Pulsifer v. United States

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-340

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Kagan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of the United States decided in the case of Mark Pulsifer, who was convicted for distributing methamphetamine and sought to minimize his sentence using the "safety valve" provision of federal sentencing law. This provision allows a sentencing court to disregard the statutory minimum if a defendant meets five criteria, one of which is related to the defendant's criminal history. The government argued that Pulsifer did not meet this requirement due to his previous three-point offenses, disqualifying him under the safety valve provision. Pulsifer, however, contended that he should be considered eligible as he did not have a two-point violent offense, arguing that only the combination of all three elements of the provision could prevent him from receiving safety-valve relief.

The court held that a defendant is eligible for safety-valve relief only if he or she satisfies each of the provision’s three conditions. More specifically, a defendant is eligible only if they do not have more than four criminal-history points, do not have a prior three-point offense, and do not have a prior two-point violent offense. This interpretation aligns with the text and context of the law and the Sentencing Guidelines. The court rejected Pulsifer’s attempts to invoke the rule of lenity, as the court found no ambiguity in the statute and, therefore, no room for lenity to play a role. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Efron v. UBS Financial Services Incorporated of Puerto Rico

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1858

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: MONTECALVO

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the plaintiff-appellant, David Efron, filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim and various Puerto Rico law claims against UBS Financial Services and other defendants. Efron alleged that the defendants had illegally disclosed his private bank account information to his ex-wife, triggering litigation and a subsequent indemnification claim from UBS. The district court dismissed Efron's case after denying him leave to file a second amended complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had not abused its discretion by limiting Efron to deposing only two UBS employees before filing his proposed second amended complaint. The court also agreed that permitting Efron to amend his complaint would be futile, affirming the dismissal of his RICO claim. The court declined to impose sanctions against Efron, despite arguments from UBS that the appeal was frivolous. The court concluded that while Efron's case was weak, it was not so squarely resolved in his prior appeal on a different RICO claim that it could be deemed frivolous.

United States v. Gerrish

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1317

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: SELYA

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit examined a case where the defendant, Derek Gerrish, challenged the constitutionality of a search of his vehicle during his pretrial release on several state criminal charges. During this period, Gerrish was subjected to at least six different bail conditions, five of which allowed for searches of his person, vehicle, or residence at any time without reasonable suspicion. The search in question led to the discovery of fentanyl and other contraband, resulting in Gerrish pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.

Gerrish argued that the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional, despite the terms of his bail conditions. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, citing two reasons: the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and Gerrish's bail conditions permitted such a search.

On appeal, the defendant argued that both of the district court's reasons were incorrect. The appeals court, however, only focused on the bail condition rationale, as it found it conclusive. The court noted that Gerrish knowingly agreed to bail conditions authorizing searches without suspicion and did not challenge the reasonableness of these conditions. Furthermore, it emphasized that the issue at hand was not the search itself, but the bail conditions that authorized it.

The court rejected Gerrish's argument that such bail conditions could not be imposed pre-trial or pre-guilty plea, referring to precedent which stated that acceptance of such conditions significantly diminishes a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. It also dismissed Gerrish's claim of a conflict with a Ninth Circuit decision, stating that Maine law requires "least restrictive" bail conditions tailored to the defendant's individual circumstances, thereby eliminating the Ninth Circuit's concerns about mandatory waiver of rights.

The judgment of the district court was thus affirmed.

United States v. MacVicar

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1130

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: SELYA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant, Kevin MacVicar, who pled guilty to a single count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced by the district court to a seven-year term, which was below the guidelines sentencing range. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing it was both procedurally flawed and substantively unreasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected these claims and affirmed the district court's sentence.

The defendant contended that the district court failed to consider his significant mental health treatment efforts and his need for continued treatment when determining the appropriate sentence. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the record clearly showed the sentencing court had adequately considered all relevant factors, including the mitigating factors that the defendant claimed were overlooked.

The defendant also argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court placed too much weight on the severity of the offense and not enough on other sentencing factors. The appellate court rejected this argument as well, stating that the sentencing court had provided a plausible sentencing rationale and reached a defensible result. It was not the court's role to adjust the weight given to individual sentencing factors according to the defendant's preferences. Therefore, the defendant's sentence was affirmed.

United States v. Orlandella

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1686

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: THOMPSON

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

The defendant, Brian Orlandella, was convicted by a jury of sexual exploitation of a minor and transfer of obscene material to a minor. The charges arose from Orlandella's interactions with a minor via the Kik messenger app. On appeal, Orlandella raised five arguments, all of which were rejected by the court.

Orlandella argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, but the court held that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he persuaded the minor to produce explicit videos and pictures. Orlandella also contended that the court erred by not giving the jury a specific unanimity instruction on Count One, but the court held that a general unanimity instruction was sufficient.

Furthermore, Orlandella claimed that the government violated its obligations to disclose evidence that could have helped his defense. However, the court found that the evidence in question was not material and its suppression did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Orlandella also argued that the court erred by failing to give the jury a missing witness instruction regarding the government's failure to call the minor as a witness. The court found that the minor was not peculiarly available to the government and that Orlandella was not prejudiced by her absence. Finally, Orlandella contended that his incriminating statements were taken in violation of his Miranda rights. The court held that even if there was a Miranda violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence against Orlandella. Consequently, his convictions were affirmed.

United States v. Sastrom

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1750

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: SELYA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Roy Sastrom, was serving a term of supervised release, a condition of which was modified by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court directed Sastrom, upon his release from federal custody, to report directly to a psychiatric hospital in Connecticut, as per his civil commitment order. This case was later transferred to the District of Connecticut. Sastrom appealed, arguing the Massachusetts district court abused its discretion by modifying his supervised release conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that despite the transfer, it retained jurisdiction to review the pre-transfer order. However, the court recognized that Sastrom's case had already proceeded in Connecticut and that the Massachusetts court no longer had authority over his supervised release. Consequently, the court asserted it could not simply remand the case for reassessment of the supervised release conditions.

The court concluded that although it had the power to grant relief, the controversy was so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counseled the court to withhold relief. The only possible remedy would require significant judicial resources and provide only a remote benefit to Sastrom. Therefore, the court declined to grant this remedy and affirmed the lower court's decision.

United States v. Vasquez-Rodrigue

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1035

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: LYNCH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Danybelkis Vasquez-Rodrigue, appealed her jury conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess over 400 grams of fentanyl. Vasquez-Rodrigue argued that the district court erred in denying her requested jury instruction on duress, claiming she was threatened into participating in the drug conspiracy. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Vasquez-Rodrigue's argument, concluding that she had failed to show she either intentionally or recklessly placed herself in a situation where it was probable she would be subjected to duress.

The court noted that by the time Vasquez-Rodrigue alleges she was threatened, she had already completed the crime of conspiracy by agreeing to collect a drug debt, coordinating the collection with the debtor, collecting the money, and remitting thousands of dollars to individuals in Mexico and the Dominican Republic. The court also noted that a reasonable person in Vasquez-Rodrigue's position would have understood the danger of getting involved with a drug conspiracy, especially one selling kilogram amounts of drugs and exporting tens of thousands of dollars out of the country.

The court also rejected Vasquez-Rodrigue's separate argument that a different duress test, imposing fewer burdens on the defendant, should apply in cases in which the sole charged offense is conspiracy. The court noted that the First Circuit has routinely applied the conventional duress test in conspiracy cases. Thus, the court affirmed Vasquez-Rodrigue's conviction.

United States v. Jimenez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2090

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: WALKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime

The case pertains to Ariel Jimenez, who owned and operated a tax preparation business in Bronx, New York. Between 2009 and 2015, Jimenez led a large-scale tax fraud and identity theft scheme, purchasing stolen identities of children to falsely claim them as dependents on clients' tax returns. Through this scheme, Jimenez obtained millions of dollars, which he laundered by structuring bank deposits, investing in real estate properties, and transferring the properties to his parents and limited liability companies. Following a jury trial, Jimenez was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States with respect to tax-return claims, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering.

On appeal, Jimenez raised two issues. First, he claimed that the district court’s jury instruction regarding withdrawal from a conspiracy was erroneous. Second, he alleged that the evidence supporting his conspiracy convictions was insufficient. The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court’s jury instruction on withdrawal from a conspiracy was a correct statement of the law and that the evidence supporting Jimenez's conspiracy convictions was sufficient. The court found that Jimenez had failed to effectively withdraw from the conspiracy as he continued to benefit from it.

United States v. Oliveras

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2954

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: BIANCO

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant-appellant, Alex Oliveras, was sentenced to sixty-three months' imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. On appeal, Oliveras challenged the imposition of a special condition of his supervised release that allowed for suspicionless searches by a probation officer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the "special needs" doctrine of the Fourth Amendment permits, when sufficiently supported by the record, the imposition of a special condition of supervised release that allows suspicionless searches of the defendant's person, property, vehicle, place of residence, or any other property under their control by a probation officer. However, the court also found that the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing that special condition here. The court explained that the district court failed to make the individualized assessment required to support the special condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), including a sufficient explanation as to how the condition was reasonably related in this particular case to the applicable statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and involved no greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary under those factors. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the Search Condition and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of whether it is necessary to impose the Search Condition in this particular case and, if so, for the district court to explain the individualized basis for imposing the Search Condition.

