Rosa v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1523

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Montecalvo

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Edson Pires Rosa, a citizen of Cape Verde, entered the U.S. on a visitor visa in 2015, which expired later that year. His mother, a lawful permanent resident, filed a petition for him, which was approved, but his subsequent application for adjustment of status was denied. In 2019, Rosa was accused of participating in a sexual assault, leading to a police report and a pending criminal charge. Despite his denial of the allegations, he was placed in removal proceedings for overstaying his visa. Rosa applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure.

The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Rosa's asylum and withholding of removal applications but granted voluntary departure. Rosa appealed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case to consider his adjustment of status application after his mother became a U.S. citizen. On remand, a new IJ denied his adjustment of status and voluntary departure requests, citing the pending criminal charge as a significant negative factor. Rosa appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ's decision, finding no error in the reliance on the police report and pending charge.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in deeming Rosa's challenge to the voluntary departure denial as waived and vacated the BIA's decision on both adjustment of status and voluntary departure. The court remanded the case to the BIA to reconsider these issues, particularly whether the police report and pending charge alone could justify the denial of discretionary relief without corroborating evidence, as required by precedent.

United States v. Moran-Stenson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1842

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: MONTECALVO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2023, Shaiquan Moran-Stenson pled guilty to unlawfully possessing ammunition as a felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine enhanced his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), citing a prior Maine drug trafficking conviction. Moran-Stenson objected, arguing that his Maine conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for the enhancement.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine overruled Moran-Stenson's objection, applying the modified categorical approach to determine that his Maine drug trafficking conviction was a predicate offense. The court found that the Maine statute was divisible and that the specific drug involved, cocaine base, was a federally controlled substance. Consequently, the court sentenced Moran-Stenson to seventy-seven months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the district court correctly applied the modified categorical approach. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Maine statute's "scheduled drugs" component was divisible. The court concluded that the specific drug trafficked, cocaine base, was an element of the offense, allowing the use of the modified categorical approach. The court found that Moran-Stenson's prior conviction for trafficking cocaine base qualified as a predicate controlled substance offense under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), justifying the sentencing enhancement.

United States v. Boima

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6115

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Samuel Boima, a native of Sierra Leone, was charged with assaulting federal officers at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility while awaiting deportation. The incident involved Boima spitting a mixture of saliva and blood on the officers. Following his arrest, Boima exhibited uncooperative and erratic behavior, leading to a court-ordered psychological evaluation. Dr. Kari Schlessinger diagnosed Boima with a psychotic disorder, concluding he was incompetent to stand trial. Boima was subsequently committed to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina, for further evaluation.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York found Boima incompetent to stand trial and ordered his hospitalization. Dr. Kristina P. Lloyd and Dr. Charles Cloutier at FMC Butner diagnosed Boima with schizophrenia and recommended antipsychotic medication to restore his competency. The government moved for a Sell hearing to authorize involuntary medication. The district court granted the motion but did not address whether the government had an important interest in prosecuting Boima, a necessary finding under Sell v. United States.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing forced medication, noting the lower court's failure to consider whether important governmental interests were at stake, as required by Sell. The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the government’s interest in prosecuting Boima justified involuntary medication, considering factors such as the seriousness of the crime, potential civil commitment, and the time Boima had already spent in custody.

United States v. Rivera

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2081

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: NATHAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Victor Rivera participated in a robbery crew responsible for over a dozen robberies of jewelers and luxury watch owners between October 2019 and November 2020. The crew identified victims on social media and ambushed them, often at gunpoint. Rivera was arrested and indicted on 18 counts. He pled guilty to one count of participating in a Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy under a plea agreement with a stipulated Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted Rivera's plea agreement. However, the Probation Office's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) revealed additional convictions in Puerto Rico, increasing Rivera's criminal history points from three to ten, placing him in Criminal History Category V. The Government, agreeing with the PSR, advocated for a revised Guidelines range of 235 to 240 months. Rivera's defense argued that the Government should have reviewed his criminal history more thoroughly before the plea agreement. The district court sentenced Rivera to 235 months’ imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Rivera argued that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher Guidelines range based on information available at the time of the plea and by describing him as a leader in the conspiracy. The court found that the Government breached the plea agreement by relying on Rivera’s Puerto Rico convictions, which were available at the time of the plea. However, this breach did not amount to a "plain" error. The court also found no error in the Government's description of Rivera as a leader, as it was relevant to the sentencing factors. Rivera's procedural and substantive challenges to his sentence were rejected, and his request for resentencing due to a recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines was denied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Kalu v. Spaulding

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1103

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Scirica

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.

Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect.

United States v. Sok

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1939

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: AMBRO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A Philadelphia police officer stopped Sunny Sok for making an illegal right turn. During the stop, the officer discovered that Sok's vehicle had an expired registration and mistakenly believed there was an active arrest warrant for Sok. The officer arrested Sok and claimed to smell marijuana from the vehicle, leading to a search that uncovered narcotics and a firearm. Sok was charged with drug and firearm offenses and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unlawful.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held a suppression hearing and found the officer's testimony about the marijuana odor not credible, thus ruling there was no probable cause for the search. However, the court denied Sok's motion to suppress, concluding that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered under Philadelphia’s Live Stop Policy, which mandates impounding unregistered vehicles and conducting inventory searches.

Sok appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the inevitable-discovery doctrine should not apply because the Government did not prove that impoundment of his vehicle was lawful or inevitable under the Live Stop Policy. The Third Circuit noted that Sok failed to raise these arguments in the District Court and thus could not consider them unless Sok showed good cause for the failure. The court found that Sok did not demonstrate good cause, as his counsel's misunderstanding of the law did not suffice. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, upholding Sok's conviction and sentence.

USA v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-1970

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Porter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Joseph Johnson was convicted of making a false statement and aggravated identity theft after he used a lawyer’s signature without consent to file an exhibit in federal court. This exhibit accused a plaintiff in a separate case of underreporting taxable income. The government prosecuted Johnson, and a jury convicted him. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later vacated his conviction, finding that the government failed to prove the materiality of Johnson’s false statement.

Johnson then sought compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 1495, which requires proving that he did not cause his own prosecution through misconduct or neglect. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied his petition, concluding that Johnson’s use of the lawyer’s signature was misconduct that directly led to his prosecution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Johnson’s misconduct was a but-for cause of his prosecution, meaning that if he had not filed the exhibit using the lawyer’s signature, the government would not have prosecuted him. Therefore, Johnson could not satisfy the requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2) that he did not cause his own prosecution by misconduct or neglect. The court emphasized that the statutory language did not incorporate proximate causation principles and that Johnson’s actions directly led to his prosecution. Consequently, Johnson was not entitled to a certificate of innocence or compensation.

U.S. v. Olson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-4564

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Rushing

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Timothy Olson, a fifth-grade teacher, used peer-to-peer software to download approximately 100 child pornography videos depicting the sexual abuse of prepubescent children. Olson admitted to downloading the videos and understanding the software due to his master's degree in information systems management. He pled guilty to transporting and possessing child pornography involving minors under twelve.

