United States v. Dudley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 23-1496, 23-1497

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case involves Joel Dudley, who was appealing the 2023 revocation of his supervised release and his sentence of two terms of two years of incarceration, to be served consecutively, followed by supervised release for life. The revocation was the second one from his prior convictions in 2014 for possession of child pornography and making a false declaration before the court. The revocation was based on the district court's finding that he had violated five conditions of his supervised release, including by sharing images of himself sexually abusing his daughter when she was approximately four years old and engaging in sexual contact with, exchanging sexually explicit messages with, and receiving and possessing pornographic video of his daughter when she was seventeen years old.

Previously, Dudley had been found guilty on both counts at two separate jury trials. His supervised release was first revoked in 2019 after he violated the conditions of his release by failing to update his sex offender registration and having other individuals access the internet on his behalf. His supervised release was again revoked in 2020 after he had unapproved contact with his daughter, exchanged sexually explicit messages with her, and used an unreported cell phone number and Facebook account under a false name.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court judge did not err or abuse his discretion in revoking Dudley's supervised release and that Dudley's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

United States v. Rosa-Borges

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 22-1195, 22-1218

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: RIKELMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Reynaldo Rosa-Borges, who was sentenced to 72 months for unlawful firearm possession and 36 months for violating the terms of his supervised release from a previous conviction. The firearm and ammunition were discovered during two separate incidents. The first incident occurred when Rosa-Borges was found with a firearm during a police patrol at a beach. The second incident happened the following day when police searched Rosa-Borges' residence and found additional ammunition. Rosa-Borges' brother, Naim, claimed that the ammunition belonged to Rosa-Borges.

In the lower courts, Rosa-Borges pleaded guilty to the charges. However, he disputed the claim that he possessed the additional 100 rounds of ammunition found at his residence, arguing that the information was derived from unreliable hearsay from his brother, who had a motive to avoid his own criminal liability. Despite these objections, the district court sentenced Rosa-Borges to a total of 108 months in prison.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. The appellate court found that the district court had relied on unreliable hearsay evidence from Rosa-Borges' brother to extend Rosa-Borges' sentence. The court concluded that the brother's statement was self-serving and inconsistent with the government's version of events, and therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to find the statement reliable. The court did not address Rosa-Borges' argument that his limited confrontation right under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) was violated.

United States v. Santonastaso

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1944

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: MONTECALVO

Areas of Law: Aviation, Criminal Law, Transportation Law

The defendant, Antonio Santonastaso, was convicted of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The charges stemmed from a 2018 investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) into allegations that Santonastaso was flying a helicopter without the necessary certifications. During the investigation, Santonastaso falsely claimed that he had the requisite certifications to fly and that his previous involvement in a 2000 helicopter theft was part of an undercover operation.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, where Santonastaso was found guilty. He appealed the decision, arguing that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt and that the district court erred by not giving a materiality instruction based on the Supreme Court's decision in Maslenjak v. United States.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Santonastaso guilty of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The court also ruled that the district court did not commit instructional error in rejecting Santonastaso's proposed materiality instruction. The court held that the law-of-the-circuit doctrine foreclosed the application of the Maslenjak materiality standard to § 1001(a) prosecutions, and that the district court's instruction correctly stated the controlling law on materiality.

US v. Abbas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1864

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: GELPÍ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Hassan Abbas, who was convicted on several counts of wire fraud and money laundering. Abbas was found guilty of participating in an email-based fraud scheme that targeted citizens of Massachusetts. He appealed his conviction on several grounds, including the appropriateness of Massachusetts as the venue for his trial.

In the lower courts, Abbas challenged the venue for his trial, arguing that the wire fraud and money laundering activities did not occur in Massachusetts. The district court denied his motion, determining that the issue of when the wired funds became "proceeds" was not capable of resolution before the trial.

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed Abbas's convictions for wire fraud but vacated his convictions for money laundering. The court found that the money sent from the victims did not become "proceeds" until it reached Abbas's bank accounts in Illinois and California. Therefore, Abbas did not "participate in the transfer of proceeds" from Massachusetts, making Massachusetts an improper venue for the money laundering charges. The court remanded the case for resentencing and recalculation of restitution.

US v. Figaro-Benjamin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1749

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: THOMPSON

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Maximiliano Fígaro-Benjamín, a co-conspirator in a multi-defendant drug conspiracy case. Fígaro-Benjamín was part of a crew that transported cocaine between Puerto Rico and St. Thomas on a vessel named the Black Wolfpack. The crew was intercepted by federal agents in January 2018. Fígaro-Benjamín was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and conspiracy to import controlled substances into the U.S. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 292 months in prison.

Fígaro-Benjamín appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court relied on unreliable evidence at sentencing and incorrectly calculated his sentence. He also claimed that the court did not adequately explain its sentence. His arguments were based on the testimony of a co-conspirator, José Javier Resto Miranda, who testified at the trial of Fígaro-Benjamín's co-defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Fígaro-Benjamín's arguments did not hold up. It ruled that the sentencing court did not err in considering Resto's testimony, which was reliable and corroborated by other evidence. The court also found that the sentencing court correctly calculated Fígaro-Benjamín's guidelines sentencing range and did not err in finding that he was a supervisor in the trafficking operation. Lastly, the court found that the sentencing court adequately explained its sentence.

United States v. Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2958

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: PARK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A U.S. citizen, Maalik Alim Jones, pleaded guilty to terrorism-related charges for his involvement with al-Shabaab, an Islamist military organization in Kenya and Somalia. The district court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 25 years of imprisonment. Jones challenged his plea agreement and sentence, arguing that a prior mandate of the court precluded the government from charging him in a superseding indictment, that the language of his plea agreement was ambiguous and inapplicable to him, and that his sentence was based on erroneous factual findings and constitutionally impermissible factors.

Jones was initially indicted on five counts related to his support and training with al-Shabaab. He later consented to a superseding information, which reduced the charges to three counts. Jones pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment. However, following a Supreme Court ruling that found a section of the law under which Jones was charged to be unconstitutionally vague, Jones appealed his conviction on one of the counts. The court vacated this conviction and remanded for resentencing on the remaining counts. On remand, the district court denied the government's motion to reinstate the initial indictment but did not preclude the government from seeking a superseding indictment. The government subsequently filed a superseding indictment, which Jones moved to dismiss.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Jones's arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the mandate did not preclude a superseding indictment, and that the plea agreement unambiguously allowed for new charges if a conviction was vacated. The court also found that Jones's sentence was not based on erroneous factual findings or constitutionally impermissible factors, and that his challenges were barred by the appeal waiver in the plea agreement.

United States v. Ortiz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1775

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Menashi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

Antonio Ortiz, while on supervised release for a drug-trafficking conviction, was accused of repeatedly raping his teenage daughter. The district court found Ortiz guilty of three release violations related to the rapes and revoked his supervised release. Ortiz was sentenced to the statutory maximum of sixty months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to any state court sentence he might receive.

Ortiz appealed, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the evidentiary hearing and that the sentence imposed by the district court was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He claimed his counsel failed to present medical evidence that would have corroborated his testimony that he was physically incapable of raping his daughter due to injuries from previous motorcycle accidents.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Ortiz's arguments. The court noted that Ortiz had not shown that the purportedly deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his defense. The court also concluded that the rationale for the sentence was evident from the record and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing it. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Herrington v. Dotson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-6272

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: G. Steven Agee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics, Tax Law

The case involves Donald Herrington, who was charged with multiple counts of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, filing false or fraudulent income tax returns, failure to file an income tax return, and drug possession. Herrington chose to represent himself in court, waiving his right to counsel. He was eventually convicted on several charges and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Herrington appealed his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring two meritorious arguments on direct appeal.

The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected Herrington's arguments and denied his petition. Herrington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court found that Herrington knowingly, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, thus affirming that aspect of the district court's decision. However, the court agreed with Herrington that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury was erroneously instructed on the requirements for a conviction for failure to file a tax return. The court reversed this part of the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless Herrington is afforded a new state court appeal in which he may raise this claim.

Percival Partners Limited v. Paa Nduom

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1309

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Harris

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, International Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves a group of Ghanaian investors who placed their funds with a Ghanaian private investment firm, Gold Coast, owned by the Nduom family, who are domiciled in Virginia. The Nduom family allegedly used a network of shell companies in Ghana and the United States to illicitly transfer the investors' funds out of their reach. The investors sued in a federal district court in Virginia, invoking a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that authorizes a private cause of action for any person injured in his business or property by a violation of RICO’s substantive prohibitions.

The district court dismissed the action, ruling that the plaintiffs had not alleged a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a private RICO plaintiff. The court considered the residency of the plaintiffs and the location of the money when it was misappropriated, both of which were in Ghana. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as there was no diversity jurisdiction over the claims and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims after dismissing the only federal claim in the case.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed that the plaintiffs had not alleged a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a private RICO plaintiff. The court noted that the case involved Ghanaian victims who entrusted Ghanaian funds to a Ghanaian entity, with no expectation that their money would end up in the United States. The defendants’ unilateral use of American entities to complete their scheme did not domesticate an otherwise foreign injury.

Thurston v. Frye

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-1459

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves David Thurston, a registered sex offender, who moved to Avery County, North Carolina, where Kevin Frye served as Sheriff and Lee Buchanan was the Deputy in charge of sex-offender registrations. Thurston informed Sheriff Frye that he had been invited to his nephew’s wedding in Spokane, Washington, and sought advice on how to comply with the law and asked for permission to attend the wedding. Sheriff Frye gave Thurston permission to travel and instructed him to email a copy of his Washington visitor-registration form within ten days of his arrival. However, while Thurston was away, the Sheriff’s Office mailed his verification form. Thurston contacted Sheriff Frye for guidance, but Sheriff Frye never responded. Deputy Buchanan began investigating Thurston and obtained a warrant alleging three different criminal violations. Thurston was arrested upon his return to North Carolina.

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the officers' motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their arrest of Thurston did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The officers appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Thurston’s arrest was unconstitutional and that the officers failed to prove that they acted objectively reasonably in seeking Thurston’s arrest warrant. The court also concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because Thurston’s right to be free from unlawful arrest was clearly established.

United States v. Briscoe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4013

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Stephanie Dawn Thacker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Andre Ricardo Briscoe was involved in the purchase and sale of narcotics in Baltimore. He learned from a contact, Kiara Haynes, that Jennifer Jeffrey had received a large supply of heroin. Briscoe and Haynes decided to rob Jeffrey. Briscoe went to Jeffrey’s house, robbed her of at least 80 grams of narcotics, shot and killed her, and shot and killed her seven-year-old son, K.B., whom Briscoe feared might testify against him. Briscoe was arrested and initially charged with possession with intent to distribute narcotics, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. A later superseding indictment added three new counts: two counts of murder with a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime and one count of killing a witness to prevent communication with law enforcement. After a twelve-day jury trial, Briscoe was convicted on all charges.