Annor v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1281

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: GRIBBON MOTZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding whether a money laundering conspiracy conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that would bar withholding of removal under immigration law.

The petitioner, David Annor, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, had pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, related to a romance fraud scheme. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Annor, who sought withholding of removal and deferral under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA both determined that Annor's conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime", thus barring his eligibility for withholding of removal.

Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found that the BIA had erred in two ways. Firstly, it had incorrectly applied its own precedent by analysing the elements of the wrong statute, instead of the correct one under which Annor was convicted. Secondly, it failed to consider whether the nature of Annor's offense indicated that he posed a danger to the community, a key factor in determining if a crime is "particularly serious".

Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.

Daulatzai v. Maryland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-2214

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: NIEMEYER

Areas of Law: Aviation, Criminal Law, Transportation Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Anila Daulatzai, was removed from a Southwest Airlines flight after the captain received information about her dog allergy and the presence of two dogs on board. Daulatzai insisted on remaining in her seat despite the captain’s decision, leading to her physical removal by Maryland Transportation Authority police officers. She was later charged with various offenses, including disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.

Daulatzai filed an action against Southwest Airlines and the State of Maryland, alleging various grounds to challenge her removal from the plane and her arrest. The district court dismissed Daulatzai’s complaint for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. Daulatzai appealed that judgment and, while her appeal was pending, she also filed a motion in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), seeking to file a fourth version of her complaint with the district court.

The court denied her request, finding that her efforts were pursued in bad faith, that her repeated failures to cure defects in her pleadings had been prejudicial to the defendants, and that the fourth complaint would, in any event, be futile. Daulatzai appealed that ruling as well.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Daulatzai had failed to establish any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daulatzai leave to file her proposed third amended complaint. The court also found that Daulatzai had waived her challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her second amended complaint by failing to preserve it below.

Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1238

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: WILKINSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law, International Law

Carlos Gomez-Ruotolo, a native citizen of Venezuela, was brought to the United States in 2001 and became a lawful permanent resident. He was convicted twice in Virginia for crimes involving minors: once for attempted sexual battery and another for electronic solicitation of a minor. Based on these convictions, he was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and was denied relief by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Gomez-Ruotolo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his crimes were not morally turpitudinous and that he should receive protection against removal under the Convention Against Torture.

The court disagreed. It held that attempted sexual battery and electronic solicitation of a minor both involved moral turpitude, thus making Gomez-Ruotolo deportable under immigration law. The court also affirmed the agency's decision to deny Gomez-Ruotolo protection under the Convention Against Torture, agreeing that he had not shown he was more likely than not to face torture in Venezuela. Therefore, the court denied Gomez-Ruotolo's petition for review.

United States v. Richardson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-6748

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: FLOYD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a district court can reduce a sentence for both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they were sentenced as a package. The defendant, Nathaniel Richardson, was originally sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin and for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. After the passage of the First Step Act, Richardson sought a sentence reduction. The district court reduced the sentence for the crack cocaine distribution offense but left the sentence for the continuing criminal enterprise offense undisturbed.

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court has the discretion to reduce both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they function as a package. The court reasoned that since district judges often sentence on multiple counts as an interconnected process, they should be given the discretion to reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure it remains adequate to satisfy the statutory sentencing factors. The court further noted that the sentencing package doctrine is applicable here because when one count of a package is remanded, the district judge must be given the discretion to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan. The case was remanded for the district court to decide whether the counts functioned as a package, and if so, to resentence accordingly.

United States v. Tipton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-5

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Criminal Law

This consolidated opinion, delivered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pertains to the appeals of defendants Richard Tipton and James Roane, Jr. Both were convicted in 1993 and sentenced to death and multiple years in prison for involvement in a drug-related enterprise that also included firearms, murders, and other racketeering activity. They have consistently sought post-conviction relief, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, they contested their sentences related to their firearm-related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions in 1993.

The court affirmed the district court's decisions, rejecting the defendants' challenges to their § 924(c) sentences. The court concluded that Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) murder constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). The defendants failed to demonstrate that there was more than a reasonable possibility that the jury did not rely on the valid VICAR murder predicate for any of their § 924(c) convictions. Therefore, the validity of any other alleged § 924(c) predicate did not need to be decided. The court held that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions and sentences were legally sound.

United States v. Underwood

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4405

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three South Carolina law enforcement officers who were found guilty of various abuses of power. The trio, Sheriff George Underwood, Chief Deputy Robert Sprouse, and Lieutenant Johnny Neal, were convicted on multiple counts, including financial corruption, civil rights violations, and conspiracy.

Underwood used his position as sheriff to enrich himself through illegal means, including forcing deputies to perform work on his personal property while on public payroll. He also orchestrated a scheme with Neal to skim money from the extra compensation meant for deputies at drunk-driver checkpoints. Additionally, Underwood and Sprouse misused county money for personal travel expenses.

The court also found that Underwood abused his authority by targeting enforcement against opponents and refusing to investigate offenses reported against friends and supporters. Notably, Underwood unlawfully arrested a citizen for recording a car accident scene, which led to a violation of the citizen's civil rights.

After the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered the corruption, Sprouse and Neal conspired to lie and fabricate documents to cover up their misconduct. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, and the appeals court affirmed those convictions. The court also ruled that the district court's calculation of restitution for the losses sustained was reasonable.

US v. Lassiter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4147

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where the defendant, Malek Lassiter, appealed his convictions for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Lassiter argued that his convictions were erroneous due to a change in legal authority in the form of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor which altered the definition of a "crime of violence".

Lassiter's convictions were based on attempted murder in aid of racketeering activity, arguing that this did not constitute a crime of violence in light of the Taylor decision. However, the court disagreed, distinguishing between the requirements for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which was the focus of the Taylor case, and murder, asserting that murder requires the use of force, therefore attempted murder necessarily requires the attempted use of force, fitting within the definition of a crime of violence.

The court rejected Lassiter's arguments and affirmed his § 924(c)(1)(A) convictions. However, due to an inconsistency between the oral and written descriptions of one of Lassiter’s supervised-release conditions, the court vacated his sentence in its entirety and remanded the case for a full resentencing.

USA v. Marchetti

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40617

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of defendant Vincent Marchetti, Jr., who was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit illegal remunerations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Marchetti was involved in a scheme wherein Vantari Genetics LLC, a medical laboratory, paid distributors to attract Medicare referrals to Vantari. Marchetti, who operated Advanced Life Sciences LLC, was one of the distributors and had a network of sub-distributors. The court found sufficient evidence that Marchetti was knowingly and actively participating in a scheme involving CodonDx, another entity, that violated the Anti-Kickback Statute. The court rejected Marchetti's challenges regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the district court's failure to submit his theory of defense instruction, the court's alleged constructive amendment of the indictment, and the court's application of the sentencing guidelines. The court also dismissed his claim for a new trial based on cumulative error.

USA v. Santiago

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30149

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant, Clarence Santiago, appealed both his conviction and sentence related to drug trafficking and firearms charges. Santiago and his co-conspirators were selling marijuana from a hotel room when they were robbed at gunpoint by previous buyers, leading to a shootout. Santiago was apprehended and confessed to his involvement in the crime.

Santiago pleaded guilty to four separate charges but later moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the presentence investigation report recommended he be improperly punished for attempted first-degree murder. The district court sentenced Santiago to 360 months, a decision he appealed on multiple grounds.

The Court of Appeals found no reversible error in Santiago's plea but held that the district court erred in calculating the guideline range for sentencing. The court noted that Santiago and his co-conspirators were under threat during the shootout, which may have been an act of self-defense rather than attempted murder.

Given this, the Court of Appeals found that the district court committed clear error by applying an attempted-murder cross-reference without considering Santiago's potential self-defense. The court affirmed Santiago's conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

USA v. Schorovsky

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50040

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Willett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2022, Richard Schorovsky pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He had prior convictions in Texas for felony robbery, aggravated robbery, and burglary of a habitation. The district court determined these previous convictions were "violent felonies" committed on separate occasions, qualifying Schorovsky for sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). He was sentenced to the ACCA’s mandatory minimum of 15 years of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Schorovsky appealed, challenging his enhanced sentence and guilty plea.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court determined that the district court properly concluded that Schorovsky's previous convictions were committed on separate occasions, based on "Shepard-approved" documents, which included indictments and judgments for Schorovsky’s prior convictions. The court also ruled that Schorovsky's prior burglary-of-a-habitation conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate, as Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) fits within the generic definition of burglary and thus qualifies as an ACCA violent felony. The court dismissed Schorovsky's argument that the district court violated his due process right to notice by finding that his burglary conviction was an ACCA violent felony, stating that Schorovsky was aware of and understood his ACCA enhancement. The court finally concluded that Schorovsky's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, despite the district court advising him of incorrect minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment resulting from his plea.

