US v. Crater

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1159

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Rikelman

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant, Randall Crater, was convicted of wire fraud, unlawful monetary transactions, and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business based on his involvement in a cryptocurrency scheme. The trial lasted eight days and was based on Crater's management of My Big Coin (MBC), a cryptocurrency company that allegedly misrepresented itself as a gold-backed digital currency and claimed a partnership with MasterCard. The defendant appealed two of the district court's rulings.

Firstly, Crater argued that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by refusing to enforce subpoenas against three federal agency witnesses due to Crater's non-compliance with the agencies' Touhy regulations. Secondly, Crater contended that the district court did not perform its gatekeeping duty by admitting testimony from the government's cryptocurrency expert without holding a Daubert hearing.

However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Crater's arguments could not be reconciled with controlling precedent or the record in the case. The court found that Crater's failure to show how the excluded testimony of the federal agents would have been both material and favorable to his defense invalidated his Sixth Amendment claim. Furthermore, the court held that Crater's objections to the expert witness's qualifications and methodology were insufficient to necessitate a Daubert hearing.

US v. Katana

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1867

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Rikelman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Grace Katana appealed his conviction for conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act. He argued that the indictment accused him of conspiring to rob Joseph Wilson, while the government only proved at trial that he had planned a break-in at Wilson's home. Katana claimed that this constituted a constructive amendment to the indictment in violation of his constitutional rights, that there was a prejudicial variance from the charge in the indictment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Katana's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the offense charged in the indictment was the same offense on which the court instructed the jury and on which the government presented evidence. The court also held that the identity of the robbery target was not an element of a robbery or conspiracy to commit robbery under the Hobbs Act, so focusing on Wilson's home business as the target at trial did not amount to a constructive amendment. The court further concluded that Katana failed to demonstrate that any variance from the indictment was prejudicial, as the record showed he had sufficient notice of, and was able to defend himself against, the government's theory at trial. Finally, the court ruled that a rational jury could have concluded that Katana and his co-conspirators planned to rob Wilson's home business, so there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

US v. Rand

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1979

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: GELPÍ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Michael Rand, was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of distributing a controlled substance. His sentence was time served followed by 36 months of supervised release. Shortly thereafter, Rand violated his supervised release multiple times, leading to a revocation hearing. At the hearing, Rand was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment followed by 24 months of supervised release. Rand appealed his sentence on the grounds that it was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court found that the district court had adequately explained its rationale for the sentence, which was based on a combination of Rand's lying and absconding shortly after his original sentence, his drug relapse, and his failure to comply with the terms of his supervised release. Lastly, the court found that the sentence fell within the broad range of reasonableness considering the totality of the circumstances.

US v. Sierra-Jimenez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 21-1915, 21-1917

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: GELPÍ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Juan Sierra-Jiménez was a felon who pled guilty to possessing a firearm. While on supervised release for a prior federal firearm offense, Sierra was arrested and found with a Glock 22 pistol, which had been modified to function as a machine gun. He was also in possession of extra ammunition and approximately five grams of a substance suspected to be heroin. Sierra was sentenced to fifty-eight months in prison and an additional consecutive eighteen-month supervised release violation sentence. Sierra appealed, arguing that the fifty-eight-month sentence was procedurally unreasonable and that the government breached the plea agreement regarding his eighteen-month sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Sierra's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled that the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings and did not rely on the suspected heroin possession in determining Sierra's sentence. The court also found that Sierra failed to show that the government's lack of an oral recommendation for a concurrent sentence prejudiced him.

Vivaldi Servicios de Seguridad, Inc. v. Maiso Group, Corp.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1372

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: GELPÍ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

This case revolves around the dismissal of a case due to the plaintiff's counsel's unexcused absence from the final pretrial conference. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit raised the question of whether a district court may dismiss a case for such a reason, especially when it's the first and only instance of non-compliance and the court did not consider a lesser sanction. In this case, the plaintiff had filed a complaint alleging RICO violations and related state-law claims. However, the plaintiff's counsel failed to appear at the final pretrial conference, leading to the dismissal of the case by the district court.

Upon review, the Court of Appeals held that while a district court has inherent power to manage its docket and may dismiss a case sua sponte for reasons prescribed in Rule 41(b), such dismissal should only occur when a plaintiff's misconduct has been extreme or contumacious. The dismissal should not be viewed as a sanction of first resort or an automatic penalty for every failure to abide by a court order. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had erred in dismissing the case without first considering a lesser sanction or warning the disruptive party. The court vacated the district court's dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1086

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Livingston

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision from the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. The defendant, Cory Johnson, had been convicted for the production of child pornography and challenged his conviction on the basis of a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss the indictment.

The evidence in question was a video depicting the sexual abuse of a toddler, which had been found following a review of digital data seized from Johnson's devices. This review had taken place after his sentencing for an earlier prosecution. Johnson argued that this review violated his Fourth Amendment rights, as it had taken place after the sentencing and had looked for evidence of a new crime. The court disagreed, ruling that the review was within the scope of the original search warrant and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Johnson also argued that his second prosecution was barred by his earlier plea agreement. He contended that the plea agreement prohibited future prosecution for offenses "known to the United States as of the date it signed the agreement." The court, however, found that the government had not been aware of Johnson’s sexual abuse of his daughter and his production of child pornography at the time of the agreement. Thus, the plea agreement did not preclude his subsequent prosecution for these crimes.

In conclusion, the court affirmed Johnson's conviction.

Kelley v. Bohrer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-6179

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Quattlebaum

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Kenneth Kelley pled guilty to twenty-eight counts arising from a fatal car accident that resulted in the death of five people. The charges ranged from manslaughter by auto to driving with an expired license. Kelley later argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he wasn't informed of the nature and elements of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument. The Court held that Kelley was informed of the offenses' elements as he testified at his plea hearing that he had read the indictment, his attorney had discussed the matter thoroughly with him, and he had signed a waiver acknowledging that he understood the charges and their elements. The Court also noted that the judge at the plea hearing had explained the charges to Kelley and that the prosecution had read its factual basis into the record at the plea hearing. The Court therefore concluded that Kelley's plea was knowing and voluntary. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to deny Kelley's habeas corpus petition.

