McIntosh v. United States

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-7386

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Sonia Sotomayor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Louis McIntosh, who was indicted on multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses. The indictment demanded that McIntosh forfeit all property derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the offenses. The Government later provided McIntosh with a pretrial bill of particulars that included as property subject to forfeiture $75,000 in cash and a BMW that McIntosh purchased just five days after one of the robberies. After a jury convicted McIntosh, the District Court imposed a forfeiture of $75,000 and the BMW at the sentencing hearing. However, the Government failed to submit an order of forfeiture for the court’s signature within a week from the hearing as ordered by the District Court.

On appeal, the Government moved for a limited remand to supplement the record with a written order of forfeiture. The Second Circuit granted the unopposed motion. Back in District Court, McIntosh argued that the failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B) meant that the District Court could not proceed with forfeiture at all. The District Court overruled McIntosh’s objections, finding that the Rule is a time-related directive, and that the failure to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before sentencing did not prevent the court from ordering forfeiture because the missed deadline did not prejudice McIntosh. The Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that a district court’s failure to comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s requirement to enter a preliminary order before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review. The Court agreed with the Second Circuit and the Government that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) establishes a time-related directive. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Casey v. US

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1414

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: Lipez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lashaun Casey was sentenced to life imprisonment after being found guilty by a jury of carjacking and murdering an undercover police officer. Casey sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial attorney failed to seek exclusion of inculpatory statements he made during a period of improper delay in bringing him before a magistrate judge following his arrest and detention. The district court rejected this claim, concluding that while a delay occurred, it was reasonable and necessary for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Casey's presentment was justifiably delayed. However, the court agreed with Casey that admission at trial of one of the two contested sets of statements was improper. Despite this, the court concluded that Casey had not demonstrated that his trial counsel's failure to press that error constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because his showing of prejudice fell short of the Sixth Amendment standard. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment denying the writ of habeas corpus.

United States v. Boyrie-Laboy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1354

Opinion Date: April 22, 2024

Judge: MONTECALVO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around Carlos Rubén Boyrie-Laboy, a Puerto Rico Police officer, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 371, and 641 for his involvement in a conspiracy to commit robbery and theft of government property. Boyrie-Laboy was part of the Humacao Drugs Division, responsible for seizing illegal weapons, drugs, and other contraband. In 2015, Officer Gabriel Maldonado-Martínez joined the division and began working with Boyrie-Laboy. Maldonado-Martínez later became an undercover FBI informant to identify corrupt police officers. Boyrie-Laboy was involved in two thefts of fireworks and was present during two FBI operations designed to catch corrupt officers. However, he did not accept any stolen goods or money from these operations.

The government indicted Boyrie-Laboy and three other officers based on these activities. Boyrie-Laboy was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to steal and convert government property, and theft and conversion of government property. He proceeded to a five-day jury trial, where the jury found him guilty on all counts. Boyrie-Laboy appealed the convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support them.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Boyrie-Laboy's counsel had declined the opportunity to move for a judgment of acquittal twice during the trial and did not make a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. As a result, the court applied the "clear and gross injustice" standard of review. The court found that the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's findings and that upholding Boyrie-Laboy's convictions did not result in a clear and gross injustice. Therefore, the court affirmed the convictions.

United States v. Nieves-Diaz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 21-1519, 21-1520

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Heclouis Nieves-Díaz, was on supervised release for a federal drug conviction when he was convicted of possession of ammunition as a convicted felon, illegal possession of a machine gun, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. He received an 84-month prison term for each conviction, to be served concurrently. His supervised release was also revoked, resulting in an additional 18-month prison term to be served consecutively to his 84-month sentences.

Nieves had previously pleaded guilty to one count of drug conspiracy and was sentenced to 80 months of imprisonment and 96 months of supervised release. His term of supervised release was twice revoked. While on his third term of supervised release, Nieves was arrested following a search of an apartment where he was residing. The search yielded cocaine, marijuana, approximately 149 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition, and a device that could convert a Glock pistol into a fully automatic weapon.

Nieves appealed his 84-month sentences and the revocation sentence. He argued that the District Court improperly calculated his Guidelines Sentencing Range (GSR) for each of the underlying offenses and that the court's application of a four-level enhancement was incorrect.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the District Court did err in applying the four-level enhancement, as the record did not support the determination that the ammunition in this case had the required potentially facilitative effect. Therefore, the court vacated the District Court's sentences and remanded for resentencing. However, the court affirmed the revocation sentence, finding it both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United States v. Perez-Delgado

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1231

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Ricardo Perez-Delgado, who was sentenced to forty years in prison for his role in a violent robbery that resulted in the death of a businessman. The sentence was significantly higher than the guideline sentencing range (GSR), which had a maximum of thirty years and five months. Perez-Delgado appealed, arguing that the district court did not adequately explain its rationale for imposing a sentence nearly a decade over the top of the GSR.

The district court had adopted the probation office's GSR calculation and considered the relevant statutory factors, Perez-Delgado's background, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the arguments of both parties. However, the court's explanation for the upward variance was limited to a single sentence stating that the recommended sentence did not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, protect the public from further crimes by Perez-Delgado, or address issues of deterrence and punishment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with Perez-Delgado's argument. The court found that the district court's explanation was insufficient to justify the significant upward variance from the GSR. The court noted that the greater the variance, the greater the explanation must be. The court vacated Perez-Delgado's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to provide an individualized explanation proportional to the length of the variance if it decided to upwardly vary again.

US v. Centariczki

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1194

Opinion Date: April 15, 2024

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Edgar Centariczki, the defendant, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution of methamphetamine and fentanyl in 2021. He was sentenced to time served (two days) and three years of supervised release. His case was transferred to the District of Maine, where he resided. Between June and October of 2021, Centariczki tested positive for marijuana and cocaine multiple times and missed several probation office appointments. Despite warnings from the court, he continued to violate the terms of his supervised release, leading to his arrest in November. In January 2022, a revocation hearing was held due to multiple violations, including drug and alcohol use and failures to report to probation office appointments.

The District Court for the District of Maine held a final revocation hearing in February 2023. The court calculated a guideline sentencing range of four to ten months, with thirty months of supervised release. However, the government advocated for an above-guidelines sentence of eighteen months' incarceration with no supervised release to follow, arguing that Centariczki had received multiple chances to seek drug treatment and yet continued to violate the terms of his probation. The court agreed and sentenced Centariczki to eighteen months' incarceration with no supervised release to follow.

Centariczki appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court lacked a sufficiently above-guidelines plausible rationale for imposing an eighteen-month sentence. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the district court's rationale was plausible and its sentence was reasonable. The court noted that Centariczki's repeated violations of his supervised release terms and the multiple second chances afforded to him by the court and probation officer justified the above-guidelines sentence. The court affirmed the district court's decision.

Medunjanin v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-1438

Opinion Date: April 24, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Adis Medunjanin was arrested in 2010 and charged with nine terrorism-related counts, including attempting to commit an act of terrorism and possessing a destructive device in furtherance of crimes of violence. The charges stemmed from a plot to conduct coordinated suicide bombings in the New York City subway system. Medunjanin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Medunjanin appealed his conviction, arguing that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possessing a destructive device in furtherance of crimes of violence should be vacated. He claimed that the crimes were predicated on invalid "crimes of violence" in light of a Supreme Court decision, Sessions v. Dimaya. The District Court agreed with the government that one of the § 924(c) convictions should be vacated, but upheld the other because it was predicated on attempted terrorism, which remained a crime of violence.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Medunjanin argued that the attempted terrorism count was an invalid predicate because the jury may have found him guilty of attempted terrorism based on aiding and abetting liability. The court disagreed, holding that the fact that a defendant may have been convicted of an otherwise valid crime of violence based on an aiding and abetting theory of liability has no effect on the crime’s validity as a § 924(c) predicate. The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

United States v. Dai

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-8081

Opinion Date: April 24, 2024

Judge: PARK

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Patrick Dai, a student at Cornell University, who was charged with making interstate threats of violence against Jewish students at the university. The government sought to detain Dai pretrial, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), which allows for pretrial detention of defendants charged with a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, or an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed. Dai argued that this provision did not apply to him as his charge, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), was punishable by at most five years in prison. He contended that the phrase "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed" applied to "crime of violence," thus excluding crimes of violence punishable by less than 10 years.

The district court rejected Dai's argument, and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that § 3142(f)(1)(A) permits the government to seek detention of defendants charged with any crime of violence, not just those punishable by 10 years or more. The court reasoned that the government's interpretation avoided surplusage, made grammatical sense, and was supported by statutory history. The court concluded that the phrase "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed" did not modify "crime of violence" in § 3142(f)(1)(A).

United States v. Freeman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6394

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: CABRANES

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rodger Freeman, convicted of a felony in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. After completing his federal prison sentence, Freeman was transferred to New York State custody to face a pending indictment. The New York Appellate Division vacated Freeman’s state convictions due to procedural error and ordered a new trial. Freeman was held in state custody for over four years pending retrial. The state eventually dismissed the charges against Freeman and released him from pre-trial detention.

The District Court held that Freeman's term of supervised release began only after his release from state custody, not upon his release from federal custody. The court based its decision on United States v. Johnson, which established that a term of federal supervised release does not begin until a defendant’s imprisonment has ended.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which states that a term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment. The court held that Freeman's term of supervised release began on the day he was released from state custody, not federal custody. The court did not address the question of whether Freeman’s federal term of supervised release was “tolled” during his years in state custody following the vacatur of his state convictions.

In re Edwards

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 20-2229

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Montgomery-Reeves

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Terril Edwards, who was convicted in 2008 on three counts: possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Based on Edwards’s criminal history, the District Court determined that the statutory minimum for the Drug Trafficking Charge was life imprisonment. In 2011, Edwards filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, which the District Court denied. In 2019, following the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Edwards filed a motion for resentencing. The District Court granted the motion and resentenced Edwards to a total of 240 months.

Edwards's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In 2020, Edwards filed a second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States. The District Court transferred the petition to the Third Circuit to determine whether it could consider the successive petition.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Edwards's second motion was a second or successive motion because a First Step Act resentencing is unrelated to the validity of the judgment it amends and thus does not result in a new, intervening judgment under Magwood. The court also held that Edwards had not satisfied the requirements of § 2255(h) because Rehaif did not announce a “new rule of constitutional law” made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Finally, the court held that Edwards could not challenge his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as the Supreme Court had foreclosed this possibility in Jones v. Hendrix. As a result, the court denied Edwards's requests.

United States v. Chu

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1375

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: CHUNG

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves Alice Chu, who was indicted in September 2019 and convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and five counts of health care fraud. Chu's trial was initially set for February 22, 2021, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chief Judge of the District of New Jersey issued multiple standing orders that delayed trials and excluded these delays from Speedy Trial Act (STA) calculations. Chu's trial eventually commenced on March 1, 2022.

Chu moved to dismiss multiple times on STA grounds, arguing that the delays denied her right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and that the government abused the grand jury process causing inexcusable delay. The District Court denied these motions. After her conviction, Chu filed two motions for a new trial, claiming she was unfairly prejudiced by trial testimony about prior bad acts and that newly discovered evidence could change the probability of a conviction at trial. The District Court denied both motions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the exclusions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic did not violate defendants’ rights under the STA. The Court also found no clear error in the District Court’s adoption of the factual findings contained within the COVID Standing Orders. The Court of Appeals further agreed with the District Court that Chu failed to show that the government’s “sole or dominant purpose” was to impermissibly delay her trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chu's motions for a new trial and that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove Chu’s knowledge and intent to commit health care fraud.

United States v. Hill

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-3508

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: Montgomery-Reeves

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Carlos Hill, who was convicted in 2013 for possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a law that makes it illegal for a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison to possess a firearm. In 2019, Hill sought to challenge his conviction following the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, which overturned previous interpretations of § 922(g)(1) and held that the government must prove that the person knew they belonged to the prohibited group. Hill requested the appointment of counsel to pursue his Rehaif claim in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District Court denied his request, ruling that Hill's § 2255 motion was second or successive and that he did not qualify for relief under Rehaif.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court's ruling. The appellate court determined that Hill's § 2255 motion was not second or successive, and that Rehaif announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive for non-successive § 2255 motions. The court concluded that the District Court's order was incorrect and vacated it, remanding the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also issued a certificate of appealability for Hill's appeal, finding that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether Hill has stated a valid constitutional claim and whether the District Court was correct in its procedural ruling.

United States v. Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-7325

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: GREGORY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Antonio Davis, who was serving a 210-month prison sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, petitioned the district court for compassionate release due to his elevated risk of severe COVID-19 and a change in the law regarding his career offender status. The district court denied his request, concluding that Davis was not due compassionate release based on his susceptibility to COVID-19 and did not fully consider each of Davis’s arguments.

Davis was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in January 2013. He pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in June of that year. Davis received a career offender enhancement because he had previously been convicted of certain other offenses and because the offense at issue here was a “controlled substance offense” at the time of conviction. In February 2021, Davis filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he was uniquely susceptible to the potential spread of COVID-19 due to his type-2 diabetes and hypertension. He also argued that a recent court decision invalidated his career offender Guidelines designation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part the district court's decision. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Davis failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based on the pandemic. However, the court found that the district court did not properly address Davis’s arguments regarding intervening changes in law and rehabilitation. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of compassionate relief and remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Hunt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4231

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Diana Jane Gribbon Motz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of seven members of the "36th Street Bang Squad" gang. The gang members were charged with racketeering conspiracy, murder, attempted murder, and related crimes, following a string of murders, attempted murders, and assaults in 2015 and 2017. The defendants appealed, raising several issues including challenges to the classification of their racketeering offenses as crimes of violence, the denial of their motions to exclude testimony of three forensic experts, and the denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal and for a mistrial. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. The court also held that an attempt offense qualifies as a crime of violence if the completed offense invariably requires the use of physical force.