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina sentenced Olson to 120 months’ imprisonment and a 30-year term of supervised release with numerous special conditions. Olson did not object to these conditions at sentencing. He later appealed, challenging six of the supervised release conditions as substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the plain error standard because Olson did not object to the conditions at the time of sentencing. The court found that each of the six challenged conditions was reasonably related to Olson’s offense, history, and characteristics, and that none involved a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. The conditions included restrictions on interacting with felons, refraining from excessive alcohol use, submitting to suspicionless searches, avoiding places frequented by children, and not possessing children’s items without permission.

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing these conditions. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the conditions were substantively reasonable and aligned with statutory goals of deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation.

United States v. Moody

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-6319

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Diaz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Harry Nolan Moody was convicted in 2002 for conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. He was sentenced as a career offender to 360 months’ imprisonment. If sentenced today, Moody would no longer qualify as a career offender, and the advisory minimum would be 210 months. Moody moved for compassionate release based on this disparity, but the district court denied relief, holding that the sentencing disparity, considering Moody’s individual circumstances, didn’t constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against a reduced sentence.

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially denied Moody’s motion for compassionate release, finding that the career-offender designation only increased his offense level by one level and didn’t impact his criminal history category. Moody appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, directing the district court to reassess the drug quantity attributable to Moody and reevaluate the effect of the career-offender designation on the guidelines range.

On remand, the district court again denied Moody’s motion. It found that Moody was responsible for at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine and concluded that the sentencing disparity didn’t amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The court reasoned that Moody’s conduct fell within the enhancement’s scope and that his criminal history and risk of recidivism justified an upward variance sentence. The court also considered Moody’s age, time served, and rehabilitative efforts but found that these factors, either singly or in combination, didn’t warrant release. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the court didn’t abuse its discretion in its analysis.

US v. Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4564

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Detective Frias of the Richmond Police Department observed an Instagram video showing known gang member J.S. and others brandishing firearms at the Belt Atlantic apartment complex. The video, posted shortly before the incident, depicted two men later identified as Anthony Cornelius Brown, Jr., and Dequane Aquil McCullers. Detectives accessed live surveillance footage showing individuals matching the video’s description at the same location. Upon arrival, the officers approached the men, who attempted to walk away. Brown and McCullers were detained and frisked, leading to the discovery of firearms.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Brown and McCullers' motions to suppress the evidence of the firearms. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendants based on the video and their behavior. Brown and McCullers entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown and McCullers based on the Instagram video and their actions upon the officers' arrival. The court also found that the frisk of McCullers was justified as the officers reasonably believed he was armed. Additionally, the court ruled that the length of Brown’s detention was reasonable given the circumstances and the need to ensure officer safety. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to suppress.

United States v. Plezia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-20483

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Carl E. Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime

Richard Plezia, a Houston-based personal injury attorney, was charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States, making false statements, and falsifying records in a federal investigation. The charges stemmed from allegations that Plezia conspired with other attorneys and case runners to unlawfully reduce the federal income taxes owed by Jeffrey Stern. The scheme involved funneling illegal payments through Plezia to case runner Marcus Esquivel, which were then falsely reported as attorney referral fees.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a fifteen-day jury trial, where Plezia was convicted on all counts. Plezia challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for one count, and the admission of certain witness testimonies. The district court denied his motions for acquittal and a new trial, and sentenced him to six months and one day in prison, followed by two years of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Plezia that the statute of limitations for the false statements charge was not subject to equitable tolling and vacated his conviction on that count, remanding with instructions to dismiss it with prejudice. However, the court affirmed the remaining convictions, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the conspiracy and falsification charges. The court also held that any error in admitting witness testimonies was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

United States v. Smith

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-20354

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Sha Kendrick Smith was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for enticing a minor to engage in prostitution. The minor victim (MV) was a thirteen-year-old runaway who was a ward of the state. Smith provided MV with a cell phone and took her to various locations where she engaged in commercial sex with multiple men, with Smith keeping the money. MV initially told Smith she was eighteen, but he later learned she was underage. MV described Smith as always carrying a gun and being feared by those who knew him. Smith was eventually arrested after MV reported her situation to the police.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas sentenced Smith to 235 months of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. The court applied two sentencing enhancements: one under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) for undue influence over the minor and another under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) for MV’s status as a vulnerable victim. Smith objected to these enhancements, but the district court overruled his objections, adopting the presentence investigation report (PSR) and the government’s arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s application of both sentencing enhancements. It found that the district court’s determination that Smith unduly influenced MV was plausible given the evidence of Smith’s control over MV, including his age, size, possession of a gun, and the fear he instilled in others. The court also upheld the vulnerable-victim enhancement, noting that MV’s age, status as a ward of the state, and economic desperation made her unusually vulnerable, and Smith knew or should have known of her vulnerabilities. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its findings and affirmed Smith’s sentence.

Standard Insurance Co. v. Guy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-5562

Opinion Date: August 19, 2024

Judge: LARSEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, ERISA, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Trusts & Estates

Joel M. Guy, Jr. murdered his parents in 2016 with the intent to collect the proceeds from his mother’s insurance plans. His mother had life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance through her employer, naming Guy and his father as beneficiaries. Guy was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and abuse of a corpse by a Tennessee jury.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee determined that Guy would be entitled to the insurance proceeds if not disqualified. However, the court ruled that Guy was disqualified under Tennessee’s slayer statute or federal common law, which prevents a murderer from benefiting from their crime. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Guy’s family members, who argued that Guy was not entitled to the benefits. Guy appealed, arguing that ERISA preempts Tennessee’s slayer statute and that no federal common-law slayer rule applies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that ERISA does not explicitly address the issue of a beneficiary who murders the insured, and thus, either Tennessee law or federal common law must apply. The court found that both Tennessee’s slayer statute and federal common law would disqualify Guy from receiving the insurance proceeds. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Guy’s actions disqualified him from benefiting from his mother’s insurance plans under both state and federal law.

United States v. Ellis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3147

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Don Ellis committed a carjacking and bank robbery in Toledo, Ohio, on August 13, 2018. He threatened a gas station customer with a gun, stole a car and $200, and later robbed a Fifth Third Bank. The police tracked him using a GPS device hidden in the stolen money, leading to a high-speed chase and his arrest. Ellis escaped from jail two days later but was recaptured five days after that. A federal grand jury indicted him on six counts, including carjacking, bank robbery, escape, unlawful firearm possession, and two counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio accepted Ellis's guilty plea to all six counts under a plea agreement, which included a waiver of his right to appeal except under specific circumstances. Ellis later moved to withdraw his plea, arguing he did not understand the appeal waiver's implications. The district court denied his motion, finding that he had been adequately informed of his rights and the plea agreement's terms. At sentencing, the court rejected Ellis's argument that the indictment failed to state a § 924(c) offense and sentenced him to 201 months in prison, as agreed in the plea deal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Ellis argued that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea and that the indictment was flawed. However, the court found that Ellis had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement. The court also held that the alleged indictment error did not affect the district court's jurisdiction and could be waived. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss Ellis's appeal.

