cell conditions did not amount to a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the denial of pro bono counsel was appropriate and that the officers did not violate Jones's Eighth Amendment rights.

Roalson v. Noble

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2833

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: BRENNAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Christopher Roalson was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and burglary for the murder of a 93-year-old woman. At trial, a DNA analyst testified about evidence found on the murder weapons, although she did not perform the initial DNA testing. The original analyst was unavailable, and the testifying analyst based her conclusions on the initial analyst's notes. Roalson argued that this violated his right to confront the witness who performed the DNA testing.

Roalson appealed his conviction, claiming a Confrontation Clause violation. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, citing State v. Luther Williams, which allows one analyst to testify about their own conclusions based on another analyst's work if they can provide an independent evaluation. The Wisconsin and United States Supreme Courts denied certiorari. Roalson then filed a habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed. The district court found no clear federal law barring the testifying analyst from giving her own independent opinions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the relevant federal law, as established by the Supreme Court, does not clearly prohibit an analyst from testifying to their own conclusions based on another analyst's data. The court found that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied existing law and that the testifying analyst did not merely act as a conduit for the original analyst's conclusions. Additionally, the court determined that any potential error was harmless given the substantial evidence supporting Roalson's conviction, including eyewitness testimony and his own confessions.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, denying Roalson's habeas corpus petition.

Schimandle v. DeKalb County Sheriff's Office

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2151

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: BRENNAN

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

A high-school administrator, Justin Schimandle, forcibly restrained a student, C.G., at school. Following an investigation, Detective Josh Duehning of the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office submitted affidavits to support an arrest warrant for Schimandle on battery charges. An Illinois state magistrate judge issued the warrant, and Schimandle turned himself in. The criminal case proceeded to a bench trial, where Schimandle was found not guilty after the prosecution rested.

Schimandle then sued the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office and Duehning, alleging false arrest. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the motion, dismissing Schimandle’s claims. The court found that there was probable cause to arrest Schimandle and that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that arguable probable cause supported Schimandle’s arrest, meaning a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed based on the circumstances. The court also found that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity, protecting him from liability for the false arrest claim. Additionally, the court noted that the magistrate judge’s issuance of the arrest warrant further supported the reasonableness of Duehning’s actions. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Schimandle’s complaint.

Lockhart v. Siloam Springs, Arkansas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2642

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Christopher Lockhart, a licensed Arkansas bail bondsman and private investigator, was stopped by Siloam Springs police officer Zachary Ware around 3:30 AM on March 11, 2019, for alleged traffic violations. Lockhart was arrested and charged with DWI, careless driving, and driving left of center. After refusing a plea deal, Lockhart was tried for DWI but was found not guilty. Subsequently, Lockhart filed a § 1983 action against multiple defendants, including claims of unreasonable stop, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims but allowed Lockhart’s illegal stop and false arrest claims against Officer Ware and the malicious prosecution claim against Siloam Springs to proceed. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Officer Ware had probable cause to stop Lockhart, as the dashcam video did not conclusively support Ware’s testimony. The court also denied summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, finding a material fact dispute about whether the prosecutor had probable cause to try Lockhart for DWI.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Officer Ware had probable cause to stop Lockhart for careless driving, as Lockhart’s tires touched the centerline, which under Arkansas law constitutes a traffic violation. The court reversed the district court’s decision regarding the initial stop and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining issues. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, agreeing that Arkansas statutory immunity does not apply to intentional torts like malicious prosecution.

United States v. Alexander

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2280

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Bruce Alexander and Terrence Gay were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. Gay pleaded guilty, while Alexander went to trial and was found guilty by a jury. Alexander appealed, challenging the exclusion of Gay’s exculpatory statement, the handling of government witnesses, and the trial court’s comments.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri excluded Gay’s exculpatory statement, ruling it hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). The court found that the statement lacked sufficient corroborating circumstances to indicate its trustworthiness, given Gay’s close relationship with Alexander and Gay’s subsequent fugitive status. The court also held a three-day jury trial where it occasionally interjected to clarify witness testimony and maintain the trial’s pace.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the exclusion of Gay’s statement, agreeing that it lacked trustworthiness. The court also found no plain error in the handling of government witnesses, noting that the officers’ dual-role testimony was appropriately managed and did not affect the trial’s outcome. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court’s comments during the trial were aimed at clarifying testimony and maintaining order, and did not deprive Alexander of a fair trial.

The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings or trial management, and thus affirmed Alexander’s conviction and sentence.

United States v. Dailey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2355

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Henry Dailey began a ten-year term of supervised release after serving a prison sentence for his involvement in a commercial sex trafficking ring. Four months into his supervised release, his Probation Officer filed a Violation Report alleging numerous violations of his release conditions. Dailey admitted to most of the violations, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 6 to 12 months imprisonment. Despite a joint recommendation for 6 months imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release, the district court sentenced Dailey to 12 months imprisonment followed by 240 months of supervised release.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri initially sentenced Dailey to 84 months imprisonment followed by 120 months of supervised release after he pleaded guilty to one count of Interstate Transportation for Prostitution. Upon completing his prison term, Dailey began his supervised release in November 2022. In March 2023, his Probation Officer reported multiple violations, including failing to register internet-capable devices and involvement in drug sales. At a preliminary revocation hearing, the magistrate judge found probable cause to proceed. Dailey later stipulated to most violations but contested some allegations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Dailey appealed the new term of supervised release, alleging procedural errors and a substantively unreasonable sentence. The appellate court found no procedural error, noting that the district court did not base its sentence on unproven allegations and allowed Dailey ample opportunity to defend against the contested violations. The court also found the 240-month term of supervised release substantively reasonable, given Dailey's criminal history and repeated violations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Mull