Rivers v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-11031

Opinion Date: April 15, 2024

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Danny Richard Rivers, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, filed a second habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 while his first petition was still pending on appeal. The second petition challenged the same convictions as the first but added new claims. Rivers argued that these new claims arose after he was able to review his attorney-client file, which he had long requested and only received after a successful state bar grievance adjudication against his counsel. The district court deemed the second petition "successive" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires an applicant to first get authorization from the appropriate court of appeals for such a petition. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition without such authorization and transferred the matter to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Rivers appealed the district court's transfer order, arguing that his second petition should have been construed as a motion to amend his first petition since it was still pending on appeal. He also contended that his claims should not have been considered successive because his counsel withheld his client file that would have allegedly exposed his ineffective assistance, and this information was not available to him when he filed his first petition.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Rivers' arguments. The court found that Rivers' second petition attacked the same conviction as his first petition and added several new claims that stemmed from the proceedings already at issue in his first petition. The court held that the fact that Rivers' later-obtained client file allegedly contained information that was not available to him when he filed his first petition did not excuse him from meeting the standards for seeking authorization under § 2244. The court also held that the timing of Rivers' second petition did not permit him to circumvent the requirements for filing successive petitions under § 2244. The court affirmed the district court's order transferring the matter to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

United States v. Brannan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40098

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: Duncan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Elden Don Brannan was living with his sister and her three children in Corpus Christi, Texas. In 2022, Brannan's sister called 911 to report that Brannan had assaulted her boyfriend and was threatening suicide. She informed the police that Brannan had a "pipe bomb" in his bedroom closet. The bomb squad removed the device and Brannan was arrested. He was later indicted by a grand jury for possessing an unregistered "destructive device" in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). His sister testified that Brannan had built the device from disassembled fireworks. Brannan's defense was that the device was not an explosive but a "makeshift roman-candle or fountain firework" designed to emit a pyrotechnic display.

Brannan was found guilty by a federal jury. He moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show he had designed the device as a weapon. These motions were denied. Brannan also requested the court to instruct the jury that to convict him under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it had to find he had intentionally designed the device for use as a weapon. The court rejected this proposed instruction, reasoning that Brannan's intent to design the device as a weapon was not an element of the offense but an affirmative defense. The jury found Brannan guilty and he was sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brannan argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the jury instruction omitted an element of the offense. The court disagreed, affirming Brannan's conviction. The court held that under its binding precedent, the exception to § 5861(d) is an affirmative defense, not an element of the crime. Therefore, the government did not need to prove that the device was "designed for use as a weapon." The court also concluded that the district court did not err by following the circuit’s pattern instructions and declining to add "designed as a weapon" as an element of § 5861(d).

United States v. Fluitt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30316

Opinion Date: April 24, 2024

Judge: James L. Dennis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.

In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.

In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense.

United States v. Perkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50987

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Thomas Perkins, who was convicted of one count of distributing child pornography and eight counts of possessing devices containing child pornography. Perkins, who has mental health issues, was deemed competent to stand trial by the district court. He was sentenced to over 157 years in prison, a significant upward variance from the guideline range. Perkins appealed, challenging both the competency determination and the reasonableness of his sentence.

Perkins was initially charged with possession and distribution of child pornography. His counsel filed a motion for a mental examination, which was granted. Perkins was evaluated by a psychologist who determined that he was competent to stand trial. Perkins filed a motion for a second competency hearing, supported by a report from a psychologist retained by the defense, who diagnosed Perkins with bipolar-type schizoaffective disorder and autism. The government then moved for another psychological examination. Perkins was evaluated by a second psychologist, who determined that Perkins did not have a mental disease that rendered him unable to understand the nature of the charges or the consequences of the proceeding or to assist in his defense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence. The court found that the district court's determination of Perkins's competency was not clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. However, the court found that the district court erred in its sentencing, as it did not provide a sufficient explanation for the significant upward variance from the guideline range. The case was remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Sterling

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30069

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Elliott Sterling, who was convicted for engaging in a fraudulent scheme to obtain loan and grant funds from the Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program. Sterling submitted fraudulent applications on behalf of students, both real and fictional, and also committed fraud in connection with his educational consulting business. He was indicted for multiple counts of wire fraud, financial aid fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity. Sterling chose to represent himself during the trial after his request for a new counsel was denied.

The district court found Sterling competent to waive his right to counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se in his defense. After a 9-day jury trial, Sterling was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 132 months of imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Sterling appealed, raising several Sixth Amendment claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no merit in Sterling’s procedural or substantive challenges. It held that Sterling's waiver of counsel was clear, unequivocal, and voluntary, and that he was competent to represent himself at trial. The court also found that the district court did not err in allowing Sterling to represent himself at his own competency hearing, and that the district court's determination of Sterling's competence did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

United States v. West

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-11001

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kyle Lamar West was charged with seven counts of production of child pornography. He negotiated a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts in exchange for the dismissal of the other five. The plea agreement included a waiver of most of his appellate rights, but reserved the right to appeal a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum punishment. The probation office recommended a sentence of 720 months of imprisonment and $6,000 in restitution to the victim's mother. The district court adopted these recommendations.

West appealed the restitution part of his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to conduct a proximate-cause analysis as required by precedent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the district court had cited inapplicable statutes and had not conducted a proximate-cause analysis. The court also noted that the record lacked any dollar amount or range approximating the amount of the victim's losses.

The Court of Appeals found that the district court's failure to conduct a proximate-cause analysis was a clear and obvious error. The court also found that this error affected West's substantial rights and undermined the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court concluded that the district court had plainly erred by failing to connect West's offense conduct to the loss suffered by the victim.

The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's restitution order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court noted that on remand, the district court could determine whether the government could present new evidence justifying the order of restitution.

USA v. Garcia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40570

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: Ramirez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves Maria E. Garcia and Liang Guo Yu, who were convicted for money laundering. The charges stemmed from their involvement with the Villalobos drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Houston, Texas. The DTO was known for moving hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and making yearly profits in the millions. Garcia and Yu were implicated in the seizure of large sums of cash during two separate searches. They were charged with conspiring to launder monetary instruments and aiding and abetting money laundering. Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed the offenses.

Prior to their trial, the defendants had their motions for a new trial and to suppress denied by the district court. At trial, the government presented testimony from ten witnesses and introduced dozens of exhibits. The jury found Garcia and Yu guilty of both charges. Post-trial, the district court denied all three motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. Garcia was sentenced to two concurrent 78-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release. Yu was sentenced to two concurrent 151-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the district court did not err in assessing a sentencing enhancement for Garcia and in denying Yu's motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court further held that the district court did not err in denying Yu's motion for a new trial as untimely.

Hubbard v. Rewerts

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-2968

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Batchelder

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Carl Hubbard, who was convicted of first-degree murder in Michigan state court in 1992. Over two decades later, Hubbard filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, arguing that he is entitled to an equitable exception to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) time bar based on a credible showing of actual innocence. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely.

The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Hubbard argued that he had new evidence that impeached the State’s case against him, but he failed to present evidence affirmatively demonstrating his actual innocence. The court held that AEDPA does not permit him to file an untimely habeas petition. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Hubbard's new evidence did not meet the burden of showing that the State had imprisoned an innocent person. Therefore, Hubbard must comply with the same law with which all other habeas petitioners must comply.

Tanner v. Walters

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1963

Opinion Date: April 15, 2024

Judge: Davis

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Hattie Tanner, who was convicted of murder and served seventeen years in prison before her conviction was set aside due to insufficient evidentiary support. After her release, Tanner filed a lawsuit against David Walters, a retired police detective, alleging that he violated her constitutional rights by falsifying investigation reports and providing false testimony, leading to her wrongful conviction. Walters sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court partially granted and partially denied. The court allowed Tanner's claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution to proceed to trial. Walters appealed this decision.

Previously, the district court found that Tanner's claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution should proceed to trial. Walters appealed this decision, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Walters knowingly fabricated evidence against Tanner, and thus he was not entitled to qualified immunity on Tanner's fabrication-of-evidence claim. The court also found that a reasonable jury could find that Walters's false statements influenced the decision to charge Tanner, and that without these false statements, there would not have been probable cause to prosecute Tanner. Therefore, Walters was not entitled to qualified immunity on Tanner's malicious prosecution claim.

United States v. Aldridge

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3179

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around Joshua Aldridge, who was found guilty of conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, among other charges. Aldridge and his girlfriend, Kathy, were both addicted to painkillers and sought out higher-dosage pills from Larry Dean Porter. When they could not afford to purchase pills with money, Porter would allow them to have the pills as long as they agreed to pay him later. Eventually, Kathy was informed that she could “work off” the debt by “cleaning and doing sexual favors.” Aldridge would regularly drive Kathy to Porter’s house, take his pill, leave Kathy at the house, and return to pick her up when she was finished.

The district court denied Aldridge's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the adult-sex-trafficking-by-force conspiracy charge. The court reasoned that a jury could find that Aldridge had personally coerced Kathy to buy pills in exchange for sex acts. The jury found Aldridge guilty on all three counts. At sentencing, the district judge applied two enhancements over Aldridge’s objections: the enhancement for use of a computer to entice or offer and the vulnerable-victim enhancement.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Aldridge challenged the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion and the district court’s application of two sentencing enhancements. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Aldridge knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy with intent to further its objective. The court also found that the district court properly applied the sentencing enhancements.

United States v. Lester

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-6077

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Travis Lester, a convicted felon, was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm after law enforcement officers found a stolen .40 caliber pistol in his motel room. The arrest occurred after Lester violated the terms of his supervised release from a previous conviction for possessing ammunition as a felon. During the arrest, officers found a baggie of crack cocaine and $869 in cash on Lester's person. Lester admitted to having marijuana in his motel room. Based on this information, officers obtained a search warrant for the room, where they found the pistol, a digital scale, and a small bag of marijuana.

Prior to his trial, Lester filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the officers' protective sweep of his motel room and his admission about the marijuana, arguing that these violated his Fourth Amendment and Miranda rights. The district court denied this motion, finding that the officers had not violated Lester's rights. At trial, the jury convicted Lester, and the district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. The court also imposed an additional seventeen-month prison sentence to be served consecutively due to Lester's violation of the supervised-release conditions from his earlier conviction.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Lester argued that his Miranda and Fourth Amendment rights were violated, that there were evidentiary errors, and that there were mistakes in his sentencing. The appellate court disagreed with Lester's claims and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officer's question during Lester's arrest was not an interrogation under Miranda, and that the protective sweep of Lester's motel room did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings or in its sentencing of Lester.

United States v. Robinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5245

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Davis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Katrina Robinson, founder and director of The Healthcare Institute (THI), a for-profit company in Memphis, Tennessee, that provided certified nursing assistant training. THI received a federal grant from the Geriatrics Workforce Enhancement Program (GWEP), administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), from 2015 to 2019. The grant provided scholarships for eligible THI students. Robinson was convicted of four counts of wire fraud for actions she took in administering the grant. The district court granted Robinson's post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal on two of the counts, and Robinson appealed the denial of acquittal on the remaining two counts.

The district court's decision was based on a federal investigation that raised concerns about Robinson's use of HRSA grant funds for personal expenses and discrepancies in Annual Performance Reports (APRs) that Robinson had submitted on THI’s behalf. The APRs contained inaccurate information on the number of students who graduated from the program, the number of students who received grant-funded scholarships, and the unique numerical identifiers assigned to students. The government argued that these "errors" were intentional manipulations by Robinson to ensure THI’s continued receipt of grant funds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Robinson's submission of false information in the APRs constituted a course of conduct intended to deprive the government of money. The court also found that Robinson's intent to defraud was demonstrated by her direct involvement in preparing and submitting the APRs, and her direction to charge personal wedding expenses to the grant. The court reversed the district court's grant of acquittal on one of the counts, finding that a rational juror could conclude that Robinson's transmission of materially false information was done to induce HRSA to continue funding the grant. The court affirmed the district court's denial of acquittal on the remaining two counts.

Lickers v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1179

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: SCUDDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves Jacob Lickers, who was convicted for transporting and possessing child pornography. The conviction was based on evidence found on Lickers' devices, which were seized during a traffic stop and subsequent arrest for drug possession. The initial search of the devices was authorized by a state court warrant, which later suppressed the evidence due to the unconstitutionality of the initial stop and arrest. However, the case was referred to federal authorities who conducted a second search of the devices under a federal warrant. The federal warrant application did not mention the state court's suppression ruling.

In the lower courts, Lickers' attorney challenged the constitutionality of the initial stop and arrest, and the adequacy of the state search warrant. The state court agreed, suppressing all evidence seized during the stop and any statements made by Lickers. The state charges were subsequently dismissed. However, in the federal court, the same arguments were unsuccessful. Lickers pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 132 months' imprisonment on each count.

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Lickers argued that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the federal agent acted in bad faith by omitting the state court's suppression ruling from the federal warrant application. The court disagreed, finding that the link between the state court's suppression ruling and the federal warrant application was too attenuated to obligate the attorneys to explore the possibility of bad faith. The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief.

United States v. Gay

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2097

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Anthony Gay, a convicted felon, who was found guilty of possessing firearms and ammunition, both of which he was prohibited from possessing due to his prior felony convictions. Gay was a passenger in a car that was stopped by the police, and upon being pursued, he fled on foot. The police testified that they found a gun where Gay had fallen and later discovered bullets in a motel room he had rented. Gay was subsequently indicted and convicted on one firearms count and one ammunition count, leading to a sentence of 84 months' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, plus three years' supervised release.

Previously, Gay had contested the admissibility of the bullets found in the motel room, arguing that their discovery violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the district court denied his motion to suppress the bullets, stating that Gay's right to occupy the room had expired, the motel manager had found the bullets before the police were involved, and the manager had the right to admit the police under state law. Furthermore, the court noted that Gay, being on parole, had a diminished expectation of privacy.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Gay argued that the evidence did not support his conviction on the firearms charge, suggesting that the weapon may have been planted. However, the court found that the evidence, including the bullets found in the motel room, supported the firearms charge. The court also dismissed Gay's argument that the reduction of two weeks in preparation time for his second trial was prejudicial, stating that the parties had just been through a trial and the evidence had been assembled.

Gay also contended that the prosecution was unconstitutional, arguing that the Second Amendment permits persons with felony convictions to possess firearms and ammunition. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, citing precedents that upheld the validity of "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons." The court concluded that Gay, having been convicted of 22 felonies and being on parole, did not fit the description of a "law-abiding, responsible citizen" who has a constitutional right to possess firearms.

USA v. Aron

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2364

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Rovner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Bryant D. Aron was indicted by a grand jury for possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Initially, Aron agreed to plead guilty under a binding plea agreement, which recommended a sentence of 96 months' imprisonment. However, the district court refused to accept this sentencing recommendation. As the plea agreement was binding, Aron was given the option to withdraw his guilty plea, which he did. Instead of negotiating a different plea agreement, Aron chose to proceed to trial. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 months' imprisonment.

