United States v. Ayala-Vazquez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1734

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: BARRON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

In 2010, Ángel M. Ayala-Vázquez was indicted and convicted on multiple drug-related charges, including conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession of with intent to distribute over 280 grams of cocaine base. He was sentenced in 2011 to life imprisonment. In 2021, Ayala filed a motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act and for compassionate release due to his hypertension and obesity making him vulnerable to COVID-19.

The District Court denied Ayala's motion, concluding that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act because his sentences were imposed "in accordance with" the amendments made by the Fair Sentencing Act. The court also rejected his request for compassionate release, finding that Ayala failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant such relief. Moreover, the court determined that Ayala posed a danger to other persons and the community.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court affirmed the District Court's decision. It concluded that Ayala was indeed convicted of offenses involving 280 grams or more of cocaine base, and his life sentences were in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act. Therefore, he was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. As for the compassionate release, the court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's evaluation of Ayala's health conditions and perceived danger to the community.

Jimenez v. Stanford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2582

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Lynch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case of Rafael Jimenez v. Tina M. Stanford, Chairperson of the New York State Board of Parole, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Jimenez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In 1992, Rafael Jimenez was convicted of second degree murder. The prosecution relied on the testimonies of two eyewitnesses, Rafael Jimenez and Carmen Velazquez. Over two decades later, one of the eyewitnesses, Rafael Jimenez, recanted his testimony and two alibi witnesses came forward. Despite these developments, the court denied post-conviction relief.

Jimenez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming actual innocence and Brady violations. The district court found that Jimenez had cast enough doubt on his guilt to excuse his untimely petition, but ultimately denied relief on the merits.

On appeal, Jimenez argued that the district court erred in deferring to the State court's conclusions, held his actual innocence claim to an impossibly high standard, and contravened factual findings made following an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that Jimenez's newly discovered evidence does not satisfy the substantially higher standard of proof required to prove actual innocence. The Court further concluded that there is no merit to Jimenez’s Brady claim.

United States v. Benjamin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-3091

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: MENASHI

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Brian Benjamin, a state senator in New York from 2017 to 2021, who was indicted on charges of federal funds bribery, honest services wire fraud, conspiracy to commit each of those offenses, and falsifying records. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed three of the charges on the ground that the indictment failed to allege an explicit quid pro quo between Benjamin and his campaign donor. The government appealed this decision.

According to the allegations, Benjamin agreed to allocate state funds to a non-profit organization controlled by a real estate developer in his district, in exchange for campaign contributions. The developer was allegedly aware of the quid pro quo arrangement and proceeded to provide funds to Benjamin's campaign. Furthermore, Benjamin allegedly attempted to conceal this arrangement by falsifying campaign forms and providing false information during his background check when he was nominated to be lieutenant governor of New York.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that an explicit quid pro quo does not need to be expressly stated; it can be inferred from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions. The court concluded that the indictment sufficiently alleged an explicit quid pro quo, as it stated that Benjamin obtained campaign contributions in exchange for his agreement to use his official authority to obtain a state grant for a non-profit organization. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Wong v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-6185

Opinion Date: March 11, 2024

Judge: Sullivan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Kwok Sum Wong, a citizen of China and Hong Kong native, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) that found him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The IJ had found Wong removable because he had been “convicted” of “two crimes involving moral turpitude.” Wong's offenses were theft by deception under New Jersey law and second-degree forgery under New York law. The BIA determined that a "conviction" under immigration law hinges on whether the offenses were criminal proceedings with “minimum constitutional protections”, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and certain rights such as the right to a speedy trial and protection against double jeopardy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the BIA’s interpretation of “conviction” was not arbitrary or capricious and that the “minimum constitutional protections” test to ascertain a “conviction” retroactively applies to Wong’s case. The court further held that second-degree forgery under New York law is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), and that the statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is not unconstitutionally vague. The court thus denied the petition for review.

Lacombe v. Warden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-1886

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: KRAUSE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Claude P. Lacombe appealed the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's denial of habeas relief, arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court wrongfully denied his claims that the State breached its plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to demand specific performance of the plea agreement. Lacombe had pleaded guilty to several counts, including second-degree murder, in exchange for the State's agreement to recommend a sentence of 22 years. Instead, Lacombe received a life sentence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas relief. The Court held that even if the State breached its plea agreement and Lacombe's counsel was ineffective, any constitutional error was harmless under Brecht, Strickland, and Puckett v. United States, as Lacombe could not establish that he suffered "actual prejudice" as a result of the State's rhetoric and his counsel's failure to object. The court did not decide whether the State actually breached the plea agreement, citing that a failure to show either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim.

United States v. Alowemer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-3217

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: BIBAS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard an appeal from Mustafa Alowemer, a Syrian refugee living in the U.S. who had become a radical Islamist and plotted to bomb a Nigerian-American church in Pittsburgh. Alowemer, an ISIS supporter, had been found guilty of attempting to materially support a terrorist group in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). At sentencing, the District Court applied a terrorism enhancement, concluding that Alowemer's attempted attack was intended to retaliate against the U.S. and Nigerian governments for their actions against ISIS. This resulted in a twelve-level increase in his sentence, leading to a prison term of over seventeen years.

Alowemer appealed, arguing that the terrorism enhancement was improperly applied. The Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's application of the sentencing enhancement for abuse of discretion. It found that Alowemer had intended to retaliate against government conduct, as evidenced by his statements about avenging his "ISIS brothers" in Nigeria and his references to U.S. forces as invaders in the Middle East.

Alowemer also argued that the District Court did not adequately consider his childhood trauma and poor mental health. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the District Court had thoroughly examined the evidence and found that while Alowemer's mental health issues may have explained his radicalization, his actions were still intentional, knowing, and voluntary.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Alowemer's plot to bomb a church in retaliation for government action against ISIS triggered the terrorism enhancement and that his mental health issues did not undermine this intent.

