United States v. Kumar

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1087

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: HOWARD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Manish Kumar was involved in a scheme to smuggle misbranded prescription drugs and controlled substances into the United States from March 2015 to August 2019. Kumar, an Indian national, was a partner in Mihu, a New Delhi-based company that sold generic versions of drugs like Viagra, Cialis, Adderall, and tramadol without FDA approval or proper prescriptions. Kumar managed call centers in India where representatives made false statements to U.S. customers, claiming the drugs were FDA-approved and that no prescriptions were needed. Kumar was arrested in August 2019 on unrelated identity theft charges and later charged in Massachusetts with conspiracy to smuggle drugs, distribute controlled substances, and make false statements. He pled guilty to all charges in October 2022.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Kumar to 87 months in prison. The court applied a fraud cross-reference in the Sentencing Guidelines and accepted the government's estimate of the loss amount involved in the offense, which was approximately $3.8 million. Kumar objected to both the application of the fraud cross-reference and the loss amount calculation, arguing that the evidence was insufficient.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the fraud cross-reference was correctly applied because the false statements made by call center representatives were within the scope of Kumar's conspiracy and were made in furtherance of the criminal activity. The court also found that the sentencing court did not clearly err in its loss amount calculation, as it relied on detailed government estimates and supporting data. The First Circuit affirmed Kumar's 87-month sentence.

United States v. Rivera-Gerena

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1066

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, Misael M. Rivera-Gerena, was aboard a vessel in U.S. waters when the Coast Guard seized 52 packages containing amphetamine and cocaine, along with an additional 448 bricks of cocaine. Rivera-Gerena was arrested and indicted. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 150 kilograms but less than 450 kilograms of cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The district court accepted his plea and ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI Report).

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico set a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of 262 to 327 months, based on the actual amount of cocaine seized. The statute of conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. The government recommended a 135-month sentence, while Rivera-Gerena requested the mandatory minimum of 120 months, citing his acceptance of responsibility and other mitigating factors. The district court considered the plea agreement and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the need to promote respect for the law and protect the public. The court acknowledged Rivera-Gerena's personal circumstances but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and his criminal history. Ultimately, the court imposed a 147-month sentence, varying downward from the GSR but higher than the parties' recommendations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Rivera-Gerena argued that his sentence was procedurally flawed and substantively unreasonable, claiming the district court failed to adequately evaluate the § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court found no procedural error, noting the district court had considered all relevant factors and provided a plausible rationale for the sentence. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, given the seriousness of the offense and Rivera-Gerena's criminal history. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

Englert v. Lowerre

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2016

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Reena Raggi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2013, the petitioner was convicted in Monroe County, New York, of engaging in a course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of the child victim, who described years of sexual abuse by the petitioner. A medical expert for the prosecution testified that the child's normal physical examination was consistent with past sexual abuse, as any injuries would have healed over time. The defense did not call a medical expert but cross-examined the prosecution's expert to elicit that normal findings could also indicate no abuse.

The petitioner challenged his conviction in state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to consult or call a medical expert. The Appellate Division rejected this claim, stating that the petitioner had not shown that such testimony was available, would have assisted the jury, or that he was prejudiced by its absence. The New York Court of Appeals denied further review. The petitioner then filed a motion under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10, which was also denied without a hearing. The state court found that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the absence of a defense expert, as the prosecution's expert's key conclusions were not seriously challenged.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied the petitioner's habeas corpus petition, ruling that the state courts had not unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in rejecting the ineffective-assistance claim. The petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington in concluding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to consult or call a medical expert. The court noted that the defense counsel effectively neutralized the prosecution's expert through cross-examination, and the petitioner failed to show that expert testimony would have likely changed the trial's outcome.

Fisher v. Hollingsworth

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2846

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Tony Fisher, a federal inmate, filed a lawsuit against several prison officials, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault by another inmate, resulting in his rape. Fisher entered federal prison in 2013 and was transferred to Fort Dix, where he reported past sexual assault and harassment by other inmates. Despite these reports, prison staff did not classify him as at high risk for sexual assault. Shortly after, Fisher was raped by another inmate. Fisher claimed that a prison official, Captain Fitzgerald, discouraged him from reporting the assaults and seeking legal help, warning him of potential retaliation.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed Fisher’s complaint, ruling it was time-barred under New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Fisher appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the prison official’s threats and his mental health issues.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that no Bivens cause of action exists for failure to protect an inmate from another inmate’s violence, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule. The court also ruled that even if such a claim were cognizable, Fisher’s complaint was untimely. The court found that Fisher did not qualify for equitable tolling because he was transferred away from the influence of the threatening official shortly after the assaults and did not exercise due diligence in pursuing his claims. Additionally, the court held that New Jersey’s revival statute for sexual assault claims did not apply to Bivens actions.

Williams v. Greene

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2053

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: RESTREPO

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2015, Eddie Williams was prosecuted in Pennsylvania for crimes related to a drug dispute that resulted in one death and one serious injury. Williams, along with Rick Cannon and Akeita Harden, was implicated in the incident. Cannon pleaded guilty to twenty charges, including homicide and conspiracy, some of which named Williams as a coconspirator. During Williams's trial, his attorney misrepresented Cannon's plea, leading the judge to read Cannon's entire Criminal Information to the jury, which included references to Williams as a coconspirator.

Williams was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment plus additional years. He filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's actions. The PCRA court denied relief, finding no Confrontation Clause violation and concluding that the attorney's strategy was reasonable. The Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further appeal.

Williams then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted relief, finding that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information violated the Confrontation Clause and that Williams's counsel was ineffective for not objecting. The Commonwealth appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information, which included references to Williams, was testimonial and violated the Confrontation Clause. The court also found that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the reading, which prejudiced Williams's defense. The court concluded that these errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, warranting habeas relief.

United States v. Ellis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4093

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: Quattlebaum

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Robert Dale Ellis, after being convicted under North Carolina law for child pornography offenses, failed to register as a sex offender, leading to a federal conviction and subsequent supervised release. Ellis repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release, resulting in multiple revocations and re-impositions of prison terms and new supervised release conditions. His violations included unauthorized travel, failure to report to his probation officer, and non-compliance with treatment programs.

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina handled Ellis' supervised release violations. The court modified his conditions multiple times, including imposing home detention and location monitoring. Despite these measures, Ellis continued to violate his release conditions, leading to further revocations and re-impositions of supervised release terms. In his latest revocation, the district court imposed two contested conditions: requiring probation officer approval for internet-capable devices and six months of location monitoring.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Ellis' appeal, where he challenged these two conditions. Ellis argued that the device-approval condition improperly delegated judicial power, effectively banned internet use, and was overbroad. He also contended that the location-monitoring condition was not reasonably related to his sentencing factors and imposed an excessive deprivation of liberty. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the device-approval condition did not delegate judicial power improperly and was not a complete internet ban. The court found that the condition was reasonably related to Ellis' history and characteristics and did not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. Similarly, the location-monitoring condition was deemed reasonably related to Ellis' offense and necessary for public protection and deterrence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Perdue

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4533

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Floyd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In December 2018, law enforcement began investigating a residence in Fairmont, West Virginia, for suspected drug dealing. Officers found drug residue in the trash and observed hand-to-hand transactions. During a traffic stop, they seized marijuana and a firearm from a visitor. A search warrant executed on January 31, 2019, led to the discovery of drugs and firearms in the residence. Lamar Perdue, found trying to escape, was among those detained. A federal grand jury indicted Perdue and two others on multiple drug charges and one count of aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia accepted Perdue's guilty plea to all charges without a plea agreement. During the plea hearing, the court failed to inform Perdue of the advance knowledge requirement for the firearm charge under Rosemond v. United States. Perdue was sentenced to 195 months in prison. He later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not pursuing an appeal. The district court granted the motion, allowing Perdue to appeal but did not alter his sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the district court erred by not explaining the advance knowledge requirement but found that Perdue did not show a reasonable probability that he would have pleaded differently if properly informed. The court noted that Perdue voluntarily pleaded guilty, rejecting a plea agreement to avoid cooperating against co-defendants. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the error did not affect Perdue's substantial rights.

United States v. Garcia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40701

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law

Jose Pedro Garcia was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture containing fentanyl. He pled guilty to the charge. While awaiting sentencing, Garcia assaulted another detainee. This incident led the probation officer to determine that Garcia was not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, a determination the Government adopted. The district court agreed and denied any reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Garcia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the Government breached the plea agreement by not recommending a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Garcia did not raise this issue in the district court, so the appellate court reviewed for plain error. Garcia contended that the plea agreement required the Government to move for a three-level reduction under § 3E1.1. However, the plea agreement only obligated the Government to move for the third point of reduction under § 3E1.1(b) if the district court awarded the initial two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a). The agreement did not restrict the Government's arguments regarding the initial two-level reduction.

The Fifth Circuit found that the Government's argument against the reduction was consistent with a reasonable understanding of the plea agreement and did not constitute a breach. Since Garcia did not demonstrate that the Government breached the plea agreement and did not argue that the appeal waiver in his plea agreement was invalid, the court dismissed the appeal. The court did not consider Garcia’s remaining arguments challenging the denial of the reduction under § 3E1.1.

United States v. Romero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50443

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: Kernodle

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Izik Romero pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During a police pursuit, Romero threw a firearm from his vehicle, which was later recovered by officers. A large-capacity magazine was found nearby. At his initial sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a base offense level of 20 due to the presence of the large-capacity magazine, resulting in a sentencing range of 92 to 115 months. Romero did not object to the PSR, and the district court sentenced him to 115 months of imprisonment.

Romero appealed the application of the increased base offense level. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the government failed to prove that the firearm was capable of accepting the magazine, as required by the Sentencing Guidelines. The court vacated Romero’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. At the resentencing hearing, the government presented new evidence, including testimony from an ATF special agent, to establish the connection between the firearm and the magazine. The district court overruled Romero’s objection to the new evidence and reimposed the same sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found no error in the district court’s actions. The court held that the district court was permitted to consider new evidence at resentencing because the remand order did not limit what could be considered. The court also found that the evidence supported the application of the increased base offense level, as the firearm and the large-capacity magazine were in close proximity and compatible. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to reimpose the 115-month sentence.