The district court's refusal to accept the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement led to Aron's decision to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. After his conviction and sentencing, Aron appealed, raising several challenges to the indictment and the plea and sentencing process. He argued that the indictment failed to include a known and necessary element, that he had good cause for not raising this objection in the district court, and that the deficiency in the indictment was either structural error or met the plain error standard.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Aron's arguments. The court found that the indictment was not defective and that Aron had failed to raise his objection in a timely manner. The court also found that Aron had not demonstrated good cause for his failure to raise the objection pretrial. Therefore, the court did not conduct a plain error review of his claim.

Aron also challenged the district court's rejection of his binding plea agreement. He argued that the court had improperly inserted itself into the plea negotiation process, failed to provide a sound reason for rejecting the plea agreement, and did not provide enough notice of its rejection of the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments as well, affirming the decision of the district court.

USA v. Campbell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1564

Opinion Date: April 24, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves William Campbell, who, along with his cousin, burglarized an Indiana home and stole over 25 firearms. They sold these firearms to another person. Law enforcement was able to recover eight of the stolen firearms, but the rest remain unaccounted for. Campbell was indicted for possessing the eight recovered firearms as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment by the district court. The court, in its explanation for the sentence, remarked that the missing guns were likely in the hands of other felons, as they are the people who buy stolen guns.

The district court adopted the presentence investigation report, which calculated an adjusted offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of III, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 108 to 120 months’ imprisonment. The court, however, decided to sentence Campbell to a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment. The court explained its sentence with reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, discussing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of Campbell’s case.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Campbell argued that the district court's statement about the missing guns being likely in the hands of other felons amounted to impermissible speculation, requiring the sentence to be vacated. The appellate court, however, disagreed. It reviewed the procedural challenge de novo and found that the district court did not rely on speculative or inaccurate information in imposing the sentence. The court's concern was that the firearms are now unaccounted for, somewhere in the public, where authorities cannot track their owners and whereabouts. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

USA v. Craft

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3015

Opinion Date: April 22, 2024

Judge: LEE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In October 2019, Randall Craft pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute over fifty grams of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 150 months in prison and five years of supervised release. The district court applied two sentencing enhancements: one for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, and another for Craft's role as a manager or supervisor of the scheme.

The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court erred in applying the premises enhancement, as the record did not support the conclusion that Craft used his home for the primary or principal purpose of manufacturing or distributing drugs. However, the court agreed with the district court's application of the two-level role enhancement, given Craft’s extensive role in the conspiracy.

Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated Craft’s sentence and remanded his case to the district court for resentencing, taking into account the appellate court's findings regarding the two sentencing enhancements.

USA v. David Perez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3282

Opinion Date: April 24, 2024

Judge: Hamilton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

David Perez, while on federal supervised release, was recorded by a police surveillance camera holding what appeared to be a firearm. His conditions of release, as well as federal law, prohibited him from possessing a firearm. At a revocation hearing, the government presented the surveillance video as evidence. The district judge asked Perez's probation officer to narrate the video, to which Perez objected and requested to cross-examine her. The district court denied this request, asserting that the probation officer was not a witness and that the narration was only for the hearing transcript. Perez's counsel did not take up the judge's offer to suggest questions for the probation officer.

Perez appealed, arguing that the probation officer was effectively an adverse witness and that his rights were violated by the refusal to allow cross-examination. He also contested the district court's finding that he possessed a firearm and the subsequent revocation of his supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that Perez should have been allowed to cross-examine the probation officer. However, the court found this error to be harmless, as the district court did not rely on the probation officer's testimony in its finding that Perez possessed a firearm. The video provided ample evidence of Perez's possession of a firearm, and the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his supervised release. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

USA v. Ostrum

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1364

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Dylan Ostrum, who was under investigation for drug dealing and possession of firearms. During a search of his home, Ostrum revealed that he had moved his belongings, including his car, to his father's house. However, the car, which was reported stolen by a rental company, was found nearby with Ostrum's belongings inside, including a gun, methamphetamine, and marijuana, all stashed in two safes. The key issues on appeal were whether Ostrum had standing to challenge the search of the stolen car and whether the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The investigation into Ostrum began after law enforcement agents found text messages between him and another individual, Ricky Blythe, showing that they repeatedly sold each other methamphetamine and marijuana. Based on this evidence and information from confidential informants, law enforcement obtained a valid warrant to search Ostrum’s residence. However, the search turned up little, and Ostrum informed the officers that he had moved his belongings to his father's house. The officers later located the car, which was reported stolen, and discovered the safes inside.

Ostrum was charged with multiple counts related to drug possession and distribution, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence found inside the car, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied the motion, finding that Ostrum lacked standing to challenge the search because the car was stolen, and that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Ostrum was convicted on all counts and received a 240-month sentence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Ostrum failed to meet his burden on standing and that the existence of probable cause justified the search under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The court concluded that Ostrum had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car or its contents, and thus no standing to object to its search.

Washington v. City of Chicago

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2467

Opinion Date: April 15, 2024

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves plaintiffs Tabatha Washington and Donte Howard who were charged with first-degree murder. They were detained for over a year before being acquitted. They then filed a suit against the City of Chicago and three police detectives, alleging unlawful pretrial detention under the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution under Illinois law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Previously, the Circuit Court of Cook County had found probable cause to detain both plaintiffs without bail. A few weeks later, a grand jury indicted them on charges of first-degree murder, including a felony-murder theory premised on felony mob action. The plaintiffs argued that the detectives deliberately misled judges and the grand jury to secure these determinations of probable cause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that even if the detectives' alleged misrepresentations and omissions were accepted as true, the prosecutors' independent fact-gathering and the remaining undisputed evidence still supported probable cause to detain the plaintiffs. Therefore, the judicial determinations of probable cause were presumed to be valid, and the pretrial detention of the plaintiffs did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims failed for the same reason.

United States v. Tyrone Cameron

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2839

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tyrone Cameron was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition following a three-day trial. The district court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Cameron appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, that his conviction violated the Second Amendment, that the district court should not have admitted his prior felony convictions involving firearms into evidence, and that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.

The district court had reviewed the evidence, including surveillance footage and testimonies, and found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Cameron's conviction. The court also admitted Cameron's prior felony convictions into evidence, which were relevant to show that Cameron knew he was a felon and knowingly possessed ammunition.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that a reasonable jury could have found there existed ample circumstantial evidence to support Cameron’s conviction. The court also rejected Cameron's Second Amendment challenge, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen did not cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. The court found no error in the district court's admission of Cameron's prior felony convictions, as they were relevant to the case and not unfairly prejudicial. Lastly, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct, as the government's remarks during closing arguments were permissible interpretations of the evidence.

United States v. Veasley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1114

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Stras

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Devonte Veasley was charged with possessing a firearm while using a controlled substance, following an incident where he shot at his drug dealer. Veasley pleaded guilty to the charge. However, after the Supreme Court ruled in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen that a New York law requiring "proper cause" to carry a firearm violated the Second Amendment, Veasley sought to withdraw his plea or have the indictment dismissed. He argued that the federal statute under which he was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by someone using or addicted to a controlled substance, was facially unconstitutional. The district court did not allow him to withdraw his plea or dismiss the indictment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected Veasley's facial challenge to the statute. The court reasoned that the prohibition of firearm possession by drug users or addicts does not always violate the Second Amendment. The court drew analogies to historical regulations that restricted the rights of certain groups, such as the mentally ill and those who used firearms to terrorize others, to bear arms. The court concluded that, at least for some drug users, the statute imposes a comparable burden on the right to bear arms and serves a comparable justification. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

FEJES V. FAA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-70129

Opinion Date: April 22, 2024

Judge: NELSON

Areas of Law: Aviation, Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Transportation Law

The case involves James Fejes, a pilot who held a certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 49 U.S.C. § 44703. Fejes used his aircraft to transport and distribute marijuana to retail stores within Alaska, an activity that is legal under state law but illegal under federal law. After an investigation, the FAA revoked Fejes's pilot certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(2), which mandates revocation when a pilot knowingly uses an aircraft for an activity punishable by more than a year's imprisonment under a federal or state controlled substance law.

Fejes appealed the FAA's decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the revocation. He then appealed the ALJ's decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also affirmed the ALJ. Throughout the agency proceedings, Fejes admitted that he piloted an aircraft to distribute marijuana within Alaska, but argued that his conduct fell outside of § 44710(b)(2)'s reach.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Fejes's petition for review of the NTSB's order affirming the FAA's revocation of his pilot certificate. The court rejected Fejes's argument that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to revoke his pilot certificate because Congress cannot authorize an administrative agency to regulate purely intrastate commerce like marijuana delivery within Alaska. The court held that airspace is a channel of commerce squarely within congressional authority, and therefore, Congress can regulate Fejes's conduct. The court also rejected Fejes's argument that his conduct was exempt under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. § 91.19, and that the FAA misinterpreted § 44710(b)(2). The court concluded that the FAA's revocation of Fejes's pilot certificate was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

United States V. Blackshire

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-10230

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Andrew David Hurwitz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lawrence Blackshire was convicted of various offenses arising from an assault on his girlfriend, C.S. After the government was unable to locate C.S. to testify at trial, the district court admitted statements she gave to police officers and a nurse. The central issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in finding that Blackshire forfeited his right to confront C.S. by causing her unavailability.

The district court found that Blackshire intentionally caused C.S.'s unavailability, based on recorded conversations where Blackshire discussed making "peace" with C.S. and telling her she could not be compelled to testify. Blackshire argued that the government failed to prove his conduct caused C.S.'s absence and that there was no wrongdoing because the recordings showed only that he made peace with C.S.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that Blackshire forfeited his right to confront C.S. by causing her unavailability and in admitting C.S.'s out-of-court statements. The court rejected Blackshire's arguments, holding that circumstantial evidence supports the inference that Blackshire caused C.S.'s absence. The court also held that Blackshire's past domestic violence against C.S. is relevant to determining whether Blackshire's actions were wrongful. Against the backdrop of past abuse, Blackshire's recorded statements can reasonably be interpreted as evidencing efforts to coerce, unduly influence, or pressure C.S. into not showing up in court.

United States v. Medina-Luna

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-705

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: Graber

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Genaro Medina-Luna, a Mexican national, was charged with attempted reentry by a removed noncitizen, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, after he was found concealed in the trunk of a car at the Otay Mesa, California Port of Entry. Medina-Luna had been previously removed from the United States five times between 2006 and 2022. He waived his right to a grand jury indictment and pleaded guilty unconditionally. The district court sentenced him to 41 months of imprisonment, a downward variance from the Guideline range of 63–78 months, considering his sincere family reasons for reentry and overcoming methamphetamine addiction.

Medina-Luna appealed his sentence, raising two issues: the validity of his waiver of the right to a grand jury indictment and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Medina-Luna waived his right to appeal the validity of his waiver of indictment by entering an unconditional guilty plea. The court overruled a previous decision, United States v. Travis, which characterized any defect in the waiver of indictment as jurisdictional, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cotton, which held that defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of jurisdiction.

Regarding the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, the court found no abuse of discretion. The district court had considered the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), acknowledged Medina-Luna's sincere family reasons for reentry, and his overcoming of methamphetamine addiction. The court affirmed the 41-month sentence, which was the sentence Medina-Luna himself had requested. The appeal was dismissed in part and affirmed in part.

United States V. Ramirez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50045

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Victor Ramirez, who was pulled over by police officers for traffic violations. Recognizing Ramirez as a gang member from a previous encounter, one of the officers asked him about his parole status. Ramirez confirmed he was on parole for a firearm-related offense. During the stop, the officers discovered a loaded firearm in Ramirez's car. Ramirez was subsequently indicted for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon.

Ramirez moved to suppress the gun and ammunition, arguing that the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop by asking about his parole status, which he claimed was unrelated to the traffic stop. The district court denied Ramirez's motion to suppress, and Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that asking about parole status during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as it reasonably relates to the officer's safety and imposes a negligible burden. The court also remanded the case in part so that the district court could correct the written judgment to conform it to the oral pronouncement of sentence.

USA V. MIRABAL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50217

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: THOMAS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Gabriel Mirabal, a prisoner at a federal correctional institution in Victorville, California, who was convicted of two counts of assaulting a federal officer resulting in bodily injury. The incident occurred when Mirabal and another inmate, Erik Rojo, passed through metal detectors after lunch. A dispute arose over which inmate wore a white shirt and which wore a brown shirt, as the color of the shirt was linked to the initiation of the assault. The government consistently portrayed Mirabal as the person in the white shirt, while Mirabal maintained that he was clad in brown. Mirabal's defense was predicated upon the theory that he acted in self-defense, a theory that was practically unavailable to the white-shirted individual who joined the fight after it started.

In the lower courts, the government filed a motion in limine to exclude the original factual basis under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 802. The district court granted the government’s motion, reasoning that the original factual basis constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court held that Rule 801(d)(1)(A)’s hearsay exclusion for prior inconsistent statements did not apply to the original factual basis because Rojo was not called to testify at Mirabal’s trial. And it reasoned that Rule 801(d)(2)’s hearsay exclusion for an admission of a party opponent did not apply to the “opinion” of a prosecutor.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the sworn statement of a government attorney as hearsay at Mirabal’s trial. The court stated that in a criminal case, the sworn statement of a government attorney in a plea agreement or sentencing memorandum is a party admission, excluded from the definition of hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). The court further held that the error was not harmless. As a result, Mirabal’s conviction was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

USA V. PAYNE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50262

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Tallman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jeremy Travis Payne, a California parolee, was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and cocaine. The charges stemmed from evidence obtained from a house in Palm Desert, California, and from Payne's cell phone, which was unlocked by police using Payne's thumbprint during a traffic stop. Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search of his phone and the house violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

The district court denied Payne's motion. It found that the search of Payne's phone was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given Payne's parole status and the conditions of his parole, which allowed for suspicionless searches of his property. The court also determined that the use of Payne's thumbprint to unlock his phone was not testimonial and therefore did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the search of Payne's phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It found that the search was authorized under a general search condition of Payne's parole, which allowed for the suspicionless search of any property under Payne's control. The court also held that the search of Payne's phone was not unreasonable under California law, which prohibits arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches.

Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that the use of Payne's thumbprint to unlock his phone was not testimonial because it required no cognitive exertion. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment did not apply.

Finally, the court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for the house in Palm Desert, California, without regard to observations made during a challenged protective sweep of the house.