United States v. Alvarado

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5459

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: STRANCH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involved Ricardo Alvarado, who was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His crime was reported by officers who responded to a call that a man was carrying what appeared to be a machine gun in a mobile home park. Alvarado was found with a Ruger AR-556 semi-automatic rifle, and upon investigation, officers discovered that he had two prior felony convictions. He was sentenced to 104 months' imprisonment, including a four-level sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.

Alvarado appealed his conviction and sentence. He contended that his conviction violated the Second Amendment based on the standard articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, an issue he raised for the first time on appeal. He also argued that the evidence did not support a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Alvarado’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court found that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under Bruen was subject to reasonable dispute and would not disturb Alvarado’s conviction on plain error review. However, the court found that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment. Without record evidence of anyone in proximity to Alvarado’s line of fire, or otherwise facing an imminent risk of harm, the Government could not satisfy Tennessee’s zone of danger requirement. Consequently, Alvarado's sentence was vacated.

United States v. Singh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1474

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The case revolves around an appeal by Karnail Singh, who was charged with using a fraudulently procured passport and making false statements to immigration officials. Singh pleaded guilty to using a fraudulently procured passport in exchange for a lower sentencing range and the dismissal of the false-statement count. After his plea, the government initiated proceedings to revoke his citizenship. In response, Singh petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, requesting the district court to set aside his conviction, arguing he would not have pled guilty had he known his plea could affect his citizenship. The district court denied his petition, leading to this appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Singh's plea was knowing and satisfied due process, regardless of whether he understood it could impact his citizenship. They found that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the court to inform the defendant that a conviction may have immigration-related consequences.

Singh also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney incorrectly informed him that his plea would only affect his citizenship if he committed another crime. The court rejected this claim, citing lack of evidence that Singh would have chosen to go to trial if he had received different advice from his counsel.

Finally, the court rejected Singh's argument that the district court should have held a hearing before ruling on his coram nobis petition, stating that the record clearly showed Singh was not entitled to coram nobis relief.

United States v. Foxx

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1761

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime

LaTonya Foxx, along with two others, was charged and convicted for engaging in a fraudulent tax scheme. Foxx pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay $1,261,903 in restitution. The scheme involved filing fraudulent tax returns to generate improper refunds for clients and the defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard Foxx's appeal of the restitution order.

The court noted that any power to award restitution must come from a statute. In this case, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act authorizes restitution for wire fraud offenses. The court noted that restitution is limited to the actual losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the offense, and the government must establish those losses by a preponderance of the evidence.

Foxx argued that the district court failed to adequately delineate the scheme and make specific findings that the losses included in the restitution derived from the same scheme for which she was convicted. The court found no fatal deficiency in the district court's findings and concluded that Foxx failed to demonstrate a plain error. The court held that Foxx could be ordered to pay restitution for all the losses she caused during the scheme, not just those relating to the specific wire transactions to which she pleaded guilty. The court affirmed the restitution order.

USA v. White

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1315

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: ST. EVE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit involves an appeal by Shamone White, who had been convicted by a jury of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm as a felon. White appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that the prosecution presented inadequate evidence to establish possession. He also argued that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury, allowing them to find him guilty based solely on his admission that he touched the gun a week before his arrest.

White was arrested after a vehicle he was a passenger in was pulled over. Inside the vehicle, the police found two bags, one of which White admitted to owning. This bag contained cash and cannabis, while the other bag, which White denied ownership of, contained a firearm, ammunition, scales with cannabis residue, and other items.

The court found that the evidence was sufficient for each conviction and that the jury instruction was not misleading. The court highlighted that possession could be either actual or constructive. The court determined that a reasonable jury could infer that White constructively possessed the firearm due to its proximity, the presence of scales with drug residue in the same bag, and the fact that the contents of the two bags collectively formed a complete set of drug trafficking tools. The court also found that White's admission to having previously touched the gun did not mislead the jury. The judgement of the district court was thus affirmed.

United States v. Wesely

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1847

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: STRAS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed two cases where the district courts did not impose a $5,000 special assessment fee mandated by the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act on defendants Jason Wesely and Jesus Diaz-Figueroa. The Act stipulates that non-indigent individuals convicted of sexual exploitation of a child must pay this fee, but both defendants were deemed indigent.

The Court of Appeals assessed the financial situations of both defendants. In Wesely's case, the court upheld the original decision, concluding that the district court did not err in recognizing Wesely's indigence. At the time of sentencing, Wesely had minimal assets and was facing uncertain future income, largely due to prison time and potential suspension of his military disability benefits.

In contrast, the appellate court reversed and remanded the district court's decision regarding Diaz-Figueroa. At the time of sentencing, Diaz-Figueroa had a net worth of approximately $120,000, even when accounting for court-ordered restitution. Given his positive net worth, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court's finding of Diaz-Figueroa's indigence was clearly erroneous. Thus, the court concluded that Diaz-Figueroa was not indigent and should have been required to pay the $5,000 special assessment.

MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-15806

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Collins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the appellant, Michael McLaughlin, challenged his state court convictions for attempted murder, battery, and burglary arising from a stabbing attack on multiple employees at a social services office in Nevada. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a defense of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent, a required element for the charges.

The district court denied McLaughlin's habeas corpus petition, but the Ninth Circuit initially vacated and remanded the decision. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied relief, concluding that despite new evidence, the appellant's trial counsel had not provided ineffective assistance and that McLaughlin had not demonstrated prejudice.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, which clarified standards for considering new evidence in federal habeas proceedings, meant that the lower court was barred from considering any new evidence offered by McLaughlin. The Ninth Circuit found that McLaughlin's failure to present that evidence to the state courts "in compliance with state procedural rules" constituted a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) as construed by Shinn. The court also noted that under Shinn, it made no difference that McLaughlin's first post-conviction counsel's negligence led to that failure.

As McLaughlin conceded that he could not succeed on his ineffective assistance claim unless the new evidence was considered, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of McLaughlin's habeas petition.

United States v. Garcia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50314

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: SANCHEZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of a pretrial release condition that temporarily barred two defendants from possessing firearms pending trial. The defendants, Jesus Perez-Garcia and John Thomas Fencl, were charged with various felony offenses. The district courts imposed a condition barring them from possessing firearms as part of their pretrial release, arguing that the restriction was necessary for public safety. The defendants appealed, arguing that this condition infringed on their Second Amendment rights.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the firearm condition was constitutional. The court reasoned that the Bail Reform Act of 1984's firearm condition on pretrial release is consistent with how courts have historically balanced the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees with public safety considerations. The court also pointed out that the nation has a long history of temporarily disarming criminal defendants facing serious charges and those deemed dangerous or unwilling to follow the law. Therefore, the court held that the temporary disarmament of the defendants was justified by this historical tradition.

United States v. Hay

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-3276

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: TYMKOVICH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling regarding a veteran, Bruce Hay, who was convicted of ten counts of stealing government property and six counts of wire fraud. The case centered around Hay's alleged exaggeration of his disability to gain benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA conducted a six-year investigation, even installing a pole camera that recorded Hay's daily activities outside his house for 68 days.

Hay appealed his conviction on three grounds: insufficient evidence supporting his conviction, violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by the VA's installation of the pole camera, and wrongful admission of evidence by the district judge. The court rejected all three arguments.

First, the court ruled that Hay's fraudulent acquisition of government property constituted "stealing" under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction for stealing government property and wire fraud.

Second, the court held that the use of the pole camera did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment as it only captured his activities in public view.

Lastly, the court rejected Hay's claim that evidence post-dating the charging period was improperly admitted, finding that the district court acted within its discretion.

In conclusion, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a judgment of acquittal and the admission of contested evidence.

United States v. Moore

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-3173

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves an appeal by Jamaryus Moore against his sentence imposed following a probation violation. Moore had initially pleaded guilty to a Hobbs Act robbery and, despite facing a sentencing guideline range of 51 to 63 months, requested probation. The court gave Moore a choice of a 51-month imprisonment or probation, with the understanding that a violation would lead to an 84-month sentence. Moore opted for probation, but he subsequently violated its terms, and the court imposed the previously agreed 84-month sentence. On appeal, this sentence was reversed, with a two-step sentencing process proposed. On remand, the district court applied this two-step process, resulting in an 80-month sentence. Moore appealed, arguing that the district court was wrong in applying the two-step process.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the two-step process was not dicta and could not be disregarded under the clearly erroneous/manifest injustice exception to the law of the case doctrine. The court noted that the two-step process was integral to the initial appeal's holding that the district court had plainly erred and that the error affected Moore’s substantial rights. The court concluded that Moore had not shown that the previous decision was clearly erroneous or that applying it would result in manifest injustice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Mapson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11159

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: JORDAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of sisters Tierzah, Charis, and Elisa Mapson in connection with a shooting incident. The victims were Joshua Thornton, the father of Tierzah's daughter, and his wife. The government charged the sisters with interstate domestic violence, interstate stalking, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The jury found that the shooting was part of a scheme by the sisters to kill Mr. Thornton over a child custody dispute.

