Hudson v. Kelly

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1899

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: BARRON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1990, Mac Hudson and Charles Hughes were tried for charges relating to a shooting incident which resulted in the death of one person and injury of another. After being convicted, their verdict was reversed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court for unrelated reasons and a retrial was ordered.

During the second trial in 1997, issues arose regarding the jury selection process and the admission of certain witness testimonies. The judge reduced the number of jurors from sixteen to fifteen, which Hudson claimed prejudiced his use of peremptory challenges. Furthermore, key witness Kimbrough, who recanted his testimony from the first trial, was deemed unavailable to testify. His previous testimony was, however, read into the record. Hudson argued that his right to due process was violated by these actions. Despite these objections, Hudson was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for second-degree murder, among other charges.

Following unsuccessful appeals in state court, Hudson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, arguing that his right to due process was violated during his trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of Hudson's petition. The court found that the Massachusetts Appeals Court's rulings on Hudson's claims were not contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1238

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: BARRON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves Joseph A. Jakuttis, a former officer and detective in the Dracut Police Department, who also served as a Task Force Officer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's Cross Borders Initiative. Jakuttis brought multiple federal and state claims against the Town of Dracut, certain Dracut police officers, and members of the federal law-enforcement task force. He alleged that he was demoted and faced retaliation after reporting serious criminal activities implicating two Dracut police officers, which he learned from a confidential drug informant.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's Bivens claims against Michael V. O'Hanlon and Richard P. Poirier, Jr., and his §1983 claim against the Town of Dracut, David J. Chartrand Jr., and Demetri Mellonakos. The court ruled that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they could have reasonably thought that Jakuttis was speaking as part of his official duties rather than as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct, thus not clearly violating his First Amendment rights.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's state-law tort claims against Poirier, as Poirier was deemed to be acting within the scope of his federal employment during the relevant times. However, the court remanded the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act claim against the Town of Dracut and the Intentional Interference with Advantageous Economic Relationship claim against Chartrand and Mellonakos to the District Court. The court reasoned that these state-law claims should be resolved by a state court due to reasons of comity.

United States v. Delvalle

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1539

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Defendant-Appellant Kevin Delvalle appealed his sentence, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary as he believed he would receive a sentence below the Guidelines range. Delvalle had pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to conspiracy to distribute and possess crack cocaine. The district court imposed a 420-month sentence, within the Guidelines range stipulated in the plea agreement. On appeal, Delvalle contended that he expected to receive a lesser sentence than he ultimately received.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendant, stating that during the plea colloquy, the lower court had confirmed that Delvalle had not been promised any particular sentence, and that he understood that a below-Guidelines sentence was only a possibility, not a guarantee. The court held that a defendant's guilty plea is not rendered involuntary simply because he subjectively expected to receive a lower sentence than he ultimately did. It also emphasized that a defendant's guilty plea is not involuntary merely because he has a mistaken expectation of what his sentence will be, even if this expectation is based on his lawyer’s erroneous prediction about the sentence. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.

US v. Hamilton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4434

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: TRAXLER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involved Martin William Luther Hamilton, who pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The probation agent preparing Hamilton's presentence report determined that three of Hamilton’s prior North Carolina convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years for defendants who have three prior convictions for offenses that qualify as a “violent felony or a serious drug offense.”

Hamilton objected to the ACCA classification, disputing that the third conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon met the requirements of the ACCA. The district court followed a previous court's unpublished decision which held that a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the court concluded that Hamilton qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.

Hamilton appealed, challenging only the district court’s determination that the attempted robbery conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA. In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no error in the determination that Hamilton’s conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-87(a) qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.

United States v. Owens

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-51046

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Douglas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jacob Ray Owens was convicted for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine and was sentenced to 324 months in prison, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Owens appealed his sentence, arguing that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the purity of methamphetamine attributed to him. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

Owens and a co-conspirator, Brian Edward Stowe, were involved in a drug trafficking operation. After Owens was arrested, he continued to work with Stowe to maintain their business. The methamphetamine attributed to Owens was based on the drugs seized during his arrest and those he transported with Stowe from Mexico. Owens's base offense level was 36, with a total offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of V, leading to his sentencing guideline range of 324 to 405 months.

Owens challenged his sentence, arguing his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the purity of the methamphetamine attributed to him. However, the court held that Owens failed to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, noting that the district court could make plausible inferences based on the evidence at hand. The court noted that even if the objection were made, the district court would have adopted the same guideline range and imposed the same sentence. Therefore, Owens could not show a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if his counsel had objected or raised the argument on appeal.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-6048

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Mathis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In November 2018, Marlon Johnson was arrested after a vehicle he was driving crashed during a police pursuit. The police found over 1,000 grams of pure methamphetamine and a loaded semiautomatic pistol in the vehicle. A jury convicted Johnson of firearm and drug trafficking offenses, and he was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Johnson appealed his convictions and sentence on four grounds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Johnson's convictions and sentence. Firstly, the court rejected Johnson's claim that his jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Jury Selection and Services Act. The court found that Johnson failed to show that the underrepresentation of African Americans in the jury pool was due to systematic exclusion.

Secondly, the court dismissed Johnson's claim that his felon-in-possession conviction violated the Second Amendment. The court noted that there was no precedent explicitly holding that the law under which Johnson was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional.

Thirdly, the court upheld the district court's decision to admit testimony about Johnson's prior drug sales as "res gestae" evidence. This type of evidence is considered to be part of the story of the charged offense and is not subject to Rule 404(b), which generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts.

Finally, the court found that Johnson's sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment was not substantively unreasonable. Johnson had argued that the district court erred in using a 10:1 weight ratio between methamphetamine mixtures and actual methamphetamine to determine the offense level. The court noted that a district court’s use of the 10:1 ratio is a discretionary decision and cannot, by itself, render a criminal sentence invalid.

United States v. Bender

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1878

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: BRENNAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, defendant Anthony Bender, Jr. was convicted for unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a 96-month prison sentence. The conviction stemmed from an incident where, upon fleeing a traffic stop, an officer saw Bender pull a handgun from his sweatpants and toss it. The incident was captured on a dashboard camera, but it didn't show the gun. Bender challenged the government's conduct during his trial, the credibility of the jury's determinations, and the judge's sentencing decision.

On appeal, Bender raised three challenges: he claimed the government violated due process by failing to disclose certain video evidence, the video the government did disclose contradicted the arresting officer's testimony, and that his sentence was unreasonable. The court found no errors and affirmed Bender's conviction and sentence.

The court determined that the government did not violate due process by failing to disclose the camera footage from another squad car, as it did not exist and couldn't have shown the gun on the ground. The court also found that the evidence of possession, while only based on an officer's testimony, was not "impossible under the laws of nature," and thus, the jury did not err by finding it credible. Lastly, Bender's sentence, which was below the recommended guidelines range, was deemed not unreasonably high.

United States v. Holder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1426

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: WOOD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a 240-month prison sentence given to Herbert Holder, a repeat offender convicted on three counts of distributing methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Holder appealed the sentence claiming both procedural and substantive error. He argued the district court failed to consider one of his arguments for leniency, specifically, a recent assault he had suffered in jail, and that it did not adequately weigh his mitigation arguments.

