US v. Condron

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1032

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Rikelman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Christopher Condron, was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining payment for false claims. He had been involved in submitting applications to the United States Department of the Treasury for grant money in connection with supposed renewable energy projects. The applications were submitted on behalf of four different companies, which were created under the name of his then-girlfriend, Jessica Metivier.

Condron appealed his conviction on three main grounds:
1) He argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on all counts.
2) He claimed that the government's argument and evidence at trial constructively amended, or at least prejudicially varied from, one of the wire fraud counts.
3) He contended that the district court abused its discretion when it limited his cross-examination of a key government witness.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected all three arguments and affirmed Condron's conviction. It found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, that the government did not constructively amend or prejudicially vary from the indictment, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Condron's cross-examination of a key government witness.

United States v. Ventura

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 17-3904

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: Lohier

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The case in question involves a defendant, Saba Rosario Ventura, who was initially detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after the District Court ordered his release on bail pending his criminal trial. The District Court later dismissed the indictment against Ventura, arguing that ICE had detained him in bad faith, aiming to circumvent the bail order. The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which previously remanded the case to the District Court to clarify whether it had found that ICE's detention of Ventura was a direct violation of a federal court order releasing him under the Bail Reform Act.

On remand, the District Court reasserted its claim that ICE's detention of Ventura was pretextual and in bad faith, not for removal, but to detain him pending his criminal trial. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no substantial evidence to support the District Court's assertion. The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court's finding was based on legal arguments rather than factual evidence. It also noted that, even if ICE disagreed with the District Court's assessment of Ventura's risk of flight, it was not enough to prove that ICE's detention was pretextual.

The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the District Court's orders, concluding that the finding of ICE's pretextual and bad faith detention of Ventura was clearly erroneous, given the lack of factual evidence.

Khamal Fooks v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2097

Opinion Date: March 26, 2024

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case arose from appellant Khamal Fooks' claim that his attorney misled him about the parole eligibility related to his plea agreement. Fooks had pleaded guilty to third-degree murder, conspiracy, and carrying an unlicensed gun in a Pennsylvania state court. He later alleged that his lawyer incorrectly assured him he would be eligible for parole after ten years, when in reality, he had to serve at least twenty. His allegations, if true, would demonstrate that his lawyer’s advice was ineffective.

Both the state and the federal district courts dismissed his claims without providing an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Fooks then appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Circuit Court found that Fooks' allegations, if proven, would indeed establish ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby warranting habeas relief.

The Circuit Court held that the district court erred in not affording Fooks an evidentiary hearing to substantiate his allegations. The court emphasized the importance of giving petitioners a fair chance to prove their allegations and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The court did not rule on Fooks' entitlement to relief, instead emphasizing the need for a fair opportunity to present evidence supporting his claims.

Zaid v. Department of Justice

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1821

Opinion Date: March 25, 2024

Judge: WILKINSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) could withhold records relating to a criminal investigation based on Exemption 7(A) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This exemption allows federal agencies to withhold records if their release could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings.

In the case, Mark Zaid, an attorney, requested records related to the FBI's criminal investigation into one of his clients, Zackary Sanders, who had been charged with production and possession of child pornography. The FBI refused to release the requested records, citing Exemption 7(A) of FOIA. Zaid then sued the FBI to release the records, but the district court found the records were exempt from disclosure.

The appeals court agreed with the district court's decision, stating that the disclosure of these records could reasonably be expected to interfere with ongoing or future investigations and prosecutions of child pornography cases. The court also noted that forcing the FBI to disclose information exchanged between law enforcement agencies could make those agencies hesitant to share information in the future, which would harm FBI investigations. The court also dismissed Zaid's arguments that cited two decisions from the Middle District of Florida, stating those decisions were not binding on the district court or the appeals court.

Upshaw v. Stephenson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1705

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: STRANCH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case under review, the appellant, Lafayette Deshawn Upshaw, was convicted of crimes associated with two separate incidents occurring on the same day: a gas station robbery and a home invasion. Following exhaustion of state court remedies, Upshaw sought habeas relief in federal court, upon which the district court granted relief on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of the Batson rule.

The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on trial counsel's failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses. The Batson rule violation claim was derived from the State’s use of peremptory challenges to strike six Black jurors. The Warden appealed the district court's decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.

The court found that the trial counsel's failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses and to request an adjournment to rectify the situation was unreasonable and prejudicial to Upshaw, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also found that the State's failure to provide race-neutral reasons for striking certain jurors, coupled with the trial court's failure to properly evaluate the State's justifications, constituted a violation of the Batson rule. The court held that even a single racially motivated peremptory strike requires relief. The court concluded that both of these errors entitled Upshaw to habeas relief.

Rogers v. Wells

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 17-2903

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: BRENNAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, the petitioner, Tony Rogers, convicted of sexually assaulting his daughter, DAR, appealed his conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rogers claimed his trial lawyer failed to move for in-camera review of DAR’s medical records, which he believed contained information about her mental health that could have impacted the credibility of her testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Rogers's claim, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.

Rogers then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. He contended that his trial counsel's failure to obtain DAR’s medical records or at least file a motion for in camera review violated his rights. The district court denied Rogers's petition, concluding that the state court decision did not contravene federal law and that the state court's application of the federal standard to Rogers's case was not unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. It found that Rogers's counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a motion for in camera review of DAR’s medical records. The court held that such a motion would have been meritless because Rogers could not make the preliminary showing of the records’ materiality required under state law. The court also found that Rogers's claim that he made a plausible showing for in camera review of DAR’s medical records was based on speculation and devoid of context. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law.

USA v. Hibbett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2715

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Hamilton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves an appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, made by Shazariyah Hibbett, the defendant, who was sentenced for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defendant contested his sentence, arguing that the district court had wrongly applied a two-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight. Hibbett claimed that he was merely a passenger in a vehicle that evaded police, and he did not encourage the driver to flee.

