United States v. Rathbun

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1192

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves John Michael Rathbun, who was convicted for creating a homemade firebomb and placing it near a Jewish living facility in Longmeadow, Massachusetts. The bomb was discovered and Rathbun was identified as a suspect when his blood was found on the device. He was charged with attempting to transport and receive an explosive device, attempting to damage and destroy buildings, vehicles, and real and personal property by fire and explosion, and making false statements during an interview. Rathbun appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in admitting irrelevant, biased, and prejudicial testimonial evidence, and in allowing repeated references to inappropriate and highly charged religious topics.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court found that the testimonies of the government's witnesses were relevant and probative, and that the district court had taken reasonable steps to limit any potential prejudice. The court also rejected Rathbun's argument that the cumulative effect of the testimonies and the government's opening and closing arguments unfairly prejudiced him. The court concluded that the government's case against Rathbun was strong and that it was highly probable that the admission of the challenged evidence did not affect the jury's verdict.

United States v. Reynolds

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1268

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Securities Law

The case involves Francis M. Reynolds, who was convicted of three counts of obstruction of a United States Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding and one count of securities fraud. The District Court sentenced him to seven years of imprisonment plus three years of supervised release, ordered him to pay restitution to the victims of his fraud in the amount of $7,551,757, a special assessment of $400, and to forfeit $280,000 to the United States. Reynolds appealed his conviction, but he died while the appeal was pending.

Reynolds was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. While the appeal was pending, Reynolds died. The government suggested that the court should either dismiss the appeal as moot or follow the practice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and dismiss the appeal as moot while instructing the District Court to add a notation in the record.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to decide whether to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio, which holds that when a criminal defendant dies during the pendency of a direct appeal from his conviction, his death abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception. The court decided to apply the doctrine, aligning itself with other federal courts of appeals and its own past decisions. The court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the District Court to vacate the convictions and dismiss the indictment. The court also instructed the District Court to vacate the orders of restitution and criminal forfeiture that were imposed in this case, as well as the special assessment.

United States v. Askew

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4222

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: WILKINSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Jerod Montrel Askew, who was convicted of various crimes related to drug trafficking, including two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Askew appealed his convictions on several grounds, including erroneous jury instructions, insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for the firearm-related convictions, an abuse of discretion in offering a sua sponte jury instruction about the legality of the search warrants, and an abuse of discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecution referred to his invocation of the right to counsel during closing arguments.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had previously denied Askew's motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. Askew was sentenced to a total term of 198 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Askew’s conviction. The court found no error in the jury instructions, no insufficiency in the evidence supporting the firearm-related convictions, no abuse of discretion in the district court's sua sponte jury instruction about the legality of the search warrants, and no abuse of discretion in denying Askew's motion for a mistrial. The court concluded that the prosecution's brief remark about Askew's invocation of his right to counsel did not amount to impermissible exploitation.

United States v. Frazer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4179

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Darryl Colton Frazer, who was convicted and sentenced on drug and firearm offenses in 2023 in the District of Maryland. The charges stemmed from an incident in 2019 when Frazer was stopped by police officers who had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Frazer had thrown away a black bag just before he was apprehended, which was later found to contain a firearm and approximately 100 grams of marijuana. Frazer unsuccessfully moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and that they needed a warrant to search the bag.

The District Court rejected Frazer's suppression effort, ruling that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and could constitutionally search the bag that Frazer had discarded. Frazer was subsequently convicted for three offenses and sentenced to 72 months in prison. He appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion and the court’s failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Frazer, based on his headlong flight and noncompliance with the officers' commands. The court also ruled that Frazer had voluntarily abandoned his bag, and thus lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. Regarding the reasonable doubt instruction, the court held that the district court was not required to define reasonable doubt to the jury, and thus did not abuse its discretion by declining to give the instruction.

United States v. Clayton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30231

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Courtney D. Clayton was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine. As part of a three-month drug trafficking investigation, officers conducted video surveillance of Clayton's home and placed GPS tracking devices on two vehicles associated with him. Based on the surveillance and information from a reliable confidential informant, officers obtained search warrants for Clayton's home and one of his vehicles. However, before the warrants could be executed, officers observed burglars break into Clayton's home. Believing that evidence of drug trafficking may have been stolen, officers continued their investigation for another two weeks before seeking a new warrant for Clayton's residence. The officers did not renew their search warrant for the vehicle.

The district court denied Clayton's motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle and his incriminating statement to law enforcement. Clayton contended that the search warrant of the vehicle had become stale, and that officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. He also argued that the Government failed to show that officers advised him of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Clayton pleaded guilty but preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the search of Clayton's vehicle was proper under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment, which allows a warrantless search of a readily mobile vehicle when law enforcement has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. The court also found that Clayton failed to properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right to silence, as his indication through body language that he did not wish to speak to officers did not constitute a "simple, unambiguous statement" invoking his right to remain silent.