United States v. Burgess

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7033

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Kendall Len Burgess, who was convicted for aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact involving a seven-year-old victim, P.G. The primary issue was whether the district court erred in admitting a fifty-minute video recording of a forensic interview with P.G., conducted three days after the last incident of alleged sexual abuse. The interview was admitted under the residual exception to the rule against hearsay, after P.G., then aged nine, testified inconsistently at trial about the acts committed by Burgess.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma had convicted Burgess based on the evidence presented, including the video recording. The court found that P.G.’s statements during the recorded interview were trustworthy and more probative than any other evidence that could be obtained through reasonable efforts.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded interview. The court also rejected Burgess's other arguments, including allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and cumulative error. The court held that the prosecutor's questions and closing argument did not warrant reversing Burgess's convictions. Therefore, the court affirmed both of Burgess's convictions.

United States v. Flechs

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5088

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In January 2021, John William Thomas Flechs, using the pseudonym “John Breezy,” began conversations on the Kik online messaging platform with someone he believed to be a 14-year-old boy. In fact, Flechs was messaging Sergeant John Haning, a member of the Rogers County, Oklahoma Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. Over the next four days, Flechs and the minor discussed sexual topics in graphic detail. After they discussed meeting in person, Flechs asked the minor if he would be going to the skatepark. When Flechs arrived at the skatepark, he handed two Dr. Pepper sodas to an officer posing as the minor. Officers then arrested him.

A grand jury indicted Flechs for attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). A petit jury returned a guilty verdict. The district court sentenced Flechs to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. Flechs timely appealed.

On appeal, Flechs argued that the trial evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to entice the minor or took a substantial step toward enticement. He also argued that the jury instruction on the term “grooming” violated Federal Rule of Evidence 605, contained an unconstitutional presumption on the element of intent, and misstated the law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Flechs of attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The court also held that the jury instruction on the term “grooming” did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 605, did not contain an unconstitutional presumption on the element of intent, and did not misstate the law.

United States v. Benton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3028

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Henderson

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Election Law, Securities Law

In 2016, Jesse Benton, a political operative, received funds from Roman Vasilenko, a foreign national, and contributed those funds to a fundraiser supporting then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump. Benton was subsequently convicted of six felonies related to the unlawful contribution and related campaign finance filings. Benton appealed his conviction on several grounds, including challenges to the government’s decision to prosecute campaign finance crimes under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the admissibility of an earlier pardoned conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury charge.

The District Court denied Benton's motion to dismiss the charges, ruling that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be applied to false campaign finance filings. The court also allowed the admission of Benton's earlier pardoned conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its use at sentencing. After a three-day jury trial, Benton was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and twenty-four months' supervised release.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government had discretion to prosecute under either the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The court also found no error in the district court's admission of Benton's pardoned conviction under Rule 404(b) and declined to review Benton's challenge to the use of the pardoned conviction at sentencing. Finally, the court rejected Benton's challenges to the jury instructions, finding that any error was invited by Benton himself.

United States v. Denney

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3084

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: CHILDS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Lucas Denney, a former U.S. Army specialist and president of a Texas-based militia, who was arrested and indicted for assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon during the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol. Denney pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifty-two months in prison. The district court applied a two-level enhancement for "more than minimal planning" and a four-level enhancement for use of "a dangerous weapon" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

Prior to the appeal, Denney had been found guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. He challenged the application of the two enhancements in his sentence, arguing that his planning was for a political protest, not an assault, and that he did not intend to cause bodily harm with the weapon.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found ample evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that Denney had engaged in more than minimal planning for violent altercations with law enforcement officers. The court also found that Denney had admitted in open court to intentionally and forcibly hitting an officer with a PVC pipe, which was considered a dangerous weapon. The court concluded that the enhancements were correctly applied, and Denney's sentence was upheld.

United States v. Holroyd

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 20-3083

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Henderson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Wayne Holroyd, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine. After his plea but before his sentencing, Congress amended the "safety valve" provision of the statute used to compute Holroyd's sentence, expanding the eligibility of a drug offender to be sentenced without regard to the statutory mandatory minimum. However, the district court sentenced Holroyd to the statutory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment. Holroyd argued that his counsel should have contended that he was eligible for sentencing without regard to the statutory minimum under the recently revised safety valve provision.

The district court sentenced Holroyd to the mandatory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment. Holroyd's counsel did not move for reconsideration. Holroyd contended that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in representing him at sentencing because counsel failed to give the correct interpretation to the safety valve provision. He argued that his two past convictions did not exclude him from the safety valve under the provision because the word "and" between subparagraphs must be read conjunctively so that only a defendant who has convictions satisfying all subparagraphs cumulatively is ineligible.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. The court held that Holroyd's counsel's decision not to argue at sentencing or to move for reconsideration on the basis of Holroyd's eligibility for the safety valve was not deficient representation. The court noted that the Supreme Court recently adopted a different construction of the safety valve provision, which held that a defendant satisfies the criminal-history requirement only when he does not meet any of the disqualifying criteria. As Holroyd had a 6-point criminal history based on two previous 3-point offenses, he did not satisfy the criteria and was therefore ineligible for the safety valve.

USA v. Evans

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3024

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: GINSBURG

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Deangelo Evans, a passenger in a car pulled over for traffic violations, was subjected to a pat-down search by the United States Park Police officers during the stop. The search revealed a firearm in his waistband, leading to his arrest and subsequent charge for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Evans moved to suppress the firearm as evidence, arguing that it was obtained through an unlawful search. The district court denied his motion, ruling that the pat-down search was justified due to the bulge in his pants that the officers believed might be a gun.

The case was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where Evans was convicted following a stipulated trial. He preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearm as evidence.

The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court reviewed the district court's findings of fact for clear error. The sole issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in crediting the police officers' testimony that they initiated a Terry frisk only after they saw a bulge in Mr. Evans’s pants that they believed might be a gun. Evans argued that the officers' testimony was inconsistent and implausible. However, the appellate court found that the inconsistencies Evans identified were not so glaring that the police officers' testimony must be a fabrication. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that the protective pat-down search was justified and the firearm was admissible as evidence.

State v. Grubb

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Citations: 268 P.3d 293, 357 P.3d 789, 491 P.3d 1088

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: PATE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

Brennan Grubb was convicted of sexually abusing a minor, which resulted in severe emotional trauma for the young boy. The boy's mother, a teacher, resigned from her job to care for her son. Grubb pleaded guilty to the charges and was ordered by the superior court to pay restitution, including compensation for the mother's future lost wages and benefits. Grubb appealed the restitution order, arguing that his criminal conduct was not the proximate cause of the mother's future lost wages and benefits. The court of appeals agreed with Grubb and vacated the restitution order.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that the mother's resignation from her teaching position was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Grubb's criminal conduct. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that the legislature has steadily expanded the rights of crime victims to obtain restitution and that the statutory right to restitution must factor into the proximate cause analysis. The court also noted that the statutory definition of "victim" necessarily affects the proximate cause analysis. The court concluded that it was error to hold as a matter of law that Grubb's conduct could not be the proximate cause of the mother's future lost wages and benefits.

CULLEN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 60

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2018, John Patrick Cullen pleaded nolo contendere to second-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to seventy-two months' imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction or sentence. In 2021 and 2022, Cullen filed petitions for writ of error coram nobis and writ of habeas corpus in the Garland County Circuit Court, alleging his innocence based on new evidence. This evidence included statements from the victim, Kathi Brinkley, which Cullen claimed contained factual errors, and an admission from a second individual, Kati Knight, that she did not witness the assault. Cullen also argued that the affidavit supporting his arrest contained fabrications by Brinkley.

The Garland County Circuit Court denied Cullen's petitions, finding that he had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and had not asserted any grounds for which he could successfully pursue these claims. Cullen appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Cullen's claim of actual innocence was not cognizable under current law and that his allegations regarding Knight's admissions had been abandoned on appeal. Therefore, the court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cullen's petition for writ of error coram nobis. Regarding the writ of habeas corpus, the court found that Cullen had failed to state a colorable claim under the relevant statute and had not alleged that his sentence was illegal or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court concluded that the lower court did not have personal jurisdiction to issue a writ even if Cullen had stated a legitimate ground for relief, as his second habeas petition was not filed in the correct jurisdiction.

ECHOLS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 61

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Damien Echols, one of the "West Memphis Three," who was convicted for the murder of three eight-year-old boys in 1993. Echols, along with Jason Baldwin and Jessie Misskelley, were found guilty, with Echols receiving a death sentence. In 2011, Echols entered an Alford plea, maintaining his innocence but acknowledging the prosecution's evidence, and was released from prison. Echols sought further DNA testing of the evidence using new technology, arguing that it could potentially identify the true perpetrator(s) of the crime.

Previously, the Crittenden County Circuit Court denied Echols's petition for additional DNA testing under Act 1780, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction as Echols was not in State custody. The court interpreted Act 1780 as a form of habeas corpus relief, traditionally available only to those in State custody. Echols appealed this decision, arguing that the plain language of Act 1780 allows any person convicted of a crime to petition for additional DNA testing to demonstrate actual innocence, regardless of their custody status.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. The court found that the plain language of Act 1780 unambiguously permits "a person convicted of a crime" to petition for additional DNA testing to demonstrate actual innocence. The court held that the lower court had misinterpreted the plain language of Act 1780 by imposing a requirement that a petitioner must be in State custody to seek relief under the Act. The court concluded that Echols, as a person convicted of a crime, was entitled to seek relief under Act 1780, regardless of his custody status.

P. v. Reynoza

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S273797

Opinion Date: April 22, 2024

Judge: Guerrero

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of California was asked to interpret a witness dissuasion statute, Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2), in a case involving defendant Raymond Gregory Reynoza. Reynoza was found guilty of violating this statute based on actions that occurred after the complaint in the underlying criminal case had been filed. The court had to determine whether the statute applies where a defendant dissuades a witness from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case after the charging document has already been filed, or whether a conjunctive interpretation precludes a conviction under such circumstances.

The lower courts had disagreed on the interpretation of the statute. The Court of Appeal held that section 136.1(b)(2) requires proof that the defendant attempted to prevent or dissuade another person from causing an accusatory pleading to be filed. If the defendant was aware the relevant charging document had already been filed, and the defendant did not attempt to prevent or dissuade the filing of any amended or subsequent charging document, the defendant has not violated section 136.1(b)(2).

The Supreme Court of California found that the statute is equally susceptible to both the conjunctive and disjunctive constructions. Therefore, the rule of lenity counsels in favor of adopting the “interpretation more favorable to the defendant.” Here, that is the conjunctive construction, which does not permit a conviction to be based solely on proof of dissuasion from “assisting in the prosecution” of an already-filed charging document. Because there is no dispute that Reynoza’s conduct amounted to, at most, dissuasion after a complaint was filed, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing his conviction.

Mosley v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C099530(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: RENNER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Jameal M. Mosley, who was charged with unauthorized possession and transportation of a machine gun, being a felon in possession of a firearm for the benefit of a street gang, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. These charges stemmed from warrantless searches of Mosley's car and person, which yielded a loaded magazine and a Glock handgun with an automatic switch. Mosley filed a motion to suppress the magazine and handgun, arguing that the searches were unsupported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

The trial court held a suppression hearing. The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department had received a call about a group of men creating a music video in a parking lot, with one of them holding a handgun. The officers arrived at the scene and detained all members of the group, including Mosley. They found a firearm on one of the men, D.M., and another firearm in D.M.'s car. Mosley was detained for approximately 41 minutes before his car was searched, revealing a loaded magazine. A subsequent search of Mosley's person revealed a Glock handgun with a switch. The trial court denied Mosley's motion to suppress, finding that the officers had probable cause to search Mosley's car and that the detention was not prolonged.

Mosley filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District. The appellate court agreed with Mosley's argument that the trial court erred in finding the warrantless searches were supported by probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to search Mosley's car and that the detention was unlawfully prolonged. The court granted Mosley's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Mosley's motion to suppress and enter a new order granting the motion.

P. v. Basica

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166580(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 22, 2024

Judge: SMILEY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around a bail bond forfeiture involving Florian Basica, who was charged with second-degree robbery. The North River Insurance Company (the surety) and Bad Boys Bail Bonds (the bail agent) posted a $60,000 bond for Basica's release. However, Basica failed to appear for his preliminary hearing, leading to the forfeiture of the bond. The bail agent sought an extension of the exoneration period, which was granted twice by the trial court. The appellants later filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail bond, arguing that the trial court did not declare the forfeiture in a timely manner.

The trial court denied the appellants' motion and entered summary judgment against the surety. The appellants argued that the entry of summary judgment was premature and an act in excess of jurisdiction, citing dicta from People v. Granite State Insurance Co. They contended that the court's power to enter summary judgment begins on the day following the denial of the motion.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with the appellants' argument. It found that the trial court had the authority to enter summary judgment when the bond is forfeited and the period specified in section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture being set aside. In this case, the bond had been forfeited, and the exoneration period had elapsed without the forfeiture being set aside by the time the trial court entered summary judgment. Therefore, the court acted within its jurisdiction in entering summary judgment. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

P. v. Beaudreaux

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166001M(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Streeter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Nicholas Beaudreaux, serving a 50-year-to-life sentence for the first-degree murder and attempted robbery of Wayne Drummond, twice petitioned unsuccessfully for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. In the resentencing proceedings on his second petition, the trial court ruled that the order denying relief on his first petition, an order affirmed in 2020, foreclosed relief. Beaudreaux appealed again, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, which clarified the procedural law governing section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings.

Previously, Beaudreaux and a co-defendant, Brandon Crowder, were charged with the same two counts: murdering Drummond and attempting to rob Drummond. However, only Beaudreaux was charged with personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death to Drummond. A jury trial followed, and Crowder changed his plea from not guilty to no contest to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The jury found Beaudreaux guilty of first-degree murder and attempted robbery of Drummond, and found the sentencing enhancement allegations against him to be true.

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, the court agreed with Beaudreaux that the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by once again failing to appoint counsel, and by relying on substantive facts summarized in this court’s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. However, the court concluded that these errors were harmless. The dispositive question was whether, based on the record of conviction, Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond’s actual killer. The court concluded that the record was sufficient to refute conclusively Beaudreaux’s attempt to allege entitlement to section 1172.6 relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.

P. v. Gray

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085699M(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Snauffer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2016, Shawn Vincent Gray was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) for one count of stalking and two counts of making criminal threats. He also admitted to a prior strike allegation and six one-year prior prison commitment allegations. As part of his plea agreement, Gray acknowledged that an NGI verdict would mean that he would be committed to the Department of Mental Health for a maximum term of 19 years and four months. In 2023, Gray filed a petition to recall his maximum commitment time and strike the legally invalid enhancement, citing Senate Bill No. 483 (SB 483) and Penal Code section 1172.75. The Kern County Superior Court granted the petition, recalculating Gray's maximum commitment term to 13 years and four months.