The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had not erred. The court noted that evidence, including video footage of the vehicle evading police and statements from the driver, supported the enhancement to Hibbett's sentence. The court also rejected Hibbett's argument that the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 79.1, which pertains to control of trial exhibits, conflicted with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 55. The court stated that Hibbett had not demonstrated how the application of the local rule to his case caused him any harm.

Therefore, the court upheld the district court's judgment, affirming Hibbett's sentence. The court also suggested that Hibbett's concerns about Local Rule 79.1 should be directed to the Advisory Committee for the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

USA v. Osadzinski

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3140

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns Thomas Osadzinski, who was convicted for providing material support to a terrorist organization. In 2019, Osadzinski, a computer science student, developed a software program to facilitate the rapid duplication of terrorist propaganda videos for ISIS. He shared this program with people he believed were ISIS supporters, taught them how to use it, and used it to assemble and distribute a large collection of ISIS media. Osadzinski appealed his conviction, arguing that it violated the First Amendment because his actions constituted free expression. He also contended that he lacked fair notice that his actions violated the material-support statute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Osadzinski's arguments. The court held that although Osadzinski's actions could be regarded as expressive activity, this activity was coordinated with or directed by ISIS, a known terrorist organization, and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment. The court also rejected Osadzinski's claim that he lacked fair notice that his actions violated the material-support statute. The court affirmed Osadzinski's conviction, ruling that his conduct fell outside First Amendment protection, clearly violated the material-support statute, and provided a reasonable basis for the jury to return a guilty verdict.

United States v. Mayo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1412

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolved around Darron Mayo, who was appealing the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a hidden camera placed by police officers across his apartment door. The evidence from this camera was used to obtain a search warrant for Mayo's apartment, where police found drugs, paraphernalia, cash, a loaded pistol, and an iPhone containing incriminating photographs and videos.

Mayo argued that the footage from the hidden camera violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the search warrant was deficient after removing evidence obtained from the camera. He also contended that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the decision of the District Court, ruling that the probable cause affidavit remained sufficient even when the evidence from the hidden camera was omitted.

The court cited four sets of related facts supporting this conclusion. First, various drugs, a scale, and stolen handguns were found in a car associated with Mayo. Second, Mayo's fingerprints were found on a handgun magazine, and a video linked him to the vehicle. Third, during a traffic stop, Mayo gave a false name, marijuana was found in the car, and he made incriminating phone calls recorded by a police dash camera. Fourth, utilities in Mayo's name connected him to the apartment in question. These facts indicated a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in his apartment. Therefore, the court held that the hidden camera footage was not necessary to establish probable cause.

Iversen v. Pedro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-35076

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: Montalvo

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the petitioner, Terry Eugene Iversen, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Iversen had been sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for the crime of public indecency under Oregon’s sex offender recidivism statute due to his extensive criminal history, which included prior convictions for public indecency, rape, and sodomy. Iversen argued that the LWOP sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

The court, applying the demanding standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, upheld the district court’s decision. The court found that the Oregon state court’s decision concerning Iversen’s sentence was not contrary to Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The court considered Iversen’s extensive history of adult felony recidivism, his mental health record, his failed opportunities to reform, and the fact that he remained dangerous to others. The court also noted Oregon’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons like Iversen.

The court concluded that Iversen’s sentence did not raise an inference of gross disproportionality given the gravity of his offense and criminal history. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Iversen’s habeas petition.

JOSEPH HART V. RON BROOMFIELD

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-99011

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: THOMAS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A petitioner, Joseph William Hart, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case emerged from a 1988 trial in which Hart was convicted of the murder of Diana H., and of the rape, sodomy, and forced oral copulation of Amy R. Hart was sentenced to death.

Hart argued that the State suppressed evidence that could have impeached one of the prosecution’s expert witnesses, Dr. Dewitt Hunter, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. He also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Dr. Hunter’s qualifications and testimony.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Hart's petition. It held that the Supreme Court of California could have reasonably concluded that the impeachment evidence Hart referred to was not material. The court also found that Hart's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge Dr. Hunter's qualifications and testimony. The court determined that Hart's counsel's decisions were entitled to deference and that Hart provided no substantial evidence that another expert would have contradicted Dr. Hunter's findings.

USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50069

Opinion Date: March 25, 2024

Judge: Forrest

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Jose Jimenez-Chaidez's conviction for knowingly importing cocaine and methamphetamine, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing.

The court's decision had several key components. First, it approved the lower court's decision to admit evidence of Jimenez's prior drug smuggling activities, as it demonstrated his knowledge and intent, and was not unduly prejudicial. Second, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court in allowing an FBI agent to testify as a lay witness about extracting data from a cellphone, holding that specialized knowledge was not required for this testimony.

The court did, however, find error in the district court's failure to make an explicit reliability finding regarding an expert's testimony about the value of the drugs found in Jimenez's vehicle. Nevertheless, it determined this error was harmless.

Lastly, the court vacated Jimenez's sentence and remanded for resentencing, in line with recent authority guiding the process for conducting a mitigating role inquiry under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The court clarified that the relevant comparison for this inquiry is to other participants in the defendant's crime, not to typical defendants who commit similar crimes.

SAGELY v. HUTCHINSON

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 37

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Webb

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed a lower court's decision dismissing Floyd Sagely's claim that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103, which prohibits a person who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution from owning or possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional. Sagely was involuntarily committed to a mental health treatment facility in 2010, and in 2019, was charged with a misdemeanor for possessing a firearm in his car due to his previous commitment.

Sagely argued that the statute violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the precedent set by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. He contended that the law treated felons and persons involuntarily committed to a mental health facility differently, as felons could petition to have their gun rights reinstated, while those who were involuntarily committed could not.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas found that Sagely's equal protection claim failed because he could not demonstrate that he and persons convicted of a felony offense were similarly situated. The court stated that civil litigants like Sagely are not similarly situated to criminal defendants for equal-protection purposes. The court further held that the statute is presumptively constitutional under Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Sagely's complaint.