United States v. Cruz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1192

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: BIBAS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Danny Cruz, a prisoner, hatched a plan to smuggle cell phones into prison and sell them to fellow inmates by bribing a prison guard. Upon being caught, Cruz was charged with conspiring to violate the Travel Act under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Facing an additional five years in prison, Cruz entered a plea deal in which he pleaded guilty in exchange for the prosecution's agreement to recommend that the total offense level is 14. However, the Probation Office called for a four-level enhancement because the crime involved a public official in a sensitive position, leading to a dispute over whether this enhancement should apply.

Cruz argued that if the government endorsed the enhancement, it would contravene the plea agreement, and the prosecution initially supported the enhancement during a presentence conference. Subsequently, the prosecution changed its stance in a brief, taking no position on the enhancement, and reiterated this at the start of the sentencing hearing. Despite this, the District Court found that the four-level enhancement did apply, leading to a final offense level of 15 and a final Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months.

The Third Circuit Court concluded that the prosecution breached the plea agreement when it initially supported the four-level enhancement, as it had promised to recommend a total offense level no higher than 14. The Court further ruled that the prosecution's later neutral stance did not unequivocally retract its erroneous position, and thus did not cure its breach. Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court vacated Cruz's sentence and remanded the case, instructing that a different judge should decide whether to grant specific performance or allow withdrawal of the plea.

Wharton v. Graterford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2839

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the case of Robert Wharton, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office conceded that Wharton's death sentence should be vacated without conducting a comprehensive investigation into evidence against Wharton’s habeas claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the office did not disclose key facts about the claim, leading the District Court to find misconduct and impose mild sanctions.

Wharton had been sentenced to death for terrorizing and ultimately murdering a family over a disputed debt. On appeal, the Third Circuit ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether Wharton's counsel was ineffective for not investigating prison records or presenting evidence showing that Wharton had adjusted well to prison life. However, before this hearing could take place, the District Attorney’s Office filed a notice of concession. The District Court did not accept the concession and appointed the Pennsylvania Attorney General as amicus curiae to investigate Wharton’s prison adjustment.

The court found that the District Attorney’s Office violated Rule 11(b)(3) by failing to investigate the facts of Wharton's case reasonably and by failing to communicate adequately with the victims' family. Consequently, the court ordered District Attorney Larry Krasner to apologize in writing to the victims' family members and to provide a "full, balanced explanation" of the facts when conceding federal habeas cases in the future. This case highlights the importance of conducting thorough investigations and maintaining honesty and forthrightness in court procedures.

Wharton v. Graterford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-9001

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, Robert Wharton, was convicted of murder in 1985, and after the jury found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, he was sentenced to death. After exhausting his state court options, Wharton petitioned in 2003 for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, claiming his lawyer was ineffective for failing to introduce his prison records as mitigation evidence during the penalty phase.

The District Court denied his petition, finding that Wharton did not suffer any prejudice from his counsel’s failure to introduce the prison records. The Court reasoned that evidence of Wharton's positive adjustment to prison would have opened the door to negative behavior while in custody, most notably his repeated escape attempts.

Wharton appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in finding that he failed to establish prejudice and that the case should be remanded for a new hearing before a different judge. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that there was not a reasonable probability that Wharton’s prison records would have caused a juror to change his or her sentencing vote given the compelling rebuttal evidence the prosecution would have presented. The Court of Appeals also rejected Wharton's argument that the District Court created an appearance of unfairness and partiality.

United States v. George

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4617

Opinion Date: March 11, 2024

Judge: THACKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant, Terry George, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The government's key witness, Prince Frazier, had given inconsistent accounts of who was in the car at the time of the traffic stop leading to George's arrest. This inconsistency was not disclosed to George prior to trial. After being convicted, George sought to have his conviction vacated or a new trial ordered, arguing that the government's failure to disclose this inconsistent testimony violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, which requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to an accused. The district court denied George's motion, finding that the government's failure to disclose was not material to George's defense.

George was also serving a term of supervised release as a result of a separate criminal conviction at the time of his felon in possession conviction. The district court revoked George's supervised release based on his new conviction.

George appealed both decisions. Upon review, the court affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that while the government should have disclosed the inconsistent statement, it was not material to George's defense because George's conviction would stand independently of any question about Frazier's credibility. Furthermore, the court affirmed the revocation of George's supervised release, as it was based on a valid conviction.

United States v. Hoover

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4322

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: GRIBBON MOTZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2019, Michael Scott Hoover was arrested on multiple counts of indecent liberties with a minor. Subsequent investigations led to the discovery of videos and images of child pornography on his work-issued iPhone. The videos depicted two minors, both relatives of Hoover, engaging in explicit sexual conduct. Hoover was subsequently indicted on two counts of child pornography production and one count of possession of child pornography. Following a trial, Hoover was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 840 months' imprisonment. He appealed his conviction and sentence, raising several arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected all of Hoover's claims and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, denial of Hoover's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, or in instructing the jury on the elements of child pornography production. The court also found that the district court did not err in sentencing Hoover to 840 months' imprisonment. The court found sufficient evidence supporting Hoover's child pornography production convictions, including the specific-intent and interstate-nexus elements of the offenses. The court also rejected Hoover's challenges to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, finding that the district court had adequately explained its conclusion that the sentence was not unfairly harsh for Hoover.

United States v. Golson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3078

Opinion Date: March 11, 2024

Judge: Davis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Fred Golson, Jr. had pleaded guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court added a two-level enhancement to Golson's sentencing guidelines range, based on the assessment that his flight from law enforcement during one of the underlying incidents amounted to reckless endangerment. Golson challenged this enhancement, arguing that he wasn't the driver of the vehicle during the incident.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. It found that, despite Golson not being the driver, the undisputed facts of the case created a reasonable inference that he was an active participant in the reckless flight from police. The court considered Golson's active participation in the crime, his extensive criminal record, his immediate flight from the crashed vehicle, and his subsequent involvement in another shooting and immediate flight from that scene as indicators of his active participation in the reckless flight. Consequently, the court found no error, plain or otherwise, in the district court's application of the two-level enhancement.

