McElrath v. Georgia

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-721

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Jackson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2012, Damian McElrath, a young man diagnosed with multiple serious mental health disorders, killed his mother. Georgia charged McElrath with three crimes: malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At trial, McElrath asserted an insanity defense. The jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice-murder charge but guilty but mentally ill on the felony-murder and aggravated-assault charges. The state courts, however, decided that these verdicts were "repugnant" because they required contradictory conclusions about McElrath's mental state at the time of the crime. They therefore nullified both the "not guilty" and "guilty" verdicts and authorized McElrath’s retrial.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from retrying McElrath for the crime that had resulted in the “not guilty by reason of insanity” finding. The court clarified that a jury’s determination that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity is a conclusion that “criminal culpability had not been established,” just as much as any other form of acquittal. Despite the seemingly inconsistent findings, the court emphasized that, once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate, and the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.

Thomas v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-2026

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the case revolves around the appeal of Gregory Thomas, who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file an appeal from his resentencing. Thomas was convicted in 2006 on various counts, including murder for hire, drug-trafficking offenses, and mail fraud. In 2020, he was resentenced to approximately 24 years of imprisonment. No appeal was filed post-resentencing, which Thomas claims was against his explicit instructions to his counsel. He subsequently filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied by the district court without conducting any fact-finding.

The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred by denying Thomas's petition without conducting a fact-finding inquiry. Citing the precedent set in Campusano v. United States, the court highlighted the necessity of a factual inquiry when a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel failed to file a requested notice of appeal. The court emphasized that the right to appeal is sacrosanct, especially in cases involving the loss of an entire appellate proceeding. As a result, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a fact-finding inquiry into Thomas's allegations.

United States v. Kokinda

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4595

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: THACKER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, a registered sex offender, was convicted for knowingly failing to update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The appellant argued that as he was mobile without a fixed abode, he was not required to register anywhere under SORNA. He also contested the district court's jury instruction on SORNA’s definition of “resides,” claiming it expanded the definition. Furthermore, he argued that SORNA, as applied to him, violated the Tenth Amendment. He also contested two aspects of his sentence: an eight-level enhancement for his third degree sexual abuse of a minor and possession of child pornography, and his lifetime term of supervised release.

The court held that the district court correctly instructed the jury on the meaning of “resides” and “habitually lives” under SORNA and that SORNA, as applied to the appellant, did not violate the Tenth Amendment. The court also affirmed the district court’s sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. It concluded that the appellant, who was required to register as a sex offender due to a previous conviction, failed to update his registration while residing in West Virginia, thus violating SORNA. The court found that his argument of not having a fixed abode did not exempt him from the registration requirements of SORNA.

United States v. Zelaya-Veliz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4656

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: WILKINSON

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, six men affiliated with the transnational criminal organization MS-13 were convicted of sex trafficking a thirteen-year-old girl by force, fraud, or coercion, and conspiracy to do the same. The accused appealed the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained from Facebook warrants, arguing the warrants failed the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. One of the accused also appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, contending that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction.

The court held that the Facebook warrants were supported by probable cause, as they were based on substantial evidence linking the accused’s use of Facebook to their criminal activities. The court also held that the warrants were sufficiently particular as they identified the items to be seized by reference to the suspected criminal offenses and confined the officers’ discretion by restricting them from rummaging through the accused’s social media data in search of unrelated criminal activities. However, the court noted that future warrants enhance their claims to particularity by requesting data only from the period of time during which the defendant was suspected of taking part in the criminal conspiracy.

The court rejected one appellant's sufficiency challenge to his conviction and affirmed his convictions, finding that substantial evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that he was guilty of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor under fourteen or of a minor by force, fraud, or coercion, and of conspiracy to transport a minor in interstate commerce with intent for the minor to engage in prostitution or illegal sexual activity.

Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects.

US v. Carlos Kinard

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-6285

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case in question originated from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellant, Carlos Emanuel Kinard, had been convicted on twelve counts related to a drug and racketeering conspiracy in 1994. One of the counts was for the use of a firearm during and in relation to a "crime of violence" under § 924(c), with the predicate offense arising under the violent crimes in aid of racketeering statute (VICAR) for VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon, which incorporated the North Carolina statutory crime of assault with a deadly weapon. In 2016, Kinard moved to vacate his sentence under § 2255, arguing that the VICAR assault offense was not a "crime of violence" as per the definition in Johnson v. United States. The district court rejected this as untimely and meritless.

In 2019, Kinard moved for authorization to file a successive habeas petition based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, which held that the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague. Kinard argued that the VICAR assault offense is not categorically a "crime of violence" as it could be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another and could be committed negligently or recklessly. The district court denied this motion, leading to Kinard's appeal.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon, incorporating the North Carolina assault offense, qualifies as a § 924(c) "crime of violence". The court relied on its recent decision in United States v. Thomas to conclude that the purposeful or knowing conduct element of the VICAR assault offense satisfies the mens rea requirement for a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Gordon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50043

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns an appeal by Carl Monroe Gordon against his conviction on the grounds of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and abusive sexual contact with a child. Gordon argued that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated due to delays in bringing him to trial and the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment by the district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Court held that the delay in bringing Gordon to trial did not violate the Speedy Trial Act since the period of delay was attributed to other proceedings related to the defendant and ends-of-justice continuances due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the Court determined that Gordon's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated as he failed to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay.

USA v. Abundiz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50697

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case involved Marco Antonio Abundiz, the defendant-appellant, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for sexually abusing his six-year-old niece, K.Z. Abundiz appealed his conviction arguing that the district court erred in several areas including: allowing the victim to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) which he claimed violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; failing to make the necessary findings before permitting the victim to testify via CCTV; admitting evidence of a previous sexual assault; admitting evidence that he possessed child pornography; and the instructions given to the jury regarding evidence admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.

After reviewing the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. The Court held that the district court did not err in allowing the victim to testify via CCTV. The Court determined that the district court made the necessary findings showing that the child would be unable to testify in open court due to fear and a substantial likelihood she would suffer emotional trauma.