In re Seumanu

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A169146M(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: STREETER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case considered by the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, Ropati Afatia Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) for nine claims in his habeas corpus petition. The petition was filed after the superior court dismissed his previously filed petition in a capital case. The court determined that it could issue a COA for one of the claims but declined to do so for the remaining eight.

Seumanu had been convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping to commit robbery, and first-degree robbery, with special circumstances that led to a death penalty sentence. His appeal and subsequent habeas corpus petition were both unsuccessful. In 2022, Seumanu filed a new petition presenting nine claims not previously raised. The superior court dismissed the new petition as 'successive' under a specific provision of the Penal Code, meaning the claims were not new or different but rather repeated or supplemented those in the original petition.

The appellate court found that the court orders regarding the habeas petition did not materially impair a fair adjudication of the case. The court determined that the ten-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests in the Court of Appeal was directory rather than mandatory. The court also agreed to appoint specific attorneys to represent Seumanu in his appeal.

In terms of the specific claims, Seumanu argued that he was denied a fair penalty phase trial, that the trial court allowed the prosecution and defense to stipulate to the removal of potential jurors, and that the process of 'death qualifying' juries violated the rights of prospective jurors. The court found that the claims did not meet the requirements for relief or substantiality and upheld the superior court's dismissal.

The court did grant a COA for a part of one claim which argued that a potential juror was improperly excused for cause which could result in a penalty retrial. However, for the remaining claims, the court found that Seumanu had not met the burden of demonstrating a substantial claim for relief or a substantial claim that the requirements of the relevant subdivision of the Penal Code had been met. As such, the court denied Seumanu's request for a COA for these claims.

P. v. Beaudreaux

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166001(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Streeter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case pertains to a defendant, Nicholas Beaudreaux, who was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery. He is serving a 50-year sentence. Beaudreaux made two unsuccessful attempts to petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court ruled that the denial of relief on his first petition, which was affirmed in 2020, forecloses relief. However, Beaudreaux appealed again, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, which clarified the procedural law governing section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings. He claimed that the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by not appointing counsel and relying on substantive facts from this court’s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. However, the court concluded that these errors were harmless. The dispositive question was whether, based on the record of conviction, it must be concluded that Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond’s actual killer. The court believed so, and therefore, Beaudreaux's attempt to allege entitlement to section 1172.6 relief was refuted. The order dismissing Beaudreaux’s second petition for section 1172.6 relief was affirmed.

P. v. Freetown Holdings Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B309295(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the People of the State of California filed a lawsuit against Holiday Liquor (owned by Abdul Jamal Sheriff and operated under Freetown Holdings Company) for public nuisance. The People claimed that the store had become a hub for illegal drug transactions, with customers and dealers using the store as a meeting point. The store was accused of tolerating loitering and drug dealing, lacking security, operating until 2 a.m., and selling alcohol in cheap single-serving containers.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the People, ordering the store to hire guards, stop selling single-serving containers of alcohol, and take other measures to address the issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision.

The court held that Holiday Liquor had indeed facilitated a public nuisance by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent the sale of illegal drugs on its property. The court ruled that the proprietor was aware of the illegal activities as he had been informed multiple times by the police. Despite this knowledge, he failed to implement recommended measures to mitigate the issue, such as hiring security guards, limiting operating hours, and ceasing the sale of single-serving alcohol containers. The ruling was based on the violation of sections 11570 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code (the drug house law), sections 3479 et seq. of the Civil Code (the public nuisance law), and sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (the unfair competition law).

P. v. Morris

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061916(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: Delaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case involves an appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, with the defendant, Richard Curtis Morris, Jr., appealing from the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Morris was previously convicted on charges of first-degree murder with associated special circumstances of rape, robbery, and murder for financial gain. He argues that for a nonkiller to be convicted of first-degree murder under the amended felony-murder statute when the nonkiller acts with intent to kill, the prosecution must prove the nonkiller assisted the actual killer in the killing itself. According to him, the jury found that he aided an actor in committing the underlying felonies, which he claims is insufficient basis for denying a resentencing evidentiary hearing.

The appeals court disagreed with Morris, holding that a person who, with an intent to kill, directly commits or aids and abets an enumerated felony in which a death occurs commits the actus reus necessary for felony murder under the amended felony-murder statute by acting in furtherance of the common design of the felony. The jury instructions and verdicts in this case establish the jury necessarily concluded Morris possessed an intent to kill during the commission of the underlying felonies and aided and abetted the actual killer in committing those felonies. By this ruling, the court affirmed that the record of conviction establishes, as a matter of law, that Morris is not eligible for resentencing. Therefore, the trial court was correct in its summary denial of the petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.

P. v. Serrano

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166011(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Jackson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a shootout following a high-speed car chase, the defendant, Mario Guadalupe Serrano, was convicted of 13 criminal counts, including two counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer. After the trial court dismissed five of six firearm enhancements, it sentenced Serrano to a total determinate term of 35 years 8 months and a total indeterminate term of 30 years to life. On appeal, Serrano argued that there was insufficient evidence supporting the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation, the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to consider striking the premeditation and deliberation findings, and the trial court erroneously attached the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement to his determinate term rather than his indeterminate term.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five affirmed the judgment, with the exception of the last argument. It held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Serrano had committed premeditated attempted murder of two peace officers beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that the trial court did not err in failing to exercise its discretion to dismiss the jury’s findings of premeditation and deliberation because these findings constitute alternative penalties for the offenses rather than enhancements. However, the court agreed with Serrano's assertion that the trial court erred in orally pronouncing that the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement was attached to his determinate term. Therefore, the court remanded the case for the limited purpose of correcting the record to reflect that the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement was attached to Serrano's indeterminate term.

People v. Hill

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B322561(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 25, 2024

Judge: LUI

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the appeal case presented, the defendants, Brian Terrell Hill and Clifford Jenkins, sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 for their convictions of first-degree murder and attempted murder. The defendants were initially convicted based on their involvement in the 1990 kidnapping and subsequent murder of Randy Burge and attempted murder of Kevin Thomas.