The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments. It found that the district court had adequately addressed Holder's assault in jail. The court engaged in a back-and-forth exchange with Holder about the assault and acknowledged it as one of his mitigation arguments when explaining its sentencing decision. The Court of Appeals also noted that the district court had balanced the seriousness of Holder's offenses and his criminal history against his mitigating factors, including his drug addiction, the loss of his mother, the time elapsed since his prior convictions, and his recent assault in jail.

The court concluded that Holder had not provided compelling evidence to overcome the "nearly irrebuttable presumption" that his below-guidelines sentence was reasonable. The Court of Appeals thus upheld the lower court's decision, affirming Holder's sentence.

USA v. Creek

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1942

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois that a tin can filled with energetic powder, sealed with adhesive, and outfitted with a fuse qualifies as a "destructive device" under the National Firearms Act.

The case involved Jeffrey E. Creek, who was found in possession of such a device, firearms, magazines, ammunition, and a silencer that had been shipped from China. Creek was subsequently charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At his sentencing hearing, the district court applied a two-level "destructive device" enhancement in calculating his Guidelines range.

Creek appealed the decision, arguing that his device was a firework and not a destructive device. However, the appellate court found that the district court correctly classified the device as a bomb under the National Firearms Act due to it having a metal casing, an adhesive seal, explosive powder, and a fuse. It was irrelevant that Creek intended to use the device as a firework, as the device was fully assembled and fit the definition of a destructive device.

Creek also challenged the district court's consideration of his criminal history and substance abuse disorder in his sentencing. However, the appellate court dismissed these arguments, stating that the district court correctly exercised its discretion in considering Creek's full criminal history and the risk to public safety. As a result, the district court's judgment was affirmed.

USA v. Seymour

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1236

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Flaum

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves Keenan Seymour, a member of the street gang, Latin Dragon Nation, who pled guilty to a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy charge. Seymour was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment, which was below the Sentencing Guidelines' recommendation. He appealed for re-sentencing on three grounds: (1) questioning certain factual findings, (2) challenging his accountability for a murder, and (3) pointing out the court's failure to discuss unwarranted sentencing disparities.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court emphasized that Seymour was an active participant in the gang and knew about the gang's rules. It found Seymour's arguments against the court's factual findings unpersuasive, stating that the record offered ample support for the findings. The court also rejected Seymour's argument that the district court erred in calculating his offense level by attributing a murder to him, explaining that the murder was foreseeable given Seymour’s gang activities. Lastly, it dismissed Seymour's argument about unwarranted sentencing disparities, stating that the district court had adequately addressed this concern during sentencing.

The court held that Seymour's 180-month sentence, which was below the Guidelines, was substantively reasonable and thus affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Craig

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2211

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Defendant Ledra Craig appealed his conviction for various counts related to the distribution of fentanyl. On August 2, 2020, Craig sold fentanyl to two men, R.P. and N.B., at a casino in Missouri. R.P. and N.B. were later found unconscious and R.P. ultimately died. Craig was then arrested and made a statement to officers after waiving his Miranda rights, which was later used as evidence during his trial.

Craig raised three main points of contention in his appeal. First, he argued that text messages between him and an unidentified co-conspirator, "Glenn," were wrongly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). The court disagreed, stating that the texts, which discussed drug deals, were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy. Second, Craig claimed that the court improperly denied him the right to present a complete defense by restricting his ability to question an officer about the circumstances surrounding his inculpatory statement. The court also rejected this argument, noting that Craig had been able to conduct a thorough cross-examination of the officer. Finally, Craig contended that evidence of his prior drug conviction was erroneously admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as it was irrelevant to the current case and served as improper propensity evidence. The court disagreed, stating that the prior conviction was relevant to his intent to engage in the charged conspiracy to distribute drugs. Based on these reasons, the court affirmed Craig's conviction.

USA V. LAYFIELD

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50047

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Owens

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involved an appeal by Philip James Layfield against his convictions for wire fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses. Layfield argued that the 21-day period it took the U.S. Marshals Service to transport him from the District of New Jersey, where he was arrested, to the Central District of California (CDCA), where he was indicted, violated the Speedy Trial Act and required the court to overturn his convictions. The argument centered on a provision of the Speedy Trial Act that mandates trial commencement within seventy days from the date a defendant appears before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Layfield's argument, affirming his convictions. The court ruled that the 21-day delay between Layfield's detention in New Jersey and his first appearance before a judge in the CDCA was immaterial to the Speedy Trial Act analysis. The court held that a plain reading of the relevant section of the Speedy Trial Act dictates that the 21-day delay did not trigger a Speedy Trial Act violation. The court also rejected Layfield's argument that a different provision became relevant because he was detained. The court held that this provision applies to prisoners traveling between jurisdictions for court proceedings once the seventy-day clock has started, not to a pre-indictment or pre-appearance transfer.

USA V. LEMUS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50046

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Bumatay

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Edgar Hernandez Lemus and Junior Almendarez Martinez for conspiracy, aiding and abetting the receipt of the proceeds of extortion, and receiving the proceeds of extortion. The defendants, involved in a scheme to kidnap Mexican nationals seeking illegal entry into the United States and extort their families, argued that they could only be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 880 if they knew the money they received was obtained from extortion.

The court, however, held that § 880 only requires knowledge that the proceeds were “unlawfully obtained,” not specifically from extortion. The court noted that if Congress had intended for specific knowledge of the money's origin from extortion to be necessary, it would have included such language in the statute. The court also rejected the defendants' arguments that the court's interpretation of § 880 rendered the statute vague, stating that the defendants' conduct clearly fell within the proscription of the law.

The court remanded the case for recalculation of the restitution amount, but otherwise affirmed the convictions and sentences.

United States v. Hurst

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7041

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Briscoe

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involved Garrett Joseph Hurst, who was charged with knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a minor, in violation of various sections of the United States Code. At sentencing, the district court imposed the maximum term of imprisonment of 180 months, followed by a thirteen-year term of supervised release, which was higher than the advisory Guidelines imprisonment range.

Hurst appealed, arguing that the district court erred in rejecting a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement proposed by the parties, incorrectly concluded that he was ineligible for a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence, and committed plain error by failing to explain why it selected a thirteen-year term of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the district court had not erred in rejecting the plea agreement, correctly concluded Hurst was ineligible for a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court also found that while the district court had erred in failing to explain its reasons for the term of supervised release, this error did not affect Hurst's substantial rights.

United States v. McBride

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-4119

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Seymour

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law, Government Contracts

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed convictions against Whitney McBride and her company, Odyssey International Inc., for fraudulent conduct in obtaining a government contract. McBride was convicted of five offenses, including wire fraud, major fraud, and making a false declaration. She appealed the convictions, arguing that they should be vacated based on a Supreme Court case decided after her conviction, Ciminelli v. United States, which dealt with the interpretation of federal fraud statutes. She also contended that her conviction for making a false declaration should be vacated due to errors in the jury instructions.