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Briscoe's motion to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations, concluding that the indictment related back to the earlier filed information. The court also denied Briscoe's motion to suppress evidence obtained through the use of a cell site simulator, finding that the police had obtained a tracking order which authorized them to use the simulator. The court further found that the police had obtained consent to search the apartment where Briscoe was found and that their subsequent actions were part of a lawful protective sweep of the apartment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government properly tolled the statute of limitations by filing an information within the five-year period and that the subsequent indictment related back to that filing. The court also held that the police had authority to use a cell site simulator to obtain Briscoe's location information and to search the apartment where he was found. The court rejected Briscoe's arguments that the government committed a Brady violation by failing to follow up on whether any footage was contained on a broken camera and that the government knowingly relied upon false testimony to secure his conviction. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Briscoe on all counts.

United States v. Lee

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4299

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Rushing

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Austin Kyle Lee, who was found guilty of several federal drug and firearm offenses. After serving over four years in a New York prison for selling cocaine, Lee was released in late 2015 and moved to North Carolina, where he resumed selling drugs. A search of his residences revealed distribution quantities of a fentanyl–heroin mixture, cocaine, and marijuana; handguns and ammunition; packaging material; and over $200,000 in cash. A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Lee with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana, among others.

The district court found Lee guilty on all counts. The court also found additional facts that increased Lee’s mandatory minimum sentence for those crimes. Lee appealed, arguing that this judicial factfinding violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Government agreed but contended that the district court’s procedural error was harmless because proof of the relevant facts was overwhelming and uncontroverted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court agreed with the Government that any procedural error in the district court’s determination that the serious drug felony enhancement applied to increase Lee’s statutory sentencing range was harmless. The court noted that Lee conceded that, under existing law, the judge could decide the fact of his prior conviction without a jury. Furthermore, the Government’s proof of the other two elements—concerning the duration and recency of his incarceration for that offense—was overwhelming and uncontroverted.

United States v. Minton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4089

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Heytens

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Bobby Lee Minton, who has a history of mental illness and substance abuse, was convicted of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The incident began when Minton knocked on a stranger's door asking for water and ended with him pulling out a gun. Minton appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in not dismissing the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act.

The district court had found Minton incompetent to stand trial on June 11, 2020, and his competency was restored on September 27, 2021. The dispute in this appeal was about how much of the 473-day period between these two dates should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculation. Minton argued that 129 days of the incompetency period should be included, as he was not transported to a facility for competency restoration until 139 days after the court committed him to the Attorney General's custody. He based his argument on 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), which presumes delays of more than 10 days in transporting a defendant to be unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with Minton's argument. The court held that the entire period of Minton's legal incompetency was excluded from the Speedy Trial Act's 70-day trial clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4), which excludes any period of delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court correctly denied Minton's motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act.

Sanchez-Perez v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3004

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The case involves Jose Yanel Sanchez-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who entered the United States in 1998. In 2009, Sanchez-Perez pleaded guilty to committing misdemeanor domestic assault under Tennessee law. The following day, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. In 2015, an immigration judge found Sanchez-Perez ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to establish that he had been continuously present in the United States for ten years prior to receiving the notice to appear. However, the judge also found that Sanchez-Perez was not statutorily barred from seeking cancellation of removal due to his 2009 domestic-violence conviction.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal and agreed with the immigration judge’s findings that Sanchez-Perez lacked the requisite continuous physical presence and thus was not eligible for cancellation of removal. In 2018, the immigration judge found that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction is categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal from this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in determining that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction was categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court noted that the Tennessee statute at issue criminalizes conduct that does not require the use or threatened use of violent physical force. Therefore, the court granted Sanchez-Perez’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case to the BIA for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

United States v. Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3797

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: SILER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Carlos Brown, a defendant who was indicted on fraud and identity theft charges related to a credit card scheme. Brown argued that his right to a speedy trial, as stipulated by the Speedy Trial Act, was violated twice during the 1,176 days between his arraignment and his guilty plea. The first violation involved a 36-day delay in transporting Brown from Ohio to the Federal Medical Center in Lexington for his competency evaluation. The second violation involved a 21-day period after the denial of Brown’s first motion to dismiss.

The district court denied both of Brown's motions to dismiss. It ruled that the 36-day delay was excludable and entered a 21-day retroactive ends-of-justice continuance after denying Brown's first motion to dismiss.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the district court erred in denying both motions. The court held that the 36-day delay in transporting Brown was not excludable and that the district court abused its discretion by not properly placing its reasoning for the 21-day retroactive ends-of-justice continuance on the record. As a result, the court vacated Brown's conviction and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether his indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice.

United States v. Cervenak

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3466

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: McKEAGUE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Tyren Cervenak pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing crack cocaine and one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. Prior to this, Cervenak had been convicted of numerous crimes in Ohio state court, including two felony convictions: one in 2016 for two counts of robbery while using a firearm and another in 2020 for trafficking heroin. Prior to sentencing in the federal case, pretrial services recommended that the district court consider Cervenak a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. Cervenak objected to his career-offender designation, arguing that a conviction under Ohio’s robbery statute does not qualify as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.

The district court overruled Cervenak’s objection and accepted the guidelines calculations recommended by pretrial services. The court agreed with the government and imposed a total sentence at the high end of the guidelines range: 188 months. After the hearing, the court issued an order explaining its reasoning for applying the career-offender enhancement to Cervenak’s guidelines calculations. The district court concluded that a conviction under Ohio Revised Code § 2911.02(A)(2) (“Ohio robbery”) falls within the definition of “robbery” included among the enumerated offenses in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), meaning that Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines. Cervenak timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under its recent decision in United States v. Carter, a conviction for Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines. The court found that Ohio robbery categorically matched generic “extortion,” which is also an enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The court rejected Cervenak's arguments that the Carter panel erred by failing to conduct the double-divisibility analysis mandated by Butts and Wilson and by assuming that “theft offense” under the Ohio statute categorically matches the “obtaining” element of generic extortion. The court concluded that Cervenak’s conviction for Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence.

United States v. Jordan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3334

Opinion Date: May 1, 2024

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The case involves Terrence Jordan and Damara Sanders, who were pulled over by a state trooper for speeding. During the stop, the trooper noticed inconsistencies in their travel plans and observed Jordan's heavy breathing, which raised his suspicion. He called for a canine unit, which detected the presence of drugs. A subsequent search of the vehicle and the defendants revealed marijuana, pill presses, digital scales, plastic baggies, firearms, and a significant quantity of pills containing a fluorofentanyl-fentanyl mixture.

The defendants were charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. They sought to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The District Judge denied the motion. The defendants also proposed a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession of a controlled substance, which the court rejected, citing the quantity of drugs and distribution paraphernalia as evidence of intent to distribute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, based on the defendants' suspicious travel plans, Sanders's implausible explanations, and Jordan's heavy breathing. The court also agreed with the district court's decision not to give a lesser-included-offense instruction, given the substantial evidence of the defendants' intent to distribute drugs. However, the court vacated the defendants' convictions for possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking due to an error in the jury instructions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.

Henyard v. Eplett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3086

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Keith Henyard was charged with eight drug-related felonies in Wisconsin. During his preliminary hearing, Court Commissioner Frank Parise presided. Later, Henyard hired Parise as his attorney. Parise secured a plea deal for Henyard, who pleaded guilty to four of the eight charges. The remaining four charges were dismissed but considered during sentencing. Henyard did not raise any objections about Parise's potential conflict of interest during these proceedings. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison followed by 5 years of extended supervision for one count, and 6 years of probation for the other three counts.

Henyard later petitioned the Kenosha County Circuit Court for postconviction relief, arguing that Parise's previous role in his preliminary hearing constituted a conflict of interest, rendering his representation ineffective. The circuit court denied his petition, finding that Henyard had not demonstrated an actual or serious potential conflict of interest. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also rejected Henyard's petition, stating that he had failed to show that Parise's alleged conflict of interest had adversely affected his performance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Henyard's petition for review.

Henyard then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which also denied his petition. The court found that Henyard needed to show a conflict that affected counsel's performance, as per the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court. The court concluded that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision complied with this precedent and reasonably applied the law to deny Henyard relief.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Henyard argued that Parise's conflict of interest rendered his representation ineffective. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, stating that Henyard had not demonstrated that Parise actively represented conflicting interests or that the alleged conflict adversely affected his performance. The court concluded that the state court's denial of Henyard's petition was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Kustok v. Mitchell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2125

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: WOOD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2014, Allan Kustok was convicted of murdering his wife, Anita “Jeannie” Kustok. Kustok claimed that his wife had accidentally shot herself or committed suicide. However, the state argued that Kustok had shot his wife and presented evidence of his extramarital affairs, his purchase of the gun used in the shooting, and inconsistencies in his account of the incident. After his conviction, Kustok sought a new trial, arguing that new evidence cast doubt on the testimony of an expert witness for the prosecution. His motion was denied, and his subsequent appeals were unsuccessful.

Kustok then filed a state postconviction petition, arguing that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to discover exculpatory evidence before the trial. The state courts found that Kustok had waived this claim by not raising it on direct appeal. Kustok then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, presenting the same claim. The district court held that the state-court waiver meant Kustok had procedurally defaulted the claim for federal-court purposes.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that Kustok had procedurally defaulted his claim. The court also concluded that Kustok did not qualify for any exception to the procedural-default rules, and therefore affirmed the dismissal of his petition. The court found that even if Kustok's lawyer had introduced evidence about a certain soot stain at trial, it was not substantially likely that the jury would have returned a different verdict.

United States v. Anderson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-1325

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Jackson-Akiwumi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Denny Anderson, who was sentenced in 2012 for possessing a firearm as a felon, after shooting at a man and using racial slurs. The maximum penalty for the illegal-possession offense is typically 10 years, but the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for anyone with three prior convictions for a "violent felony." Anderson was sentenced to an agreed-upon term of 180 months (15 years) in prison. He was resentenced in 2021, following a successful habeas petition he filed in 2013. The government maintained that he was subject to a 15-year minimum sentence due to his prior convictions.

The district court agreed that Anderson's convictions for burglary, robbery, and Florida aggravated assault qualified as violent felonies, triggering a 15-year minimum sentence. Anderson did not object to his designation as an armed career criminal. The court then resentenced him to 188 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Anderson’s Florida conviction in 2001 is not a predicate violent felony and that the government may not substitute one of Anderson’s other prior convictions as an alternative predicate offense. Because Anderson does not have three predicate convictions, the ACCA enhancement was improper. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing.