The defendants contended that their petitions for resentencing were denied based on a felony murder theory related to kidnapping, which they argued violated ex post facto principles. They stated that at the time of the offense, kidnapping was not an enumerated felony under section 189, subdivision (a) to which felony-murder liability could be attached. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that section 1172.6 does not apply new law retroactively to make formerly innocent conduct criminal, but looks to whether a defendant could be convicted under current law.

The court found substantial evidence supporting the lower court's determination that Hill intended to kill Thomas and was therefore guilty of attempted murder. Similarly, the court found substantial evidence supporting the lower courts' findings that both Hill and Jenkins were guilty of felony murder as major participants in the kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Given these findings, the court affirmed the denial of Hill's and Jenkins' petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.

People v. McClelland

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081369(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: CASTILLO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1994, David D. McClelland pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in a California state prison. In 2019, he filed for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.951, which provides a mechanism for defendants who were not the principal in a murder but were charged due to imputed malice. The court scheduled and rescheduled an evidentiary hearing multiple times at the request of both parties.

In 2022, the prosecution responded to the order to show cause, planning to rely on the grand jury transcript and McClelland’s statements in Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation records as evidence. McClelland’s counsel requested the court not to consider certain hearsay testimony and argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a hearing in September 2022, the prosecution presented additional evidence, and McClelland's counsel requested the court to take McClelland's age at the time of the offense into consideration. McClelland's counsel then agreed to the court issuing a written ruling, and the court took the matter under submission. In November, the court denied the petition, ruling that McClelland was ineligible for resentencing as the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted the actual killer.

McClelland appealed, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not present at the evidentiary hearing. The court disagreed, stating that the September hearing, in which all parties were present and evidence was presented, was the evidentiary hearing as per section 1172.6(d)(3). The court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Martinez v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 6M

Opinion Date: March 25, 2024

Judge: HOOD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed a lower court's restitution order, ruling that the defendant was the proximate cause of the victim's pecuniary loss. The defendant, Arnold Roman Martinez, had stolen a bicycle and was pursued by the bicycle's owner in a car. The car was damaged when the owner cut off Martinez, causing him to crash into the car. The district court ordered Martinez to pay over $2,000 in restitution for the damage to the car.

On appeal, Martinez challenged the order, asserting that he did not proximately cause the damage to the car. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado ruled that the standard for reviewing a district court's determination of proximate cause for criminal restitution is clear error, not the abuse-of-discretion standard used by the lower court. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Martinez's theft was the proximate cause of the damage to the car. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order on different grounds.

People v. Maes

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 15

Opinion Date: March 25, 2024

Judge: HOOD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Colorado examined the case of Carlos Ray Maes, who was charged with six felony counts. A magistrate presided over the preliminary hearing and found that probable cause existed for each of the eligible counts. The case was then bound over to the district court. Nearly three months later, Maes petitioned the district court for a review of the magistrate's probable-cause determination, but the district court declined, arguing that it did not have jurisdiction to review such a determination and that Maes's petition was not timely.

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a magistrate's finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing is a "final order or judgment" under the Colorado Rules for Magistrates and is therefore reviewable by a district court. Further, the court held that the time limit for petitioning for district court review of a magistrate's final order or judgment begins when the magistrate memorializes that determination in writing. Consequently, the court concluded that Maes's petition was timely filed. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

State of Iowa v. Canady

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0397

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: Mansfield

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, Lawrence George Canady III, had been charged with voluntary manslaughter, willful injury causing bodily injury, and assault causing bodily injury due to his involvement in a fatal nighttime shooting incident. He was not the shooter, but the State alleged that he was beating the victim while another person shot the victim. The appellant challenged the admission of a cell phone video recorded prior to the shooting where he and the shooter were seen singing a rap song containing lyrics that seemed to reference the victim. The district court allowed the video, but the court of appeals reversed the decision, remanding for a new trial.

Upon further review by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video. It was relevant to the case as it showed the appellant and the shooter jointly voicing a threat, which could counter the appellant's claim that he was unaware of the shooter's intention. The court also found no error in the admission of a Snapchat photo, as it was relevant to showing that the appellant may have been aware that the shooter had a gun and was willing to use it. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's voluntary manslaughter conviction.

The appellant's argument that his sentences for voluntary manslaughter and willful injury causing bodily injury should be merged was rejected as the offenses did not overlap in elements. Moreover, the court found no error in the sentencing court's consideration of the minutes of testimony or in its imposition of consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the appellant's convictions and sentence.

State of Iowa v. Luke

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1367

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: Mansfield

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case at hand arose from the appeal by Scott Randolph Luke, who was convicted of domestic abuse assault while on probation for two previous domestic abuse assaults. The district court sentenced him to two years in prison for the latter offense, revoked his probation, and ordered his sentences to be served consecutively. Luke challenged the sentence, contending that the district court abused its discretion and failed to provide reasons for the consecutive sentences.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a prison term for the latest offense. It also determined, though narrowly, that the district court's explanation for the consecutive sentences was sufficient.

Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa also affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the district court had given a detailed and personalized explanation for why it was sending Luke to prison. Although the district court did not explicitly discuss reasons for running that sentence consecutively to the sentence imposed on the probation revocation, it addressed that omission in the written sentencing order. The Supreme Court found no error in Luke's sentence.

STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. KENT

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-K-00008

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case in question concerns the defendant, Sharrieff M. Kent, who was convicted by a Plaquemines Parish jury of two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm, one count of aggravated criminal damage to property, and one count of illegal discharge of a firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident where Kent fired several shots at a pickup truck containing law enforcement officers as they were fleeing his property during an investigation. Kent claimed he was protecting his family from unknown intruders on his property.

The Court of Appeal had reversed Kent's convictions, determining that the State violated Kent's right to due process by introducing evidence of other crimes and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Court of Appeal also found that the State violated Kent’s right to remain silent by referencing his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.

