Robinson v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department Of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-9001

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case revolves around Harvey Robinson, who was convicted of multiple crimes including three counts of first-degree murder. The prosecution sought the death penalty for each of the murder counts, arguing that Robinson posed a future danger to society if he was ever released from prison. During sentencing, a juror asked the judge whether a life sentence would entail parole. The judge initially speculated that while current law doesn't permit parole, the law might change in the future. Later, the judge corrected his statement, firmly asserting that life imprisonment meant no parole.

Robinson's case went through several layers of courts. During his appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, arguing that the prosecution did not make an issue of Robinson's future dangerousness and there was no error in the trial court's instruction. The state courts and a federal district court denied him collateral relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court noted that the judge's final instruction to the jury made it clear that Robinson, if sentenced to life imprisonment, would not be eligible for parole. The court concluded that even if the judge's initial speculation about parole had been problematic, his subsequent correction absolved any error. The court also concluded that the prosecution had indeed raised the issue of Robinson's future dangerousness, contrary to the state court's ruling. Thus, the court upheld the denial of habeas corpus.

United States v. Barksdale

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2284

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case involves a criminal defendant, William Barksdale, who was denied the right to testify in his own defense during a supervised release revocation hearing. Barksdale had previously pled guilty to conspiring to commit wire fraud, was sentenced to twenty months in prison and five years' supervised release. Near the end of his supervised release, his probation officer reported ten potential violations of his release terms to the District Court. During the revocation hearing, Barksdale repeatedly expressed his desire to testify, but the judge denied his request, stating that Barksdale had chosen not to testify. The judge then found Barksdale guilty of nine release violations and sentenced him to thirty months in prison.

Barksdale appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the District Court denied him his right to testify in his own defense. The Circuit Court reviewed the District Court's findings of fact for clear error, its legal rulings de novo, and its ultimate decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion.

The Circuit Court found that on the record before them, the District Court judge had erred in denying Barksdale his right to testify. The Court ruled that nowhere on the record did Barksdale himself waive that right, and thus he was denied his constitutional right to testify. The government was then required to prove that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which they failed to do. The Court noted that even if Barksdale's testimony could have reduced his sentence only slightly, that is enough to make the error harmful.

Finally, despite Barksdale's request for a new judge on remand, the Circuit Court found no evidence of bias or appearance of bias from the District Court judge. Therefore, the case was remanded to the same judge for a new revocation hearing.

USA v. Davitashvili

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1024

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Davit Davitashvili, who was charged with violating federal law by transmitting threats to injure his ex-wife, Olga Volosevich, and other unnamed individuals. This was after a long history of abusive behavior towards Volosevich, culminating in threatening messages sent to her via the messaging app Viber. Davitashvili appealed his conviction, arguing that his threats towards unnamed individuals were constitutionally protected speech.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with Davitashvili's claim. It noted that Davitashvili's threats towards "others" were not protected speech under the First Amendment, as they targeted particular individuals, supporting a conviction. The court pointed out that the jury instructions required the jury to find that Davitashvili’s communication threatened to "injure a person or a group of people," which accurately reflected the relevant federal law.

As for the defendant's argument that his conviction was based on an invalid theory (threatening unspecified "others"), the court held that the jury likely would have convicted Davitashvili based on his threats to Volosevich alone, even if the "kill others" theory was excluded. The court concluded that the trial was error-free and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

D&T Partners v. Baymark Partners

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-11148

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Douglas

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Business Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

A group of individuals, including D&T Partners LLC and ACET Global LLC, alleged that Baymark Partners Management LLC and others attempted to steal the assets and trade secrets of their e-commerce company through shell entities, corrupt lending practices, and a fraudulent bankruptcy. The plaintiffs claimed that Baymark had purchased D&T's assets and then defaulted on its payment obligations. According to the plaintiffs, Baymark replaced the company's management, caused the company to default on its loan payments, and transferred the company's assets to another entity, Windspeed Trading LLC. The plaintiffs alleged that this scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs were unable to plead a pattern of racketeering activity, a necessary element of a RICO claim.

The case was then taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court, holding that while the complaint alleges coordinated theft, it does not constitute a "pattern" of racketeering conduct sufficient to state a RICO claim. This is because the alleged victims were limited in number, and the scope and nature of the scheme was finite and focused on a singular objective. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

United States v. Agrawal

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5931

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Jyoti Agrawal, was convicted of three financial crimes. Agrawal had obtained over $1.5 million in federal and state grants to research and develop a scanning electron microscope. However, she forged a letter in her company’s application to the Department of Energy, and later lied about how the funds were spent. She diverted a portion of the grant funds for personal expenses, including her MBA. The district court found that Agrawal's conduct caused a loss of $1,548,255, which was used to calculate her sentencing guidelines range. She was also ordered to pay restitution of the same amount.

On appeal, Agrawal challenged the district court’s evidentiary and instructional rulings at trial, its estimate of the amount of loss from her fraud, and its decision to find her personal property forfeitable due to the fraud. However, the Court of Appeals found that the alleged evidentiary and instructional errors were harmless, the district court properly refused to offset its loss amount by her project expenses, and the court properly subjected her personal property to forfeiture because she commingled that property with grant funds.

Furthermore, the court rejected Agrawal's challenges to her sentence, including her claim that the court identified an incorrect guidelines range, miscalculated the restitution amounts, and entered an illegal forfeiture judgment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision.

United States v. Kellogg

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2124

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from Christopher Tate and Sandra Kellogg, who were charged with conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs and other drug offenses. They were tried jointly, and the jury convicted them on all counts. The district court imposed substantial, yet below-guidelines, prison sentences. On appeal, both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on one of the counts of their convictions and the enhancements used to determine their guidelines sentencing ranges.

The court affirmed the convictions and sentences of both defendants. It concluded that the jury could have found that Tate at least jointly possessed the methamphetamine found in his car. The court also held that although Kellogg argued that she was not part of the larger conspiracy, she failed to establish prejudice resulting from the supposed variance between the larger conspiracy charged in the indictment and the smaller conspiracy proven at trial.

Furthermore, the court held that the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court were justified. It found that the evidence supported the application of a 2-level firearm-possession enhancement against Tate, and that any error in its application would have been harmless. Similarly, the court found that Kellogg's challenge to the application of a 3-level enhancement for her role as a manager or supervisor of criminal activity was unavailing. Despite Kellogg's argument that she was not a "manager or supervisor" and that the criminal activity did not involve five or more participants, the court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's findings.