United States v. Betts

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2572

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: Jackson-Akiwumi

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Shamar Betts was indicted for inciting a riot in violation of the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101, after he posted a flyer on Facebook calling for a riot at a mall in Champaign, Illinois. The riot resulted in damage to several businesses. Betts moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Anti-Riot Act was overbroad and violated the First Amendment, but the district court denied his motion. Betts then pled guilty and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $1,686,170.30 in restitution to 35 businesses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.

On appeal, Betts challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, the application of a sentencing guideline by analogy, and the district court's order of restitution. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, finding no compelling reason to overrule its previous decision in United States v. Dellinger, which upheld the Act. The court also found no error in the district court's application of a sentencing guideline by analogy to the Anti-Riot Act.

However, the court agreed with Betts's argument that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that he directly and proximately caused damages to all businesses included in the restitution order. The court vacated the sentence with regard to the amount of restitution ordered and remanded the case for the limited purpose of reconsidering the amount of restitution.

United States v. Brooks

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2764

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: PRYOR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Thomas Brooks, II, who was charged with and pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The incident occurred when Brooks was leaving an apartment complex and saw police officers waiting outside to arrest him due to several outstanding warrants. Brooks began to run and during the chase, he threw a loaded firearm and an extended magazine into the grass. The police apprehended him and retrieved the discarded items.

Prior to his sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report, which calculated an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category VI, yielding an advisory guidelines range of 63 to 78 months in prison. Brooks argued that the reckless endangerment enhancement should not apply because the government could not demonstrate that his actions created a substantial risk of serious bodily harm. The district court disagreed and applied the two-level reckless endangerment enhancement.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Brooks challenged his sentence on three grounds: the application of a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment while fleeing from police, the district court's failure to address one of his key mitigation arguments, and the district court's decision to sentence him above the Guidelines range. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the district court did not err in its application of the enhancement, adequately addressed Brooks's mitigation arguments, and provided a sufficient explanation for the above-Guidelines sentence.

United States v. Feeney

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2607

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: LEE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

John Feeney, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawfully possessing two pistols and carrying explosives, specifically modified fireworks shells, during the commission of that felony. Feeney pleaded guilty to both offenses. During sentencing, the court and the parties disagreed on the applicable base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines for Feeney’s conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court sided with the government and applied a higher base offense level to Feeney’s sentence.

The district court calculated the total offense level for the firearm possession conviction to be 15, which combined with a criminal history category of IV, yielded a guideline range of 30 to 37 months of imprisonment. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 30 months for the firearm possession offense and a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months for the offense of carrying explosives while committing a felony.

Feeney appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred when it applied a base offense level of 18 under the Sentencing Guidelines instead of a base offense level of 14. He contended that the court's decision resulted in him being punished twice for the same conduct, which is prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Feeney's interpretation of the relevant guideline and application note. The court found that the district court had erred in applying a higher base offense level based on Feeney's possession of an explosive. The court concluded that such an application constituted an "enhancement" prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines, which aim to prevent duplicative punishment. The court vacated Feeney's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

United States v. Kelly

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1449

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Robert Sylvester Kelly, a music industry professional, who was accused of sexually abusing underage girls in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The victims, referred to as Jane, Pauline, and Nia, were introduced to Kelly through various connections. The abuse, which included explicit phone calls, oral sex, and intercourse, was often recorded by Kelly. The victims' testimonies, along with three videos of Jane and Kelly, were presented as evidence during the trial.

Prior to this case, Kelly had been acquitted in a 2008 criminal trial for similar conduct involving different victims. In 2019, federal prosecutors secured an indictment against Kelly, which included thirteen counts of producing and receiving child pornography, inducing minors to engage in sexual activities, and obstructing justice in the state case. The jury convicted Kelly on six counts, including inducing Jane, Pauline, and Nia to engage in sexual activities, and three child pornography production counts corresponding to the three videos in evidence. The jury acquitted Kelly on the other seven counts.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Kelly raised three arguments: a statute of limitations defense, a request for severance of his trial, and a challenge to his sentence. The court rejected all three arguments. It ruled that the current statute of limitations for sex crimes against children, which extends through the life of the victim, applied to Kelly's case. The court also found no error in the district court's decision to conduct a single trial on all charges against Kelly. Finally, the court affirmed Kelly's sentence, which was calculated based on the Guidelines range in place at the time of his offenses, and varied upwards to 240 months considering the nature of his crimes and his history. The court concluded that the sentence was procedurally proper and substantively fair.

United States v. Britton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1700

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Benton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Antjuan Dante Britton, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release. Britton appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle.

Prior to his arrest, law enforcement received information from a tipster and two women arrested for possession of methamphetamine, all of whom identified Britton as their source of the drug. The information provided by these individuals was corroborated by law enforcement, including details about Britton's rental vehicle and his stays at a local hotel. A controlled buy was arranged with Britton, but the deal fell through. However, Britton was arrested at the location of the planned deal, and his vehicle was searched, leading to the discovery of a pound of methamphetamine.

Britton argued that his arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle were not supported by probable cause. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The court found that the corroborated information from the tipster and the two women, along with Britton's arrival at the planned drug deal, provided probable cause for his arrest and the search of his vehicle.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the totality of the circumstances, including the corroborated information and Britton's actions, provided probable cause for his arrest and the search of his vehicle. The court noted that a warrantless arrest and a vehicle search under the automobile exception are permissible if supported by probable cause.

United States v. Escudero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2364

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In 2021, Hugo Escudero was investigated as a suspected wholesale cocaine dealer based on information provided by a confidential informant. The informant claimed that Escudero and his brother were selling large amounts of cocaine and used a runner, M.G., to deliver the drugs. Law enforcement officers corroborated this information through surveillance and obtained a GPS tracking warrant for Escudero's vehicle. This led to additional search warrants for Escudero's apartment and music studio. In September 2021, officers arrested Escudero and M.G. when they arrived with a kilogram of cocaine for a controlled buy.

Escudero was indicted and filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the tracking and search warrants. A federal magistrate judge recommended denying Escudero's motions to suppress, and the district court adopted this recommendation. During the trial, Escudero posted a message on M.G.'s Facebook page, which the court admitted into evidence as it was "probative of the consciousness of guilt" and not unfairly prejudicial. The jury found Escudero guilty of possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, and he was sentenced to 216 months of imprisonment.

On appeal, Escudero challenged the legitimacy of the tracking warrant, the admission of his Facebook message, and the sufficiency of evidence for his guilty verdict. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the tracking warrant, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Escudero's Facebook message and witness list comment, and the evidence was sufficient to convict Escudero of possession.

Cronick v. Pryor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-1238

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around an incident where Colorado Springs Police Officers Robert McCafferty and Christopher Pryor responded to a 911-call placed by Sasha Cronick reporting a drug overdose. During the incident, Officer Pryor questioned Cronick, which escalated into an argument, leading to her arrest for failure to desist and disperse in violation of Colorado Springs Code § 9.2.103. Cronick filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the officers violated her constitutional rights. The officers asserted qualified immunity, but the district court denied their claim.

The district court found several disputes of fact, including whether Officer Pryor issued an order for Cronick to leave the scene, whether Cronick was obstructing the scene, and whether Officer Pryor grabbed Cronick's arm to escort her away or after she had already turned to walk away. The court concluded that these disputes prevented it from finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Cronick.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that a reasonable officer under these circumstances would not have arguable probable cause to arrest Cronick for failure to desist or disperse. The court also found that the officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search incident to arrest. The officers failed to articulate specific facts that led them to believe Cronick posed a threat and offered nothing beyond conclusory references to safety. Therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated Cronick's clearly established constitutional rights.

United States v. Hill

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10934

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: Rosenbaum

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Victor Hill, the former Sheriff of Clayton County, Georgia, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for using his position to deprive detainees in his custody of their constitutional rights. Hill ordered individual detainees, who were neither violent nor uncontrollable, into a restraint chair for at least four hours, with their hands cuffed behind their backs and without bathroom breaks. Each detainee suffered injuries, such as “open and bleeding” wounds, lasting scars, or nerve damage.

Hill was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. He appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that he lacked fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the district court improperly handled allegations of juror misconduct.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected Hill's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that case law provided Hill with fair warning that his actions violated constitutional rights. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Hill's conduct had no legitimate nonpunitive purpose, was willful, and caused the detainees’ injuries. Lastly, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in investigating and responding to alleged juror misconduct.

USA v. Ferguson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12013

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Lagoa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

B'Quan Ferguson was convicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The conviction followed an incident where local police officers in Savannah, Georgia, recognized Ferguson as the subject of an ongoing investigation. The officers found a pistol in Ferguson's vehicle, and a DNA test confirmed that Ferguson's DNA was present on the pistol. Ferguson was subsequently charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.

Previously, Ferguson had been convicted under Georgia law for threatening physical harm to a witness, which was considered a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This prior conviction led to Ferguson being classified as an armed career criminal, which mandated a minimum sentence of 15 years. Ferguson objected to this classification, arguing that his Georgia conviction for threatening a witness did not qualify as a violent felony for ACCA enhancement purposes. The district court overruled Ferguson's objection and sentenced him to 180 months' imprisonment.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Ferguson argued that his prior Georgia conviction did not qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA. The court disagreed, concluding that the Georgia statute under which Ferguson was convicted was divisible and that a conviction for threatening physical harm under the statute qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Ferguson's sentence.

USA v. Hicks

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-10280

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: HULL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Sanchez Hicks, a convicted felon, was indicted on two counts of firearm possession. He pleaded guilty to both counts. At sentencing, it was undisputed that Hicks had two prior Georgia convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The presentence investigation report recommended a base offense level of 24, citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which applies when the defendant committed his firearm offense after two felony convictions for a “crime of violence” as defined in § 4B1.2(a), which includes “aggravated assault.” Hicks objected, arguing that his Georgia convictions were not “crimes of violence.” The district court overruled Hicks’s objection, citing a previous Eleventh Circuit ruling that a Georgia conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a crime of violence.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court relied on its previous ruling in United States v. Morales-Alonso, which held that a Georgia conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The court rejected Hicks's argument that the Georgia offense requires a mens rea of only recklessness, whereas generic aggravated assault requires a mens rea of “extreme indifference to human life.” The court held that Morales-Alonso foreclosed Hicks’s claim, as it had already concluded that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is not categorically broader than generic aggravated assault. Therefore, the court affirmed Hicks's 96-month total sentence.