In Re: Ivan Cantu

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-40110

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Jones

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Ivan Cantu, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2001, sought to authorize the district court to consider a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244. He claimed a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and suppression of evidence by the state in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The Fifth Circuit denied his motion for authorization, holding that Cantu had failed to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).

The court found that Cantu failed to exercise due diligence to discover the evidence he was now relying on and that he failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. The court also noted that Cantu's last-minute filing was an attempt at manipulation and did not serve the public interest or the interest of the victims in the timely enforcement of the sentence. Consequently, the court denied Cantu's motion for a stay of execution.

United States v. Garza

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-11007

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The case concerns an appeal by Andrew Ocanas Garza against his conviction and a 235-month sentence for drug trafficking and firearm possession. Garza argued that the court incorrectly used his 2016 felony drug offenses for sentencing enhancement, contending that the 2018 amendment to the Agricultural Improvement Act altered marijuana’s definition, potentially excluding the substance he was previously convicted for trafficking. He also claimed that the court erred by not suppressing an unMirandized statement he made about having a gun in his bedroom during the execution of a search warrant.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling. The Appeals Court held that Garza waived his right to challenge the admission of the Bedroom Gun statement by bringing it up during the trial. The Court also rejected Garza's argument concerning the sentencing enhancement based on his 2016 drug convictions. The Court applied the "backward-looking" test, which determines whether the prior convictions were felonies at the time of conviction and were final at the time of sentencing for the current crimes. The Court found that Garza's 2016 convictions met these criteria, making them applicable for sentencing enhancement. The Court also noted that even if the District Court had erred in applying the sentencing enhancement, the error was harmless, as the same sentence would have been imposed.

United States v. Rider

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40144

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In this case, Chad Michael Rider was convicted of three counts of producing or attempting to produce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and was sentenced to 720 months’ imprisonment. The evidence presented included numerous videos that Rider had taken of minors, in various stages of undress, in places where they expected privacy such as bathrooms. Rider appealed his conviction and sentence on several bases, including arguing that his conversation with police officers, where he admitted to setting up cameras, should have been suppressed, that expert testimony about his lack of pedophilic tendencies should have been admitted, that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, and that his sentence was unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected all of Rider's arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The court found that Rider was not in custody when he spoke to the officers, and so his statements were not involuntary. The court also found that there was no error in excluding the expert testimony, as it was not relevant to any element of the charges that the government had to prove. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, as there was ample evidence that Rider had the intent and took the necessary steps to produce child pornography. The court also ruled that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment. Finally, the court found that the sentence was not unreasonable, given the uniquely disturbing facts of the case and Rider's lack of remorse.

United States v. Axline

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5141

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: CLAY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Bryce Axline, appealed the 65-month sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to charges of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault on federal lands. Axline argued that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by failing to provide sufficiently compelling reasons for varying upward from the Sentencing Guidelines advisory range by approximately 40 percent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the sentence was substantively reasonable. The court found that the district court thoroughly assessed the seriousness of Axline's offense, his history with underage substance abuse, and the importance of specific and general deterrence. The court also found that the circumstances of this case fell outside the heartland of similar cases. The court noted that the Guidelines did not necessarily account for the confluence of his underage drinking and extremely reckless driving, nor did they necessarily adequately account for the effect of Axline's actions on multiple victims. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in varying Axline's sentence above the Guidelines range.

United States v. O'Neill

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3793

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Larsen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Charles O’Neill, appealed the judgment of the district court. O’Neill was charged with sexually exploiting a minor and receiving or distributing child pornography. He pleaded guilty to both charges but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home and a barn he owned. The evidence included large numbers of photographs of nude and partially nude minor boys on O’Neill’s phone and iPad, and a computer, camcorder, camera, digital storage devices, miscellaneous clothing, and a vibrator found in the barn.

The district court found that although the affidavits from the police officers used to obtain search warrants contained false statements and lacked probable cause, the officers had not knowingly or recklessly misled the issuing magistrate, and their reliance on the warrants was objectively reasonable under the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that none of the exceptions to the good-faith exception applied. The court found that the officers' errors in the affidavits were negligent rather than reckless, the affidavits weren't "bare bones" as they contained more than conclusory claims and were far from devoid of factual support, and the warrants weren't facially deficient. The court noted that the officers' reliance on the search warrants was objectively reasonable, and therefore the fruits of their searches shouldn't be suppressed. The court also noted that even if it shared the dissenting judge's view on the officers' state of mind, it would likely conclude that the district court's denial of the suppression motion was proper because the remaining content of the affidavit would likely establish probable cause.

Anderson v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2666

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the petitioner, Monta Anderson, sought to vacate his guilty plea for conspiring to distribute heroin, claiming that his plea was not knowing and voluntary due to his counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. Anderson argued that his counsel advised him to plead guilty without first consulting a toxicology expert on whether the heroin he distributed was a but-for cause of a user's death. Previously, the court had remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Anderson had articulated a viable claim of attorney ineffectiveness.

On remand, Anderson presented evidence that consultation with a toxicology expert would have revealed the government's inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the heroin he supplied was a but-for cause of the user's death. However, the government argued that even without the death-results enhancement, Anderson would have faced a mandatory life term due to his prior felony drug convictions and the fact that two individuals suffered serious bodily injuries from overdosing on heroin supplied by Anderson.

Having considered the evidence and arguments, the court concluded that Anderson was not prejudiced by any alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. Even if the death-results enhancement were discounted, Anderson still faced a mandatory life term due to his prior felony drug conviction and the serious bodily injuries caused by his heroin distribution. As such, his decision to plead guilty and accept a 20-year sentence was reasonable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment denying Anderson's motion to vacate his guilty plea.

United States v. Blount

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2470

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: EASTERBROOK

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered an appeal by Linnel Blount, Jr., who was convicted on drug and gun charges in 2019 and sentenced to 63 months in prison. Blount's jury trial was initially set for February 2020 but was postponed to March 2020 at his request. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a series of court orders suspended criminal jury trials from March 2020 through April 2021. The district judge deferred Blount's trial further during this period, citing health and safety considerations. Blount eventually waived his jury trial and agreed to a bench trial, which commenced in July 2021.