United States v. Tate

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2060

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: RIPPLE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case under review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of two defendants, Christopher Tate and Sandra Kellogg, charged with conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs and other drug offenses. The government had charged twelve people with these offenses. Ten of them pleaded guilty, while Tate and Kellogg chose to go to trial. They were tried jointly, and the jury convicted them on all counts. Both defendants appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for one of their conviction counts and objecting to one of the enhancements used to determine their sentencing guidelines.

The court found that the evidence was sufficient for both defendants' convictions. For Tate, the jury could have reasonably found that he at least jointly possessed the methamphetamine found in his car. For Kellogg, even if a juror could not have found a larger conspiracy connecting her, Harris, Mr. Tate, and others, she did not establish prejudice from the supposed variance between the larger conspiracy charged and the smaller conspiracy proven at trial.

In terms of sentencing enhancements, the court found that the district court correctly applied the firearm-possession enhancement for Mr. Tate and the manager-supervisor enhancement for Ms. Kellogg. The court concluded that Mr. Tate's total offense level would have been the maximum under the Guidelines with or without the enhancement. As for Ms. Kellogg, she did not raise an objection to the enhancement in the district court and thus the matter was waived.

USA v. White

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2014

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Sykes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case arose from a drug trafficking operation led by Keith White in an Indiana prison. White, along with others, was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin after three inmates died of drug overdoses. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced under enhanced penalties due to his criminal history, which included two felony convictions for cocaine dealing. This was his second appeal challenging his sentence.

White argued that his status as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines was improperly determined based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. He contended that the guideline’s definition of a “controlled substance offense” unambiguously excluded inchoate offenses, such as conspiracy, and thus the application note expanding this definition deserved no deference.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. It noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor did not unsettle Stinson v. United States, which provided that commentary in the Guidelines interpreting or explaining a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline. Thus, the court deferred to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the career-offender guideline.

Additionally, the court rejected White's argument that the “major questions doctrine” invalidated the application note. The court concluded that the application note was not a “transformative expansion” of the Sentencing Commission’s authority, and, therefore, the doctrine did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment.

United States v. Arrington

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2173

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law

Jonathan Weber Arrington, the defendant, was employed by Recon Roofing and Construction to handle their finances. He was found guilty of wire fraud, having embezzled a total of $315,835 from the company between August 2019 and March 2021. Arrington appealed his sentence and the related restitution order. He argued that the district court erred by assigning him the burden of proof regarding any offset to the restitution amount. The defendant also contended that the court didn't account for the value of payments he made towards the loss, and that the imposed sentence was unreasonably harsh.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the sentence but vacated the restitution order. The Appeals Court stated that the district court was correct in assigning Arrington the burden of proof for any offset to the amount of restitution. However, it was determined that the district court had erred in not reducing the restitution amount by the value of shares sold by the defendant back to the company. Therefore, the restitution amount was reduced by $50,000 to $265,835. The court found the prison sentence to be reasonable, considering the factors such as Arrington's position of trust within the company, the extent of the fraud, his attempt to cover it up, and his prior federal fraud conviction.

United States v. Cody Hopkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2203

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In this case, the defendant, Cody Wayne Hopkins, was charged with Attempted Enticement of a Minor Using the Internet, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The accusation revolved around an online conversation Hopkins had with a government agent posing as a 13-year-old girl. Despite knowing her age, Hopkins continued the conversation, making explicit sexual remarks, and arranging to meet her at a nearby high school. Upon arriving, Hopkins was arrested, and in a subsequent interview, admitted to knowing the girl was underage but claimed his intention was only to talk to her.

During his trial, Hopkins claimed he was severely sleep-deprived during the interview, which led to confusion. However, the prosecution implied that he was lying about this assertion since it was not mentioned in the interview's transcript, which was redacted and given to the jury. Furthermore, the prosecution argued that Hopkins intended to entice a minor into engaging in illegal sexual activity based on his explicit text messages, despite Hopkins's claims of merely wanting to talk.

The jury found Hopkins guilty, and he moved for a new trial citing prosecutorial misconduct. He argued that the prosecution had attacked his credibility based on untrue facts - that he had not mentioned sleep deprivation during the interview - and had repeatedly misstated the elements of the charged crime. However, the district court denied his motion for a new trial.

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no plain error in the prosecution’s conduct that would affect Hopkins' substantial rights, as the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. The court also did not find any exceptional circumstances warranting reversal due to the prosecutor's alleged misstatement of the elements of the crime during the closing argument. Lastly, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not deny Hopkins a fair trial.

United States v. Roads

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1828

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: ERICKSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Jeffrey Roads was convicted of transporting and accessing child pornography, and received a 324-month prison sentence. He appealed, alleging conflicts of interest among his defense counsel and the presiding judge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously vacated Roads's sentence and ordered a lower court to determine whether a conflict of interest among Roads's defense counsel may have affected his substantial rights. After re-assignment of the case to a different judge and changes in counsel, Roads's motions for disclosure of information and recusal were denied. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea was also denied, and he was re-sentenced to the same term of imprisonment.

On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Roads argued that the district court erred in denying his motions and in applying a two-level obstruction enhancement during sentencing. He claimed that a reasonable person may question the impartiality of the court due to perceived personal relationships with federal officials or court employees who had been threatened by another individual, Justin Fletcher.

However, the Appeals Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roads's motions. It found that Roads had failed to provide any information suggesting the court could not be impartial. The court also found that Roads's reasons for recusal were based on inaccurate "facts" and mere speculation. The court denied Roads's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as he failed to show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. It concluded that the district court was correct in applying the obstruction enhancement, as Roads had attempted to destroy evidence. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Roads's sentence.

United States v. Winder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1829

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In March 2021, Jeffrey A. Winder and Heather Durbin rented a room at a motel. During check-in, the motel manager, Gary McCullough, warned Winder that any illegal activity would result in eviction. The next day, McCullough entered the room for cleaning and discovered a backpack containing what appeared to be methamphetamine. He immediately called 911 and informed the responding officers about his discovery. Upon the officers' arrival, McCullough granted them permission to enter the room, which led to them finding more drugs and a handgun. Winder and Durbin were later arrested when they returned to the motel; another gun and more drugs were found in their vehicle.