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3424

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Darris Lamar Mull pleaded guilty to four counts of being a felon in possession of firearms, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence investigation report (PSR) assessed a base offense level of 20 due to the involvement of a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. Mull objected, arguing that his co-defendant was responsible for that firearm. The district court overruled the objection and sentenced Mull to 135 months’ imprisonment. Mull appealed, challenging the application of the sentencing enhancement and arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated his Second Amendment rights.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri initially reviewed the case. Mull objected to the PSR's findings, particularly the base offense level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). The district court found that Mull's offense involved a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and overruled his objection. The court adopted the PSR's factual content and calculations, sentencing Mull to 135 months based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) enhancement. It found that Mull and his co-defendant engaged in jointly undertaken criminal activity, making Mull accountable for the co-defendant's possession and use of the firearm. The court also rejected Mull's Second Amendment challenge, citing Eighth Circuit precedent that upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, maintaining Mull's 135-month sentence.

United States v. Scherer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2402

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2011, Shawn Scherer was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Shortly after beginning his supervised release, he tested positive for methamphetamine and absconded, leading to the revocation of his supervised release in June 2020. He was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment and three more years of supervised release. Scherer violated the conditions of his second supervised-release term, resulting in another revocation in April 2021 and a sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment and 24 months of supervised release. During his third term, he again violated conditions, leading to state charges and federal revocation proceedings.

The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota revoked Scherer’s supervised release multiple times due to repeated violations, including drug use and absconding from reentry centers. At his latest revocation hearing, Scherer admitted to the violations. The government requested a sentence within the Guidelines’ range of 8 to 14 months, while Scherer’s counsel highlighted his positive activities while incarcerated. The district court, however, noted Scherer’s consistent non-compliance with supervised release conditions and sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Scherer argued that the district court abused its discretion by limiting his counsel’s argument and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that any error in limiting counsel’s argument was harmless, as the mitigating factors were already presented through other means. The court also found the 36-month sentence substantively reasonable, given Scherer’s repeated violations and failure to comply with supervised release conditions. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.

Godinez v. Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1194

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Omar Godinez, a minor at the time of his conviction, is serving a 32-years-to-life sentence in Colorado state prison for kidnapping and sexually assaulting two victims. After exhausting state appeals, he sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Graham v. Florida, which prohibits life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide offenses committed by minors without a meaningful opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation.

The state trial court rejected Godinez's interpretation of Graham, concluding that the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) allows the parole board to consider maturity and rehabilitation, even if not explicitly mandated. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence on different grounds, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. Godinez then filed a habeas petition in the District of Colorado, which was denied. The district court agreed with the state trial court that the parole board could consider the Graham factors.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. They had previously certified a question to the Colorado Supreme Court, which clarified that SOLSA permits consideration of maturity and requires consideration of rehabilitation. The Tenth Circuit denied Godinez's habeas petition, holding that he could not show that the Colorado courts unreasonably applied federal law. The court concluded that the parole board's ability to consider maturity and rehabilitation when Godinez becomes eligible for parole in 2034 meets the requirements set forth in Graham. The court also noted that any future failure by the parole board to adhere to constitutional requirements could be challenged at that time.

United States v. Aragon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2135

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Arthur Aragon was indicted for unlawfully possessing an incendiary device, specifically a Molotov cocktail, which he threw onto his neighbor's property. This act was part of a series of harassments against his neighbors, including threats and property damage. Despite the Molotov cocktail causing a fireball, it did not result in significant damage or meet the threshold for felony arson under New Mexico law.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico applied a four-level sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The court reasoned that Aragon's use of the Molotov cocktail had the potential to facilitate a felony offense, specifically arson, even though the actual damage did not meet the felony threshold. Aragon was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment, and he appealed the enhancement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court misapplied § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The enhancement requires either the use of a firearm to facilitate an actual felony offense or the possession of a firearm with the potential to facilitate a committed felony offense. The court clarified that the guideline does not apply to potential felony offenses that were not committed. Since Aragon did not commit felony arson, the enhancement was improperly applied. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing without the enhancement.

Boyd v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10299

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: GRANT

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Lucious Boyd, a Florida prisoner sentenced to death for first-degree murder, sexual battery, and armed kidnapping, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after a series of unsuccessful state collateral attacks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Boyd's claim that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to a juror's undisclosed criminal history. The juror, Tonja Striggles, admitted her criminal history and disclosed additional information, but Boyd did not amend his petition to include these new disclosures. The district court denied Boyd's habeas petition on the merits and granted a certificate of appealability, leading Boyd to appeal.

While his appeal was pending, Boyd moved in the district court to amend his habeas petition under Rule 15(a)(2) or, alternatively, to reopen his habeas proceedings under Rule 60(b)(6), citing new evidence from Striggles's testimony. The district court characterized Boyd's motion as a second or successive habeas petition, requiring preauthorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which Boyd had not obtained. Consequently, the district court dismissed his motion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that once a district court has entered a final judgment on a habeas petition, any new filing seeking to relitigate the same claims is considered a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The court also noted that an appeal transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court, preventing the district court from amending the petition or reopening the case. Boyd's failure to obtain the necessary preauthorization from the appellate court meant that the district court correctly dismissed his motion.

In re Tellez

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S277072

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: Evans

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Victor Raul Tellez was charged with three counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child and faced a maximum prison term of 12 years. On the advice of his attorney, he accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to one count and receiving a three-year prison sentence. Tellez was not informed that his conviction would make him eligible for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). After completing his prison term, the District Attorney initiated SVPA proceedings for his involuntary commitment to a state hospital.