USA v. Morley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12988

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Lagoa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Derrick Morley was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of cocaine. Morley was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, the trial evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the district court erred in providing a deliberate ignorance jury instruction, and the district court erred in denying him a safety valve sentence reduction.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Morley's motion to suppress the cocaine that was taken from his vehicle without a warrant. The court found that there was probable cause to believe Morley’s car contained contraband or evidence of a crime and that apparent authority existed under the circumstances. Morley proceeded to a four-day jury trial and was found guilty as charged in the indictment. The district court denied Morley's motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Morley’s convictions and sentence. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the automobile exception applied, allowing for a warrantless search of Morley's car. The court also found that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Morley's convictions and that the district court did not err in providing a deliberate ignorance jury instruction. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Morley's request for a reduced sentence, finding that Morley was ineligible for the safety valve reduction in light of a recent Supreme Court decision.

USA v. Hutchings

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3069

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: PILLARD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around James Hutchings, Jr., who was convicted of conspiracy to unlawfully traffic and transport firearms. The conviction was based on evidence obtained from Hutchings's iPhone, which was seized during the arrest of suspected firearms and narcotics trafficker Linwood Thorne. The phone was found in Thorne's apartment, and a separate warrant was obtained to search the phone based on its association with Thorne. It was only after the search began that the agents realized the phone belonged to Hutchings.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where Hutchings moved to suppress the evidence from his phone, arguing that the search was unsupported by the warrant because the probable cause finding depended on the phone's association with Thorne. The district court denied Hutchings's motion, stating that the phone was indeed associated with Thorne, regardless of its ownership. Hutchings was found guilty and sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.

The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Hutchings argued that the officers reviewing the report were required to discontinue their search after seeing the notation on its first page that the phone was "James's iPhone." The court disagreed, stating that the validity of the warrant did not depend on who owned the phones, but on their association with Thorne. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, stating that the label "James's iPhone" did not contradict the facts that supported the warrant application.

In re Hospitalization of Dominic N.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18282

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: CARNEY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves a man, Dominic N., who was involuntarily committed for mental health treatment. Dominic N. has a history of being charged with sexual abuse of a minor and has been deemed incompetent to stand trial multiple times. He has been diagnosed with numerous mental health and behavioral conditions, including major depressive disorder, selective mutism, and borderline intellectual functioning. In 2021, he was again charged with sexual abuse of a minor and found mentally incompetent to stand trial. While at the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for competency restoration, he was diagnosed with additional disorders, including antisocial personality disorder.

The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, held a competency hearing and found Dominic mentally incompetent. The court ordered his commitment to API for further evaluation and restoration. The State petitioned for an order authorizing Dominic’s evaluation to determine whether he was mentally ill and likely to cause harm to others. The court granted the petition, and API staff filed a petition for 30-day civil commitment. After a hearing, the court found that Dominic was mentally ill and likely to cause harm to others, and ordered his commitment to API for 30 days.

Dominic appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, arguing that the State failed to prove that he was mentally ill as defined by statute and that his diagnoses were the type of intellectual and developmental disabilities excluded from the definition. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order, concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that Dominic suffered from mental illness that is more than his excluded disabilities. The court found that Dominic’s impulse control disorder and pedophilic disorder were distinct from his intellectual and developmental disabilities, satisfying the statutory definition of mental illness.

STATE OF ARIZONA v ANDERSON

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-23-0008-PR

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: BRUTINEL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Larry Dean Anderson was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for twenty-five years. Anderson filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, claiming that his attorney erroneously advised him that he was eligible for parole, which led him to reject a plea agreement. The issue was whether this claim for PCR based on ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) was either precluded or untimely.

The Superior Court in Pima County initially dismissed Anderson's request for an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. The court determined that Anderson's IAC claim was not precluded or untimely, but it also determined that Anderson's IAC claim was not colorable. The court of appeals denied relief, determining Anderson's IAC claim was untimely and his delay unexcused. It also held his claim was precluded because he failed to raise it in his previous petitions for PCR.

The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed and remanded the case. The court held that Anderson's PCR claim was neither untimely nor precluded and he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he had been offered a plea agreement before his trial. The court found that Anderson's attorney's performance was deficient under Strickland because his error constituted incorrect advice on a significant issue relating to Anderson's potential sentence if convicted. The court also found that Anderson had presented enough evidence for an opportunity to establish the existence of an offered plea agreement at an evidentiary hearing.

SCARBROUGH v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 71

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, Daryl Jason Scarbrough, was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery by the Pulaski County Circuit Court and sentenced to life imprisonment with an additional forty-year term. Scarbrough appealed the decision, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting the State's motions for continuance, denying his motion for continuance, denying his motion to suppress, allowing prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor, and admitting a map into evidence.

The case revolved around the murder of David Dunn. Scarbrough was identified as a suspect and was arrested on an active parole-absconder warrant. He was found hiding in a flower bed, and his jeans, which had blood stains, were seized and sent for DNA testing. The DNA matched that of the victim and an unknown male. The State charged Scarbrough with capital murder and aggravated robbery.

Scarbrough filed a motion to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that the police had collected and examined the evidence without a search warrant. The State countered that Scarbrough was lawfully arrested on active warrants and that the clothes were seized pursuant to a search incident to arrest. The circuit court denied Scarbrough's motion to suppress the blood evidence.

At trial, the prosecutor referred to Scarbrough as a "homicidal hitchhiker" during the opening statement. Scarbrough objected and moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the circuit court. The court also admitted into evidence a map made by AT&T showing the location of cell-phone pings made from the victim's phone shortly after his murder.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motions for continuance and denying Scarbrough's motion for continuance. It also found that the circuit court did not err in denying Scarbrough's motion to suppress the blood evidence, allowing the prosecutor's remarks, and admitting the map into evidence. The court reviewed the record for all errors prejudicial to Scarbrough, as required by Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), and found no reversible error.

P. v. Flores

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S267522

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Corrigan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In May 2019, police officers detained Marlon Flores in a Los Angeles neighborhood known for narcotics and gang activity. The officers observed Flores standing alone near a parked car, ducking behind it as they approached. The officers suspected Flores was involved in narcotics activity due to his behavior and the area's reputation. During a pat-down search, the officers found a drug pipe in Flores's car and methamphetamine in his wallet. Flores was subsequently charged with carrying a loaded firearm and armed possession of methamphetamine.

The trial court denied Flores's motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that his behavior was suspicious enough to warrant detention and subsequent questioning. Flores pleaded no contest to the firearm charge, and the methamphetamine charge was dismissed. He was sentenced to three years' probation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that Flores was not detained until he was ordered to stand and put his hands behind his head, and that reasonable suspicion justified the detention.

The Supreme Court of California reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the officers' observations of Flores's behavior, combined with his presence in a high crime area at night, did not provide a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Flores was engaged in illegal activity. The court emphasized that a person's mere presence in a high crime area cannot transform them into a suspect. The court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Flores, and thus, the evidence obtained during the pat-down search should have been suppressed. The case was remanded to the trial court to allow Flores to withdraw his no contest plea and for the court to grant Flores's suppression motion.

People v. McDavid

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S275940A

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: Goodwin Liu

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case involves Weldon K. McDavid, Jr., who was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and attempted premeditated murder. McDavid, a shooting instructor, had a romantic relationship with Diana Lovejoy, who was going through a contentious divorce. The two hatched a plan to kill Lovejoy's husband, Greg Mulvihill. McDavid shot Mulvihill, causing severe injuries but not killing him. The jury found true allegations that McDavid intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury, and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.

McDavid appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court was unaware of its full sentencing discretion under Senate Bill No. 620, which grants trial courts the discretion to strike formerly mandatory enhancements. The Court of Appeal agreed, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. However, the trial court declined to strike the enhancements. McDavid appealed again, and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court has the authority to impose a lesser enhancement not only under section 12022.53 but also under other statutes if the facts supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by a jury. The Attorney General filed a petition for rehearing, which the Court of Appeal granted. On rehearing, the Court of Appeal reversed course and held that a trial court’s discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement is confined to the enhancements in section 12022.53 and does not include enhancements specified in other statutes.

The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The court held that when a court has exercised its discretion under subdivision (h) to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement and finds that no other section 12022.53 enhancement is appropriate, the second sentence of subdivision (j) is inapplicable and does not bar the court from imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a law other than section 12022.53. The court thus has discretion to impose such an enhancement if it is supported by facts that have been alleged and found true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

P. v. Coleman

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165198S(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Jackson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel exhibited racial bias towards him in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) by advising him to use Ebonics and slang when he testified. He also contended that the trial court erred in imposing two sentence enhancements and a parole revocation restitution fine after sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, found that the defendant's trial counsel did not exhibit racial bias. The court noted that the counsel's advice to the defendant to "speak how you speak" when testifying was a valid tactical decision aimed at ensuring the defendant appeared authentic and genuine before the jury. The court also found that the defendant had not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel's advice indicated racial animus or bias towards him. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no violation of the RJA.

The court also found that the defendant's claim that his enhancements should have been stricken was forfeited for failure to request that the trial court strike the enhancements under section 1385. However, the court agreed with the defendant and the People that the trial court improperly imposed a parole revocation restitution fine. The court modified the judgment to strike the parole revocation restitution fine and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.

People v. Berlin

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166452(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: SIMONS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Monica Berlin was charged with felony stalking and six misdemeanors, including two restraining order violations and four protective order violations. In March 2020, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and placed Berlin on mental health diversion. After successfully completing the diversion program, Berlin moved to dismiss the criminal charges in March 2022. However, the prosecution argued that the case could not be dismissed until the court awarded restitution. The court scheduled further proceedings on the motion to dismiss and the restitution issue.

The trial court ruled in May 2022 that it had the authority to award restitution. Berlin's counsel objected, arguing that the court could not award restitution after the end of the period of diversion. After the court rejected her argument, Berlin's counsel stated that Berlin would prefer to withdraw from diversion and avoid a restitution award by winning an acquittal at trial. In August 2022, the trial court ordered Berlin to pay over $17,000 in restitution to the victim and the California Victim Compensation Board, dismissed the criminal charges, and ordered the case sealed.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five reversed the trial court's restitution orders. The appellate court found that the trial court had ordered the restitution after the end of the statutory maximum two-year period of diversion, which was not permitted under the relevant statute. The statute only allowed the trial court to order restitution "during the period of diversion." Therefore, the trial court's restitution orders were reversed, but its other orders were affirmed.

People v. Fay

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B328209(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 29, 2024

Judge: Rothschild

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, John Fay, was living unhoused outside a public library when he got into a verbal altercation with Anthony Davis, who was intoxicated. The altercation escalated, and Fay punched Davis multiple times in the head. Davis died at the scene, with the cause of death being a combination of blunt head trauma and acute alcohol intoxication. Fay admitted to intending to hurt Davis but denied intending to kill him. A jury convicted Fay of second-degree murder.