Before trial, Winder moved to suppress all the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the motel room, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. A magistrate judge recommended that the motion to suppress be denied. The district court adopted this recommendation, ruling that Winder had been evicted at the time of the search and that the officers had probable cause to search the backpack based on McCullough's account. Winder pleaded guilty conditionally to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court found that Winder was lawfully ejected from the motel room prior to the officers' entry, thus eliminating his expectation of privacy. The court also ruled that the officers' search of the backpack did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it did not exceed the scope of McCullough's private search. Consequently, the use of a drug dog and the subsequent seizure of evidence did not violate Winder's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Tat

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50240

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: MENDOZA

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law

The case under review is an appeal regarding the resentencing of Vivian Tat, who was involved in a money-laundering scheme. At her initial sentencing, Tat was convicted on several counts and sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. However, she appealed and the higher court vacated her conviction on one count and her sentence, remanding for de novo resentencing. At the resentencing hearing, Tat received an 18-month sentence.

Her appeal to this court is her second one, and she argues that the lower court erred in applying sentencing enhancements related to her role as an organizer/leader and her abuse of trust, improperly considered "cost" in dismissing her community-service proposal at sentencing, and violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by failing to make factual findings about certain parts of her presentence report.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant’s failure to challenge specific aspects of her initial sentence on a prior appeal does not waive her right to challenge comparable aspects of a newly imposed sentence following de novo resentencing. The court found that the lower court had erred in applying an organizer/leader enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, as Tat’s status as a mere member of the criminal enterprise did not bear on whether she was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal activity, and the criminal conduct was not “otherwise extensive.” However, the district court did not err in applying an enhancement for abuse of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, where Tat’s position as a manager at the bank gave her the discretion to carry out transactions like the one at issue here without oversight, and where her position of trust facilitated her role in the underlying offense. The court also found that the lower court did not improperly consider “cost” in dismissing Tat’s community-service proposal. The court vacated Tat’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

USA V. SAPALASAN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-30251

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: NELSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Markanthony Sapalasan was arrested and his backpack was searched. After the arrest, his backpack was taken into police custody, and Sapalasan was taken to the police station for questioning regarding a potential murder. After questioning, Sapalasan was released, but his backpack remained in police custody. Approximately six hours later, Officer Tae Yoon conducted an inventory search of the backpack and discovered methamphetamine. Sapalasan was subsequently convicted of two drug felonies and appealed the conviction, claiming that the search of his backpack violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the police may constitutionally conduct an inventory search of belongings when the property is lawfully retained and the search is done in compliance with police regulations, even after the individual has been released. The court found that the lawfulness of the initial separation of Sapalasan from his backpack was unchallenged, so the justification of an inventory search did not depend on whether he was headed to jail. The court also determined that Officer Yoon's inventory search substantially complied with the police department's policy. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of Sapalasan's motion to suppress the methamphetamine found during the search.

USA v. Haitham Alhindi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-11349

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves Haitham Yousef Alhindi, the defendant-appellant, who was charged with five counts of cyberstalking. Alhindi's counsel requested a competency evaluation, which was conducted by the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau), albeit late. Based on limited information and caution, the Bureau's report deemed Alhindi incompetent. The court ordered Alhindi to be hospitalized for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). However, before Alhindi was hospitalized, the Bureau reported that he was not exhibiting any signs of mental illness and recommended a second competency evaluation, which the court ordered over Alhindi's objection. The second evaluation also concluded that Alhindi was incompetent. Alhindi appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to order a second competency evaluation and commitment for hospitalization.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 4241 authorizes district courts to order multiple competency evaluations and commitments for hospitalization when appropriate under the statute's terms. The court also found that the four-month limit in § 4241(d)(1) applies to the period of hospitalization, not the entire commitment period. The court emphasized the importance of district courts’ continued close supervision of competency proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's entry of the commitment order.

USA v. Handlon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13699

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by Quinton Handlon, a prisoner convicted of producing, coercing, and possessing child pornography. Handlon had requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because his elderly father needed a caregiver. The district court denied the request as Handlon failed to provide substantial evidence about his father's condition or proving that he was the only available caretaker. Handlon appealed this decision.

The Appeals Court upheld the district court's decision, affirming that Handlon's case did not meet the extraordinary and compelling reasons necessary for compassionate release under the policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. At the time of Handlon's motion, the policy statement recognized four categories for compassionate release, none of which included the incapacitation of a parent when the defendant could serve as a caregiver.

The court noted that a recent amendment to the policy statement now includes such a scenario, but clarified that it could not be applied retroactively in this appeal because it was a substantive amendment, not a clarifying one. The court affirmed the denial of Handlon's motion for compassionate release, but hinted that Handlon might be able to file a new motion for compassionate release under the updated policy.

USA v. Thomas Daniels

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13590

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: Marcus

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In February 2020, Thomas Daniels was convicted of carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, brandishing and discharging a firearm during the carjacking, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. The incident occurred when Daniels entered a tow yard, threatened two individuals with a gun, shot them both, and then stole their possessions and vehicle. Daniels appealed his convictions, challenging on evidentiary and suppression grounds.

Daniels argued that the district court erred in excluding a defense expert who was offered to testify on the reliability of eyewitness identification, and in admitting the victim’s out-of-court identification testimony. He also objected to a detective’s testimony identifying him in the tow yard surveillance footage, and the failure to suppress photographs taken of him after the crime. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found no error in the district court's decisions and affirmed Daniels’ convictions.

The court held that given the detective's familiarity with Daniels, his identification of Daniels in the surveillance footage was indeed helpful to the jury. In addition, the court found that the photo array shown to one of the victims was not unduly suggestive, and even if it were, the victim's identification of Daniels was nonetheless reliable. Finally, the court found no constitutional violation in the encounter between the detective and Daniels as there was probable cause to arrest Daniels, and thus the photos taken during that encounter were not the "fruit" of an unlawful seizure.

USA v. Vargas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10604

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Marcus

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Victor Vargas, was convicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the 35-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the delay did not weigh heavily against the government.

The court noted that the delay was broken down into three parts. The first ten months involved diligent efforts by the case agent to arrest Vargas. The second part was an eight-month period of inactivity due to the case agent being transferred to another position. The final period was a 16-month delay due to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that none of these delays were intentional or in bad faith. It further pointed out that throughout this period, Vargas was living freely and was not restricted in any way. Given these considerations, the court concluded that the delay did not uniformly weigh heavily against the government. Consequently, the court held that Vargas must demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay, which he admitted he could not do. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision that Vargas's right to a speedy trial was not violated.