The People appealed the superior court's decision, arguing that the court erred by recalculating Gray's maximum term of commitment. They claimed that the legislative changes that eliminated most section 667.5(b) sentencing enhancements did not retroactively apply to Gray's 2016 maximum term of commitment and that because Gray continued to be a threat to public safety, any reduced commitment recalculation was erroneous.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District found that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and consider Gray's petition in the first instance and its subsequent orders were void. The court concluded that the People's appeal was statutorily authorized and that it had appellate jurisdiction. However, it also found that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and consider Gray's petition in the first instance and its subsequent orders were void. The court reversed and vacated the superior court's orders recalling the 2016 judgment and recalculating Gray's maximum term of commitment. The court ordered the superior court to instead enter a new and different order denying Gray's petition in its entirety.

P. v. Lezama

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062075(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 22, 2024

Judge: Delaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The defendant, Noe Lezama, was initially charged with murder but later entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the timing and factual basis of his plea should not preclude him from being eligible for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied his petition, concluding that legislative history confirmed that those who pled guilty to manslaughter after statutory amendments eliminated imputed malice theories of murder liability are not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

Previously, the trial court had sentenced Lezama to a total of 13 years in prison for voluntary manslaughter and a gang enhancement. The prosecution had initially charged Lezama and another individual with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, alleging that they had killed a man with malice aforethought. However, in 2019, the prosecution and Lezama reached a plea agreement, and the original information was amended to add a count of voluntary manslaughter and modify a criminal street gang enhancement.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the statutory language and defendant’s record of conviction confirmed that Lezama was not eligible for resentencing. The court noted that Senate Bill 1437, which took effect in 2019, amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. However, the court concluded that this did not apply to Lezama, who pled guilty to manslaughter after such theories had been eliminated by Senate Bill 1437.

People v. Barooshian

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081050(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: HUFFMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Adam Daniel Barooshian, who was convicted of murder under a Watson murder theory in his second trial. The Watson murder theory refers to a situation where a person who kills another while driving under the influence of alcohol may be charged with second-degree murder if the circumstances support a finding of implied malice. In Barooshian’s first trial, the jury did not reach a verdict on a murder charge but convicted him of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated among other offenses.

Barooshian argued that his second trial violated double jeopardy principles because gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated should be considered a necessarily included (or lesser included) offense of a Watson murder. However, the court noted that under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all the elements of the lesser offense.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The court held that gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of murder. The court also rejected Barooshian's argument that his second trial violated double jeopardy principles. The court concluded that Barooshian had not persuaded them to create a new test to apply to his second trial.

People v. Carrillo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F084751M(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: FRANSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The case involves Francisco Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of assault with a firearm in 2002 and sentenced to 301 days in jail. In 2007, Carrillo admitted to a probation violation and was sentenced to an additional 90 days in jail. The combined jail time exceeded one year, making his conviction an aggravated felony under immigration law and subjecting him to mandatory deportation.

In 2022, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Carrillo had not demonstrated that his lack of understanding prejudiced his decision to go to trial or his defense strategy.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that Carrillo had not shown a reasonable probability that he would have done something differently, such as pursuing an immigration-safe plea or presenting different arguments at sentencing, had he understood the immigration consequences. However, the court modified the trial court's order to allow Carrillo to file a new motion addressing grounds not raised in his original motion.

People v. Cunningham

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323640(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: YEGAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Robert Wayne Cunningham, was convicted of provocative act murder and other offenses related to a 1995 shootout with the police. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, along with consecutive determinate sentences. The incident occurred when Cunningham and his accomplice, Soley, were under police surveillance due to suspicion of committing a series of armed robberies. The police followed them to a liquor store, where they committed a robbery. The police blocked their car, leading to a shootout initiated by Cunningham, which resulted in Soley's death and injuries to Cunningham and at least one police officer.

Cunningham sought sentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 but was unsuccessful. He appealed, arguing that provocative murder is based on the imputation of malice, which he claimed is now barred by the newly enacted Penal Code section 188, subdivision (a)(3). He also contended that the prosecutor's argument that he started the gun battle was equivalent to arguing the now discarded "natural and probable consequences" doctrine.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with Cunningham's arguments. The court noted that provocative act murder has been a part of California law since the 1960s and that the legislature's failure to mention it in the new statute indicates it did not intend to discard this theory. The court also stated that the prosecutor's argument did not preclude the statute and that the jury's verdict was informed by the instructions given. The court cited a recent case, People v. Antonelli, where it held that the provocative murder doctrine survived recent legislative enactments. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, denying Cunningham's sentencing relief.

People v. Estrada

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324576(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: VIRAMONTES

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Hildo Ocampo Estrada, who was convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter. The charges stemmed from an incident where Estrada and others were involved in a fight with another group, which resulted in the death of Martin Corio and the severe injury of Carlos Zuniga Flores. Estrada was charged with murder and attempted murder, but he pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder, admitting to the use of a deadly weapon and causing great bodily injury. He was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 15 years and 4 months.

Estrada later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61, arguing that the record of conviction did not establish that he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The prosecution opposed the petition, asserting that Estrada was ineligible for relief because he was the actual killer. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied his petition at the prima facie stage, concluding that Estrada was the actual killer. Estrada appealed this decision.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the case. The court found that the record of conviction did not conclusively establish that Estrada was the actual killer or that he acted with intent to kill or actual malice. The court concluded that the lower court erred in denying Estrada's petition at the prima facie stage without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to issue an order to show cause under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and to hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1).

People v. Flores

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D083310(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 15, 2024

Judge: Buchanan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The case involves Manuel Dejesus Flores, who was convicted of four counts of lewd and lascivious acts committed against two victims under 14 years old. The victims, sisters B.C. and Y.G., lived with Flores in their family apartment between 2006 and 2008. Both victims testified that Flores had touched them inappropriately multiple times. B.C. disclosed the abuse to her friends in 2016, which was reported to Child Protective Services. The trial court admitted B.C.'s disclosure statements under the "fresh complaint" doctrine, despite the significant delay in reporting the abuse.

The trial court also admitted expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), which explains common behaviors and reactions of child victims of sexual abuse. Flores was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in prison and denied any conduct credits. Flores appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting B.C.'s disclosure statements and the CSAAS expert testimony.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the trial court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. The court found no error in the trial court's admission of victim disclosure evidence and CSAAS expert testimony. However, it agreed with Flores that he was entitled to presentence conduct credits, and remanded the matter for the trial court to calculate and award these credits.

People v. Koontzy

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167703(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: SIMONS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Takeya Lashay Koontzy, pleaded no contest to fleeing the scene of an injury accident and was placed on probation with the condition that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to the victim's delay in providing documentation of her damages and failure to appear on multiple dates set for restitution hearings, the trial court did not determine the amount of restitution before the termination of Koontzy's probation. More than two years post-termination, the court ordered Koontzy to pay $86,306.12 in victim restitution. Koontzy argued that the trial court was without authority to modify the amount of restitution owed to the victim following the termination of probation.

The trial court had suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Koontzy on formal probation for three years, including that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to various delays, the amount was not determined until after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The prosecution sought a determination of restitution, and over Koontzy's objection, the trial court concluded it retained jurisdiction to modify the victim restitution order.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five agreed with Koontzy's argument. The court held that the trial court erred in modifying the restitution order after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The court reasoned that the restitution order in this case was not issued pursuant to section 1202.4, because the victim's damages were not due to Koontzy's criminal conduct. Therefore, modification of the restitution order after termination of probation could not be based on the express retention of jurisdiction in section 1202.46. The court concluded that the restitution order was a condition imposed under section 1203.1, and it was subject to the limitations in section 1203.3 permitting modification of probation conditions only during the term of probation. Accordingly, the trial court was without authority to modify the restitution order following termination of probation. The trial court's restitution order was reversed.

People v. Lewis

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E082085(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: MENETREZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Tyshawn Michael Lewis, a prisoner diagnosed with rapidly progressing amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), appealed the denial of a petition for his compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Lewis was serving a 75-year sentence for first-degree murder committed in 2020. In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended his release due to his deteriorating health condition. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that despite his physical condition, Lewis posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, based on his criminal history, the nature of his crime, and his alleged gang affiliations.

The trial court's decision was based on a diagnostic study and evaluation report that suggested Lewis retained the capacity to commit or influence others to commit criminal acts endangering public safety. The court also considered Lewis's criminal history, including his conviction for first-degree murder, his lack of remorse, and his alleged ongoing association with a violent criminal street gang.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Lewis's petition for compassionate release. The court concluded that the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that Lewis posed an unreasonable risk of committing a violent felony. The court noted that Lewis's mere capacity to commit a crime did not prove that he posed an unreasonable risk of doing so. The court also found that the evidence of Lewis's gang involvement was ambiguous and did not support the trial court's finding. The court reversed the trial court's order and directed it to grant the petition for compassionate release.

People v. Rafael B.D.R.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167246(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: TUCHER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Rafael B.D.R., was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison for committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 and sending or exhibiting harmful matter to a minor. The victim was his 11-year-old niece, Jane Doe. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that Jane's mother, Janeth, and the defendant's ex-wife, Elizabeth, had conspired to have Jane falsely accuse him of abuse.

The trial court had excluded testimony from two defense witnesses who would have testified that Janeth had asked them to lie about the defendant. The court found no clear nexus between these conversations and Jane's credibility. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of Jane and her older sister, Melissa. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges.

Before sentencing, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Elizabeth had sent an unsolicited email to the defense counsel, disclosing that she and Janeth had devised a plan to falsely accuse the defendant of abuse to get him deported. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the new evidence was not credible and would not likely lead to a different outcome at trial.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the new trial motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing to assess the new evidence. The court concluded that Elizabeth's declaration did constitute new evidence and that the trial court had failed to properly evaluate its credibility and force.

People v. Uriostegui

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B325200(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: BALTODANO

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Israel Marcial Uriostegui, who was convicted of first-degree residential burglary by a jury. Uriostegui appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his objection under section 231.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section aims to prevent the improper removal of jurors based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or membership in another protected group. Uriostegui's objection was based on the prosecutor's peremptory challenge against a prospective juror, T.N., who appeared to be Hispanic.

Previously, the trial court had asked T.N. for basic information during voir dire. T.N. disclosed her employment at Taco Bell, her current unemployment due to an injury, and her lack of prior jury service. She also revealed that two of her family members had been convicted of a crime, but she was not close to them. When the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against T.N., Uriostegui's counsel objected, arguing that the basis for excusing T.N. was presumptively invalid under section 231.7. The prosecutor justified the challenge by citing T.N.'s "lack of life experience," her unemployment, and her demeanor. The trial court denied Uriostegui's objection, finding no substantial likelihood that T.N.'s perceived membership in a protected class was a factor in the peremptory challenge.

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District, Uriostegui contended that the trial court erred in denying his objection under section 231.7. The court agreed with Uriostegui, stating that the prosecutor's reasons for excusing T.N. were presumptively invalid under section 231.7. The court found that the prosecutor's reasons and the trial court's findings did not overcome the presumption of invalidity. The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Uriostegui's objection under section 231.7. As a result, the judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.

People v. Montoya

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 20

Opinion Date: April 15, 2024

Judge: HOOD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Glen Gary Montoya, who was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI). After initially agreeing to a blood test, Montoya later refused. However, after the nurse left, he changed his mind and requested to take the test. The test was not conducted. At trial, the prosecution sought to use Montoya’s refusal as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Montoya was found guilty of DUI and careless driving.

The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that if a criminal court determines that a driver refused testing, that determination must be based on the law of refusal that has developed in the administrative, license-revocation context. The court also concluded that if the prosecutor seeks to use as evidence a defendant’s refusal of a chemical test, but the defendant disputes refusal, the entire circumstances surrounding the defendant’s test-taking must be submitted for the jury’s consideration. The court reversed Montoya’s DUI conviction and remanded for a new trial.

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the law of refusal. The Supreme Court held that criminal DUI trials are governed by the same evidentiary rules as any other criminal trial. Therefore, criminal courts are not bound by the law of refusal that governs administrative, license-revocation hearings. The court also concluded that the district court erred by admitting evidence of Montoya's refusal to submit to testing and excluding evidence of his subsequent request for testing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court, remanding the case for a new trial.

Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20703

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: Mullins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around a plaintiff who was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arresting officer prepared a report of the incident and mailed it to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), but not within the three business days required by statute. At the plaintiff's license suspension hearing, the plaintiff's attorney objected to the admission of the report on the grounds that it was not prepared and mailed within the statutory timeframe. The hearing officer overruled the objection and admitted the report, which was the only evidence submitted at the hearing.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that strict adherence to the preparation and mailing requirement was not necessary for the report to be admissible. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the preparation and mailing requirement is directory, and therefore, strict compliance with that requirement is not necessary for a report to be admissible at a license suspension hearing.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that the hearing officer abused her discretion in admitting an incident report that did not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing provision of the statute in the absence of testimony from the arresting officer. The court concluded that the preparation and mailing requirement was mandatory because it promoted the accuracy and reliability of the information that would be used at a license suspension hearing. The court clarified that the statute describes substantive requirements that incident reports must meet, and the failure to meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible insofar as it fails to satisfy the exception for the report to be admitted without the need to produce the arresting officer at the suspension hearing.

State v. Diaz

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20720

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: Ecker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Gonzalo Diaz, was convicted of felony murder, burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with a shooting death. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could consider his interest in the outcome of the trial when assessing his credibility. He also claimed that the prosecutor made improper remarks during his cross-examination and during rebuttal argument.

The Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury found Diaz guilty of felony murder, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, and attempt to commit robbery in the first degree. The court also found him guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. The court later vacated the conviction for manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm.

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court agreed that the trial court's instruction to the jury was erroneous, but it did not result in manifest injustice. The court also found that the prosecutor's remarks were not improper. The court concluded that the defendant failed to establish that the evidence adduced at trial, the disputed factual issues before the jury, and the instructions as a whole gave rise to the danger of juror misunderstanding or confusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

HENDERSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0092

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Gavin Henderson, who was convicted by a DeKalb County jury for malice murder, cruelty to children in the first degree, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. The charges were related to the fatal stabbing of his sister, Kiara Henderson. Henderson was indicted for these charges on September 11, 2018, and found guilty on all counts on July 9, 2021. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, among other sentences for the remaining charges. Henderson filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

The case was then brought to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Henderson argued that the trial court erred in admitting prior-acts evidence, failed to charge the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter, and committed cumulative errors that require reversal. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, found Henderson's claims of error to be without merit. The court affirmed the trial court's order denying Henderson's motion for a new trial. The court found that the evidence of Henderson's prior violent acts was admissible for purposes of proving his intent, and that there was no evidence to support giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The court also found that Henderson failed to demonstrate any trial court error that would warrant a new trial.