The court rejected her arguments, finding that she had waived her challenges to the convictions for conspiracy, wire fraud, and major fraud because she invited error by proffering the jury instruction she now disputed. The court also found that she waived her challenges due to her numerous procedural errors, including failing to argue for plain error on appeal and failing to meet the requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court concluded that she had waived her arguments and affirmed her convictions.

United States v. Pemberton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7028

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Judge: TYMKOVICH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

In this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Paul Curtis Pemberton, contested his federal conviction for a murder committed in McIntosh County, Oklahoma in 2004. The case was influenced by the Supreme Court decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020), which confirmed that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation covered a larger area of eastern Oklahoma than previously acknowledged by state and federal governments. This ruling impacted many crimes that had been prosecuted in state courts but were actually committed within tribal jurisdictions. Pemberton, an enrolled member of the Creek Nation, argued that his crime fell within this category and should have been prosecuted in federal court under the Major Crimes Act.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that the state officers involved in Pemberton’s arrest and the subsequent collection of evidence had acted in good faith, based on the prevailing legal understanding at the time. The court noted that the officers could not have known that the Major Crimes Act barred state jurisdiction over the crime as the reservation boundaries were not clarified until the McGirt decision in 2020.

The court also rejected Pemberton’s argument that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation during his sentencing. The court found that Pemberton's request to represent himself was made with the intention to delay the proceedings and was not related to the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the lower court's decision to deny his request was affirmed.

United States v. Ronquillo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1247

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Carson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined a case involving a defendant who was found sleeping in a detached garage during the execution of a search warrant. The defendant had been found with methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin on his person and was subsequently charged with possession with intent to distribute these substances. In his defense, he argued that the officers should not have entered the garage as it was not included in the search warrant. However, the court disagreed, upholding the lower court’s decision that the warrant covered the garage since it was within the curtilage of the property being searched.

The court applied the four-factor test from United States v. Dunn, considering the proximity of the garage to the home, whether the area was enclosed, the nature of the uses of the area, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. The court found that the garage was close to the main residence, enclosed by a chain link fence, used for intimate activities associated with home life, and shielded from public view. Therefore, it was part of the curtilage of the property, and the search was lawful.

The defendant also argued that he was unreasonably detained because he was outside the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched when he was arrested. However, the court concluded that the immediate vicinity included the detached garage, making the detention reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding the defendant's conviction and sentence.

Michael David Carruth v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13548

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2002, Michael David Carruth was convicted and sentenced to death for four counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted murder, first-degree burglary, and first-degree robbery in Alabama. Carruth appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, which raised six main issues. These included allegations of ineffective trial counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial, and ineffective appellate counsel for failing to notify him of further available appellate proceedings and to argue that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Carruth also argued that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury and due process of law due to premature jury deliberations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined all the issues and affirmed the district court's denial of Carruth's habeas corpus petition. The circuit court determined that Carruth's claims did not survive deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, as the state court's adjudications were not contrary to federal law, nor did they involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also held that Carruth's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally barred because it was not properly raised and preserved at the state level. The circuit court concluded that the nature of the crimes and the strength of the evidence against Carruth outweighed any potential mitigating evidence that may have been presented.

USA v. Dubois

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10829

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Pryor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The case involves Andre Dubois, who was convicted on several federal firearm offenses. These offenses arose when Dubois attempted to ship a box containing firearms from Georgia to Dominica. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was asked to address five issues on appeal.

Firstly, the court dismissed Dubois's argument that a recent Supreme Court case overturned the precedent upholding a ban on felons possessing firearms. The court held that the Supreme Court case did not abrogate the precedent, and therefore Dubois's argument failed.

Secondly, the court affirmed that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Dubois knew he was in possession of a firearm.

Thirdly, the court found that Dubois's prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana under Georgia law qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, triggering a higher base offense level.

Fourthly, the court rejected Dubois's argument that the application of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a stolen gun violated his due process rights.

Finally, the court held that the district court had not erred in imposing a $25,000 fine on Dubois, as there was sufficient evidence to suggest that he could afford to pay the fine.

Therefore, Dubois's convictions and sentence were affirmed.

USA v. Gbenedio

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12044

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: Pryor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case pertains to Thomas Ukoshovbera A. Gbenedio, a licensed pharmacist, who was charged with 72 counts of unlawful drug dispensing and one count of refusing an inspection of his pharmacy, essentially operating a "pill mill." The district court sentenced Gbenedio to 188 months of imprisonment and imposed a $200,000 fine.

Gbenedio appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to insufficient notice of the charges against him, and in making certain evidentiary rulings. He also contested the fine imposed, stating he was unable to pay.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the indictment provided enough facts for Gbenedio to understand the charges against him. It also deemed the district court's evidentiary rulings as non-abusive and found that Gbenedio failed to prove his inability to pay the fine.

USA v. Brock

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3045

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Millett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit presided over a case involving an appellant, Larry Brock, who had been convicted for his participation in the January 6th riot at the United States Capitol. Brock was convicted of six crimes, including obstructing Congress’s certification of the electoral count under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The district court applied a three-level sentencing enhancement to Brock’s conviction, arguing his conduct resulted in “substantial interference with the administration of justice[.]” Brock challenged the interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2)’s elements and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Brock’s conviction, agreeing with the district court’s interpretation of the elements of Section 1512(c)(2) and finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. However, the court concluded that the three-level sentencing enhancement for interfering with the “administration of justice” was inapplicable to interference with the legislative process of certifying electoral votes. As a result, the court vacated Brock’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing without the application of the sentencing enhancement.

USA v. Calloway

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-3057

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Ginsburg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Clark Calloway Jr., a former U.S. Marine convicted of several firearms offenses. Calloway had acquired a fully automatic AK-47, which was inoperable, from an FBI source after expressing violent intentions on social media, advocating for ISIS, and pledging to commit violence against non-Muslims. He was arrested upon possession of the firearm and was later convicted on three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and § 924.

At sentencing, the district court calculated Calloway's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and found that he posed a serious risk to public safety, which justified an upward departure in his sentence. Calloway appealed this decision, arguing that the inoperability of the gun he received negated significant public endangerment, and that the upward departure was duplicative of a separate sentencing enhancement applied by the court.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with Calloway's arguments. It held that the district court was correct in its findings of fact that Calloway was dangerous at the time of the offense, and that his possession of the firearm and his intent to use it for violent purposes posed a serious risk to public safety. The court also rejected Calloway's argument that the upward departure was duplicative of the sentencing enhancement, as the latter was applied due to Calloway's intent to use the firearm for another felony offense, while the former was due to the risk he posed to public safety.

WILLIAMS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 12

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the verdict of the Ashley County Circuit Court convicting Robert J. Williams, Jr. of capital murder and aggravated assault and sentencing him to life imprisonment without parole and a term of twenty-eight months’ imprisonment, respectively. Williams appealed on three grounds: the circuit court's granting of the State's motion for continuance; violation of his speedy-trial rights; and the circuit court's denial of his Batson challenge during voir dire.

The Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's decisions. It held that the State had shown due diligence in procuring unavailable witnesses and that the affidavit filed by the State complied with the requirements set forth by law. It also held that Williams was brought to trial within the twelve-month period required by law, as periods of delay were properly excluded from the calculation. Finally, it held that the circuit court properly allowed the State to strike a juror during voir dire and that its decision to deny the Batson claim was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

The Supreme Court reviewed all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to Williams, and found no prejudicial error. Therefore, the circuit court's decision was affirmed.

P. v. Hardin

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S277487

Opinion Date: March 4, 2024

Judge: Kruger

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In California, the People v. Hardin case involves the defendant, Tony Hardin, who is serving a life sentence without parole for a special circumstance murder he committed at age 25. Hardin challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that provides parole hearings for most young adult offenders but excludes those serving life sentences without parole for crimes committed after turning 18.

The Supreme Court of California found that the legislature acted rationally in distinguishing between young adults serving life sentences without parole and those serving parole-eligible sentences for crimes committed when they were young. The court reasoned that the legislature's decision to exclude certain offenders from parole hearings reflected a balance of multiple considerations, including the seriousness of the offender's crimes and the capacity of all young adults for growth.

The court stated that while the primary purpose of the statute was to provide opportunities for early release to certain young adults, the legislature also considered other factors. It could rationally balance the seriousness of the offender's crimes against the capacity of all young adults for growth, and determine that young adults who have committed certain very serious crimes should remain ineligible for release from prison.

The court also noted that it is the legislature's prerogative and duty to define degrees of culpability and punishment and to distinguish between crimes. Therefore, Hardin's argument that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by irrationally discriminating against young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole was dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed.

In re Miguel R.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E082250(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Menetrez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

This case involves the appeal of an order to transfer a juvenile, Miguel R., from the juvenile court system to the criminal court system in California. Miguel was originally charged with murder and other offenses when he was 17 years old. After a juvenile wardship petition was filed, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer Miguel to the criminal court. The defendant appealed this order, but it was affirmed by the appellate court.

Subsequently, changes in legislation led to the case being transferred back to the juvenile court to address the statutory amendments. The juvenile court, applying the new standard of proof, again ordered Miguel to be transferred to the criminal court. Miguel appealed this second order, arguing that the juvenile court misapplied the statutory changes and that the prosecution did not meet its burden under the clear and convincing evidence standard.

The appellate court affirmed the order of the juvenile court. It clarified certain points about the recent amendments to the relevant statute, stating that the statute does not require any one factor to be given more weight than others when determining whether a minor is suitable for rehabilitation under the juvenile court's jurisdiction.

The appellate court also found that the juvenile court's decision to transfer Miguel to the criminal court was supported by substantial evidence, and that it was not reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion even if it had applied the most recent version of the statute. The court's ruling was based on factors such as Miguel's degree of criminal sophistication, his potential for rehabilitation before the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, the success of previous attempts to rehabilitate him, and the circumstances and gravity of his offenses.

In re Miguel R.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E082250M(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Menetrez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

This case involves the multiple appeals of a juvenile, Miguel R., who was transferred to criminal court for alleged felonies including murder and second-degree robbery. A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Miguel committed these crimes when he was 17 years old. The juvenile court initially granted the People’s motion to transfer Miguel to criminal court. Miguel appealed this order, but the decision was affirmed. Following the remittitur issue, the juvenile court transferred the matter to criminal court.

However, subsequent amendments to section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code necessitated a second transfer hearing. The amendments raised the standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence on the issue of whether a juvenile should be transferred. The juvenile court, after considering the statutory changes, again ordered Miguel to be transferred to criminal court based on the conclusion that he was “not amenable to the care, treatment and training programs available through the juvenile court system”. Miguel appealed this order as well, arguing that the juvenile court misapplied the statutory changes and that the prosecution did not carry its burden under the clear and convincing evidence standard.

The court of appeal rejected Miguel’s arguments and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court was not required to give greater weight to any particular statutory criterion in its determination of whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings. Thus, the order transferring Miguel to criminal court was affirmed.

Lunsted v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E081770(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Menetrez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the State of California, a defendant, Kevin Lunsted, sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant his motion to quash a subpoena from the prosecution. The prosecution subpoenaed Lunsted's case file (c-file) from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to prepare for his resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Lunsted argued that the request for his entire c-file was overbroad and sought privileged and immaterial medical and mental health records. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the c-file was likely to contain information relevant to the resentencing hearing.

Lunsted appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to apply the factors set out in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Touchstone) (2020) to determine whether the prosecution made a sufficient demonstration of good cause to defeat his motion to quash.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two agreed with Lunsted. It held that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard by failing to apply the seven-factor test set out in the Facebook case. The Court therefore granted Lunsted's petition and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the motion to quash under the correct legal standard. The Court clarified that the Facebook factors apply to subpoenas issued not only by the defense but also by the prosecution.

P. v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168018(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: Brown

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2015, defendant Lee Farley allegedly shot and killed four men in a car in San Francisco. The prosecution claimed it was a drive-by shooting committed for the benefit of "Page Street," a supposed "criminal street gang" under Penal Code section 186.22(f). The superior court ruled that the prosecution had not presented evidence that Page Street was sufficiently "organized" to qualify as a criminal street gang.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with the lower court's ruling. It found that the prosecution had indeed met its burden to show that Page Street was an "ongoing, organized association or group," which is the requirement for a criminal street gang under the amended version of Penal Code section 186.22(f). The court relied on the testimony of a police officer who described Page Street as "informal but organized" with members having particular roles in carrying out crimes and some members having more influence than others.

As a result, the court granted a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order setting aside the gang-related count, allegations, and enhancements against Farley. This means that the prosecution can proceed to trial on the gang-related charges.

People v. Felix

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B317938(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: GRIMES

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case involved Jason Felix, who was arrested for a traffic violation in Utah where a consensual search of his car led to the discovery of a handgun, ammunition, and over five kilograms of methamphetamine. Felix became a suspect in two murders in Southern California while in custody in Utah on drug charges. Upon his return to California, Felix invoked his right to counsel during an interview about one of the murders. He was then placed in a cell with an undercover detective, to whom he made incriminating statements about both murders. The trial court denied Felix's motion to suppress the evidence from the Utah traffic stop and admitted his incriminating statements made to the undercover agent. He was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

On appeal, Felix contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search of his car and in admitting his statements to the undercover agent as he had previously invoked his right to counsel. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed and affirmed the judgment of conviction in its entirety. The court held that the traffic stop was lawful and not unduly prolonged, and Felix's consent to the car search was voluntary and free from coercion. It also held that Felix's incriminating statements to the undercover detective were properly admitted, as they were made freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. However, the court agreed that Felix should be awarded an additional day of presentence custody credits and remanded the case to the superior court for correction.