On appeal, Blount argued that his indictment should have been dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act because the delay of his trial was based on the general pandemic-related court orders rather than individualized, case-specific circumstances. However, the court of appeals found that Blount's lawyer did not make a formal motion to dismiss the indictment, which is necessary under the Speedy Trial Act. Moreover, the court determined that the district judge was not required to interpret Blount's pro se filings as implicit motions to dismiss.

More broadly, the court held that the Speedy Trial Act does not require judges to reiterate considerations that have already been established by the court as an institution. It concluded that the delay of criminal jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic was justified by societal, not personal, considerations, and that such delays were permissible under the Speedy Trial Act. The court affirmed Blount's conviction and sentence.

United States v. Cade

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1001

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: KIRSCH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case concerns an appeal by Brandon Cade against a ruling by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, before the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit. Cade was arrested by Chicago police officers who noticed an open bottle of alcohol in a sedan next to which Cade and another individual were standing. During a search of the car, officers found an unlicensed firearm and Cade admitted it was his. He was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. Cade argued to suppress evidence of the gun and his incriminating statements, but the district court denied his motion. Cade pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. He argued that his initial encounter with the officers was an unlawful seizure and that his incriminating statements should be suppressed because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize him.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court found that the initial encounter with the officers was consensual and did not constitute a seizure. The court also ruled that even if there was an unlawful seizure, Cade's incriminating statements were sufficiently attenuated from any allegedly unlawful conduct. The presence of the open alcohol bottle provided probable cause for the search, which led to the discovery of the firearm, and Cade's admission to owning the firearm occurred after he was read his Miranda rights. The court concluded that there was no evidence of bad faith by the officers, and that an evidentiary hearing was not needed as there were no material factual disputes.

USA v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2174

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Police officers executing a warrant at Jamic Johnson's home discovered firearms and baggies of substances that turned out to be methamphetamine, leading to Johnson's conviction for federal firearms and methamphetamine-related drug-trafficking offenses. To determine the sentencing guideline range for the drug-trafficking offense, the district court calculated the amount of methamphetamine Johnson was responsible for dealing. However, the court did not differentiate between pure methamphetamine and a mixture containing methamphetamine, as required by the Sentencing Guidelines. This error would have resulted in a lower guideline range for Johnson. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing so that the district court could accurately determine the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to Johnson. The appeal court found that the district court's error in not distinguishing between pure methamphetamine and a mixture containing methamphetamine affected Johnson's substantial rights and the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding.

Reach Companies, LLC v. Newsert, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3570

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Shepherd

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law

In this breach-of-contract dispute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court of Minnesota, which rejected Reach Companies, LLC's appeal for a new trial after a jury awarded $1,196,364 in damages to Newsert, LLC and David Serata. Reach Companies, a distributor of hand sanitizers, alleged that Newsert, a wholesaler of the same products, continued accepting late shipments despite delays and price fluctuations. Newsert countered that Reach failed to fulfill all but one of its purchase orders, causing Newsert to lose two customers. The court found that the purchase orders were unambiguous with respect to their terms, rejecting Reach’s argument that the "must ship by" dates were simply aspirational. The court also held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove Newsert's lost profits with reasonable certainty, dismissing Reach's argument that the losses were speculative and didn't account for overhead. Lastly, the court allowed the admission of evidence of prior criminal convictions of Reach’s Vice President for impeachment purposes, as the crimes involved fraud and deceit and were thus relevant to the issues in the case.

United States v. Blair

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3573

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Kobes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kenneth Blair was convicted by a jury of possessing with intent to distribute and distributing methamphetamine, and was sentenced to 292 months in prison. Blair appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing against the denial of two pre-trial motions, refusal to acquit him on both counts, and the calculation of drug quantities for sentencing. Blair's main argument against his conviction was that the evidence against him was insufficient. However, the court found that there was ample evidence linking him to the possession and distribution of meth, including the fact that he was found with marked buy money and drugs at an apartment linked to him. The court stated that the jury could reasonably conclude that Blair had dominion over the apartment and the drugs within it. The court also dismissed Blair's claims against the calculation of drug quantities for sentencing. Blair argued that the court should not have relied on testimony from a confidential informant and a cooperating witness due to their unreliability. However, the court held that it was within the district court's discretion to credit their testimony. The court therefore affirmed Blair's conviction and sentence.

United States v. Donavan White Owl

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2431

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Colloton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Donavan Jay White Owl, appealed an order of the district court denying his motion to dismiss an indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. White Owl had been indicted for felony murder and arson within Indian Country. A mistrial was declared during the initial trial after a dispute over White Owl’s access to information about a prosecution witness. White Owl argued that a new trial would violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.

The Appeals Court, however, ruled that White Owl had impliedly consented to the mistrial. The court noted that while the defendant did not expressly request a mistrial, his actions and responses during the proceedings indicated his implicit agreement. Specifically, when the district court declared its intention to declare a mistrial and asked the parties for their views, White Owl did not object but instead emphasized the need for more time to prepare for cross-examination of a prosecution witness.

In light of this, the court concluded that White Owl's lack of objection amounted to implied consent to a mistrial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying White Owl's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause.

United States v. Doolin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2421

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: Gruender

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Tony Doolin was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release for distribution of crack cocaine. After his release, Doolin lived in Iowa and possessed a medical-marijuana card, which permitted him to obtain medical marijuana under Iowa law. However, his supervised release was revoked due to his ongoing marijuana use and his distribution of medical marijuana to his girlfriend. Doolin appealed this decision, arguing that it violated the Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution, due to the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA) of 2023. This act prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from using funds to prevent states from implementing their own medical marijuana laws.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, holding that the revocation of Doolin's supervised release did not violate the Appropriations Clause or the CAA of 2023. The court noted that marijuana possession remains illegal under federal law, regardless of any state laws or limits on prosecutorial funding. Federal courts are required to impose a prohibition on a defendant’s unlawful possession or use of all controlled substances, including marijuana, as a condition of any term of supervised release. Even if section 531 of the CAA prohibits the DOJ from funding marijuana-related prosecutions or revocations, where doing so prevents a state from implementing its medical marijuana laws, the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Doolin’s supervised release. Doolin engaged in unlawful conduct, even under Iowa’s medical-marijuana regime, as private distribution of marijuana is illegal under Iowa law, as is smoking marijuana, even for medical purposes. Therefore, the court found that the revocation of Doolin's supervised release was not prohibited by the CAA, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Doolin's supervised release.