MILTON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S24A0068, S24A0069

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jarvis Lamont Milton and Richard Stroud, Jr. were indicted for several crimes, including murder, in relation to the shooting death of Frederick Cade. The case was tried before a jury, and Milton was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder charge and five years in prison for possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime. The other charges were either merged into the murder conviction or vacated. Milton filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

Milton appealed his convictions, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and the evidence presented at trial. The evidence included testimony from witnesses, including the victim's wife and Milton’s girlfriend, as well as physical evidence such as blood samples and a pendant found at the crime scene. The court also considered the conflicting testimonies given by Milton’s girlfriend during the investigation and at trial.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was constitutionally sufficient to support Milton’s convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court stated that even if the jury had concluded that Stroud was the shooter, the evidence was sufficient to find Milton guilty as a party to the crime. The court noted that the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses and resolve any discrepancies in the evidence presented at trial.

STROUD v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S24A0068, S24A0069

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Richard Stroud Jr. was convicted of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in relation to the shooting death of Frederick Cade. Stroud and Jarvis Lamont Milton were indicted on multiple charges, including violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated assault, possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime, and aggravated assault. After Milton's case was severed, Stroud was tried before a jury and was acquitted on the malice murder charge but found guilty on the remaining charges. Stroud was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for the felony murder charge and five years in prison for the firearm possession charge, to run consecutively.

Stroud filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed his convictions, arguing that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Stroud's convictions. The court found that the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, was sufficient to support Stroud's convictions for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court concluded that even if the jury believed that Milton, and not Stroud, shot Cade, there was ample evidence of Stroud's conduct before, during, and after the shooting for the jury to find Stroud guilty as a party to the crimes because of a shared criminal intent. The court also found that the trial court did not err in denying Stroud's motion for a directed verdict.

STRYKER v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0125

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Austin Stryker was convicted for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting and stabbing death of Hannah Bender. Stryker was a member of a small gang, and the prosecution argued that he killed Bender because he suspected she was informing on the gang's activities. Stryker was charged with multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, possession of a firearm and knife during the commission of a felony, violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, concealing the death of another, and tampering with evidence. The jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, along with consecutive sentences for other charges.

Stryker appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense when it prevented his counsel from making a closing argument that co-defendants Issac Huff and Dylan Reid would have faced minimum sentences of life in prison had they not pled guilty. He also contended that the prosecutor personally attacked his defense counsel in closing argument and that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on “grave suspicion” after the prosecutor allegedly misconstrued the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in closing arguments.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Stryker's convictions, concluding that his claims failed. However, the court identified merger errors in Stryker’s sentencing that required correction, and thus vacated part of the judgment.

THOMPSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0117

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Diante Thompson was convicted for malice murder and other crimes related to the stabbing death of Bobby Jermaine Ricks. Thompson, along with Demarco Draughn, Benny Hayward, and Xavier Levatte, were charged with malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. Thompson's trial was severed from his co-indictees, who were also convicted of malice murder. The jury found Thompson guilty on all charges and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder. The felony-murder count was vacated by operation of law. Thompson filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

Thompson appealed his convictions, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial. He also argued that the State committed reversible error in its closing argument by telling the jury that it needed to adjudicate the guilt of Thompson’s co-indictees, who were tried separately, and by allegedly shifting the burden of proof to Thompson. Additionally, Thompson argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the same allegedly improper statements made by the State.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Thompson’s convictions. The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to uphold Thompson’s convictions. The court also found that Thompson's claims of reversible error in the State's closing argument were not preserved for appellate review because defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements at trial. Lastly, the court found that Thompson failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor’s allegedly burden-shifting comments.

State of Iowa v. Brown

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-0055

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Clayton Curtis Brown, who was convicted of possession of a firearm as a felon, aggravated eluding, and driving while barred. The charges stemmed from an incident where Brown eluded a police officer's attempt to initiate a traffic stop. The officer later found the car abandoned and discovered a loaded handgun under the driver's seat and ammunition in the center console and under the front passenger seat. Brown's personal items were also found in the car.

The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed Brown's convictions for possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated eluding, concluding there was insufficient evidence to show that Brown knowingly possessed the handgun. Brown also contested the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove his identity as the driver of the car that eluded the officer.

The Supreme Court of Iowa disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the State's evidence, including the officer's testimony, the location of the firearm, and the presence of Brown's personal effects in the car, was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Brown had constructive possession of the firearm. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that Brown was driving the car when it eluded the officer. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the portion of the court of appeals decision reversing those convictions and affirmed the district court judgment in full.

State v. McCollaugh

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-0600

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Oxley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Jesse McCollaugh was found guilty of child exploitation after his wife discovered videos on his phone of her 15-year-old sister using the bathroom, which McCollaugh had secretly recorded. The videos showed the minor partially nude, unaware she was being filmed. McCollaugh admitted to recording the videos and having a sexual problem. He was charged with one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, to which he pleaded not guilty. After a bench trial, the district court found McCollaugh guilty and sentenced him to a prison term not exceeding two years, and required him to register as a sex offender.

Before the Supreme Court of Iowa, McCollaugh appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it failed to establish that the minor had the purpose of engaging in nudity to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of a person who may view the visual depiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with McCollaugh's interpretation of the statute, stating that the relevant "purpose" that the State must prove is identified after the word "purpose" in the definition, not before. The court held that the State must prove the purpose of purchasing or possessing a visual depiction of the nude minor—not the minor’s purpose in being nude. The court found sufficient evidence to prove McCollaugh’s purpose for taking the videos was for his sexual gratification and affirmed his conviction. McCollaugh also argued that the district court relied on an improper factor in its sentencing order, but the Supreme Court found no evidence that the district court relied on the improper factor and affirmed the sentence.

State v. Wilson

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-0560

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Christopher James Wilson, was charged with two counts of indecent exposure after he was seen masturbating in public by two women, E.H. and T.A., at a gas station. Wilson followed the women to another location where he continued his actions. He was subsequently arrested and charged. After a jury trial, he was convicted on both counts and sentenced to an enhanced sentence under Iowa Code section 901A.2(1) to an indeterminate prison term of two years for the first count and an indeterminate prison term of two years for the second count. The sentence for count one was ordered to run consecutively to the sentence for count two.

Wilson appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure is per exposure, not per viewer. Therefore, he contended that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on two separate counts of indecent exposure. He also argued that the district court did not provide sufficient reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d).

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure is one count per viewer, not one count per exposure. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on two counts of indecent exposure. The court also found that the district court provided sufficient reasoning for imposing a consecutive sentence. The court noted that the district court's reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences may be the same reasons the court relied on for the imposition of incarceration. The court concluded that the district court's statement that the only appropriate sentence was to send Wilson to prison for as long of a period of time as possible implied that the sentences should run consecutively.

Jarmer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124920

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Shana L. Jarmer was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) after failing a breath alcohol test. At the time of the arrest, Jarmer was in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a muddy ditch. Despite her efforts to move the vehicle, it remained stationary due to the muddy conditions. Following her arrest, Jarmer was notified that her driving privileges would be suspended by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1014. Jarmer challenged the suspension, arguing that she was merely attempting to operate the vehicle, not actually operating it, as the vehicle was not moving.

The KDR upheld the suspension, finding that Jarmer was operating the vehicle. Jarmer sought judicial review of this decision in Sumner County District Court, which denied her petition, agreeing with the KDR that Jarmer was operating the vehicle since the engine was running, she was behind the wheel, and the tires were spinning. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Jarmer operated the vehicle because she caused it to function or work when she engaged the transmission and pressed the gas pedal.

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that to "operate" a vehicle means to "drive" it, which requires motion on the part of the vehicle. The court found that while Jarmer unquestionably attempted to operate the vehicle, her car did not move, despite her best efforts. Therefore, it was factually impossible for Jarmer to "move"—and, under the court's precedent, "operate"—the vehicle. The court concluded that Jarmer's unsuccessful effort to drive her car out of a muddy ditch fails to satisfy K.S.A. 8-1002(a)(2)(A)'s requirement that she was "operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both." The court reversed the suspension of Jarmer's driver's license and remanded the matter to the KDR for further proceedings.

State v. Waldschmidt

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123631

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: Biles

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the conviction of Kylie Jo Elizabeth Waldschmidt for aiding and abetting felony murder and interference with a law enforcement officer. Waldschmidt was involved in a romantic relationship with Diego Gallaway, the victim, and Ryan Thompson, the person who killed Gallaway. The court found that Waldschmidt's actions, including discussing plans to confront Gallaway, driving Thompson to pick up a gun, and driving him to Gallaway's apartment, constituted aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime.

The lower court had rejected Waldschmidt's claim that the predicate felonies of aggravated assault and aggravated battery were not distinct from the killing and thus should be merged. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with the lower court, finding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the acts of displaying the gun and placing Gallaway in a headlock were distinct from the act that killed Gallaway.

The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the use of force in defense of a person or in defense of an occupied vehicle. The court held that while these instructions would have been legally appropriate, their omission was not clearly erroneous and therefore could not be assigned as error on appeal.

The court also found that the prosecutor committed two errors: bolstering the credibility of the State's witnesses and personally commenting on Waldschmidt's testimony. However, the court held that these errors did not deprive Waldschmidt of a fair trial. The court also held that an unpreserved instructional issue that is not clearly erroneous cannot be considered in a cumulative error analysis.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ULLMAN

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0293-DG

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Ricky Ullman was convicted on three counts of distribution of a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to twelve years, probated for five years, with several conditions including completion of a community-based sex offender treatment program (SOTP). The court later revoked his probation due to his failure to complete the SOTP, among other violations. Nearly two years after his probation was revoked, Ullman filed a motion challenging the revocation order, arguing that he could not be legally required to complete the SOTP. The circuit court granted him relief and vacated its revocation order, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that Ullman’s challenge to the condition that he complete the SOTP was untimely and reinstated the circuit court’s revocation order. The court also held that a sentencing court may impose SOTP as a condition of probation for defendants who have not been convicted of a “sex crime” as defined by KRS 17.500. The court declined to address Ullman’s argument that the circuit court’s revocation order failed to comply with KRS 439.3106, as it was not properly preserved for review. However, the court agreed to remand the case for consideration of Ullman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

ROBERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0158-MR

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Demetrius Roberson, who was convicted by a Logan County jury for murder, first-degree robbery, nine counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and attempted murder. The case arose from an incident where two men, one of whom was identified as Roberson, entered an apartment and fired shots, killing Lexus Bell and endangering several others present. The prosecution's theory was that Roberson and another individual, Reba Kirk, planned to rob the apartment as a form of retaliation against Bell's boyfriend, who had allegedly stolen from Kirk's drug dealing business. Roberson was sentenced to life without parole for twenty-five years.

Roberson appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, raising several issues. He argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that another man admitted to the shooting, in admitting deposition testimony of a deceased witness, in excluding testimony regarding why he broke up with his child’s mother, in allowing the prosecution to accuse his mother of lying and committing perjury, in excluding evidence that his family attempted to provide police with exculpatory evidence, in failing to sequester the jury during its guilt phase deliberations, in allowing the jury to review only a portion of a witness’s testimony, and in imposing the longer of two inconsistent sentences recommended by the jury.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Logan Circuit Court, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings and actions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the sentence imposed was within the trial court's discretion.

WOODALL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0232-MR

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Keller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1998, Robert Keith Woodall was sentenced to death for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a teenage girl. In 2015, Woodall filed a Motion to Vacate the Death Sentence Due to Intellectual Disability, arguing that he is intellectually disabled and thus the imposition of the death penalty would violate his constitutional rights. The trial court denied his motion without a hearing. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.

On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and again denied Woodall’s motion. The court found that Woodall had not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that he is intellectually disabled. Woodall appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the trial court. The court found that the trial court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that Woodall had not proven that he is intellectually disabled by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also rejected Woodall's arguments that the trial court violated his due process rights and Confrontation Clause rights by admitting and relying on a report without requiring the report's author to testify at the hearing.

State of Maine v. Ouellette

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 29

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Stanfill

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Roger Ouellette, who was convicted of Operating Under the Influence (OUI) following a police stop in his driveway. The police officer had observed Ouellette's vehicle crossing the center line of the road, which led the officer to suspect a violation of traffic laws. Ouellette entered a conditional guilty plea after his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop was denied by the trial court.

The trial court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Ouellette due to his observed traffic violation. Ouellette argued that the stop was unjustified as the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. However, the court determined that the stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that Ouellette had violated the motor vehicle statute requiring vehicles to be operated within a single lane.

On appeal, Ouellette argued that the stop was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it occurred within the curtilage of his home without a warrant and without any applicable exception to the warrant requirement. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the court's failure to grant Ouellette’s motion on that ground did not constitute obvious error and that the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion. The court also found that Ouellette's argument regarding the stop occurring within the curtilage of his home was unpreserved and did not amount to obvious error.

State of Maine v. Weddle

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 26

Opinion Date: April 16, 2024

Judge: Lawrence

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Transportation Law

Randall J. Weddle was involved in a major motor vehicle accident in Washington, Maine, which resulted in the death of two drivers. The accident involved five vehicles, one of which was engulfed in flames. Weddle, the driver of a large tractor trailer, was found to be the cause of the accident. Hospital tests revealed that Weddle had alcohol in his system and officers found a three-quarters-full whiskey bottle and a shot glass in his truck several days after the accident.

Weddle was charged with two counts of manslaughter, two counts of aggravated criminal operating under the influence, one count of causing injury while operating under the influence, one count of aggravated driving to endanger, one count of driving to endanger, and eight counts of violating commercial motor carrier operator rules. The jury found Weddle guilty of all counts. The court conducted a sentencing analysis and set the basic sentence at twenty years, considering the nature and circumstances of the crime. The court set the maximum sentence at thirty years, weighing mitigating and aggravating factors. The final sentence was set at thirty years, with all but twenty-five years suspended, followed by four years of probation.

Weddle appealed his sentence to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. He argued that his sentence was unconstitutional because it was not proportioned to the offense and that it was excessively harsh. The court affirmed the sentence, concluding that the sentence was not greatly disproportionate to the offense and did not offend prevailing notions of decency. The court also found that the sentence was not excessively harsh, as the court had considered both aggravating and mitigating factors in setting the maximum sentence.