United States v. Smith

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60321

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Three individuals, Jamarr Smith, Thomas Iroko Ayodele, and Gilbert McThunel, were convicted of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions were based on evidence obtained through a geofence warrant, which collected location data from Google to identify suspects. The robbery involved the theft of $60,706 from a U.S. Postal Service route driver, Sylvester Cobbs, who was attacked with pepper spray and a handgun. Video footage and witness testimony linked the suspects to the crime scene, but no arrests were made immediately. Investigators later used a geofence warrant to gather location data from Google, which led to the identification of the suspects.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi denied the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the geofence warrant. The defendants argued that the warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights due to lack of probable cause and particularity, and that the government did not follow proper legal procedures in obtaining additional information from Google. The district court found that law enforcement acted in good faith and denied the motion to suppress. The defendants were subsequently convicted by a jury and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 121 to 136 months.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that geofence warrants, as used in this case, are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because they resemble general warrants, which are prohibited. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress, citing the good-faith exception. The court concluded that law enforcement acted reasonably given the novelty of the geofence warrant and the lack of clear legal precedent. Therefore, the convictions were upheld.

Franklin v. Franklin County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-6107

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In January 2019, Ashley Franklin, an inmate at the Franklin County Regional Jail, was transported to a hospital by Jail Sergeant Brandon Price due to illness. During the transport, Price sexually assaulted Franklin. Franklin filed a lawsuit against Price, Franklin County, and two other Jail employees, asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims. She alleged that Price and his superior, Captain Wes Culbertson, were deliberately indifferent to her safety and that Franklin County had inadequate policies and training to prevent such assaults.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Franklin’s motion for summary judgment on her Eighth Amendment claim against Price but denied her other claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendants, finding no evidence that Culbertson or Franklin County were deliberately indifferent or that the County’s policies were inadequate. The court also found that the County’s previous incidents of misconduct did not establish a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Franklin’s negligence claims against Culbertson and Jailer Rick Rogers were dismissed, with the court ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Franklin County was not liable under § 1983 because Franklin failed to show a direct causal link between the County’s policies and her assault. The court also found that Culbertson and Rogers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their actions were discretionary and performed in good faith. Franklin’s claims of gross negligence were deemed forfeited due to lack of development in her arguments. The court concluded that Franklin had not established that the County’s policies or training were constitutionally inadequate or that there was a pattern of similar constitutional violations.

United States v. Betro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1106

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: Nalbandian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves Joseph Betro, Mohammed Zahoor, Tariq Omar, and Spilios Pappas, who conspired to defraud Medicare by administering medically unnecessary back injections and bribing patients with opioid prescriptions. They fraudulently billed these injections as “facet injections” to receive higher reimbursements. Additionally, they ordered unnecessary urine drug tests and referred patients to ancillary services in exchange for kickbacks. Despite patient complaints about the ineffectiveness and pain of the injections, the defendants continued their fraudulent practices.

A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The defendants filed motions for a new trial, which the district court denied. They then appealed their convictions and sentences, raising various challenges related to the prosecution, evidence admission, jury instructions, and sentencing calculations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgments. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the defendants knowingly participated in the fraudulent scheme. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for a new trial, admitting evidence, or instructing the jury. The sentences imposed were deemed procedurally and substantively reasonable, with the court noting that the district court had appropriately calculated the loss amounts and applied relevant sentencing enhancements.

United States v. Burrell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1261

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, DEA agents, acting on an anonymous tip, conducted a four-month investigation into Robert Cortez Burrell's alleged drug trafficking activities. They surveilled Burrell, observed suspicious behavior consistent with drug transactions, and corroborated the tip with additional evidence, including Burrell's criminal history and interactions with known drug dealers. Based on this information, they obtained and executed search warrants for four residences associated with Burrell, recovering significant quantities of illegal narcotics, firearms, and drug-manufacturing equipment. Burrell was subsequently convicted by a jury of multiple drug-related offenses and being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, resulting in a 180-month prison sentence.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Burrell's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches, as well as his motion to dismiss the firearms and ammunition charges on Second Amendment grounds. The court found that the search warrants were supported by probable cause and that Burrell's motion to dismiss was untimely. Additionally, the court admitted testimony that Burrell argued violated the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the search warrants were supported by probable cause, as the DEA agents had sufficiently corroborated the anonymous tip through extensive surveillance and other investigative methods. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burrell's motion to dismiss as untimely and that Burrell's constitutional challenges to the firearms and ammunition charges failed under the plain-error standard. Furthermore, the court ruled that the admission of the contested testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause or the Federal Rules of Evidence, as the statements were not offered for their truth but to explain the DEA's actions.

United States v. Ralston

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3651

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: Gilman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Gregory D. Ralston was found guilty by a jury of distributing and possessing with intent to distribute a fentanyl-containing substance. He was acquitted of causing serious bodily injury by distributing the fentanyl. Ralston challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence without an evidentiary hearing, the limitation of his cross-examination of two government witnesses, and the reasonableness of his 180-month sentence.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Ralston’s motion to suppress but later denied the motion without holding the hearing. Ralston proceeded to trial, where the court limited his cross-examination of witnesses regarding potential bias and prior convictions. The jury convicted Ralston on the drug charges but acquitted him of the enhancement for causing serious bodily injury. The district court then imposed a 180-month sentence, significantly above the Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months, citing Ralston’s prior conviction and the seriousness of the current offense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing, as the issues raised were legal rather than factual. The appellate court also upheld the limitation on cross-examination, noting that Ralston had the opportunity to question the witnesses directly about potential bias. The court found the sentence procedurally reasonable, as the district court adequately explained the upward variance and considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, given the district court’s rationale and the evidence supporting the findings.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but remanded the case for consideration of a potential sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) due to an intervening amendment in the Sentencing Guidelines.

United States v. Tripplet

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1676

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: Bloomekatz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2022, Condarius Tripplet pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The district court sentenced him to 188 months in prison, applying a drug-premises enhancement. This enhancement adds two levels to the base offense level when a defendant maintains a premises for drug manufacturing or distribution. Tripplet acknowledged maintaining an apartment but disputed that its primary use was for drug distribution, noting he lived there with his girlfriend and her two children.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan found that Tripplet had significant quantities of illegal drugs, cash, a firearm, and drug manufacturing tools in the apartment. The court also noted that he regularly distributed drugs from this residence. Based on these findings, the court applied the drug-premises enhancement, resulting in a higher offense level and a longer sentence. Tripplet appealed the application of this enhancement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the drug-premises enhancement was correctly applied. The court noted that the enhancement does not require drug operations to be the sole purpose of the premises, only that it be one of the primary uses. Given the substantial quantities of drugs, cash, and drug-related tools found in the apartment, along with evidence of regular drug transactions, the court affirmed the district court's decision to apply the enhancement. The court concluded that the totality of the evidence supported the inference that Tripplet maintained the apartment for drug trafficking purposes, justifying the enhancement and the resulting sentence.

United States v. Bradley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2830

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: EASTERBROOK

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jasmine Bradley was assessed as incompetent to assist in her defense against criminal charges and was referred to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation under 18 U.S.C. §4241. She reported to the U.S. Marshal on January 28, 2022, and was released on August 24, 2022, with a report stating she was competent. Bradley then pleaded guilty to ten counts of fraud and aggravated identity theft, receiving a 198-month sentence. Her conditional guilty plea reserved the issue of whether the seven-month period between reporting and release required dismissal of her indictment with prejudice.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois held that dismissal was not mandatory, even though the Bureau exceeded the statutory time limits set by §4241(d). The court found that the statute did not specify a remedy for exceeding the time limits, and thus dismissal was not required.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that while §4241(d) sets a four-month limit for evaluating a defendant's competence, it does not specify a consequence for exceeding this limit. The court emphasized that statutory time limits are "time-related directives" and that dismissal with prejudice is not a fitting remedy for delays in restoring a detainee to competence. The court also noted that the Speedy Trial Act excludes delays caused by mental-health examinations and that dismissal of the indictment would not serve the interests of justice. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy for such delays is not dismissal but potentially ordering the release of the detainee while evaluations continue.

Evans v. Dodd

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3290

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Melloy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Two high school brothers, Kameron and Noah Evans, were arrested for disorderly conduct after wearing tactical vests to school. The brothers, who had faced racial bullying, wore the vests on a day when the school was screening an active-shooter video. They were searched by school resource officers, who found no weapons. The principal decided to have them arrested, and they were charged with disorderly conduct. The state court later acquitted them, and the brothers filed a lawsuit under § 1983 and state tort claims against the officers, alleging lack of probable cause and excessive force.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The officers appealed, arguing they had probable cause or at least arguable probable cause to arrest the brothers for disorderly conduct under Arkansas law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the brothers, as their actions did not disrupt a lawful assembly or constitute threatening behavior. The court also determined that the officers did not have arguable probable cause, as the brothers were cooperative and their attire did not violate the school dress code. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment claims. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force and abuse of process claims, as the plaintiffs failed to respond to these arguments on appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

U.S. v. Plume

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3501

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Gabriel White Plume, Sr. was convicted of multiple charges, including witness tampering and assault, following a violent incident involving his girlfriend, CLS. On January 10, 2023, White Plume, while under the influence of alcohol and methamphetamine, assaulted CLS with the help of his friend, Edison Jumping Eagle. White Plume choked CLS, forced her to perform oral sex, and inflicted severe physical injuries, including a deep laceration in her vagina. CLS was treated at a hospital for extensive injuries, including bruises, bite marks, and cigarette burns. White Plume recorded part of the assault, and these recordings were used as evidence at trial.