United States v. Ducharme

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2116

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Arnold

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court considered an appeal by Whitehorse Ducharme, who had pleaded guilty to abusive sexual contact with a child and was sentenced to life in prison. Ducharme challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he asserted that the district court failed to consider the offense level used to calculate his recommended sentencing range. Second, he argued that the court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.

The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. Regarding the first, the court noted that the district court had indeed meticulously calculated Ducharme's offense level, and the assertion that it failed to consider the applicable offense level was untenable. Ducharme's actual issue appeared to be with the court's reliance on the § 3553(a) considerations to impose a sentence above what the Guidelines recommended. The appellate court pointed out that once courts have correctly calculated the Guidelines range, they may find a sentence outside that range "appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range."

On the second point, Ducharme argued that a life sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court did not weigh the § 3553(a) sentencing considerations properly. He highlighted his limited criminal history and the fact that a life sentence far exceeded his Guidelines range. However, the court noted that its review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is narrow and deferential. The district court had considered the relevant sentencing criteria and given several convincing reasons for the sentence it chose, leading the Court of Appeals to conclude that it did not commit "a clear error of judgment" in varying upward to a life sentence.

Thus, the court affirmed the life sentence given to Ducharme.

United States v. Jesse Sierra

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1345

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Jesse and Dustin Sierra, convicted of various charges including kidnapping, interstate domestic violence, and aiding and abetting both offenses, respectively, appealed their convictions. Jesse Sierra challenged the district court’s decision to exclude evidence of the victim’s other traumatic experiences, arguing that it violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. He also argued that the government suppressed exculpatory or impeachment material, violating the Brady v. Maryland precedent. Dustin Sierra challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions and argued that his trial should have been severed from Jesse's trial due to the prejudicial nature of the testimony and evidence presented. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that the exclusion of the victim's other traumatic experiences did not violate Jesse's constitutional rights, and that no Brady violations had occurred. The court also found that the evidence against Dustin was sufficient for the convictions and that there was no severe prejudice warranting a separate trial.

United States v. Linnell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2121

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: Shepherd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Mary Linnell appealed her conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The case arose after a traffic stop during which law enforcement officers found methamphetamine, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Linnell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the patrol officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion, and Linnell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the suppression ruling. She was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment with 5 years of supervised release to follow.

On appeal, Linnell contended that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress, asserting that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The appellate court disagreed, ruling that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the officer observed three traffic violations (running a stop sign, following another vehicle too closely, and speeding), and therefore had probable cause to conduct the traffic stop. The court gave deference to the lower court's credibility determination of the officer's testimony, noting that the officer had several years of experience and had been involved in hundreds of traffic stops. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Creech v. Richardson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-275

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by Thomas E. Creech, a death row inmate in Idaho. Creech was sentenced to death in 1981 for killing a fellow prisoner while serving two life sentences for first-degree murder. In his habeas corpus petition, Creech raised an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that societal standards have evolved since Ring v. Arizona (2002) to deem a death sentence imposed by a judge rather than a jury as unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that Creech's claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which mandates the dismissal of most claims filed in "second or successive" federal habeas petitions. The court held that Creech's claim was ripe and could have been brought in his prior petition challenging the same judgment, making his current petition second or successive. The court also dismissed as moot Creech's motion to stay his execution while the appeal was pending.

USA V. ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-10435

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Christen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, International Law

The defendant, Ahmed Alahmedalabdaloklah, a Syrian national, was convicted after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted US military personnel and property in Iraq. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed some convictions and reversed others. The court agreed with both parties that Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same could not stand after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis. The court reversed these convictions and remanded to the district court to vacate them. However, the court affirmed Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage US government property by means of an explosive. The court held that the statutes under which Alahmedalabdaloklah was convicted applied extraterritorially, meaning they applied to acts committed outside the United States. The court also held that the district court properly used procedures set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act to withhold or substitute classified information from discovery. Despite several errors by the government in invoking the state-secrets privilege, the court excused these errors because remanding for proper invocation would be of little or no benefit. Finally, the court held that the use of overseas deposition testimony did not violate Alahmedalabdaloklah's rights under the Confrontation Clause or other constitutional and evidentiary rules. The court remanded the case to the district court for resentencing.

United States v. Ware

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-6203

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Rossman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

This case concerned an appeal by Matthew Ware, a former correctional officer, against the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Ware was convicted by a jury of two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 46 months of imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed this sentence.

Ware was a correctional officer at the Kay County Detention Center in Oklahoma. The charges against him arose from two incidents where he was found to have abused his power and caused harm to inmates. In one incident, Ware ordered the transfer of two inmates to a different level of the detention center, despite knowing that this would likely result in a fight, which it did. In another incident, Ware ordered a detainee to be handcuffed in a painful position for an extended period of time.

Ware appealed his sentence, arguing that the court did not give adequate weight to his personal history and lack of criminal record. However, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had thoroughly weighed each of the sentencing factors and detailed its reasoning. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Ware to 46 months of imprisonment, and affirmed the sentence.

United States v. Gray

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13516

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Raquan Emahl Gray was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substances offense, after helping transport a car filled with drugs to a state prison. Gray appealed his conviction, arguing that the government failed to prove that he knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, rather than a controlled substance generally. The appeals court affirmed Gray's conviction, holding that the government only needed to prove general knowledge to obtain a controlled-substances conviction, which it did. Gray also argued that the district court erred when it denied his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal due to his failure to timely renew the motion at the conclusion of the evidence. The appeals court acknowledged that Gray's renewed motion was timely, but deemed the district court's error as harmless because enough evidence supported Gray's conviction.