However, the Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed with the Court of Appeal's determinations. It concluded that the references made to the officers conducting the trash pull as part of a narcotics investigation do not constitute impermissible references to other crimes or misconduct. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the State did not violate the Fifth Amendment as the circumstances presented align more with the exceptions and non-application of Doyle than with Doyle itself.

While the Supreme Court agreed that the State introduced the facts underlying Kent's prior conviction without first satisfying necessary prerequisites to their admission, it did not believe this error warranted a reversal of Kent's conviction. Considering the overwhelming testimonial and physical evidence showing Kent fired his weapon at a fleeing vehicle in the street, the Supreme Court concluded that the verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal and reinstated Kent's convictions and sentences.

Matthews v. State

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 12/23

Opinion Date: March 25, 2024

Judge: Eaves

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the State's duty to preserve scientific identification evidence, such as DNA, is limited to specific crimes specified in the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) and does not extend to all crimes for which a person may petition for DNA testing. The Court ruled that the preservation obligation does not apply to the inchoate (or incomplete) offenses of those crimes listed under the same section of the law. The Court also found that the State's duty to preserve evidence does not extend to attempted murder.

The case involved Darrell Eugene Matthews who had been convicted of attempted murder and was seeking post-conviction DNA testing of a glove found at the crime scene. The glove had been destroyed according to the police department's evidence retention policy after Matthews's first petition for DNA testing. The Court held that the circuit court correctly denied Matthews's second petition for post-conviction DNA testing because the State was not required to preserve evidence related to Matthews's attempted murder conviction for the duration of his sentence. The Court also found that the evidence Matthews sought to test had been destroyed in line with the police department's evidence retention policy.

Commonwealth v. Robinson

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-08464

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Charles Robinson, the defendant, was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Edward Figueroa. Following his conviction, Robinson appealed and also filed a motion for a new trial citing multiple errors by trial counsel. Despite his appeal and the motion for a new trial, the conviction was affirmed.

Later, Robinson appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that he was not competent to stand trial due to mental health issues and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court upheld the ruling, stating that Robinson had not shown any evidence that his mental health issues had influenced the jury's conclusion or prevented an adequate defense.

Robinson's contention that his counsel failed "reasonably to communicate with him" during and after a conversation in the lockup was also dismissed, as the court found no evidence of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that warranted a new trial.

The court concluded that the defendant did not present a substantial issue meriting an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his request for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E for a new trial.

State of Minnesota vs. Bradley

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0960

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the conviction of John Ishmael Bradley, III, who was charged with second-degree assault and felony domestic assault for striking his girlfriend over the head with a broom handle. Bradley challenged his convictions, claiming the broom handle was not a dangerous weapon and that his two convictions for one assaultive act was improper.

The court ruled that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the broom handle was a dangerous weapon. The court determined that an object is "likely to produce death or great bodily harm" if it is used in a manner where death or great bodily harm is a probable or reasonably expected result. Given the manner in which Bradley used the broom handle, the court found there was enough evidence to sustain this claim.

The court also examined whether Bradley could be convicted of both second-degree assault and domestic assault for the same criminal act. The court rejected Bradley's argument that domestic assault is a "lesser degree" of second-degree assault. The court concluded that the term "degree" in the phrase "lesser degree of the same crime" in Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1(1), is an unambiguous technical term referring to offenses within an ordinal statutory scheme. Therefore, domestic assault is not a lesser degree of second-degree assault, and the court affirmed both convictions.

State of Minnesota vs. Glover

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-0154

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: PROCACCINI

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around a murder conviction. On February 23, 2021, a bar shooting resulted in the death of Raymond Renteria-Hobbs and injury to another victim, M.P. Police identified Andrew Vernard Glover as the suspect based on security footage showing him at the bar on the night of the murder and his interactions with Renteria-Hobbs before the shooting. The police arrested Glover and, upon searching his residence, found the hat he wore on the night of the shooting, a loaded firearm, and ammunition.

At trial, Glover challenged his arrest and the subsequent search of his residence. However, the court held that the police had probable cause to arrest Glover, and the search warrant application for his residence did not materially misrepresent information.

Glover also sought to introduce evidence of prior crimes committed by an alleged alternative perpetrator, but the court denied his request, finding those crimes were neither relevant nor material to the charged offense. Glover also argued that the court violated his confrontation rights by denying his request to cross-examine the lead investigator about whether police had investigated unnamed suspects from a prior shooting of one of the victims. The court rejected this argument as well.

The jury convicted Glover of first-degree murder during a drive-by shooting, drive-by shooting, and ineligible person in possession of a firearm. Glover appealed, but the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the conviction. The court held that the police had probable cause to arrest Glover, the search of his residence was lawful, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Glover's motion to admit reverse-Spreigl evidence, and Glover's confrontation rights were not violated.

State of Minnesota vs Wiggins

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1281

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, Lyndon Akeem Wiggins, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping), and kidnapping, all based on aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. The crimes were related to the kidnapping and murder of realtor Monique Baugh, which involved Wiggins, his girlfriend Elsa Segura, and two other men, Cedric Berry and Berry Davis.

On appeal, Wiggins argued that the district court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress the cell-site location information (CSLI) for his cell phone as the facts alleged in the warrant application failed to establish probable cause. He also contended that the district court improperly instructed the jury by stating that it could find Wiggins guilty if Wiggins "or another (or others)" satisfied each element of the offense.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wiggins' motion to suppress the CSLI. It found that the totality of the circumstances alleged in the search warrant application established a "fair probability" that evidence of a crime would be found in the CSLI records of Wiggins’s cell phone carrier.

However, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in its instructions to the jury. The court determined that the instructions materially misstated the law as they allowed the jury to convict Wiggins of the charges based on the actions of others without reaching the issue of his liability under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court reversed Wiggins's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Tichich vs. State of Minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1063

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: PROCACCINI

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the appellant, Thomas Robert Tichich, was found guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Tichich later petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging that two of the State’s expert witnesses falsely testified at his trial and that the jury’s guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent. He submitted a new expert opinion and other evidence to support his claim of false testimony. The district court denied Tichich’s petition, determining that the guilty verdicts were legally consistent and that Tichich’s false-testimony claim failed to satisfy the test set forth in Larrison v. United States.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Tichich's claim was one of newly discovered evidence, not one of newly discovered evidence of false testimony, and therefore the standard set forth in Rainer v. State, which governs claims of newly discovered evidence, applied. The court found that Tichich’s claim failed the Rainer test because the new evidence merely served to impeach, rather than disprove, the trial testimony, and would not likely produce a different result given the strength of the State’s evidence.

Additionally, the court held that the guilty verdicts for third-degree criminal sexual conduct and attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct were legally consistent, as no necessary element of one offense negated a necessary element of the other. Therefore, Tichich’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue otherwise.

State v. Boudette

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 65N

Opinion Date: March 26, 2024

Judge: McGrath

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around Eric Boudette, who was convicted of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, First Offense, following a jury trial on May 31, 2022. Boudette appealed the verdict, asserting that his motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct was wrongly denied. He also contended that his plea for a new trial was wrongly denied on the grounds that his arrest was an unlawful seizure, the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case, and the statutory speedy trial deadline had expired by the time his trial was held.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case following Boudette's appeal against the District Court's affirmation of the Justice Court's decision. The Supreme Court analyzed several aspects of the case, including jurisdiction, the Community Caretaker Doctrine, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the speedy trial issue.

The Court ruled that Boudette could rightfully be charged in either county where he was found driving under the influence. They also determined that the arresting officer acted in her capacity as a community caretaker when she entered Boudette's vehicle to check on his wellbeing, thus making the arrest lawful. Regarding the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court found no evidence of perjury or the State unreasonably impeding Boudette from obtaining an independent blood test. Lastly, the Court declared that Boudette had waived his right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance.

Hence, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision.

Judd v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 21

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Bulla

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case tried in the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, the appellant, Kim A. Judd, was charged with one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle and one count of felony coercion. This came after an altercation where Judd struck a 1957 Chevrolet truck several times with a sledgehammer following a disagreement with the owner of the vehicle, Scott Reber, over payment for repairs.

The key issue addressed by the court was the interpretation of the phrase "physical force" in NRS 207.190(2), which distinguishes between coercion being punished as a felony versus as a misdemeanor. The court needed to determine whether "physical force" should be limited to physical force against a person, and not merely against property.

The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature intended for the distinguishing statutory element of "physical force" to be limited to force against a person. As such, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of giving proper jury instructions for the essential elements of a crime and ruled that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the definition of physical force as being limited to force against a person necessitated the reversal of this conviction.

However, the court affirmed the felony conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, concluding that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper measure of damages for the partial destruction of property. The conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle was based on the uncontroverted expert testimony at trial, which provided a replacement cost for the damaged parts of the vehicle.

Kabew v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Christopher Kabew, who pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary, his first felony conviction. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation with the condition that he complete a substance abuse treatment program. After successfully completing the program, Kabew petitioned the district court to set aside his conviction under NRS 176A.240(6)(a), which states that upon completing the terms and conditions of a drug court program, a court "shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction" unless the defendant has a prior felony conviction or previously failed to complete a specialty court program. The district court denied the motion, and Kabew petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada.

The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court improperly denied Kabew's motion. The court held that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory and does not afford district courts any discretion to deny a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction when the defendant meets the statutory requirements. The court further held that the statute does not intrude on judicial functions, as it is within the legislature's power to define crimes and determine punishments. The court concluded that the district court failed to perform a duty required by law by denying Kabew's motion, and ordered the district court to set aside Kabew's conviction.

Smith v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 19

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: Bell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada dealt with the issue of the scope of a valid search warrant and its implications under the Fourth Amendment. The appellant, Deva One Smith, was convicted of two counts of possession of a visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen years of age. The case centered on the validity of a search warrant that officers used to seize and conduct a forensic search of Smith's cell phone.

The court clarified that under Nevada law, an affidavit may be incorporated into a warrant to establish probable cause, but that affidavit cannot expand the scope of the search and seizure permitted under the warrant's specific language. Officers must search only the places authorized on the face of the warrant. In Smith's case, the officers had a valid warrant for his residence only; however, they seized his cell phone while he was outside his residence.

The court found that the imminent destruction of evidence exigency justified the seizure of the cell phone. However, no other exigent circumstance allowed for the subsequent forensic search of the cell phone. The court concluded that because officers failed to obtain a warrant to search the cell phone, the search of that device violated Smith's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Smith's motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone. As a result, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction.

State v. Pierce

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0728

Opinion Date: March 26, 2024

Judge: MacDonald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case of Kierran Pierce, who appealed his convictions of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and attempted AFSA. Pierce argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge at the close of the State's case. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did indeed err in denying the request for a mistrial. The court found that a statement made during the trial, indicating that Pierce had allegedly touched multiple children inappropriately, was highly prejudicial and should have resulted in a mistrial.

However, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge, as they found sufficient evidence to prove guilt. The court reasoned that, despite alternative explanations presented by the defendant, the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was attempting to commit an act of sexual assault.

The Supreme Court also briefly addressed the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for a view of the residence where the alleged sexual assaults occurred. The court did not make a definite ruling on this issue, suggesting instead that the parties might wish to develop these facts further in any subsequent trial. The case was ultimately reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

State v. Cooper

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-35-22

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: NORIEGA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Kalil Cooper, who was charged with promoting organized street crime, among other offenses, after a wiretap investigation into a local gang's activities. He was charged with twelve separate counts, including two counts of racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering, and one count of promoting organized street crime. The promoting count charged that Cooper "purposefully conspire[d] with others... to commit a continuing series of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity." However, Cooper objected to this count, arguing that the "pattern of racketeering activity" was not a predicate offense under the promoting statute.