Tellez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not being advised of the SVPA consequences. The superior court denied his petition, and the Court of Appeal also denied it, stating that prevailing norms did not require such advisement and that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. Tellez then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.

The California Supreme Court held that Tellez did not sufficiently demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise him of the SVPA consequences. The court noted that Tellez provided insufficient evidence that he would not have accepted the plea deal had he been informed of the SVPA consequences. Therefore, the court did not address whether his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. However, recognizing the significant liberty deprivation involved in SVPA commitments, the court exercised its supervisory powers to require trial courts to inform defendants of potential SVPA consequences when pleading guilty or no contest to a qualifying offense. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed on the ground that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice.

People v. Williams

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S262229

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: JENKINS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Jeremiah Ira Williams, who was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 100 years to life plus 86 years and two months for committing multiple forcible sexual offenses under California's One Strike law when he was 24 years old. Williams argued that the exclusion of One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility under California’s youth offender parole statute (Pen. Code, § 3051) violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He contended that it was irrational to exclude young adults convicted of One Strike offenses from early parole while not excluding young adults convicted of murder without special circumstances.

The San Diego County Superior Court convicted Williams on multiple counts, including robbery, forcible rape, and sodomy by use of force, among others. The jury found him guilty on most counts and found true several aggravating factors, including personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court imposed the lengthy sentence based on these findings. Williams appealed to the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, arguing that the exclusion of One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility violated equal protection. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim, finding a rational basis for the differential treatment based on the threat of recidivism by violent sexual offenders.

The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The court held that the Legislature could rationally exclude One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility under section 3051 based on concerns about the high risk of recidivism and the aggravated nature of their offenses. The court concluded that these concerns provided a rational basis for the differential treatment, thus rejecting Williams' equal protection challenge. The court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to consider any briefing on Williams' entitlement to the benefit of any ameliorative legislation enacted during the pendency of his appeal.

In re Hill

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166191(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: STEWART

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1987, Michael Hill was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Hill maintained that the murders were committed by Michael McCray, whose statements to the police incriminated both himself and Hill. McCray did not testify at trial, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, but his statements were admitted under the hearsay rule. Decades later, Hill discovered that the prosecution had failed to disclose a promise not to prosecute McCray for his involvement in the case. Hill filed a habeas corpus petition alleging violations of Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois.

The trial court dismissed Hill’s claims, finding he failed to establish a prima facie case. The court concluded that the evidence against Hill was overwhelming and that the failure to disclose the non-prosecution agreement did not undermine confidence in the verdict. The court also found that Hill did not plead that false evidence was presented to the jury, as required under Napue.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that Hill established a prima facie case for both Brady and Napue violations. The court noted that McCray’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was misleading and that the prosecution’s suppression of the non-prosecution agreement allowed McCray to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, leading to the admission of his statements without cross-examination. The court concluded that the suppressed evidence was material and could have affected the jury’s verdict. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause.

People v. Daffeh

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166899(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: CHOU

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with vehicle theft and receiving stolen property. He pled no contest to misdemeanor vehicle theft, and the court placed him on three years of probation, reserving the issue of victim restitution. The prosecutor did not inform the court or the defendant of a $440 restitution claim submitted by the victim before the probation period ended. The court did not order the defendant to pay any specific restitution amount during his probation.

The defendant's probation expired without any restitution order being issued. He then filed a petition for dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4, asserting he had fulfilled all probation conditions. The probation department supported his petition, confirming he met all terms and no victim restitution was ordered. However, the prosecutor objected, claiming the defendant still owed $440 in restitution. The trial court denied the petition, citing the reserved restitution.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant fulfilled all probation conditions since no specific restitution amount was ordered during his probation. The court emphasized that reserving restitution is not equivalent to ordering payment of a specific amount. The court also noted that the prosecutor's failure to pursue the restitution claim during the probation period meant the defendant was not responsible for any unpaid restitution. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the defendant's petition for dismissal.

People v. Dauterman

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C099223(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: BOULWARE EURIE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant pled no contest to making criminal threats and admitted to a prior serious felony. Under a negotiated agreement, the trial court imposed and suspended an eight-year prison sentence, placing him on a two-year term of formal probation. Nearly two years later, the probation department filed a petition alleging the defendant violated probation by failing to contact the department for three consecutive months. The trial court revoked probation and ordered the defendant to serve the previously suspended sentence.

The Superior Court of Tehama County initially placed the defendant on probation in February 2021, with a two-year term starting from that date. The court credited him with 228 days for time served in county jail. In January 2023, the probation department filed a petition to revoke probation, which the court granted after the defendant admitted to the violation. The court terminated probation and imposed the suspended eight-year sentence.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation in 2023 because his probation term should have ended in July 2022, considering the 228 days credited for time served. The appellate court rejected this argument, stating that there is no legal basis for reducing a probation term by the time already served in custody. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to terminate probation, given the defendant's repeated failures to report to probation. Additionally, the appellate court found no ineffective assistance of counsel and agreed that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the proper conviction assessment.

The appellate court affirmed the judgment with directions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect a $30 conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373.

People v. Howard

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H050156(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Danner

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Jermaine Randy Howard was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man at an unlicensed nightclub in San Jose. Howard claimed he acted in self-defense, but the jury rejected this defense. Before sentencing, Howard filed a motion alleging the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) by questioning him about his connection to East Palo Alto, which he argued was racially biased. The trial court denied the motion, finding Howard failed to make a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, and sentenced him to 19 years to life in prison.

Howard appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his RJA motion and that the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing arguments violated the RJA and his due process rights. He also contended that the jury instructions misstated the law regarding murder, imperfect self-defense, and heat of passion, cumulatively prejudicing his defense.