The Court also found no error in the district court's admission of evidence regarding prior sexual assaults and child pornography possession. The Court observed that the district court had appropriately exercised its discretion to admit this evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, providing that such evidence can be considered in sexual assault and child molestation cases, respectively.

Lastly, the Court concluded that the district court's jury instructions regarding the use of evidence admitted under Rules 413 and 414 were not erroneous. The Court noted that the instructions appropriately informed the jury that such evidence could be used for any relevant purpose only if it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The instructions did not allow the jury to convict using a lower standard of proof or confuse the preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt standards.

USA v. Anderson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60040

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Higginson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Native American Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, Mike Austin Anderson, the defendant, was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and using a gun during a crime of violence. These charges stemmed from an incident that took place on the Choctaw Indian Reservation in Mississippi, where Anderson shot Julian McMillan after an argument. On appeal, Anderson contested that the district court erred in ruling that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the jury to return guilty verdicts, despite the court's self-defense instruction. He also argued that the district court wrongly denied his pretrial motion to recuse the lead prosecutor and the entire United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Mississippi due to a conflict of interest. Anderson claimed that the lead prosecutor had previously represented him and his father while working as a public defender in Choctaw Tribal Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the evidence against Anderson was sufficient and that the district court did not err in denying his recusal motion. The appellate court found no substantial relationship between the prosecutor's prior representation of Anderson and the current federal prosecution against him.

USA v. Gentile

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50837

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Bobby Quinton Gentile, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine. He later appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court judge improperly coerced him into withdrawing his objections to the drug amount calculation in the Presentence Investigation Report by threatening to deny him his acceptance of responsibility points. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found no plain error and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Gentile's argument that he was judicially coerced to withdraw his objections to the drug amount calculation fails under plain error review because, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred clearly by coercing him, Gentile did not show the error affected his substantial rights. His sentence was affirmed.

USA v. King

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20620

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Jones

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In a healthcare fraud case involving Medicare kickbacks, defendants Lindell King and Ynedra Diggs appealed their convictions and sentences. They challenged the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas's decision to admit recordings involving them and other co-conspirators, and disputed the court's calculation of the improper benefit received for the purpose of their sentence, as well as the restitution award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined these arguments and ruled in favor of the lower court.

The defendants were accused of receiving bribes from a Medicare provider, Dr. Paulo Bettega, for referring Medicare beneficiaries to him for unnecessary treatment or non-provided treatment. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' Confrontation Clause arguments, stating the recordings were not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. It further dismissed the defendants' assertion that the recordings were impermissible hearsay.

Regarding the calculation of the improper benefit, the court concluded that the government had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the entire operation was fraudulent. The defendants failed to provide rebuttal evidence of any legitimate medical expenses that should offset the amount paid to Bettega for treatment provided to residents of their group homes.

The Court of Appeals also upheld the restitution award. It rejected the defendants' argument that their maximum restitution was limited to the $70,000 they received in kickbacks. The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for all foreseeable losses within the scope of their conspiracy.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, finding no error in its proceedings or decisions.

United States v. Histed

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-2080

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: MATHIS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Zachariah Histed pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The District Court for the Western District of Michigan sentenced him to 300 months' imprisonment. Histed appealed his sentence on both procedural and substantive grounds, arguing that the district court incorrectly calculated the drug quantity, wrongly applied multiple sentencing enhancements, improperly denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a sentence that was too long.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated Histed’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in calculating the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to Histed because it did not adequately explain how it arrived at the drug quantity or articulate any methodology for reaching the offense level of 32. Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated Histed's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing with a more precise determination of the drug quantity attributable to Histed.

However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's application of the dangerous-weapon, reckless-endangerment, and obstruction-of-justice enhancements, as well as its denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The court found that Histed's possession of an inert grenade during his drug-trafficking offense justified the dangerous-weapon enhancement. It also held that Histed's reckless behavior during his flight from law enforcement warranted the reckless-endangerment enhancement, and his attempts to make others lie to investigators justified the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Finally, the court held that despite Histed's guilty plea, his lack of full acceptance of responsibility for his actions justified the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

United States v. Ivy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-4052

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Mathis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined whether a conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon under Ohio law could be considered a "crime of violence" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which would lead to an enhanced sentencing range. The defendant, Alexander Ivy, had pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court found that Ivy's prior conviction for aggravated robbery was a "crime of violence," resulting in an increased Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months' imprisonment instead of the likely 46 to 57 months' imprisonment without such a finding. Ivy appealed this decision.

The Court of Appeals held that a conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon under Ohio law without further information that the aggravated-robbery conviction is predicated on a particular underlying theft offense is not a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. The court found that the Ohio aggravated-robbery statute criminalizes a broader range of conduct than both robbery and extortion, making it not a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Moreover, the court found that Ohio aggravated robbery doesn't require an offender to obtain something of value from another person, making it broader than the definition of extortion under the Guidelines.

Therefore, the court vacated Ivy's sentence and remanded the case back to the district court for resentencing, consistent with its opinion.

Darnell Dixon v. Tarry Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-1375

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Rovner

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition by Darnell Dixon, who was convicted of home invasion and murder by an Illinois state court and sentenced to life imprisonment. Dixon's habeas petition primarily focused on claims of actual innocence and prosecutorial misconduct. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The case involved a series of events including a drug-related robbery and subsequent murders. Dixon and Eugene Langston were implicated in the murders, with Langston identified in a police lineup by a witness, Horace Chandler. However, Chandler later recanted this identification. The state's case against Dixon relied heavily on a confession that Dixon later claimed was false. Dixon's confession and Chandler's identification of Langston were central to the state's theory of accomplice liability, arguing that Dixon was accountable for Langston's acts.

In his habeas petition, Dixon argued that he was denied due process when the trial court excluded evidence that charges against his alleged accomplice, Langston, were dismissed. He also asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the exclusion of that evidence. Furthermore, Dixon claimed that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by presenting conflicting positions regarding Langston's involvement in the murders at trial and during post-conviction proceedings.

However, the Seventh Circuit found that Dixon's claim of actual innocence, based on the state's post-conviction contention that Langston's involvement was irrelevant and evidence of abusive and perjurious conduct by the case's police detective, did not meet the high standard required to conclusively prove his innocence. The Seventh Circuit also rejected Dixon's arguments of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no clear error in the district court's factual findings on these issues.