People v. Lewis

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G060049A(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: O’LEARY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A California Court of Appeal has affirmed a lower court's judgment in a case involving a defendant convicted of rape by an intoxicating substance and kidnapping to commit rape. The defendant, Rodney Taurean Lewis, was accused of getting the victim intoxicated and then taking her away from a bar with the intent of sexually assaulting her. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conviction for rape given the victim's high blood alcohol concentration and the presence of a sedative in her system, and Lewis's admission of the sexual encounter.

Despite Lewis's argument that there was no force involved in the kidnapping, the court applied a "relaxed force standard" previously applied to cases involving minors, which also applies to incapacitated adults. This standard does not require physical force or fear, but rather the physical act of moving the victim. The court found that Lewis driving the victim away from the bar satisfied this standard.

Concerning the kidnapping charge, the court found that there was sufficient evidence that Lewis intended to sexually assault the victim when he moved her, and that he knew or should have known that she was too intoxicated to consent to the movement. The court also noted Lewis's deception in claiming to help the victim find her lost phone and his lie to the police about having sexual intercourse with her as consciousness of guilt. As such, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

People v. Paul

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B320488M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: MOOR

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

This case pertains to Jeremiah Paul, a parolee, who was convicted of possession of a firearm due to his prior violent conviction, after police officers discovered a firearm in his vehicle. The discovery occurred after the officers asked him about his parole status during an encounter, which he contends was an unlawful detention that led to the discovery of the firearm. Paul argued that the evidence of the firearm should have been suppressed as it was only discovered following his unlawful detention.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court's ruling that the initial encounter between Paul and the police officers was consensual. The appellate court highlighted several factors such as the positioning of the police officers, their use of flashlights on Paul, the fact that Paul was engaged in a phone conversation when the officers approached, and the opening of the vehicle's door, which would have led a reasonable person to believe that they were not free to leave. This, they concluded, constituted an unlawful detention.

Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling stating the initial encounter was consensual. The court held that Paul's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, which was discovered as a result of the unlawful detention, should have been granted. The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to grant Paul's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm.

BAKER v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0860

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellant Morgan Baker was convicted of malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Tamarco Head. Baker appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a portion of a rap music video in which he appeared. The State used this video to portray Baker as violent and familiar with guns. The court agreed with Baker that the trial court's admission of the video was an abuse of discretion under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”), as the video's highly prejudicial nature substantially outweighed its minimal probative value.

The court found that the video had little probative value in proving Baker's presence at the crime scene or his identity, as these facts were not in dispute. Furthermore, the video's depiction of Baker waving a gun during a music performance did not significantly prove his access to or familiarity with guns at the time of the shooting. Conversely, the video was highly prejudicial as it allowed the State to introduce impermissible propensity evidence, portraying Baker as a threatening gunman.

The court concluded that the State had failed to show that the error in admitting the video was harmless, given the video's significant prejudicial effect and the lack of compelling evidence of Baker's guilt. Therefore, the court reversed Baker's conviction.

JENNINGS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0095

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, Savanna Jennings, was convicted of malice murder and related charges in relation to the shooting death of her grandfather, Otha Perrin Sr. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and she was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, Jennings argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other-acts evidence, admitting certain business records, and that her trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.

The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Jennings' financial activities pertaining to her grandfather's bank account, as it formed part of the financial motive for the crime. The court also found no plain error in the admission of Facebook messages between Jennings and another individual, which were arguably hearsay but did not likely affect the outcome of the trial.

In terms of ineffective counsel, the court found that Jennings' lawyer did preserve her objections to the admission of the bank records. As for the failure to preserve an objection to the Facebook records and to timely disclose an expert witness, the court concluded that Jennings failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that these actions affected the outcome of her trial. Therefore, the court affirmed Jennings' convictions.

MADERA v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0148

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Georgia, Francisco Javier Madera, who was convicted of the murder of Juan Carlos Zambrano, appealed his conviction on five grounds. He argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial; admitting video footage of the injured victim; admitting evidence under OCGA § 24-8-803 (5); his counsel was ineffective; and the cumulative effect of the errors required a new trial.

Madera was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. After a physical altercation at a party, Madera shot Zambrano, who was unarmed. Madera claimed he acted in self-defense, but the State presented evidence that no weapons were found on Zambrano.

The court upheld Madera's conviction, rejecting all five claims of error. Madera’s arguments on the admission of evidence were reviewed for plain error as they were not objected to at the trial. The court found no plain error or any showing that the errors affected his substantial rights. The court also upheld the denial of his motion for a new trial, noting that the decision is vested solely in the trial court and is not subject to review.

Madera’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected. He failed to show how further investigation would have revealed additional evidence or how it would have helped his defense. His disagreement with his counsel’s strategy to not file a pre-trial immunity motion did not mean the strategy was objectively unreasonable. Madera’s claim of cumulative error also failed as no trial court error was identified.

MCCULLUM v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0927

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In November 2019, Samuel Earl McCullum was convicted of the 1998 rape and murder of Monica Blackwell and the 1999 rape of another woman identified as C.C. McCullum appealed, asserting that the evidence presented in court was insufficient to support his convictions for the murder and rape of Blackwell. He claimed that there was no evidence showing that he intoxicated Blackwell or was connected to the drugs she took before her death, nor that the sexual encounter with Blackwell was non-consensual. McCullum also argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the count of rape against C.C. on constitutional speedy trial grounds and in denying his motion to sever that count from the counts related to Blackwell’s murder and rape.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to convict McCullum of Blackwell’s rape and murder. The medical examiner's testimony established that while Blackwell died of cocaine intoxication, the combination of the cocaine, the head injuries inflicted by McCullum, and the rape materially accelerated her death. The court also found that McCullum's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and it did not abuse its discretion in denying McCullum's motion to sever the counts.

MCKINNEY v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23G0448

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In August 2021, a Fulton County grand jury indicted defendant Jerrion McKinney on various charges relating to his alleged participation in an "armed takeover" of an area in Atlanta, including twelve counts of violating Georgia’s Gang Act. The state sought to introduce evidence of McKinney's previous acts under evidence rule, OCGA § 24-4-418 (“Rule 418”), which allows for the admission of evidence of other acts listed in Georgia’s Gang Act in prosecutions under the same.

The trial court ruled that only one of the three acts proffered by the state was admissible. The state appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly interpreted Rule 418 as requiring a nexus between the other act and an intent to further gang activity. The Court of Appeals agreed with the state, reversed the trial court's decision in part and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”), which governs the admissibility of relevant evidence.

Upon review, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that Rule 418 does not require a nexus between the other act and an intent to further gang activity. The Court clarified that while Rule 418 does not impose a nexus requirement, the admissibility of evidence under Rule 418 is still subject to the application of other rules of evidence, including Rule 403. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to assess whether the other acts at issue should be excluded under Rule 403 or any other related rules.

PALMER v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1091

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Willie Williams Palmer appealed his 2023 convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting deaths of his estranged wife, Brenda Jenkins Palmer, and his 15-year-old stepdaughter, Christine Jenkins. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated, that the loss or destruction of potential biological evidence from the crime scene required dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct or an instruction allowing the jury to draw an adverse inference against the state, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence of bias against him from local law enforcement and prosecutors, and that he was unfairly targeted as the shooter to the exclusion of other possible suspects. He also claimed that the cumulative effect of the court’s errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial.

However, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions. The court found that the delay in bringing Palmer to trial did not violate his right to a speedy trial. Regarding the potential biological evidence, the court found that the State did not act in bad faith in failing to preserve it and that it lacked exculpatory value. It also ruled that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of historical bias against Palmer as it was tangential to the issues at trial. The court found no basis for Palmer's claim of being unfairly targeted as the shooter to the exclusion of other possible suspects. Lastly, the court ruled that cumulative error analysis was inapplicable as Palmer did not show any error by the trial court.

SINKFIELD v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1201

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, a Georgia Supreme Court decision, the defendant, Remond Sinkfield, was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the death of Levi Atkinson. Atkinson died after either jumping or being pushed out of a moving vehicle during an altercation with Sinkfield. The vehicle was then struck by another car.

Sinkfield appealed the convictions arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder and theft, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a pretrial interview by police, and that the trial court committed plain error in several ways. Moreover, Sinkfield claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's deficiencies, including by failing to retain a medical expert to testify as to the cause of Atkinson's death.

The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of these claims and affirmed the convictions. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Sinkfield's convictions, that the trial court did not commit plain error, and that Sinkfield was not denied effective assistance of counsel. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in various evidentiary rulings.

THE STATE v. LEDBETTER

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0900, S23X0901

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

This case involves two appeals from rulings in a pretrial order related to the indictment of John Ledbetter for two separate murders. The State appeals the trial court's decision to grant Ledbetter’s motion to suppress evidence provided by Ledbetter’s former attorney, Dennis Scheib, to law enforcement, asserting the information was protected by attorney-client privilege. Ledbetter cross-appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cell phone records obtained through two search warrants.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed both orders. The court found that the trial court properly granted Ledbetter's motion to suppress evidence provided by Scheib, holding that Ledbetter’s attorney-client privilege had been violated by Scheib’s disclosures to Detective Leonpacher. The court also held that the trial court order did not suppress physical evidence provided by Scheib or "derivative evidence", but rather prohibited the State from presenting evidence to the jury that Scheib, Ledbetter’s attorney, was the source of the physical evidence given to law enforcement.

Regarding Ledbetter's cross-appeal, the court concluded that the trial court correctly denied Ledbetter’s motion to suppress his cell phone records. The court found that the search warrants were supported by probable cause and rejected Ledbetter's various challenges to the warrants. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's pretrial order in its entirety.

State v. Anderson

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125104

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the convictions of Todge Anton Anderson for first-degree felony murder, second-degree intentional murder, aggravated robbery, distributing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and criminal possession of a weapon. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not excluding evidence of a jail call as a sanction for a discovery violation, given that the evidence was disclosed before the start of the trial and the defendant had reviewed it. The prosecutor did commit error during closing arguments by suggesting that the burden of proof was on the defendant; however, the court determined that this error did not affect the outcome of the trial. The court also found there was sufficient evidence to support Anderson’s conviction for distributing synthetic marijuana or possessing it with intent to distribute. Lastly, the court vacated the trial court's order for Anderson to pay $5,000 in attorney fees without considering the burden of payment on the defendant, and remanded for reconsideration of that issue.

State v. Perry

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 122246

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case revolves around whether the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas can exercise jurisdiction over an appeal that was not filed within the statutory time limit. The appellant, Leroy L. Perry, was convicted of murder in the 1990s and filed a self-represented motion in district court to modify his life sentence. The court denied the motion and, a year and a half later, Perry filed a notice of appeal, asserting that he had never received the order denying his motion.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to make factual findings about the notice of appeal's untimeliness. The district court found that Perry did receive the order shortly after it was mailed to him and held that Perry could not show excusable neglect for his failure to timely appeal. Perry appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that he didn't receive the order until after receiving a report in October 2019.

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings. It reasoned that Perry would not have known there was a decision to appeal, nor the precise date the order was filed, unless he had received the order shortly after the clerk sent it to him. The court concluded that Perry's appeal was untimely under Kansas state statute and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The court did not reach the State's excusable neglect argument.

State of Minnesota vs. Thompson

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1277

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Chutich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case revolves around the appellant, Sheldon James Thompson, who was convicted for the brutal murders of his girlfriend, her 20-month-old son, and her unborn child. Thompson was convicted by a jury for eight offenses, including first-degree premeditated murder for each victim. The jury's decision was based on the prosecution's argument, which included statements about Thompson's motive and activities before, during, and after the murders. Thompson appealed his conviction, asserting that the prosecutor committed unobjected-to misconduct during the closing argument, which affected his substantial rights. He also contended that the court should order a new trial as prosecutors continued to make speculative statements during closing arguments.

The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, affirmed the conviction. The court held that the State had met its burden to show that Thompson’s substantial rights were not affected by any alleged plain error in the prosecutor’s closing argument. The court also determined that Thompson had failed to establish that speculative statements were a widespread form of prosecutorial misconduct; thus, a prophylactic reversal was not warranted. This conclusion was based on the strength of the evidence against Thompson, the limited extent of the alleged misconduct, and the opportunity Thompson had to rebut any improper remarks.

Garth v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KM-00182-SCT

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case at hand involves an appeal from Lady B. Garth against the Monroe County Circuit Court's dismissal of her appeal of a criminal misdemeanor conviction. The Supreme Court of Mississippi was tasked with determining whether the lower court erred in this dismissal.

The pivotal issue revolved around the procedural aspects of perfecting an appeal from a justice court to a circuit court. According to Mississippi law, this requires a simultaneous filing of a written notice of appeal, a cost bond, and an appearance bond within 30 days of judgment. In this case, Garth failed to comply with these requirements. While she faxed a written notice of appeal on the 30th day following the original judgment, the cost bond and appearance bond were not submitted until six days later.

The court concluded that Mississippi law does not permit the filing of the required bonds past the 30-day appeal time, and as such, the Monroe County Circuit Court committed no error in dismissing Garth's appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision.

It should be noted that while Garth raised additional issues concerning the merits of the underlying justice-court judgment and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, these were deemed outside the scope of the present appeal or more appropriately raised in post-conviction-relief petitions, and were thus not considered by the court in this decision.

Harris v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-01195-SCT

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Percy Harris, a staff sergeant in the Mississippi Army National Guard, was convicted of first-degree murder of his wife, Shauna. Harris testified that during an argument, Shauna shot herself while he attempted to prevent her from doing so. However, Harris's stepson, M.K., testified that he heard his mother pleading with Harris not to shoot her. The prosecution pointed to several inconsistencies in Harris's account, such as the nature of Shauna's injuries and the fact that she was shot three times when Harris claimed to only hear two shots.

On appeal, Harris argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing arguments, including making "send-a-message" and "golden-rule" arguments, commenting on his right to trial, and inflaming the jury's emotions. The Supreme Court of Mississippi disagreed, finding that the prosecutor's statements were not inflammatory and were within permissible bounds. The prosecutor's comments on Harris's credibility and demeanor were allowed because Harris chose to testify, hence putting his credibility and demeanor at issue. The Court affirmed Harris's conviction and life sentence.