United States v. Jaimez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3189

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Timothy Jaimez was found guilty of federal drug charges and sentenced to supervised release. Following several violations of the terms of his release, the district court sentenced him to sixty months' imprisonment. Jaimez appealed the decision, arguing that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with Jaimez's arguments. Jaimez claimed that the court inadequately explained his sentence, improperly considered certain sentencing factors, and incorrectly classified his release violation. The appellate court found that the district court had sufficiently explained the sentence, correctly considered relevant sentencing factors, and accurately classified the release violation.

Jaimez also argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. He claimed that the court placed too much weight on his conduct underlying the release violation, inflicted "double punishment" by considering conduct for which he had already been punished in Ohio, and imposed a sentence that was too long in light of mitigating evidence. The appellate court disagreed with all of these points, finding that the district court had appropriately weighed Jaimez's conduct and that the sentence did not constitute "double punishment." The court also found that the sentence length was reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellate court upheld the district court's sentence of sixty months' imprisonment for Jaimez. The holding of the case is that the district court correctly considered the relevant sentencing factors, accurately classified the release violation, and imposed a reasonable sentence given the circumstances. The court affirmed the district court's decision.

United States v. Marsh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5746

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Larsen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered an appeal by Herbert Marsh, who was convicted of various charges related to a robbery of a Nashville pawn shop. Marsh and two co-conspirators stole eleven firearms and over $8,000 in cash. Marsh challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop the day after the robbery, arguing the stop was based on a mistaken interpretation of Tennessee traffic law. The court held that the officers' interpretation was objectively reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, affirming the denial of Marsh's motion to suppress.

Marsh also argued that the calculation of his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. The court rejected Marsh's argument that the district court's calculations constituted double counting, finding that the district court’s factual findings fully supported holding Marsh accountable for his co-conspirator’s conduct through the base offense level and the enhancements. The court held that the base offense level and the three firearms enhancements penalized Marsh for distinct harms, so there was no impermissible double counting. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Mitrovich

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1010

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: SCUDDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Deny Mitrovich, was indicted for possession of child pornography following a multinational investigation that used a software program to unmask his computer. Mitrovich requested detailed technical information about the software program, which was used by Australian and New Zealand authorities, to aid his defense. However, the United States government did not have this information and was unsuccessful in obtaining it despite repeated efforts. Mitrovich argued that the government was obligated to provide this information under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The court disagreed with Mitrovich, stating that Rule 16 does not require the production of documents held exclusively by foreign authorities. Furthermore, Mitrovich was unable to demonstrate that the government's inability to provide the requested information resulted in prejudice, a necessary condition to establish a Brady violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision not to impose sanctions on the government for failure to disclose the requested information.

The court also clarified that while the doctrine of constructive possession could extend to co-participants in a joint international investigation under the Due Process Clause, this would not apply if the U.S. lacks the capacity to access or obtain the information through reasonable means. The court also emphasized that mere speculation about the content of the missing information is not sufficient to establish prejudice under Brady.

Springs v. Payne

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3399

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Thomas Springs was convicted by an Arkansas jury for the capital murder of his wife, Christina, and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct review by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Later, Springs filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing, among other points, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present his son Matthew’s testimony during the trial's penalty phase.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of Springs' § 2254 petition. The court noted that Springs needed to show both that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. However, the court found that even if Matthew had testified, Springs failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different given the extensive evidence against him and the nature of his crime. The court also declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include Springs's challenge to his competency to stand trial and participate in the appellate process. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied Springs’s request to expand the certificate of appealability.

United States v. Morin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2221

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Nolan Ryan Morin, who had pleaded guilty to a false-statements charge, a class D felony, faced the revocation of his supervised release multiple times. After his initial violation of supervised release, he was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. After two more violations, his supervised release was revoked and he was sentenced to 18 months' and then 24 months' imprisonment, respectively.

Morin appealed his most recent 24-month revocation term of imprisonment, arguing that the "all or part" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which governs the revocation of supervised release, requires a sentencing court to credit previous revocation terms of imprisonment up to a maximum of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the underlying offense. In Morin's case, he claimed that the total length of all revocation imprisonment he may serve based on his false-statements conviction was capped at 3 years, and as he had already served 30 months on his first two revocations, the district court was only authorized to impose a maximum of 6 months on the present revocation.

The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Morin's interpretation. The court held that the "all or part" clause imposed a per-revocation limit and did not require the court to consider or aggregate prior revocation terms of imprisonment. Moreover, the court opined that the clause expanded the sentencing court's authority by removing the limitation that a prison term imposed could never be longer than the term of the revoked supervised release. Thus, the court affirmed the 24-month term of revocation imprisonment Morin received as it was authorized by statute.

Yar v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1001

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The petitioner, Loing Yar, a native and citizen of South Sudan who entered the United States as a refugee, appealed an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied his claim under the Convention Against Torture for deferral of his removal to South Sudan. Yar was convicted of distributing methamphetamine in the United States, which is considered an aggravated felony, leading to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Yar sought relief from removal, claiming he would be likely tortured if he was returned to South Sudan due to his membership in the minority Nuer tribe and his relationship to his father, an advocate for South Sudanese independence who died under suspicious circumstances.

An immigration judge initially granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, but the BIA vacated this decision, concluding that the potential harm identified by the immigration judge did not rise to the level of torture, as defined by the law. The BIA further asserted that the likelihood of detention or imprisonment alone does not amount to torture, and the indeterminate "chance" of future upheaval or ethnic cleansing did not meet the legal standard of "more likely than not" under the regulations implementing the Convention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Yar's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. The court found no error in the BIA's legal conclusion that Yar failed to establish a likelihood of torture upon return to South Sudan. The court agreed with the BIA's interpretation of the Convention Against Torture, emphasizing that the definition of torture is a legal issue and whether a predicted factual outcome meets the definition of "torture" is a question of law.