USA v. Green-Remache

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3058

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: Edwards

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Joey Green-Remache, who was charged with interstate violation of a protective order, following a jury trial. Green-Remache was also charged with first-degree burglary and kidnapping, but the jury hung on these charges. He later pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary, and the Government dismissed the kidnapping charge. The charges were based on the Government's claim that Green-Remache broke into his on-again-off-again girlfriend's apartment and forcibly transported her from D.C. to Maryland, contrary to a civil protective order. At trial, the Government presented a Clinical Psychologist who testified about the characteristics of coercive control relationships between sexual partners. The appellant claimed that the jury was likely heavily influenced by this "opinion testimony," which he argues was not connected to the circumstances of this case. Therefore, he requested that the case be remanded to determine whether counsel's failure to object to the Psychologist's testimony constituted ineffective assistance that prejudiced him.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the appellant's request for a remand. The court held that the record conclusively demonstrated that the appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged errors. The court noted that the Government introduced considerable evidence to support its theory that the appellant caused his girlfriend to travel with him to Maryland by force, coercion, duress, or fraud, apart from the Psychologist's testimony. This evidence included the girlfriend's grand jury testimony, recorded interviews, a 911 call, testimony from a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, and testimony from two eyewitnesses. The court concluded that this "overwhelming" evidence against the appellant undercut his claim that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

Knudsen v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085992(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: POOCHIGIAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Eric Bean Knudsen, who had his driver's license suspended following an administrative per se (APS) hearing. The hearing officer from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) concluded that Knudsen had driven his car with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or greater. Knudsen challenged this decision through a writ of mandate in the Kern County Superior Court, which was denied, and the suspension was upheld.

Knudsen appealed the decision, arguing that his state and federal due process rights were violated because the hearing officer who conducted the APS hearing was not constitutionally impartial. He cited a previous case, California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. DMV, which held that a public hearing officer who acts as both an advocate and adjudicator violates a driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reviewed the case. The court agreed with Knudsen, concluding that the public hearing officer acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, which violated Knudsen's due process right to an impartial adjudicator. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new APS hearing.

Lew-Williams v. Petrosian

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B330387(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: FEUER

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves Gail Dee Lew-Williams, as the surviving spouse and successor in interest of Wilbur Williams, Jr., M.D., and Wilbur Williams, M.D., Inc. (collectively, the Williams plaintiffs) and Sevana Petrosian and her associates Salina Ranjbar, Vana Mehrabian, and Staforde Palmer (collectively, the Petrosian defendants). The Williams plaintiffs accused the Petrosian defendants of embezzling approximately $11.5 million from the Corporation’s bank accounts. The trial court compelled the case to arbitration, but the Williams plaintiffs failed to initiate arbitration proceedings. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants.

The Williams plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they did not have the funds to initiate the arbitration and that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration. The Petrosian defendants argued that the claims were properly dismissed because the Williams plaintiffs had the funds to arbitrate and should not be allowed on appeal to challenge the trial court’s order compelling arbitration before first arbitrating their claims.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, concluded that once a trial court has compelled claims to contractual arbitration, the court has “very limited authority with respect to [the] pending arbitration.” If a party fails to diligently prosecute an arbitration, the appropriate remedy is for the opposing party to seek relief in the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants for failure to prosecute. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case.

People v. Brown

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081445(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: KELETY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Gregory Terence Brown, who was charged with aggravated mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon. Initially declared incompetent due to a diagnosed mental disorder, Brown was later considered competent for trial. He requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, which was denied. Brown was subsequently convicted and sentenced.

Brown appealed, arguing that the denial of his motion for mental health diversion was incorrect, and that amendments to section 1001.36 (effective after his conviction but before sentencing) should be applied retroactively, warranting reconsideration of his motion. The People argued that Brown waived his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration prior to sentencing.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, found that the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion in 2022, but concluded that the amendments to section 1001.36 were retroactive. The court also determined that under the circumstances, Brown did not forfeit his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration. Accordingly, the court of appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for further consideration under the amended statute.

People v. Gray

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085699(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: SNAUFFER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the appeal of the state against a defendant, Shawn Vincent Gray, who had been committed to the Department of Mental Health after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) for one count of stalking and two counts of making criminal threats. Gray had also admitted a prior strike allegation and six one-year prior prison commitment allegations. The trial court had determined Gray's maximum term of commitment to be 19 years four months, which could be extended if his sanity was not restored. No appeal was filed at the time, and the judgment became final.

In 2019, Senate Bill No. 136 (SB 136) amended the Penal Code and limited one-year prior prison term sentencing enhancements to sexually violent offenses. All other one-year sentencing enhancements from prior prison commitments were declared legally invalid. In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (SB 483) made SB 136’s changes to the Penal Code partially retroactive to include previously final criminal judgments.

In 2023, Gray's counsel filed a petition to recall the maximum commitment time and strike the legally invalid enhancements. The court granted the petition, recalled the judgment, and reset the maximum term of commitment to 13 years four months. This decision was appealed by the state.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District found that the Superior Court of Kern County did not have jurisdiction to consider Gray's petition in the first instance and therefore its subsequent orders were void. The court noted that SB 483 and section 1172.75 of the Penal Code did not apply to NGI judgments or to their underlying maximum terms of commitment. The Court of Appeal thus reversed and vacated the Superior Court's orders and directed the court to deny Gray's petition in its entirety.

State v. Sayles

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20575

Opinion Date: March 26, 2024

Judge: Robinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant, Dwayne Sayles, was convicted of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, among other crimes, in connection with his role in the robbery of a convenience store and the shooting death of the store clerk. On appeal, Sayles challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence of his cell phone and the data contained therein. He argued that the police had violated his rights under Miranda and the Connecticut constitution when they continued to interrogate him after he had invoked his right to counsel, and that the seizure of his cell phone violated the fourth amendment to the U.S. constitution and the Connecticut constitution.

However, the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that any error in the admission of the contents of Sayles' cell phone was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming wealth of evidence against him. This evidence included surveillance footage from inside of the convenience store, detailed testimony from a co-conspirator about Sayles' and his own involvement in the events, testimony from a jailhouse informant that Sayles had confessed to his involvement in the crimes, and a corroborating statement made to the police by a friend of Sayles. The court also noted significant evidence of Sayles' consciousness of guilt, such as testimony that he had directed his cousin to assault a potential witness to force him to recant his testimony. Physical evidence, including a ski mask and gloves found during the search of Sayles' residence and cell phone location data, further corroborated the testimony and statements. Given this, the court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment and declined to address Sayles' constitutional challenges.