Savage v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3577

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves two separate appeals by Brian Witham and Michael Savage, who pleaded guilty to various federal crimes, including using a firearm during a crime of violence. Both appellants later sought to vacate their convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that their offenses no longer qualified as crimes of violence under United States v. Davis. The district courts rejected their motions, reasoning that they had procedurally defaulted their claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal. The courts also held that the appellants could not demonstrate their "actual innocence" of other serious charges that the government had dismissed as part of their plea deals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a defendant who secures the dismissal of equally serious charges through a plea bargain must demonstrate his "actual innocence" of those charges to avoid procedural default. The court rejected the appellants' arguments that the rule should only apply to more serious charges and that a statute enacted after the Supreme Court's decision in Bousley v. United States had changed the landscape. The court concluded that the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3296, did not speak to the issue at hand and did not undermine the rationale of Bousley.

United States v. Rogers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1432

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: Nalbandian

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Gregory Rogers, who was convicted of various drug and firearm-related crimes. The evidence leading to his conviction was obtained from his girlfriend's car, where he was found alone in the passenger seat. Rogers claimed that the evidence was collected in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

Previously, the trial court had denied Rogers' motion to suppress the evidence. The court ruled that Rogers lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle as he was neither the owner nor the driver of the car and failed to show that he had permission to occupy it. The court also determined that the search was a valid inventory search. After trial, a jury convicted Rogers on all six counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision. The court agreed with the trial court that Rogers had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The court noted that Rogers had not exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy. He was neither the owner nor the driver of the vehicle, and he had not shown that he had "complete dominion and control" over the car. The court also noted that Rogers had twice informed the police that the car was not his and had loudly disclaimed his authority over the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Rogers could not establish that the police had violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Witham v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-6214

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves two separate appeals by Brian Witham and Michael Savage, both of whom pleaded guilty to various federal crimes, including one count each of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As part of their plea deals, the government dismissed additional charges under the same statute. Later, both Witham and Savage sought to vacate their § 924(c) convictions, arguing that their offenses did not constitute "crimes of violence" in light of a subsequent Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Davis.

In the lower courts, both Witham and Savage's motions to vacate their § 924(c) convictions were rejected. The courts reasoned that they had procedurally defaulted their claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal. The courts also held that their claims of actual innocence of the attempted bank extortion/firearm charge did not excuse the default because they could not show their innocence with respect to the other dismissed firearms charges.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a defendant who has accepted a plea bargain may not collaterally attack his conviction unless he can show that he is actually innocent of equally or more serious charges dismissed as part of the bargain. Because Witham and Savage's plea agreements both involved the dismissal of § 924(c) charges, and because neither of them has shown actual innocence of the dismissed charges, the court ruled that their procedural defaults could not be excused.

United States v. Connelly

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1461

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The case involves two defendants, Christopher Yates and Shawn Connelly, who were convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The conspiracy operated out of Macomb, Illinois, and lasted thirteen months, from January 2019 to February 2020. Yates supplied the methamphetamine, initially purchasing the drugs from an unknown source in Joliet, Illinois, with alleged Mexican cartel connections. After the arrest of that supplier, Yates sought out a new source. Connelly was among the distributors.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois sentenced both defendants. Yates argued that the government failed to prove the purity of all the methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy, having only tested a small, unrepresentative amount. Connelly argued that the court should not have relied on his coconspirators’ statements to calculate the total drug weight, and that the full weight was not reasonably foreseeable to him. The district court rejected both arguments and sentenced Yates to 168 months in prison and Connelly to 188 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated Yates’s sentence and remanded the case. The court found that the government did not provide reliable evidence to support the district court's finding that the conspiracy involved at least 737.1 grams of “ice” methamphetamine. Therefore, Yates was entitled to resentencing. However, the court affirmed Connelly’s sentence, finding that the district court did not err in its calculation of the total drug weight attributable to him.

United States v. Liestman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3225

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: SCUDDER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Jay Liestman, who was convicted for transporting child pornography, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). Liestman had a prior conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law. The district court imposed an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment under § 2252(b)(1) due to his prior conviction. The main issue was whether the state conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction under § 2252(b)(1), which prescribes enhanced penalties for certain recidivist child sex offenders.

Previously, the district court had ruled that Liestman's prior conviction for possessing child pornography triggered 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)’s enhancement for repeat sex offenders, which increases the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years if the defendant has a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to ... the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” Liestman argued that the enhancement did not apply because the Wisconsin statute reached offense conduct that Congress did not expressly enumerate in the text of § 2252(b)(1). The district court disagreed and sentenced Liestman to the enhanced mandatory minimum of 15 years.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in § 2252(b)(1) brings within the ambit of the enhancement any prior offense that categorically bears a connection with the conduct enumerated in § 2252(b)(1), regardless of whether it sweeps more broadly than that enumerated conduct in some respects. Therefore, Liestman's prior offense of conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law can serve as a predicate offense under § 2252(b)(1).