In their appeal, the sisters argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Charis also challenged the admission of testimony that she once owned a firearm, claiming it was prejudicial hearsay. Elisa and Charis contested the admissibility of data obtained from automated license plate readers (ALPRs), arguing that its acquisition constituted a warrantless search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.

The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. The court also rejected Charis's challenge to the hearsay evidence, ruling it was admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The court further concluded that the ALPR data was admissible because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, and its introduction did not require expert testimony.

United States v. Owens

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11799

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant, Adam Joseph Owens, was arrested as part of a federal-state task force's investigation into a large drug ring. Owens was initially charged with multiple crimes but pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court imposed a 120-month prison sentence, double the 60-month recommendation by the Sentencing Guidelines. The court argued this upward variance was due to Owens planning to sell drugs while in jail awaiting sentencing and his involvement in the overdose death of one of his customers.

Owens appealed against these findings. The appellate court, however, affirmed the district court's sentence, concluding that the findings were not clearly erroneous. The court relied on the testimony of the warden of the detention center where Owens was held and a police sergeant who testified about the victim's death. It was found that Owens was involved in drug dealing in jail and was responsible for selling drugs that led to the victim's death. The court noted that the district court's factual findings at sentencing were not clearly erroneous and thus upheld Owens's sentence.

United States v. Wright

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12338

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Branch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case is about an appeal by Jayson Wright against his conviction for producing child pornography. Wright had pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography by a parent or legal guardian and one count of producing child pornography, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) and (e), and 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) respectively, and was sentenced to a total of 720-months’ imprisonment. Wright appealed his conviction on the grounds that the district court violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his guilty plea on the § 2251(a) charge. He argued that there was not an adequate factual basis supporting his guilty plea and that the district court did not adequately explain the nature of his charge.

Wright argued that the minor needed to have volitionally participated in the sexual act to sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). He contended that he was prejudiced and his conviction should be reversed because the district court did not mention a volitional requirement during the plea colloquy, and he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about what he contends is the volitional requirement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not require the minor to volitionally participate in the sexual act. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error in taking Wright’s guilty plea without finding that the minor volitionally participated in the sexual act.

Gomez v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062526(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: O’LEARY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, the petitioner, Eddie Gomez, Jr., sought to challenge a Superior Court judge's denial of his request to disqualify another judge, Judge Kimberly Menninger, who was set to consider his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.

Gomez had previously appeared before Judge Menninger for his arraignment, where he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder and two enhancements. Following the plea agreement, Judge Menninger dismissed the remaining counts and enhancements, sentencing Gomez to 11 years in prison. Later, Gomez filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and subsequently filed a peremptory challenge to disqualify Judge Menninger from ruling on this resentencing petition.

However, Judge Jonathan S. Fish denied the peremptory challenge, stating it was untimely and that Judge Menninger, as the sentencing judge, was required to handle the resentencing under section 1172.6. Gomez then sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, but his petition was denied.

Upon review of the case, the Court of Appeal held that Gomez's peremptory challenge was indeed untimely. The court reasoned that the resentencing proceeding was a continuation of the earlier criminal action, and therefore Gomez was not entitled to file a peremptory challenge at the resentencing stage. The court affirmed that when the judge assigned to examine and rule on the resentencing petition is the same judge who presided at the petitioner's earlier criminal action, the petitioner is not entitled to peremptorily challenge that judge. As a result, the court denied Gomez's petition for a writ of mandate.

People v. Carrillo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F084751(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: FRANSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.

Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.

Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing.

People v. Jackson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B328954(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Albert Jackson was alone in a parked car when two officers approached him. The officers boxed him in, shined flashlights on him, and questioned him, while observing that he was wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night and seemed nervous. The officers did not have any reason to suspect criminal activity, but they stopped and detained Jackson due to his behavior. The officers found a gun in Jackson's possession, leading to his arrest. Jackson challenged his arrest, arguing that his detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court disagreed and denied his motion to suppress the evidence.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight held that the officers' actions amounted to an unjustified detention. The court found that a reasonable person in Jackson's position would not feel free to leave due to the officers' display of authority. The court noted that the officers did not have any specific and articulable facts suggesting that criminal activity was afoot. Wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night, appearing surprised and nervous, and sitting awkwardly in a car do not amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court also rejected the prosecution's argument that the area was a high-crime area, stating that the officer's words did not suggest this.

The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its order denying Jackson’s motion to suppress the evidence and to enter a new order granting that motion. The court concluded that Jackson's detention was invalid and violated the Fourth Amendment.

People v. Montgomery

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167813(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Rodríguez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery Jr. was sentenced to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences, after pleading no contest to several violent felonies. Later, under Senate Bill No. 483, which invalidated most prison priors imposed before January 1, 2020, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing. Although the court struck the prison priors, it did not hold a resentencing hearing.

This matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three was to correct this oversight. The court agreed with the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed the trial court's order striking the prison priors, and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.

The court also addressed a disagreement between the parties about the power of the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea bargain if the resentencing resulted in further sentence reductions. The court sided with Montgomery, concluding that the legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the resentencing hearing. The court's interpretation was based on the text and legislative history of Senate Bill No. 483, which indicated an intent to reduce or preserve sentences while limiting the prosecutor's ability to rescind plea agreements.

McDougal v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 170, 2023

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Traynor

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case of James McDougal v. State of Delaware, McDougal was convicted of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. His convictions and sentence followed the Superior Court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from him during a street encounter with police officers. According to the State, the police had reasonable suspicion that McDougal was loitering, which justified his initial detention. A subsequent pat-down search revealed a concealed firearm. McDougal appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.

The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed and vacated the lower court’s judgment. The court found that the officers' suspicion of loitering was not reasonable and did not justify even a limited investigative seizure. The court also stated that the citizen is not required to answer the officer’s questions during a consensual encounter, and his refusal to answer cannot form the basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Applying these principles, the court concluded that the detention of McDougal and the consequent nonconsensual search of his person was unlawful. The court held that the Superior Court erred when it denied McDougal's motion to suppress.

DURDEN v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0270

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case in question revolves around a defendant, Devin Durden, who was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Dewayne Chronister. Durden was indicted along with Dontavis Screws and Jasmine Thomas for malice murder, felony murder predicated on armed robbery, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Screws and Thomas pleaded guilty to lesser offenses, and Durden was convicted of all counts except malice murder.

Durden's appeal centers on two primary points of contention. First, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing a detective to testify extensively, identifying Durden as the individual shown in surveillance footage. Second, he argues that the court erred in instructing the jury on single-witness testimony without also instructing it on accomplice corroboration. Durden also contends that the cumulative harm of these alleged errors warrants reversal.

In reviewing the appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirms in part and vacates in part. First, while the court acknowledges that the detective's identification testimony was excessive, it finds that the error likely did not impact the trial's outcome because the testimony was redundant of other evidence presented in court. Second, the court agrees that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on accomplice corroboration, but again determines that this error likely did not affect the trial's outcome due to substantial corroborating evidence.

Finally, the Supreme Court of Georgia notes an unraised issue regarding sentencing. It observes that Durden's conviction for armed robbery, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder charge, should have merged into the felony murder conviction. As a result, the court vacates Durden's conviction and sentence for armed robbery.

EVERETT v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0396

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jerome Everett was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Keith Nelson. Everett appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by giving an incorrect jury instruction on justification and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State's use of his prior convictions as impeachment evidence.

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that even if the jury instruction was erroneous, it was a harmless error since the jury was highly unlikely to have believed the use of deadly force was justified. The court also found that Everett's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because his trial counsel did object to the admission of evidence of Everett's prior convictions and thereby preserved the issue for appeal.

Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction. In the decision, the court noted that Everett's justification defense was significantly undermined by the evidence presented at trial, which included his admission to shooting Nelson, evidence of Everett's attempt to flee the crime scene, and the lack of gunshot residue on Everett’s hands, which supported the State's theory that Everett was wearing gloves when he shot Nelson.

HASSAN v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0026

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Muhammad Hassan was convicted of participation in street gang activity, murder, aggravated assault, and firearms charges in connection to a drive-by shooting that resulted in the death of Amira Cameron. The shooting was alleged to be a retaliation against a rival gang, the Crips, who were blamed for the unsolved murder of a fellow gang member. Hassan appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay evidence regarding the prior murder and failing to instruct the jury about the State’s heightened burden of proof when the case relies entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected both arguments. Regarding the hearsay evidence, the court found that the challenged testimony, which included information about the prior murder and gang affiliations, did not clearly constitute hearsay as it did not expressly involve the repetition of out-of-court statements by other individuals. Additionally, Hassan did not object to the evidence at trial, which limited the appeal to a review for plain error, a high standard that Hassan failed to meet.

On the second issue, the court found that the trial court's instruction to the jury—that they could convict only if the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, excludes all reasonable theories of innocence—effectively conveyed the burden of proof required for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence. Therefore, no plain error occurred. The court affirmed Hassan's conviction.