The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in concluding Howard had not made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation regarding the prosecutor's cross-examination about East Palo Alto. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on Howard's RJA motion. The court rejected Howard's claims of instructional error, finding the jury instructions correctly stated the law and did not mislead the jury about the prosecution's burden of proof.

The appellate court's main holding was that Howard made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, warranting a hearing on his motion. The court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the conviction and sentence otherwise. If the trial court denies relief on remand, the judgment will be reinstated; if relief is granted, further proceedings will follow.

People v. I.B.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098871(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: MESIWALA

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In 2017, a minor admitted to two counts of assault with intent to commit rape and was initially placed in a Level B program. Due to multiple probation violations, the juvenile court later committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in 2019. After being discharged from DJJ in April 2023, the juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring the minor to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.008. The minor appealed, arguing that this requirement violated his equal protection rights because it treated him differently from minors who committed similar offenses after the juvenile justice realignment, which closed DJJ and transferred responsibilities to county facilities.

The Superior Court of Sacramento County upheld the probation condition, rejecting the minor's equal protection argument. The court found that the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a loss of liberty and thus did not implicate a fundamental right, applying the rational basis standard of review. The court reasoned that the Legislature could have determined that minors in county facilities have a lower risk of recidivism due to more effective treatment, justifying the differential treatment.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the rational basis standard applied because the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification. The court found that a rational basis existed for the differential treatment, as the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that minors already in DJJ custody posed a higher risk of recidivism and required continued registration to protect public safety. Thus, the court found no equal protection violation and affirmed the dispositional order.

People v. Lopez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061870(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: SANCHEZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2005, Gerardo Lopez was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances of committing the murder during a robbery and kidnapping. The prosecution's theory included felony murder. In 2022, Lopez petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law should apply to his case. The trial court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, citing the jury's findings that Lopez had the specific intent to kill and was engaged in the kidnapping, which disqualified him from resentencing.

The Superior Court of Orange County found that the jury's special circumstance findings, which included Lopez's specific intent to kill, precluded him from relief under section 1172.6. The court noted that the jury instructions required a finding of specific intent to kill for the kidnapping special circumstance, and thus, Lopez was not convicted under any imputed malice theory.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), a participant in a felony who has the intent to kill is liable for murder without needing to assist in the killing itself. The court concluded that the jury's findings that Lopez committed kidnapping with the intent to kill met the requirements of section 189, subdivision (e)(2), making him ineligible for resentencing. The court affirmed the postjudgment order, agreeing that Lopez's petition was correctly denied at the prima facie stage.

People v. Tidd

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167548(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: TUCHER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a shooting incident that occurred around midnight on October 7, 2020, in San Francisco. The victim, who was intoxicated, was walking home when a white SUV approached him. After a brief interaction, the SUV drove away, but the victim made an obscene gesture, prompting the driver to return and fire two shots, one of which hit the victim's leg. The police later found a nine-millimeter Luger cartridge case at the scene. Six days later, officers located a white Mercedes SUV matching the description, arrested Raymond Tidd, and found a loaded gun and a similar cartridge in the vehicle.

In the Superior Court of San Francisco, Tidd was charged with attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. He pled guilty to additional firearm possession charges. At trial, the prosecution presented expert testimony from a firearms toolmark analyst, Jacobus Swanepoel, who claimed that the cartridge case found at the scene matched a test-fired cartridge from Tidd's gun. Despite the defense's objections, the trial court allowed this testimony. The jury convicted Tidd of assault with a firearm and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle but could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting Swanepoel's testimony without sufficient evidence of its reliability. The court noted that Swanepoel's method lacked objective standards and was based on subjective judgment without supporting studies or validation. Consequently, the court held that the admission of this expert testimony was prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.

People v. Vigil

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085762(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: MEEHAN

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 1997, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus an additional 10 years. In January 2020, he filed a petition under former section 1170.95, which was summarily denied. In January 2023, he filed a motion for relief under section 745 of the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), claiming racial bias in his conviction and sentence. The trial court denied the motion, citing improper service and failure to state a violation of the RJA.

The defendant appealed, arguing that he made a prima facie case for a hearing under section 745 and that the denial violated his equal protection rights. The People contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion and that the denial was not erroneous. The defendant countered that his motion was authorized under section 745, subdivision (b).

The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the defendant's motion was prematurely filed under the RJA’s phased-in retroactivity provisions. Specifically, the court noted that the defendant's case fell within the last phase of eligibility for relief, commencing January 1, 2026. As a result, the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider the motion, rendering its order void. The appellate court vacated the trial court's order and dismissed the appeal.

Cole v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2024-1170

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1994, Loran Cole and his companion encountered John Edwards and his sister while they were camping. Cole murdered John and raped his sister. Cole was indicted and found guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and sexual battery. The jury recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed. Cole's convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his certiorari petition was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1998.

Cole filed multiple postconviction relief motions, all of which were denied by the circuit court and affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. His claims included ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence, and constitutional challenges. Cole also sought federal habeas relief, which was denied. His subsequent motions for postconviction relief, including claims based on newly discovered evidence and Hurst v. Florida, were also denied.

The Florida Supreme Court reviewed Cole's fourth successive motion for postconviction relief and his public records requests. Cole argued newly discovered evidence regarding his treatment at the Dozier School for Boys, Eighth Amendment violations due to his prison conditions, and the unconstitutionality of Florida's lethal injection procedures. The postconviction court denied these claims as untimely, procedurally barred, or without merit. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court's decision, finding no error in the summary denial of Cole's claims and public records requests. The court also denied Cole's motion to stay his execution and his request for oral argument.