BLASH V THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1096

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, Demarcus Deshawn Blash, was convicted for malice murder and other offenses related to the shooting deaths of Jain Marie Williams and Wendell Everett Williams. Blash contended that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. He also argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his objection to the introduction of his jail phone call recordings and to expert testimony regarding gang language in those recordings.

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to authorize Blash’s convictions, as he and his co-defendants had planned the crimes and he was a party to them. The trial court properly exercised its authority in denying Blash’s motion for a new trial. The trial court did not err in admitting the jail call recordings, as they were properly authenticated and not unduly prejudicial. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony interpreting gang terminology, as it helped the jury understand the specialized language in the recordings.

However, the court vacated the sentences for burglary and one count of theft by taking because these counts should have merged with home invasion and armed robbery, respectively.

State v. Rose

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50765

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Zahn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho vacated a lower court's decision to modify Kenneth Richard Rose, Jr.'s sentence. Rose had pleaded guilty to one count of felony aggravated driving under the influence, and the district court sentenced him to six years in prison with one year fixed. The district court indicated it would reconsider Rose's sentence after his direct appeal and stayed the execution of his sentence. Following the conclusion of Rose's appeal, he moved the district court for a reduction of sentence per Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b). The district court agreed and modified Rose's sentence, leading the State to appeal.

The Supreme Court found that the district court did not have jurisdiction to modify Rose's sentence because his Rule 35(b) motion was untimely. The court concluded that the 120-day timeframe for filing a Rule 35(b) motion began when the district court initially entered its judgment, not after Rose's appeal concluded. The court held that the district court's decision to stay the execution of Rose's sentence did not extend the timeframe for filing a Rule 35(b) motion. Thus, because Rose's motion was filed more than three years after his sentence was imposed, exceeding the 120 days permitted by Rule 35(b), the district court did not have jurisdiction to modify his sentence.

State v. Van Zanten

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48808

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Transportation Law

The case involves the defendant, Kevin James Van Zanten, who was convicted for felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor driving under the influence. Van Zanten challenged the conviction, arguing that the evidence was obtained unlawfully following a stop of the commercial vehicle he was driving. He claimed the stop was based on regulations adopted by the Idaho State Police, which he argued resulted from an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

In September 2020, an Idaho State Police Trooper observed a 2005 Kenworth truck driven by Van Zanten. The Trooper noted several violations, including an improperly displayed Department of Transportation number, unsecured hazardous material, and other items on the truck. The truck was stopped, and the driver was identified as Van Zanten, whose driving privileges were found to be suspended. A subsequent search of the truck resulted in the finding of drugs, leading to Van Zanten's arrest.

At the trial court, Van Zanten moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the Trooper had no legal basis to stop him. He asserted that the Trooper initiated the stop to investigate state regulations that were unenforceable because the statutes authorizing those regulations unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. The district court denied his motion, leading to his appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's judgment. It held that the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop Van Zanten due to specific, articulable facts, thus justifying the stop. The court noted that the inherent danger associated with unsecured hazardous waste and other violations fell within the community caretaking function of law enforcement, and given the nature of the vehicle Van Zanten was driving, the public interest in safety outweighed the limited intrusion of stopping the vehicle. Consequently, the court did not need to address the constitutionality of the statutes in question. The court affirmed Van Zanten’s judgment of conviction.

People v. Johanson

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129425

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Korem M. Johanson, was found guilty of Class X felony predatory criminal sexual assault of a child following a bench trial in the circuit court of McHenry County. Before sentencing, Johanson argued that the penalty for this offense violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, as it contained identical elements to the less severe Class 2 felony offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse but carried a harsher sentence. The circuit court denied this motion and sentenced Johanson to 16 years' imprisonment.

Johanson appealed, maintaining the same argument. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, concluding that the two offenses did not contain identical elements. While both offenses required the victim to be under the age of 13, the court found that the definition of sexual conduct for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse could be satisfied without contact involving the sex organ or anus, which was a requirement for the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found a clear difference between the two offenses based on the statutory language. While acts that satisfy the contact element of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child also satisfy the element of sexual conduct, the opposite is not always true. Therefore, the two offenses do not contain identical elements. The court also rejected Johanson's argument that the elements of the offense as alleged in this case were identical for both offenses, stating that this was an as-applied challenge, which is not appropriate under the identical elements test. The court concluded that the more severe sentence provided for the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child is not constitutionally disproportionate to the less severe sentence for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.

State of Iowa v. Goble

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1507

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: Waterman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals and the district court that sentenced a recidivist drug offender, Jacob Lee Goble, to an indeterminate prison sentence of up to five years. Goble, who had pleaded guilty to a class "D" felony, appealed on the grounds that the sentencing court improperly considered parole as a factor in determining his sentence. The court mentioned parole once in the context of Goble's need for a structured setting for his rehabilitation and protection of the community.

The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, found that the mention of parole in this context was not inappropriate. The court stated that the district court did nothing to circumvent the parole board’s discretion in determining the release date, and its reference to parole is authorized by statute. Goble’s sentence was therefore affirmed, and his claim that the sentencing court relied on an improper factor by mentioning parole was rejected.

The court also differentiated this case from precedent where it was held impermissible for the district court to impose a longer prison sentence for the purpose of delaying the defendant’s release on parole. In this case, the district court’s choice was limited to imposing a five-year indeterminate sentence with immediate parole eligibility or suspending that sentence and placing Goble on probation. The court concluded that the district court did not impose a longer sentence to circumvent the parole board’s discretion.

State of Iowa v. Starr

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-0858

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: Mansfield

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa ruled in a case involving an individual, Faron Alan Starr, who was arrested and denied his request to call a family member to get an attorney. Starr was suspected of an assault and stealing two firearms. After his arrest, he was taken to a police station where he initially equivocated about speaking to the police without an attorney. However, he later requested to call his father to obtain a lawyer, which was refused by the police officer. The officer proceeded to question Starr about his actions and whereabouts of the stolen firearms.

Starr was charged with multiple offenses, and he subsequently filed a motion to suppress his statements and any evidence derived from them, asserting violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court granted the motion, finding a violation of Starr's rights under Iowa Code section 804.20, which mandates that an arrested person be allowed to call and consult a family member or an attorney without unnecessary delay upon arrival at the place of detention.