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota indicted White Plume on nine counts, including sexual assault, assault, witness tampering, and distribution of a controlled substance. A jury convicted him on eight of the nine counts, and he was sentenced to 480 months of imprisonment. White Plume appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for his convictions on witness tampering and assault, and claimed double jeopardy for three of the charges.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on witness tampering, noting that White Plume attempted to persuade CLS to recant her statements through his daughter and direct communication. The court also upheld the assault conviction, determining that the evidence of CLS’s substantial bruising was sufficient to meet the statutory definition of substantial bodily injury. Regarding the double jeopardy claim, the court applied the Blockburger test and concluded that each of the three challenged charges required proof of an element not required by the others, thus rejecting the double jeopardy argument. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

United States v. Barrera

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2873

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Insurance Law, Public Benefits

Christina Barrera, the office manager at PowerMed, was involved in a scheme to help unqualified individuals, mainly employees of AB InBev, fraudulently obtain disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and private insurers. Patients paid PowerMed $21,600 for a "disability package" that included unnecessary medical tests and assistance in fraudulently applying for disability benefits. Barrera explained the scheme to patients, helped them complete paperwork, and coached them on how to appear disabled. An undercover officer's investigation led to Barrera's indictment and subsequent trial, where a jury found her guilty of conspiracy to defraud the SSA but acquitted her of health care fraud and theft of government funds.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri sentenced Barrera, ordering her to pay restitution to the SSA and private insurers. The presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended $339,407.80 in restitution to the SSA, but the Government argued for additional restitution to private insurers, totaling $203,907.62. The district court adopted the Government's figures, ordering Barrera to pay a total of $543,315.42 in restitution. After Barrera's sentencing, her co-conspirator Clarissa Pogue was sentenced but was not required to pay restitution to private insurers, leading Barrera to appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Barrera's criminal conduct included defrauding private insurers as part of the scheme to defraud the SSA, affirming the district court's decision to order restitution to private insurers. However, the court found errors in the calculation of restitution amounts for Prudential and MetLife, vacating those portions and remanding for further proceedings. The court rejected Barrera's argument regarding sentencing disparities with Pogue, emphasizing that the statutory direction to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities refers to national disparities, not differences among co-conspirators. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

United States v. Euring

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1212

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2018, 16-year-old S.G. was reported missing but returned to her Iowa high school the next day. She told the school resource officer, Matthew Poirier, that she had spent the weekend in Chicago at "Sweat's" father's home, earning money by packaging cocaine. She later admitted to making money through dates but denied engaging in sex acts. S.G. identified Keith Euring, Sr., also known as "Sweat," in a photo lineup. Her statements to medical personnel and police contained inconsistencies, including the amount of money given to Euring and whether she had sex with him. Law enforcement found evidence linking Euring to S.G.'s trips to Chicago, including phone records and hotel bookings.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa indicted Euring on multiple counts, including sex trafficking of a child. At trial, the government presented testimony from S.G. and her clients, as well as cell phone data suggesting Euring's involvement. S.G. testified that Euring facilitated her dates and took a portion of her earnings. The defense attempted to introduce extrinsic evidence of S.G.'s inconsistent statements and the grand-jury testimony of Dr. Muhammad Ali, who had interacted with S.G. during one of her trips. The district court excluded Dr. Ali's testimony and limited the use of extrinsic evidence, ruling that S.G. had not been given the opportunity to explain her statements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Ali's grand-jury testimony, as the government did not have a similar motive to develop his testimony at that stage. The court also upheld the district court's limitation on extrinsic evidence, interpreting Rule 613(b) to require that a witness be given the opportunity to explain or deny prior inconsistent statements. Finally, the court found sufficient evidence to support Euring's conviction for sex trafficking of a child, affirming the district court's decision.

United States v. Hanapel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2653

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

James Hanapel was convicted by a jury of attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity. The case stemmed from an undercover operation during the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally in South Dakota, where a Department of Homeland Security agent posed as a fourteen-year-old girl named "Journey" on a dating app. Hanapel initiated contact with Journey, and after learning her age, he continued to communicate with her, suggesting they meet and engage in sexual activities. Hanapel was arrested when he arrived at the agreed-upon location with condoms.

In the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Hanapel raised an entrapment defense, arguing that he was induced by law enforcement to commit the crime. The district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found him guilty. Hanapel was sentenced to 120 months in prison, the statutory minimum. He appealed the conviction, contending that he was entrapped as a matter of law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether Hanapel was induced by the government and whether he was predisposed to commit the crime. The court found that Hanapel initiated contact and was the first to suggest sexual activity. The court also determined that the photo sent by the undercover agent was not overly suggestive and did not constitute inducement. Additionally, the court noted that Hanapel's quick agreement to meet and his possession of condoms indicated predisposition. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could reject the entrapment defense and affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Harris

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2957

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Elmarries Harris was serving a term of supervised release following a prison sentence for a firearms offense. In January 2023, the probation office reported several violations of his release conditions, including an allegation that he assaulted his wife, Erica. At a revocation hearing in June 2023, Harris denied the allegations, and the government presented a violation report and a defense investigator’s report stating Erica denied being assaulted. Harris objected to the hearsay evidence, and the court continued the hearing for additional evidence. In August, the government presented medical records of Erica’s injuries and testimony from a police officer who responded to a 911 call reporting the assault. The officer’s body camera footage and testimony from Erica’s neighbor and a 911 caller were also presented, despite Harris’s objections to hearsay.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri found Harris committed a Grade A violation by committing a domestic assault in the second degree, supported by medical records and corroborating witness statements. The court also found Harris violated other conditions of his release, including failing to answer the probation officer’s questions truthfully, failing to notify the probation officer before changing his residence, and consuming alcohol. Harris was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum, with no supervised release to follow.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Harris argued that the reliance on hearsay evidence violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and due process. The court concluded that the district court’s decision was consistent with due process, noting the reliability of the evidence and the government’s reasonable explanations for the absence of witnesses. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Parker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3371

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Derrick Lovell Parker pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The advisory Guidelines range for his sentence was 70 to 87 months. However, the district court varied upward and sentenced Parker to 180 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Parker appealed his sentence, arguing that it was substantively unreasonable.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas initially reviewed the case. The court considered the nature of Parker's offense, which involved a significant amount of heroin and an incident where Parker, armed with a gun, created a "very scary situation" at a residential re-entry center. The district court expressed concern about Parker's potential to repeat his unlawful conduct and decided on a substantial upward variance from the Guidelines range.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Parker contended that the district court gave undue weight to factors already considered by the Guidelines, such as his offense conduct and criminal history. The appellate court noted that while courts should be cautious when supporting a substantial upward variance with factors already reflected in the Guidelines, such factors can still justify a variance. The appellate court found that the district court did not give undue weight to these factors.

Parker also argued that the district court failed to consider the need to avoid sentence disparities and mitigating factors like his mental health issues. The appellate court observed that the district court had considered these factors and recommended substance abuse treatment and mental health counseling for Parker. The appellate court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and affirmed the 180-month sentence.

United States v. Roubideaux

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2760

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In March 2022, federal and local law enforcement in Sioux Falls conducted an undercover operation to identify individuals enticing minors online for sexual purposes. Agents created profiles on social media applications, posing as minors. Sky Thomas Roubideaux, a 22-year-old man, engaged in explicit conversations with an undercover agent posing as a minor on the Grindr app. Roubideaux arranged to meet the supposed minor and was arrested upon arrival with items indicating intent for sexual activity.

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota convicted Roubideaux of attempted enticement of a minor using the internet, sentencing him to 120 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. Roubideaux appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his Batson challenge, his motion for judgment of acquittal based on entrapment, his motion for a new trial, and his right to present a complete defense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no clear error in the district court's Batson ruling, determining that the prosecution's race-neutral explanation for striking a juror was credible. The court also upheld the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding that a reasonable jury could find Roubideaux predisposed to commit the crime. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial, as substantial evidence supported the verdict. Lastly, the court ruled that the exclusion of certain evidence did not violate Roubideaux's right to present a complete defense, as the district court acted within its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Roubideaux's conviction and sentence.

United States v. Wolter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1848

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2019, Robert Wolter robbed a bank in Bismarck, North Dakota, taking approximately $6,800. He was later arrested in February 2019 for smuggling bulk cash while attempting to fly to Ghana. Those charges were dismissed in February 2020, and he was subsequently arrested for bank robbery. Wolter was arraigned in July 2020. He filed multiple motions to continue the trial, delaying it significantly. He also requested a psychological evaluation, which further delayed proceedings. Wolter eventually moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming his right to a speedy trial was violated under the Speedy Trial Act (STA) and the Sixth Amendment.

The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied Wolter's motion to dismiss. The court found that most delays were excludable under the STA and that the government did not negligently or intentionally cause delays. The court calculated that only 31 days of non-excludable time counted toward the STA. Regarding the Sixth Amendment claim, the court found no evidence of government misconduct and attributed most delays to Wolter. The court also found no demonstrable prejudice to Wolter due to the delays. Wolter was convicted of bank robbery by a jury in January 2023 and sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the delays were either excludable under the STA or attributable to Wolter. The court concluded that only 46 days of non-excludable time counted toward the STA, well below the 70-day limit. Additionally, the court applied the Barker v. Wingo balancing test and determined that Wolter's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated, as the delays were largely due to his own actions and did not result in demonstrable prejudice.

Chong v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-55140

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion.

Clements v. Madden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-55333

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Kennelly

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Charles Clements was convicted by a California state jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of second-degree robbery, and related enhancements. His convictions were based in part on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Donald Boeker, who claimed Clements had solicited him to murder a key witness. Boeker testified that he received no benefits for his cooperation and that his motives were altruistic. However, it was later revealed that Boeker did receive parole consideration for his testimony, which the prosecution knew or should have known.

Clements appealed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition, which was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The district court had denied his claims, including one under Napue v. Illinois, which asserts that the prosecution knowingly used false testimony. The district court reviewed the Napue claim de novo but ultimately denied it, finding no reasonable likelihood that Boeker’s false testimony affected the jury’s judgment.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Clements’s Napue claim, holding that the prosecution violated Napue by allowing Boeker to falsely testify about not receiving any benefits for his cooperation. The court found that Boeker’s testimony was highly probative of Clements’s consciousness of guilt and identity on the aggravated kidnapping counts. The court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to grant Clements’s habeas petition with respect to the aggravated kidnapping charges. The court did not address Clements’s Brady claim or his request for an evidentiary hearing, as the relief sought was already granted under the Napue claim. The court also affirmed the denial of Clements’s Massiah and prosecutorial misconduct claims, finding that the state court’s determinations were not objectively unreasonable.

Helm v. Thornell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-15689

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Collins

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In 1984, Roger Scott Helm, Jr., then 14 years old, murdered his adoptive parents and stepsister. He was arrested and charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder. Helm pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder, and one count of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder with eligibility for parole after 25 years, followed by consecutive sentences totaling an additional 42 years for the other counts.