United States v. O'Hara

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5695

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Nalbandian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Trusts & Estates

John O’Hara pleaded guilty to wire fraud and bank fraud for misappropriating funds from his mother, Sally Thrush. Thrush passed away shortly after his plea, leaving O’Hara as the sole beneficiary of her estate. At sentencing, the district court ordered O’Hara to pay over $300,000 in restitution to Thrush’s estate, despite knowing that O’Hara would likely receive the restitution as the estate’s beneficiary. Four years later, the district court amended the judgment to direct O’Hara to pay the federal Crime Victims Fund instead of the estate.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially sentenced O’Hara to twenty-six months in prison and ordered him to pay restitution to his mother’s estate. After O’Hara’s release from prison, the district court, prompted by the government, amended the judgment to substitute the Crime Victims Fund as the payee, reasoning that allowing O’Hara to receive his own restitution would be contrary to the intent of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court did not have the authority to modify the final judgment to substitute a new payee. The appellate court held that the MVRA, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2), does not provide the statutory authority to amend a restitution order post-judgment. The court emphasized that a final restitution order can only be modified under specific statutory provisions, none of which applied in this case. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case.

Stowe v. Rybroek

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-3345

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2004, Graham Stowe was charged with violent offenses against his former girlfriend and her family. He pleaded no contest, claiming insanity, which a state judge accepted, leading to his commitment for 39.5 years unless he recovered earlier. Released in 2007, Stowe was soon re-incarcerated for violating release conditions and later escaped in 2013, using drugs while free. After serving a sentence for escape, Stowe sought release in 2016 under Wisconsin law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of significant risk to deny release. Expert testimony indicated Stowe had a personality disorder and posed a risk of violence, leading the state circuit court to deny his release, a decision affirmed by the state court of appeals.

Stowe then sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that the Wisconsin statute violated the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Foucha v. Louisiana, by allowing detention without a finding of mental illness. The district court found that Stowe had not preserved an as-applied challenge in state courts and limited the certificate of appealability to whether the statute was facially invalid. The district court upheld the statute, noting it allows consideration of mental history and condition, and thus often includes findings on mental illness.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Stowe failed to show the Wisconsin statute was facially invalid under clearly established federal law, as the statute permits consideration of mental condition and does not inherently violate due process. The court also noted that Stowe's as-applied challenge was not preserved for federal review. Therefore, the court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not entitle Stowe to immediate release.

USA v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2338

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: RIPPLE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Cameron Johnson, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a firearm on September 15, 2019. He pleaded guilty to this charge. The Government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Johnson's three prior robbery convictions under Indiana law. Johnson argued that two of these robberies, committed on January 22, 2009, occurred on the same occasion and thus should not count as separate offenses under ACCA. He also contended that a jury should determine whether the robberies were committed on different occasions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana rejected Johnson's argument, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent that did not require a jury to decide the different-occasions question. The court concluded that the robberies were committed on different occasions and sentenced Johnson to fifteen years in prison, the minimum under ACCA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Erlinger v. United States established that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitle defendants to have a jury decide whether prior offenses were committed on the same or different occasions. Given this precedent, the Seventh Circuit determined that the district court erred in not submitting the different-occasions question to a jury. The court also found that this error was not harmless, as it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found the robberies to be committed on different occasions.

The Seventh Circuit vacated Johnson's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

USA v. Walker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1424

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: PRYOR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In late 1996, Jerry Walker was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) and other drug-related offenses. He was sentenced to life in prison. Following the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Walker sought a sentence reduction in 2020, arguing that his CCE conviction qualified as a "covered offense" under the Act. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially handled Walker's case. After his conviction, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated his statutory penalties, suggesting a mandatory 20 years to life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). The government argued for a mandatory life sentence under § 848(b), the "Super CCE" provision. The court agreed with the PSR's guideline range of life imprisonment but did not explicitly state whether the sentence was under § 848(a) or § 848(b). In 1998, the Seventh Circuit vacated Walker's conspiracy charge but upheld the CCE conviction and life sentence. In 2020, Walker moved for resentencing under the First Step Act, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that his CCE conviction under § 848(a) was not a "covered offense."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no clear error in determining that Walker was sentenced under § 848(a). The court held that a conviction under § 848(a) is not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, as its statutory penalties were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Therefore, Walker was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Walker's motion for First Step Act relief.

Xengxai Yang v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2777

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: BRENNAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Xengxai Yang robbed a credit union in Appleton, Wisconsin, wearing a black mask and armed with a sawed-off rifle. After his arrest, Yang admitted to the robbery, claiming he wanted to "try something new." He was indicted on multiple counts, including armed bank robbery. Yang initially raised an insanity defense but later withdrew it and entered a plea agreement. However, he subsequently sought to withdraw his guilty plea, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. A second psychological evaluation suggested Yang's mental conditions impaired his judgment during the crime. The court allowed Yang to withdraw his plea and reassert the insanity defense, but ultimately found him guilty and sentenced him to 168 months in prison.

Yang did not appeal his conviction directly but filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, Yang withdrew this claim and instead argued that the court's failure to hold a competency hearing violated his due process rights. The district court denied his motion, finding that Yang had procedurally defaulted his competency claim by not raising it earlier and that he was competent during the proceedings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that procedural default bars Yang's competency claim because he failed to raise it on direct appeal and did not demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome the default. The court concluded that Yang's competency claim was procedurally defaulted and dismissed his petition for collateral relief under § 2255.

Roberts v. Payne

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1935

Opinion Date: August 19, 2024

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2000, Karl Roberts was convicted and sentenced to death in Arkansas state court for the rape and murder of his twelve-year-old niece. Roberts waived his right to challenge his conviction on direct appeal, in state postconviction proceedings, and in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Both the Arkansas state trial court and the Arkansas Supreme Court found the waiver to be knowing and voluntary. On the day of his scheduled execution in 2004, Roberts moved for a stay of execution, which was granted, and subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, initiating two decades of litigation.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Roberts’s nineteen habeas corpus claims but granted a certificate of appealability (CoA) on three claims: whether Roberts was intellectually disabled, competent to be tried, and competent to waive his direct appeal. The Eighth Circuit expanded the CoA to include two ineffective assistance of counsel claims: failure to investigate and challenge Roberts’s competency to be tried and failure to investigate and present evidence of Roberts’s mental health as mitigating evidence at sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Roberts’s habeas petition. The court held that the Arkansas courts’ findings that Roberts was not intellectually disabled, was competent to stand trial, and was competent to waive his direct appeal were reasonable and supported by the record. The court also found that Roberts’s trial counsel was not ineffective, as the counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there was no prejudice to Roberts. The court concluded that Roberts failed to show that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the alleged errors by his counsel.

United States v. Bradford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2240

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In July 2018, a tornado damaged Vermeer Corporation’s facilities in Pella, Iowa. Roger Paul Bradford was hired in January 2019 as the Director of Construction to oversee the reconstruction. Bradford conspired with Viorel Draghia to receive kickbacks in exchange for steering construction contracts to Draghia’s company. Bradford shared confidential information with Draghia, who inflated his bids to include kickbacks for Bradford. Vermeer accepted Draghia’s higher bids despite cheaper alternatives. The FBI investigated in 2020, and Draghia admitted to the kickbacks. Bradford was indicted for Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa accepted Bradford’s guilty plea, which included an appeal waiver for his conviction but allowed an appeal of his sentence. The court applied a 10-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, determining a loss of more than $150,000. Bradford was sentenced to 20 months in prison and ordered to pay $23,000 in restitution. Bradford appealed, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction due to a defect in the indictment and challenged the loss calculation and denial of access to certain documents.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appeal waiver was enforceable, and Bradford had not shown a miscarriage of justice. The court found no error in the district court’s loss calculation or its denial of access to Draghia’s Presentence Investigation Report and immigration file. The court also upheld the district court’s consideration of uncharged conduct in sentencing. Bradford’s post-sentencing motions were denied as they were based on the same grounds covered by the appeal waiver.