HOWARD v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0105

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case from the Supreme Court of Georgia, Marquavious Howard was appealing his felony murder conviction for the 2017 shooting death of Jacorbin King. Howard was accused of participating in a robbery at King's apartment that resulted in King's death. Howard was indicted along with four others, and at trial, he was found not guilty of malice murder and firearm possession, but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.

Howard appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence of a photo identification, and the trial court erred in excusing a juror for cause. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of Howard's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.

The Court found that there was enough evidence to support the conviction, including testimonies from several witnesses and a confession Howard allegedly made to a jail bunkmate. As for the claim of ineffective counsel, the Court ruled that Howard didn't prove that a motion to suppress the photo identification would have been granted. Regarding the excused juror, the Court stated that Howard didn't have a right to a specific juror and didn't prove that the selected jury was biased or incompetent.

RICHARDSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0179

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In January 2018, Matthew Richardson was convicted for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Julius Aderhold, III. The incident occurred in a drive-by shooting when Richardson was allegedly upset with Jabari Johnson for his involvement in stealing a gun belonging to Richardson's cousin. Richardson, Johnson, and another individual, Young, were involved in the shooting. During the incident, Aderhold was shot and killed. Richardson was found guilty of all counts and sentenced to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive five-year term on Count 5, and 20 years in prison to run concurrent on Counts 2, 3, and 4.

Richardson later appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted testimony of a detective that improperly bolstered out-of-court statements by Johnson and Young, and that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to that same testimony.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction. The court held that the detective's testimony did not directly address the credibility of Johnson and Young and thus did not constitute improper bolstering. Additionally, the court found that Richardson's trial counsel's performance was not deficient, as it was not a clear case of improper bolstering, so no reasonable lawyer would have objected to such testimony on those grounds.

RICHARDSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0179

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2018, Matthew Richardson was involved in a drive-by shooting during which his passenger, Julius Aderhold, was shot and killed. The incident occurred in Atlanta, Georgia, and stemmed from Richardson's anger over a stolen gun. Richardson was convicted for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting in November 2019. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, a consecutive five-year term, and 20 years to run concurrently. Richardson appealed his conviction, alleging the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of a detective, which he claimed improperly bolstered out-of-court statements by two other witnesses. He also contended his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the same testimony.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Richardson's conviction. The court determined the detective's testimony did not constitute improper bolstering as it did not directly address the credibility of other witnesses, but instead focused on their demeanors. The court also rejected Richardson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as it found no deficiency in his trial counsel's performance. Therefore, Richardson's claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The court further concluded that the trial court did not commit an error that was clear and obvious beyond reasonable dispute.

Kopf v. Kelly

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 127464

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: OVERSTREET

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case concerns a challenge to an Illinois statute that prohibits child sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a day care home. The plaintiff, Martin Kopf, who in 2003 had pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a 15-year-old victim, argued that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Illinois determined that the statute did not violate Kopf's substantive due process and equal protection rights, as it was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting children. The court noted that while the law may create difficulties for sex offenders in finding compliant housing, it does not force them to leave their communities. The court reversed the lower court's decision that found the statute facially unconstitutional and remanded the case for further proceedings on the plaintiff's as-applied challenges.

People v. Gray

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 127815

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: O’BRIEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, defendant Demetrius Gray was convicted of the offense of being an armed habitual criminal. The appellate court reversed this conviction, contending that the prosecution failed to prove that Gray had two prior qualifying felony convictions because he was 17 years old at the time of one of the alleged predicate offenses. The State appealed this decision, arguing that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the elements necessary to convict Gray of being an armed habitual criminal.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed Gray's conviction. The court found that Gray's defense counsel's stipulation that Gray had "two prior qualifying felony convictions for the purposes of sustaining the charge of armed habitual criminal" was sufficient evidence of Gray's prior qualifying convictions. Therefore, the State did not need to present further evidence in support of the stipulated fact of Gray's prior qualifying offenses. The court also rejected Gray's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in making the stipulation as Gray could not show that, but for the deficiency in counsel's representation, there is a reasonable probability the trial result would have been different. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charge of being an armed habitual criminal beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Griffin

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 128587

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: WHITE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2011, Shamar Griffin entered a guilty plea in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, to one count of first-degree murder in exchange for a 35-year sentence and the dismissal of additional charges. Several years later, Griffin filed a motion to file a successive post-conviction petition, alleging actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that Griffin's guilty plea precluded his actual innocence claim. The appellate court reversed, allowing Griffin to file a petition alleging actual innocence despite his guilty plea.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the same standard applies to all petitioners when determining whether to grant leave to file a successive post-conviction petition based on an actual innocence claim, regardless of whether the petitioner was convicted following a trial or pleaded guilty. The court also held that each claim in a successive post-conviction petition must meet the applicable standard in order to advance to second-stage post-conviction proceedings.

In this case, the court found that Griffin presented a colorable claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence that, if true, could lead to his acquittal on retrial. This evidence included two affidavits identifying a different individual as the actual shooter. The court affirmed the appellate court's decision allowing Griffin to file a successive post-conviction petition based on his actual innocence claim, but it remanded the case to the appellate court for further consideration of Griffin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

People v. Logan

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129054

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: CUNNINGHAM

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois evaluated a case involving Jessica Logan, who was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of her 19-month-old son. Before her trial, Logan moved to suppress a video reenactment of her son’s death, arguing that police should have given her Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the video was admitted as evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that the reenactment was not custodial.

The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, but for different reasons. The court found that Logan was in custody during the reenactment and should have received Miranda warnings. Despite this, the court held that admitting the reenactment as evidence did not amount to plain error, as the evidence of Logan's guilt was not closely balanced. The court also rejected Logan's claims that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, finding that she had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if her counsel had acted differently.

People v. Marcum

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 128687

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: ROCHFORD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Clayton T. Marcum, was convicted of two counts of aggravated domestic battery and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of seven years on each count. Marcum appealed, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been violated, he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel, the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated domestic battery, and the circuit court violated his right to remain silent when it ordered him to participate in the preparation of his presentence investigation report.

The appellate court agreed that the evidence was insufficient to prove Marcum guilty of aggravated domestic battery. As a result, his convictions were reduced to Class 3 aggravated batteries and the case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The appellate court rejected Marcum's remaining arguments. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, only contesting his speedy trial and waiver of counsel claim.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court held that a violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial does not alone constitute plain error. The court also found that the trial court substantially complied with Rule 401(a) in admonishing Marcum, therefore he effectively waived his right to counsel at trial and continuing through sentencing. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s order remanding the case to the trial court for resentencing on the reduced convictions for aggravated battery.

People v. Torres

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129289

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: OVERSTREET

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed a case where a defendant, Ramon Torres, was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of his four-year-old daughter. The State’s evidence included testimony that Torres tested positive for chlamydia in 2013 and again in 2016. On appeal, Torres argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the admission of evidence of these two test results. He maintained that the test results fell under the purview of the physician-patient privilege statute and that none of the statutory exceptions to the physician-patient privilege applied.

This case required the court to interpret the physician-patient privilege statute and whether the test results would have been excluded from evidence at his jury trial had his attorney objected. The appellate court disagreed with Torres and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts’ judgments.

The court held that the physician-patient privilege statute did not apply to the 2016 test results as Torres submitted to testing in 2016 not for the purpose of seeking medical treatment, but because he was ordered to do so by the Department of Children and Family Services. Therefore, the privilege and the exceptions to the privilege were irrelevant to the admissibility of the 2016 test results.

Regarding the 2013 test results, the court found that the physician-patient privilege statute does apply. The court, however, determined that the exception set out in subsection (7) authorizes physicians to disclose information subject to the physician-patient privilege “in actions, civil or criminal, arising from the filing of a report in compliance with the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act.” Therefore, the 2013 chlamydia test results were admissible even though the physician-patient privilege attached to those test results. The court concluded that the defendant has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland standard, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

People v. Wells

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129402

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: NEVILLE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois considered an appeal by Emanuel Wells, who had entered a fully negotiated plea agreement with the state. Wells had pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver and received the minimum six-year sentence. He also agreed to pay a $100,000 fine and was credited for the 54 days he had spent in custody. After sentencing, Wells filed a motion to receive credit for time he spent on home detention prior to the plea. The trial and appellate courts denied the motion, holding that a fully negotiated guilty plea constitutes a waiver of presentence custody credit not provided for in the plea agreement.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that a fully negotiated plea deal that is a complete and final expression of the parties' agreement gives rise to a presumption that every material right and obligation is included and that neither party may unilaterally seek modification of the agreement. The court found that Wells, by entering into a plea deal that granted him 54 days of credit, agreed to forgo his right to credit for time he spent on home detention. Although it was unclear whether Wells was aware of the potential credit for his time spent on home detention, the court determined that Wells waived this right by entering into a plea agreement that provided for 54 days of credit. Consequently, Wells was not entitled to additional credit not included in the agreement.

State of Iowa v. Jackson

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-1319

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: McDonald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Iowa, the case involved David Jackson, who was involved in a car accident that resulted in the death of another motorist. Jackson was convicted of vehicular homicide by operating while intoxicated, reckless driving, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. Jackson appealed on the basis that the court allowed rebuttal evidence of his medical condition, which he claimed caused him to black out and lose control of the vehicle, over his objections that the evidence was hearsay.