The trial court agreed with Cooper's argument but instead of striking the charge, it amended the indictment to incorporate other offenses relevant to the racketeering charge as predicate offenses to the promoting charge. The jury found Cooper guilty of four counts, including the promoting charge, with conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) found as the predicate offense for promoting.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a listed predicate offense under the promoting statute, and as such, Cooper's conviction for a crime that does not exist must be vacated. The court reasoned that the jury instruction in this case erroneously departed from the list of permissible predicate offenses in the promoting statute, leading the jury to convict Cooper for a crime that does not exist. This was deemed a manifest injustice. Hence, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacated the jury's verdict on the promoting count without a remand.

State v. Harrell

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-13-23

Opinion Date: March 26, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, an eight-year-old child disclosed during an interview with a detective in 2016 that her music teacher, defendant Donnie E. Harrell, had touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions during school hours. In 2019, a grand jury indicted Harrell on charges of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, with additional official misconduct charges added in a superseding indictment later that year. In 2021, the trial court approved the admission of the child's entire recorded statement under the "tender years" hearsay exception. However, while preparing for trial in 2022, the child could not recall most of the events she had originally reported.

The trial court decided to limit her trial testimony to the one incident she recalled, ruling that her lack of memory rendered her unavailable for cross-examination on the incidents she could not recall, which would violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the defendant's right of confrontation was not dependent on the child's ability to recall the details, but on the defendant's opportunity to probe her lack of recollection on cross-examination.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that the admission of the child's entire video-recorded statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, even if she doesn't recall all the details. The court also emphasized that it is essential for the State to act expeditiously in investigating and prosecuting matters that rely heavily on a young child's ability to recall events, to avoid memory decay over time.

State v. Jordan

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 124PA22

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: Dietz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

During an investigation of a stolen car, law enforcement officers followed a suspect into a nearby home where they discovered an illegal drug operation. One of the participants in the operation, the defendant, did not live at the residence and denied any ownership or control over the premises or the objects within, including a safe containing illegal items. The homeowner, who was also the defendant's uncle, consented to the search of the home. After the defendant was convicted of several drug-related offenses, he appealed, arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed because the police entered the home without a warrant.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with deciding if the defendant had standing to challenge the warrantless entry into the home, given that he had declared he did not live there. The Court of Appeals had previously reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, stating that the trial record did not support any finding that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing could support findings that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. The court, however, noted that the trial court failed to make these findings despite the presence of materially conflicting evidence in the trial record. The case was remanded to the trial court for findings of fact based on the trial record. Depending on those findings, the trial court could again deny the motion to suppress, or it may grant the motion to suppress in whole or in part and order a new trial.

State v. Walker

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 202PA22

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

Judge: Barringer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals related to a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Over two decades later, the defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing that his trial counsel did not inform him of his right to testify and prevented him from testifying. He also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective because they filed an Anders brief.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly disposed of the defendant's claims. The record demonstrated that the defendant was aware of his right to testify, and there was no evidence to support his claim that his trial counsel prevented him from testifying. Furthermore, the defendant's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge limitations on an expert witness’s testimony was without merit because the trial court had appropriately restricted the expert from using legal terminology. Therefore, the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel were deemed baseless.

The Supreme Court also held that the standard of review set forth in a previous case, State v. Allen, which involved reviewing MARs in the light most favorable to defendants, was a departure from the court's longstanding standard of review. Thus, the court returned to the previous standard of review, which involves a statutory review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c).

State ex rel. Taylor v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Common Pleas

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1127

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case centers on an appeal by the appellant, Gudonavon J. Taylor, who petitioned for a writ of prohibition against the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (the trial court). Taylor argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to convict him of and sentence him for felony murder in 2010. He claimed that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him on one of his murder counts. The Second District Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and Taylor appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder under R.C. 2903.02(B). Even if Taylor's claim that he could not have committed a predicate offense necessary for the conviction was correct, this would have been an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, not in the lack of it. As Taylor was unable to demonstrate that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, he was not entitled to a writ of prohibition. The court also denied Taylor's request for oral argument.

State ex rel. Townsend v. Gaul

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1128

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with an appeal made by an inmate, Albert Townsend Sr., against the Eighth District Court of Appeals' decision denying his complaint for a writ of mandamus. Townsend was previously convicted on several counts of rape and kidnapping, leading to a sentence of 56 years to life in prison and classification as a sexually violent predator. The court of appeals had deemed his sentence faulty concerning two of his victims and remanded the case for resentencing on eight of the counts.

In Townsend's mandamus complaint, he alleged entitlement to a resentencing hearing and claimed he should have received the benefit of a purported plea deal offered by the state. However, the court of appeals dismissed his complaint, noting that he had not complied with R.C. 2969.25(C), which mandates an inmate seeking a waiver of the court's filing fee to submit an affidavit of indigency that includes a certified statement of the balance in the inmate's institutional account for the past six months. The court of appeals noted that Townsend's complaint was defective due to noncompliance with this requirement.

Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision. They noted that Townsend had indeed failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C) and that his provided account statement was neither certified by the institutional cashier nor covered the required six-month period. As Townsend did not argue his compliance with R.C. 2969.25(C) in his appeal, the Supreme Court found no grounds for reversal of the lower court's judgment.

State v. Jones

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1083

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: BRUNNER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves James W. Jones, who was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 60 months for offenses under three separate indictments. These convictions included trafficking marijuana, having weapons while under a disability, and operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The trial court imposed two 30-month prison sentences to be served consecutively for his convictions on trafficking marijuana and having weapons while under a disability. Jones appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the trial court had made the necessary findings for imposing consecutive prison sentences, as required by Ohio law. Specifically, the court cited Jones's extensive criminal history and evidence that he continued to commit crimes while awaiting trial or sentencing for previous crimes. The court also noted that the harm caused by Jones's crimes was so great that no single prison term adequately reflected the seriousness of his conduct. Furthermore, the court found that Jones posed a danger to the public, making consecutive sentences necessary to protect the public from future crime.