Pierce v. Vanihel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2073

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: ST. EVE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Donald Pierce was convicted of multiple counts of child molestation and of being a repeat sexual offender. The case revolved around the testimonies of the victim and several adults who had been told about the incidents. Pierce's lawyer did not object to the sequence of these testimonies, which violated an Indiana evidentiary rule. Pierce later petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that his lawyer's failure to object meant he was deprived of constitutionally adequate representation. This was denied by the Indiana Court of Appeals, which found that the lawyer's failure to object was strategic and did not constitute constitutionally deficient performance. Pierce then sought habeas relief, alleging the state appellate court had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and made an unreasonable fact determination. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the previous decision, finding that the state court did not unreasonably apply the precedent and its fact determination was not unreasonable.

USA v. Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2313

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In an appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed a case concerning Adam Tyrale Williams Jr.'s ongoing effort to reduce his sentences for crack-cocaine offenses. Williams was convicted in 2001 of various drug-related offenses, and over the years, he sought sentence reductions based on retroactive amendments to the guidelines and, most recently, the First Step Act of 2018. The district court denied Williams's most recent application for sentence reduction, but the appellate court vacated the decision because the district court failed to calculate the amended statutory sentencing ranges applicable to Williams's convictions. Upon remand, Williams further emphasized changes to his record and conditions of confinement that occurred after the order was vacated. However, the district court again denied Williams's request shortly after receiving the updated motion. The appellate court found that the district court's reliance on its previous reasoning and failure to adequately explain its decision was an abuse of discretion. Thus, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, indicating that a more complete explanation from the district court was necessary given the changes in law and facts relevant to the case.

United States v. Angel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1260

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Timothy Eugene Angel, appealed against his sentence for possessing ammunition after having been convicted of a felony. Angel had pleaded guilty to the charge but disagreed with the district court's application of the attempted murder cross-reference from the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) in determining his offense level and consequent sentence. The dispute stemmed from an incident where Angel fired shots at two individuals, Leonard Fisher and Tityana Woodland, outside a club in Davenport, Iowa, after a heated altercation inside the club.

The court found that the district court did not err in applying the attempted murder cross-reference. It based this decision on the premise that Angel, by firing five shots at Fisher and Woodland, demonstrated a specific intent to kill. Moreover, the court also found that Angel had enough time after the altercation to be fully conscious of his intent and deliberate about his conduct, thereby satisfying the requirement for premeditation.

Angel raised a self-defense argument, contending that he fired his gun in response to Woodland threatening him with a gun. However, the court rejected this argument, finding that Angel had escalated the situation by choosing to leave the club, retrieve a gun, and open fire. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Angel's sentence.

United States v. Crawford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1676

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

This case involves an appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota filed by the defendant, Nathaniel Crawford. Crawford was involved in a domestic dispute with his ex-girlfriend at an apartment complex, which led to concerned residents calling 911, reporting that Crawford was threatening to shoot a person or burn the complex. After officers arrived at the scene, Crawford fled but returned later to threaten his ex-girlfriend with a firearm. He fled again before officers could arrive; however, they found him and his vehicle in a nearby parking lot. Officers identified a wooden object protruding from the vehicle's center console, which they inferred to be a firearm. Crawford was subsequently charged with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm due to his prior felony and misdemeanor domestic violence convictions.

Crawford moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that officers lacked probable cause to search his vehicle. The district court denied his motion, leading to Crawford's appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the 911 calls, the ex-girlfriend's statements, and the wooden object established probable cause for the vehicle search. The court ruled that the officers' search was supported by probable cause based on the combination of these factors, establishing probable cause to search Crawford's vehicle for a firearm. The court also rejected Crawford's arguments that the search was unreasonable due to the officers' original investigation of him for a different crime and their lack of knowledge about his status as a prohibited person under federal law. The court maintained that the government can search for evidence of one crime and charge the suspect with a different crime based on what it later learns. The court concluded that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" was admissible because the tree in this case was not poisonous.

Hoskins v. Withers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-4081

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: BACHARACH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In November 2018, Joseph Hoskins was stopped by a Utah state trooper, Jared Withers, because his Illinois license plate was partially obscured. The situation escalated when Trooper Withers conducted a dog sniff of the car, which led him to search the car and find a large amount of cash. Mr. Hoskins was arrested, and his DNA was collected. Mr. Hoskins sued Trooper Withers and Jess Anderson, Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and state law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Trooper Withers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop because Utah law requires license plates to be legible, and this applies to out-of-state plates. The court also found that the dog sniff did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop, as Mr. Hoskins was searching for his proof of insurance at the time. The court ruled that the trooper's protective measures, including pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins, handcuffing him, and conducting a patdown, did not elevate the stop into an arrest due to Mr. Hoskins's confrontational behavior.

The court further held that the dog's reaction to the car created arguable probable cause to search the car and that the discovery of a large amount of cash provided arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Hoskins. The court found that Trooper Withers did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights by pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins in retaliation for protected speech or as excessive force. Lastly, the court found no violation of Mr. Hoskins's due process rights related to the handling of his DNA sample, as neither the Due Process Clause nor state law created a protected interest in a procedure to ensure the destruction of his DNA sample.

United States v. Martinez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-2034

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: HOLMES

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Jody Rufino Martinez, a member of the Syndicato de Nuevo México (“SNM”), a violent New Mexico-based prison gang, was convicted of murder under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (“VICAR”) Act, racketeering conspiracy, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The convictions were related to the 2008 murder of David Romero and the 2018 shooting of Donald Salazar. On appeal, Mr. Martinez argued that the district court erred in three ways: (1) denying his motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, (2) admitting unduly prejudicial evidence during trial, and (3) denying his motion for a new trial after evidence emerged that he was involved in threats to kill the presiding district court judge. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Martinez's motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, as the court's finding that Mr. Martinez did not oppose a motion to continue the trial was plausible given the record as a whole. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of SNM's violent acts, as that evidence was probative of SNM's use of violence to maintain and augment organizational respect and played a critical role in the government's case. Lastly, the court held that the district court did not err in failing to recuse itself, as the judge had no knowledge during the trial that Mr. Martinez was connected to threats against him.