United States v. McGhee

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1615

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: BRENNAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Harold McGhee, who was convicted and sentenced for drug trafficking. In August 2021, law enforcement received information from a confidential source about a drug dealer distributing large amounts of cocaine in Peoria, Illinois. The dealer was said to drive a Chevy Malibu and supplied cocaine to a house on West Millman Street. With this information, along with details from other informants and a tracking warrant, the police identified McGhee as the suspected dealer. They conducted three controlled buys and a trash pull at McGhee's residence, which led to the discovery of rubber gloves and baggies with a white powdery residue that tested positive for cocaine. This evidence led to a search warrant for McGhee's residence, vehicle, person, and electronic devices, resulting in the discovery of nearly a kilogram of various drugs, a handgun, and other drug trafficking paraphernalia.

McGhee sought to suppress the evidence recovered at his residence and moved for a hearing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. He argued that the affidavit's use of "SUBJECT PREMISES," in reference to both his residence and the Millman Street house, was impermissibly ambiguous. The district court denied the motion. McGhee later renewed his motion to suppress, arguing that the trash pull was constitutionally unreasonable because it was executed without a warrant. The court denied this motion as well.

On appeal, McGhee raised ten challenges to the criminal proceedings resulting in his convictions and sentence. The court considered some of his arguments on the merits and resolved others on procedural grounds. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects.

United States v. Yates

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2994

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves two defendants, Christopher Yates and Shawn Connelly, who were convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The conspiracy operated out of Macomb, Illinois, and lasted thirteen months, from January 2019 to February 2020. Yates supplied the drugs, initially from an unknown source in Joliet, Illinois, with alleged Mexican cartel connections. After the arrest of that supplier, Yates sought a new source. Connelly was among the distributors. The government conducted one seizure and nine controlled buys from members of the conspiracy during its investigation.

In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, both defendants pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The main dispute at Yates’s sentencing was the classification of the methamphetamine attributable to him as “ice” or “actual” (i.e., pure) methamphetamine, as opposed to its generic variant. The district court found that all 737.1 grams of methamphetamine for which the conspiracy was accountable was “ice” methamphetamine. Connelly raised two objections to the PSR at his sentencing hearing. He argued that the court could not rely on the statements of his coconspirators, Amber Phelps and Jeanna Rechkemmer, for purposes of determining the amount of methamphetamine handled by the conspiracy. He also contended that the full drug weight attributed to the conspiracy was not reasonably foreseeable to him. The district court denied both objections.

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Yates challenged the district court’s finding that the methamphetamine attributable to the conspiracy was “ice” methamphetamine. Connelly once more attacked the district court’s calculation of the total drug weight attributable to him. The court vacated Yates’s sentence and remanded. The court found that the government must supply reliable evidence making that approximation reasonable. Because such evidence was lacking, Yates is entitled to resentencing. The court affirmed Connelly’s sentence.

United States v. Jidoefor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3235

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

A Nigerian citizen, Okwuchukwu Jidoefor, pleaded guilty to mail fraud. As part of the plea agreement, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota agreed to send a letter to immigration authorities outlining Jidoefor’s cooperation in prior cases. After the sentencing hearing, the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) sent the agreed letter to immigration authorities. However, due to an internal mistake, the U.S. Attorney sent a second letter stating the first letter was not the office’s official position. Upon discovering the mistake, the U.S. Attorney sent a third letter retracting the second letter and reaffirming the first one. Jidoefor moved to remedy the government’s breach of the plea agreement, which the district court denied, finding the third letter an adequate remedy. Jidoefor appealed this decision.

The District Court for the District of Minnesota found that the government's third letter was an adequate remedy for the breach of the plea agreement. Jidoefor appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in not providing a remedy. He also separately appealed the district court’s sentence and its order for restitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the government's third letter, which retracted the second letter and reaffirmed the first one, was an adequate remedy for the breach of the plea agreement. The court also found that the district court did not err in calculating Nationwide’s losses and imposing the $22,028 restitution obligation. Furthermore, the court dismissed Jidoefor's challenge to the length of his sentence as moot, as he had already served the sentence.

United States v. Thomas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2179

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: ERICKSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The defendant, Darion Thomas, was arrested at a hospital in Iowa while accompanying his sick child and the child's mother, Tyliyah Parrow. During the arrest, law enforcement found a gun on Thomas and a backpack containing drugs. The backpack was searched after Parrow gave her consent. Thomas's cell phone, which was in Parrow's possession, was also seized and searched after a warrant was obtained five days later. Thomas was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the backpack and cell phone.