The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part based on the waiver and affirmed the district court’s judgment.

United States v. Burch

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3356

Opinion Date: August 19, 2024

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Norman Burch was convicted by a jury of attempting to sexually exploit a minor, attempting to receive and receiving child pornography, and committing a felony sex offense involving a minor while required to register as a sex offender. These actions also violated the terms of his supervised release from a prior conviction for possessing child pornography. Burch was sentenced to a combined 420 months of imprisonment for these convictions and violations.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa presided over Burch’s case. The court admitted evidence of Burch’s 2014 conviction for child pornography under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 414(d)(2)(B). Burch objected to this evidence, but the court overruled his objection. The jury found Burch guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 420 months of imprisonment, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. The court also revoked Burch’s supervised release from his previous conviction, imposing an additional 24 months to run concurrently with some counts and consecutively with others.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Burch challenged the admission of his prior conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence for all counts, and the revocation of his supervised release. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior conviction under Rule 414, as it was relevant to show Burch’s propensity to be sexually interested in minors. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Burch’s convictions on all counts, including the attempted sexual exploitation of a minor and the receipt of child pornography. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the revocation of Burch’s supervised release.

United States v. Sully

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3635

Opinion Date: August 19, 2024

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Tina Sully, a foster parent for the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was charged with multiple counts of abusing her three adopted children. The charges stemmed from an incident where 13-year-old C.S. ran away from home and reported to neighbors and authorities that Sully had physically abused her and withheld food. An investigation revealed similar allegations from two other foster children, D.F.H. and G.S. Sully was indicted on ten counts, including assault with a dangerous weapon and felony child abuse.

The first trial in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury. The court scheduled a second trial to begin eighteen days later. Sully requested a continuance twice, citing her counsel's scheduling conflicts and the unavailability of key defense witnesses, but both motions were denied. The second trial proceeded, and Sully objected to the admission of several out-of-court statements under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2) and 807, which the court admitted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sully's motions for a continuance, as she failed to demonstrate how the denial prejudiced her defense. The court also found that even if the admission of the challenged hearsay statements was erroneous, it was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence against Sully, including testimony from C.S., medical professionals, and other witnesses.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Sully's convictions on all counts related to C.S. The court concluded that the denial of the continuance and the admission of hearsay evidence did not warrant a new trial.

CORIA V. GARLAND

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-970

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Bress

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. In 1999, she was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine in California. In 2015, upon returning from a trip to Mexico, she was detained and later charged with inadmissibility due to her drug conviction. She sought cancellation of removal and later moved to terminate the removal proceedings.

The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charges of removability and denied her relief, ordering her removal to Mexico. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), requesting remand to the IJ to pursue derivative U visa status based on her husband's pending U visa application. She also moved for administrative closure of her removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed her appeal and denied both motions, finding it speculative whether she would receive U visa relief and noting the need for an inadmissibility waiver due to her conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motions for remand and administrative closure due to the criminal jurisdiction bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The court found that the petitioner’s motions merged with her final order of removal and that judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. The court also noted that the decision did not disturb the result in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, which requires an agency determination of removability based on a covered conviction for the criminal alien bar to apply. The petition for review was dismissed.

NEISS V. BLUDWORTH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-35877

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Wardlaw

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Patrick Neiss was convicted in Montana state court of deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, based on circumstantial evidence. He filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Neiss argued that his trial counsel failed to challenge the particularity of a search warrant, which led to the discovery of silencer-related internet searches on his computer, and that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal.

The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed Neiss’s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which allows for preliminary screening of habeas petitions. The district court adjudicated the petition on the merits, concluding that Neiss’s trial counsel was not deficient because they had made multiple attempts to suppress the evidence, albeit not on the particularity grounds. The court did not find the petition procedurally defective or frivolous.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Rule 4 standard, which is intended to screen out only those petitions that are procedurally defective or frivolous. The court emphasized that Rule 4 does not permit summary dismissal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that Neiss’s petition alleged a cognizable, non-frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not have been dismissed summarily. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

United States v. Trumbull

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-912

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: John Byron Owens

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Derek Steven Trumbull pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was found with a Glock 17 loaded with a magazine containing seventeen rounds of nine-millimeter ammunition, and he also had two spare magazines. Trumbull had multiple prior felony convictions. He was indicted on federal charges and pled guilty without a plea agreement.

The United States District Court for the District of Montana calculated Trumbull’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), which includes an increase for offenses involving a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. The court applied Application Note 2 of the commentary to § 2K2.1, which defines a large capacity magazine as one that can accept more than fifteen rounds. Trumbull objected, arguing that Application Note 2 was an invalid interpretation under Kisor v. Wilkie. The district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Application Note 2’s definition of “large capacity magazine” warrants deference under Kisor because the term is ambiguous, the interpretation is reasonable, and it meets the criteria for deference. The court found that the district court did not err in applying § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) as interpreted by Application Note 2 to Trumbull’s base offense level. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.

USA V. BELLOT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-10247

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Richard R. Clifton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In early 2018, the DEA began investigating drug smuggling at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and received a tip implicating Lemack Bellot. Using a confidential source (CS), the DEA conducted a series of recorded meetings and phone calls with Bellot, who indicated he had previously smuggled drugs through the airport. Bellot and the CS agreed on plans to smuggle cocaine through SFO on two occasions, with the CS using fake cocaine provided by the DEA. Bellot advised the CS on how to package the drugs and introduced an associate to assist. The CS successfully smuggled the fake cocaine through airport security both times, paying Bellot fees for his assistance.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged Bellot with two counts of attempting to aid and abet possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Bellot was convicted by a jury on both counts. He then moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury instructions and the evidence presented at trial constructively amended the indictment, effectively convicting him of a different crime than the one for which he was indicted. The district court denied his motion, and Bellot appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Bellot’s conviction. The court held that the indictment was not constructively amended. It explained that whether Bellot was charged with aiding and abetting an attempt to possess cocaine or attempting to aid and abet possession of cocaine, the crime charged remained the same: knowingly attempting to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The court also found that the government’s statements during closing arguments did not alter its theory of the case or constructively amend the indictment. The court concluded that Bellot had sufficient notice of the charges against him and that the jury instructions were appropriate. The conviction was affirmed.

USA V. MANNEY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-716

Opinion Date: August 19, 2024

Judge: De Alba

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Gail Manney was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which criminalizes making false statements in connection with the acquisition of firearms. On April 21, 2021, Manney visited Hi-Cap Firearms in Reno, Nevada, and selected seven handguns to purchase. She filled out the required ATF Form 4473, certifying she was the actual purchaser. However, after her purchase, a Hi-Cap employee suspected her of being a straw purchaser and contacted the ATF. Upon investigation, ATF Special Agent Joshua Caron found incriminating messages on Manney’s phone indicating she was buying the firearms for her son, Razaaq, a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms.

The United States District Court for the District of Nevada indicted Manney on May 27, 2021, for making false statements on ATF Form 4473. She was convicted after a jury trial. Manney appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) violated her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was not material under the statute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Manney’s Second Amendment challenge, stating that the Second Amendment does not protect false statements. The court emphasized that § 922(a)(6) regulates false statements made during firearm acquisitions, not the possession of firearms. The court also dismissed Manney’s argument regarding the materiality of her false statement, citing Abramski v. United States, which held that a false statement about the actual purchaser of a firearm is material even if the actual purchaser could legally possess a firearm.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Manney’s conviction, concluding that § 922(a)(6) did not violate her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was material under the statute.