LEWIS V. ANDES

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-99001

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Christen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.

Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims.

USA V. OROZCO-OROZCO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50146

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Christen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Melchor Orozco-Orozco, was appealing his conviction for being a previously removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Orozco had previously been removed from the U.S. following a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215, which had been classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

The appellate court examined whether this classification was correct. It found that the California Supreme Court had determined that a person could commit carjacking under § 215 without the intent to steal required by a generic theft offense. This court held that Orozco's carjacking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA because § 215 was not a categorical match for a “theft offense.”

The appellate court reversed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment on equal protection grounds.

United States v. Zhong

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1034

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Eid

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dealt with the appeal of Youlian Zhong, who contested her mandatory minimum sentences for crimes related to her participation in a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute large quantities of marijuana. Zhong argued that the district court erred in finding that she did not qualify for the statutory safety valve for mandatory minimum sentences.

Zhong and her husband, Housheng Xian, were found guilty of conspiring to grow more than 1,500 marijuana plants in their residence, intending to process and sell the marijuana. They were convicted on three counts: conspiring to manufacture and possess with the intent to distribute 1,000 and more marijuana plants, manufacturing and possessing with intent to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana plants, and using and maintaining their house for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing marijuana.

Before sentencing, Zhong and Xian requested a non-guideline sentence of time served plus five years of supervised release, arguing that they met the requirements of the safety valve provisions. However, the court found that they did not provide all necessary information to the government, particularly regarding their mens rea, or intent, for the crimes for which they were convicted.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appeals court held that a defendant must provide the government with information sufficient to prove the mens rea required for the crimes of conviction to meet the requirement of providing “all information and evidence” concerning the offense for the safety valve provision to apply. The court concluded that Zhong did not provide sufficient information about her intent to commit the crimes for which she was convicted, and thus, did not meet her burden to prove that she qualified for safety-valve relief.

United States v. Markovich

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 22-10978, 23-11835

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Pryor

Areas of Law: Banking, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involved an appeal by two brothers, Jonathan and Daniel Markovich, who were convicted for operating fraudulent drug rehabilitation clinics in Florida. They were found guilty of various charges, including health-care fraud, wire fraud, kickbacks, money laundering, and bank fraud, resulting in fraudulent claims of over $100 million.

The brothers appealed their convictions on several grounds. They argued that the district court violated their constitutional rights by denying their motion to compel the prosecution to obtain and disclose confidential medical records possessed by third parties. They also claimed that the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence by admitting unreliable and confusing expert testimony about the clinics' medical and billing practices. Additionally, they argued that the court abused its discretion by admitting lay summary testimony about medical and billing records.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court ruled that the prosecution had no duty to seek out potentially exculpatory evidence not in its possession. It also determined that the expert testimony was clear and reliable, and the summary testimony was proper. The court found that any challenge to bank-fraud counts was forfeited due to a lack of explanation or supporting legal authority. Finally, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the brothers' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

State of Alaska v. Mckelvey

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17910

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Borghesan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether law enforcement officers violated the Alaska Constitution by conducting warrantless aerial surveillance of a private property with high-powered optics to investigate a tip about marijuana cultivation. The property was located in an isolated area near Fairbanks and was surrounded by trees that obstructed ground-level view. The officers' aerial surveillance aided by a high-powered zoom lens led to a search warrant, which uncovered marijuana plants, methamphetamine, scales, plastic bags for packaging, a loaded AK-47 rifle, and a large amount of cash. The defendant, McKelvey, was subsequently charged with criminal offenses.

The Superior Court denied McKelvey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the aerial surveillance, holding that although McKelvey had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation was objectively unreasonable given the visibility of his property from the air. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that under the Alaska Constitution, a warrant was required for law enforcement to use high-powered optics for aerial surveillance of a private property.

The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that conducting aerial surveillance of a person's property using high-powered optics constitutes a search that requires a warrant under the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that such surveillance has the potential to reveal intimate details of a person's private life and could discourage Alaskans from using their private outdoor spaces. The court concluded that the chilling effect of such surveillance outweighed the utility of the conduct as a law enforcement technique.

WHITESIDE v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 30

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Hiland

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed an appeal from Lemuel Whiteside, who was challenging the denial of his petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. Whiteside was previously convicted of capital felony murder, aggravated robbery, and a firearm enhancement, receiving respective sentences of life, thirty-five years, and fifteen years. He argues that his constitutional rights were violated and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Whiteside claimed that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated due to the jury's consideration of a life-sentence option on the aggravated-robbery charge. However, the court noted that this argument could have been raised during his direct appeal and, as such, was ineligible for consideration in a Rule 37 proceeding.

Whiteside further claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his attorneys failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment claim and failed to offer the testimony of a co-defendant as mitigating evidence. The court rejected these allegations, noting that failure to make a meritless argument is not deficient performance and that the decision to call a witness is typically a matter of trial strategy.

Whiteside also argued that his counsel failed to investigate or offer evidence regarding his mental state and history of psychiatric treatment for mitigation purposes. The court upheld the trial counsel's strategic decision not to introduce this evidence due to the potentially damaging counter-evidence the state could have presented. The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, rejecting Whiteside's claims.

In re Seumanu

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A169146(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 11, 2024

Judge: STREETER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, considered a habeas corpus request by Ropati Afatia Seumanu, a capital case convict. Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) after his habeas corpus petition was dismissed, as he sought to challenge the superior court's decision on nine points. The court agreed to issue a COA on one claim but declined to do so for the remaining claims. The court also addressed three unprecedented issues: whether the 10-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests was mandatory or directory; how strong a showing a COA applicant must make to meet the “substantial claim for relief” test; and whether an as-applied attack on the constitutionality of section 1509, subdivision (d) was appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court found that the 10-day time limit was not mandatory, a “substantial claim to relief” required a strong enough showing for reasonable jurists to debate whether the trial court erred, and as-applied attacks on the constitutionality of section 1509(d) were appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court also discussed the need for a COA applicant to provide an adequate record for review.