Helm's case was transferred from juvenile to adult court, and he was sentenced after a detailed hearing where the court considered mitigating factors such as his age and drug influence, as well as aggravating factors like his lack of remorse and dangerousness. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the consecutive sentences on direct appeal.

Helm later filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The Arizona trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected his claim, stating that Miller does not apply to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Helm's habeas corpus petition. The court assumed, for argument's sake, that Helm's sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole. However, it concluded that Helm's sentence complied with Miller because the trial judge had discretion and considered Helm's youth before imposing the sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Helm's habeas corpus petition, holding that Helm's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller and clarified in Jones v. Mississippi.

RANA V. JENKINS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-1827

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Smith Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law, International Law

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.

The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes.

United States v. Osorio-Arellanes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-10003

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Hawkins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.

The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court.

USA V. CHICHANDE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-50041

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Criminal Law

In December 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Victor Gaspar Chichande and his co-defendants on a small boat near the Galapagos Islands, carrying approximately 1,230 kilograms of cocaine. The defendants attempted to evade capture by throwing items overboard and fleeing, but the Coast Guard disabled their boat. The discarded packages were later found to contain cocaine. Chichande was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine on a vessel, possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California initially sentenced Chichande to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to an error in the district court's analysis of whether Chichande was entitled to a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court had incorrectly compared Chichande to a single average participant rather than the average of all participants in the crime.

Upon remand, the district court again denied the minor role reduction, finding that Chichande was not substantially less culpable than the average participant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, clarifying that the district court correctly identified all participants, calculated a rough average level of culpability using the five factors from the Mitigating Role Guideline, and compared Chichande’s culpability to that average. The court also declined to remand for resentencing based on a retroactive amendment for zero criminal history points, noting that Chichande could seek relief through the established protocol in the Southern District of California. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the minor role reduction and affirmed the 180-month sentence.

United States v. Capps

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-3095

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: HARTZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The defendant was convicted on 12 counts related to fraudulently obtaining federal funds intended for COVID-19 relief. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the district court erred by reading the jury instructions only at the outset of the presentation of evidence and not again after the close of evidence.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas had indicted the defendant on 19 counts, including bank fraud, false statements to a bank and the Small Business Administration, wire fraud, and money laundering. The indictment alleged that he obtained COVID-19 relief funds by making false representations regarding the workforce of three entities. During a pretrial conference, the district court decided to read the jury instructions before the presentation of evidence and provide jurors with individual copies of the instructions. The trial proceeded, and the court read all 40 primary instructions to the jury before any evidence was introduced. After the close of evidence, the court denied the defense's motion to reread eight specific instructions, allowing defense counsel to refer to them during closing arguments instead.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the defendant did not preserve his argument that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c) required the court to instruct the jury after the close of evidence. The court applied plain-error review and determined that the defendant could not prevail because he did not show that any error was plain or that it affected the outcome of the proceeding. The court noted that the district court had provided jurors with written copies of the instructions and allowed defense counsel to refer to them during closing arguments. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Manzano

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-6073

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: SEYMOUR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Julian Manzano was pulled over by Oklahoma City police on March 26, 2022, just twenty-five days after being released from a thirteen-year prison sentence. During the stop, officers smelled burnt marijuana and found a .45 caliber pistol and ammunition in his car. Manzano admitted ownership of the firearm. Due to a prior 2009 conviction for second-degree murder in Oklahoma, he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and pled guilty.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sentenced Manzano, applying a higher base offense level based on the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) which classified his prior second-degree murder conviction as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Manzano objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the criteria for a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Oklahoma's second-degree murder statute, which includes homicides committed during the commission of any felony, does not categorically match the federal definition of "murder" under the Guidelines. The federal definition requires the underlying felony to be "dangerous," whereas Oklahoma law allows for potentially dangerous felonies to qualify. This broader scope means that Oklahoma second-degree murder criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "murder." Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing, finding that Manzano's prior conviction should not have been classified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).

Fernandez v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-12915

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Rosenbaum

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2007, Luis Fernandez and others conspired to rob a fictional cocaine stash house set up by law enforcement. They were arrested en route to the stash house with loaded firearms. Fernandez was indicted on multiple charges, including conspiracy and attempt to possess cocaine, conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The jury found him guilty of the Hobbs Act charges and the § 924(c) charge but acquitted him of the drug-related charges. He was sentenced to 360 months in prison.

Fernandez's direct appeal was unsuccessful. In 2016, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that his § 924(c) conviction was invalid under Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court denied the motion as untimely and procedurally defaulted. In 2020, Fernandez sought to file a second § 2255 motion based on United States v. Davis, which invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause. The Eleventh Circuit granted his motion, acknowledging that his conviction might be unconstitutional under Davis.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed Fernandez's appeal. The court held that Fernandez could not prove that his § 924(c) conviction rested solely on the residual clause, as required by Beeman v. United States. The court noted that the jury's general verdict did not specify which predicate offense supported the § 924(c) conviction. Additionally, the court found that the legal landscape at the time of Fernandez's conviction did not clearly establish that only the residual clause could support his conviction. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Fernandez's § 2255 motion.

Guardado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10957

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: Luck

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jesse Guardado confessed to the Walton County Sheriff’s Office that he had robbed and murdered Jackie Malone. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement or counsel, and was later appointed counsel for the penalty phase. A jury recommended the death penalty, and the state trial court sentenced him to death. Guardado filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence and for not challenging biased jurors.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no prejudice from counsel's performance. The court determined that the additional mitigating evidence presented during postconviction proceedings was cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. It also found no actual bias in the jurors that Guardado claimed should have been challenged.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington by using a stricter "actual bias" standard instead of the reasonable probability standard for prejudice. However, upon de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Guardado failed to show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome if the jurors had been challenged or if additional mitigating evidence had been presented. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief.

United States v. Bell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12750

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Three owners and officers of a currency-exchange business, Sterling Currency Group, were involved in a scheme to defraud retail investors by promoting false rumors about the imminent revaluation of the Iraqi dinar. They also concealed their payments to advertise on dinar-discussion forums and falsely claimed plans to open currency-exchange kiosks. Two of the defendants lied to federal agents about their activities. The business sold over $600 million worth of currencies, and many investors lost significant amounts of money due to the fraudulent inducements.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia conducted a five-week trial, after which the jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and making false statements. The district court sentenced the defendants to prison terms ranging from 84 to 180 months. The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary admissions, and one defendant's sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and the sentence of one defendant, except for the refusal to grant a downward departure, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the fraud convictions, as the misrepresentations about the revaluation and the airport plan went to the core of the bargain with investors. The court also found that the district court properly instructed the jury and did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary rulings. The court upheld the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court, including those for sophisticated means, obstruction of justice, and substantial financial hardship.

USA v. Brooks

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11456

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Lagoa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Xavier Rashad Brooks, a felon, pled guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 100 months in prison by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Brooks appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining his base offense level, applying a two-level enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm, and applying a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense.

The district court determined Brooks's base offense level was 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) due to his prior convictions for armed robbery and robbery. Brooks argued that his 2008 robbery conviction was not a "crime of violence." The court found that the statute under which Brooks was convicted was divisible and that Shepard documents showed he was convicted of robbery by force, which qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).

The district court also applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because Brooks possessed a stolen Smith & Wesson pistol in January 2021. Brooks contended that this possession was not relevant to his October 2020 conviction for possessing a Glock. The court found that the possession of the stolen Smith & Wesson was part of the same course of conduct as the possession of the Glock, thus qualifying as relevant conduct.

Finally, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, specifically theft by receiving stolen property. Brooks argued that the firearm did not facilitate the theft offense. The court held that the firearm, being the fruit of the theft, had the potential to facilitate the offense, thus justifying the enhancement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all counts, upholding Brooks's 100-month sentence.

STATE OF ARIZONA v MONTOYA

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-22-0106-AP

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Bolick

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, Christopher Montoya, was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, kidnapping, aggravated identity theft, unlawful use of means of transportation, theft, and two counts of animal cruelty. Montoya was sentenced to death for the murder charge. The crimes occurred after Montoya's relationship with the victim, A.R., ended, leading him to break into her house, attack, and ultimately kill her. Montoya also used A.R.'s personal information and belongings for his benefit after her death.

The Superior Court in Maricopa County handled the initial trial, where Montoya pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted to two capital aggravators: committing previous serious offenses and murdering A.R. in an especially cruel and heinous manner. Despite his guilty plea, Montoya waived the presentation of most mitigation evidence, allowing only the records of his guilty pleas and mitigation waiver hearings to be submitted as evidence of his acceptance of responsibility. The jury returned a death verdict, and the court sentenced Montoya to death for the murder and to a combined 103 years in prison for the other charges.

The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. The court affirmed Montoya’s convictions and sentences, including the death penalty. The court found no fundamental errors in the trial process, including the handling of voir dire, the admission of autopsy photographs, and the acceptance of Montoya’s waiver of mitigation evidence. The court also determined that the jury instructions were adequate and that the victim impact statements did not fundamentally prejudice Montoya’s right to a fair trial. The court conducted an independent review of the death sentence and concluded that a reasonable jury could have found the mitigating circumstances insufficient to warrant leniency.

P. v. Walker

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S278309

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Groban

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In June 2012, Maurice Walker assaulted a woman and a 78-year-old man in Los Angeles. Walker was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, elder abuse, and misdemeanor battery. The jury found true the enhancement allegations that he used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury on an elderly person. Walker admitted to having prior strike convictions and a prior serious felony conviction. Initially, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison, which was later reduced to 19 years after one enhancement was struck in a habeas proceeding. Another habeas proceeding in 2018 led to the removal of his remaining prior prison term enhancement, and the case was remanded for potential resentencing.

The Los Angeles County Superior Court conducted a full resentencing hearing in April 2022. Despite the new provisions of Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), which favor dismissing enhancements under certain mitigating circumstances, the trial court declined to dismiss Walker’s enhancements. The court did not find it in the interest of justice to dismiss the enhancements, even though multiple enhancements were present. Walker appealed, arguing that the trial court misapplied section 1385.