Ritchie v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12117

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: NEWSOM

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Sarah Ritchie, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of her motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Ritchie had pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). She argued that her trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise her that the facts of her case might not support a conviction if the law developed in a particular way.

The district court, after reviewing Ritchie's motion, concluded that her lawyer's failure to advise her on a "novel and unsettled point of law" did not amount to deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that the existing legal precedent did not suggest that the facts of Ritchie's case were legally insufficient to support a conviction under § 2251(a). Consequently, the district court denied her motion and her request for an evidentiary hearing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Ritchie's lawyer was not constitutionally ineffective. The court noted that at the time of Ritchie's plea, there was no on-point decision suggesting that her conduct fell outside the scope of § 2251(a). The court emphasized that an attorney's failure to predict future legal developments does not constitute ineffective assistance. Given the state of the law at the time, the court found that it was not unreasonable for Ritchie's lawyer to advise her to accept the plea deal, which resulted in a significantly reduced sentence compared to the potential maximum.

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Ritchie's lawyer's performance was not deficient and affirmed the district court's denial of her § 2255 motion.

P. v. Brannon-Thompson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097565(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Wiseman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2018, the defendant was sentenced to 12 years in state prison for multiple offenses, including shooting at an occupied vehicle and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. In 2022, the trial court recalled the sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, struck a prior prison term enhancement, and resentenced the defendant to 11 years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the reimposition of the upper term.

The Superior Court of Butte County initially sentenced the defendant to 12 years, considering his criminal history and the severity of his offenses. The court found that the circumstances in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation. In 2022, the same court struck the prior prison term enhancement but maintained the upper term for the other offenses, resulting in an 11-year sentence.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), the trial court was not required to find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was previously imposed. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in reimposing the upper term and that the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, as there was no sound legal basis for such an objection. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's resentencing order.

P. v. Green

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082232(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1998, Denail Shane Green was charged with possessing cocaine base with intent to sell. The information also alleged a prison prior for a 1990 robbery conviction and two prior strike offenses, including the robbery and a lewd act involving a minor. Green was acquitted of the possession charge but convicted of a lesser offense. He admitted to the prior convictions and was sentenced to 26 years to life, including a one-year enhancement for the prison prior.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Green as potentially serving an invalid enhancement under Senate Bill 483, which retroactively invalidated certain prison prior enhancements. Green sought resentencing under the new law. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied his request, reasoning that his prison prior enhancement remained valid because he served concurrent terms for both the robbery and the lewd act.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the enhancement was not imposed for a sexually violent offense as required by the new law. The information had only alleged the robbery as the basis for the enhancement, not the lewd act. Therefore, the enhancement was invalid under section 1172.75. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a full resentencing, directing the trial court to eliminate the invalid enhancement and apply any other changes in the law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.

P. v. Guenther

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H049810(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Danner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of 20 counts of oral copulation by duress and sodomy by duress against an employee, Jane Doe. The relationship began consensually but evolved into a coercive and abusive dynamic. The defendant required Doe to perform daily oral and anal sex, threatening her employment and pay if she refused. Doe testified that she initially participated willingly but later felt compelled due to the defendant's escalating control and threats.

The Santa Clara County Superior Court sentenced the defendant to 60 years in prison, with consecutive lower terms of three years for each count. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions on duress and the reasonable mistake of fact defense. He also contended that the court improperly allowed Doe to testify about his state of mind and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in its instructions on duress, finding that the prosecution's theory of duress was supported by the evidence of the defendant's control and threats. The court also upheld the reasonable mistake of fact instruction, consistent with established precedent requiring the defendant's belief in consent to be reasonable. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing Doe's testimony about the defendant's state of mind, as it was based on her observations and experience. Finally, the court rejected the defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment, concluding that the 60-year sentence was not disproportionate given the nature of the offenses and the defendant's conduct.

The judgment was affirmed.

P. v. Holliday

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080471(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Buchanan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, two defendants were tried for multiple assaultive incidents that occurred in 2017. The first incident involved the defendants accosting a man in Pacific Beach, where one defendant punched the victim and the other stole his bike. The second incident took place in Chula Vista, where the defendants attempted to rob a man carrying a shopping bag. The third incident occurred in the Gaslamp Quarter, where one defendant punched an inebriated man, leading to a brawl during which the other defendant fatally stabbed one man and seriously injured another.

The Superior Court of San Diego County found both defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery for the Pacific Beach and Chula Vista incidents. One defendant was also found guilty of premeditated murder, attempted murder, and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury for the Gaslamp Quarter incident. The other defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury for the same incident.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred by giving a modified version of CALCRIM No. 375, which used a preponderance of the evidence standard for the jury’s consideration of evidence of the charged Pacific Beach and Chula Vista crimes. This instruction effectively lowered the prosecution’s burden of proving those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a structural error is reversible per se.

The Court of Appeal reversed both defendants’ convictions for the Pacific Beach and Chula Vista crimes (counts 5–7) and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the remaining convictions related to the Gaslamp Quarter incident, finding no prejudicial error in those respects.

P. v. Ramirez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G063224(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two police officers on routine patrol stopped a car for a traffic violation. Officer Booth approached the driver, Luis Ramirez, while Officer Driscoll approached the passenger side. Booth ordered Ramirez out of the car after noticing a bulge at Ramirez’s waistband, suspecting he might be armed. As Ramirez exited the car, Driscoll saw a handgun behind the driver’s seat. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the stop.

The Superior Court of Orange County granted Ramirez’s motion to suppress, reasoning that there was no change in circumstances regarding the officers’ safety between the beginning of the stop and the point at which Ramirez was removed from his car. The court dismissed the case because the prosecution could not proceed without the excluded evidence. The Orange County District Attorney appealed the decision.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that under the Fourth Amendment, once a vehicle is lawfully detained for a traffic violation, an officer may order the driver to exit the vehicle without any additional justification. The court determined that Officer Booth’s actions were permissible and that there were no Fourth Amendment violations. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal order and remanded the matter with directions to deny Ramirez’s motion to suppress evidence.

People v. Obermueller

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B327891(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kurt Brady Obermueller was convicted of stalking Kathy B., a former girlfriend from junior high school, after a 30-year hiatus in contact. In 2018, Obermueller began sending Kathy B. sexually charged and threatening emails, texts, and online communications. Despite a restraining order issued in 2019, he continued his harassment by sending messages to Kathy B.'s father and sister, who forwarded them to her. These messages included disturbing references to weapons and violence, causing Kathy B. significant distress and fear for her safety.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially handled the case, where Obermueller was charged with stalking and disobeying a court order. He was convicted on both counts and sentenced to five years in custody. Obermueller appealed, arguing that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted stalking, based on his claim that he only contacted Kathy B.'s family members and not her directly.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the method of conveying threats is irrelevant under the stalking statute, which requires only that the defendant made a credible threat with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear. The court found that Obermueller's actions constituted completed stalking, not attempted stalking, as he was recklessly aware that his messages would be perceived as threatening. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on attempted stalking, as there was no substantial evidence to support the lesser offense. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

People v. Sorto

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B331652(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Egerton

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Eddie Sorto was sentenced to over 100 years in prison for crimes committed at age 15, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, assault, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. The jury found multiple special-circumstance allegations and enhancements true. After serving 15 years, Sorto petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and thus entitled him to relief under equal protection principles.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Sorto’s petition, stating that he was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d) because he had not been sentenced to an explicit LWOP term. The court did not address Sorto’s equal protection argument directly but noted that he was eligible for parole after 25 years under section 3051, which it found sufficient to deny the petition.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms are entitled to relief under section 1170(d) based on equal protection guarantees. The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the case People v. Heard was wrongly decided and contrary to California Supreme Court precedent. The court also held that parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render offenders ineligible for relief under section 1170(d).