P. v. Santos

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096979(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Renner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case revolves around the appeal of Timothy Marvin Santos, who was originally sentenced in 2007 under California's Three Strikes law and other enhancement provisions. The appeal concerns a resentencing order issued in 2022, where the trial court struck Santos' prior prison term and drug conviction enhancements but maintained his sentence of 25 years to life under the original Three Strikes law.

Santos argued that the court did not apply the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to reduce his sentence and that the resentencing was held without his presence, violating his federal and state constitutional rights. The People initially supported the trial court's decision but later changed their stance, suggesting that the court should have resentenced Santos under the current penalty provisions specified by the Reform Act.

However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, disagreed with this assertion. The court held that the Reform Act's revised penalty provisions could not be retroactively applied to Santos' sentence outside of the specific mechanism provided for in the Act itself. The court further concluded that if the resentencing statute was interpreted to authorize retroactive application of the revised penalty provisions without adhering to the criteria in the Reform Act, it would unconstitutionally amend the initiative statute.

Concerning Santos' absence during resentencing, the court concluded that any error in accepting his counsel's waiver of his presence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Santos could not have offered any help since he was not eligible for a reduction of his term under the Three Strikes law based on the resentencing statute. Consequently, his absence could not have influenced the proceeding's outcome. The court affirmed the judgment.

P. v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H051311(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Danner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the 1992 murder case of Laurie Houts, John Kevin Woodward was charged but not convicted. The case went to trial twice, resulting in deadlocked juries and subsequent mistrials both times. After the second mistrial in 1996, the trial court dismissed the case, citing "insufficiency of the evidence."

In 2022, new DNA evidence led to the refiling of the murder charge against Woodward. However, Woodward moved to dismiss the complaint on double jeopardy grounds, asserting that the 1996 dismissal operated as an acquittal. The trial court agreed and dismissed the refiled complaint.

The district attorney disputed this interpretation and petitioned the appellate court to vacate the dismissal order and deny Woodward's motion to dismiss. The district attorney contended that the 1996 dismissal did not bar refiling because the earlier dismissal was not due to legal insufficiency of the evidence, but was instead a decision made in the furtherance of justice.

The appellate court agreed with the district attorney, finding that the trial court's 1996 dismissal did not clearly indicate an intent to dismiss for legally insufficient evidence and thus preclude retrial. As such, the appellate court ruled that double jeopardy principles do not bar the refiling of the murder charge against Woodward, and directed the lower court to vacate its dismissal order.

People v. Felix

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B317938M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: GRIMES

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Jason Felix, was arrested in Utah for a traffic violation where a consensual search of his car led to the discovery of a handgun, ammunition, and over five kilograms of methamphetamine. While in Utah, Felix became a suspect in two murders that took place in Southern California. Upon his return to California, Felix invoked his right to counsel when questioned about one of the murders. He was then put in a cell with an undercover detective, during which he made incriminating statements about both murders. Felix was eventually found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

On appeal, Felix argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his car and his statements to the undercover agent. He contended that the traffic stop extended beyond a reasonable duration, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, he argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated as he had invoked his right to counsel before making the incriminating statements to the undercover agent.

However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that the duration of the traffic stop was lawful and that Felix's consent to the car search was valid. The court also held that Felix's statements to the undercover detective were correctly admitted as they were made voluntarily and without coercion. Felix's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as the incriminating statements were not the product of coercive interrogation.

Lastly, both Felix and the prosecution agreed that Felix was entitled to an additional day of presentence custody credits, which the court confirmed. The case was remanded to the trial court to correct the presentence custody credits.

Godinez v. Williams

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 14

Opinion Date: March 11, 2024

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case involves the interpretation of a provision in the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) that dictates the factors parole boards must consider when deciding whether to release a convicted sex offender on parole. The Supreme Court of Colorado was asked by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether SOLSA requires, permits, or prohibits parole boards from considering maturity and rehabilitation of an offender.

The case arose from the sentencing of Omar Ricardo Godinez, who was convicted of several serious offenses committed when he was fifteen years old. Godinez argued that SOLSA violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to him, claiming that the Act does not allow parole boards to consider an offender's maturity and rehabilitation. This, he contended, renders the Act unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, which mandates that young offenders must be given "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."

The Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that although SOLSA does not expressly require parole boards to consider an offender's maturity, it does not prevent them from doing so. Hence, SOLSA permits consideration of maturity. As for rehabilitation, the Court held that it is a necessary part of the factors the parole board is required to consider under SOLSA. Thus, the Court concluded that SOLSA requires consideration of rehabilitation. Therefore, the Court held that SOLSA permits consideration of maturity and requires consideration of rehabilitation.

State v. Henderson

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20688

Opinion Date: March 19, 2024

Judge: D’Auria

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Lawrence Lee Henderson, was convicted of home invasion after a jury trial. During the trial, the defendant contracted COVID-19, resulting in a 25-day delay in jury deliberations. When the deliberations resumed, the jury found the defendant guilty of home invasion but not guilty of other charges and lesser included offenses.

The defendant appealed, claiming that the court should reverse his conviction of home invasion or grant him a new trial on that charge because the jury’s verdicts of guilty of home invasion and not guilty of a lesser included offense were legally inconsistent. He also claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to declare a mistrial when he contracted COVID-19, which resulted in the delay in jury deliberations.

The court upheld the trial court’s decision, holding that legally inconsistent verdicts are unreviewable on appeal, following its precedent in State v. Arroyo, which was consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and that of the majority of other jurisdictions. In terms of the COVID-19 delay, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial, as the delay was unavoidable due to the pandemic, and the defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay.