The California Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate courts on the interpretation of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). The court concluded that the statute does not create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement unless it endangers public safety. Instead, it requires trial courts to give significant weight to mitigating circumstances but allows them to consider other factors. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, finding that Walker was not entitled to relief under the clarified interpretation of the statute.

People v. Moore

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167918(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Jackson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Nathan Howard Moore pleaded no contest to stalking under Penal Code section 646.9(a). He was sentenced to 36 months of probation and 96 days in jail, with credit for 48 days served. Moore violated his probation four times, leading to its permanent revocation and a two-year prison sentence with credit for 417 days. He appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not requesting pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36.

The Mendocino County Superior Court handled the initial proceedings. After Moore's fourth probation violation, the court revoked his probation and imposed a two-year prison sentence. Moore filed a notice of appeal, stating that the appeal was based on issues arising after the plea that did not affect its validity. He did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that Moore needed a certificate of probable cause to pursue his appeal. The court referenced People v. Braden, which clarified that requests for pretrial mental health diversion must be made before a plea or trial. Consequently, an attorney's failure to request such diversion is not a matter occurring after the plea. The court found that Moore's appeal, based on ineffective assistance of counsel for not seeking pretrial mental health diversion, affected the validity of the plea. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed due to the lack of a certificate of probable cause.

Watson v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 303, 2023

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Karen L. Valihura

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Shannon Watson was convicted of Assault Second Degree after striking Damon Howard in the face multiple times, resulting in severe and permanent head injuries. The incident occurred outside the bathroom of Catherine Rooney’s Irish Pub. Watson claimed he acted in self-defense due to prior tensions with Howard, who was his friend’s ex-boyfriend. Both men testified, providing conflicting accounts of the altercation. Watson argued that Howard had a history of violence and that he felt threatened during the encounter.

The Superior Court of Delaware presided over the initial trial. Watson did not object to the trial court’s use of the term “victim” when referring to Howard, nor did he request a specific jury instruction regarding character evidence. The jury found Watson guilty, and he was sentenced to eight years in custody, suspended for one year at supervision Level II.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case on appeal. Watson argued that the trial court’s reference to Howard as the “victim” and the failure to issue a “character of the defendant” jury instruction constituted plain error. The Supreme Court held that the single reference to Howard as the “victim” did not amount to plain error, as it did not suggest the trial court’s acceptance of the State’s version of the facts. Additionally, the court found that the omission of a specific character evidence instruction did not deprive the jury of its ability to perform its duty, as the jury was adequately instructed to consider all evidence and determine the appropriate weight to give it. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed Watson’s conviction.

Wing v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 320, 2023

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Traynor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the fall of 2020, the Wilmington Police Department investigated the NorthPak street gang, which was involved in a series of violent crimes in Wilmington, Delaware. Gregory Wing, identified as a leader and shooter for NorthPak, was implicated in multiple shootings, including the murders of Ol-lier Henry and Taquan Davis. The investigation revealed that NorthPak was engaged in a violent feud with the M-Block Grimy Savages (MGS) gang. Wing was tied to the crimes through ballistics evidence, cell tower data, social media posts, and witness testimony. He was arrested in September 2020 with a firearm linked to the shootings.

The Superior Court of Delaware tried Wing and his co-defendant Elijah Coffield together. The trial lasted 14 days, with over 50 witnesses and 600 exhibits. The jury found Wing guilty of gang participation, two counts of first-degree murder, and four counts of attempted first-degree murder, among other charges. He was sentenced to two life terms plus additional years in prison. Wing appealed, challenging two evidentiary rulings: the admission of a witness's out-of-court statement and the limitation on cross-examination of another witness.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case. Wing argued that the Superior Court erred in admitting Kenneth Griffin's out-of-court statement under 11 Del. C. § 3507, claiming it was not voluntary and not truthful. The court found that Griffin's statement was voluntary, as he initiated contact with the police and was read his Miranda rights. The court also determined that Griffin's indication of the truthfulness of his statement met the requirements of § 3507. Wing also contended that the court improperly restricted cross-examination of Tyrie Burton, a witness who testified against Coffield. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting the cross-examination to avoid Fifth Amendment issues.

The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed Wing's convictions and sentences.

Bowman v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0642

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the death of Tammy Wolfe. The evidence presented at trial showed that Wolfe and the appellant had a tumultuous romantic relationship, marked by instances of jealousy and violence from the appellant. On the morning of Wolfe's death, cell phone records indicated that Wolfe's phone communicated with a phone linked to the appellant shortly before she was found dead. Wolfe's body was discovered with gunshot and stab wounds, and the letters "R" and "O" were written in blood on her car windshield. The appellant was arrested and found with weapons, despite previously telling police he did not carry any due to a medical condition.

The trial court sentenced the appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and additional time for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective on several grounds and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior acts of violence.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appellant's claims and found that his trial counsel's performance was not deficient. The court held that the decisions made by counsel, such as not calling certain witnesses or presenting specific evidence, were strategic and reasonable under the circumstances. The court also concluded that any potential errors in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior acts of violence were harmless given the substantial evidence of his guilt. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the appellant's convictions and sentences.

Garrison v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24G0007

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: PETERSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On November 15, 2018, Misty Michelle Garrison was involved in a traffic accident, leading to charges of DUI (less safe) (alcohol), failure to maintain lane, and improper tires. The State initially filed an accusation on May 29, 2019, and later amended it on January 12, 2021, to include additional charges. At trial, evidence included testimony from witnesses and officers, with a focus on Garrison's behavior and the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test conducted by Trooper Kyle McSween.

The trial court denied Garrison's motion in arrest of judgment, which argued that the accusation was filed beyond the statute of limitations. The court found that the Chief Justice’s emergency orders during the COVID-19 pandemic extended the limitations period. The jury found Garrison guilty on all counts, and she was sentenced accordingly. Garrison appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the emergency orders tolled the statute of limitations and that the HGN test evidence was admissible under the Harper standard.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the State was not required to allege and prove the tolling of the statute of limitations due to the emergency orders. The Court reasoned that such orders are effective as a matter of law and do not require factual proof. However, the Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the Harper standard to the HGN test evidence instead of the Daubert standard, which became applicable in criminal cases as of July 1, 2022. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the admissibility of the HGN test evidence under the Daubert standard. If the evidence is found inadmissible, a new trial will be necessary.

Heyward v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0694

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Aimee Glover Heyward shot and killed her husband, Bruce Heyward, and was charged with malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, among other crimes. At trial, Heyward requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder, which the trial court provided. However, at the request of Heyward's counsel, the court did not instruct the jury that it could find Heyward guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of felony murder. The jury acquitted Heyward of malice murder but convicted her of felony murder.

The DeKalb County grand jury indicted Heyward on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. After a jury trial, Heyward was found guilty of all charges except malice murder and was sentenced to life in prison plus additional years for other charges. Heyward filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. She then appealed, arguing that her trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a voluntary manslaughter instruction for the felony murder charge.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed Heyward's convictions. The court held that Heyward did not demonstrate prejudice from her counsel's decision regarding the jury instructions. The evidence presented at trial indicated a long history of difficulties between Heyward and Bruce, culminating in a series of altercations on the day of the shooting. The court found that the jury was unlikely to conclude that Heyward experienced the kind of sudden and severe provocation necessary to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, even if the jury had been given the option to convict Heyward of voluntary manslaughter instead of felony murder, there was no reasonable probability that it would have done so. Consequently, Heyward's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed, and her convictions and sentence were affirmed.

Johnson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0633

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Deand’re Dwayne Johnson was convicted for the stabbing death of Louis Tyler and the non-fatal assault of Vicki Robinson. The incidents occurred on November 10, 2018, following a series of conflicts between Johnson and Tyler’s family, particularly over the custody and care of Johnson’s son, K.J. Johnson had previously been involved in altercations with Tyler and Robinson, including forcibly taking K.J. and breaking windows at their residence. On the night of the stabbing, Johnson approached Tyler’s apartment with a knife, leading to a confrontation where Tyler was fatally stabbed.

A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Johnson on multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated stalking, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. In October 2019, a jury found Johnson guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years. Johnson’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court in September 2023.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the impeachment of a witness based on bias, knowledge, and the defense of accident, and by allowing hearsay testimony. The Supreme Court found no plain error in the trial court’s jury instructions, noting that the instructions given sufficiently covered the necessary legal principles. The court also determined that any error in admitting the hearsay testimony did not affect the trial's outcome, as the evidence of Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming and the contested testimony was cumulative of other evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Johnson’s convictions.

Nunnally v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0574

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Malik Nunnally was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the death of Maya Mitchell. On December 30, 2018, Mitchell left her boyfriend Xavier Lamar's home to meet Nunnally. The next morning, her body was found in Glen Emerald Park with a gunshot wound to the head. Evidence showed that Mitchell had been in contact with a phone number ending in -2170, which was in Nunnally's possession. Text messages indicated that Mitchell was meeting Nunnally to buy marijuana. Nunnally's girlfriend testified that he left her apartment that night with a gun. Cell-site data placed Nunnally's phone near the crime scene. Mitchell's car was later found abandoned, and Nunnally's internet search history showed searches related to the murder.

The DeKalb County Superior Court held a jury trial from August 26, 2021, to September 2, 2021. The court granted a directed verdict for Nunnally on the armed robbery charge but the jury found him guilty on the remaining counts. Nunnally was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for firearm possession charges. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault count merged into the malice murder count for sentencing. Nunnally's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court on December 8, 2023.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions under constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law. The court also found no error in the trial court's jury instruction on party to a crime, as there was at least slight evidence supporting the theory that Nunnally was involved in the events leading to Mitchell's murder. The judgment was affirmed, and all justices concurred.

Pinkins v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0716

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: COLVIN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Nathanieo Pinquez Pinkins, who was convicted of malice murder and related offenses following the shooting death of Cheryl Loving and the shooting of Desiraee Clay. Pinkins and Clay had a tumultuous relationship, and after a series of confrontations, Pinkins shot at Clay in a parking lot, injuring her. Shortly thereafter, he went to Loving's house, where he shot and killed her. Evidence included surveillance footage, forensic analysis, and Pinkins' own admissions.

The Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Pinkins on nine counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, home invasion, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated battery. The jury found him not guilty of home invasion but guilty of the other charges. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder, along with additional consecutive sentences for other charges. Pinkins filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the malice murder conviction, noting that the jury could reasonably infer Pinkins' intent to kill from his actions and the circumstances of the crime. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pinkins' motion to sever the counts related to Loving from those related to Clay, as the offenses were part of a connected series of acts. The court concluded that the jury was capable of distinguishing the evidence and applying the law to each offense, as evidenced by their verdicts.

Russell v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0565

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Rendell Russell was convicted in 2022 for malice murder and related crimes after killing Gregory James with a machete. The incident occurred on October 27, 2020, following Russell's breakup with his girlfriend, Kenisha Shepherd. On the night of the crime, Russell entered Shepherd's apartment uninvited, where James, Shepherd's new boyfriend, was staying. Despite being asked to leave, Russell returned with a machete, confronted James, and ultimately attacked him, resulting in James's death from multiple sharp and blunt force injuries.

A Cobb County grand jury indicted Russell on several charges, including malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The trial court bifurcated the firearm possession count. In March 2022, a jury found Russell guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder and additional concurrent and consecutive terms for other charges. Russell's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court in December 2023, leading to this appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, rejecting Russell's claim of self-defense. The court found that Russell was the aggressor and that the State had disproved his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court rejected Russell's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that his trial counsel's decision not to file a pretrial motion for immunity was a reasonable strategic choice. The court determined that there was little chance such a motion would have been successful given the evidence against Russell.

State v. Newsom

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0749

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: BOGGS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A Georgia State Patrol trooper observed Christopher James Newsom making an illegal left turn into the right lane of Georgia Highway 61 southbound. Following the traffic stop, the trooper determined that Newsom was driving under the influence of alcohol. The State charged Newsom with DUI less safe, DUI per se, and improper turn at an intersection. Newsom filed a motion to suppress, arguing that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, making the traffic stop unlawful.

The trial court agreed with Newsom, ruling that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague when read in conjunction with OCGA § 40-6-40 (c). The court found that the statutes provided conflicting directions to drivers, making it unclear whether Newsom had to complete his turn in the left lane. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the charges against Newsom, concluding that the traffic stop lacked probable cause.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Newsom. The statute provides clear notice that a driver making a left turn must complete the turn in the far-left lane. The court found that the trial court erred in interpreting Georgia Highway 61 as a single roadway, which led to the incorrect application of OCGA § 40-6-40 (c). The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the statute's language was clear and did not conflict with other statutory provisions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Wilson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0526

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2013, Demon Wilson was involved in the shooting death of Desmond Kinnemore in Rockmart, Georgia. Witnesses Cindy and John Bowman saw Kinnemore approach a red sedan, heard a gunshot, and saw Kinnemore fall into a ditch. The red sedan then drove away. Police later found Kinnemore dead with a gunshot wound to the head and a .223 caliber shell casing nearby. Wilson was stopped by police driving a red Cadillac matching the description given by the Bowmans. Further investigation revealed .223 caliber cartridges and a spent shell casing in Wilson’s car, which matched the casing found at the crime scene. Wilson was indicted and convicted of malice murder and related crimes.

Wilson was tried in the Superior Court of Polk County, where the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, merging the other counts for sentencing purposes. Wilson’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Wilson argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by not allowing evidence of other suspects. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, as it excluded every reasonable hypothesis except Wilson’s guilt. The court also found that any error in excluding evidence of other suspects was harmless, given the strong evidence against Wilson. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court’s judgment, upholding Wilson’s conviction and sentence.

JK Homes, LLC v. Brizzee

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 50662

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

While employed as a bookkeeper for Castlerock Homes, Sarah Brizzee embezzled over $230,000 by writing fraudulent checks and using the company credit card for personal purchases. She also created fraudulent lien waivers and invoices to cover her tracks. The crimes were discovered in October 2018, and Brizzee was charged with grand theft and forgery in April 2019. She pleaded guilty to one count of each and was sentenced in March 2020 to a unified sentence of seven years, with two years determinate and five years indeterminate, but the court retained jurisdiction, placing her on a rider program. She was released from incarceration in October 2020 and placed on probation until October 2026.

The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho found that Idaho Code section 5-248 created a one-year statute of limitations for crime victims to file civil claims, starting from the offender's release from incarceration. Since Brizzee was released from her rider in October 2020, the court ruled that Castlerock's complaint, filed in September 2022, was untimely and dismissed the case with prejudice.

The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Idaho Code section 5-248 does not create a one-year limitations period but instead tolls the applicable limitations period until one year after the offender has been released from incarceration and has fully satisfied the sentence imposed. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing Castlerock’s complaint as untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, clarifying that the statute of limitations was tolled during Brizzee's incarceration and for one year after her release, making Castlerock's complaint timely.

In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of Doelz

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125740

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Robert William Doelz was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to a warrantless search, and the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. On remand, the State dropped the charge and did not pursue a retrial. Subsequently, Doelz sought compensation for his wrongful conviction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5004, which requires proving actual innocence among other criteria.

The Shawnee District Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, interpreting K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) to require a claimant to prove that their innocence resulted in the reversal of their conviction, dismissal of charges, or a not guilty verdict upon retrial. The court found that Doelz's conviction was reversed due to a Fourth Amendment violation, not because he did not commit the crime. Since there was no evidence explaining why the charges were dismissed, a material fact remained unresolved. At a bench trial, Doelz testified to his innocence, but the court granted the State's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Doelz failed to prove the charges were dismissed due to his innocence.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) requires a claimant to prove actual innocence and that this innocence led to the reversal, dismissal, or acquittal. The court found that the legislative intent behind the statute was to compensate only those who are factually innocent. Since Doelz did not provide evidence that the charges were dismissed because of his innocence, he did not meet the statutory requirements for compensation.

State v. McMillan

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124726

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Marla J. Luckert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Pettix McMillan was convicted of three counts of attempted first-degree murder after shooting his then-wife and two sons. The State sought upward durational departure sentences for the counts involving his sons, citing their vulnerability and McMillan's fiduciary responsibility. The jury found these aggravating factors, and McMillan filed a motion for a downward departure, which the sentencing judge denied. The judge imposed a total sentence of 1,068 months but did not clearly designate a primary count or specify the sentences for each count.

McMillan appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals vacated his sentences, finding the total sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. On remand, the district court imposed a new sentence of 1,029 months, designating count two as the primary count but did not consider McMillan's renewed departure motion. McMillan appealed again, and the Court of Appeals held the district court erred by not considering the departure motion and by imposing a new sentence on counts two and three, which it deemed legal in the original sentencing.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the original sentences were illegal due to the failure to designate a primary count and specify sentences for each count. The Court found the original sentencing judge's intentions unclear and the journal entry inconsistent. It concluded that the McMillan II panel correctly vacated all sentences and that the McMillan III panel erred in limiting the resentencing to count one. The Court also held that the district court on remand must consider McMillan's departure motion, as the mandate rule did not preclude it. The case was remanded for a third sentencing hearing with directions to consider the departure motion and comply with the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act.

State v. Union

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 121643

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Trusts & Estates

Alonzo Union served as the caretaker and power of attorney for Jean Miller, an elderly woman with dementia. Union had access to Miller's finances and was responsible for her care. After Miller moved into a nursing home and accumulated an unpaid bill, the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF) investigated Union's financial activities. Union entered a no contest plea to mistreatment of a dependent adult. The court ordered Union to pay restitution to the nursing home for Miller's outstanding balance and to Miller for certain payments and cash withdrawals from her account.

The Wyandotte District Court accepted Union's no contest plea and found him guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a 43-month underlying sentence, suspended in favor of probation, and ordered Union to pay $31,511.26 in restitution. This amount included $7,632.74 to the nursing home and $23,878.52 to Miller, covering one-half of the ATM withdrawals and Walmart purchases, among other expenses. Union appealed, arguing that the restitution order was not supported by substantial competent evidence. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's restitution order, except for the part that converted the restitution award into a civil judgment.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the portion of the restitution order directing Union to pay the nursing home $7,632.74, finding insufficient evidence that Union's crime caused the unpaid bill. However, the court affirmed the restitution order requiring Union to pay $23,878.52 to Miller. The court concluded that Union's no contest plea established that he misappropriated at least $25,000 from Miller, providing substantial competent evidence to support the restitution amount. The court held that the no contest plea and the well-pleaded facts in the charging document could be considered in determining the restitution award.

Jarvis v. State

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 22/23

Opinion Date: August 12, 2024

Judge: Shirley M. Watts

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Aaron Jarvis was involved in a physical altercation with his brother-in-law, Ethan Durrett, which resulted in Jarvis stabbing Durrett. The incident occurred after a heated exchange of text messages regarding a family dispute. Jarvis claimed he acted in self-defense, fearing for his safety due to Durrett's aggressive behavior and larger physical stature. Jarvis testified that he brandished a knife to deter Durrett and that the stabbing was accidental during a struggle.

The Circuit Court for Cecil County instructed the jury on perfect self-defense but declined to instruct on imperfect self-defense. Jarvis was acquitted of attempted murder charges but convicted of first-degree assault and other lesser offenses. He was sentenced to 15 years of incarceration, with all but 10 years suspended, and five years of supervised probation.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on imperfect self-defense, given that it had instructed on perfect self-defense. However, the court deemed this error harmless, reasoning that an acquittal of attempted murder was more favorable than a mitigated conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. The court found no evidence that Jarvis subjectively believed his use of deadly force was necessary for his safety. Jarvis's testimony indicated that the stabbing was accidental, and there was no evidence to support that he believed stabbing Durrett was necessary for self-defense. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Mitchell v. State

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 8/23

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: Biran

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Charles Mitchell was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of sexually abusing his nine-year-old daughter. During voir dire, Mitchell's defense counsel requested the court to ask potential jurors if they had concerns about a child testifying and if they believed a child could lie about such a serious crime. The court only asked the first part of the question, omitting the second part. The jury found Mitchell guilty, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison, with all but five years suspended.

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the conviction, holding that Mitchell had preserved his claims of error related to voir dire. The court noted that trial courts have broad discretion in voir dire but must ask questions reasonably likely to reveal specific cause for disqualification. The Appellate Court, bound by the precedent set in Stewart v. State, ruled that questions about the credibility of child-witnesses did not support disqualification for cause and thus found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to ask the second part of the proposed question.