United States v. Rodriguez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-6194

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: BACHARACH

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the convictions of Juanita Viridiana Garcia Rodriguez, the defendant-appellant, on charges of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute and interstate travel in aid of a drug-trafficking enterprise. The case stemmed from a cross-country car trip where secret compartments containing methamphetamine were found in the car driven by Tony Garcia, with Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez as a passenger.

The court held that the prosecution failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had knowledge of the methamphetamine hidden in the vehicle, which was required to prove her guilt. The court found that simply being a passenger in a car carrying drugs is insufficient to implicate the passenger in a criminal conspiracy. The court also found that the evidence presented by the prosecution, including the value of the methamphetamine, the appearance of the car's rear doors, and Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez's apparent nervousness, were insufficient to prove her knowledge of the drugs. The lack of evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had ever tried to open the rear doors or that she knew about the secret compartments was particularly significant.

The court concluded that any inferences about Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez's knowledge of the drugs were based on speculation, which is not sufficient to uphold a conviction. The court therefore reversed the convictions and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.

United States v. Tolbert

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-2085

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Ebel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Donald Alvin Tolbert, appealed against the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) opening his emails and attachments without a warrant. These emails contained child pornography and were detected by AOL's software, which reported them to the NCMEC. The NCMEC, state law enforcement in New Mexico, and the federal government subsequently conducted investigations leading to Tolbert's conviction.

Tolbert argued that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the warrantless search of his emails and attachments. The court, however, ruled that even if Tolbert's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the evidence would still be admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception allows illegally obtained evidence to be admitted if it would have inevitably been discovered by legal means.

The court found that the investigations by the NCMEC and law enforcement would have proceeded in the same way, even if the emails and attachments had not been opened, based on their routine practices. They would have used information available in the CyberTips, such as IP addresses and email addresses, to link the CyberTips to Tolbert and conduct further investigations. Thus, the evidence against Tolbert would have been discovered even without opening his emails and attachments.

The court, therefore, affirmed the district court's denial of Tolbert's motion to suppress and motion to reconsider.

NELSON v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 24

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Hiland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, the appellant, William Nelson, appealed his conviction of first-degree domestic battery by a Lonoke County jury in the Supreme Court of Arkansas. He raised seven points on appeal: (1) substantial evidence did not support his conviction; (2) the circuit court’s refusal to recuse was an abuse of discretion; (3) the circuit court improperly denied his Batson objection; (4) the circuit court abused its discretion by limiting questions regarding sentencing during voir dire; (5) the circuit court allowed inadmissible prior-bad-acts evidence to be introduced; (6) refusal to dismiss a juror for-cause during trial was an abuse of discretion; and (7) the circuit court improperly restricted expert witness testimony or, alternatively, erred by denying a motion for a continuance to obtain a new expert. The State cross-appealed, arguing that the circuit court misinterpreted the statutory requirement to support a sentencing enhancement and improperly granted Nelson’s directed-verdict motion on the issue.

The court affirmed Nelson's conviction on all points. It found that substantial evidence supported the conviction and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in any of the contested decisions. In the cross-appeal, the court dismissed the State's appeal, ruling that it did not present an issue of interpretation of the criminal rules with widespread ramifications and the resolution of the issue turned on the facts unique to the case.

ROYCE CALKINS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 23

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case, Royce Calkins appealed a Stone County Circuit Court order that convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, plus a fifteen-year sentencing enhancement to each term for using a firearm. Calkins had shot and killed his girlfriend and father in a shared home. The Supreme Court of Arkansas confirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal.

Calkins argued two points on appeal. First, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his first-degree-murder convictions, and second, he argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his proffered jury instructions on justification and kidnapping.

Regarding the first point, Calkins argued that there was no proof that he intended to kill anyone. The court, however, found substantial evidence supporting both counts of first-degree murder. The court considered the fact that Calkins shot each victim multiple times, attempted to stage the scene to make it look like a murder-suicide, and fled the scene as evidence supporting his purposeful intent.

Regarding the second point, Calkins argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to provide jury instructions on justification and kidnapping. The court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury on these issues, as there was no rational basis in the evidence for such instructions. The court noted that Calkins's statements to a physician about his fear of being hurt by the victims did not constitute evidence of a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger, nor was there evidence to support the claim of kidnapping. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision.

P. v. Clark

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S275746

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Kruger

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of California was asked to interpret the "collective engagement" requirement under the California Penal Code section 186.22(f) and its application to the proof of predicate offenses. This requirement was introduced through Assembly Bill 333, which amended gang sentencing provisions. The defendant, Kejuan Darcell Clark, a member of the Northside Parkland street gang, was charged with several offenses related to a home invasion and assault. The prosecution sought to apply gang enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b).

The court held that the term "collective engagement" in section 186.22(f) does not require that each predicate offense must have been committed by at least two gang members acting in concert. Rather, the court interpreted the term to require a showing that links the two predicate offenses to the gang as an organized, collective enterprise. This can be demonstrated by evidence linking the predicate offenses to the gang's organizational structure, its primary activities, or its common goals and principles.

The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal as to Clark's gang enhancement and remanded the case for further proceedings to apply this interpretation of the collective engagement requirement.

P. v. Kim

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B327473(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Kim

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Los Angeles County District Attorney appealed an order denying the prosecution’s attempt to reinstate charges accusing two defendants, Woodrow Kim and Jonathan Miramontes, of filing false peace officer reports. The charges were related to a police incident involving a high-speed chase and subsequent officer-involved shooting. The defendants, both deputies with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, were accused of falsely reporting that a suspect, Martinez, had walked into their patrol vehicle and remained standing, when in fact, video evidence showed that the patrol car’s door had hit Martinez with enough force to knock him to the ground. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that there was a rational basis for believing that both deputies had filed false reports in violation of Penal Code section 118.1. The court ordered the lower court to reinstate the complaint and return the matter to the magistrate for further proceedings.