PUGH v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1063

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, Andre Pugh appealed his conviction for the murder of his wife and the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pugh challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant for his cell phone records. He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search warrant's specificity and that his counsel during his motion for a new trial was ineffective in various respects.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with Pugh's claims and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the search warrant in question was supported by probable cause. The warrant was based on Pugh's unusual behavior at the crime scene, his relationship with the victim, inconsistencies between his statements and the evidence at the scene, and evidence suggesting that the crime was committed by someone familiar with the residence.

The court also rejected Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. It found that the claims Pugh wanted his trial counsel to raise would not have been successful. Additionally, it determined that Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his motion for a new trial were procedurally barred.

A. W. v. State of Indiana

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-JV-00040

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Massa

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

This case before the Indiana Supreme Court concerns a juvenile, A.W., who was adjudicated for possession of a machine gun and dangerous possession of a firearm. The court was asked to determine if these adjudications violated the principle of double jeopardy under Indiana law. A.W. asserted that he did not know the firearm he possessed had been modified to function as a machine gun.

The court found that A.W.'s exclusive possession of the modified gun, along with his abrupt flight from police, supported the conclusion that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a machine gun. This satisfied the first part of the court's inquiry.

On the issue of double jeopardy, the court noted that while the Indiana Constitution could apply in juvenile proceedings, it avoided deciding that issue. Instead, it focused on whether possession of a dangerous firearm is a lesser-included offense of possession of a machine gun under the test set out in the case Wadle v. State. The court found that it was, meaning A.W.'s adjudications for both offenses violated his rights under the principle of double jeopardy. Therefore, the court affirmed the finding that A.W. knowingly possessed a machine gun but reversed the adjudication that he committed dangerous possession of a firearm.

State of Iowa v. Miller

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0903

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: McDonald

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

A case was brought before the Supreme Court of Iowa involving Kadin Miller, who was convicted of harassment after he posted a video of himself and his ex-girlfriend engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on a pornography website without her consent. This act was done to "annoy" and "get back at" his ex-girlfriend after their relationship ended on bad terms. As a result of his conviction, Miller was sentenced to two years in prison and was required to register as a sex offender. The main issue in the appeal was whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A.

Under Iowa law, individuals convicted of any sex offense are required to register as a sex offender if they reside, are employed, or attend school in the state. The law sets forth a comprehensive list of sex offenses that require an offender to register as a sex offender. However, the crime Miller was convicted of, harassment in the first degree, is not a per se sex offense. For non-per se sex offenses, an offender is required to register only if the state proves “beyond a reasonable doubt” to “a judge or jury” that the offense was “sexually motivated.”

In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller's crime was sexually motivated. The court found that the district court's reasoning did not focus on the relevant statutory inquiry—whether the crime was sexually motivated—and instead focused on whether Miller had a sexual interest in the video. The court also noted that there was no evidence to support the district court's finding that Miller's commission of the crime of harassment was done for the purpose of his own sexual gratification. As such, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's finding that Miller's crime was sexually motivated, and therefore, Miller was not required to register as a sex offender.

State v. Guebara

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 120994

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Kansas, the appellant, Paul Guebara, was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon by a felon. Guebara had stipulated that he had previously been convicted of "a felony crime" without further detail. The Court of Appeals reversed the criminal-possession conviction, finding that a generic stipulation did not establish that a defendant had been convicted of a felony that would prohibit him from possessing a weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, explaining that because Kansas' possession-of-a-weapon ban applies only to people who have committed certain felonies, a generic stipulation to "a felony" is insufficient. The court also noted that the district court failed to obtain a jury-trial waiver before accepting Guebara's stipulation, which it deemed to be a constitutional error. However, both errors were found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as Guebara did not contest his status as a prohibited felon, and the State had conclusive evidence to prove this element. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Guebara's convictions.

State v. McDonald

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123797

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed a lower court's decision, holding that a warrantless traffic stop and subsequent search of a vehicle was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The case involved Tyler Brandon McDonald, who was stopped by a sheriff's deputy while parked at a public park. The deputy, citing concern for public safety based on a previous murder-suicide in the same area, initiated a public welfare stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, the deputy smelled marijuana, leading to a search of the vehicle and McDonald's subsequent conviction for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

According to the court, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. A public safety stop is considered a seizure and an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, but it must be justified based on specific and articulable facts that indicate a threat to public safety. Suspicion of criminal activity does not justify a public welfare stop.

In this case, the court found that the deputy's reasons for the stop (the late hour, the secluded location, the fact that McDonald was alone, and the deputy's knowledge of past criminal activity in the area) were insufficient to support a public safety stop. The court pointed out that McDonald was parked legally in an open public park, was not in an adverse physical state, and did not appear to be at risk of self-harm. The court concluded that the stop was unconstitutional, reversed the judgment of the lower courts, and reversed McDonald's convictions.

BOWMAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0073-MR

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A man, convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and possession of a handgun by a felon, appealed his convictions and sentence to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The case centered around the shooting death of a bar owner. The defendant argued that he shot in self-defense during a struggle, but the prosecution argued that the defendant was the initial aggressor, pointing to high-quality security camera footage that captured the events leading up to and following the shooting.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the defendant was not in custody when initially questioned at the hospital, so his Miranda rights were not violated. The Court also ruled that the trial court did not err in issuing an "initial aggressor" limitation to the jury's self-defense instructions, as the defendant’s act of pointing a gun at the victim constituted "physical force" under Kentucky law. Finally, while the trial court erred in the manner it polled the jury, the Supreme Court found the error was not "palpable" and would not have changed the result of the case.

Commonwealth v. Kalila

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13428

Opinion Date: March 13, 2024

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around a defendant convicted of severe, racially motivated violence, who sought to stay the execution of his sentence pending appeal. The defendant, a dual citizen of the U.S. and Morocco, with frequent travel to Morocco, was deemed a flight risk and a danger to others by the trial judge and a single justice of the Appeals Court. While the defendant demonstrated a likelihood of success on his appeal, the single justice upheld the trial judge's decision, citing the defendant's regular travels abroad, the serious nature of his crimes, and the significant sentence he faced as reasons for his potential flight risk. Following the denial of his stay, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the defendant's likelihood of success on appeal did not mitigate the identified security risk. The court ruled that the likelihood of success on appeal and the potential security risk are two distinct factors to consider, and one does not influence the other. The court concluded that the single justice's decision was not outside the range of reasonable alternatives, thus not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the denial of the defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal.