Commonwealth v. James

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13395

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: Georges

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Internet Law, Juvenile Law

The case involves a professional photographer who sexually exploited a minor. The defendant initially contacted the victim through a social networking site and began communicating with her through various means, eventually soliciting and receiving explicit images of the victim. The defendant also met the victim in person and sexually abused her. After the victim's parents reported the exploitation to the police, an investigation was launched. The police seized a computer tower, an external hard drive, and other items from the defendant's former residence. A forensic examination of the hard drives revealed explicit images of the victim, communications between the defendant and the victim, and hundreds of images of unidentified females in various stages of undress.

The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including aggravated rape of a child and enticement of a minor. He pleaded guilty to all charges, except for the eight counts of aggravated rape of a child, where he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of statutory rape. After being sentenced, the defendant filed a motion for the return of the seized property. The Commonwealth opposed the return of the property, arguing that it was in the "public interest" to destroy the devices. The Superior Court denied the defendant's request for the return of certain property.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted an application for direct appellate review. The court concluded that the procedural requirements set forth in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, must be followed before a forfeiture decree may be issued under G. L. c. 276, § 3. The court vacated the Superior Court orders denying the return of certain property to the defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Commonwealth v. Robinson

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-09903

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2005, Leon Robinson was convicted of first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm for the 2001 shooting death of Recardo Robinson. The incident occurred in a barbershop after an argument between the two men. Several witnesses identified Leon as the shooter. The prosecution also presented evidence of a small bloodstain on Leon's jacket that matched the victim's DNA. Leon appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that evidence obtained from his apartment was wrongly admitted, his right to self-representation was violated, the prosecutor acted improperly, and his counsel was ineffective.

The Superior Court Department had previously denied Leon's pretrial motion to suppress evidence from his apartment. Leon argued that the search warrant was erroneously granted, but the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. Leon's motion for a new trial was also denied by the Superior Court Department. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing certain evidence and not retaining expert witnesses, but the Supreme Judicial Court found these decisions to be strategic and not manifestly unreasonable.

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Leon's murder conviction, finding no errors that would have influenced the jury's decision. However, the court vacated his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. The court ruled that, in light of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, the absence of a license was an essential element of the firearm possession offense that the prosecution needed to prove. The case was remanded for a new trial on the firearm charge.

Nash v. Commissioner of Public Safety

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1238

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: THISSEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 1, which requires law enforcement officers to inform individuals suspected of driving under the influence that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime. The respondent, Brian Matthew Nash, was pulled over for suspected impaired driving. After failing field sobriety tests, he was arrested and a state trooper obtained a search warrant for a blood or urine test. The trooper informed Nash that refusal to take a test is a crime, and Nash complied. His blood test revealed the presence of a controlled substance, leading to the revocation of his driving privileges.

Nash sought judicial review of his license revocation, arguing that the trooper's advisory did not comply with the statutory requirement. The district court rejected Nash's arguments and sustained the revocation. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, finding that the advisory given to Nash was misleading and an inaccurate statement of law.

The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute. The court held that the trooper's statement that "refusal to take a test is a crime" satisfied the advisory required by section 171.177, subdivision 1. The court reasoned that the statute does not require officers to inform drivers of all the elements and permutations of what is required before the state may take adverse action against them. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the other issues raised by Nash in his appeal.

Robinson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-00184-SCT

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Griffis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case revolves around Gail Robinson, who was convicted of heat-of-passion manslaughter for the killing of Bobby Pruitt. The two had a tumultuous relationship, with both having been convicted of domestic violence against each other in the past. On the night of the incident, after a series of altercations, Robinson stabbed Pruitt, who later succumbed to his injuries. Robinson admitted to the stabbing, stating that she was the one who put the knife in Pruitt's chest, not her son who was also present at the scene.

Prior to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the case was heard in the Alcorn County Circuit Court. Robinson was charged with heat-of-passion manslaughter, and the jury was instructed on heat-of-passion manslaughter, self-defense, and reasonable use of force. Robinson was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty years, with eight years suspended and twelve years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Robinson's post-trial motion was denied by the trial court.

In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Robinson challenged her conviction on two grounds. First, she argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer a jury instruction on her right to stand her ground in self-defense. Second, she contended that the State presented insufficient evidence to show she did not act in self-defense. The court affirmed her conviction, stating that the record was not clear enough to address her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The court also found that the State's evidence was sufficient to disprove Robinson's claim of self-defense. The court noted that Robinson continued to attack Pruitt past the point of any reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm, and the jury had rejected her self-defense claim after weighing the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.

In re Name Change of Nichols

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 85N

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: McGrath

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case revolves around the petitioner, Tom Nichols, also known as Nikki, who is currently serving a prison sentence for sex crimes against children. Nikki, a transgender woman in the process of transitioning, filed a petition for a sealed-record name change, arguing that an open-record proceeding could jeopardize her safety due to her gender identity.

The District Court of the Third Judicial District initially denied Nikki's petition. The court's decision was based on the fact that Nikki failed to demonstrate probable cause that her safety was at risk, a requirement under Section 27-31-201, MCA, for a petition to proceed on a sealed-record basis. The court also had to be satisfied that the petitioner was not attempting to avoid debt or hide a criminal record.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that district courts have broad discretion to grant or deny a petition for a sealed-record name change. The Supreme Court would only reverse a district court decision if it was arbitrary or exceeded the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Nikki failed to provide specific instances of abuse or explain why an open-record proceeding would change her circumstances at the Montana State Prison. Furthermore, Nikki did not provide any support for the alleged risk of harm from members of the public. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the evidence was insufficient to support Nikki’s petition.

State v. Anthony

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 308

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the defendant, Donald Gene Anthony, who was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The charges stemmed from an altercation that resulted in the death of Said Farah. The defendant appealed his convictions based on evidentiary rulings made by the district court during the trial.

The trial court heard testimony from several witnesses who were present at the scene of the crime. The defendant's girlfriend, Marissa Stephens, testified that Farah was acting "weird" on the night of the incident. The court, however, did not allow Stephens to testify about whether she believed Farah was under the influence of drugs at the time of the altercation.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the trial court did not err in excluding Stephens' lay opinion that Farah was under the influence, as it was largely cumulative to other evidence received at trial without objection. The court also found that the trial court did not err in admitting certain statements as nonhearsay, as they were offered for relevant nonhearsay purposes related to their effect on the listener. Lastly, the court found no error in the trial court's exclusion of statements made by law enforcement during the defendant's post-arrest interviews.

In re D.C.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 25

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: PICKERING

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The case involves a minor, D.C. Jr., who was charged with murder, attempted murder, and robbery. D.C. Jr., who has an IQ of 66, was 14 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. His counsel requested a competency determination before proceeding to the certification hearing. After an initial finding of incompetency followed by competency-restoration sessions, the juvenile court declared D.C. Jr. competent to proceed. However, the court did not explicitly address the conflicting expert testimony regarding D.C. Jr.'s understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist counsel.

The juvenile court certified D.C. Jr. for prosecution as an adult. The court's decision was based on the assumption that the competency standards for juvenile court applied, which was a mistake. The court did not adequately support its determination with findings, and it appears to have applied an incorrect standard.

The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the certification order and the competency determination. The court held that a juvenile facing the possibility of prosecution as an adult on serious criminal charges must meet the adult criminal court standard for competence. The court remanded the case for the juvenile court to reassess D.C. Jr.'s competency using the correct standard. The court emphasized that the stakes were high, and the record did not show that the juvenile court correctly assessed D.C. Jr.'s competency to proceed. The court also vacated the order certifying D.C. Jr. for criminal proceedings as an adult, which followed the competency determination.

Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 30

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of several Nevada statutes regulating "ghost guns," or unfinished firearm frames or receivers. The respondent, Polymer80, Inc., a manufacturer of gun-related products, argued that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" in the statutes was impermissibly vague, making the statutes unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, concluding that the definition did not clearly explain key terms or notify individuals when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The court also found that the definition allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the lower court's findings. The court found that the terms used to define "unfinished frame or receiver" had ordinary meanings that provided sufficient notice of what the statutes prohibited. The court also concluded that the statutes were general intent statutes that did not lack a scienter requirement and did not pose a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague.

People v. Dunton

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 02130

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: Jenny Rivera

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Corey Dunton, who was convicted of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment after he opened fire at a skating rink, injuring two individuals. Dunton had a history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior, both in and out of the courtroom. During the announcement of the verdict, Dunton, who was handcuffed for security reasons, disrupted the proceedings with verbal outbursts directed at the jury. As a result, the court ordered his removal from the courtroom.

The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Dunton's conviction. However, following a similar case (People v Antoine), Dunton's appellate counsel contacted the Office of the Appellate Defender (OAD) regarding filing a writ of error coram nobis on Dunton's behalf. The OAD filed the writ, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims, including that the trial court violated Dunton's constitutional and statutory right to be present during the rendering of the verdict when it removed him from the courtroom without prior warning. The Appellate Division granted the writ, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial.

The case was then brought before the Court of Appeals. The court held that the trial court's removal of Dunton from the courtroom was appropriate given his history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior. The court rejected the argument that any error was de minimis based on the timing of Dunton's removal from the courtroom. The court also held that the Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated Dunton's right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted Dunton's writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of issues raised but not determined by that Court.

People v Baez

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 02225

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: CANNATARO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Melvin Baez, was convicted of possessing a quantity of cocaine after a nonjury trial. The conviction was based on evidence obtained during a traffic stop when NYPD officers observed Baez using his cell phone while driving. Upon stopping Baez, the officers noticed his bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of marijuana in his car. During a search, a clear plastic bag containing a white substance fell from Baez's jacket pocket. The bag was retrieved, placed in a latex glove for safekeeping, and later stored in a narcotics envelope at the police station.

The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the cocaine was inadmissible because the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of custody and there were no reasonable assurances that the substance examined at trial was authentic. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion and found him guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the decision, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the chain of custody of the cocaine and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the prosecution had laid a legally sufficient foundation for the admission of the drugs into evidence. The court noted that the prosecution had established a legally adequate chain of custody and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence. The court also noted that the discrepancies in the record regarding the condition, appearance, or handling of the cocaine were not significant enough to render the drugs inadmissible. The court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and the defendant's conviction was upheld.

People v Fisher

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 02129

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Kenneth Fisher, who was convicted of three counts of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, based on two controlled buy operations. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. During the trial, one of the jurors believed that Fisher had followed her home after the first day of jury selection. She did not immediately inform the court of her concern but waited until the case was submitted to the jury, and then expressed her safety concern to the other jurors during deliberations.

The trial court deemed the juror's belief likely unfounded and, despite some assurances that the juror could put aside her concerns, the court decided to retain her. Fisher's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis that he did not have a fair and impartial jury, but the court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeals found that the juror's belief that she had been followed home by Fisher was a prejudicial belief about the defendant that was not based on the evidence at trial. The court noted that the juror's fear was not about witnesses or collateral matters, but about the defendant's character. The court also noted that the juror had violated the court's instructions by failing to inform the court promptly about her beliefs about the defendant and instead introduced those beliefs into jury deliberations. The court concluded that the juror was "grossly unqualified" and should have been dismissed, and a mistrial granted. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial.

People v Franklin

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 02227

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: HALLIGAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Cid Franklin, who was arrested following a road rage incident that involved a firearm. The police searched the basement of Franklin's home, which he shared with his son and stepmother, and found a gun in a closet containing items belonging to both Franklin and his stepmother. Franklin was interviewed by an employee of the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) while in Queens central booking prior to arraignment. The CJA employee recorded Franklin's address as the basement of his home. This information was central to the prosecution's case at trial, as no DNA or fingerprints were discernable on the gun, and no other direct proof was provided that Franklin lived in the basement.

The trial court admitted the CJA form as either "a public document" or "a business record," rejecting the defense's objections that it was hearsay and violated Franklin's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Franklin was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the introduction of the report violated Franklin's Confrontation Clause rights.

The Court of Appeals of New York, however, reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the primary purpose of the CJA interview report was administrative, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus it was not testimonial. The court noted that the CJA report was introduced as a business or public record, and the pedigree information collected, including the defendant's address, was pertinent to establishing community ties; it was only incidentally relevant in this case. Therefore, the introduction of the CJA interview report did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court.

People v Mosley

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 02125

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: HALLIGAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the issue of when a non-eyewitness can testify to a jury that the defendant is the person depicted in a photo or video. The incident in question occurred on June 10, 2015, when a man was captured on police cameras in Syracuse firing three shots into a van. The defendant, Farod Mosley, was indicted for the shooting in September 2015, but the indictment was dismissed as legally insufficient. In July 2016, an assistant district attorney showed the video of the shooting to Detective Steven Kilburn, who identified Mosley as the shooter in the video. This identification led to a new indictment against Mosley.

The trial took place in February 2018, with the key issue being the identification of the shooter in the video. The prosecution relied on Kilburn to provide lay, non-eyewitness identification testimony that he believed Mosley was the shooter in the video. The jury ultimately convicted Mosley of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Mosley argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Kilburn's testimony.

The Appellate Division rejected Mosley's contention, holding that the People demonstrated Kilburn was more likely than the jury to correctly identify Mosley in the video. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the People failed to establish that Kilburn's testimony would aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the person in the video was Mosley. The court ruled that such testimony may be admitted where the witness is sufficiently familiar with the defendant that their testimony would be reliable, and there is reason to believe the jury might require such assistance in making its independent assessment. In this case, there was no showing that the proffered witness was sufficiently familiar with the defendant to render his testimony helpful, or that the jury faced an obstacle to making the identification that the witness's testimony would have overcome.

People v Weinstein

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 02222

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: RIVERA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Harvey Weinstein, a well-known figure in the entertainment industry, who was convicted by a jury for various sexual crimes against three complainants. Weinstein appealed, arguing that he was judged based on irrelevant, prejudicial, and untested allegations of prior bad acts, rather than the conduct for which he was indicted.

The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the third-degree rape prosecution was timely commenced and that the trial court properly admitted testimonies of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes. The court also concluded that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Weinstein on a broad range of uncharged bad acts should he testify.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes because that testimony served no material non-propensity purpose. The court also held that the trial court erred when it ruled that Weinstein, who had no criminal history, could be cross-examined about those allegations as well as numerous allegations of misconduct that portrayed Weinstein in a highly prejudicial light. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and ordered a new trial. However, the court rejected Weinstein's claim that the third-degree rape prosecution was untimely, holding that the trial court properly discounted the days Weinstein was continuously outside the state and correctly held that the prosecution was not time-barred.