During the jury's deliberations, they were divided on how to apply the instructions on implied malice. The prosecutor argued that a defendant has the mental state for implied malice if he is aware that his conduct is dangerous to others, but does not "care if someone is hurt or killed." The court informed the jury that this statement was based on "case law decisions." Shortly afterward, the jury found Fay guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, Fay contended that the prosecutor's statement regarding the mental state for implied malice was a misstatement of the law, which the court erroneously accepted in its response to the jury's question. The court agreed with Fay, stating that the prosecutor's statement set the bar too low for implied malice, as it suggested that the mens rea for implied malice could be satisfied if the defendant acted with conscious disregard for harming another, rather than endangering life. The court found that the prosecutor's misstatement, combined with the court's endorsement of that misstatement, allowed the jury to apply an incorrect legal principle to the evidence and convict Fay on an invalid theory of law. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and reversed the judgment.

People v. Garcia

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B326131(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 1, 2024

Judge: FEUER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2019, Miguel Garcia pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon, admitting he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. His 12-year sentence included seven one-year prior prison term sentence enhancements. At a resentencing hearing, the superior court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements but resentenced Garcia to the same 12-year sentence by imposing the firearm enhancement that had been previously stricken, finding Garcia continued to pose a threat to public safety. Garcia appealed, challenging the superior court’s finding that imposition of a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had initially sentenced Garcia to 12 years, including seven one-year enhancements for prior prison terms. However, due to changes in the law, these enhancements were later deemed invalid and Garcia was resentenced. At the resentencing hearing, the court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements but maintained the 12-year sentence by imposing a previously stricken firearm enhancement, citing Garcia's continued threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven reviewed the superior court’s finding that reducing Garcia’s sentence would endanger public safety for an abuse of discretion. The court considered the nature of the offense, Garcia’s multiple prior felony convictions of increasing seriousness, his failure to appear for sentencing, and his participation in a prison riot in which he beat another inmate. The court found that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. However, the court directed the superior court to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment to reflect that Garcia was sentenced to a concurrent term of two years on count 2 for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court affirmed the resentencing order.

People v. Lovejoy

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080941(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: DATO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Diana Lovejoy, who was convicted of conspiring with her co-defendant, Weldon McDavid, to murder her ex-husband, Greg Mulvihill. She was also found guilty of attempted murder after McDavid shot and wounded Mulvihill. Several years after her convictions were final, she sought to be resentenced pursuant to current Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming that both convictions may have been based on a theory of imputed malice. The trial court disagreed and denied her petition for relief without an evidentiary hearing.

The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed Lovejoy's convictions. The court concluded that Lovejoy’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was necessarily based on a jury finding that she personally harbored an intent to kill, making her ineligible for relief under the statute. Lovejoy appealed this decision.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Lovejoy's conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was necessarily based on a jury finding that she personally harbored an intent to kill, making her ineligible for relief under the statute. The court also found that Lovejoy's conviction for attempted murder was not based on a now-impermissible theory, i.e., the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying Lovejoy’s petition for resentencing.

Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Kwan

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097382(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Robie

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Utilities Law

The case involves Sacramento Municipal Utility District (District) and David Kwan. The District opened an electrical service account for Kwan, which was later found to be diverting power to support a cannabis grow operation. The trial court held Kwan liable for aiding and abetting utility diversion and awarded treble damages plus attorney fees. Kwan appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove his knowledge of the power theft and challenging the monetary awards.

Previously, the District filed a complaint against Kwan for power theft, conversion, and account stated. After a trial and a retrial, the court found Kwan liable for aiding and abetting utility diversion. Kwan claimed he was a victim of identity theft and had no connection to Sacramento. However, the District provided evidence contradicting Kwan's defense, including phone records, equipment purchases, and cash payments.

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found substantial evidence that Kwan aided and abetted power diversion, including his purchase of equipment that could be used to grow cannabis, his phone calls to a Sacramento number, and cash deposits made during the period of power theft. The court also upheld the monetary awards, finding no error in the trial court's calculation of damages, its decision to treble damages, or its decision to award attorney fees. The court concluded that the District had established the fact of the proximately caused injury from the date of account creation with reasonable certainty.

State of Florida v. Penna

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2022-0458

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Grosshans

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2015, Zachary Penna committed a series of violent crimes in Florida, including two murders. After his arrest, Penna was read his Miranda rights and initially invoked his right to counsel. However, during his hospitalization, Penna voluntarily initiated several conversations with Deputy Michael Nettles, during which he made incriminating statements. Penna was subsequently charged with several crimes, including two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, Penna moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing that they were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion, and Penna was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.

Penna appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which found that the statements during the first two conversations were not obtained in violation of Miranda. However, the court ruled that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing to re-read Penna his Miranda rights prior to the final three conversations. The court relied on its own precedent, which had interpreted a previous Florida Supreme Court decision to require a full re-reading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this case. The court found that the error was not harmless, despite the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt.

The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the case for review. The court was asked to consider whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment Miranda rights are automatically violated when an officer fails to re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact. The court held that there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights. The court found that the Fourth District Court of Appeal had improperly expanded the requirements of Miranda and receded from its previous decision that had established a categorical rule requiring a full re-reading of Miranda warnings. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard.

Hooks v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0037

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kiervon Armani Hooks was convicted of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, both charges stemming from the shooting death of Brandon Ray Foster. The incident occurred on September 26, 2017, and Hooks was indicted on December 18, 2017. The jury found Hooks guilty of all counts during a trial held from February 4-6, 2019. He was sentenced to life without parole for felony murder and an additional five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Hooks filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

Hooks appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions as no physical evidence or eyewitness testimony linked him to the crime scene. He also argued that the State did not present enough evidence to exclude the possibility that someone else shot Foster. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions.

The court found that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to uphold the convictions. The evidence included Foster's statement that "Buddha" shot him, with multiple witnesses identifying Hooks as the only person they knew by that nickname. Additionally, a .40-caliber shell casing was found near the building where Hooks was staying, and Hooks admitted to being in the building except for when he stepped out to smoke a cigarette. The court concluded that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, authorized the jury to find Hooks guilty of the felony murder of Foster and possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime.

HUBER v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0170

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Andrew Thomas Huber was convicted of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault in relation to the shooting death of Daniel Raburn. Huber, along with his accomplices Thomas Wayne Harper and Brandilee Nicole Woodard-Brady, were indicted on charges of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, and three counts of aggravated assault against Raburn. Prior to Huber's trial, Harper was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, and Woodard-Brady pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. A jury found Huber not guilty of malice murder but guilty of all the remaining counts against him. The trial court sentenced Huber to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder. Huber filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

Huber appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury on simple assault and voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, was sufficient to support Huber’s conviction for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault. The court also found that Huber's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance and that the trial court did not commit plain error in its instructions to the jury.

Pittman v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0013

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Randy Leon Pittman, Jr. was convicted for malice murder and arson in connection with the shooting and burning death of Natoshia Smith. Pittman challenged his convictions on several grounds. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to identify Smith’s skeletal remains, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the District Attorney who had previously represented him, that the trial court improperly prohibited him from asking witnesses about other fires that occurred while he was incarcerated, and that the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial.

The case was previously reviewed by a Haralson County grand jury, which indicted Pittman for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, arson in the first degree, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury found Pittman guilty of the remaining charges and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive term of 20 years for arson. Pittman filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the forensic evidence and eyewitness testimony were sufficient to identify Smith as the victim. The court also found no error in refusing to disqualify the District Attorney based on his prior representation of Pittman, as it was undisputed that the prior representation ended several years before and was completely unrelated to the murder prosecution. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of other fires because the evidence was not relevant. Finally, the court concluded that Pittman did not preserve for appeal his claim related to the denial of his motion for mistrial.

PLATT v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0399

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Rodrigues Platt, who was convicted for crimes related to the shooting death of David Jones, Jr. The crimes occurred on June 16, 2009, and Platt, along with two others, was indicted for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A jury found Platt guilty on all counts in August 2011, and he was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, two concurrent twenty-year terms for armed robbery and burglary, and a consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense. Platt filed a motion for a new trial in August 2011, which was denied in September 2023.

Platt appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court should have granted a mistrial due to the State’s failure to disclose the inconclusive test results of a hair sample from a critical witness against him who was also a possible suspect. He also argued that the court should have granted a mistrial based on the State’s belated disclosure that Platt’s initial custodial interview had been recorded despite previously representing otherwise. Platt also argued that the trial court should have taken some curative action when the prosecutor improperly identified him for testifying witnesses, and that the cumulative prejudice of these errors warrants a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that Platt failed to establish that a mistrial was necessary to preserve his right to a fair trial, that any curative action was necessary based on the prosecutor’s identification of him, or that any errors cumulatively prejudiced him. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision.

POWELL v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S24A0239, S24A0240

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Two former police officers, John Powell and Brian Scott, were indicted for violating their oaths of office under OCGA § 16-10-1. The indictment alleged that they failed to uphold the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by Brady v. Maryland by not conducting investigations into allegations of police misconduct. The officers filed a general demurrer, arguing that the indictment failed to adequately charge them with any offense against the laws of Georgia, and that the oath-of-office statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case. The trial court denied the demurrer, concluding that the allegations would constitute conduct violative of the oaths of office taken by the officers.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the trial court's ruling on the general demurrer de novo. The court agreed with the officers that the trial court's ruling regarding the sufficiency of the indictment was erroneous, and their general demurrers should have been granted. The court found that the indictment alleged that the officers committed the crimes in a specific way that was legally impossible. The court concluded that the indictment against the officers could not withstand a general demurrer and reversed the trial court's denial of the general demurrers to the indictment. The court did not reach the officers' constitutional challenge or the speedy-trial issue also before them on appeal.

SAUDER v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0011

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Frederick Sauder was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the armed robbery of Wayne Alexander and his subsequent shooting death. The crimes occurred in August 2016, and Sauder was indicted in December 2017. The jury found Sauder guilty of the charges in February 2019, and he was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, along with additional years for armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Sauder appealed, arguing that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support several of his convictions and that the trial court made several errors.

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the evidence presented at Sauder's trial was sufficient to support his convictions. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence an excerpt of a phone call Sauder made while in jail awaiting trial. The court did, however, vacate Sauder's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault due to a merger error, but affirmed his other convictions.

SCHMITT v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0036

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Bryan Keith Schmitt was convicted of malice murder for the death of Hamid Jahangard, who died after being hit by Schmitt’s car. Schmitt was indicted on charges of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and two counts of aggravated assault. The jury found Schmitt guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Schmitt appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on the defense of accident.