The district court denied Thomas's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that Parrow had the authority to consent to the search of the backpack and that her consent was voluntary. The court also found that the five-day delay in obtaining a search warrant for the cell phone was reasonable. At sentencing, the court applied a two-level enhancement based on text messages that showed Thomas had supervised a minor in drug transactions.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Thomas argued that the district court erred in its rulings on the search of the backpack, the delay in obtaining the search warrant for the cell phone, and the application of the two-level enhancement. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decisions, finding no clear error in its factual findings or legal conclusions. The court held that Parrow's consent to the search of the backpack was voluntary, the delay in obtaining the search warrant for the cell phone was reasonable, and the application of the two-level enhancement was justified based on the evidence presented.

United States v. Milheiser

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-50162

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: FRIEDLAND

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Six defendants were convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud for their sales companies' tactics in selling printer toner. The government's case was based on the argument that a representative from the sales company would call a business, falsely imply that the sales company was the business's regular supplier of toner, and falsely state that the price of toner had increased. The representative would then state that the business could lock in the old price by purchasing more toner that day. The defendants argued that this theory of fraud was overbroad because it permitted the jury to convict even though all of the businesses received the toner they ordered at the agreed price.

The case was heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, where the defendants were found guilty on all counts. The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the government's theory of fraud was overbroad.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendants, holding that the government's theory of fraud was overbroad because it did not require the jury to find that the defendants deceived customers about the nature of the bargain. The court vacated the defendants' convictions and remanded the case back to the lower court.

United States v. Bradley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-1223

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: ROSSMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2015, Jason Vincent Bradley was convicted on multiple counts related to firearm possession and drug trafficking. He was sentenced to concurrent 120-month sentences on three counts and a consecutive 60-month sentence on the fourth count, followed by three years of supervised release. In 2021, Bradley filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the need to care for his minor children due to his mother's ill health and his own health conditions that increased his risk of serious illness from COVID-19.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Bradley's motion for compassionate release. The court acknowledged Bradley's claims of extraordinary and compelling reasons for release but found that the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not support a sentence reduction. Bradley appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred by not considering his proffered extraordinary and compelling reasons for release as part of its § 3553(a) analysis and by not accounting for his post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Bradley had waived his first argument by not raising it in the lower court. Regarding his second argument, the court found that the district court had considered Bradley's post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation, and it had provided a rationale for its decision. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bradley's motion for compassionate release.

United States v. Zamora

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-4096

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: ROSSMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In December 2021, Kevin Alonso Zamora was discovered by law enforcement officers in Taylorsville, Utah, near a car that had been reported stolen. As officers approached, all suspects except Zamora entered the vehicle and drove off, while Zamora fled on foot. During his flight, Zamora ran through a residential neighborhood and a commercial area, eventually collapsing near a Taco Bell drive-thru. Officers found a gun tucked inside Zamora's pants, which had discharged during his flight, injuring him.

Zamora was indicted and later pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. During sentencing, the district court applied a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which Zamora challenged as being erroneously applied. He argued that his armed flight did not recklessly create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Zamora's flight from law enforcement with a loaded gun, not carried in a holster, which discharged during his flight, constituted reckless behavior. The court also found that Zamora's actions created a serious risk of bodily injury to law enforcement. Furthermore, the court noted that Zamora ran directly in front of an occupied vehicle moments before his gun discharged, creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2.

United States v. Al Jaberi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12852

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: Tjoflat

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Nihad Al Jaberi, who was convicted and sentenced for attempted smuggling, failure to notify a common carrier, and submitting false or misleading export information. Al Jaberi appealed his convictions and sentences, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt, his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were violated due to the Government's failure to correct false witness testimony and prejudicial statements, and his sentences were unreasonable.

In February 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Al Jaberi for smuggling firearms from the United States, delivering firearms to a common carrier without giving written notice, and submitting false and misleading export information. The Government presented evidence that Al Jaberi admitted to shipping the firearms to Iraq without informing the common carrier of the firearms. The jury found Al Jaberi guilty on all counts.

Al Jaberi appealed his convictions and sentences to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, his convictions and sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were violated because the Government failed to correct false witness testimony and made prejudicial statements, and his sentences were unreasonable.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Al Jaberi’s convictions and sentences. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to convict Al Jaberi on all three charges. The court also found that Al Jaberi’s convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were not violated, and his sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United States v. Boone

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11153

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: HULL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law

The defendant, Jeffrey Boone, was charged with using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing child pornography, distributing child pornography, and possessing child pornography. The minor in question was Boone's four-year-old daughter. Boone pleaded guilty to all three counts. The evidence against Boone included images and videos of his sexual abuse of his daughter, which he had shared via Kik Messenger. The FBI was alerted to Boone's activities by an online covert employee who had received the explicit images from Boone.

Boone's case was heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The Presentence Investigation Report grouped Boone's three counts together and assigned a total offense level of 43, factoring in enhancements based on the victim's age and other offense characteristics. The report recommended a five-level increase due to Boone's pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. Boone did not object to the report. The district court imposed an 840-month sentence, comprised of consecutive terms of 360 months on Count 1 and 240 months each on Counts 2 and 3, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.