United States v. Kent

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13068

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: BRASHER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case relates to the admission of an investigator's testimony from a preliminary hearing in a subsequent trial. The appellant, Maurice Kent, was a member of a violent gang and was charged with RICO conspiracy and five other substantive crimes, including the attempted murder of Shadeed Muhammad. The government alleged that the gang murdered a former member, Qualeef Rhode, for cooperating with the police’s investigation into the attempted murder. The government introduced an investigator’s testimony from a preliminary hearing in a related case, which identified Rhode as cooperating with law enforcement to implicate Kent in the attempted murder. Kent argued that this testimony was hearsay and its admission violated his Confrontation Clause rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Kent's arguments and affirmed the decision of the district court. The court held that the investigator's testimony was not hearsay because it was offered for the effect it had on the listeners (other gang members) and not for the truth of the matter asserted. It was relevant because it influenced Kent and the other gang members who heard the testimony at the preliminary hearing, providing them with a motive to murder Rhode. The court also determined that the district court had sufficiently reduced the risk that the jury would improperly consider the out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted by redacting the most prejudicial portions of the testimony and instructing the jury to consider the testimony only for its effect on the listeners. Therefore, the admission of the testimony did not violate Kent's rights under the Confrontation Clause.

USA v. Tripodis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12826

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case of Everett Tripodis, who had appealed his sentence from the Northern District of Georgia. Tripodis was involved in a scheme of stealing and reselling luxury vehicles. After being indicted on multiple counts, he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy offense under a negotiated plea agreement. As per the agreement, the government was to recommend a 60-month prison sentence, but the agreement did not make explicit mention of supervised release. At sentencing, a three-year term of supervised release was imposed, and Tripodis appealed, arguing that this was not part of the plea agreement.

The court, however, affirmed the sentence. It found that the plea agreement was unambiguous and only committed the government to recommend a 60-month custodial sentence. There was no mention of supervised release, and the agreement’s silence on this issue did not bind the government to any promise regarding it. The court also noted that during the plea hearing, Tripodis was informed that he could be subject to a term of supervised release and he affirmed his understanding of this. Therefore, the court concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement by recommending supervised release, and the district court did not err in imposing it. The court did, however, advise the government to be clearer in future plea agreements about what it is promising and what it is not.

People v. Gaillard

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082071(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: BUCHANAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, the defendant, Devin Gaillard, appealed from a lower court decision denying his petition for resentencing on a 2014 voluntary manslaughter conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). Gaillard argued that he had established a prima facie case because the record of conviction did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief. The People, represented by the Attorney General, conceded this error and agreed that the order must be reversed.

Gaillard had initially pled guilty to counts of voluntary manslaughter and transportation of marijuana, admitting that he "aided [and] abetted the voluntary manslaughter of Dillon Davis [and] transported marijuana." The trial court sentenced him to a 25-year prison term.

In 2022, Gaillard filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. However, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that Gaillard was a direct aider and abettor and therefore ineligible for relief under the law. Gaillard then filed a timely appeal.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in its decision. It found that Gaillard’s guilty plea did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6. The court ruled that Gaillard’s admission that he aided and abetted in the crime did not definitively establish that he could still be convicted of murder under current law, which requires the defendant to personally harbor malice aforethought. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition.

People v. Hollywood

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323018(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: YEGAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had denied Jesse James Hollywood's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Hollywood had been previously convicted of first-degree murder with a special circumstance that the murder occurred during a kidnapping. He contended that the court erred in denying his petition because the record did not conclusively establish that he had aided the actual killer in the commission of the murder. However, the court held that Hollywood was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because aiding and abetting an enumerated felony under section 189 with the intent to kill suffices to constitute felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), which precludes a petitioner from section 1172.6 relief. This decision was based on the jury finding that Hollywood had the intent to kill during the commission of a kidnapping and the fact that Hollywood had provided the murder weapon and ordered his subordinates to carry out the killing. The court rejected Hollywood's argument that the absence of an explicit reference to section 190.2, subdivision (c) in the amended section 189, subdivision (e)(2) meant the Legislature intended to alter this specific ground for liability under the felony murder rule. The court noted that the Legislature used the same phrase interpreted by the Supreme Court in a previous case when amending section 189 to state the new felony-murder rule, and therefore, they assumed it was intended to have the same meaning.

People v. Lopez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F086179(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: LEVY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1995, Armondo Lopez was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder for his role in an incident where his co-defendant, intending to kill a rival, accidentally shot and killed an unintended victim. Lopez had assisted his co-defendant, knowing that the co-defendant intended to kill the rival. Although Lopez was not the shooter, he was deemed liable for the unintended victim's death under the doctrine of transferred intent. This doctrine holds that if a person intends to harm one individual but unintentionally harms another instead, the intent to harm is transferred to the actual victim, making the person liable for that harm.

In 2021, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that changes in the law under Senate Bill 1437 meant he could no longer be convicted of murder. Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, amended California's murder law to limit murder liability for accomplices who did not act with intent to kill and were not major participants in the crime. Lopez argued that the doctrine of transferred intent, which had been used to establish his liability for murder, was a form of imputed liability and therefore incompatible with the revised law.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California disagreed, holding that Senate Bill 1437 did not abrogate the doctrine of transferred intent. The court reasoned that the bill's language did not suggest any intent to abolish this long-established doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the doctrine of transferred intent requires an intent to kill, which Lopez had demonstrated through his actions and admissions. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Lopez's petition for resentencing.

People v. Mares

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E080611(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: RAPHAEL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, the defendant, Daniel Oliver Mares, had appealed from an order that denied his petition to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction and resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.6. Mares had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter while facing a murder charge. The record of conviction includes the preliminary hearing transcript, where police recounted Mares’s admissions that he stabbed the victim and acted alone. Mares claimed in his petition that he could not be convicted today due to changes made to the murder laws in 2019 legislation. The court determined that Mares had failed to make a prima facie showing for relief, as he was the actual killer and acted alone in stabbing the victim. The court's decision was based on the record of conviction, which contained uncontradicted facts that refuted Mares’s assertion. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Mares's petition.

People v. McDowell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062263(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: O’LEARY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case presented, Wesley McDowell Jr. was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and other offenses, leading to a sentence of 23 years to life in prison. McDowell appealed this sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his elevated sentence of 15 years to life under section 236.1(c)(2) of the Penal Code, which pertains to human trafficking of a minor with aggravating circumstances. He cited Senate Bill 81, claiming it compelled the sentencing courts to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances, applicable to his elevated sentence.

However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three held that Senate Bill 81 applies only to enhancements--additional terms of imprisonment added to the base term. As McDowell conceded, section 236.1(c)(2) provides an alternative punishment for the underlying offense and is therefore not an enhancement. Thus, Senate Bill 81 did not apply to McDowell’s elevated sentence under section 236.1(c)(2). The court affirmed the original sentence.