The Court concluded that the district court had erred in admitting the testimony of an employee of a healthcare vendor who had reviewed some of Jackson’s post-accident medical records. The court found that the testimony was hearsay and did not fall into the business records exception to the hearsay rule because the testimony was about the records, not the records themselves.

The Court affirmed Jackson’s conviction for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, but vacated his convictions for vehicular homicide (OWI), reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State v. Burris

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123650

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

Carol Sue Burris was convicted of mistreatment of a dependent adult and the second-degree reckless murder of her husband, Michael Burris, who suffered from dementia and other significant health issues. Carol, as Michael's sole caregiver, was found to have neglected his care and prevented others from helping him. Michael subsequently died of pneumonia with severe emaciation as a significant underlying factor.

Carol appealed her conviction, arguing that her conviction for reckless but unintentional second-degree murder should be reversed, as it was based solely on a failure of care—that is, on things she did not do rather than affirmative acts she did. Her argument was premised on the idea that she had no duty to act—to provide the care at issue—under these facts.

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Carol owed a clearly defined legal duty of care to her husband, based on their marital relationship, her voluntary assumption of Michael's care, and her role as Michael's sole caregiver under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5417. The prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were found not to be in error, and thus, Carol's convictions were upheld.

The court held that a person may be held criminally liable for a failure to act if that person owes a legal duty of care, which can arise out of either common law or legislative enactment. A legal duty of care is imposed at common law when a person is in a special relationship with another, such as marriage, or when a person has voluntarily assumed the care of another and has prevented others from rendering aid. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5417 imposes a legal duty of care on the primary caregivers of dependent adults.

State v. D.W.

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125637

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Kansas, the defendant, D.W., was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle. The defendant was in the passenger seat of a vehicle when an accomplice in the backseat shot and killed the 16-year-old driver of the car they were pursuing. The defendant was sentenced to life without parole for 50 years and appealed his conviction and sentence.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting bodycam footage showing the victim's dying moments, asserting it warranted a new trial. He also claimed that the court imposed an illegal sentence by ordering lifetime post-release supervision on his murder conviction.

The Supreme Court disagreed with both arguments. The court determined that the bodycam footage was relevant and its probative value outweighed the risk of undue prejudice. The court also found that the lower court had imposed a term of lifetime parole, not lifetime post-release supervision, which conformed with the applicable sentencing statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence.

State v. Edwards

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125632

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Luckert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this decision from the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the defendant, Jerome Edwards, appealed the denial of his 2022 motion for DNA testing. Edwards had previously filed similar motions in 2011, 2018, and 2022 asking for DNA testing of biological materials on a cigarette butt and a bullet, both of which were denied. He argued that the district court erred by applying the "law of the case" doctrine to deny his 2022 motion, stating that the court did not have jurisdiction over his case when it denied the 2018 motion as he had an appeal pending at the same time.

The Supreme Court held that K.S.A. 21-2512, the law governing DNA testing, grants the district court jurisdiction to consider and act on a motion seeking DNA testing even after an appeal has been docketed. This conclusion was based on the plain language of the law, which allows a defendant to seek DNA testing "at any time" and "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." The court also held that the law of the case doctrine applied to the defendant's 2022 motion, as it sought DNA testing of the same evidence as his 2018 motion. Therefore, the district court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine to deny Edwards' 2022 motion for DNA testing. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision.

State v. Martin

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124607

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Kansas, Miles Loren Martin was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and possession of a controlled substance without a drug-tax stamp. Martin appealed, arguing that these convictions violated constitutional protections against double jeopardy and a Kansas statute prohibiting multiple convictions for the same conduct.

The Kansas Supreme Court rejected Martin's argument. It held that possession of methamphetamine and failure to affix a drug-tax stamp were not the same offenses under the Kansas statute, because the former carried a higher penalty than the latter, and because the latter required an element (failure to affix the stamp) not required for the former. Consequently, the legislature had not prohibited multiple punishments for these offenses.

The court also held that Martin's convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions. It reasoned that the legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for the offenses because they targeted different conduct (possession of an illegal narcotic versus failure to pay a drug tax) and carried different penalties.

On Martin's challenge to the search of his pill bottle, the court found that the search fell within the exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest. The court noted that the officer had a legitimate basis to arrest Martin before the search and that the arrest followed shortly after the search. The court also found that the search of the bottle did not exceed the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest.

Commonwealth v. Corey

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12100

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

This case involved defendant Julie A. Corey who was convicted of first-degree murder on the grounds of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with the underlying felony of aggravated kidnapping. Following her conviction, Corey filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney's failure to call a cell phone expert to testify about her location on the night of the murder. She also requested that the court enter a required finding of not guilty. The trial judge, who was also the motion judge, denied Corey's motion for a new trial but vacated her conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Corey committed the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping.

On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Corey’s argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that her trial counsel's decision not to call a cell phone expert was not ineffective and would not have likely influenced the jury's conclusions. Furthermore, the court agreed with the Commonwealth that there was sufficient evidence to find Corey guilty of felony-murder with a predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, the court reinstated that conviction. The court also declined to exercise its powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce Corey's conviction.

Commonwealth v. Escobar

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13321

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Rigoberto Escobar, was found guilty of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Magno Sosa after a heated argument that escalated into a fistfight. The defendant appealed, arguing that his confession to police was improperly obtained because he was improperly Mirandized, coerced into confessing, and his rights to prompt arraignment and telephone use after arrest were violated. Moreover, the defendant contended that the trial judge made errors by denying his motion for a mistrial and failing to instruct the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. He also claimed that improper testimony by the Commonwealth's experts on fingerprint identification and forensic ballistics led to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Lastly, the defendant argued that his firearm convictions should be vacated according to a recent ruling in Commonwealth v. Guardado.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree. They concluded that the defendant's motion to suppress his confession was properly denied, his motion for a mistrial was rightly denied, and the trial judge did not err in declining to provide a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. However, the trial judge did err in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Despite this, they found the defendant was not prejudiced by this decision due to the jury instructions as a whole and the lack of evidence supporting a finding of voluntary manslaughter.

The court also affirmed that even if the expert testimony was improper, it did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because the Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence tying the defendant to the firearm and to the crime. However, the court vacated the defendant's firearm convictions and remanded for a new trial to give the Commonwealth the opportunity to prove that the defendant was not licensed to carry a firearm.

Kaiser vs. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0749

Opinion Date: March 13, 2024

Judge: MOORE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed a case in which Robert John Kaiser had been convicted of second-degree felony murder for the death of his infant son. Kaiser sought postconviction relief, arguing that two expert witnesses for the State had presented false evidence at his trial. The district court granted a new trial, determining that the expert testimony at issue was indeed false and that the jury might have reached a different conclusion without it. The State appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the lower court's decision, stating that the district court had not abused its discretion. It held that the Larrison test, which is used to determine the legitimacy of claims of witness recantation or false trial testimony, was the appropriate legal standard for this case. The court found that the expert testimony presented at Kaiser's trial was factual and false, thus meeting the requirements of the Larrison test. The court further found that the jury might have returned a different verdict without the false testimony. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the decision of the lower courts to grant Kaiser a new trial.

State vs. Lehman

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0200

Opinion Date: March 13, 2024

Judge: MCKEIG

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case in question involves Dale Edward Lehman, Jr., who was convicted for knowingly permitting a minor to ingest methamphetamine, a violation of Minnesota Statute § 152.137, subd. 2(b) (2022). Lehman appealed, arguing the state failed to provide evidence proving he knew the minor in question, identified as A.D., was under the age of 18. Lehman also argued the court failed to instruct the jury to evaluate whether he knew A.D. was underage. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating the statute did not necessitate proof of the defendant's awareness of the minor's age.

Lehman's case reached the Supreme Court of Minnesota, where he petitioned for a review. The Supreme Court stated it did not need to resolve the statutory interpretation issue raised by Lehman, as the circumstantial evidence was inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than Lehman's guilt. The Court took into consideration Lehman's longstanding relationship with the minor's family, his frequent visits to their home, and his statements indicating he knew the minor was underage. The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that Lehman knew A.D. was under the age of 18 at the time he provided her with methamphetamine.

The Court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the appellate court but on different grounds, maintaining Lehman's conviction.

Exson v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-01089-SCT

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case before the Supreme Court of Mississippi involves an appeal by Joe Exson, who was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, grand larceny, and first-degree arson. Exson was identified in a video committing these crimes, wearing a distinctive hoodie that was later found in his possession. He stole numerous items from the property and set it on fire, causing it to burn down entirely. The primary issue in Exson's appeal was the valuation of the stolen items, which was used to determine the charge of grand larceny. The property owner estimated the value of the stolen goods to be over $1,000, which is the minimum threshold for grand larceny under Mississippi law.