Foster v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0831

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: SASSO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1994, Jermaine Foster was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and four counts of kidnapping. The jury recommended two death sentences, which the trial court imposed. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster later sought postconviction relief based on intellectual disability claims, but the postconviction court denied his motion. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this denial.

Foster filed a successive motion for postconviction relief after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Florida, which was applied retroactively in Walls v. State. The postconviction court denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing, but the Florida Supreme Court remanded for a Hall-compliant hearing. Before this hearing occurred, the Florida Supreme Court decided Phillips v. State, which held that Hall should not be applied retroactively. The State moved to cancel Foster's hearing, but the postconviction court denied the motion based on the State's concession that it could not deviate from the mandate requiring a hearing.

After the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. State, which clarified that Phillips represented a change in controlling legal principles, the State renewed its motion for summary denial of Foster's intellectual disability claim. The postconviction court granted this motion, concluding that Phillips constituted an intervening change in law and that Hall did not apply retroactively.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of Foster's successive motion for postconviction relief. The court held that Foster's intellectual disability claim failed because Hall did not apply retroactively, and the State's initial concession did not preclude it from challenging the retroactive application of Hall. Consequently, Foster's request for an evidentiary hearing was denied.

State v. Thomas

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 15/23

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Gould

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2002, Steven Anthony Thomas was indicted for three hotel robberies in Charles County, Maryland. He pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery and one count of second-degree burglary, resulting in a total sentence of 40 years. In 2014, his sentence for the first armed robbery was reduced to 12.5 years, triggering a new five-year period for filing a motion to modify his sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(e). Thomas filed a timely motion in 2015, which the court held in abeyance. He supplemented his motion multiple times, but the court took no action before the five-year period expired in December 2019.

The Circuit Court for Charles County eventually held a hearing in 2021 and concluded it lacked authority to revise the sentence after the five-year period. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, relying on Schlick v. State, which held that the circuit court retained fundamental jurisdiction over a timely-filed motion even after the five-year period expired.

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and overruled Schlick v. State. The court held that under Rule 4-345(e), a circuit court does not have jurisdiction to revise a sentence more than five years after its imposition. The court emphasized that the rule's language is unambiguous and imposes a strict temporal limit. The court also clarified that deferring a motion to reduce a sentence for the full five-year period is equivalent to denying it within that period. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's decision, affirming that the circuit court lacked authority to modify Thomas's sentence after the five-year deadline.

Commonwealth v. Canjura

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13432

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Georges

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves the defendant, David E. Canjura, who was arrested by Boston police officers on July 3, 2020, after an altercation with his girlfriend. During a search incident to the arrest, officers found a spring-assisted knife on Canjura. He was charged with carrying a dangerous weapon under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b), and assault and battery on a family or household member. Canjura conceded the knife met the statutory definition of a switchblade but challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Second Amendment.

In the Boston Municipal Court, Canjura filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The judge denied the motion, and Canjura entered a conditional plea, reserving his right to appeal. The court accepted his plea and placed him on administrative probation, while the assault and battery charge was dismissed at the Commonwealth's request. Canjura appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and applied the two-part test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. The court first determined that switchblades are "arms" under the Second Amendment, as they fit historical definitions and were commonly used for lawful purposes at the time of the founding. The court then examined whether the statute was consistent with the nation's historical tradition of arms regulation. Finding no historical analogues to justify the regulation of switchblades, the court concluded that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b), violated the Second Amendment. The court reversed the denial of Canjura's motion to dismiss, vacated his admission to sufficient facts, and ordered judgment to enter for the defendant on the dangerous weapon charge.

State v. Frydenlund

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 187

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2023, the State charged Samuel Wade Frydenlund with burglary, stalking, and partner or family member assault. Frydenlund intended to present a defense of mental disease or defect. Before trial, the court dismissed the stalking and assault charges, proceeding only with the burglary charge. Frydenlund requested that the jury be instructed on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary. The court agreed to include this instruction if the jury could not reach a verdict on the burglary charge.

At trial, the jury found Frydenlund not guilty of burglary but guilty of criminal trespass. Frydenlund moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the jury should not have considered the lesser offense after acquitting him of burglary. The Ninth Judicial District Court denied his motion, stating that it was not inconsistent to find him not guilty of burglary but guilty of criminal trespass, as the latter requires proof of fewer elements.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the verdict form and jury instructions were consistent with Montana law, specifically § 46-16-607(3), MCA, which allows the jury to consider a lesser included offense if it cannot reach a verdict on the greater offense. The court found no double jeopardy violation, as Frydenlund was convicted of only one crime—criminal trespass. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that the jury's consideration of the lesser included offense was appropriate and that Frydenlund's rights were not violated.

State v. Loberg

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 188

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Chris Landon Loberg was convicted of Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs after a guilty plea. He appealed a decision by the Tenth Judicial District Court, which denied his motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle. Loberg argued that the law enforcement officers lacked sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct a canine sniff of his vehicle.

The Tenth Judicial District Court found that Officer Connelly had particularized suspicion based on several factors: Loberg's pinpoint pupils, the smell of a masking agent, his presence at a casino, old reports associating him with drug users, and his delayed response to being pulled over. The court concluded that these factors collectively justified the canine sniff and denied Loberg's motion to suppress the evidence.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the totality of the circumstances did not amount to particularized suspicion. The court noted that pinpoint pupils alone were insufficient for a drug possession investigation, the smell of a single air freshener was not enough to suggest masking illegal drugs, and the old, uncorroborated reports in the police database were unreliable. Additionally, Loberg's brief stop at the casino and his delayed but safe pull-over did not provide specific indicia of criminal activity. The Supreme Court held that the evidence obtained from the canine sniff should be suppressed, as the officer's suspicion was no more than a generalized hunch. The decision of the lower court was reversed.