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the trial court did err in denying Schmitt's request for an accident defense instruction. The court noted that there was at least slight evidence supporting Schmitt's claim that the collision was an accident, including his own testimony and expert testimony that he veered away from Jahangard before the collision. The court also noted that the trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard accident as a key legal principle was problematic, as it may have led the jury to disregard Schmitt's accident defense.

The court concluded that the trial court's error was not harmless, as the evidence of Schmitt's criminal intent was disputed and not overwhelming. Therefore, the court reversed Schmitt's conviction. The court also found that the trial court erred in declining the accident instruction for the related counts of felony murder and aggravated assault, and reversed those verdicts as well. However, the court noted that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain Schmitt’s conviction, and so the State may retry him.

Sconyers v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0139

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Charles Michael Sconyers who was convicted for malice murder and cruelty to children in the first degree, in relation to the death of 23-month-old Lincoln Davitte. The child died from blunt-force trauma to his skull. Evidence presented at trial showed that Sconyers and the child's mother, Chelsea Finch, lived together and that the child sustained a severe head injury while under Sconyers' sole care. Sconyers claimed the injury was due to a ground-level fall on the patio, but several medical experts testified that the injury was inconsistent with such a fall.

Sconyers was indicted for malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count each of aggravated assault and cruelty to children in the first degree. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and concurrent 20-year prison terms for aggravated assault and cruelty to children. The felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law. Sconyers filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sconyers raised four issues on appeal: the trial court's repeated allowance of evidence of previous injuries to the child without cautioning the jury that the parties agreed Sconyers did not cause those injuries; the jury instruction about “prior difficulties” between Sconyers and the child without limiting what evidence qualified as prior difficulties; the admission of hearsay statements allegedly made by Finch; and the prosecution's alleged improper impeachment of Finch. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting all of Sconyers' arguments.

Smith v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0236

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law

Truman Harry Smith was convicted of felony murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Johnny Crawford. Smith claimed self-defense, stating that he shot Crawford due to fear for his life, and argued that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The jury rejected Smith's defense and he was sentenced to life in prison plus five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Smith appealed, contending that the trial court should have allowed him to testify about his PTSD diagnosis and should not have permitted the State to impeach him with a prior military charge.

The trial court had denied Smith's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Court of Georgia granted Smith's application for interlocutory appeal. Smith argued that his PTSD diagnosis should have been admissible under a hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that this exception does not apply to medical diagnoses themselves, but to statements patients make to medical professionals to aid in their diagnosis or treatment.

Smith also contended that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a prior military charge. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that even if it was an error to allow the State to ask about the charge, the error was harmless given the overall evidence. The court affirmed Smith's convictions and sentence.

WARD v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0352

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves James Graham Ward who was convicted for felony murder and other crimes related to two shootings that occurred on March 24, 2021, one of which resulted in the death of Brian Belin. Ward was indicted for multiple counts including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was found guilty on several counts and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus a total of 20 consecutive years for other counts. Ward filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

Ward appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, in denying his motion for a directed verdict on certain counts, and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court of Georgia, after reviewing the evidence and arguments, found no merit in Ward's claims and affirmed his convictions. The court held that there was not even slight evidence to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter, the evidence was sufficient to support Ward’s convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm, and Ward failed to prove that his counsel performed deficiently.

State v. Buehler

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50701

Opinion Date: May 1, 2024

Judge: Zahn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Cyrus Wolf Buehler, who was convicted for aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) after a collision with a motorized bicycle, resulting in severe injuries to the cyclist, Raymond Hanson. Buehler was found to have a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .181 and .179 at the time of the incident. He sought to introduce evidence suggesting that Hanson's conduct was a superseding, intervening cause of the collision, arguing that Hanson was speeding, under the influence, and his bicycle lacked a headlight. Buehler also challenged the admissibility of his BAC results, as the officer who administered the test had an expired certification.

The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho denied Buehler's motions, ruling that the evidence he sought to introduce was irrelevant to the determination of whether his act of driving under the influence had some causal connection to Hanson’s injuries. The court also held that the officer’s lapsed certification did not require exclusion of Buehler's BAC results, as the State could establish the foundation for the admission of the evidence through expert testimony. Buehler's conviction was affirmed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that Hanson's conduct was not relevant to the determination of whether Buehler's act of driving while under the influence had some causal connection to Hanson’s injuries. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to admit Buehler's BAC results, ruling that the officer's lapsed certification did not affect the validity of the BAC results. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its rulings, and Buehler's judgment of conviction was affirmed.

Lane v. State of Indiana

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-CR-00150

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Goff

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Dustin Lane, a defendant with a history of violent offenses, was serving a prison sentence for domestic battery against his ex-wife, A.N., when he violated a no-contact order by sending her ten letters. These letters, which ranged in tone from loving and apologetic to critical and accusatory, were seen as part of a cycle of manipulation and abuse. Lane was charged with ten counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, one for each letter, and pleaded guilty to all counts. The trial court sentenced him to ten 300-day sentences, each to run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate 3,000-day sentence.

On appeal, Lane argued that his sentence was inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding the sentence inappropriate considering the nature of his offenses, and remanded the case with instructions to impose fully concurrent sentences for an aggregate 300-day term. However, a dissenting judge disagreed, noting Lane's history of violence and the manipulative nature of the letters.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The court noted that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits reviewing courts to revise a criminal sentence that is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The court found that Lane's violent criminal history and the risk he posed of perpetuating the cycle of domestic abuse against A.N. warranted the lengthy sentence. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing the importance of protecting victims and the community from offenders with a history of violence.

Smith v. State of Indiana

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-MI-00345

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Rush

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a civil forfeiture action initiated by the State of Indiana against $11,180 found during a search of Dylan Williams's apartment. Williams did not respond to the State's complaint, but his aunt, Angela Smith, intervened, claiming that she owned the money and that it was not connected to any criminal activity. The State argued that the money was tied to criminal activity, specifically drug offenses, based on its location and the denominations in which it was found. The trial court ruled in favor of the State, leading to an appeal by Smith.

The case was initially heard in the Marion Superior Court, where the State seized the money and initiated forfeiture proceedings. After a hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of the State, leading to an appeal by Smith. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

The case was then reviewed by the Indiana Supreme Court. The court found that the State failed to establish a substantial connection between the seized money and any underlying offense. The court also noted that the State did not identify a specific, applicable offense that would subject the money to forfeiture. Furthermore, the court found that Smith presented uncontradicted evidence that the money belonged to her. The court therefore reversed the trial court's forfeiture order and ruled that the money must be returned to Smith. The court also clarified the procedural framework for when the State seeks forfeiture of money and who constitutes an "owner."

In re Wrongful Conviction of Spangler

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 126062

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: Luckert

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case revolves around William P. Spangler, who was initially convicted of second-degree murder for his role in the shooting death of Faustino Martinez. After serving a prison term longer than his sentence, Spangler was retried and convicted of a lesser charge, involuntary manslaughter. He then sought compensation for the extra time he spent in prison.

Spangler's initial conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals. However, he later filed a motion arguing that he received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel. The district court agreed, finding that Spangler's trial counsel failed to investigate his mental health status and its effect on his state of mind when he shot Martinez. This failure was deemed prejudicial to Spangler, and a new trial was ordered. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

In the retrial, Spangler was again convicted, but this time of involuntary manslaughter rather than second-degree murder. He was released based on time served, having served about four-and-a-half years beyond the sentence imposed for his involuntary manslaughter conviction. Spangler then filed a civil action seeking compensation for the time he spent in prison beyond his involuntary manslaughter sentence.

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the district court's decision that Spangler's own conduct caused or brought about his conviction, thus precluding any recovery. The court interpreted the statute to reflect the Legislature's intent to impose a common-sense limitation: Only someone innocent of the criminal conduct supporting the underlying conviction may pursue a claim for damages. Therefore, a claimant like Spangler, who stands convicted of a lesser included offense based on the same charge as a previous conviction, is not eligible to seek relief.

State v. Garcia-Martinez

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125685

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Jose Garcia-Martinez, who was convicted for first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, and battery. The incident occurred on July 1, 2020, when Garcia-Martinez and others attacked Roy Hayden, suspecting him to be a law enforcement officer. The group beat Hayden, confined him in a bathroom, and later moved him to the trunk of a car. Hayden's decomposed body was found days later in the abandoned car.

The case was initially tried in Sedgwick District Court, where Garcia-Martinez was found guilty. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the State presented alternative means of committing aggravated kidnapping and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt on each of the alternative means. He also argued that the district court erred in refusing to give a unanimity instruction because the jury heard evidence of multiple acts that could have supported his aggravated kidnapping conviction.

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the phrase "taking or confining" in K.S.A. 21-5408(a) does not present alternative means of committing kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping; rather, it presents options within a means merely describing the factual circumstances that may prove the material element of holding the victim to accomplish one of the four alternative means of committing kidnapping set forth in the statute. The court also found that a unanimity instruction was not required because the evidence established a single continuous incident of aggravated kidnapping, not multiple acts.

State v. Saucier

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 31

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Michael G. Saucier was convicted by a jury in the trial court (Aroostook County, Nelson, J.) for one count of gross sexual assault (Class A), one count of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), and one count of unlawful sexual contact (Class C). The charges stemmed from incidents that occurred when Saucier was the stepfather of the victim. The key issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the victim's age at the time of the offenses, which was a crucial element for each of the charges.

The trial court denied Saucier's motion for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, except for one count of unlawful sexual contact (Class B) due to insufficient evidence to prove that the victim was under twelve years old when the offense occurred. The jury found Saucier guilty on the remaining three counts. Saucier was sentenced to twenty-two years for the Class A offense, with nine years for the Class B offense and five years for the Class C offense, all to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the evidence regarding the victim's age was sufficient to sustain a conviction on the Class C offense but not on the Class A and B offenses. The court noted that the State failed to provide evidence to identify the victim's date of birth or her age during the relevant time period. The court concluded that while the jury could reasonably infer that the victim was under fourteen during her time in Exeter, no such inference could be made that she was under the age of twelve. Consequently, the court vacated the convictions on the Class A and B offenses, affirmed the conviction on the Class C offense, and remanded the case for resentencing on the Class C offense.

Williams vs. State of Minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-0851

Opinion Date: April 24, 2024

Judge: Anderson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Edbert Neal Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder in the death of Genelda Campeau and the attack on her adult granddaughter, S.C. Williams was sentenced to life in prison for murder and received a 180-month consecutive sentence for attempted murder. He appealed, and his convictions were affirmed. In this postconviction proceeding, Williams seeks a new trial or an evidentiary hearing based on new DNA evidence not available at the time of trial. Williams asserts the DNA evidence exonerates him and implicates an alternative perpetrator.