People v. Patterson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F086065(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: POOCHIGIAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The California Fifth Appellate District Court examined a case where the defendant, Brandon Michael Patterson, petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Patterson was initially convicted for first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. He later petitioned for resentencing, claiming that he did not meet the criteria for murder under changes made to sections 188 and 189. The lower court agreed and redesignated his murder conviction as attempted robbery and first-degree residential burglary.

However, the appellate court found that the murder conviction could not be redesignated as a first-degree residential burglary because it was not the "underlying felony" of Patterson's felony-murder conviction. Based on the instructions given to the jury during the original trial, the only "underlying felony" was attempted robbery. The court ruled that the term "underlying felony" refers to the specific crime that underlies a felony-murder conviction, which, in this case, was attempted robbery. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's decision to redesignate the murder conviction as a first-degree residential burglary, and remanded the case for Patterson to be sentenced on the redesignated attempted robbery conviction.

People v. Pittman

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166669(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: STREETER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case involves an appeal from a postconviction order for restitution in the amount of $6,700. The defendant, Joshua Jereco Pittman, was ordered to pay this amount for jewelry stolen from the home of victims Michael F. and Betty F. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's restitution order. The court noted that a victim's estimate of the value of stolen items is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of loss, subject to rebuttal by the defendant. In this case, the victims' estimates were contained in a police report and in restitution forms, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on these estimates. The appellate court also found that evidence of replacement value for the stolen property was sufficient to support the restitution order.

People v. Rios

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061764(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: MOORE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The California Court of Appeal held that evidence from a TruNarc laser narcotics identification test was improperly admitted at trial because the prosecution failed to establish its reliability under the Kelly rule. The Kelly rule requires that expert testimony based on a new scientific technique must be shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, that the expert testifying about the technique is qualified, and that correct scientific procedures were used in the test. The court found that the TruNarc test, which uses a laser to identify substances, was a new scientific technique and that the prosecution did not demonstrate its general acceptance or reliability. Consequently, it was error to admit testimony about the TruNarc test at trial. However, the court also held that this error was not prejudicial in relation to the defendant's two methamphetamine convictions because there was other compelling evidence supporting those convictions. It concluded, though, that the error was prejudicial with respect to the defendant's conviction for simple possession of carisoprodol (a muscle relaxant), because the officer's identification of the pills as carisoprodol was less certain and partly based on an unverified public website. As a result, the court reversed the carisoprodol conviction but affirmed the methamphetamine convictions.

People v. Robinson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G063090(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: MOORE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

This case involves an appeal from the defendant, Royce Lanele Robinson, who was convicted of domestic violence with great bodily injury and spousal battery. The charges were based on three separate incidents involving his girlfriend, referred to as Jane Doe. Robinson contended on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of his prior domestic violence conviction without a description of the underlying facts.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Robinson's claim had been forfeited on appeal because he did not raise this argument in the trial court. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of the prior conviction under Evidence Code section 1109. Even if there was an error, the court stated it would not have been prejudicial, and thus, the judgment was affirmed.

The key facts of the case include a series of incidents where Robinson allegedly inflicted bodily harm on Doe. The first incident involved Robinson pushing Doe out of his moving car. In the second incident, Doe reported that Robinson had pushed down on her chest, causing a fracture. In the third incident, Doe reported a prolonged assault by Robinson. Throughout the trial, Doe provided inconsistent testimonies, and Robinson's mother testified that her son attempted to aid Doe during a choking incident. The jury found Robinson guilty of spousal battery for the first incident and guilty of inflicting Doe's chest injury for the second incident. However, Robinson was found not guilty for the charges related to the third incident.

Persiani v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062648(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: MOTOIKE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The case involved Rhonda Persiani, a defendant charged with multiple counts of driving under the influence (DUI) in California. Due to doubts about Persiani's mental competence, the criminal proceedings were suspended, and she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and parties believed Persiani was ineligible for such treatment due to a California Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with DUI. Persiani sought dismissal of her cases, asserting that dismissal was required under the Penal Code because she was ineligible for any of the treatment options. The court denied Persiani’s motion to dismiss and imposed mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. In an appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District held that a trial court has the authority under the Penal Code to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with DUI. The court concluded that the Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion for DUI does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to receive treatment through mental health diversion after criminal proceedings have been suspended. The matter was remanded back to the lower court to determine whether to order Persiani to receive mental health diversion treatment.

Miller v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2022-0745

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2024, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions and death sentences of Everett Glenn Miller for the first-degree premeditated murders of Kissimmee Police Officers Matthew Baxter and Richard “Sam” Howard. In August 2017, Miller had interrupted a conversation Officer Baxter was having with three individuals, requesting the presence of a superior officer at the scene. After Sergeant Howard arrived, Miller shot both officers twice in the head from close range. At the time of his arrest later that night, Miller was found carrying two firearms, including the murder weapon.

Prior to the murders, Miller, a former Marine, had been posting hateful anti-police and race-based comments on social media. At trial, Miller did not dispute that he had killed the officers, but his defense argued that premeditation was lacking and that the murders should be considered second-degree. The jury convicted Miller of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and unanimously recommended death for each murder.

Miller raised seven issues on appeal, including arguments about the admissibility of certain evidence, the qualifications of an expert witness, the presence of the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating factor, and the constitutionality of Florida's capital punishment scheme. The court found no merit in any of these arguments and affirmed Miller's convictions and death sentences.

State v. Johnson

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50026

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, Develin Johnson appealed against the district court's decision that upheld his convictions for domestic battery and false imprisonment. The key issue in the appeal was the admissibility of Johnson's previous misdemeanor conviction for petit theft under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) and whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Johnson argued that the district court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction because his misdemeanor conviction for theft was inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) and the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the conduct leading to Johnson's 2013 misdemeanor conviction was probative of his character for truthfulness and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value.

State of Iowa v. Slaughter

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0892

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Gaming Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the conviction of the defendant, Sydney Leiann Slaughter, for gambling and making a false claim of winnings. The defendant falsely claimed that she won a slot machine jackpot of $4,000 when her boyfriend was the actual winner. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had the requisite intent to defraud and had not made a wager contingent on winning a gambling game. The court also held that expert testimony regarding the definition of a "wager" was admissible, and found that the lower court’s error of admitting reference to case law in the expert’s testimony was harmless. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and vacated it in part, ultimately affirming the judgment of the District Court.