State v. Toulouse

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 184

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In April 2020, Christopher I. Toulouse was charged with multiple offenses, including misdemeanor partner or family member assault (PFMA), felony intimidation, felony stalking, and misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order, following a series of harassing incidents directed at his ex-girlfriend, L.J. Toulouse pled guilty to PFMA, intimidation, and stalking under a plea agreement, and the State dismissed the no-contact order violation. The District Court initially intended to impose a consecutive sentence for stalking but allowed Toulouse to withdraw his guilty pleas. Toulouse later re-entered his guilty pleas and was sentenced to a combination of suspended and active sentences.

The Fourth Judicial District Court of Missoula County sentenced Toulouse to a total of 15 years, with 10 years suspended. In April 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke Toulouse’s suspended sentences due to new charges. Toulouse admitted to two violations, and the District Court revoked his suspended sentences, imposing a 15-year commitment to the Montana State Prison (MSP) with no time suspended.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. Toulouse argued that the new sentence was illegal because it imposed a longer imprisonment term than his original sentence. The Court agreed, noting that under Montana law, a district court can only impose a sentence upon revocation that does not exceed the original sentence's imprisonment term. The Court found that the District Court's sentence of a 15-year MSP commitment exceeded the original suspended sentence's terms, making it illegal. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

State v. Anderson

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 435

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The case involves the prosecution of Kay E. Anderson for multiple misdemeanor violations of a city property maintenance code at a residential apartment complex in Omaha, Nebraska, known as Yale Park. Anderson was responsible for managing and maintaining the complex, which consisted of 13 buildings with approximately 100 residential units. In September 2018, city inspectors, acting on numerous tenant complaints about unsafe living conditions, obtained an inspection warrant and discovered approximately 2,500 code violations. Anderson was subsequently charged with 99 counts of violating the Omaha Municipal Code (OMC).

In the county court, Anderson filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the inspection, arguing that the warrant was invalid because inspectors had not complied with the statutory requirement to seek consent before obtaining the warrant. The county court initially granted the motion, but the district court reversed, finding Anderson lacked standing to challenge the warrant for units leased to others. Anderson's renewed motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on four counts after a bench trial.

On appeal, Anderson argued that the evidence should have been suppressed due to the invalid warrant and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the failure to seek consent before obtaining the inspection warrant did not render the warrant constitutionally invalid. The court held that the omitted information about not seeking consent was not material to the probable cause finding. Additionally, the court found that the violation of the statutory requirement did not affect Anderson's substantial rights and did not require suppression of the evidence.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support Anderson's convictions. The violation notices were properly served, Anderson was responsible for maintenance, and he knowingly failed to comply with the correction orders for at least 90 days. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Anderson's convictions and sentences.

State v. Hodges

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-0121

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: MACDONALD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) involving a minor, including two counts of cunnilingus, two counts of vaginal intercourse, and one count of a pattern of sexual assaults causing severe mental anguish or trauma. The assaults occurred between December 2017 and December 2020, and the victim disclosed them in April 2021. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the pattern sexual assault charge and errors in the trial court's handling of certain records.

The Superior Court conducted a jury trial in November 2022. The trial court reviewed the victim's DCYF and counseling records in camera, disclosing some DCYF records but none of the counseling records. The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments for insufficient evidence was denied, and the jury found him guilty on all counts.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court first addressed the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly regarding the "extreme mental anguish or trauma" element of the pattern AFSA charge. The court found that the victim's testimony about her emotional distress, nightmares, and difficulty trusting people, along with her demeanor during testimony and interviews, provided sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find extreme mental anguish or trauma. Thus, the court concluded there was no plain error.

The court also reviewed the trial court's handling of the in camera review of the victim's records. It determined that the trial court applied the correct standard and that its decisions regarding the disclosure of the records were not clearly unreasonable or untenable. Consequently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court's decisions and the defendant's convictions.

State v. Van Uden

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0616

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: MACDONALD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On August 2, 2021, the defendant drove through a red light at high speed in Manchester, New Hampshire, hitting three vehicles and causing significant damage. His car flipped over and landed on another vehicle, leading to a multi-car collision. A paramedic found the defendant unconscious with symptoms suggesting opioid use and administered Narcan. At the hospital, a police officer observed the defendant's lethargy and pinpoint pupils, indicative of opioid influence.

The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including second-degree assault and reckless conduct. Before trial, he moved to exclude testimony from a paramedic and a victim about signs of opioid use, arguing it was inadmissible expert testimony. The Superior Court allowed the testimony, provided it was based on the witnesses' observations. The jury convicted the defendant on five counts of reckless conduct but acquitted him of disobeying a police officer. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to merge the reckless conduct charges for sentencing, resulting in five separate sentences.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting lay witness testimony about opioid use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's reckless conduct. The court also found that the defendant's argument against the State's closing argument references to opioid use was not preserved for appeal. However, the court agreed with the defendant that the reckless conduct charges should be merged for sentencing, as the statute focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than the number of persons endangered. The court affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's decision on sentencing and remanded for further proceedings.

State v. Voight

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0244

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: BASSETT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of three counts of domestic violence simple assault following a jury trial. The incidents occurred during two altercations between the defendant and the complainant on October 12 and October 15, 2019. The complainant recorded a video of the October 12 altercation on her cell phone. The defendant moved to exclude excerpts of this video, arguing that he had not received the entire video despite multiple discovery requests. The trial court granted this motion.