Exson argued that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence of the fair market value of the stolen property and that the jury was improperly instructed on the value element of the larceny statute. However, the court noted that Exson failed to raise these arguments during his trial and thus, they were procedurally barred. Besides, the court found no merit in Exson's arguments as he was clearly seen committing the crime in the video. Moreover, reversing his larceny sentence would not substantially change his overall sentence since his arson sentence was longer and was to run concurrently.

The court also examined the jury instructions and found that they tracked the language of the grand larceny statute correctly, even though they did not further define the element of value. Since Exson did not object to the instructions or request a definitional instruction during his trial, the court found no reversible error. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Exson's convictions.

Keith Montrago Jackson a/k/a Keith Jackson v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-00273-SCT

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Griffis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case conducted by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the defendant, Keith Montrago Jackson, was charged and convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to life imprisonment. The case stemmed from an incident involving Jackson and his girlfriend's twelve-year-old daughter, Anna. Jackson and Anna went to a store late at night, and upon their return, Jackson sexually assaulted Anna in his truck. Anna reported the incident to her school, and law enforcement was contacted.

At trial, Anna testified about the incident and identified Jackson as the perpetrator. Forensic evidence, including sperm cells found in Anna that matched Jackson's DNA, was presented. Jackson testified in his own defense, denying the allegations. However, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Jackson appealed the conviction, but his appellate counsel found no arguable issues for appellate review. The Court, having independently reviewed the record, also found no arguable issues. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Marbley v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-01280-SCT

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Kitchens

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence of Timothy Marbley for aggravated domestic violence. The case originated from an incident in April 2020, where officers responded to a disturbance at an apartment complex. They found Sherita Lynch, Marbley's girlfriend, with injuries and a trail of blood leading from the apartment. Marbley was not present at the scene. Lynch and Marbley both testified at the trial, providing different accounts of the incident.

The court noted that Marbley's counsel had filed a brief asserting that there were no arguable issues for review and complied with the procedures set out in Lindsey v. State when an attorney believes there are no appealable issues. Despite being given an opportunity, Marbley did not file a pro se brief. After reviewing the entire record, the court concurred with Marbley's counsel and found no issues that warranted appellate review.

Consequently, the court affirmed Marbley's conviction for aggravated domestic violence and his sentence of ten years, five of which were suspended with nonreporting, supervised probation.

State ex rel. Dorsey vs. Vandergriff

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Dockets: SC100388, SC100486

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: Powell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On December 13, 2023, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued an execution warrant for Brian Dorsey, who is serving a death sentence for two counts of first-degree murder. Subsequently, Dorsey filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is innocent as he was incapable of deliberation due to drug-induced psychosis at the time of the offenses, that his trial counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest resulting from a flat-fee arrangement, and that his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment as he belongs to a unique class of persons for whom the penological goals supporting capital punishment are no longer met.

The Court found that Dorsey failed to present any legally cognizable claims for habeas relief. He did not deny committing the murders and failed to establish that he was actually innocent of first-degree murder. The Court had previously found Dorsey's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest to be without merit, and he was procedurally barred from raising this claim again. Lastly, Dorsey's Eighth Amendment claim was deemed without merit and was interpreted as a plea for clemency, which is beyond the Court's review and authority. Therefore, both petitions for writ of habeas corpus were denied.

State. v. Holmes

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 57

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Rice

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Kaitlyn Holmes, a nurse, was convicted of theft and ordered to pay restitution for stealing credit cards from the personal belongings of several employees at a medical clinic in Bozeman, Montana. The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, also held Holmes responsible for the disappearance of social security cards from the belongings of one of the victims, Brooke Templeton, and included in the restitution order the cost of LifeLock memberships for Templeton and her children.

Holmes appealed the decision, arguing that she should not be held liable for the missing social security cards as she only admitted to stealing the credit cards. She also contested the inclusion of the cost of long-term LifeLock memberships in the restitution order.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision holding Holmes responsible for the missing social security cards, noting that there was sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between Holmes' crimes and the missing cards. However, the court partially reversed the lower court's decision regarding the restitution order. It held that the cost of the LifeLock memberships, intended to provide broad identity theft protection for the victims, was too attenuated to qualify for restitution under the statute as it was not incurred in the pursuit of the lost property.

The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment. The court's decision underscores the importance of establishing a clear causal relationship between a defendant's criminal conduct and the pecuniary loss suffered by the victim when determining restitution. This case also highlights the limitations of restitution orders, indicating that secondary expenses, not directly related to the pursuit of lost property, may not qualify for restitution under the statute.

State v. Crazymule

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 58

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Native American Law

In this case, the defendant, Malinda Crazymule, was found to have violated her probation. The Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County revoked her suspended sentence and ordered a four-year commitment to the Department of Corrections (DOC). The court gave Crazymule 130 days of street time and 21 days of jail time credit but denied credit for jail time served while Crazymule was in Northern Cheyenne Tribal custody. Crazymule appealed this denial.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower court's decision. The key issue was whether Crazymule was entitled to credit for the time served during her arrest warrant's issuance while she was in custody for tribal offenses. The Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes.

According to Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, if a suspended or deferred sentence is revoked, the judge must allow credit for time served in a detention center. The Supreme Court emphasized that the language of this statute is not discretionary regarding awarding credit for time served. The court held that the District Court had jurisdiction over Crazymule once the arrest warrant was issued following the filing of the State’s revocation petition with the court, regardless of Crazymule's incarceration for a different offense.

The Supreme Court concluded that Crazymule was entitled to credit from the date the revocation warrant was issued and she remained incarcerated in a detention center. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

State v. R. Gibbons

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 63

Opinion Date: March 20, 2024

Judge: McKinnon

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Montana, Robert Murray Gibbons was found guilty of driving under the influence, his fifth or subsequent offense. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Gibbons raised three issues. First, he argued that the District Court incorrectly instructed the jury that he did not need to be conscious to be in actual physical control of his vehicle. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the instruction was consistent with the preventative purpose of the state's DUI statute.

Second, Gibbons argued that the State’s rebuttal argument, which suggested that he could have introduced photographic evidence that was available to him during discovery, violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the State was entitled to respond to Gibbons’ accusation that it had improperly withheld evidence.

Finally, Gibbons challenged the constitutionality of the statute that imposed a mandatory minimum $5,000 fine for his offense, arguing that it did not take into account a defendant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court agreed with Gibbons on this point, finding that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it required the imposition of a mandatory fine in every case without considering constitutionally required proportionality factors, such as the financial burden on the defendant and the defendant’s ability to pay.

Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed Gibbons’s DUI conviction, but reversed the $5,000 fine and remanded the case to the District Court for recalculation of the fine in line with its opinion.

State v. Schroder

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 59

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2019, Vietnam veteran Bruce Schroder was charged with criminal mischief, a felony, after he removed an Uber sign from driver Jamie Hauge's car and pounded on the vehicle when several younger women offered Hauge cash for the ride and pushed Schroder out of the way. Schroder's charge was later reduced to a misdemeanor in exchange for his guilty plea and an agreement to pay restitution up to $4,930.07 as determined by the court. At the sentencing hearing, the court issued a 6-month deferred sentence and imposed a total of $2,039.20 in restitution and fees to be paid in monthly installments of $340.

Schroder appealed the decision, arguing that the District Court erred in imposing restitution against him without fully considering his ability to pay. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed. The court found that there was a plea agreement in place where Schroder had agreed to pay restitution in any amount up to $4,930.07 as determined by the court. By signing this agreement, Schroder had affirmatively represented to the court that he had the ability to pay that amount. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, Schroder made no claim of duress or undue pressure in entering the plea agreement.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana thus affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that while it is better practice for a district court to thoroughly analyze a defendant’s ability to pay restitution, fines, and fees at sentencing, under these circumstances, it could not fault the District Court for not making a more thorough inquiry into Schroder’s financial ability to pay.

Gee v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 16

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Insurance Law

The appellant, Demitri Gee, was convicted for driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm. He appealed the judgment of conviction, challenging the restitution amount of $9,940 that was awarded to the State of Nevada Victims of Crime Program. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada found two main issues: whether an order of restitution must be based on competent evidence and whether a defendant’s restitution obligation should be offset by the amount the defendant’s insurance provider paid to the victim for the same losses.

Gee had been driving while intoxicated when he lost control of his vehicle and collided with another car, severely injuring the occupants. He subsequently fled the scene. As a result of the collision, Gee was charged with two counts of driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm among other charges. A civil settlement agreement was reached with the victims, and they received compensation through Gee's insurance.

The court found that the restitution amount of $9,940 was not supported by competent evidence as the state failed to present evidence to support it. The court also found that the district court had not evaluated whether the restitution should be offset by the insurance payment made by Gee to the victims. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by ordering restitution not supported by competent evidence and by failing to evaluate whether the award needed to be offset by the compensation provided to the victim through Gee’s insurance. The court then vacated the $9,940 in restitution, affirmed the rest of the conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the restitution amount.

People v Bohn

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 01500

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Garcia

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Jason Bohn, was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of a woman with whom he had an abusive relationship. He appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain, which is a requirement under the first-degree murder statute. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction.