Boone appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that the district court erred at sentencing by applying a pattern-of-activity enhancement and considering his military service as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor. The Court of Appeals affirmed Boone's sentence, finding no procedural or substantive error in the district court's decision. The court noted that Boone had invited the error he was alleging by expressly agreeing to the application of the pattern-of-activity enhancement. The court also found that the district court had acted within its discretion in considering Boone's military service as an aggravating factor.

United States v. Nassif

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3069

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: PILLARD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves John Maron Nassif, who was convicted of four misdemeanor offenses for his role in the January 6, 2021, riot at the United States Capitol. He was sentenced to seven months in prison. On appeal, Nassif challenged one of his convictions and his sentence. The challenged conviction was for demonstrating in a United States Capitol building. Nassif argued that the statute’s prohibition against parading, demonstrating, or picketing in Capitol buildings is facially overbroad and void for vagueness in violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.

The district court rejected Nassif’s overbreadth claim, holding that the interior of the Capitol building is a nonpublic forum where the government may limit First Amendment activities so long as the restrictions are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. The court reasoned that, in enacting section 5104(e)(2)(G), Congress permissibly determined that its institutional interest in peaceful space in which to do its lawmaking work supports the challenged limitation on demonstrating inside the Capitol buildings.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the prohibition is reasonable and that it clearly applies to Nassif’s conduct, so it rejected his facial challenges and affirmed the conviction. The court also rejected Nassif’s challenges to his sentence and affirmed it.

State ex rel Mitchell v. Palmer

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-21-0397-PR

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: BEENE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Tamira Durand, who was indicted for several fraud-related offenses, including illegally obtaining a credit card in the name of Scott Blum, a prosecutor with the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO), the agency responsible for prosecuting Durand. Durand argued that her due process rights would be violated if she was prosecuted by an agency with a conflict of interest, given that Blum, one of the victims in her case, was a prosecutor with MCAO. The trial court granted Durand’s motion, disqualifying MCAO from the case. The State appealed this decision.

The trial court's decision to disqualify MCAO was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which accepted jurisdiction but denied relief. The State then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona.

The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the trial court's decision, stating that the trial court had erred by not considering the Gomez factors, a set of considerations established in a previous case, Gomez v. Superior Court, when deciding whether to disqualify MCAO. The court held that the trial court should have considered these factors, which include whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing the defendant, whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in some way if the motion is not granted, whether there are any alternative solutions, and whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh any benefits that might accrue due to continued representation. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings, with instructions to apply the Gomez factors and consider Durand’s due process rights.

Davis v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 49

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Karen R. Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the conviction of Leashebia Davis for capital murder. The incident occurred on May 4, 2020, when Elvis Kendal was shot and killed. Davis was charged with capital murder on July 1, 2020, and was later convicted by a Jefferson County Circuit Court jury on May 17, 2023. She was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The case was based on the testimonies of multiple witnesses, including Natasha Gill, a cousin of the victim, who witnessed the shooting, and Roderick Breedlove and Michael Brazell, who were with Davis in the vehicle at the time of the incident. The testimonies varied, with Davis and Breedlove implicating Brazell as the shooter, while Brazell testified that Davis was the shooter.

The Jefferson County Circuit Court found Davis guilty of capital murder. Davis appealed the decision, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction and that the court erred in denying her motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. The court denied her motion for a new trial, asserting that Davis failed to demonstrate that the juror in question engaged in misconduct.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found substantial evidence to support Davis's capital murder conviction, including the testimonies of witnesses and the video-surveillance footage. The court also held that Davis failed to prove that the juror engaged in misconduct, as there was no evidence that the juror was dishonest during the jury-selection process or had any relationship with Davis's defense attorney. The court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis's motion for a new trial.

Hill v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 54

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: WOMACK

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Jessie Hill, a prisoner serving life imprisonment without parole for capital murder and an additional 720 months for first-degree murder, filed multiple pro se petitions for writ of habeas corpus. He claimed double jeopardy, violations of his right to due process, insufficient evidence supporting his convictions, and other obscure claims. The Jefferson County Circuit Court dismissed his petitions, noting that Hill's pleadings were often illegible and contained profane language. The court concluded that Hill failed to establish that he was being illegally detained.

Hill had previously filed multiple petitions for postconviction relief, including four habeas corpus petitions, all of which were denied by the circuit court and affirmed on appeal. In his current appeal, Hill argued that his convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the charging informations were defective and violated his right to due process, and that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision, stating that Hill's claims did not challenge the legality of his sentences or the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial courts that entered the judgments of conviction. The court noted that a habeas proceeding does not afford a petitioner an opportunity to retry his case and is not a substitute for raising an issue either at trial or on direct appeal. The court concluded that Hill's double-jeopardy claim failed to state a basis for habeas relief, and his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims represented an abuse of the writ as he had raised these claims in his previous habeas petitions.