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that while public safety concerns could potentially justify a delay in honoring an arrested person's rights under Iowa Code section 804.20, the circumstances of this case did not warrant such a delay. The court noted that the police did not address the issue of the missing firearms until nearly two hours after Starr was taken into custody for questioning at the police station. Therefore, the delay in permitting Starr to call a family member was deemed unnecessary.

Commonwealth v. Zucchino

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13384

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts heard an appeal involving Bradley Zucchino, who was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, causing serious bodily injury and death. Zucchino challenged the admissibility of his blood alcohol content (BAC) evidence, arguing that it was collected without his consent, contravening G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e). The court had to determine whether the Commonwealth needed the defendant's consent to admit his BAC results in the prosecution of a G. L. c. 90, § 24L (OUI-SBI) offense.

The court determined that the language of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) was clear and unambiguous, applying specifically to violations of § 24 (1) (a), or simple OUI. The court noted that if the Legislature had intended the consent requirement of § 24 (1) (e) to apply to aggravated OUI offenses, it would have made this explicit. The court stated that it is within the Legislature's purview to treat simple OUI and aggravated OUI offenses differently, including with regard to the admissibility of evidence.

Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the consent provision of § 24 (1) (e) does not apply to violations under any other section or chapter, including G. L. c. 265, § 13 1/2, or G. L. c. 90, § 24L. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of Zucchino's motion to suppress his BAC results.

Owens v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-00887-SCT

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Randolph

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this criminal case heard before the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the appellant, Ronald Owens, was convicted by a jury for burglary of a business and was sentenced to serve seven years as a habitual offender. Following the guilty verdict, Owens moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (J.N.O.V.) or, alternatively, for a new trial; both motions were denied by the trial judge. Owens appealed the denial of a new trial, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Owens's petition for certiorari, focusing on the question of whether the trial judge abused his discretion by denying Owens's motion for a new trial.

The case centered on a burglary that occurred at a closed pharmacy, with security footage showing an individual leaving the premises carrying a dark bag shortly after the pharmacy's alarm was triggered. A subsequent video from a nearby gas station showed Owens with a bag that matched the one seen in the first video. The prosecution also presented evidence of a stock bottle from the pharmacy found in Owens's home following his arrest.

Owens argued that the state presented no evidence linking him to the burglary and that the bag he was seen carrying in the gas station video, which appeared to be red, could not be the same as the black bag seen in the video from the pharmacy. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the jury's verdict and the trial court's decision, arguing that the jury had enough evidence to rationally conclude that Owens was the individual involved in the burglary. The court held that the verdict was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and thus the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Owens's motion for a new trial.

Wakefield v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-00187-SCT

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Coleman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Dwan Wakefield aided Byron McBride after McBride committed a car theft, kidnapping, and murder. Wakefield was convicted under Mississippi Code Section 97-1-5 for three counts of aiding McBride in the aforementioned crimes. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, arguing that being charged multiple times for being an accessory after the fact for each felony committed by the principal violated the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy.

The court found that, under the unit of prosecution test, the State may charge multiple violations of Section 97-1-5 for each felony committed. The court argued that each felony committed by the principal constitutes a separate unit of prosecution, allowing for multiple convictions under the statute. Wakefield's argument was based on the belief that he committed a single act (giving McBride a ride home) while McBride committed three distinct acts (auto theft, kidnapping, and murder). However, the court disagreed and upheld the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Madison County Circuit Court.

In conclusion, the court held that for the purposes of Mississippi’s accessory after the fact statute, Section 97-1-5, each felony committed by a principal offender constitutes a single unit of prosecution. Therefore, Wakefield was not put in jeopardy by being charged with three separate counts under Section 97-1-5. The court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Morrison v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 24

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Westbrook

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In 2016, 21-year-old Kwame De-Markquise Morrison initiated a sexual relationship with a 12-year-old girl, A.M. In 2017, A.M. became pregnant and gave birth to a child, who was later adopted. Morrison was charged with six counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography. Morrison admitted to having sex with A.M. but claimed he believed she was 16 years old.

The district court convicted Morrison of three counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography. The court instructed the jury that a lack of knowledge or a mistake as to the victim's age is not a defense to a charge of using a minor in producing pornography. Morrison appealed, arguing that the instruction was inaccurate because the State is required to prove that the defendant "knowingly" used "a minor" in producing pornography.

The Court of Appeals of Nevada agreed that the instruction was inaccurate. However, it found that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Morrison admitted that he believed A.M. was 16 years old—and therefore a minor—during their sexual relationship. The court also rejected Morrison's other claims on appeal, including that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss counsel and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, the court affirmed Morrison's judgment of conviction.

Ortiz v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 23

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Bell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Ramel Ortiz was convicted of six counts of sexual assault and other felonies after breaking into M.P.'s house and forcing her to engage in multiple sexual acts. Four of these sexual assault counts arose from an incident during which Ortiz subjected M.P. to intercourse in different sexual positions. Ortiz appealed his conviction, arguing that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support multiple sexual assault convictions.

Ortiz's case was first reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, which denied his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ortiz then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada.

The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada found that appellate counsel's omission of a sufficiency challenge to the multiple convictions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court concluded that because the sufficiency challenge stood a reasonable probability of success had it been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction, Ortiz was prejudiced by appellate counsel's omission of that challenge. The court therefore reversed in part and remanded for the district court to vacate three of Ortiz's sexual assault convictions. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision as to Ortiz's remaining claims, which it found to lack merit.

State v. Small

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0563

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: MacDonald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Christopher A. Small, was convicted on four charges, including aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) by sexual intercourse with a minor, AFSA by digital penetration of a minor, and two counts of pattern AFSA. The charges stemmed from incidents where Small sexually assaulted a minor victim, starting with inappropriate touching and escalating to touching the victim's vagina. The defendant was indicted on four counts of AFSA, including a pattern of touching the victim's genitalia and a pattern of touching the victim's breasts.

During the trial in the Superior Court, the victim testified that the defendant's inappropriate behavior began with cuddling and escalated to touching her chest and vagina. At the close of the State's case, the defense moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing that there was no testimony to indicate that the victim was specifically referring to her breasts when she described it as her chest. The court denied the motion, stating that the jury could find that her testimony referred to her breasts. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the defendant argued that the record only established that he may have touched the victim's breasts, which was not sufficient to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State countered that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant committed AFSA by touching the victim's breasts. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, stating that a rational jury could reasonably infer that the defendant touched the victim's breasts as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of pattern AFSA.