People v Williams

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 02128

Opinion Date: April 23, 2024

Judge: TROUTMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In December 2016, an undercover police officer purchased heroin through an intermediary during a buy-and-bust operation in Manhattan. The officer did not meet the seller face-to-face but followed several feet behind the intermediary and the seller. The officer was far enough away that he could not hear their conversation. After the transaction, the officer reported to his team that the dealer was wearing specific clothing. Minutes later, the police arrested the defendant nearby, and the undercover officer identified him as the seller. The defendant filed a motion arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the court should suppress the undercover officer's identification, the prerecorded buy money, and the defendant's cell phone.

The Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The undercover officer testified about his observations during the operation and his subsequent identification of the defendant. After the hearing, the court ruled that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and suppressed the undercover officer's identification and the physical evidence recovered from the defendant. The defendant then moved for an independent source hearing to determine whether the undercover officer would be allowed to identify him at trial. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the undercover's testimony at the probable cause hearing provided clear and convincing evidence for an in-court identification of the defendant at trial. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.

The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the court had exercised its discretion appropriately in denying the defendant's request for a separate independent source hearing. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent source hearing. The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer's in-court identification without a hearing record sufficient to support an independent source determination for the identification. The court found that the testimony at the probable cause hearing did not provide enough evidence to support an independent source determination. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an independent source hearing, as requested.

State v. Fuglesten

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 74

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Fuglesten was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after a police officer entered his garage without a warrant. The officer had responded to a 911 call about a truck repeatedly driving by a house with loud music. The officer identified the truck as Fuglesten's, knew his license was suspended, and followed him to his home. The officer did not attempt a traffic stop or initiate his overhead lights. Upon reaching Fuglesten's home, the officer approached the garage on foot and interacted with Fuglesten, who was inside the garage. Fuglesten was subsequently arrested and charged.

Fuglesten filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's entry into his garage was unlawful. The district court denied the motion, and Fuglesten conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court found that the officer had probable cause to believe Fuglesten had committed the offense of driving under suspension, but did not find evidence of exigent circumstances relating to dissipation or destruction of evidence.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lange v. California, exigent circumstances were required for law enforcement to enter Fuglesten's garage without a warrant. The court found that the facts presented to the district court did not establish exigent circumstances. The court concluded that the officer's entry into Fuglesten's garage, without exigent circumstances, constituted an illegal entry. The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to allow Fuglesten to withdraw his guilty plea.

State v. Williams

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1433

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Fischer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The case revolves around Timothy Williams, who was 16 years old when he committed the offense in question. Williams rang the doorbell of Everett and Leslie Lawson's home, pretending to have been injured in a car accident. When Leslie opened the door to help, Williams shot her twice, killing her instantly. Williams was charged in juvenile court for conduct that would constitute murder and felonious assault if committed by an adult. The state did not charge Williams in the juvenile-court complaint for conduct that would constitute tampering with evidence.

The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Williams committed all the offenses and transferred the case to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. A grand jury then indicted Williams for murder, felonious assault, and tampering with evidence. Williams eventually pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and tampering with evidence. He was sentenced to an aggregate 17-year prison term.

Williams appealed his tampering-with-evidence conviction to the First District, arguing that his statutory and constitutional rights were violated when he was indicted for and convicted of tampering with evidence, because that charge had not been transferred from the juvenile court to the adult court. The First District, relying on a previous decision, held that the adult court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the tampering-with-evidence charge because the juvenile court had not found probable cause on that charge. The appellate court thus vacated Williams’s tampering-with-evidence conviction.

The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which reaffirmed its previous holding that a defendant who was a juvenile when he committed an offense may be charged for and convicted of that offense in adult court even though a charge for the offense was not brought in juvenile court and considered in a bindover proceeding, if the charge is rooted in the same acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to that court for it to resolve any remaining assignments of error.

State v. Azar

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069578

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: DeHoog

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

The case involves Raji Afife Azar, who was charged with three counts of "computer crime" under ORS 164.377(2)(c) for selling items on eBay that he believed to be stolen. The state argued that by selling stolen merchandise on eBay, Azar had accessed and used a computer system for the purpose of committing theft of property. Azar moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not proved that he had engaged in "computer hacking," which he asserted was required to establish computer crime. The trial court denied Azar's motion, and a nonunanimous jury convicted him of those counts.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court concluded that Azar's conduct of selling stolen property on eBay constituted computer crime under ORS 164.377(2)(c). The court reasoned that "theft" as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses each of the forms of theft described in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiving.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the computer crime statute to reach conduct such as Azar's, which may constitute "theft" within the meaning of the Criminal Code but neither interferes with another’s protected interests in a computer, computer system, or computer network nor depends on computer technology as the means of gaining access to the thing that the person seeks to unlawfully obtain. The court held that the trial court erred in denying Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Commonwealth v. Drayton

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 83 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: Seamus P. McCaffery

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves Lamarcus Eugene Drayton, who was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault against his nephew. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Drayton was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment, followed by five years' probation. Drayton appealed, asserting that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court erred when it excluded an alleged prior inconsistent statement by the victim. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and Drayton did not seek further review.

Drayton later filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court sent written instructions to the jury in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, and for failing to call three witnesses whom Drayton claimed would have testified that he had no opportunity to commit the sexual offenses. The PCRA court dismissed Drayton’s petition, and the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review to consider whether trial counsel’s failure to object, when a trial court provides certain written instructions to the jury during deliberations in contravention of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se such that a PCRA petitioner need not establish prejudice in order to obtain relief. The court held that counsel’s failure to object to a Rule 646 violation is not one of the limited bases establishing ineffectiveness per se. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the lower courts.

State v. Tavares

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 22-152

Opinion Date: April 22, 2024

Judge: Goldberg

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant, Victor Tavares, was convicted by a jury on two counts of first-degree sexual assault and one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred at a party in 2012, where Tavares and another man, Franklin Johnson, were accused of sexually assaulting a woman named Mary. The evidence against Tavares included Mary's testimony, a used condom found at the scene, and DNA evidence linking Johnson to the condom. Tavares, who represented himself at trial and on appeal, raised twelve issues for consideration.

Before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Tavares argued that the trial court erred in several ways, including by not dismissing the indictment based on the rule of consistency, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the General Assembly's lack of authority to enact criminal laws. He also claimed that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire and allowed the introduction of Johnson's DNA evidence.

The Supreme Court rejected all of Tavares's arguments. It held that the trial court properly conducted voir dire and correctly allowed the introduction of Johnson's DNA evidence. The court also found that the General Assembly had the authority to enact the criminal laws under which Tavares was charged and convicted. Furthermore, the court ruled that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and the rule of consistency did not apply in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Tavares's conviction.

State v. Bolden

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 22

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In October 2019, Max Bolden shot and killed Benjamin Donahue outside a club in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Bolden was indicted for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At trial, Bolden claimed that he shot Donahue in self-defense. The circuit court denied Bolden's motions for a judgment of acquittal on the murder charges. The jury found Bolden guilty of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Bolden appealed his first-degree murder conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court noted that Bolden had used a gun to shoot Donahue point blank in the face without provocation, and then shot him again while he was lying on the ground. The court also pointed out that Bolden had immediately left the scene, fled the state, and disposed of the gun used to shoot Donahue. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Wood v. Wallin

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 21

Opinion Date: April 19, 2024

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the interplay between the requirements of the Vermont Sex Offender Registry and the merger provision of the concurrent-sentence statute. The plaintiff, Andrew Wood, was sentenced concurrently for murder and sexual assault. He served the maximum sentence for his sexual assault conviction but remained on parole. Wood filed a grievance with the Department of Public Safety (DPS) requesting removal from the sex offender registry, arguing that he had served his maximum sentence for the sexual assault conviction. The DPS denied his request, stating that the registry statute continued to apply because Wood had not yet been discharged from parole.

The civil division of the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State, ruling that the registry statute continued to apply because Wood had not yet been discharged from parole, regardless of the connection between the parole and the registrable sex offense. Wood appealed this decision.

The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, stating that there were unresolved factual and legal questions regarding whether Wood's parole was linked to his sex offense. The court found that the plain language of the statute was insufficient to determine the impact of Wood's concurrent sentence on the registration requirements. The court remanded the case for further factual development to resolve whether the Department of Corrections considered Wood's parole to be connected to his sex offense.

Hannah v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230316

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: MANN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Vernon Eugene Hannah was convicted of one felony count of forging a public record and one misdemeanor count of providing false information to a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to five years of incarceration with two years suspended for the felony, and twelve months of incarceration with eight months suspended for the misdemeanor. The circuit court partially suspended Hannah’s sentences on the condition of good behavior, compliance with urine screens, payment of costs, and supervised probation. Despite these conditions, Hannah tested positive for controlled substances multiple times. As a result, Hannah’s probation officer requested that the circuit court issue a rule to show cause, which led to a probation revocation hearing.

The circuit court found Hannah guilty of violating the terms of his probation on both the felony and misdemeanor convictions, revoked the suspended sentences for both, and resuspended the sentences for the same period of supervised probation, this time adding new special conditions. Hannah appealed the reimposition of his suspended sentence to the Court of Appeals on two grounds, challenging the circuit court’s jurisdiction to hold the probation revocation hearing, and challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the circuit court’s May 2022 order revoking and resuspending Hannah’s sentence was not void ab initio under the 2021 statutory amendments. The court also held that the amended Code § 19.2-303.1 did not abrogate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide Hannah’s revocation. Furthermore, the court found that Hannah’s challenges based on Code § 19.2-303.1 were waived under Rules 5A:18 and 5A:20, and that Hannah’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was barred by Rule 5A:18.

Spokane County v. Meneses

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,520-8

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: JOHNSON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves an action filed by Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney Lawrence Haskell against Jilma Meneses, the secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The Prosecutor sought a writ of mandamus directing Meneses to comply with statutory duties under chapter 10.77 RCW and timely provide competency services in criminal proceedings. The case specifically concerned three categories of Spokane County defendants in felony criminal proceedings ordered to receive competency services from DSHS.

Previously, a class action was filed in federal court, challenging DSHS's delays in providing competency services to criminal defendants in pretrial custody. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held these delays violated the class members’ due process rights and issued a permanent injunction against DSHS. The injunction set strict time limits for providing competency services to defendants in pretrial custody, appointed a special court monitor, and began oversight of DSHS’s efforts to comply with the injunction.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, DSHS argued that the court must dismiss the petition for lack of original jurisdiction because the secretary is not a state officer within the meaning of the state constitution. The court agreed with DSHS, concluding that the secretary is not a state officer. The court reasoned that a state officer must be elected, subject to impeachment, and granted a State sovereign power, none of which applied to the secretary. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus.

State v. Bertrand

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 100,953-4

Opinion Date: April 18, 2024

Judge: Yu

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves Andrew Bertrand, who was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation. Bertrand argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to propose lesser included offense instructions on fourth-degree assault. The trial court denied Bertrand's motion, ruling that although counsel was deficient for purposes of Strickland’s first prong, Bertrand could not show prejudice as required by Strickland’s second prong. The trial court ruled that because the State had met its burden of proving each element of first-degree child molestation and the jury convicted Bertrand of those charges, he could not show prejudice.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington clarified that a defendant can show ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to propose a lesser included offense instruction, even if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. However, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that Bertrand was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to propose the fourth-degree assault instructions. The court remanded the remaining issues to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

State of West Virginia v. Adkins

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-672

Opinion Date: April 25, 2024

Judge: WALKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Rachel Louise Adkins, who was charged with one felony count of driving under the influence causing death, along with four misdemeanor charges. Adkins entered a Kennedy plea in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, under the impression that she would be sentenced to home confinement, based on off-the-record plea discussions with the court. However, the court sentenced her to not less than two nor more than ten years of incarceration. Adkins objected, stating that she entered the plea because the court had promised to sentence her to home confinement.

The Circuit Court of Cabell County denied Adkins's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and resentenced her for the purpose of this appeal following her conviction for DUI causing death. Adkins appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, arguing that she would not have accepted the plea had the court not promised to sentence her to home confinement.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the lower court's participation in plea discussions was a violation of Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly prohibits judicial participation in plea discussions with criminal defendants. The court concluded that this violation constituted plain error, affecting the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The case was remanded with directions to allow Adkins to withdraw her plea and for assignment to a different circuit court judge.

State of West Virginia v. Wetzel

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-685

Opinion Date: April 17, 2024

Judge: Hutchison

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Kristen Nicole Wetzel, was convicted of unlawful taking of a vehicle, also known as "joyriding," under West Virginia Code § 17-8-4(a). As part of a plea agreement, she was sentenced to six months of incarceration, with only ten days of actual confinement and the remainder of the sentence suspended in favor of probation. The court later amended the confinement period to 240 hours of actual incarceration. Wetzel filed a motion to correct her sentence, arguing that the language of the sentencing order was denying her "good time" credit, a reduction of sentence for good conduct.

The Circuit Court of Barbour County denied Wetzel's motion. The court found that the issue of good time credit was within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the court. The court also noted that its sentencing order did not prohibit Wetzel from receiving good time credit. If Wetzel believed she should be receiving credit for good time, the court suggested she should file a civil action against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Wetzel's sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on any impermissible factor. The court agreed with the lower court that the issue of good time credit fell within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Therefore, the court found no basis to grant Wetzel any relief under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure.

State v. Slaughter

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-759

Opinion Date: April 12, 2024

Judge: WALKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Kyle Slaughter, who was arrested and charged in two separate counties in West Virginia. In Fayette County, he was arrested after leading police on a high-speed chase and subsequently charged with bribery and other offenses. While incarcerated for these charges, his bond was revoked for separate charges pending in Raleigh County. At sentencing in Fayette County, the court credited Slaughter with thirty days for time served—the time between when he was first incarcerated and when his Raleigh County bond was revoked.

The Circuit Court of Fayette County determined that any credit for time served after Slaughter's bond had been revoked in Raleigh County should be applied to the charges in Raleigh County, not Fayette County. Slaughter appealed this decision, arguing that he should receive credit for the entire period he was incarcerated on the Fayette County charges.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the Circuit Court of Fayette County erred in failing to credit Slaughter for the full 263 days he spent incarcerated on Fayette County charges and awaiting sentencing in Fayette County. The court stated that criminal defendants are entitled to credit for time served awaiting trial and sentencing while incarcerated on the underlying offense if the offense is bailable. However, the court deemed the error harmless and affirmed the lower court's decision because Slaughter was ultimately credited his full time served in the Raleigh County sentencing order.