Patrick v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 57

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Hiland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eddie Lee Patrick, Jr., a prisoner, appealed the denial of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Patrick was convicted of rape and terroristic threatening in the first degree by a Jefferson County jury in 2003 and was sentenced to 480 months' imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Patrick's petition for habeas corpus relief was based on pretrial DNA testing that he claimed proved his innocence.

The Jefferson County Circuit Court denied Patrick's petition, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Patrick argued that the lower court erred in not granting him habeas relief because the DNA evidence established his actual innocence. He also claimed that because the lower court allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis (without payment of a fee), it essentially held that the writ should be issued.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that while the DNA report showed that Patrick's DNA was not present, the jury was aware of this evidence and still found him guilty. The court also noted that Patrick did not meet the requirements to state a prima facie claim under Act 1780, as he did not seek specific scientific testing of evidence that was not available at the time of trial nor allege the existence of new scientific methods to retest evidence that was available at the time of trial. The court concluded that Patrick's claim for habeas relief was merely a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The court also rejected Patrick's argument about proceeding in forma pauperis, stating that being allowed to file a petition without paying a fee does not equate to the issuance of the writ.

Stewart v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 48

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Karen R. Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

David Stewart, an inmate, appealed the denial of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that his conviction for two counts of sexual assault violated the prohibition against double jeopardy and that a condition of his incarceration, requiring him to complete the Reduction of Sexual Victimization Program (RSVP), made his sentencing order illegal. Stewart also filed a motion for default judgment, claiming that the respondent failed to respond to his petition.

The Jefferson County Circuit Court found that the sentencing order was not illegal on its face and that Stewart was not entitled to a default judgment on his petition for the writ. The court noted that Stewart was originally charged with one count of rape and one count of sexual assault, indicating distinct impulses involved in each charge of sexual assault. The court also found that the RSVP requirement was often imposed as a condition of parole or suspended imposition of sentence (SIS), not incarceration.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Stewart failed to demonstrate that the sentencing order was illegal on its face or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of separate counts of second-degree sexual assault. The court also found that Stewart failed to show that the RSVP requirement and the no-contact order were part of his incarceration rather than his suspended sentence. Lastly, the court ruled that the circuit court did not err in denying Stewart's motion for a default judgment, as the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to a postconviction habeas proceeding.

People v. Brandon Bohler

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 18

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Brandon Mason Bohler was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing his roommate to death. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. During his arrest, Bohler made statements to the police which were later suppressed by the district court. The court ruled that Bohler was in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements, and thus, they should have been preceded by a Miranda warning.

The People of the State of Colorado appealed the district court's decision to suppress Bohler's statements. They argued that Bohler was not in custody when he made the statements, and therefore, a Miranda warning was not required. The appeal was brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the district court's decision. The court determined that Bohler was not in custody when he made the statements. The court reasoned that a reasonable person in Bohler's position would not have believed himself to be deprived of freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in suppressing Bohler's statements, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Reyes v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 232, 2023

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: GRIFFITHS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In August 2022, Corey Reyes was involved in an altercation with his girlfriend, Jennifer Deems, which resulted in Deems sustaining a broken leg. Reyes was subsequently arrested and charged with second-degree assault, resisting arrest with force or violence, and disorderly conduct. At trial, Reyes and Deems provided differing accounts of the events leading up to the assault. Reyes was found guilty on all charges.

The Superior Court of the State of Delaware allowed an amendment to Reyes's indictment during the trial, changing the citation of the statute under which he was charged with resisting arrest. Reyes appealed his conviction, arguing that the amendment was substantive and thus impermissible. He also claimed that the prosecution made statements that constituted prosecutorial misconduct, affecting the integrity of the trial process and his substantive rights.

The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the amendment to Reyes's indictment was one of form rather than substance, and thus permissible. The court also found that while some of the prosecutor's statements were improper, they did not rise to the level of plain error that would warrant reversal of Reyes's conviction. The court further noted that the prosecutor's statements did not constitute repetitive errors over multiple trials that would require reversal.

Dunn v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-CR-00123

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: Goff

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case revolves around Sabrina Dunn, who was charged with murder after shooting her ex-husband, Bill Dunn, in her home. The couple had a history of domestic disputes, with Bill exhibiting erratic and abusive behavior, leading Sabrina to obtain multiple protective orders against him. Despite these orders, Bill continued to harass Sabrina, often breaking into her home. On the day of the incident, Bill entered Sabrina's home uninvited, carrying knives. Fearing for her life, Sabrina shot and killed him.

The trial court instructed the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sabrina did not act in self-defense “and/or” in defense of her dwelling. Sabrina was found guilty of murder and sentenced to a maximum term of sixty-five years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but revised the sentence to fifty-five years with five years suspended.