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and abrogated part of its decision in Stewart v. State, recognizing that significant changes in the law had occurred. The court held that bias regarding a child witness could be a specific cause for disqualification of a juror when the child's testimony is crucial to the trial. The court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by not rephrasing the defense's question to properly inquire about potential juror bias against child-witnesses. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.

Mooney v. State

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 32/23

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Shirley M. Watts

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Christopher Mooney, who was convicted of second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and various firearm-related offenses following the nonfatal shooting of Joshua Zimmerman in Baltimore City. Zimmerman testified that he was shot in the back while sitting in his vehicle. A video recorded by a nearby camera, which depicted the events surrounding the shooting, was admitted into evidence over Mooney's objection.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the jury found Mooney guilty based on the video evidence and Zimmerman’s testimony. Mooney appealed, arguing that the video was not properly authenticated because Zimmerman did not witness the entire event depicted in the video. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions, holding that the video was properly authenticated through a combination of Zimmerman’s testimony and circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine whether the video was properly authenticated. The Court held that the "reasonable juror" test applies to the authentication of videos, meaning there must be sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the video is what it is claimed to be. The Court concluded that videos can be authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4).

The Court found that the video was properly authenticated through Zimmerman’s testimony and circumstantial evidence. Zimmerman testified that the video accurately depicted the events he witnessed, and Detective Liu testified about the video’s origin. The Court held that the combination of this testimony and the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the video was a fair and accurate depiction of the shooting and the surrounding events. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Rovin v. State

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 19/23

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The petitioner was arrested under a warrant for allegedly violating Maryland's juror intimidation statute. After a bench trial, the circuit court acquitted her based on its interpretation of the statute. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a civil suit against a sheriff’s deputy, claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violations of her rights under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The deputy had filed the application for charges after consulting with the State’s Attorney’s Office, which determined that the petitioner’s conduct violated the statute.

The Circuit Court for Wicomico County granted summary judgment in favor of the State, ruling that the deputy could not be held civilly liable for the petitioner’s arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by a judicial officer. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed this decision, concluding that the warrant provided legal justification for the arrest and that the officers’ interpretation of the statute was objectively reasonable.

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on the common law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as on the constitutional claims under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court emphasized that when an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, probable cause is predetermined by a judicial officer, creating a strong presumption of objective reasonableness. The petitioner failed to overcome this presumption.

Additionally, the Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on the petitioner’s claim that her arrest and imprisonment violated her free speech rights under Article 40. The Court found that the judicial officer had probable cause to believe that the petitioner’s speech constituted a “true threat” and thus fell outside the protections of Article 40. Finally, the Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling that the juror intimidation statute was not unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Smith

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 30/23

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, law enforcement conducted a 55-minute interview with Tony Blake, who was terminally ill, regarding a drug trafficking operation. Blake made several statements implicating both himself and the defendant, Lamont Smith. The State sought to admit the entire interview as a declaration against penal interest, arguing that the statements were so interwoven that they could not be separated. Defense counsel objected, arguing that not all statements were self-inculpatory to Blake and that the statements were severable.

The Circuit Court for Wicomico County admitted the entire interview without parsing each statement to determine its admissibility. The court treated the interview as a single statement and ruled it admissible as a declaration against penal interest. At trial, the interview was played for the jury, and Smith was found guilty on multiple charges related to possession and conspiracy to distribute controlled dangerous substances.

On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland held that the trial court erred by admitting the entire interview without conducting the required parsing analysis to determine the admissibility of each statement. The court vacated Smith’s convictions, finding that the trial court failed to follow the process established in State v. Matusky, which requires a statement-by-statement analysis to determine if each statement is genuinely self-inculpatory.

The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the trial court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each statement. The court emphasized that the test for admissibility is whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s circumstances would have believed the statement was adverse to their penal interest at the time it was made. The court concluded that Smith adequately preserved his objection to the trial court’s failure to undertake the required parsing process.

Commonwealth v. Bellard

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13475

Opinion Date: August 8, 2024

Judge: Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with assault and battery on a family or household member and was detained pretrial. While awaiting trial, he made two recorded phone calls to his fiancée, the alleged victim, advising her not to cooperate with authorities. He suggested that if she did not testify, the case against him would weaken. The fiancée expressed concerns about losing her housing and custody of her children due to police and Department of Children and Families (DCF) involvement. The defendant reassured her that things would improve if she followed his advice.

The case was initially heard in the Lynn Division of the District Court Department, where the defendant was found guilty of witness intimidation under G. L. c. 268, § 13B. The judge denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty. The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted further appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether the defendant's statements constituted an offer or promise of anything of value to dissuade his fiancée from testifying. The court found that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's vague assurances about their relationship and the potential end of the DCF investigation constituted a bribe. The court noted that the defendant did not have the power to influence the DCF investigation and that his statements did not amount to a quid pro quo arrangement. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction, set aside the finding, and ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant.

Williams v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-01017-SCT

Opinion Date: August 8, 2024

Judge: Griffis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jatavis Williams was indicted for first-degree murder after the shooting death of Tacari Walker. On November 9, 2020, police responded to a shooting in Columbus, Mississippi, where they found Walker unresponsive. Witnesses indicated that Williams and Walker had been arguing prior to the incident. Williams turned himself in the next day. At trial, Williams claimed self-defense, stating that Walker had threatened him and approached his vehicle aggressively. However, an eyewitness testified that Walker was unarmed and appeared happy before the shooting.

The Lowndes County Circuit Court conducted a jury trial from August 22 to August 26, 2022. The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Williams filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which the trial court denied. He then appealed, arguing that the conviction was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in denying his request for a mistrial due to disruptions during the trial.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The disruptions, including an outburst from the victim’s mother and an inappropriate video during a witness's Zoom testimony, were addressed by polling the jury, who indicated they could remain impartial. The court also found that the jury's verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as the jury had properly considered the self-defense claim and found it unconvincing. Therefore, the conviction and sentence were upheld.

Doe v. Olson

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100296

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: KELLY C. BRONIEC

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1997, John Doe pleaded guilty to two class C felonies: deviate sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the first degree. He was placed on probation for five years and registered as a sex offender under the Missouri Sex Offender Registry Act (MO-SORA). After completing probation in 2002, his criminal records were sealed. Despite this, Doe remained on the sex offender registry. Over the years, MO-SORA was amended to include more stringent requirements, such as public disclosure of registrants' information, in-person reporting, and lifetime registration for certain offenses.

Doe filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, arguing that the amendments to MO-SORA violated his substantive due process rights and constituted an ex post facto law. The circuit court ruled against Doe on all claims, leading to his appeal.

The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that Doe has no fundamental right to privacy in the information required by the registry, as the information was already public before his records were sealed. The court found that MO-SORA is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting children and public safety. Additionally, the court determined that MO-SORA is civil in nature and does not constitute a punitive ex post facto law. The court concluded that the registration requirements, including lifetime registration and in-person reporting, are not excessive and serve the non-punitive purpose of public safety. Therefore, the court upheld the constitutionality of MO-SORA's registration requirements.

City of Helena v. Hallberg

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 177N

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

Frank Hallberg rented an apartment from Steve Schmitz in Helena. Schmitz sent Hallberg a 30-day notice to vacate, and upon inspecting the apartment on July 12, 2021, Schmitz found 20-30 holes in the walls. Schmitz took photos and called the police, who also documented the damage. Hallberg was charged with Criminal Mischief Damage to Rental Property.

The Municipal Court scheduled an omnibus hearing, which Hallberg attended without his attorney. The hearing was rescheduled multiple times, and neither Hallberg nor his attorney appeared at the final rescheduled hearing. Consequently, the court set a bench trial for April 15, 2022, which was held on December 14, 2022. The court found Hallberg guilty and ordered him to pay $1,226.45 in restitution. Hallberg appealed to the District Court, arguing he was denied a jury trial, the evidence was insufficient, and the restitution amount was incorrect. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's decision, stating Hallberg waived his right to a jury trial by not objecting and that the restitution amount was supported by Schmitz’s testimony.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Hallberg waived his right to a jury trial by failing to object to the bench trial. The court found sufficient evidence to support Hallberg’s conviction based on the testimonies and photographic evidence presented. The court also upheld the restitution amount, finding it was not clearly erroneous as it was supported by Schmitz’s testimony regarding repair costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision.

State v. Kepler

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 173

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2013, Christopher Michael Kepler drove the wrong way on Interstate 90, causing a head-on collision that resulted in the death of Patricia Graves and injuries to her husband, Benjamin Graves. Kepler, who is schizophrenic, was found to have marijuana and methamphetamine in his system at the time. He was charged with deliberate homicide, negligent homicide, felony assault with a weapon, felony criminal endangerment, and driving on a suspended license. Kepler pleaded guilty to negligent homicide and two counts of criminal endangerment in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. He was sentenced to 40 years with 20 years suspended, under the supervision of the Montana Department of Health and Human Services (DPHHS).

The District Court of the Third Judicial District initially committed Kepler to the Montana State Hospital for evaluation. Later, he was placed on supervised release under specific conditions, including abstaining from marijuana. In 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke Kepler’s suspended sentence, citing violations such as absconding to Arizona, failing to reside at his approved residence, and not maintaining contact with his probation officer. The District Court found that Kepler had violated his release conditions and posed a danger to himself and others due to his mental illness and substance abuse.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision to revoke Kepler’s suspended sentence. The Court held that the revocation was supported by substantial evidence, including Kepler’s failure to follow treatment recommendations and his continued use of marijuana. The Court concluded that Kepler’s actions made him a danger to himself and others, justifying the revocation of his conditional release.

State v. Meuret

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 175N

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: Jim Rice

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

James Edward Meuret II was sentenced to two years with the Department of Corrections, all time suspended, for criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Meuret appealed, arguing that his attorney at the District Court rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and requested the court to vacate the judgment and allow him to withdraw his plea of no contest. The case arose from a traffic stop on July 22, 2019, where police found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Meuret's vehicle after arresting him on an outstanding warrant.