The court applied the standard that a verdict is legally sufficient when "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The court found sufficient proof for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant derived pleasure from inflicting extreme pain.

In reaching this conclusion, the court considered evidence of the defendant's threats and abusive conduct towards the victim before the murder, a voicemail that inadvertently recorded the crime, and the testimony of the medical examiner about the nature and extent of the victim's injuries. The court found that this evidence, particularly the recording of the attack and the medical testimony, was sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme pain.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that his actions were driven by anger or a desire to extract information from the victim. The court clarified that having mixed motives does not preclude a finding that the defendant took pleasure in inflicting extreme pain, as long as this was a substantial motivation. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that taking pleasure in inflicting extreme pain was a substantial motivation for the defendant's actions.

People v Estrella

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 01499

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: Troutman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case involved an appeal from the Appellate Division by the prosecution, contesting the vacation of a defendant's conviction of first-degree murder on the grounds that two elements of the crime were not proven by legally sufficient evidence. The defendant was a member of a gang who, along with his accomplices, mistook a 15-year-old boy (Junior) for a member of a rival gang and murdered him. The murder was captured on surveillance video.

The Appellate Division had vacated the defendant's first-degree murder conviction on the grounds that two necessary elements were not satisfied by legally sufficient evidence. The first element was a "course of conduct" involving the intentional infliction of extreme physical pain, and the second was that the defendant "relished" or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the second element was not proven but disagreed with them on the first. It held that the evidence, including testimony from the medical examiner and surveillance video, provided a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant and his accomplices' actions prior to and during the murder caused extreme physical pain to Junior before his death.

However, with regard to the second element, the court concurred with the Appellate Division that the evidence did not establish that the defendant took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. It stated that the evidence demonstrated, at most, that the defendant took pride in having killed Junior, not that he took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. The court stated that the statute requires that the defendant inflicted extreme physical pain and took pleasure in doing so before killing the victim.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division that vacated the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder.

People v Labate

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 01582

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Patrick Labate was charged with a class A misdemeanor, for which he was legally entitled to a trial within 90 days of his indictment. The court's record, however, showed that Labate had not been tried 420 days after his indictment. This delay was primarily due to multiple instances where the prosecution declared they were not ready for trial, without providing an explanation, causing the trial to be adjourned.

In the case in question, the main issue was the 43-day period between September 5, 2018, and October 18, 2018. The Court of Appeals ruled that this entire period must be charged to the prosecution. The court found that when the prosecution declares readiness for trial, any subsequent delay caused by their own inaction is charged to them. In this case, the prosecution had declared readiness, yet were not ready to proceed on the first scheduled trial date and provided no explanation for their unreadiness. This meant that the delay was attributable to the prosecution's inaction and affected their ability to proceed to trial.

The court emphasized that the prosecution has an obligation to maintain readiness and must provide an explanation for any changes in their readiness status. In this case, the prosecution had failed to do so, leading to the court's decision to dismiss the indictment against Labate. The court affirmed the Appellate Term's order to dismiss the indictment but provided different reasoning for its decision.

This decision serves as a reminder of the importance of providing an explanation for any changes in trial readiness status and maintaining trial readiness to ensure the prompt administration of justice.

State v. Driver

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 48

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: McEvers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the decision of the District Court of Ramsey County in a case involving a man, James Driver, who was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, reckless endangerment, and driving under suspension or revocation. Driver appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was the operator of the vehicle involved in the chase and that the vehicle was driven in a way that showed extreme indifference to human life. He also argued that the State had presented irrelevant evidence and made an improper opening statement about dismissed theft and trespassing charges, thus prejudicing his case.

The Supreme Court disagreed, indicating that the district court did not err in denying Driver's motion for a new trial or his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion in these decisions, and that there was substantial evidence to support Driver's convictions. In terms of the opening statement and the presentation of evidence, the court found that the State's actions were proper at the time and that any comments made about the dismissed charges were reasonable given the circumstances. The court also noted that the jury had been instructed to disregard any statements made by counsel that were not supported by evidence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Driver's conviction.

State v. Glaum

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 47

Opinion Date: March 18, 2024

Judge: McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Defendant Joseph Glaum, who appealed an amended criminal judgment and the denial of his request to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. Glaum claimed that the court had abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the court had misapplied the factors for considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. He also made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that the six issues preserved for appeal by his conditional pleas were wrongly decided by the court.

The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors outlined in State v. Lium, and did not clearly err in determining that Glaum did not meet his burden to show a fair and just reason to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. The court also concluded that the record was inadequate to determine Glaum’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Glaum further argued that his right to a speedy trial under the federal constitution was violated. The court applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo to evaluate this claim, considering the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether there was any prejudice to the accused. Upon balancing these factors, the court found that Glaum had not shown a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the State’s motion to amend the information and denied Glaum’s motion for continuance, finding that the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or misinterpret or misapply the law.

State v. Fork

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1016

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Transportation Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio was called upon to interpret the definition of "motor vehicle" as it applied to the crime of aggravated vehicular assault. The defendant, Joshua Fork, was charged with multiple counts, including aggravated vehicular assault, after driving a Polaris under the influence of alcohol and injuring his passengers. At issue was whether the Polaris should be classified as a "motor vehicle" or a "utility vehicle."

The Court ruled that the definition of "motor vehicle" in R.C. 4501.01(B), which applies to penal laws, should be used in the context of aggravated vehicular assault. It also held that the Polaris should be classified as a "utility vehicle," as defined by R.C. 4501.01(VV), based on its principal purpose, not its use at the time of the incident.

The Court reasoned that the principal purpose of the Polaris, as shown by evidence and testimony, was for farm-related activities, such as hauling rocks and bags of seed, removing limbs, pulling a sprayer, and trimming trees. The Polaris's ancillary use for recreation did not affect its principal purpose.

The Court concluded that, since the Polaris fit the definition of a "utility vehicle" under R.C. 4501.01(VV), the evidence admitted at trial was legally insufficient to support Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which had reversed the trial court's judgment and vacated Fork’s convictions for aggravated vehicular assault.

State v. Villeda

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070188

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Bushong

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed a case involving a defendant convicted of two domestic violence offenses, who appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial court had erred in refusing to dismiss a prospective juror for actual bias. The prospective juror had expressed during jury selection that her close friends' experiences of sexual assault might influence her judgment. The trial court denied the defendant's request to excuse the juror, who was later dismissed by the defendant using a peremptory challenge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's for-cause challenge and that the error was prejudicial because it resulted in the loss of a peremptory challenge. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's for-cause challenge. However, the Supreme Court held that the error did not prejudice the defendant in respect to a substantial right, as required for reversal under ORS 131.035.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the error did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial before impartial jurors, and the error's impact on how the defendant used his peremptory challenges did not prejudice him in respect to a substantial right. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Lehman

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 41 WAP 2022

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Brobson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The primary issue in this complex case concerned a man, Ronnie Lehman, who was residing at a residential program called the Renewal Center as a condition of his parole. While there, he was discovered unresponsive due to a drug overdose, and a search revealed possession of illegal drugs. He was charged under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, which prohibits a prisoner or inmate from unlawfully possessing a controlled substance. Lehman's legal team argued that he didn't qualify as an "inmate" under this law because he was on parole and voluntarily living at the Renewal Center.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, concluding that Lehman did qualify as an "inmate" under Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. The court reasoned that the term "committed to" in the statute didn't necessarily imply forceful or involuntary commitment, and could encompass Lehman's situation where he agreed to reside at the Renewal Center as a part of his parole conditions. Therefore, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Lehman's conviction under Section 5123(a.2), and reversed the judgment of the Superior Court which had granted Lehman post-conviction relief.

In the Int of: T.Q.B., a Minor; Apl of: T.Q.B.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 71 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was tasked with interpreting the definition of “nudity” as used in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321. The case involved a minor, T.Q.B., who encouraged another minor, A.D., to lift her shirt during an Instagram live video. A.D., who has an intellectual disability, exposed the bottom portion of her breasts below the nipple area. The rest of A.D.’s breasts, including the nipple, were covered by a bra. T.Q.B. was charged with transmission of sexually explicit images by a minor, a second-degree misdemeanor under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321(c). T.Q.B. argued that the nudity element of the statute had not been established because the nipple was not exposed.

The trial court adjudicated T.Q.B. delinquent, interpreting the statute to cover the exposure of any part of the breast below the nipple. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, determining that the term "nudity" in the statute does not require that the nipple must be exposed for the offense to be committed.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the language of Section 6321(g) does not require exposure of the nipple to establish the element of nudity. The court held that nudity is sufficiently established where any area below the top of the nipple is visible. The court concluded that the clear language of the statute and the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing established the nudity requirement, and affirmed the Superior Court’s dispositional order finding the evidence sufficient to support T.Q.B.’s adjudication of delinquency.

Justia Webinars: Confronting Racial Bias in Jury Selection

Justia Team

Our legal system is built upon the fundamental principle of a right to a fair trial by a jury of one’s peers; but can we consider the trial fair if the jury is not? Can an underrepresentation of marginalized communities of color in the jury truly deem a trial as fair, accurate, and reliable?

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