State v. Zuzelo

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0643

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, David Zuzelo, was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of New Hampshire on one count of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and one count of AFSA alleging a single act of penetration. The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss both AFSA charges due to insufficient evidence and by denying his motion to preclude the admission of evidence pertaining to the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics.

The Superior Court had denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the State had failed to introduce sufficient evidence supporting either the pattern AFSA charge involving touching of the complainant’s genitalia or the AFSA charge alleging penetration. The trial court also denied the defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics, arguing that this evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that while there was sufficient evidence to support the single-act penetration AFSA conviction, there was insufficient evidence to support the pattern AFSA conviction. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the court reversed the defendant’s pattern AFSA conviction and reversed and remanded his single-act penetration AFSA conviction.

State v. Freeman

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 66

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: McEvers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Tevin Dewayne Freeman was charged with the murder of Erica L. Herrera, a class AA felony, in October 2020. The case was brought to trial in November 2022. The prosecution's witnesses included the 911 dispatcher who received Freeman's emergency call, law enforcement officers who responded to the scene and investigated Herrera's death, the medical examiner who conducted Herrera's autopsy, and a mutual friend of Freeman and Herrera. The medical examiner testified that Herrera's injuries were inconsistent with self-inflicted or accident-related injuries and that she died from blunt force trauma. Freeman claimed that Herrera's injuries were from a fall. After the prosecution rested its case, Freeman moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The defense did not call any witnesses.

During the defense's closing argument, the prosecution objected to the defense counsel's use of "I believe" statements. This led to a sidebar conference, after which the court was informed that a juror needed a break. The court allowed a ten-minute recess. After the recess, Freeman moved for a mistrial, arguing that the break and the prosecution's objection during closing argument prejudiced him. The court denied Freeman's motion for a mistrial. The jury found Freeman guilty of murder, and judgment was entered in June 2023.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Freeman argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. He claimed that the break during the defense's closing argument showed indifference to the defense's case and that no curative jury instruction could remedy the situation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Freeman had not shown that allowing a short break in the defense's closing argument at the request of a juror to use the restroom was a manifest injustice or that the district court abused its discretion. Freeman also argued that the convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence regarding the culpability element of intentionally or knowingly. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Freeman intentionally or knowingly committed the charged offense.

State v. Thornton

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 54

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Tufte

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around a plea agreement between the State and Michael Brenum in a criminal case. The court ordered a pre-plea presentence investigation (PSI) and combined the change of plea and sentencing hearing. The risk assessment score from the PSI triggered a secondary phase of the assessment, which was referred to the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (Department) and Dr. Hein-Kolo. They refused to approve the secondary process of the assessment based on a pre-plea PSI, arguing that the risk assessment process should be used only after a conviction has occurred according to assessment guidelines. The district court held the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt for not completing the risk assessment.

The Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the law by ordering a risk assessment before acceptance of a guilty plea and that there is no other adequate remedy. They also argued that the issue is not appealable and no adequate alternative remedy exists.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo, stating that the plain language of the statute gives the Department the authority to approve the secondary process of the risk assessment and the responsibility to perform that secondary process. The court also clarified that a risk assessment is conducted on “a person that committed an offense,” and a person is considered to have committed an offense only after a conviction. The court concluded that the district court may order a PSI at any time, but it may not require the Department to perform the risk assessment other than by its approved process or before the substantive requirements are met. The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s order directing the Department to conduct a pre-plea risk assessment and the order holding the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt.

Urrabazo v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 67

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In April 2021, Jaime Urrabazo was found guilty of delivering a controlled substance by a jury. While his appeal was pending, Urrabazo filed his first application for postconviction relief, which was dismissed after he failed to attend the hearing. In April 2023, Urrabazo filed a second application for postconviction relief, arguing that the jury in his trial was not unanimous because one juror's response during the polling of the jury was inaudible on the recording.

The District Court of Cass County denied Urrabazo's second application for postconviction relief. The court found that Urrabazo had misused the process by failing to raise his claim about the lack of jury unanimity in his first postconviction proceeding. The court also found that Urrabazo's trial counsel was objectively reasonable for not moving for a mistrial after the jury polling, and that Urrabazo's appellate counsel was objectively reasonable in not raising the issue of jury unanimity on appeal.

Urrabazo appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court erred in finding his application for postconviction relief was a misuse of process and that his counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Urrabazo's second petition for postconviction relief was not a misuse of process and that his counsels' representation was objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Urrabazo had not shown that the jury was not unanimous and that his counsels' representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

State v. Carter

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1247

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: DEWINE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around a criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant, Eli Carter, was found guilty of having sexual relations with his adopted daughter. He argued that his right to face-to-face confrontation was violated because the trial court allowed a witness to testify remotely via video conference.

The trial court had allowed the remote testimony due to the witness's unavailability to testify in person due to unpredictable winter weather and uncertain airline schedules. The court also noted the state's identification of the witness as important and found his testimony relevant and admissible. The defendant appealed this decision, arguing that the remote testimony violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.

The Third District Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's arguments and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court of appeals noted that the trial court had found that airline-labor shortages and other causes were creating unprecedented travel delays. The court further stated that even if it were to assume that the possibility of inclement weather was insufficient to warrant an exception for the witness's video testimony, the trial court's determinations were justified on a case-specific finding based on an important public policy involving the COVID pandemic.

The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed that the trial court erred by allowing the remote testimony. The court held that the trial court's generalized concerns about COVID-19 risks and travel delays did not constitute a "case-specific finding of necessity," sufficient to abridge the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation. However, the court also concluded that the trial court's error was harmless given the remaining evidence at trial. The court found that there was no reasonable possibility that the witness's testimony contributed anything to the jury's findings of guilt that it could not have gleaned from other witnesses. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals, albeit on different grounds than those relied upon by that court.