People v. Ferenz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H049430(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Greenwood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case decided by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, the defendant, Ronald Gordon Ferenz, had pleaded no contest to charges of rape of an unconscious person, forcible rape, and dissuading a witness. He was sentenced to a 12-year term in state prison and was imposed a criminal justice administration fee. On appeal, Ferenz challenged the trial court's denial of his post-plea motion to substitute his counsel, the court's decision to not strike certain exhibits attached to the prosecutor’s statement of view, and the imposition of the criminal justice administration fee.

The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ferenz’s motion to substitute his counsel as there was no showing of a breakdown in communication between Ferenz and his counsel, nor was there any evidence that the counsel's conduct fell below the standard of care. The court also held that the trial court did not err in declining to strike portions of the prosecutor’s statement of view as the material was not expressly precluded by section 1203.01 and the court had inherent authority to accept the material. However, the court agreed with Ferenz that the criminal justice administration fee must be stricken due to the effect of Assembly Bill No. 1869 which rendered such fees unenforceable and uncollectible after July 1, 2021.

The court modified the judgment to vacate the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

People v. Franco

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324852M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the early 1980s, Arturo Franco, the defendant, committed two sexual offenses against his minor stepdaughter. After serving his sentence and completing his probation, Franco complied with the requirement to register as a sex offender for 37 years. In 2021, Franco petitioned to be removed from California's registry of sex offenders, arguing that he had lived a law-abiding life for over three decades since his conviction. However, the People opposed the petition, primarily arguing that one of Franco's crimes would render him ineligible for removal from the registry if prosecuted under a statute enacted 21 years after his conviction.

The trial court denied Franco's petition, giving significant weight to the egregious nature of the underlying offenses and the age of the victim, despite Franco's 37 years of law-abiding behavior and no evidence suggesting a current risk of reoffending. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision, finding that it contravened the precedent set in People v. Thai, which held that mere focus on the nature of the initial crime without evidence of the defendant's current likelihood of reoffending was not sufficient to deny removal from the sex offender registry. The appellate court also rejected the People's argument that Franco "could have been convicted" of a crime that did not exist at the time of his offense, noting that the relevant legislation tied tier placement in the registry to the offense for which the defendant "was convicted".

People v. Garcia

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081713(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: McCONNELL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves Jennifer Garcia, who was charged with multiple counts, including making threats to a public officer, disobeying a court order, possessing a weapon in a courthouse, attempted murder, and assault with a deadly weapon. After her counsel declared doubt as to Garcia's mental competence, the trial court suspended the criminal proceedings for a determination of Garcia's mental competence. Based on the evaluations of a licensed psychiatrist and a licensed psychologist, the court found Garcia mentally incompetent to stand trial and lacking capacity to make decisions regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication. Garcia appealed the court's order authorizing the state hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to her, alleging errors with the order and ineffective assistance of her trial counsel. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's order, the psychologist did not exceed the scope of her license in her evaluation, and the psychiatrist's opinion did not lack statutorily required information. The appellate court also found that the error in the trial court's form order was harmless and Garcia was not prejudiced by any ineffectiveness of her counsel.

People v. Hall

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B326944(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: WEINGART

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

In the State of California, a criminal defendant diagnosed with a mental disorder can be placed on mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The provision allows such defendants to receive treatment for their mental illness and potentially avoid prosecution. However, the court may reinstate charges if the defendant's behavior while on diversion renders them unsuitable for the program. This case involved a defendant, Jasmen Lavar Hall, who was charged with carjacking and related offenses. After being placed on mental health diversion, Hall was expelled from his residential treatment program for threatening and assaulting other patients and destroying property. Following this behavior, Hall went missing for approximately six months before being apprehended. The trial court subsequently terminated Hall's diversion and reinstated the criminal proceedings. After a jury trial, Hall was convicted of the carjacking-related offenses and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of seven years eight months in prison. Hall argued that the court erred in reinstating the criminal proceedings because his actions did not meet the statutory criteria for having his diversion terminated. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One disagreed, ruling that Hall's violent conduct and failure to comply with his treatment obligations rendered him unsuitable for diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, subdivision (g)(3). The court therefore held that the trial court did not err in terminating Hall's diversion and reinstating the criminal proceedings, and it affirmed the judgment of conviction.

People v. Rouston

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080114(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: McCONNELL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed and remanded a case involving a defendant, George Thomas Rouston, Jr., convicted of premeditated attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. The charges stemmed from a gang-related drive-by shooting. On appeal, Rouston argued that the trial court erred by allowing the lead detective in the case to opine on the main disputed issue: whether Rouston fired a gun. The appellate court agreed, stating that the detective's opinion on Rouston's guilt was "too helpful" and supplanted the jury's role. The court found this to be an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The court also found this error to be prejudicial, determining that without the detective's testimony, it was reasonably probable the jury’s verdict would have been different. Thus, the court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

People v. Yeager-Reiman

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B331175(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: KIM

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Military Law, White Collar Crime

In this case, defendant Charles Yeager-Reiman, a veteran, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor grand theft in connection with fraudulent activities related to veterans' benefits from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Yeager-Reiman appealed his conviction, arguing that his prosecution was preempted by federal law, as his offenses concerned the theft of benefits from the VA.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five disagreed with Yeager-Reiman's contention, and affirmed the lower court's judgement. The court ruled that federal preemption did not apply in this case. While federal law establishes the guidelines and regulations for VA benefits, it does not prohibit state-level criminal prosecutions for fraudulent activities related to these benefits.

In terms of field preemption, the court determined that the provisions of the federal law did not indicate an intent by Congress to occupy the field of criminal prosecution of veterans in connection with the theft of VA benefits. As for obstacle preemption, the court found that allowing state-level prosecutions for theft of VA benefits actually promotes Congress's purpose of aiding veterans by preserving funds for veterans' benefits through deterrence.

Therefore, the court concluded that neither field preemption nor obstacle preemption deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear Yeager-Reiman's case.