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Sorto’s petition and remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether Sorto meets the other requirements for relief under section 1170(d).

Sellers v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C100036(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On November 5, 2021, Davonyae Sellers was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police for a minor traffic violation. During the stop, officers observed a marijuana rolling tray and loose marijuana on the vehicle's floorboard. Despite the driver’s denial of any marijuana in the vehicle, officers found 0.36 grams of loose marijuana and a firearm under the passenger seat. Sellers was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm.

The magistrate denied Sellers' motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search, reasoning that the loose marijuana constituted contraband under Vehicle Code section 23222, subdivision (b). Sellers renewed the suppression motion under Penal Code section 995, which was also denied by the trial court. Sellers then filed a petition for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition, arguing the search lacked probable cause.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the search was supported by probable cause. It held that the loose marijuana, although lawful in amount, was contraband because it was not in a closed container, violating section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4). The court also found that the totality of circumstances, including the suspects' nervousness, false statements, and the presence of a marijuana rolling tray, provided probable cause for the search. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay order was terminated upon finality of the opinion.

State v. Yuen

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-21-0000679

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: McKENNA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Military Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves a motor vehicle collision near the entrance to Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, where Charles Yuen allegedly rear-ended another car. Military police (MPs) arrived at the scene, identified Yuen as the driver, and conducted field sobriety tests and a preliminary alcohol screening. They then detained Yuen until Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers arrived, who conducted their own tests and arrested Yuen for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII).

The District Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawai'i adjudicated Yuen guilty of OVUII based on the testimony of HPD officers. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction, finding that there was substantial evidence to support it. However, the ICA did not find sufficient evidence in the record to establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence based on a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that Yuen's trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the MPs, which could have been considered a violation of the PCA. The court found that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as it potentially impaired a meritorious defense. The court also agreed with the ICA that there was substantial evidence to support Yuen's conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Yuen's OVUII conviction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Wurdemann v. State

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 50403

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

John David Wurdemann was convicted of seven felonies related to a 2000 attack on a woman in Canyon County, Idaho. Sixteen years later, a district court granted his petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his convictions due to ineffective assistance of counsel. This decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2017. Wurdemann was not retried. In 2021, Idaho enacted the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act, which allows for compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals who meet specific criteria. Wurdemann filed a petition under this Act seeking compensation and a certificate of innocence.

The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Wurdemann had not established that the basis for vacating his conviction was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence, as required by the Act. Wurdemann appealed this decision.

The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and interpreted the statutory language of the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act. The Court held that the phrase “not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence” means “legal error related to his factual innocence.” The Court concluded that the legal error in Wurdemann’s case—ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to challenge a suggestive police lineup—did not establish his factual innocence. The reversal of his convictions was based on the deficient performance of his trial attorneys, not on evidence proving his innocence. Therefore, Wurdemann did not meet the statutory requirement for compensation under the Act.

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that Wurdemann could not satisfy the necessary element of showing that the basis for reversing his conviction was related to his factual innocence.

People v. Flournoy

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129353

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: WHITE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1994, Johnny Flournoy was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery for the 1991 killing of Samuel Harlib during a robbery at a used car dealership. After numerous unsuccessful appeals and an initial postconviction petition, Flournoy filed a motion in 2021 for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, alleging newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, due process violations, and ineffective assistance of counsel. He supported his claims with affidavits from Ramano Ricks and Elizabeth Barrier.

The Cook County Circuit Court denied Flournoy's motion, finding the affidavits did not constitute newly discovered evidence and would not likely change the trial's outcome. The appellate court affirmed, citing People v. Hobley, which held that a postconviction petitioner cannot raise a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence used to supplement a constitutional violation claim. The appellate court also found that Flournoy failed to present a colorable claim of actual innocence and was procedurally barred from arguing that one affidavit supported an independent constitutional violation claim.

The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Flournoy could not establish that the evidence in the affidavits was newly discovered, as it was available before trial. The court also found that Flournoy could not demonstrate cause for his due process claims, as he had raised them in prior proceedings. Additionally, the court determined that Flournoy's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not new and had been previously litigated. Consequently, the court denied Flournoy's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.

Seabolt v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-PC-00270

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Molter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Four appellants sought post-conviction relief in Elkhart County, Indiana, alleging systemic police and prosecutorial misconduct that led to wrongful convictions. They argued that the judge, who had recused herself in a similar prior case involving Andrew Royer, should also recuse herself from their cases due to similar concerns about impartiality. The judge had previously recused herself in Royer's case because she had characterized Royer's attorney's comments as "defamatory" and had worked with many of the witnesses Royer intended to call, raising questions about her impartiality.

In the lower courts, the Elkhart Circuit Court judge denied the appellants' motions for recusal, reasoning that her prior employment as a deputy prosecutor did not necessitate recusal and that her comments in Royer's case were misunderstood. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decisions, agreeing with the judge's reasoning.

The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the judge's prior decision to recuse in Royer's case should have compelled her to recuse in these cases as well. The Court held that an objective observer, aware of the judge's prior recusal and the similar concerns raised in these cases, would reasonably question her impartiality. The Court emphasized that the judge's entanglement with the evidence had only deepened, and there was no change in circumstances that would eliminate the concerns leading to her initial recusal.

The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's orders denying the motions for recusal and remanded the cases with instructions to grant the motions, ensuring that the judge recuses herself from these proceedings.

RUSHIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0194-DG

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: THOMPSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Darrie Rushin was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree burglary and first-degree sodomy. He pled guilty to amended charges and was sentenced to seven years in prison, followed by a five-year period of postincarceration supervision. After completing his initial sentence, Rushin was released but later reincarcerated for violating the terms of his supervision.

Rushin requested the Department of Corrections (DOC) to review his sentence calculation, arguing he was wrongfully denied sentence credits that would reduce his reincarceration period. The DOC denied his request, and his subsequent administrative appeal was also denied. Rushin then filed a motion in his underlying criminal case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed his claim on separation-of-powers grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly dismissed the petition but affirmed on other grounds, holding Rushin was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that inmates reincarcerated for violating postincarceration supervision terms are entitled to earn statutory sentence credits under KRS 197.045 during their reincarceration. The court reasoned that the initial term of imprisonment and the subsequent period of postincarceration supervision are parts of a single sentence. The court emphasized that statutory sentence credits apply to all inmates unless explicitly excluded by statute. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed.

SIMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0119-MR

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Michelle M. Keller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Dennis Keith Sims was convicted by a Casey County jury of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse involving his granddaughters, nine-year-old D.C. and seven-year-old Z.C. The incidents occurred while the girls stayed with Sims during their mother’s illness. Upon their return, D.C. exhibited behavioral changes and later disclosed inappropriate touching by Sims. Both girls provided testimony, with D.C. detailing multiple instances of abuse and Z.C. confirming inappropriate touching.

The Casey Circuit Court sentenced Sims to twenty years in prison, following the jury's recommendation. Sims appealed, raising several issues. He argued that the trial court erred by not administering an oath to the prospective jurors before voir dire, violating his Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the girls to testify outside his presence, and admitting late-disclosed evidence. He also contended that the court improperly excluded certain testimony and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him regarding Z.C.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court found no error in the trial court's failure to administer an oath to the venire, as no rule required it. The court also upheld the decision to allow the girls to testify outside Sims’s presence, citing sufficient evidence of their emotional distress. The court ruled that Sims was not deprived of effective counsel despite being separated from his attorney during the girls' testimony, as he had opportunities to consult with his lawyer. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the late-disclosed evidence and excluding hearsay testimony. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction related to Z.C., given the testimonies and Sims’s own statements.

In re Children of Destiny H.

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 66

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2021, Ronald A. Harding lived with his girlfriend, her three children, and their infant son. On May 31, 2021, Harding was holding the infant when the child became unresponsive and later died. Medical examinations revealed that the infant suffered from a fatal brain injury consistent with non-accidental trauma, specifically shaken impact syndrome. Harding was arrested on June 4, 2021, and charged with manslaughter. A grand jury indicted him on June 30, 2021. During the trial, the State presented evidence from medical professionals and experts who testified that the infant's injuries were caused by traumatic head injury while in Harding's care.

The Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket oversaw the initial trial. Harding moved for a judgment of acquittal after the State rested its case and renewed the motion after the close of evidence, but the trial court denied both motions. The jury found Harding guilty of manslaughter, and the court entered a judgment of conviction on September 19, 2023. Harding was sentenced to fifteen years, with all but eight and a half years suspended, and six years of probation. Harding appealed, arguing insufficient evidence and prosecutorial error during closing arguments.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the manslaughter conviction, noting that the jury was entitled to resolve conflicting evidence and determine witness credibility. The court also found that Harding waived his prosecutorial error argument by withdrawing his request for a curative instruction and not moving for a mistrial. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

State of Maine v. Harding

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 67

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2021, Ronald A. Harding lived with his girlfriend, her three children, and their infant son. On May 31, 2021, Harding was holding the infant when the child became unresponsive and later died. Medical examinations revealed that the infant suffered from a fatal brain injury consistent with non-accidental trauma, specifically shaken impact syndrome. Harding was arrested on June 4, 2021, and charged with manslaughter. He was later indicted by a grand jury on one count of manslaughter.

The trial took place over four days in early 2023. The State presented testimony from medical professionals and experts who treated the infant and performed the autopsy. The defense argued that the death could have been caused by COVID-19 or an earlier injury, presenting testimony from their own expert, Dr. Jane Turner. The jury found Harding guilty of manslaughter. Harding's motions for a judgment of acquittal and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied by the trial court.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Harding argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the State committed prosecutorial error during its closing argument. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Harding guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that Harding had waived his prosecutorial error argument by withdrawing his request for a curative instruction during the trial. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Cook v. State

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 14/23

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Eaves

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Thomas Dwayne Cook, who was convicted of first-degree assault and reckless endangerment for attacking Lieutenant Aubrey Fletcher while serving a prison sentence. Cook sought post-conviction DNA testing of a shirt he wore during the incident, claiming that the DNA results could support his self-defense claim and challenge the severity of the victim's injuries.

The Circuit Court for Somerset County denied Cook's petition for DNA testing without a hearing, stating that there was overwhelming evidence of Cook's guilt and that DNA testing would not produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. Cook appealed this decision, arguing that the court applied the wrong standard and that he should have been allowed to respond to the State's answer to his petition.

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Cook did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that DNA testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The court found that even if the DNA testing showed the blood on Cook's shirt was his own, it would not support his self-defense claim or negate the severity of the victim's injuries. The court also held that the Circuit Court did not err in denying the petition without waiting for Cook's response to the State's answer, as the rules do not require the court to wait for such a response before ruling.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Circuit Court's denial of Cook's petition for post-conviction DNA testing, finding no reasonable probability that the testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence.

In the Matter of McCloy

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 10/23

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Gould

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 1999, Mark McCloy was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for tampering with a potential witness in an EEOC proceeding. In 2021, he applied to purchase a handgun in Maryland, stating he had no disqualifying convictions. The Maryland State Police (MSP) disapproved his application, determining his federal conviction was equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime under CR § 9-305.

McCloy appealed the MSP's decision to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) was not equivalent to CR § 9-305 but sua sponte determined it was comparable to CR § 9-306, affirming the MSP's disapproval. McCloy sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision but on the grounds that CR § 9-305 was the appropriate equivalent Maryland crime.

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the relevant Maryland law for determining equivalency is the law in effect at the time of the application, not the conviction. The court used a two-step approach to determine equivalency, comparing the elements of the statutes and considering whether a reasonable mind could conclude the statutes prohibit similar conduct.

The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. It held that the relevant Maryland law for determining whether an out-of-State crime is disqualifying is the law in effect when the application is submitted. The court adopted a modified categorical approach, comparing the elements of the out-of-State crime with the Maryland crime. If the elements are broader, the MSP must have conclusive evidence of the acts forming the basis of the conviction to determine if those acts would support a conviction under a disqualifying Maryland crime. The court concluded that McCloy’s federal conviction was not equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the MSP’s disapproval of McCloy’s firearm application.

Commonwealth v. Lacrosse

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13080

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of his ex-girlfriend, Kathryn Mauke. The defendant and the victim had dated on and off for several years, but the victim ended the relationship in December 2014. On February 11, 2015, the defendant left work early, walked to the victim's home, and stabbed her thirty-two times. The defendant's primary defense at trial was that he was not criminally responsible due to mental illness, which the jury rejected.

The case was initially tried in the Superior Court, where the defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the testimony of two incarcerated informants was unreliable and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The motion was denied by the same judge who presided over the trial. The defendant then appealed both his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the testimony of the two incarcerated informants was permissible and declined to create a new rule requiring reliability hearings for such testimony. However, the court mandated supplemental jury instructions for future cases involving incarcerated informants. The court also found that the defendant's trial counsel provided effective assistance and that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were proper. The court concluded that the defendant's sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional based on a recent decision, Commonwealth v. Mattis, and modified the sentence to allow for parole eligibility after thirty years. The court affirmed the conviction and the denial of the motion for a new trial.

Love v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-01101-SCT

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Ishee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Soweto Ronnell Love pled guilty to two counts of attempting to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by forged prescription and was sentenced as a habitual offender to five years on each count, to run consecutively. Love later filed a pro se Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief (PCR), challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea. The Tate County Circuit Court dismissed his PCR motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding that Love's plea was voluntary based on the record.

On appeal, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Love's PCR motion in a divided decision. The Court of Appeals held that a factual basis existed for Love's plea and that he failed to show his plea was involuntary. Love then filed a pro se motion for rehearing, which was denied, and subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the circuit court erred in dismissing Love's PCR motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court held that Love was misinformed about the minimum penalty he faced as a habitual offender, which amounted to a misapplication of the law and plain error. The court also found that the record did not confirm that Love knowingly pled guilty as a habitual offender. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of Love's PCR motion and the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Love voluntarily pled guilty as a habitual offender.