The Indiana Supreme Court, however, found that the use of “and/or” in the jury instructions was ambiguous and potentially misleading. The court noted that the jury needed to understand that the State had to prove that Sabrina did not act in either self-defense or in defense of her dwelling. The ambiguous instructions, the court concluded, could have led the jury to believe that the State only needed to disprove one of these defenses, not both. Given the strength of Sabrina's defense-of-dwelling claim, the court found a serious risk that she was wrongly convicted. As a result, the court vacated Sabrina's murder conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

State v. Hambright

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124878

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: LUCKERT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Gerald D. Hambright, who was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, specifically a dagger, as a felon. The charge was based on an encounter with a sheriff's deputy, during which Hambright was found to have an object in a sheath on his belt. The object was later identified as a dagger. Hambright had a prior felony conviction, which prohibited him from possessing a weapon. The State initially charged Hambright with unlawful possession of a knife, but later amended the charge to unlawful possession of a dagger.

The case was first heard in the Sedgwick District Court, where Hambright was convicted. Hambright appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed a dagger. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hambright, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of what characteristics made the object a dagger. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, leading to the State's appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Hambright possessed a dagger. The jury had seen the dagger and heard details about its characteristics, including its sharp edge and pointed end. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirmed the district court's judgment on the single issue, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of other issues raised by Hambright that the Court of Appeals had not addressed.

Cardilli v. State

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 25

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves Mark Cardilli Jr., who was convicted of manslaughter after shooting and killing Isahak Muse, the boyfriend of Cardilli's sister. Cardilli claimed he acted in self-defense, fearing that Muse, who was unarmed but physically aggressive, would take his gun and use it against him and his family. The trial court found that Cardilli's belief that deadly force was necessary was objectively unreasonable, leading to his conviction.

Cardilli appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial attorneys failed to adequately argue that he acted in self-defense. The post-conviction court agreed, granting Cardilli's petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his conviction, and ordering a new trial. The court found that Cardilli's attorneys did not have a cohesive trial strategy and did not communicate effectively, which could have affected the trial court's fact-finding.

The State of Maine appealed the post-conviction court's decision, arguing that Cardilli did not show prejudice resulting from the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the State, finding that the trial court's factual findings left no room for any argument that Cardilli's use of deadly force against Muse was justified. The court concluded that the legal argument Cardilli claimed his counsel should have pursued was incompatible with the court's findings about what occurred. The court vacated the post-conviction court's judgment and remanded for the entry of a judgment denying Cardilli's petition for post-conviction relief.

State v. Watson

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 24

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: DOUGLAS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Tara L. Watson was charged with three crimes, including unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (cocaine base), refusing to submit to arrest, and violation of condition of release. Watson pleaded guilty to all three charges. The trial court sentenced Watson to a three-year prison term for the drug possession charge, which was the leading charge for sentencing purposes. Watson appealed the sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding or misapplying sentencing principles.

The trial court had held a sentencing hearing where the State argued that Watson was not a good candidate for probation due to her history of possession and use, previous violation of conditions of release, and her delivery of a false name and flight from the officer who stopped the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Watson, on the other hand, argued for a probated sentence so that she could focus on addressing her substance use disorder in a highly supervised residential program.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court found that the trial court had erred in its sentencing analysis by relying heavily on its own personal experiences and beliefs about drug use and crime, rather than on an individualized assessment of Watson's circumstances. The court also found that the trial court had failed to adequately address the sentencing goal of eliminating inequalities in sentences and had not given due consideration to a viable rehabilitative treatment option as an alternative to incarceration.

Commonwealth v. Tyler

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12836

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: GAZIANO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves Terrence Tyler, who was convicted of felony-murder in the first degree with the predicate felony of attempted unarmed robbery and assault with intent to rob. The incident occurred during a planned robbery of a marijuana dealer, Wilner Parisse, who was shot and killed during a physical altercation. Tyler appealed his conviction and filed two motions for a new trial. The first motion argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction. The second motion requested the retroactive application of a court decision (Commonwealth v. Brown) that abolished felony-murder as an independent theory of liability for murder. Both motions were denied.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed Tyler's case and his motions for a new trial. The court held that the rule in Brown was intended to apply prospectively, and there was no reason to depart from that limitation. The court also found that Tyler's trial counsel did not err by failing to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction, as the pre-Brown default rule applies here. The court further held that the trial judge's instruction did not allow the jury to find Tyler guilty of felony-murder for conduct only sufficient to convict him of manslaughter. The court declined to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree to a lesser degree of guilt. Therefore, Tyler's conviction was affirmed, and the orders denying his motions for a new trial were also affirmed.

State vs. Jones

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0172

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the defendant, David Darnell Jones, Jr., who was convicted of second-degree assault after threatening to beat a victim, A.M., while holding a wooden board. The board was approximately 2 inches by 3 inches and 3 feet long. To commit second-degree assault, a defendant must assault another person with a dangerous weapon. The State alleged that Jones brandished the board as a dangerous weapon near the semi-conscious victim, while simultaneously threatening to “beat [A.M.] bloody.” Jones pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial.