People v. Owens

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 10

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the defendant, Sir Mario Owens, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, witness intimidation, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and accessory to a crime. The convictions stemmed from two separate incidents: the Lowry Park shootings, in which Owens was involved, and the subsequent Dayton Street shootings, for which Owens was convicted. The defendant argued that the trial was unfair due to the court's rulings on several issues, including the admission of evidence related to the Lowry Park shootings, the denial of Owens's motions for mistrial, and the limitation on cross-examination and impeachment of the prosecution's key witness. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's rulings were proper and did not constitute reversible error. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

BLASH V THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1096

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2024, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the convictions of Demarcus Deshawn Blash for malice murder and other offenses related to the shooting deaths of Jain Marie Williams and Wendell Everett Williams. Blash challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his motion for a new trial, the introduction of his jail phone call recordings, and the expert testimony interpreting gang language used in those calls. He also questioned the legality of his sentencing process.

The crimes were committed in 2018, and Blash was indicted along with three co-defendants. Following a trial in 2021, Blash was found guilty of all counts except one count of theft. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murders and additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges.

Blash appealed his convictions and sentences, but the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to uphold the convictions. The court ruled that the trial court had properly denied Blash's motion for a new trial and did not err in allowing the introduction of jail call recordings and expert testimony interpreting gang language.

Furthermore, Blash's argument that his sentencing was not conducted under Georgia law was dismissed since the sentences fell within the statutory punishment ranges. However, the court did vacate the sentences for burglary and one count of theft by taking because these counts should have merged with home invasion and armed robbery, respectively.

FLOYD v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1042

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this Georgia Supreme Court case, the defendant, Darnell Rene Floyd, was convicted of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and other related charges in connection to the shooting death of Telmo Ortiz. Floyd argued he was acting in self-defense during the incident. On appeal, Floyd's main contention was that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective due to their handling of the interplay between self-defense and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with Floyd and reversed his conviction. The Court concluded that Floyd's trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction about self-defense under OCGA § 16-11-138, which provides that self-defense can be an absolute defense for a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Additionally, the court determined Floyd's trial counsel didn't clearly explain that self-defense applied to felony murder based on felon-in-possession and agreed with the trial court's response to the jury's question, which didn't clarify the application of self-defense to felony murder and felon-in-possession.

The court held that these failures constituted deficient performance by counsel and resulted in prejudice to Floyd's case. However, since the evidence against Floyd was constitutionally sufficient to authorize the conviction, he may be retried. The court also reversed Floyd's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, as it was only supported by the reversed felony murder conviction.

GREEN v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0840

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Donald Berry Green appealed his sentence for felony murder and aggravated assault related to the shooting death of Andre Winter. He entered a guilty plea, but years later, began filing motions for an out-of-time appeal. Green argued that his guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because he wasn't expressly advised on the record of his right against self-incrimination, one of the three specific rights listed in "Boykin v. Alabama" (1969) that a defendant waives when entering a guilty plea. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the record showed Green's plea was voluntary and intelligent, despite the absence of an express advisement of his right against self-incrimination. The Court overruled its previous decisions that adopted a "three Boykin rights" approach, which automatically reversed a guilty plea if the record didn't show the defendant was expressly informed about all three rights listed in "Boykin v. Alabama". The Court held that a guilty plea is valid if the record shows it was voluntary and intelligent, regardless of whether all three rights were explicitly conveyed to the defendant. Therefore, the Court affirmed Green's convictions.

KIRKLAND v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0942, S23A0943

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2019, co-defendants Mark Kirkland and Kendrick Ogletree were found guilty of numerous offenses, including malice murder, related to the arson-related deaths of Deangelo Barbary and Debra Morris. The pair were indicted on charges of murder, felony murder, and arson in the first degree, with Ogletree also charged with conspiracy to commit arson and criminal solicitation. Both defendants contend that the trial court erred in various ways, including by admitting improper character evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that Kirkland failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Ogletree’s convictions. As such, the court affirmed both Kirkland’s and Ogletree’s convictions. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court erred in its final instruction to the jury about the use of admitted evidence of other acts, but concluded that the error did not affect the outcome of the proceedings given the strong evidence of guilt presented by the State.

LOPEZ v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1165

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellant, Belinda Lopez, was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in relation to the shooting death of her husband, Noel Lopez. The court presented evidence of a night out involving Belinda, Noel, and Belinda’s friend Angelica Juarez, which culminated in Noel being shot in the head. Belinda called 911 to report the incident. Throughout her interviews with investigators, Belinda maintained that she was defending herself from Noel's attack when the gun accidentally discharged. However, her account of the incident shifted over time.

In her appeal, Belinda contended that the evidence presented at her trial was insufficient to support her convictions and that her trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. She claimed that the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt her theories of self-defense and accident, and alternatively, suggested that Juarez may have shot Noel.

The court rejected Belinda's claims, affirming that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support her convictions. The court found that Belinda's shifting accounts of the incident, combined with expert testimony and physical evidence, allowed the jury to conclude that she was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and the related firearm possession count.

Regarding Belinda's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that her trial counsel's decision not to pursue requests for certain jury instructions and his failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument did not constitute deficient performance. The court concluded that Belinda failed to establish that her trial counsel's performance was deficient or that she suffered prejudice as a result of his actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

REYES v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1135

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In this case, Jamie Avila Reyes, the appellant, appealed his 15-year prison sentence for crimes including homicide by vehicle in the first degree and driving under the influence of alcohol. Reyes, an undocumented immigrant, contended that the trial court improperly considered his immigration status during sentencing, violating his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reyes also argued that OCGA § 17-10-1.3, a Georgia statute that allows a trial court to consider potential deportation when determining whether to probate a convicted person's sentence, is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 17-10-1.3 is constitutional. The court found that the statute survived rational basis review because it bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring the complete execution of judicial sentences. The court also held that the trial court did not violate Reyes' due process or equal protection rights when it applied the statute and declined to probate any portion of his sentence due to his impending deportation. The court noted that there was no evidence the trial court based its sentence on discriminatory animus towards undocumented noncitizens. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

People v. Fair

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 128373

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: White

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions denying Darrell Fair's claim of torture. Fair, who had been convicted of a felony, appealed the circuit court’s denial of his claim of torture under the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission Act. The Supreme Court held that a court analyzing a claim of torture under the Act must consider the totality of the circumstances, including any allegations of constitutional violations that would not by themselves support a freestanding claim of torture under the Act. However, the court ultimately concluded that the circuit court’s determination that Fair failed to prove his claim of torture was not manifestly erroneous. The court found that Fair had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that under the totality of the circumstances, the combination of acts alleged were sufficiently severe to constitute torture. The court emphasized the circuit court’s credibility determinations as the fact finder at the evidentiary hearing, where it found Fair to be a "wholly incredible witness," while another witness was "extremely" credible.