State of Minnesota vs. Malecha

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1314

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: ANDERSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Minnesota, a defendant, Rebecca Julie Malecha, was arrested on a warrant that had been quashed but was still appearing as active in law enforcement databases due to a clerical error by court administration. During the arrest, police discovered controlled substances on Malecha's person and charged her with four controlled substance crimes. Malecha moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the search was unconstitutional due to the quashed warrant. The district court granted her motion, based on the violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, but the court of appeals reversed this decision.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained during a search on a quashed warrant that appears active to law enforcement because of a clerical error by court administration. The court reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule would serve to deter unlawful government conduct generally, not just police misconduct. The court emphasized that the benefits of excluding illegally obtained evidence outweighed the costs in this case, particularly in situations where the constitutional violation stemmed from a court clerical error. Therefore, the charges against Malecha were dismissed.

State of Minnesota vs. Vanengen

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0105

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: Chutich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The State of Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered an upward durational sentencing departure for third-degree criminal sexual conduct against a physically helpless person, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.344, subdivision 1(d) (2020), when the offense occurred in the victim’s zone of privacy.

The appellant, Curtis Lablanche Vanengen, was found guilty by the jury of third-degree criminal sexual conduct against a physically helpless person. The offense took place in the victim’s bedroom, which the jury determined as the victim’s zone of privacy. The district court sentenced Vanengen to 120 months in prison, a 29-month upward durational departure from the top of the presumptive sentencing guidelines range.

Vanengen appealed, arguing that the location of the offense in the victim’s bedroom did not make it “significantly more serious” than the “typical” criminal sexual conduct offense against a physically helpless person who is asleep. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the victim was entitled to safety and security in her own home, and the violation of this security by committing the offense in her private zone justified the upward departure. The Supreme Court concluded that the zone-of-privacy aggravating factor was a legally permissible reason for an upward departure in this type of case and was factually supported in the record. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

Godbolt v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2020-DP-00440-SCT

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the convictions and death sentences of Willie Cory Godbolt, who was found guilty of several counts of murder, kidnapping, attempted murder, and armed robbery. The Court addressed numerous issues raised by Godbolt, including whether the trial court erred by denying his motions to sever the charges, transfer the trial venue, limit voir dire, suppress certain evidence, and exclude victim impact testimony. Godbolt also claimed that his counsel provided ineffective assistance and that his death sentences were unconstitutional.

The Court rejected all of Godbolt's claims, finding no error in the trial court's decisions or in the handling of his case. It affirmed Godbolt's convictions and sentences, holding among other things that the evidence supported the jury's findings of guilt and the imposition of the death penalty, the trial court properly admitted certain evidence, and Godbolt's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. The Court also found that Godbolt's death sentences did not violate the constitution.

State v. Gleaton

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 114

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The State of Nebraska convicted DeShawn L. Gleaton, Jr. of first-degree murder, use of a firearm to commit a felony, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and witness tampering. Gleaton appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in admitting expert testimony about cell phone location data, in overruling defense objections to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument, and in declining to strike certain victim impact material from the presentence investigation report. Gleaton also accused the lower court of judicial misconduct during sentencing. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Gleaton's convictions and sentences, ruling that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, in overruling defense objections to the prosecutor's statements, or in declining to strike the victim impact material. The high court also found no judicial misconduct. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the lower court committed plain error in sentencing by applying 413 days' credit for time served to Gleaton's life sentence, instead of applying the credit to the nonlife sentences consecutive to the life sentence. The high court modified Gleaton's sentences to correct this error.

State v. Rashad

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 101

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in a case involving the right to a speedy trial. The defendant, Justin N. Rashad, was charged with first degree assault and use of a firearm to commit a felony in connection with the shooting of his father. Rashad argued that his right to a speedy trial, as provided by Nebraska law, was violated when the State failed to meet its evidentiary burden to show that there was good cause to continue his case past the 6-month speedy trial deadline. The trial was initially delayed because the judge had another trial scheduled. The trial was then set for a date in February, months past the speedy trial deadline.

The Supreme Court held that the evidence in the record, which consisted solely of emails regarding the scheduling of the hearing on the continuance and a transcript of that hearing, was insufficient to show that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial past the speedy trial deadline. The Court noted that statements of unavailability, without more, are insufficient to show that docket congestion existed, such that there was good cause to continue the trial. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the information about the judge’s availability came from statements by the judge, and that comments by the trial judge are not evidence. As such, the court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial. The case was remanded to the lower court with instructions to grant Rashad's motion for absolute discharge.

Plaza v. Black

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-853

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Robert Plaza, a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence, appealed the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Ninth District Court of Appeals. Plaza's petition related to the Adult Parole Authority's decision to revoke his parole. He argued that he was denied a preliminary hearing to determine if there was probable cause to believe he had violated parole conditions, that he was denied due process of law, and that he should be immediately released.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition based on territorial jurisdiction, as Plaza had been moved to a different correctional institution outside of its jurisdiction during the proceedings. However, Plaza argued that he had been transferred back to the original jurisdiction before the dismissal of his petition, and therefore, the Court of Appeals had erred.

The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with Plaza that the dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction was incorrect. However, the court found that Plaza's allegations did not state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. The court noted that habeas corpus is a remedy for a due-process violation only in extreme circumstances involving unreasonable delay, which was not alleged by Plaza. The court stated that the usual remedy for such a violation is a writ of mandamus compelling a second hearing, not a release from custody. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaza's petition on alternative grounds.