State v. Showalter

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124535

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Kansas, Richard Daniel Showalter was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and aggravated burglary. Showalter appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs, deposition testimony from an unavailable witness, and statements made by one of his co-conspirators. Regarding the autopsy photographs, Showalter argued they were gruesome and prejudicial, but the court found the photographs were relevant and their probative value outweighed any potential prejudice. As for the deposition testimony, Showalter claimed the court erred in finding the witness was unavailable to testify at trial, but the court ruled that the State made sufficient efforts to establish the witness’s unavailability. Regarding the co-conspirator's statements, Showalter argued they were irrelevant because the State did not prove he was aware of the co-conspirator’s claims, but the court found the statements were relevant to explain the motive and intent behind the murders. Lastly, Showalter argued that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors violated his constitutional right to a fair trial, but the court found no cumulative error as it did not find any individual errors. Accordingly, the court affirmed Showalter’s convictions.

Commonwealth v. Shepherd

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12405

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Wendlandt

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case of Commonwealth v. Rashad Shepherd, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, with attempted unarmed robbery as the predicate felony. The case centered around a failed robbery attempt that ended in the shooting and death of the intended victim. The defendant, along with two co-conspirators, hatched a plan to rob the victim, who was known to sell marijuana from his apartment. However, when the plan was put into motion, the victim resisted, and in the ensuing altercation, was shot and killed. The prosecution's theory was that the defendant was the shooter.

In his appeal, the defendant argued that the court’s decision in a prior case, Commonwealth v. Brown, which abolished felony-murder as an independent theory of liability for murder in the first and second degrees, should be applied to his case retroactively. He maintained that not doing so violated equal protection principles as more Black individuals were serving life sentences without parole for felony-murder than white individuals. However, the court rejected this argument, noting that the decision in Brown was applied to all equally, regardless of race or ethnicity.

The defendant also claimed errors in jury instructions and conduct by the trial judge, but the court determined that there was no reversible error. Lastly, the defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, but the court found that the decisions by the defense were not manifestly unreasonable.

State v. Ulrich

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1340

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: ANDERSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of Gregory Paul Ulrich for first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and discharge of an explosive or incendiary device. Ulrich had targeted the Allina Health clinic in Wright County, where he had been treated, because he was dissatisfied with his medical care and blamed the clinic for his chronic pain. He had recorded videos threatening the clinic, purchased a gun and supplies for making pipe bombs, and then carried out an attack at the clinic, shooting several people and detonating three pipe bombs. On appeal, Ulrich argued that the lower court had abused its discretion by denying his motions to strike a juror for cause and to change the venue, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court had not abused its discretion because the juror had not expressed actual bias requiring either rehabilitation or removal, and because Ulrich had not renewed his motion to change the venue after voir dire, thereby forfeiting his right to contest the denial of his motion. The Supreme Court also ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions because it supported a reasonable inference that Ulrich had planned the attack and believed that it would cause the victims' deaths.

Townsend vs. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-1100

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: THISSEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Minnesota, the defendant, Otha Eric Townsend, who was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, appealed the denial of his third motion to correct his sentence. The two crimes were tried separately, and Townsend was first sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of release after 30 years for the murder conviction. Months later, he was sentenced to serve 72 months in prison consecutively to his life sentence for the attempted murder conviction. Townsend argued that custody credit should be applied to the first of his two consecutive sentences. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the law of the case doctrine barred Townsend's appeal. The court stated that they had already decided in previous rulings that Townsend was not entitled to custody credit on his life sentence and that the district court properly applied custody credit to Townsend’s sentence for attempted second-degree murder. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision and denied Townsend's motion to correct his sentence.

State v. Rowe

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 37

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: McKinnon

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Montana overturned the conviction of Daniel Christopher Rowe for sexual assault, a felony. Rowe was initially charged with the offense for multiple instances of abuse that allegedly took place over several years against H.B., who was under sixteen years of age at the time of the offenses. The case was remanded for a new trial due to two significant issues.

First, the court found the lower court erred in admitting a subsequent uncharged act of sexual assault as proof of motive or plan to commit the earlier sexual assaults charged under a "common scheme." The court reasoned that the State had charged Rowe with a non-existent offense not recognized under Montana law, which led to the improper admission of other bad acts evidence.

Second, the court found that the lower court erred in giving the jury both conduct-based and result-based definitions of "knowingly" for the sexual assault charge without specifying to the jury which definition applied to which elements of the offense. The court determined that this lowered the State's burden of proof, which violated Rowe's right to due process. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed Rowe's sexual assault conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State v. Lear

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 14

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Cassel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The defendant, Melvin Lear, was charged with a felony offense by the State of Nebraska. Lear requested a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery, which was granted by the court. However, the continuance extended the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. Lear then filed a motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds. The district court denied the motion, finding that Lear had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory limit. Lear appealed the decision, arguing that the waiver provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) only applies to a continuance granted at the sole request of the defendant, not a request joined in by the State. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Lear's argument, interpreting the waiver provision to apply to a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel, regardless of whether the State joins the request, when the period of delay resulting from the continuance extends a trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision to deny Lear's motion for absolute discharge.

State v. Npimnee

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 1

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In Nebraska, a man named Hope T. Npimnee was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and sentenced to 35 to 40 years in prison. The victim, identified as S.M., claimed that she was intoxicated when Npimnee had non-consensual sexual contact with her. Npimnee appealed his conviction, arguing that the jury instructions were incorrect and contradictory, that there was insufficient evidence to support the theory that S.M. was so intoxicated as to be incapable of resisting, that the court failed to instruct the jury on the defense of consent, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s conviction and sentence, finding that the jury instructions were correct and that there was sufficient evidence to support the theory that S.M. was so intoxicated as to be incapable of resisting. The Court also found that there was no need for an additional instruction on the defense of consent, as the jury was already required to find that the sexual contact was without consent in order to convict Npimnee. Npimnee's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were dismissed due to insufficiently specific allegations.