State v. McCurdy

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 180

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Andrew McCurdy entered a plea agreement in February 2022, pleading guilty to felony criminal mischief and agreeing to pay restitution. The District Court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report, which included McCurdy’s juvenile records without a Youth Court order. McCurdy filed motions to strike the juvenile records from the PSI and to determine his ability to pay certain fees. The District Court denied the motion to strike, stating the records were provided pursuant to a court order, and imposed a $50 PSI fee and probation supervision costs without inquiring into McCurdy’s ability to pay.

The Eleventh Judicial District Court denied McCurdy’s motion to strike his juvenile records, reasoning that the records were provided under a court order and could be considered at sentencing. The court also imposed the PSI fee and probation supervision costs without determining McCurdy’s ability to pay, despite his motion requesting such an inquiry. McCurdy appealed these decisions.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision to include McCurdy’s juvenile records in the PSI, finding that any error in the procedure was harmless as McCurdy did not demonstrate prejudice. However, the Supreme Court reversed the imposition of the $50 PSI fee and probation supervision costs, noting that the District Court failed to inquire into McCurdy’s ability to pay, as required by law. The case was remanded for the District Court to conduct the necessary inquiry into McCurdy’s financial situation before imposing these costs.

State v. Haynie

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 371

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Jmaun D. Haynie, who was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree assault, and two counts of use of a firearm to commit a felony. The incident occurred on September 12, 2021, when Haynie and another individual, Izayah Mapp, met Franco Vasquez and Haley Grim in a parking lot in Omaha, Nebraska, under the pretense of purchasing marijuana. During the encounter, both Haynie and Mapp pulled out guns, leading to the shooting of Vasquez and Grim. Vasquez died at the scene, while Grim survived. Evidence included text messages between Vasquez and Haynie, DNA linking Haynie to the vehicle, and social media messages from Haynie indicating his involvement.

The District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, presided over the trial. During the trial, there were two incidents involving the victim's family: an outburst by Vasquez's mother and a spectator wearing a T-shirt memorializing Vasquez. Haynie's counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing these incidents could prejudice the jury. The court denied the motion but took steps to prevent further incidents. The jury was instructed not to let sympathy or prejudice influence their verdict. Haynie was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder charge, along with additional consecutive sentences for the other charges.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, as there was no evidence the jury was influenced by the incidents. The court also found no error in the jury instructions given, which followed the Nebraska Jury Instructions. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support Haynie's felony murder conviction, as the intent to rob Vasquez could be inferred from the circumstances. The court affirmed Haynie's convictions and sentences.

CARDENAS-GARCIA VS. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 52

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: LEE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

A six-year-old child, Z.K., was removed from the custody of Yumila Cardenas-Garcia due to unlivable conditions in her home. Cardenas-Garcia was charged with felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. She pleaded no contest at the custody hearing, and Z.K. remained in protective custody. In a separate criminal case, she pleaded guilty to the felony as part of a plea agreement, which allowed her to withdraw the felony plea after completing probation and instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor.

The Eighth Judicial District Court held an evidentiary hearing to determine if Cardenas-Garcia had rebutted the statutory presumption against reunification under NRS 432B.555, which applies to parents convicted of felony child abuse. The court found she had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Z.K. would not be harmed by reunification. After completing probation and withdrawing her felony plea, Cardenas-Garcia again sought a determination on the presumption's applicability. The district court maintained that the presumption still applied because she had not rebutted it at the prior hearing.

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who has ever been convicted of felony child abuse, regardless of the legal status of that conviction. The court emphasized that the statute's use of the word "ever" means it applies even if the conviction was later voided. The court concluded that the presumption against reunification remains unless the parent can prove by clear and convincing evidence that no harm will come to the child. The petition was denied, affirming the district court's application of the statutory presumption.

DAYANI v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 50

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Ron D. Parraguirre

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Fahd Dayani was on house arrest pending an unrelated trial when officers conducted a warrantless compliance check and found methamphetamine and heroin in his residence. Dayani was arrested and charged with two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance. On the same day, his cousin, Alina Jagshi, made statements to the police indicating that the drugs belonged to her. Dayani's counsel informed the district attorney's office about Jagshi's confession, which was recorded on an officer's body-worn camera. However, the State did not present this video to the grand jury, which subsequently indicted Dayani.

Dayani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State violated NRS 172.145(2) by not presenting exculpatory evidence, including the video of Jagshi's confession and evidence of a second bathroom in his residence. The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada construed the motion as a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied it as untimely under NRS 34.700(1)(a)'s 21-day deadline. Dayani then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that his motion was improperly construed and should have been considered on its merits.

The Supreme Court of Nevada held that challenges alleging violations of NRS 172.145(2) may be properly brought via a motion to dismiss and are not confined by the 21-day time limit for pretrial habeas petitions. The court concluded that the district court had a duty to consider Dayani's motion on its merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to consider the motion on its merits.

Bold v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 36 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Transportation Law

Thomas E. Bold, Jr. was found unconscious behind the wheel of his legally parked car in a mall parking lot. The car's engine was running, and the headlights were on. When roused by Officer Thomas Gelnett, Bold appeared intoxicated and admitted to drinking at a nearby bar. He intended to sleep in his car until he was fit to drive. Bold was arrested for DUI and refused a blood test at a medical facility. Consequently, PennDOT suspended his license for 18 months due to his refusal.

Bold appealed the suspension in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas. During the hearing, Officer Gelnett admitted there was no evidence that Bold had driven the car while intoxicated. The court initially upheld the suspension but later reversed its decision, finding no reasonable grounds to believe Bold was in control of the vehicle's movement. The court cited the case Solomon v. PennDOT, which found insufficient grounds for suspicion when a suspect was found sleeping in a parked car with the engine running.

The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Bold was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The court relied on past cases where the presence of a driver in a running vehicle was deemed sufficient for reasonable grounds. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the circumstances did not provide reasonable grounds to believe Bold was operating or in actual physical control of the vehicle's movement. The court emphasized that the implied consent law requires some objective evidence of control over the vehicle's movement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's ruling, siding with Bold.

CRUMLEY v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0471-23

Opinion Date: August 21, 2024

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves an appellant who engaged in online conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl named "Alyssa." The appellant's communications became romantic and sexual, leading to a solicitation for a meeting to have sex. When confronted by police, the appellant claimed he intended to warn the girl about the dangers of meeting strangers online. At trial, he testified that he did not believe "Alyssa" was a minor and thought she was lying about her identity. He introduced testimony from a past "catfisher" and sought to introduce testimony from his brothers and autism experts, which the trial court excluded.

The Fifth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the excluded testimony from the appellant's brothers and Dr. Masino, an autism expert, was relevant to rebut the mens rea element of whether the appellant knowingly solicited a minor. The court found that the exclusion of this evidence was constitutional error because it prevented the appellant from fully presenting his defense. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the expert testimony on autism did not directly rebut or negate the mens rea required for the offense. The court found that the autism evidence did not show that the appellant was incapable of perceiving the age of the person he was communicating with. The court concluded that the trial court properly excluded Dr. Masino's testimony and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address the admissibility of the brothers' testimony and Dr. Jerome's testimony. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.