Before the trial began, the State intended to have a detective testify about the content of the excluded video excerpts. The defendant objected, arguing that this would undermine the court’s prior ruling. The trial court allowed the detective’s testimony and instructed the jury that it could consider the absence of the rest of the video in determining whether the State had met its burden of proof. The jury convicted the defendant on the October 12 charges but acquitted him on the October 15 charge.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in admitting the detective’s testimony about the excluded video excerpts. The court held that this ruling was inconsistent with the trial court’s prior decision to exclude the video excerpts and that the inconsistency prejudiced the defendant’s case. The court noted that the detective’s testimony corroborated the complainant’s account and bolstered her credibility, which was crucial in a case that hinged on the complainant’s credibility.

The Supreme Court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the erroneously admitted testimony likely influenced the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State v. Applewhite

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 39A22

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Barringer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Between December 2012 and March 2015, the defendant met several women, including A.C., H.M., A.B., and M.F., and supplied them with heroin, leading to their addiction. The defendant used heroin to coerce the women into prostitution, which he and his wife arranged through online advertisements on Backpage. The women paid the defendant for heroin and basic needs, often more than the heroin's worth. The defendant withheld drugs, food, sleep, and communication means from the women, occasionally locking them in his basement or hotel rooms. He transported the women across North Carolina and to other states for prostitution.

The defendant was indicted and convicted of multiple counts of human trafficking, promoting prostitution, conspiracy to promote prostitution, and attaining habitual felon status. The trial court sentenced him to 240 to 312 years in prison and required him to register as a sex offender. The defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which issued a divided opinion finding no error in the trial court's judgments. The dissenting judge argued that human trafficking is a continuing offense and that the defendant should only be convicted of a single count of human trafficking per victim.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the statutory language of N.C.G.S. § 14-43.11 is clear and unambiguous, allowing for multiple counts of human trafficking per victim. Each distinct act of recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a victim constitutes a separate offense. The court also found that the trial court erred in calculating the defendant's prior record level but concluded that this error did not prejudice the defendant, as his federal firearms conviction is substantially similar to a Class G felony in North Carolina.

State v. Davenport

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 155PA22

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Earls

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Travis Davenport was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder of Mike Griffin. The evidence showed that Davenport and Griffin had a tumultuous relationship, culminating in a physical altercation. On the night before Griffin's murder, Davenport was seen at Griffin's home, and they exchanged several phone calls. The next morning, Griffin was found dead with multiple stab wounds, and his wallet and phone were missing. Davenport was later arrested, and another inmate testified that Davenport confessed to killing Griffin to steal $10,000 from him.

In Superior Court, Martin County, Davenport's motion to dismiss the robbery charge was denied, and he was convicted of both charges. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the State had not presented substantial evidence for the robbery charge and that the admission of evidence regarding Davenport's prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos constituted plain error. The appellate court also found that a hearsay statement, "Dianne to the house," was inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the State had presented substantial evidence for each element of the robbery with a dangerous weapon charge and Davenport's identity as the perpetrator. The Court also ruled that the admission of evidence related to Davenport's prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos did not amount to plain error, as it did not prejudice the jury's decision. Lastly, the Court determined that the statement "Dianne to the house" was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

State v. Daw

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 174PA21

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Berger

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was sentenced to multiple consecutive terms of imprisonment in 2019 for obtaining property by false pretenses. In June 2020, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming his detention was unlawful due to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety's inability to protect him from COVID-19, which he argued violated the Eighth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied his petition.

The Superior Court of Wake County summarily denied the petition, citing N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2), which mandates denial of habeas corpus applications when the petitioner is held under a valid final judgment by a competent court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but held that N.C.G.S. § 17-33(2) provided an exception to the rule in § 17-4(2). Despite acknowledging the case was moot due to the petitioner's release, the Court of Appeals applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and proceeded to the merits.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2) requires summary denial of habeas corpus applications for those detained by a final judgment of a competent court. The Court found no conflict between §§ 17-4 and 17-33, as the latter applies only to those detained by civil process, not criminal judgments. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, emphasizing that habeas corpus relief is not available under the circumstances presented by the petitioner.

State v. Phillips

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 281A23

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Berger

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On April 4, 2021, Latoyna Dunlap approached Angela Benita Phillips' home, believing Phillips had complained about her to their landlord. Witnesses provided conflicting accounts of Dunlap's demeanor and the events that followed. A confrontation ensued, during which Phillips either slapped Dunlap or struck her with a gun. Phillips then fired multiple shots at Dunlap, one of which caused severe injuries. Phillips was arrested and indicted for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. At trial, Phillips claimed self-defense and defense of habitation, requesting relevant jury instructions.

The Superior Court of Cumberland County, presided over by Judge James F. Ammons, Jr., expressed concerns about the castle doctrine instruction, suggesting it might allow excessive force. The court modified the instruction to include a prohibition on excessive force, despite objections from Phillips' counsel. The jury found Phillips guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and she was sentenced to 25 to 42 months in prison. Phillips appealed the decision.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided panel, vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, agreeing with Phillips that the trial court's instruction on excessive force was erroneous and confusing. The majority held that under the castle doctrine, excessive force is impossible unless the State rebuts the presumption of reasonable fear. One judge dissented, arguing that the statutory castle doctrine defense aligns with common law defenses, including the prohibition against excessive force.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and clarified the castle doctrine. The court held that the statutory presumption of reasonable fear under the castle doctrine can only be rebutted by specific circumstances listed in the statute. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding of instructional error but vacated its prejudice determination, remanding for proper consideration of whether the error prejudiced Phillips.

Gaddie v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 170

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

David Gaddie was charged with four counts of gross sexual imposition for allegedly sexually abusing a child. In a separate case, he was charged with three counts of gross sexual imposition for allegedly abusing the child's mother, but those charges were dismissed. The case involving the child proceeded to trial, and Gaddie was found guilty on all counts. On direct appeal, one conviction was reversed due to an issue with jury instructions.