Williams had previously filed multiple postconviction relief petitions, all of which were denied. In 2019, Williams filed a motion seeking forensic testing of evidence from the 1996 crime scene. The district court granted the motion, and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”) analyzed evidence that it had retained from the crime scene. The BCA released three reports in August 2020, September 2020, and November 2022, and a private lab Williams hired released one report in October 2022. Williams asserts that these reports corroborate his claims that he was not at the scene of the crime when it occurred and that an alternative perpetrator killed Genelda.

The district court summarily denied his petition. The court concluded that Williams’s petition was barred by the 2-year time limit for postconviction relief petitions set out in Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) (2022), and that neither the newly-discovered-evidence exception nor the interests-of-justice exception to the time bar applied.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the new DNA evidence did not meet the clear and convincing standard for newly discovered evidence and, in fact, some of the additional testing points towards Williams as the perpetrator rather than excludes him. The court also rejected Williams's claim that he is entitled to relief based on the interests-of-justice exception because his mental illness prevented him from timely filing his petition. The court noted that Williams had been sufficiently competent to file his direct appeal from his conviction, postconviction petitions, and appeals from postconviction petitions.

State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Tiffany Mills, Appellant.

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100303

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Ransom

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Tiffany Mills, who was convicted for third-degree assault and armed criminal action. Mills had a confrontation with a woman (the victim) who was friends with her boyfriend. The confrontation escalated into a physical fight, during which Mills stabbed the victim seven times. Mills claimed self-defense, stating that the victim attacked her first. The victim suffered severe injuries, including a lacerated spleen, a partially collapsed lung, and significant blood loss.

The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, where Mills was found guilty of third-degree assault and armed criminal action. Mills appealed her conviction, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to hold a jury-tried punishment stage, excluding certain evidence during the trial, and failing to appoint counsel at her initial appearance before the court.

The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and found no error in the lower court's judgment. The court held that Mills had validly waived her right to jury sentencing when she requested the judge to determine her punishment. The court also found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of specific instances of the victim's violent behavior. Lastly, the court held that a proceeding during which the circuit court considers or determines conditions for pretrial release is not a critical stage requiring the presence of counsel. Therefore, the court affirmed the circuit court's judgment.

State of Missouri v. Jackson-Bey

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100188

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Russell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Troy Jackson-Bey, who was convicted of five counts, including first-degree murder and first-degree assault, following an altercation at a residence. The altercation began when Jackson-Bey and another man argued over a parking issue. Jackson-Bey shot the man, who later died from his injuries. Jackson-Bey then forced his way into the man's home, where he fired his weapon multiple times during a struggle with the man's wife. The wife was not shot. Jackson-Bey appealed his conviction, challenging the admission of surveillance video, the submission of the verdict director for first-degree assault, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions.

The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis had previously ruled against Jackson-Bey's motion to exclude surveillance video taken from the residence. The court also found there was sufficient evidence supporting Jackson-Bey’s convictions. Jackson-Bey appealed these decisions.

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court found that the circuit court did not err in admitting the surveillance video, as the rule of completeness did not apply. The court also ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson-Bey’s first-degree assault conviction, as the jury could have reasonably found that Jackson-Bey attempted to kill or cause serious physical injury to the wife. Lastly, the court concluded that age is not an element of the offense of first-degree murder, and thus, it was not necessary for the state to prove Jackson-Bey was 18 years or older at the time of the offense.

State of Missouri vs. Colville

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100212

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ashley Colville was charged with second-degree involuntary manslaughter following a motor vehicle accident in St. Louis, Missouri, in which Rodney Larue was fatally injured. The indictment alleged that Colville caused Larue's death by colliding with his vehicle and did so with criminal negligence by failing to yield and use a turn signal. Colville filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing it was insufficient because it failed to state the offense charged.

The Circuit Court of St. Louis dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The court held that Colville's alleged failure to yield and signal did not amount to criminal negligence, an essential element of second-degree involuntary manslaughter. The court based its decision on a review of several exhibits, including a video surveillance recording of the accident, and concluded that Colville's actions did not constitute a "gross deviation" that could legally be found criminally negligent.

The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in dismissing the indictment because it was sufficient in all required respects. The court clarified that at the motion to dismiss stage, the court's review of an indictment is limited to determining whether the indictment contains the essential elements of the offense and whether it apprises the defendant of facts constituting the charge. The court found that the indictment against Colville met these requirements. The court also noted that whether the state has satisfied its burden in proving Colville committed the offense charged is not capable of determination without a trial.

State of Missouri vs. Logan

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100265

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Ransom

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around James Logan, who was convicted of three misdemeanor offenses: first-degree trespass, fourth-degree assault, and peace disturbance. These offenses occurred at a Mexican restaurant in Columbia, where Logan was seen yelling at customers and causing a disturbance. Despite being previously warned by the restaurant owner and the police, Logan continued his disruptive behavior, leading to a physical altercation with the owner. Logan was later arrested and charged with the aforementioned misdemeanors.

Logan was initially denied bond due to his perceived danger to the community. However, he was later released on his own recognizance, subject to conditions including completion of a substance use treatment program and refraining from committing new offenses. Logan violated these conditions by committing additional offenses and failing to complete the treatment program. His release was subsequently revoked.

The Circuit Court of Boone County found Logan guilty of all charges and sentenced him to jail time and probation, which included participation in a mental health treatment program. Logan appealed his convictions, arguing that his right to counsel was violated and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.

The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, chose to apply the escape rule, which denies the right of appeal to a defendant who evades justice. The court found that Logan's repeated failure to appear for his probation revocation hearing and his commission of additional criminal offenses during this period adversely affected the criminal justice system. Therefore, the court dismissed Logan's appeal.

State of Missouri vs. Woolery

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100170

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Ransom

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Robert Anthony Woolery, who was convicted of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. In 2021, the Sedalia police department identified Woolery as a subject of interest in their investigation into low-to-mid-level drug dealers. The police organized two "controlled buys" from Woolery, using a confidential informant. The transactions were recorded, and the informant produced a bag containing methamphetamine after each buy. Woolery was subsequently charged and convicted.

Woolery appealed his conviction, raising five points. He argued that the circuit court erred in not appointing counsel at his initial appearance, in not preserving a transcript or recording of his arraignment, in sentencing him to imprisonment rather than ordering a mental examination, and in overruling his motion to suppress evidence. He also claimed that the detectives lacked authority to respond to emergency situations outside the Sedalia city limits.

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court found that Woolery was not entitled to counsel during his initial appearance and arraignment, either through Rule 31.02(a) or the Sixth Amendment. The court also found that the absence of a transcript or recording of Woolery’s November 15 appearance did not hamper its ability to meaningfully review the points raised by Woolery. The court further held that Woolery failed to establish that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted from his sentencing. Finally, the court found that Woolery's claim regarding the denial of his motion to suppress was not preserved for appellate review.

State v. Phillips

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100247

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Ransom

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Lorandis Phillips, who was convicted of first-degree robbery and second-degree assault. The incident occurred on December 14, 2018, when Phillips and three other men attacked a man in a shed behind Phillips' house. The victim was struck in the head, causing him to fall and lose consciousness briefly. The men then stole his cell phone, wallet, and car keys. Phillips was arrested and charged with the crimes.

Phillips appealed his conviction, raising seven points. He argued that he was not represented by counsel at an appearance prior to his preliminary hearing, that the court failed to preserve a recording or transcript of that appearance, that the court erred in allowing his felony information to be amended, that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the robbery count, and that there was a deficiency in the amended information for the assault count.

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Phillips' lack of counsel at his initial appearance did not constitute plain error, as he had not shown that he was prejudiced by the absence of counsel. The court also found that the lower court did not err in allowing the felony information to be amended, as the amendment did not prejudice Phillips' substantial rights. The court further found that there was sufficient evidence to support the robbery conviction, and that any deficiency in the amended information for the assault count did not prejudice Phillips.

State v. Maggi

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 90

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Shane Maggi, an inmate at Montana State Prison, was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner. The charges stemmed from an incident where Maggi and another inmate attacked Wesley Smith in his cell, causing puncture wounds and a fractured facial bone. At sentencing, the Third Judicial District Court, Powell County, declared Maggi a persistent felony offender and used that designation to impose a life sentence on the aggravated assault charge.

The District Court's decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. The appellant argued that the District Court erred in imposing a life sentence under § 46-18-220, MCA, for aggravated assault when Maggi had not previously been designated a persistent felony offender. The State had sought sentence enhancements related to the offenses being committed while Maggi was in official detention, including life imprisonment for the aggravated assault charge.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana agreed with the appellant's argument. The court held that a defendant must have been previously declared a persistent felony offender, prior to the defendant’s subsequent, present felony conviction for which the offender is being sentenced, to count as an aggravating circumstance. The court found that the District Court had incorrectly used its simultaneous designation of Maggi as a persistent felony offender to enhance his sentence for the same felony conviction. As such, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case for a new sentencing. The court did, however, uphold the District Court's decision to order Maggi’s sentences to run consecutively to all prior sentences but his Powell County matter DC-20-30.

State v. Strommen

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 87

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Luke Strommen, who was charged with Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWC) and Sexual Abuse of Children. The charges stemmed from allegations made by two women, one of whom claimed that she had an ongoing sexual relationship with Strommen when she was a minor. The other woman alleged that Strommen possessed digital images of her engaged in sexual activity when she was 17. Strommen pleaded not guilty to both charges.

In the lower courts, the State of Montana sought to present the testimony of a sexual assault behavioral psychologist, Dr. Sheri Vanino, remotely via two-way video conferencing due to her unavailability to travel to Montana for the trial. The defense objected, asserting that personal in-court cross-examination was essential. The District Court granted the State's motion, allowing Dr. Vanino to testify remotely. The trial resulted in Strommen being found guilty of SIWC and sentenced to a 40-year prison term.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Strommen appealed his conviction, arguing that the District Court erroneously allowed the State to present adverse expert testimony remotely via two-way video conferencing at trial. The Supreme Court agreed with Strommen, holding that the allowance of Dr. Vanino's remote testimony violated Strommen's fundamental right to personal face-to-face confrontation of adverse prosecution witnesses in the courtroom at trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. The court reversed Strommen's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Pederson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 79

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The defendant, Jason Pederson, was found guilty of one count of terrorizing following a jury trial. The charge was based on two emails Pederson sent to her former employer, threatening to retrieve damages through the taking of physical assets and warning employees to stay out of the way to avoid unnecessary deaths. These emails were sent after Pederson had filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against her former employer. After receiving the emails, the employer contacted law enforcement, leading to Pederson's arrest.