The court concluded that the trial court's findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, in line with the review standard set by Ohio law. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision to impose consecutive sentences. The court emphasized that the trial court was not required to state reasons to support its findings, nor was it required to recite the statutory language verbatim, provided the necessary findings could be found in the record and were incorporated into the sentencing entry.

Mays v. State

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: AP-77,093

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: Hervey

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, sentenced to death for capital murder, had his conviction and sentence affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. He submitted multiple motions and applications challenging his competence to be executed, all of which were denied by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court.

In 2015, the appellant made a motion challenging his competence to be executed. The trial court denied the motion, but on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ruled that the appellant made a substantial showing of incompetence and stayed his execution. The case was remanded for further competency proceedings, including a mental health evaluation. After a hearing in 2017, the trial court again ruled that the appellant was competent for execution, a decision affirmed by the appellate court.

In September 2019, the appellant filed another motion challenging his competency. The trial court denied the motion and the appellant appealed. In April 2020, he filed a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging intellectual disability and ineligibility for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas stayed the execution and remanded the application to the trial court for review. In February 2023, the trial court recommended relief on the intellectual disability claim. Based on the agreed findings and conclusions, the appellate court granted habeas relief by reforming the appellant's sentence from death to life imprisonment without parole.

Therefore, the appellant's appeal of the trial court's determination of his competency to be executed was rendered moot, and the appeal was dismissed. The holding of the case is that the appellant's sentence was reformed from death to life imprisonment without parole due to his intellectual disability claim.

State v. Stearns

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,502-0

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: STEPHENS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered whether the State's 12-year delay in bringing charges against John Ray Stearns, despite having matched his DNA to a murder victim in 2004, violated his due process rights. Stearns contended that this delay prejudiced his defense as a key witness who could have testified that she saw the victim with someone other than Stearns in the hours preceding her death had died before the trial. The trial court denied Stearn's motion to dismiss on these grounds, and he was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this conviction, concluding that the State's negligent delay in charging and the loss of key witness testimony violated Stearns' due process rights.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington disagreed and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. Although the Court acknowledged that the State was negligent in failing to bring charges sooner, it held that the loss of the witness's testimony did not amount to a denial of due process. The Court reasoned that the due process inquiry is fact-intensive and that Stearns had not sufficiently demonstrated that the prejudice he suffered from the loss of the witness's potential testimony justified the dismissal of a serious murder case.

Davis v. Circuit Court for Dane County

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2022AP001999-W

Opinion Date: March 26, 2024

Judge: PROTASIEWICZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Antonio S. Davis, who was charged with misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct. Davis had applied for representation from the State Public Defender (SPD) and while his application was still being processed, he was arraigned. Consequently, Davis pleaded not guilty and further proceedings were scheduled. It was not until 65 days later that the SPD appointed counsel for Davis. Six days after counsel was appointed, Davis filed a request for substitution of judge, which was denied by the Circuit Court for Dane County as untimely.

Davis then filed a petition for supervisory writ, arguing that the Circuit Court had a plain duty to treat his request for substitution of judge as timely. The Court of Appeals denied his petition and the case was brought before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for review. The Supreme Court needed to decide whether Davis had forfeited the issues he brought forth and whether he was entitled to a supervisory writ directing the lower court to treat his request for substitution of judge as timely.

The Supreme Court concluded that even if Davis had forfeited the issues, they would exercise discretion to address them to clarify the procedure for appealing a denial of a request for substitution of judge as untimely. However, the court found that Davis was not entitled to a supervisory writ, asserting that the lower court did not have a plain duty to treat Davis's request as timely under Wisconsin Statute § 971.20(4), Dane County Local Rule 208, a government-created obstacle exception, or a theory of equitable tolling. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In re Termination of Parental Rights To: Mmd, Jid and Drd v. State, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 35

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: BOOMGAARDEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming heard an appeal by Rodger William Dillard, who contested the termination of his parental rights to his three minor children. Dillard had initially adopted his grandchildren after their biological parents' rights were terminated. After Dillard's wife, who had custody of the children, passed away, allegations of sexual abuse were made against Dillard by two of the children. Dillard was then charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor.

The Department of Family Services initially aimed to reunify the children with Dillard. However, after more than a year in the Department's custody, the plan was changed to adoption due to Dillard's lack of progress in meeting the requirements of his Family Service Case Plan. Dillard was eventually sentenced to concurrent sentences of three to five years for two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Following this, the Department filed a petition to terminate Dillard's parental rights.

The district court found that termination was in the best interest of the children, as Dillard was unfit to meet their ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs. Dillard appealed this decision, arguing that the Department had not made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children.

However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decision to terminate Dillard's parental rights. The Court held that Dillard's incarceration due to his felony convictions for sexual abuse of a minor demonstrated his unfitness to have custody and control of the children. The Court therefore affirmed the termination of Dillard's parental rights under the provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv), which allows for termination of parental rights if the parent is incarcerated due to a felony conviction and is shown to be unfit for custody and control of the child.

Wilson v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 34

Opinion Date: March 27, 2024

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Benjamin David Wilson, was charged with second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, following allegations involving his stepdaughter, K.P. The jury acquitted him of the second-degree charge but found him guilty of the third-degree charge. Wilson appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient for a conviction on the third-degree charge.

The facts presented to the court included K.P.'s testimony that Wilson had inappropriately touched her during a family event. Wilson denied the allegations, providing an alternative account of the incident. Despite this, the jury found him guilty of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, leading to a sentence of 10 to 15 years in prison.

In response to Wilson's appeal, the court affirmed the conviction. It stated that the jury's acquittal on one charge did not necessarily impact the verdict on the other charge. The court indicated that each charge was treated as a separate indictment, and verdicts on multiple charges did not need to be consistent. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, affirming Wilson's conviction based on K.P.'s testimony.