State of Iowa v. Cole

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1581

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: May

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In Iowa in 2021, a mother of six, Paula Cole, left her five oldest children, ranging in age from 12 to five, asleep at home while she left to go to Walmart for groceries, taking her youngest, an infant, with her. While she was gone, a disagreement arose between two of the children, leading one to leave their apartment building. A neighbor, with whom the family had an open-door policy, helped the children and eventually called 911 due to the disagreement and the child leaving the building. Upon return, Cole was charged with child endangerment. She was convicted and appealed the decision. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, but Cole sought further review from the Supreme Court of Iowa.

The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the conviction, holding that Cole did not create a risk that violated section 726.6(1)(a), which defines child endangerment as knowingly acting in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a child's physical, mental, or emotional health or safety. The court concluded that while leaving her children home alone could potentially pose risks, these were not risks created by Cole's decision to go shopping, but rather, they were ordinary risks of everyday life. The court also noted that no evidence suggested the home was unsafe, the older children could help care for the younger ones, and a neighbor was available to assist. The court stressed that not all risks children encounter are created by their parents or caregivers, and life inherently poses risks. Additionally, the court stated that a parent does not create a risk if the risk is part of the background risk of ordinary life.

State of Iowa v. Harbach

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0162

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Oxley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Iowa, the defendant, Jesse Jon Harbach, was involved in a single-vehicle rollover accident. Based on observations at the scene, an officer applied for a warrant to draw blood from Harbach. The test revealed methamphetamine but no alcohol. Harbach moved to suppress the evidence from the blood draw, arguing that the officer's claims of smelling alcohol and observing Harbach with bloodshot eyes and slurred speech were false. The district court agreed, suppressing the evidence. The state appealed, and the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the decision, stating that the officer's observations of the defendant's physical state and the smell of alcohol were sufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant. The court held that the officer's affidavit did not contain intentionally or recklessly false statements and the remaining content established probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.

State v. Coleman

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124223

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Luckert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Kansas, the appellant, Darnell D. Coleman, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and appealed his conviction. He raised four issues on appeal: (1) the prosecutors made incorrect statements of law and fact about premeditation during closing arguments, (2) the court failed to give a modified jury instruction on premeditation that had been approved in previous cases, (3) the court erred by not removing his trial counsel after a breakdown in communication, and (4) cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial.

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas found that the prosecutors made three errors during closing arguments that disregarded the cognitive component of premeditation, but these errors did not individually or cumulatively affect the outcome of the trial. The court also held that the trial judge did not err in the instructions given to the jury on premeditation, and did not abuse discretion by not removing Coleman's trial counsel. The court concluded that the cumulative effect of the errors did not affect the jury's verdict. Consequently, Coleman's conviction was affirmed by the court.

State v. Sinnard

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123687

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Joshua F. Sinnard, was charged with commercial sexual exploitation of a child after arranging to have sex with a 17-year-old in exchange for money. Sinnard contested the district court's decision to allow his trial to proceed after the statutory speedy trial deadline had passed, alleging an abuse of discretion under the "crowded-docket exception" of the Kansas speedy trial statute. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas upheld the lower court's decision, noting that the district court was within its rights to invoke the exception, and its decision was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.

Sinnard also challenged the admissibility of a detective's testimony about cell phone tower connectivity, claiming it constituted expert testimony. The Supreme Court disagreed, determining that the detective's testimony was not so specialized as to qualify as expert opinion. However, the court agreed with Sinnard that the detective's testimony about the contents of unadmitted phone records was hearsay and should not have been admitted. However, the court deemed this error harmless as it did not affect the trial's outcome.

Finally, Sinnard argued that the jury instruction on commercial sexual exploitation of a child was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the instructions given accurately stated the law and were not reasonably likely to confuse the jury. The court thus affirmed the lower courts' decisions.

Commonwealth v. Arrington

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13499

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: KAFKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the Commonwealth's appeal against the trial judge's denial of its motion to admit expert testimony on Frequent Location History (FLH) data retrieved from the defendant's cell phone in a murder case. The Commonwealth argued that the FLH data would corroborate its witness's testimony, placing the defendant at the crime scene. The trial judge denied the motion, stating that the Commonwealth had not met its burden of showing that FLH data had been generally accepted as reliable by the scientific community. The judge also found that the Commonwealth had failed to provide evidence that FLH data has been subjected to peer review or publication, has an unacceptably high known or potential rate of error, and is governed by recognized standards. The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk agreed with the trial judge's decision, concluding that the Commonwealth had not shown that FLH data is reliable. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the Commonwealth's motion to admit the FLH data.

Commonwealth v. Camuti

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13422

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the defendant, William J. Camuti, was convicted of murder in the first degree for poisoning his friend and business associate, Stephen Rakes, with potassium cyanide. Several years after his conviction, Camuti filed a postconviction motion for forensic testing of the shirt that Rakes was wearing when his body was found, claiming that DNA testing of the shirt could potentially provide evidence that could exonerate him. However, a Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding that Camuti had failed to meet his burden under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), to demonstrate that a reasonably effective defense attorney would have sought to test Rakes' shirt for DNA.

On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court reasoned that the absence of trace evidence, including DNA evidence, was a central part of Camuti's defense strategy at trial. His counsel had repeatedly emphasized the lack of physical evidence linking Camuti to the crime scene, and the introduction of DNA evidence from Rakes' shirt could have undermined this defense. The court further noted that even if DNA testing had revealed the presence of a third party's DNA on the shirt, this would have had minimal exculpatory value given the circumstances of the case. Given these considerations, the court concluded that a reasonably effective attorney would not have sought DNA testing of Rakes' shirt. Therefore, Camuti had not met his burden under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), and the denial of his postconviction motion for forensic testing was affirmed.