Initially, Meuret was represented by Casey Moore from the Office of State Public Defender (OPD). Meuret pleaded not guilty to both charges but reserved the right to file a motion to suppress evidence, which was never filed. On the morning of his trial, Meuret decided to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the drug possession charge in exchange for the dismissal of the paraphernalia charge. He acknowledged waiving his constitutional rights and expressed no issues with his counsel. Later, Meuret considered withdrawing his plea, but no motion was filed by the deadline. A new attorney, Mark Epperson, was assigned and filed a motion to suppress evidence instead of a motion to withdraw the plea, which the District Court rejected as untimely.

The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington to assess IAC claims. The court found that the record did not sufficiently demonstrate the reasons behind Moore's and Epperson's actions. The court noted that IAC claims require a developed record, which was lacking in this case. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's judgment but allowed Meuret the option to pursue his IAC claims through a petition for postconviction relief.

State v. Zitterkopf

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 312

Opinion Date: August 9, 2024

Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves William Zitterkopf, who was charged with unlawful distribution of an intimate image under Nebraska law. The charges stemmed from allegations that Zitterkopf recorded a sexual encounter with the victim, L.E., without her consent and later distributed a screenshot from the video to his ex-wife and L.E. The image showed L.E. nude from the waist down. Zitterkopf sent the image to L.E. with a message suggesting she confess to lying in an affidavit related to his divorce proceedings.

The Scotts Bluff County District Court overruled Zitterkopf’s motion to quash the charge, in which he argued that the statute under which he was charged was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was not overbroad and did not violate free speech protections because it targeted the nonconsensual nature of the disclosure rather than the content of the image. The court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and concluded that the statute served an important governmental interest without burdening more speech than necessary.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and assumed for the sake of argument that the statute was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. The court found that the statute served a compelling interest in protecting individual privacy and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The statute required a lack of consent both when the image was created and when it was distributed, and it required that the distribution be done knowingly and intentionally. The court concluded that the statute was not substantially overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment.

The court also addressed Zitterkopf’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. It found that the record on direct appeal was sufficient to determine that Zitterkopf could not show prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony. However, the court found the record insufficient to review Zitterkopf’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain testimony. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Zitterkopf’s conviction.

State v. Keller

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-0138

Opinion Date: August 13, 2024

Judge: DONOVAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The defendant, Otto Keller, was involved in a car accident after falling asleep while driving, resulting in a collision with an unoccupied car and a house. He admitted to using heroin and being involved in a methadone clinic. A blood test revealed multiple drugs in his system. Keller was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated (ADWI) for causing a collision resulting in serious bodily injury, specifically a broken right humerus.

The Superior Court denied Keller's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Colleen Scarneo, the State’s expert in human performance forensic toxicology, and his motion to dismiss the ADWI charge for insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury. The court found Scarneo’s methodology reliable under RSA 516:29-a and Daubert standards. At trial, Scarneo testified that Keller exhibited signs of impairment consistent with the drugs found in his system. The jury found Keller guilty of ADWI.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Scarneo’s testimony because her methodology was not sufficiently reliable. The court found that her methodology had not been tested, subjected to peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted in the scientific community. Additionally, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Keller’s broken arm constituted a serious bodily injury as defined by RSA 625:11, VI.

The Supreme Court reversed Keller’s ADWI conviction due to insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury and the prejudicial admission of unreliable expert testimony. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion, specifically for a new trial on the lesser-included charge of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI).

State v. Enriquez

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 164

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Christapher Enriquez pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver or manufacture, a class B felony, and was sentenced to probation. A condition of his probation was that he not possess a firearm or dangerous weapon. Federal officers from the DEA executed a search warrant on Enriquez’s home and allegedly found a handgun, fentanyl pills, and methamphetamine. The State filed a petition to revoke his probation based on these findings. At the revocation hearing, the State presented testimony from Enriquez’s probation officer, who had received a picture of the handgun and narcotics from a DEA agent. The probation officer did not know where in the house the handgun was found or if it was functional.

The District Court of Ward County found that the State did not prove Enriquez possessed fentanyl or methamphetamine but did prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed a handgun. The court revoked Enriquez’s probation and resentenced him, relying on the principle that a single violation is sufficient to sustain revocation.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and applied a two-step analysis: first, reviewing the district court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard, and second, reviewing the decision to revoke probation under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The Supreme Court found that the district court’s reliance on the case State v. Clinkscales was misplaced and that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the handgun was functional or readily capable of expelling a projectile, as required by the statutory definitions of “dangerous weapon” and “firearm.”

The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court’s finding that Enriquez possessed a dangerous weapon was clearly erroneous and that the court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. The decision to revoke Enriquez’s probation was reversed.

State v. Miller

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 167

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ladarius Miller was charged with theft of property and deceptive writings for using falsified paystubs to purchase a vehicle from an automotive dealership in Grand Forks, North Dakota. After a warrant was issued for his arrest, Miller was apprehended in Oregon and extradited to Grand Forks. He pleaded guilty to theft of property and agreed to a plea deal that included imprisonment, various fees, and $800 in restitution, with the possibility of additional restitution to be determined within sixty days. The district court sentenced him according to the plea agreement. Subsequently, the State sought additional restitution for the costs associated with Miller's extradition, totaling $2,435.91. The district court granted this request, and Miller appealed.

The District Court of Grand Forks County initially allowed Miller to contest the restitution despite the State's claim that he failed to request a hearing within the required thirty days. The court found that the State did not provide proper notice of the deadline and that a hearing had already been set, making it reasonable for Miller to assume the matter would be addressed then. The district court ultimately ordered Miller to pay the additional restitution for extradition costs.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the extradition costs were not directly related to Miller's criminal conduct of theft of property. The court emphasized that restitution must be limited to damages directly related to the offense, which was not the case here. Additionally, the court found that imposing extradition costs as prosecution costs was not permissible because it would violate the terms of Miller's binding plea agreement. Therefore, the restitution order for the extradition expenses was reversed.

State v. Blackmon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070836

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Bushong

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant faced serious felony charges and underwent two trials, both ending in mistrials. The second mistrial occurred because a courtroom clerk mistakenly gave the jury an exhibit revealing the defendant's prior felony conviction, which had been excluded from the jury's consideration. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice, arguing that a retrial was barred by the former jeopardy provision in the Oregon Constitution, as interpreted in State v. Kennedy. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it could not find "indifference" under the Kennedy test.

The Multnomah County Circuit Court initially declared a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. Months later, a juror contacted the defendant's counsel, revealing that the jury had seen an exhibit disclosing the defendant's prior conviction. The trial court then changed the basis for the mistrial to include the erroneous submission of the exhibit. After further hearings and testimony from jurors and the clerk's supervisor, the trial court found that the clerk had made an error but did not intentionally give the jury the exhibit knowing it disclosed the prior conviction. The court could not determine whether the clerk was indifferent or simply lacked the capacity to do her job.

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the record did not compel findings that the clerk knowingly engaged in improper and prejudicial conduct or acted with indifference to the consequences. The court emphasized that the Kennedy test requires a conscious choice of prejudicial action, which was not evident in this case. Therefore, the trial court was not compelled to dismiss the charges with prejudice, and a retrial was not barred under the Oregon Constitution.

Cone v. State

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28230

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The petitioner was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court refused the State's request to instruct the jury that the testimony of an alleged victim of criminal sexual conduct need not be corroborated, as per section 16-3-657 of the South Carolina Code. However, the court allowed the State to cite and quote the statute during its closing argument, over the petitioner's objection. The victim testified that the petitioner sexually abused her from the age of four or five until she was nine, with no corroborating evidence presented.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue of whether the State could argue section 16-3-657 was unpreserved for appellate review. The petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel failed to perfect his direct appeal. The post-conviction relief court granted a belated appeal, but the Court of Appeals again found the issues unpreserved and affirmed the conviction, also noting that the petitioner conceded the State could argue the statute during its closing argument.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and found that the petitioner's objections to the State arguing section 16-3-657 were preserved for appellate review. The court held that it is improper for a party to argue the statute to the jury, as it could unduly influence the jury to believe the victim's testimony without corroboration. The court noted that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the statute, combined with the State's argument and assurance that the trial court would correct any misstatement of the law, compounded the error. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Pickrell

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28229

Opinion Date: August 14, 2024

Judge: JAMES

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Gregg Pickrell was convicted of murdering Robert Lamont Demary. Pickrell and Demary were romantically involved but did not live together. Pickrell claimed that Demary routinely abused her and that she shot him in self-defense as he lunged toward her in her bedroom. The entry wound was in Demary's back, which Pickrell did not dispute.

The Circuit Court of Kershaw County admitted testimony from SLED Agent Dawn Claycomb and Kershaw County Sheriff's Investigator Rick Bailey. Pickrell objected to both testimonies. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that any error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless and that Pickrell's objection to Investigator Bailey's testimony was not preserved for appellate review. The court also found Bailey's testimony admissible under Rule 701 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on certiorari. The court agreed with the court of appeals that the error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless because the location of the shooting was not in dispute. However, the court disagreed with the court of appeals regarding Investigator Bailey's testimony, finding that Pickrell's objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The court held that Bailey's testimony did not meet the foundational requirements of Rule 701 and should have been excluded. Despite this, the court found the error harmless because Bailey's testimony was cumulative to that of Investigator Miles Taylor, who provided similar testimony without objection.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified, maintaining Pickrell's conviction.

State v. Baugh

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 33

Opinion Date: August 15, 2024

Judge: Matthew B. Durrant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In 2018, Brevan Bringhurst Baugh was charged with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The prosecution presented evidence of three instances of alleged abuse, distinguished by location, while the charges were distinguished by date. During closing arguments, the prosecution told the jury they could use any two of the three instances to fulfill the elements of the charged counts. The jury convicted Baugh on one count and acquitted him on the other.

Baugh appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the jury might not have unanimously agreed on which instance of abuse supported the conviction. He also claimed his counsel was ineffective for not requesting specific jury instructions on unanimity. The court of appeals agreed, finding that the jury instructions were ambiguous and could have led to a non-unanimous verdict. The court vacated Baugh’s conviction.

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on certiorari. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that Baugh’s counsel performed deficiently by failing to request more specific unanimity instructions. The court noted that the risk of a non-unanimous verdict was significant due to the way the evidence and charges were presented. The court also found that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Baugh if proper unanimity instructions had been given. Therefore, the court concluded that Baugh’s counsel was ineffective, and the conviction was vacated.