The district court instructed the jury on assault-fear and also instructed the jurors that an object which is neither a firearm nor designed as a weapon can still be considered a dangerous weapon if the defendant intended to use it in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily harm. The jury found Jones guilty of both second- and third-degree assault. The district court convicted Jones of both counts and sentenced him to 39 months in prison for second-degree assault. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed Jones’s conviction for second-degree assault but reversed his third-degree assault conviction as a lesser-included offense.

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court concluded that Jones’s statements expressing his plan to harm A.M., made while the assault was occurring and as Jones was brandishing the board, are direct evidence of his intent to use the board in a manner likely to produce great bodily harm. The court further concluded that, based on the direct evidence of Jones’s intended use of the board, a jury could reasonably conclude that the board was a dangerous weapon.

Archie v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00326-SCT

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: CHAMBERLIN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Joshua Archie, who was convicted of conspiracy and capital murder. The incident occurred on October 26, 2012, when the Ridgeland Police Department responded to a "shots fired" call at Party City. Upon arrival, they found store manager Bobby Adams shot dead. The police were informed by store manager Regina Blake and store employee Undra Ward that a masked gunman with dreadlocks had entered the store, demanded money, and fled with the cash. The police suspected an inside job due to the nature of the crime. Ward later confessed to his involvement and implicated Archie as the gunman.

In the lower courts, Archie was found guilty of both conspiracy and capital murder. He appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred by denying two of his requested jury instructions, that unauthenticated evidence was wrongfully presented to the jury, that the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Archie’s conviction. The court found no error in the trial court's decisions, including the denial of Archie's requested jury instructions, the admission of an unauthenticated photograph of Archie, and the verdict's alignment with the weight of the evidence. The court also found that Archie's trial counsel was not ineffective. The court concluded that the evidence against Archie was overwhelming, and any errors in the trial process did not contribute to the verdict.

State v. Severson

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 76

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: Baker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around Kyle Severson, who was convicted for mitigated deliberate homicide after shooting Tyler Hayden. Severson, his girlfriend, her sister, and his daughter were at a convenience store when Hayden and Dalton Watson arrived. Hayden approached Severson's car, and Severson shot him, claiming he feared Hayden would harm him or his daughter. Severson was charged with deliberate homicide and later found guilty of mitigated deliberate homicide, resulting in a forty-year prison sentence.

Severson appealed his conviction, arguing that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to disclose favorable evidence and that the cumulative effect of errors in the District Court denied him a fair trial. The undisclosed evidence included law enforcement investigative reports of a burglary at Severson's home and the contents of Watson's cell phone.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana concluded that the cumulative effect of errors in the proceedings denied Severson his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process. The court found that the prosecutor's misconduct and the State's failure to disclose certain evidence had a direct bearing on the credibility of the witnesses at trial. The court reversed Severson's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

State V. Simonsen

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 21

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: JENSEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Tristen Simonsen was convicted on two counts of solicitation of a minor, one count of sexual contact with a minor under the age of sixteen, and one count of rape in the fourth degree. The court did not specify during sentencing whether it intended to treat each charge as a separate transaction. After sentencing, the court signed four separate judgments of conviction and ordered each conviction to be served consecutively. Later the same day, the court held a hearing to clarify its intent, determining that each charge was the result of a separate transaction. Simonsen appealed, arguing that the court improperly enhanced his sentence after it had already commenced.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota disagreed, ruling that the circuit court's post-sentencing declaration to treat each charge as a separate transaction only affected Simonsen's future eligibility for parole, not his sentence. The court also rejected Simonsen's argument that his constitutional rights were violated by his absence from the post-sentencing hearing, noting that the hearing only impacted his parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.

State V. Trueblood

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 17

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Myren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Paul Trueblood was charged with multiple offenses, including second-degree rape, following a sexual encounter with D.B.L. After a mistrial due to D.B.L. contracting COVID-19, the State presented additional evidence to a grand jury, which added charges of aiding and abetting, witness tampering, and solicitation of witness tampering. These charges were based on allegations that Trueblood arranged to have D.B.L. attacked to prevent her from testifying. On the morning of the second trial, Trueblood pled guilty to second-degree rape under a plea agreement with the State, which dismissed all other charges.

Trueblood later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting his innocence but acknowledging that he did not immediately stop the sexual act when D.B.L. withdrew her consent. The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, denied the motion, finding that Trueblood's plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and that he had not established any "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Trueblood's fear of the possible ramifications of a trial was not a sufficient reason to withdraw his guilty plea. The court also noted that Trueblood's motion was not premised on a claim of actual innocence, as he continued to admit to facts sufficient for second-degree rape. The court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by denying Trueblood’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.