State ex rel. Woods vs. Dierker

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100369

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Gooch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Seven individuals sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition from the Supreme Court of Missouri, claiming the circuit court failed to hold a preliminary hearing within the required timeframe, thus violating Rule 22.09(a), section 544.270, and section 544.320. The plaintiffs argued that this delay was to allow the circuit attorney additional time to secure an indictment. The primary plaintiff, Lamar Lamont Woods, had been held without bond for 162 days on the complaint, with his preliminary hearing delayed for 129 days beyond the 30-day deadline in Rule 22.09(a).

The Supreme Court of Missouri noted that after the filing of a felony complaint, a preliminary hearing should be held within a reasonable time, but no later than 30 days following the defendant's initial appearance if the defendant is in custody, and no later than 60 days if the defendant is not in custody. The Court concluded that Woods was not entitled to a preliminary hearing on his charges, as he had been indicted on the same charges at issue in the complaint filed in June 2023. Since Woods had been indicted, the Court ruled that any relief it might issue in mandamus would not have practical effect on any existing controversy, thus rendering the case moot.

The Court also concluded that the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply in this case, as Woods had not established this issue would recur. Consequently, the preliminary writ of mandamus was quashed.

State v. Welch

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 42

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case involves an appeal from a defendant, Christopher Michael Welch, who was convicted of attempted incest, incest, sexual abuse of children, and unlawful restraint. Welch began dating the mother of three daughters in 2018, and they eventually got married. The oldest daughter, J.P., testified about the inappropriate behavior and sexual advances made by Welch towards her. During the trial, Welch's defense suggested J.P. fabricated her claims.

Welch's appeal raised two issues. First, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct, arguing that the prosecutor improperly vouched for J.P.'s credibility and made inappropriate emotional appeals to the jury. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct that would warrant plain error review, arguing that the prosecutor's comments were within the boundaries of discussing witness credibility and the lack of forensic evidence. The court also rejected Welch's argument that the cumulative effect of the state's comments prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

Second, Welch objected to certain probation restrictions imposed by the District Court, arguing they had no reasonable nexus to the offense charged. These included prohibitions on using or possessing alcohol and illegal drugs, gambling, entering bars, and entering casinos. The court found these to be standard conditions authorized by statute and ruled that Welch failed to demonstrate that the lower court abused its discretion in imposing them. Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction and sentencing.

State v. Gnewuch

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 47

Opinion Date: March 1, 2024

Judge: Heavican

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case before the Nebraska Supreme Court involved an appeal by Nathaniel L. Gnewuch, who was convicted of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. Gnewuch had requested a deferred sentence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-2292, but the district court refused to consider his request, deeming the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the language of § 29-2292, which allows for a deferred judgement and probation for a guilty defendant, without the entry of a final judgement of conviction, under certain circumstances.

The court rejected the district court's assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence of probation before the entry of a judgement of conviction, finding nothing in the Nebraska Constitution that prevented the Legislature from granting the district court such jurisdiction. The court also disagreed with the argument that § 29-2292 violates the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution by allowing the judiciary to invade the charging function, an inherent executive power. It concluded that the power to define criminal conduct and fix punishment is vested in the legislative branch, while the imposition of a sentence within these legislative limits is a judicial function.

Therefore, the court held that § 29-2292 does not violate the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution and remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of Gnewuch's request for a deferred judgement.

Gibbs v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 13

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Bell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

This case involves an appeal from a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The appellant, Jamel Gibbs, was convicted following a trial during which a recorded phone call between him and a defense investigator was admitted as evidence. Gibbs was in pretrial detention at the time of the call, which was made on a recorded line using another inmate's phone access code and a three-way calling system.

Gibbs argued that the recorded phone call was protected by attorney-client privilege and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court ruled against him, reasoning that the conversation was not privileged because Gibbs violated jail policy by using another inmate's phone access code and making a three-way call.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the district court's ruling. The court held that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator, even if made through a three-way call, does not, on its own, amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless it can be shown that the third party remained present during the conversation. The court also found that violating jail telephone policies does not automatically result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. As such, the district court erred in admitting the recorded phone call into evidence.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the recorded phone call directly undermined Gibbs's planned defense strategy and necessitated a change in strategy at the start of trial. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

State v. Knight

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-39-22

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Pierre-Louis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its decision, examined whether the State can obtain from defense counsel an affidavit that is physical evidence of a crime, under New Jersey discovery rules. The case revolves around a murder where two witnesses identified the defendant, Isaiah J. Knight, as the shooter. Later, one of the witnesses was allegedly kidnapped and forced to write an affidavit recanting his original statement. The prosecution believed the defendant's alleged co-conspirators gave this affidavit to the defense counsel. The State filed a motion to compel discovery of this document, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Division.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the sought-after affidavit is physical evidence of the crimes of witness tampering and kidnapping for which the defendant and others have been charged. Therefore, it is subject to reciprocal discovery under Rule 3:3-13(b)(2)(B) and (D). The Court reasoned that the affidavit, allegedly the outcome of a kidnapping and witness intimidation plot, is not the product of the defense investigation or attorney work product and hence does not fall within the exception to the discovery obligations. The Court found that compelling defense counsel to turn over an item in his possession that is physical evidence of a crime does not trigger the same Sixth Amendment concerns. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that compelling the discovery of this affidavit violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

State v. Ross

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-34-22

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: Pierre-Louis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, defendant Shlawrence Ross was indicted for attempted murder and other offenses following an alleged exchange of gunfire with police officers. During the incident, he was wounded and a bullet lodged in his abdomen. In 2022, on advice of his counsel, he underwent elective surgery to remove the bullet. The state applied for a search warrant to obtain the removed bullet from the hospital and sought all medical records regarding the defendant’s treatment. The trial court denied the applications, reasoning that the bullet was shielded from the State’s access as it resulted from defence counsel’s “conscious litigation choice”. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the Fourth Amendment, concerning search and seizure, rather than the Sixth Amendment and reciprocal discovery rules, was the appropriate legal framework.

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the proper analysis for determining whether the State can obtain this physical evidence rests within the principles of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment would preclude issuing a valid search warrant for the bullet in this case, and the trial court should have determined whether there exists probable cause on which to issue such a warrant. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of probable cause.

Archambault v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 38

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Zachary Archambault appealed from a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Archambault had been found guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a minor child, a class AA felony. Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In these proceedings, the applicant bears the burden to establish the grounds for relief.

Archambault claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in six ways. The district court addressed each of his claims and made detailed findings and conclusions regarding each ground. Among his claims, Archambault argued that his trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress his three-hour video confession because he was suffering from drug and alcohol effects and wanted to self-harm. Additionally, he argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not interview the minor victim before trial.

The district court found that Archambault did not show his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court made a series of findings that were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and were supported by evidence. These included the court's conclusion that the decision to permit equipment in the jury room is a discretionary decision that will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion, and that an unsuccessful trial strategy does not make defense counsel’s assistance defective. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the record, it agreed with the district court in denying Archambault’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the order denying his application for postconviction relief was affirmed.