The case was first heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. During the trial, Pederson, who represented herself, argued that the State had violated her rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to provide her with a recording of a conversation she had with Officer Tanner Anderson, who had informed her that she was trespassed from her former employer's property. The State argued that the recording was not relevant to the terrorizing charge and had been filed under a civil trespass file, not the criminal case. The court ruled that the State's failure to disclose the recording was not intentional and that the State must provide it before Officer Anderson was called as a witness.

The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that Pederson did not establish a Brady violation. The court found that although the State had possessed the recording and did not disclose it to Pederson, Pederson had not demonstrated that the recording was favorable to her or plainly exculpatory. The court also concluded that Pederson did not preserve the issue of insufficient evidence because she failed to move for acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 and did not argue obvious error.

State ex rel. Martre v. Reed

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1624

Opinion Date: May 1, 2024

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Derrick Martre, who was arrested in May 2017 for domestic abuse and possession of sexually explicit images of children on his cellphone. The arrest was prompted by a police report filed by Martre’s then-girlfriend, who discovered two videos on Martre’s cellphone showing Martre touching a naked female child. Martre was subsequently indicted on six felonies and sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 years in prison. In March 2021, Martre filed a motion for the return of his seized cellphone and its memory card, arguing that his cellphone was unlawfully seized.

The Allen County Court of Common Pleas granted Martre's motion for the return of his property, subject to certain limitations. The court did not address Martre’s contention that the search warrant was void. Martre appealed this decision to the Third District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court's order for the return of his property should have also vacated his convictions. The Third District rejected Martre’s argument and affirmed the trial court's decision.

Martre then petitioned the Third District for a writ of mandamus against the trial judge and the Allen County prosecutor, asserting that he had a right to a suppression hearing and a right to findings of fact and conclusions of law from the judge. The Third District dismissed Martre’s petition, concluding that Martre had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to raise his arguments, either through direct appeal or postconviction motions. Martre appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third District’s judgment, stating that Martre had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law because he could—and did—appeal the trial court's decision. The court also denied Martre’s motion for judicial notice.

State ex rel. White v. Aveni

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1614

Opinion Date: April 30, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves appellant Marcus D. White's appeal against the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus or procedendo against appellee, Franklin County Common Pleas Court Judge Carl A. Aveni II. White had filed a postconviction petition and a motion in the trial court, which he claimed were not addressed in a timely manner. Judge Aveni responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that he had not unnecessarily delayed in proceeding.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed White's complaint as moot, based on the trial court's docket entry indicating that the postconviction petition and the motion had been addressed. However, White argued that the docket entry did not constitute a decision on his motion.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed in part and reversed in part the Tenth District’s judgment. The court agreed that White's claim regarding his postconviction petition was moot as it had been addressed. However, it disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that the trial court's docket entry itself disposed of the motion. The court clarified that a docket entry was not sufficient to constitute a decision by the judge on the motion. Therefore, the case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of White's claim regarding his motion.

Judge Aveni's motion to declare White a vexatious litigator was denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio, citing a lack of precedent in which the court declared a party a vexatious litigator in a case in which the party prevailed on one of his or her claims.

United States of America v. Clemons

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28202

Opinion Date: May 1, 2024

Judge: HILL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Patrick Clemons, a convicted felon, was found guilty of possessing a firearm. He had two prior convictions for Criminal Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature (CDVHAN) and one for Assault and Battery Second Degree (AB2d) in South Carolina. Due to these prior convictions, Clemons was classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), leading to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years. Clemons appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that both CDVHAN and AB2d could be committed through reckless or negligent conduct, and therefore, neither should qualify as a predicate offense for enhanced sentencing under the ACCA's "elements clause."

Clemons' appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified two questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The questions sought to clarify the mental state required to commit AB2d and CDVHAN in South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court rephrased the questions to ask whether a defendant could be convicted of these offenses with a mens rea of recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code.

The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the answer to both questions was "yes." The court explained that the South Carolina Legislature had chosen to criminalize multiple types of conduct under the statutes for AB2d and CDVHAN. Therefore, there was not a single mens rea required for a conviction under either statute. Instead, the required mens rea depended on the actus reus of the crime being prosecuted. The court concluded that under some circumstances, a person could be convicted of AB2d and CDVHAN with a mens rea of recklessness.

EX PARTE MCMILLAN

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-88,970-01

Opinion Date: May 1, 2024

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around a woman who was convicted of theft in 2015. The prosecution used her 2001 federal felony conviction from Alaska to enhance the theft offense to a first-degree felony, resulting in a forty-year sentence and a $10,000 fine. The woman argued that her 2001 federal conviction was not final when the theft occurred, and thus, the offense was unlawfully enhanced, leading to an illegal sentence.

Prior to reaching the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the case had been reviewed by lower courts. The main issue was whether Texas law or the law of another jurisdiction should be used to determine if a prior conviction is final for the purpose of enhancing the punishment of an offense under Section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas was asked to determine whether there was ever a time prior to a previous case, Ex parte Pue, when other states were allowed to unilaterally dictate the laws and public policy of Texas. The court held that the rule in Pue, which stated that Texas law should define whether a prior conviction is final for the purposes of enhancing the punishment of an offense, applies retroactively. Furthermore, the court held that the woman's federal felony conviction was final under the rule in Pue. The court concluded that the woman's federal conviction was final under Texas law and denied her relief.

State v. Smith

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 13

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Matthew B. Durrant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Shane Craig Smith, who was arrested in a police sting operation after he attempted to engage in sexual activities with a persona named "Emily," who he believed to be a 13-year-old girl. Smith had met Emily online and had arranged to meet her at a gas station in Lehi, Utah, with the intention of having her perform multiple sex acts in exchange for driving her to California. Smith was charged with various crimes, including attempted child kidnapping, attempted rape of a child, and attempted sodomy of a child. He pled guilty to most of these charges while reserving the right to appeal two issues: whether there was sufficient evidence to bind him over for trial on the attempt charges, and whether he was entrapped as a matter of law.

Smith's case was first heard in the district court, where he moved to decline to bind over the counts of attempted rape of a child, attempted sodomy of a child, and attempted kidnapping of a child. He argued that the State’s evidence regarding the attempt crimes did not show that his actions rose beyond solicitation or mere preparation and was therefore insufficient to support probable cause on the “substantial step” element of the attempt statute. The district court denied the motion and bound over all counts for trial. Smith then filed a motion to dismiss all charges on entrapment grounds, which the district court denied. Smith eventually entered a conditional guilty plea to attempted child kidnapping, attempted sodomy of a child, and enticement of a minor, allowing him to appeal the district court’s bindover ruling and entrapment determination.

Smith appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, where he raised two issues: whether there was insufficient evidence to bind over the attempt charges for trial, and whether the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss all the charges on the basis that he had been entrapped. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings. Smith then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court found that Smith's actions constituted substantial steps toward the commission of the crimes he was charged with, and that he was not entrapped as a matter of law. The court held that Smith's actions strongly corroborated his intent to commit the crimes, and that the police conduct in the case did not create a substantial risk that an average person would attempt to commit the crimes that Smith attempted.

State v. Meade

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 23

Opinion Date: April 26, 2024

Judge: Waples

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2010, Jason Meade was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life, with all but fourteen-to-twenty years suspended. As part of his probation conditions, he was required to complete the Cognitive Self Change (CSC) Program. However, the CSC program was discontinued and replaced with the Risk Reduction Programming (RRP). In 2022, Meade's probation officer moved to modify his probation condition to require him to undergo screening for RRP and complete the program if directed by his probation officer. Meade did not agree to the requested modification.

The trial court heard evidence on the motion and subsequently issued an order granting the motion and modifying the probation condition. The court concluded that RRP was consistent with the sentencing goals articulated by the sentencing court and that the modification did not impose harsher or more restrictive conditions on Meade. It therefore modified the condition to require “Risk Reduction Programming as deemed appropriate by PO.”

Meade appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the plain language of the original condition did not require him to participate in RRP and there was no change in circumstances sufficient to justify modifying the condition. He further claimed that the modified condition violated his right to due process because it was vague and placed compliance outside his control.

The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the original probation condition could not be construed to require Meade to participate in RRP. Furthermore, the court found that the trial court erred in modifying the condition over Meade’s objection because the State failed to demonstrate that there had been a change in Meade’s circumstances or that RRP was not harsher or more restrictive than CSC.

Bolen v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 48

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Fox

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Solomon Bolen was convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. Bolen appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights by not instructing the jury on his plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI). He also claimed that his attorneys were ineffective for not seeking those instructions. Additionally, Bolen contended that his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery violated his right against double jeopardy.

The district court had found Bolen mentally fit to proceed with the trial. Despite Bolen's NGMI plea, the court-designated examiner, Dr. Wilkinson, opined that Bolen did not meet the statutory criteria for an NGMI defense. She noted that Bolen's altered state of mind and psychosis at the time of the crimes were caused by self-induced intoxication, which is specifically excluded from the statutory definition of mental illness or deficiency. Bolen's attorneys did not pursue the NGMI defense and focused instead on the self-induced intoxication defense.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Bolen did not present competent evidence to support an NGMI defense, and thus was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense. The court also found that Bolen's attorneys were not ineffective for not pursuing the NGMI defense, as the instructions would not have been proper even if they had renewed their request for them. Lastly, the court held that Bolen's convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery did not violate his right against double jeopardy, as the crimes contained separate elements.

Gonsalves v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 49

Opinion Date: May 2, 2024

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Travis No'Mana Gonsalves, who was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and sexual exploitation of children. The charges stemmed from an incident where Gonsalves, while sharing a bed with his 15-year-old stepdaughter, AA, in a hotel, moved closer to her, caressed her chest area over her bra, and placed his legs between hers. AA felt his erect penis against her and told him to stop. The next morning, Gonsalves apologized for his actions. He later told his biological son that he regretted touching AA. The incident was reported to the police, and a search of Gonsalves's electronic devices revealed child pornography and pictures of AA in a bikini and a towel.

The District Court of Natrona County held a two-day jury trial. Gonsalves was acquitted of two counts of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor based on the photographs of AA but was found guilty on the remaining counts. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of incarceration for seven to ten years for the sexual abuse of a minor convictions, and one consecutive term of eight to ten years for the sexual exploitation of children conviction. Gonsalves appealed the two sexual abuse of a minor convictions, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to find he had the necessary intent to be convicted for sexual abuse of a minor.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to infer that Gonsalves was awake during the incident and that he acted with the intent of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. The court also found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonsalves acted knowingly when he took "immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with" AA.

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