The State v. Collins

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28197

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Beatty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Randy Collins was tried and convicted for first-degree arson and criminal conspiracy, following a fire that resulted in the death of a 12-year-old boy. The conviction was based, in part, on Collins' statement to law enforcement, which was obtained during an interview where the officers assured Collins that his statements would remain confidential. Collins appealed his conviction, arguing that his statement to law enforcement was involuntary due to the officers' false assurance of confidentiality.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina, reviewing the case on certiorari, agreed with Collins. The court held that when law enforcement gave Collins Miranda warnings, but then negated them by falsely advising him that his statements would remain confidential, his statement became involuntary. The court noted that such a false assurance of confidentiality is inherently coercive because it interferes with an individual's ability to make a fully informed decision on whether to engage in an interview.

Moreover, the court found that the false assurance of confidentiality was not harmless error. Collins' statement was key evidence linking him to the arson scheme and placing him at the scene of the fire. His situation was distinguishable from cases where the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative to other properly admitted evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, albeit with modification, and held that Collins' statement was inadmissible and he was entitled to a new trial. The court also took the opportunity to unequivocally condemn the interviewing technique employed in this case.

State V. Feucht

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 16

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: KERN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Matthew Feucht was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to nine years in prison with four years suspended. The case arose when Feucht's daughter discovered bags of marijuana in their home and alerted her mother, who then contacted the police. A search warrant was executed, leading to the discovery of firearms, ammunition, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $6,800 in small bills. Feucht was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, but under a plea agreement, he pled guilty to unauthorized possession of a controlled substance.

The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, accepted Feucht's guilty plea and sentenced him to nine years in prison with four years suspended. Feucht appealed the sentence, arguing that the circuit court erred by imposing a penitentiary sentence without finding aggravating circumstances within the meaning of SDCL 22-6-11 and by not listing the aggravating circumstances in the judgment of conviction.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota agreed with Feucht's argument. The court found that the circuit court did not clearly identify on the record that it was departing from presumptive probation based on the existence of aggravating circumstances posing a significant risk to the public. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated Feucht's sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

State v. Van Der Weide

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 18

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Keaton Van Der Weide, who was accused of raping S.O., his on-and-off partner and mother of his child. S.O. alleged that Van Der Weide sexually assaulted her after she returned home from a night out, while Van Der Weide maintained that the encounter was consensual and involved the use of sex toys. He was charged with second-degree rape.

Before trial, Van Der Weide sought to introduce evidence of the sex toys and text messages between himself and S.O. The circuit court ruled that unless the State alleged that a toy was used during the rape, Van Der Weide could not proffer evidence of the same. The court allowed the State to cross-examine Van Der Weide based on other texts surrounding the excerpted messages. Van Der Weide was found guilty and appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the sex toys and allowing the State to cross-examine based on unadmitted text messages.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the decision, finding that the circuit court had erred in excluding Van Der Weide's testimony regarding the sex toys, violating his constitutional right to testify in his defense. The court could not conclude that preventing the jury from weighing this important context was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Van Der Weide was entitled to a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Holman

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230343

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: McCullough

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Marcus Cleophus Holman, who was convicted for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Holman had initially pleaded guilty to this charge as part of a strategic move to avoid a conviction for aggravated malicious wounding. However, he later challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm charge. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed Holman's conviction, applying the "ends of justice" exception to Rule 5A:18 and stating that the approbate and reprobate doctrine did not apply.

The Commonwealth of Virginia appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals, arguing that the approbate and reprobate doctrine should apply. This doctrine prevents a litigant from taking inconsistent positions in the course of litigation. The Commonwealth argued that Holman had approbated by pleading guilty to the firearm charge and then reprobated by later challenging it.

The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Commonwealth. It held that Holman had indeed approbated and reprobated on the charge of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The Court noted that Holman's decision not to contest the firearm charge was a clear trial strategy. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for the Commonwealth.

State v. Keller

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,171-7

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: McCloud

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In May 2020, Austin River Keller drove his car into a ditch and subsequently failed a breath alcohol test. The Kitsap County District Court suppressed the breath alcohol test results produced from the Dräger Alcotest 9510 machines in Keller’s case and in all other DUI cases in Kitsap County District Court. The district court concluded that the breath test results violated state statutes and regulations. The district court found that state law places strict limits on the admission of breath test results into evidence. The court also found that the Dräger machine had never rounded the mean before calculating the plus or minus 10 percent range, as required by state regulations. Instead, the Dräger was programmed to truncate the mean before performing that calculation. The district court ruled that the machine’s failure to do those necessary mathematical calculations itself rendered the results invalid and inadmissible under state law and court precedent.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutes and regulations do not require the Dräger machine itself to perform the mean and the plus or minus 10 percent range calculation at the time of the test. The court found that the State could establish those required pieces of the foundation for admission of breath test results by doing the math discussed above in a different manner. The court reversed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and suppression order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Gustke v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 38

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: Fenn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal, John Gustke (Father) contests a decision by the District Court of Natrona County, Wyoming, which partially denied several motions to set aside the forfeiture of a $100,000 surety bond. The bond was linked to a criminal case involving Father's son, Karl Gustke (Criminal Defendant), who violated his bond conditions and absconded from the state. Father was jointly liable for the bond through a promissory note and indemnity agreement with the surety and surety's insurer. The District Court also denied Father's motion to intervene in the case as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.), without giving notice to Father.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming found that the District Court had erred by not providing Father with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his motion to intervene. The court reversed the District Court's order denying Father's motion to intervene and remanded the case for a properly noticed hearing and for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Supreme Court did not reach a decision on the remission of the bond, stating that it would be premature given the District Court's error.

Soares v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 39

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Fox

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Wesley de Sousa Soares, a Brazilian national and professional jiu jitsu fighter, was charged with four counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from an encounter with a woman, KB, whom he met through an online dating application. KB alleged that Soares sexually assaulted her multiple times at her residence until she managed to escape. Soares, however, claimed that KB had consented to their sexual encounter. While in custody, Soares made phone calls in Portuguese, which were recorded and later translated. These recordings were admitted as evidence during the trial.

The District Court of Albany County convicted Soares on three of the four counts. Soares appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the audio recordings without an accompanying English transcription. He also claimed that the prosecutor committed misconduct during cross-examination and closing arguments, and that the court committed structural error by providing the jury with equipment to listen to the audio exhibits.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming disagreed with Soares' arguments. The court found no reversible error in the trial court's admission of the audio exhibits without an English transcription. It also found no prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination or closing arguments. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the trial court erred in providing the jury with equipment to listen to the audio exhibits without first screening the recordings, but it ruled that this error was not structural and that Soares had waived this claim by failing to object. Consequently, the court affirmed Soares' conviction.