State v. Henderson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 42

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Tufte

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Kimberly Ann Henderson, who was convicted of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and attempted theft. Henderson worked for Home Helpers, an agency that assists elderly people. During her time there, she was assigned to Mr. and Mrs. Cooper and had access to their financial information. The State alleged she used the Coopers’ financial accounts to pay her bills and make personal purchases. She was charged with exploitation of an eligible adult and criminal attempt of theft of property, with the value of the funds in question exceeding $50,000 and $10,000 respectively.

At trial, the State presented testimony from four witnesses and submitted thirteen exhibits, including financial documents, receipts, an eviction notice, surveillance photos from multiple businesses, and a video of an interview with Henderson. Henderson objected to the admissibility of 12 exhibits, arguing they were not properly authenticated and were inadmissible hearsay. The District Court overruled these objections and admitted the exhibits. The jury subsequently convicted Henderson on both counts.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the District Court had abused its discretion by admitting the exhibits without proper authentication and as inadmissible hearsay. The Supreme Court held that the testimony did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 803(6)(D), N.D.R.Ev. which provides a hearsay exception for records kept in the regular course of business. The Court found that the detective's testimony did not explain how the exhibits came into existence in the ordinary course of business, nor did the record contain an affidavit that could have rendered them self-authenticating. Given these pervasive errors and considering a set value was alleged in each count, the judgment was reversed.

Weber v. NDDOT

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 37

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: Crothers

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around Lawrence Weber, who was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Weber's driving privileges were suspended for 180 days by a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer following his refusal to take a chemical breath test after his arrest. Weber argued that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, which he claimed invalidated the authority of the North Dakota Department of Transportation to revoke his driving privileges.

On February 26, 2023, Weber was arrested after an onsite screening test showed a blood alcohol content of .152 percent. Following his arrest, when asked to take a chemical breath test, Weber invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and requested an attorney. Despite being given access to his phone to contact his attorney, Weber made a call to an individual who refused to help him contact his attorney. Weber did not attempt to make further calls or ask for additional time to contact his attorney.

The hearing officer found that Weber refused to take the chemical breath test and had a reasonable opportunity to call an attorney. The officer's findings were upheld by the district court. Weber appealed the decision, maintaining that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that Weber was provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney and his right to counsel was satisfied. Weber's claim that he was denied the opportunity to contact an attorney was not supported by the evidence. The court found that the hearing officer's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and her conclusion that Weber was not deprived of his right to consult counsel was in accordance with the law.

State v. Brown

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-749

Opinion Date: March 5, 2024

Judge: DeWine

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the defendant was accused of setting up a fake car sale, during which he threatened two women with a gun and stole money. The defendant was convicted of robbing both women and illegally possessing a firearm. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals overturned these convictions, arguing that the defendant could not be convicted of robbing the woman who was not directly holding the money. Furthermore, the court held that the defendant's rights were violated when the state used information at trial that was not previously disclosed to the defense.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's decision. Firstly, the court clarified that under the state's robbery statute, a person can be convicted of robbery if they commit a theft offense and threaten physical harm to another person, even if the person threatened is not the same as the theft victim. As such, both women were properly considered as victims of robbery. Secondly, the court determined that the defendant had forfeited his claim to a violation of his rights, as he failed to raise the issue of undisclosed evidence at the trial level.

The case was remanded back to the First District Court of Appeals to consider the defendant's remaining assignments of error.

State v. Dudas

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-775

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: DeWine

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of the filing deadline for a petition for postconviction relief following a delayed appeal. The defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes, did not file a direct appeal within the required 30 days but later filed a motion for a delayed appeal, which was granted. He filed a petition for postconviction relief within 365 days of the trial transcript being filed in the court of appeals.

The court of appeals had affirmed the trial court's judgment, asserting that the defendant's petition was untimely. They argued that in the case of a delayed appeal, the applicable deadline was not the direct-appeal deadline of 365 days from the date of the filing of the trial transcript but rather the no-appeal-taken deadline of 365 days from the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal.

The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, holding that under Ohio law, a delayed appeal of a conviction is a direct appeal, and the same postconviction-relief deadline applies for a delayed appeal as applies to any other type of direct appeal. The court found that the defendant had timely filed his postconviction petition within 365 days after the transcript was filed in the court of appeals in his delayed appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to that court for further consideration.

State v. Wilson

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-776

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: STEWART

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

This case originates from the Supreme Court of Ohio and concerns a defendant, Tyler Wilson, who was charged with attempted murder and felonious assault. The charges stemmed from an altercation at a gas station where Wilson fired a gun out his car window to scare off the other party involved in the dispute. Wilson claimed he acted in self-defense, but the trial court determined that he was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction because he did not intend to harm or kill the other party. Wilson was found guilty of felonious assault, but not attempted murder.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that an individual does not need to intend to harm or kill another person to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction in a criminal trial. The court found that Wilson’s testimony supported the intent element for self-defense and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a self-defense jury instruction. As such, the court vacated Wilson’s conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

State V. Abraham-Medved

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 14

Opinion Date: March 6, 2024

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In South Dakota, defendant Tashina Abraham-Medved was charged with unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance. After pleading guilty, her attorney requested to withdraw from the case due to a "serious breakdown of communication" between him and Abraham-Medved. The circuit court denied the request, arguing that as the case was set for sentencing there was little communication left to do.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota found that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to withdraw without allowing Abraham-Medved or her attorney an opportunity to establish good cause for the request. The court held that when there is a request for substitute counsel, the circuit court must at least inquire about the reasons for such requests. By failing to do so, the court abused its discretion.

Furthermore, the court found that the defendant was prejudiced by this decision as her attorney did not present any sentencing recommendation or argument. Instead, Abraham-Medved spoke on her own behalf. Given the lack of engagement from the attorney, the court found there was a reasonable probability that a different sentence might have been imposed had the attorney properly advocated on Abraham-Medved's behalf.

As a result, the court reversed Abraham-Medved’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

State v. Thomas

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: W2019-01202-SC-R11-CD

Opinion Date: March 7, 2024

Judge: BIVINS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Tennessee heard the appeal of Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, both convicted of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder stemming from a 2015 triple homicide in Memphis. The defendants were members of the Vicelords gang, and the murders were allegedly conducted in retaliation for a previous killing. Their trial relied heavily on the testimony of co-defendant Demarco Hawkins, whose trial was severed and who testified against them. Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner appealed their convictions, alleging that the prosecution breached the requirements of Brady v. Maryland by failing to produce inconsistent statements made by Mr. Hawkins, and that the evidence was insufficient to support Ms. Turner’s murder convictions.

The Supreme Court found that the State did not breach its obligations under Brady with regard to Mr. Thomas. However, the Court determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Ms. Turner’s convictions because Mr. Hawkins’ testimony was not adequately corroborated, leading to a reversal of her convictions. In addition, the Court abolished Tennessee’s common law accomplice-corroboration rule, which required some level of independent corroboration for accomplice testimony to be used in securing a conviction, but only applied this change prospectively.