Gaddie then filed an application for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The State moved for partial summary dismissal, arguing that Gaddie should have raised the prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal. The district court reserved ruling on this motion and held a hearing. During the hearing, it was revealed that the State had introduced a video containing statements about Gaddie abusing the child's mother, which Gaddie’s attorney had objected to during the trial. The district court denied the State's motion for partial summary dismissal but ultimately denied Gaddie’s application for postconviction relief, reasoning that the situation was a misunderstanding rather than intentional misconduct.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred because the State introduced inadmissible prior bad act evidence without providing the required notice under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b). The Court held that this misconduct prejudiced Gaddie’s right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment denying postconviction relief and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the criminal judgment and enter any supplementary orders required by law.

Cotten v. Frederick

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-3250

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1976, Prince Charles Cotten Sr. was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The conviction included specifications for killing a police officer while attempting to escape apprehension. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, which declared Ohio's death-penalty statute unconstitutional, the Ohio Supreme Court commuted Cotten's sentence to life imprisonment.

Cotten filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeals in July 2023, arguing that his conviction and life sentence were invalid because they were based on an unconstitutional statute. The warden moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that Cotten's life sentence had not expired and that the sentencing court had jurisdiction. The court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Cotten was imprisoned under a valid judgment from a court with proper jurisdiction and that his life sentence had not expired.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal. The court held that Cotten's life sentence was valid and that his arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of his original death sentence and the need for resentencing by a three-judge trial court were without merit. The court also denied Cotten's motion to strike documents attached to the warden's merit brief, which included a 2003 habeas corpus petition filed by Cotten that advanced similar arguments. The court concluded that Cotten's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus and that the sentencing errors he alleged were not jurisdictional.

State v. Mosley

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 22-13

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In August 2014, a gunman entered a barbershop in East Providence, Rhode Island, resulting in the fatal shooting of Yusef A’Vant. Thomas Mosley was implicated in the crime, with key testimony from Evan Watson, who admitted to providing the gun and driving Mosley to and from the scene. Watson testified that Mosley retrieved a loaded revolver from the car's glove compartment before entering the barbershop. Additional testimony from Seth Waters, who was present during the incident, and Rithy Suon, Mosley’s then-girlfriend, further implicated Mosley. Suon testified that Mosley showed her a composite sketch of the suspect and later instructed her to deny recognizing voices on a recording. Michael Drepaul, who recorded a conversation with Mosley, also testified, corroborating Watson’s account.

In the first trial, Mosley was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and obstruction of justice. The jury deadlocked on the murder and conspiracy charges. The trial justice granted a new trial for the firearm discharge charge but denied it for the other convictions. In the second trial, Mosley was convicted of second-degree murder and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence but acquitted of conspiracy to commit murder. He was sentenced to consecutive life sentences and additional time for being a habitual offender.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court found no error in the trial justice’s decisions, including the denial of motions to suppress evidence, the admission of Google Wi-Fi data, and the joinder of charges. The court also rejected Mosley’s claims of double jeopardy, improper jury instructions, and alleged violations of his rights during the trial. The court concluded that the trial justice had acted within his discretion and that the evidence supported the jury’s verdicts.

State v. Green

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: M2022-00899-SC-R11-CD

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: PAGE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

During a routine traffic stop, law enforcement conducted an open-air sniff using a drug-sniffing canine. The canine alerted to the vehicle, leading officers to search it without a warrant under the automobile exception. Inside a backpack, they found marijuana, a loaded handgun, Ziploc bags, and a scale. The defendant, a passenger, was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the canine could not distinguish between legal hemp and illegal marijuana.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges, finding the canine's reliability was not established due to its inability to differentiate between hemp and marijuana. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the smell of illegal marijuana provides probable cause to search a vehicle and that law enforcement had probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and clarified that a positive alert from a drug-sniffing canine does not establish a per se rule of probable cause but should be considered within the totality of the circumstances. The court held that a positive indication from a drug-sniffing canine may still contribute to a finding of probable cause despite the legalization of hemp. Examining the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to search the vehicle. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstating the indictments against the defendant and remanding for further proceedings.

Keefe v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 93

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: JAROSH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rickey Dean Keefe was sentenced to three to six years in prison in 2020 for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. While on parole in 2022, he was arrested and pled guilty to two new felony drug charges. In 2023, the district court sentenced him to seven to ten years in prison for the 2022 convictions but did not specify if the sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with the 2020 sentence. The Wyoming Board of Parole revoked his parole and treated the 2023 sentence as consecutive. Keefe filed a motion to correct the allegedly illegal sentence, which the district court denied.

The District Court of Campbell County initially sentenced Keefe to five to seven years in prison in 2016, suspended in favor of probation. After multiple probation violations, the court imposed the 2020 sentence. In 2022, Keefe was arrested again and pled guilty to new charges. The district court merged the two counts for sentencing and imposed a single sentence of seven to ten years in 2023. Keefe's motion to correct the sentence argued that the sentences should run concurrently, but the district court denied the motion, citing precedent that sentences are presumed consecutive when the court is silent on the matter.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Keefe’s motion. The court clarified that under Wyoming law, a sentence is presumed to be consecutive when the sentencing court is silent on whether it is concurrent or consecutive. The district court's subsequent order confirmed that the sentences should run consecutively. The court also rejected Keefe's argument that the State should be bound by its incorrect statement that sentences are presumed concurrent, noting that courts are not bound by parties’ admissions of law.

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Keefe's sentence was not illegal.