Chadwick v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 10

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Westbrook

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident after he hit a child with his vehicle and did not stop or return to the scene. He appealed on the grounds that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his alcohol consumption prior to the accident and his apparent intoxication, and his threat to a witness and gang affiliation. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the appellant's alcohol consumption and intoxication, as it was relevant to his motive to flee the scene of the accident. The court also ruled that when the defendant directly introduces evidence of bad acts, it is the defendant's responsibility to request an instruction limiting the consideration of that evidence. The court concluded that the defendant had failed to establish any grounds for reversing his conviction, and thus affirmed the lower court's decision.

BRASSFIELD v. STATE

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 OK 9

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Winchester

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma considered whether an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges constituted a "pending charge" for the purposes of expungement. The appellant, Andrew Dale Brassfield, sought to expunge his arrest records under Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation objected, arguing that Brassfield was not qualified for expungement because he had pending charges against him due to an ongoing investigation by the federal government and the Cherokee Tribe. The district court and Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.

However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed these decisions. The court held that an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges is not a pending charge under the relevant Oklahoma statute, and therefore, the appellant qualified to seek expungement. The court reasoned that a criminal investigation into whether an individual's conduct is chargeable as a crime is not the same as the individual having a pending felony or misdemeanor charge. The court also found that the requirement that the prosecuting agency will not refile the charge is satisfied, as the State of Oklahoma lacks jurisdiction to do so in this case. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

State v. Kurtz

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 13

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In South Dakota, Kenneth Leroy Kurtz pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The circuit court determined there were aggravating circumstances that justified a departure from the presumptive probation sentence, and Kurtz was sentenced to five years in prison. Kurtz appealed the decision, arguing that he did not pose a significant risk to the public and therefore should have received probation. Alternatively, he claimed the court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum prison sentence.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court had wrongly applied the statute for presumptive probation. The court noted that while the circuit court had identified aggravating circumstances, it had also found that Kurtz did not pose a significant risk to the public. The Supreme Court pointed out that the law allows for a departure from presumptive probation only if aggravating circumstances that pose a significant risk to the public are found.

The court concluded that the circuit court's statement that punishment was warranted regardless of whether Kurtz posed a threat to society contradicted the mandate in the statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for the circuit court to issue a sentence of probation.

State v. Tran

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 7

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Pohlman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this appeal of a criminal case, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah concluded that the police officers' warrantless entry and search of Alexander Hung Tran’s home were reasonable and justified under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court also declined to recognize broader protection under the Utah Constitution in the emergency aid context. The case arose when Tran appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police officers obtained during a warrantless entry and search of his home. The officers had entered Tran's home due to their belief that two individuals inside were in need of immediate aid, which was supported by a range of factors. The court held that the totality of the circumstances known to the police officers at the time they entered Tran’s home supported an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the two individuals were in need of immediate aid, thus falling within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

State v. Phillips

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 10

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Waples

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, Scott Phillips appealed against the denial of his motion for acquittal, the jury charge, and his probation conditions by the criminal division of the Superior Court, Bennington Unit. The State of Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision.

The case arose from a domestic violence incident where Phillips assaulted his girlfriend and threw a knife towards her. He was charged with three counts of domestic assault, two of which he was found guilty of by a jury. His post-trial motion for acquittal and a new trial was denied by the lower court.

Phillips argued that conviction under 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(2) required the State to prove that he threatened a household member in addition to having used or attempted to use a deadly weapon on them. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that the statute criminalizes three distinct actions: (1) using a deadly weapon on a household member; (2) attempting to use a deadly weapon on a household member; or (3) possessing and threatening to use a deadly weapon on a household member. The court found that Phillips' actions of throwing the knife in the victim's direction could be inferred as an attempt to harm her with the weapon, which satisfies the requirements of the statute.

Phillips also contested the jury instructions and the lack of a special verdict form. However, the Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's instructions or its decision not to provide a special verdict form.

Finally, Phillips objected to his probation conditions, which included substance use screening, a prohibition from consuming alcohol, and a prohibition from possessing deadly weapons. The Supreme Court rejected this objection as well, as Phillips had not preserved these issues for appellate review and failed to adequately argue for plain-error review in his briefing.

In sum, the State of Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding no error in the interpretation of the statute, the jury instructions, or the probation conditions imposed on Phillips.

In re Pers. Restraint of Arntsen

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,635-2

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Montoya-Lewis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The petitioner, Ricky Arntsen, was convicted of several crimes including second degree assault with a deadly weapon following a road rage incident where he forced another driver, Kim Koenig, to stop her car and then circled her vehicle while carrying an AK-47 assault rifle. Arntsen filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the second degree assault charge. He argued that the State failed to prove that he had the specific intent required for second degree assault, given that the testimony showed he did not point the gun at another person, nor did it establish that Koenig actually experienced apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington rejected Arntsen's arguments, ruling that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court noted that while Arntsen did not point the rifle directly at Koenig, the totality of his conduct, including his aggressive driving and approaching Koenig's car with the rifle after angrily forcing her to stop, provided sufficient basis for a rational trier of fact to infer that he intended to make her fear he might harm her. The court also held that Koenig's testimony that at times during the incident she thought Arntsen was going to shoot or harm her, demonstrated that she experienced actual apprehension and fear of injury. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to address the other issues raised in Arntsen’s PRP.

Blair v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 22

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the State of Wyoming, Jonathon Tyson Blair, representing himself, appealed the denial of his motion for sentence reduction by the District Court of Sweetwater County. Blair had been sentenced to a term of eight to ten years and requested a reduction to a term of five to ten years. He argued that he had taken steps to improve himself while incarcerated and that he needed the sentence reduction to prevent his welding certification from expiring, so he could financially support his family upon release.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the decision of the lower court, stating that the denial of the motion for sentence reduction did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court highlighted that the sentencing judge is in the best position to determine if a sentence modification is appropriate and can accept or reject information submitted in support of a sentence reduction at their discretion. The court found that there was a rational basis from which the lower court could draw its conclusion and that the original sentence imposed on Blair remained appropriate. The court also dismissed Blair's allegations of bias and illegal sentencing, stating that these issues were not raised in his motion for sentence reduction and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court discarded Blair's claim that his pre-sentencing time served was not credited to his sentence, stating that this was a matter for relief under a different rule and that the issue had already been addressed and rejected in prior proceedings.