State v. Knuff

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-902

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Deters

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Thomas E. Knuff Jr. was convicted on two counts of aggravated murder with death specifications for killing John Mann and Regina Capobianco. Knuff was released from prison and arranged to stay with Mann. After his release, he began staying at a motel, paid for by a former prison employee, Alicia Stoner, with whom he had a relationship while incarcerated. When his parole officer discovered he was not living at the motel as he claimed, he moved in with Mann. Mann was not living alone; Regina Capobianco also lived there. Knuff and Capobianco had a complicated relationship, and conflict arose between them, which led to the murders.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Knuff's convictions and the imposition of the death sentences, finding that none of the 24 arguments that he presented justified a reversal. Among other things, the court found that the trial court did not err in denying Knuff’s motion for self-representation, which was made just eight days before jury selection began. The court also rejected Knuff’s claim that the trial court improperly restricted his counsel’s voir dire questioning, thereby denying him a meaningful, constitutionally adequate voir dire. The court additionally found that the trial court did not err in overruling Knuff’s challenges for cause of various jurors, or in granting the prosecution's for-cause challenges.

The court also found that the trial court's error in giving the jury a duty-to-retreat instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Knuff’s claim that the jury’s finding of guilt for the aggravated-murder counts, felony-murder specifications, and underlying felony offenses was based on insufficient evidence and that his convictions for those offenses were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Thompson v. Fhuere

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070162

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this Oregon Supreme Court case, the appellant Matthew Dwight Thompson challenged his death sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional due to changes in the law under Senate Bill (SB) 1013. Thompson also argued that two of the penalty-phase questions presented to the jury at his sentencing were unconstitutional. The post-conviction court vacated Thompson's death sentence and modified it to life without the possibility of parole. It also ruled that Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were procedurally barred.

While Thompson's appeal was pending, Oregon Governor Kate Brown commuted his death sentence to life without the possibility of parole. After this action, the Supreme Court concluded that Thompson was not entitled to a resentencing, despite any earlier error by the post-conviction court. The commutation had the legal effect of treating the sentence of life without parole as if it had been originally imposed. As a result, Thompson's challenge to his death sentence was rendered moot.

Furthermore, Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were not preserved for appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State v. Chez

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 22-155

Opinion Date: March 12, 2024

Judge: Robinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the defendant, Mark Chez, appealed his conviction for carrying a pistol without a license. The case stemmed from an incident on May 30, 2020, when a police officer, in an unmarked police car, observed Chez in a suspicious situation. The officer recognized Chez as having outstanding arrest warrants. When the police moved towards the vehicle where Chez was seated, Chez fled, during which the officer observed him throw an object, believed to be a firearm, from his pocket. A police dog subsequently located a firearm in the area where the officer saw Chez discard the object.

Chez was charged, tried, and convicted of carrying a pistol without a license. On appeal, Chez argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the weight of the evidence did not support the jury's verdict.

The Supreme Court, after a de novo review of the evidence, held that there was more than sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that Chez was recognized by multiple officers, was observed running away from the police with a weighted object in his pocket, and that a firearm was discovered in the specific area where an officer observed him throw the object. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding Chez's conviction.

State V. Osman

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 15

Opinion Date: March 13, 2024

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In South Dakota, Adil Osman was suspected of driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. He was identified by two witnesses through a show-up identification procedure. The witnesses saw a man near a damaged vehicle involved in an accident and later identified Osman as that man. Osman was charged and sought to suppress the identification evidence, arguing that the procedure was impermissibly suggestive. The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that while the show-up identification was suggestive, it was not unnecessary given the circumstances. The Court found that the police were in an active search for the driver, who was known to have fled the scene on foot, and that blood alcohol evidence dissipates with time.

Additionally, Osman argued that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements during the testimony of Sergeant Treadway. The court acknowledged that the trial court did err in this regard, but concluded that the error was not prejudicial. The court found there was strong direct and circumstantial evidence of Osman's guilt, including testimony that Osman was given the key to the SUV involved in the accident and the key was later found near where Osman was detained. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision.

State v. Clara

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 10

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: Petersen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the interpretation of Utah's Pretrial Justification Statute and its application to a situation where a defendant, Jon Michael Clara, claimed self-defense after firing his gun at a snowplow that had repeatedly rammed his vehicle. Clara was charged with seven counts of felony discharge of a firearm. He invoked the Pretrial Justification Statute, which allows a defendant to have a claim of self-defense assessed by a judge in a pretrial hearing. At the pretrial hearing, the defendant first has to make a prima facie claim of self-defense, then the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use of force wasn't justified.

At the pretrial hearing, Clara testified that after being rammed multiple times, he believed the snowplow was making a U-turn to attack again, leading him to fire his gun as a warning. The district court ruled that Clara had made a prima facie claim of self-defense and that the State had not disproved the self-defense claim by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, the district court dismissed the charges against Clara.

The State appealed, arguing that Clara failed to make a prima facie claim of self-defense, as the defendant’s belief in the imminence of the threat wasn’t objectively reasonable. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, however, affirmed the district court’s ruling, stating that a reasonable person in Clara's position could have believed that the snowplow posed an imminent threat.

State v. Buck

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,703-1

Opinion Date: March 14, 2024

Judge: WHITENER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2016 and 2021, Steven Buck was convicted of felony failure to register as a sex offender and sentenced to prison terms followed by mandatory 36 months of community custody. The trial court ran Buck’s 2021 community custody term consecutively to the 2016 community custody term, requiring Buck to serve 72 months of community custody in total. Buck argued on appeal that the court exceeded its authority under RCW 9.94A.589(5), which limits nonexceptional consecutive terms of community supervision to 24 months in total.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the terms "community supervision" and "community custody" are synonymous within RCW 9.94A.589(5) for offenses that occurred after July 1, 2000. Thus, the statute prohibits consecutive terms of community custody exceeding 24 months in total for nonexceptional sentences.

The court found that the trial court erred in imposing a total of 72 months of community custody for Buck's 2016 and 2021 sentences. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacated the community custody portion of Buck's sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing in compliance with this interpretation of RCW 9.94A.589(5).