State v. Cummings

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0630

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: HUDSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of the term "resources" as used in the criminal restitution statute, Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a)(2). Specifically, the case examines whether the equity in a defendant's home, which he co-owns with his spouse, can be considered as a "resource" when awarding restitution. The appellant, Joshua Henry Baion Cummings (Baion), was convicted of one count of theft by false representation and was ordered to pay restitution. The district court considered the equity in Baion’s home as one of his resources when determining the amount of restitution. Baion appealed, arguing that the equity in a home owned with a non-defendant spouse cannot be considered a resource under the restitution statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The Minnesota Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the term “resources” in the restitution statute unambiguously means useful and valuable possessions, and that home equity, even when the home is co-owned with a non-defendant spouse, may be such a possession.

Underwood v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00976-SCT

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Beam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jeremy Underwood was convicted of manslaughter in Mississippi for the stabbing death of Marcus Steele. Underwood appealed, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense under the Castle Doctrine (which allows a person to use deadly force in certain situations when threatened in their own home), that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence under the Castle Doctrine, and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct during opening and closing arguments. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction, finding that the Castle Doctrine did not apply to this case and that the evidence was sufficient to support a manslaughter conviction. The court also found that the prosecutor's comments during opening and closing arguments did not constitute misconduct. Underwood had sold cocaine to Steele and Broach and claimed that Steele and Broach had forcibly entered his home multiple times before the stabbing occurred during an argument on Underwood's porch. However, the court found that the evidence did not support Underwood's claims that he was in imminent danger when he stabbed Steele.

State v. Stokes

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 32

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Shea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, defendant Bradley Alan Stokes appealed his convictions from the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Musselshell County, for both burglary and assault with a weapon. Stokes was charged with these crimes following an altercation at the home of Michael Benson, in which he used a crowbar to break into the residence and assaulted Benson with the crowbar. He was convicted of burglary and assault with a weapon, both felonies. There was agreement that Stokes could not be convicted of both charges, as the assault with a weapon charge was the predicate offense for the burglary conviction. The dispute concerned which of the convictions should be vacated and whether the case should be remanded for resentencing.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed Stokes's conviction for assault with a weapon, as it was determined to be the predicate offense that merged into the principal offense of burglary. The court held that the assault with a weapon conviction should be vacated, following the precedent that when a criminal defendant is improperly convicted of two offenses arising from the same transaction, the remedy is to reverse the conviction for the lesser-included offense only and remand for resentencing. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the District Court to vacate the assault with a weapon conviction and for resentencing on the remaining burglary conviction.

State v. Wolverine

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 31

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: McGrath

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, June Wolverine, was charged with six misdemeanor traffic violations, including a third offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI). Wolverine was unable to attend her trial due to being in federal custody. The State of Montana moved to continue the trial, but did not provide information on when Wolverine would be released from federal custody. Wolverine subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the charges due to a lack of a speedy trial, as required by Montana law. The Justice Court denied Wolverine's motion, and she pleaded guilty to the DUI charge while reserving her right to appeal the speedy trial issue. The District Court affirmed the Justice Court's denial of the motion to dismiss, ruling that Wolverine's federal incarceration had a clear causal impact on the trial delay.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the decision of the District Court. The Supreme Court held that the State had failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in Wolverine's trial. The State knew Wolverine was in federal custody and had ample time to ask for Wolverine’s temporary release for trial or to notify the Justice Court about the looming deadline for a speedy trial. Yet, the State did nothing as the deadline passed. The Supreme Court concluded that the State did not fulfill its obligation to try the defendant in a timely manner, thus violating Wolverine's right to a speedy trial. The court reversed the District Court's decision and ruled in favor of Wolverine.

State v. Miller

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 951

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Miller-Lerman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The appellant, Jordon J. Miller, was convicted and sentenced for second degree murder following a plea agreement. The charge stemmed from an incident when shots were fired at a passing vehicle, resulting in the death of Jade Lea. Miller appealed, claiming that the district court erred in overruling his motion to withdraw his plea, that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated, that the court imposed an excessive sentence, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Nebraska Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the overruling of Miller's motion to withdraw his plea, noting that a defendant’s change of mind alone is not a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea. The court also found that the record on appeal was not sufficient to review Miller's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in Miller's sentencing. As such, the court affirmed Miller’s conviction and sentence.

People ex rel. Rankin v Brann

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00850

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Garcia

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, the defendant was initially charged with a felony, released on bail, and then arrested three more times for additional violent felonies. The People sought to revoke the defendant's bail on the basis that he had allegedly committed additional felonies. The court remanded the defendant, and his counsel sought his release via a habeas proceeding. The Appellate Division decided that before the court could revoke the defendant's bail, it had to follow certain procedural requirements under CPL 530.60 (2) (c) and determine that there was reasonable cause to believe the defendant had committed the additional crimes.

The Court of Appeals held that where a defendant is initially charged with a qualifying felony offense, released on bail, and subsequently accused of committing additional violent felonies, the securing order may be modified under either CPL 530.60 (1) or (2) (a), both of which provide a mechanism for revoking a defendant's bail. However, the choice of provision must be supported by the record.

Under CPL 530.60 (1), the court must consider relevant factors to assess the defendant's risk of flight and determine how the alleged additional crimes have changed the defendant's risk profile. The court must make clear on the record that its decision is based on consideration of these factors and not merely on the allegation that the defendant committed additional felonies.

Under CPL 530.60 (2) (a), the court may consider whether, after observing certain procedural safeguards, there is reasonable cause to believe the additional crimes have been committed such that the defendant poses a danger to the community requiring remand.

In this case, the Court of Appeals found that the record did not sufficiently demonstrate that the modification was based on factors informing the defendant's likelihood of returning to court. Therefore, the determination was presumed to rest upon the fact of the subsequent arrest and the danger the defendant posed to the community, and the failure to follow the procedural requirements of subdivision (2) (c) was considered error.

The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, the habeas corpus proceeding was converted into a declaratory judgment action, and judgment was granted in accordance with the opinion.

People v Aguilar

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00849

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Singas

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a dispute involving a fatal stabbing outside a Manhattan bar in 2000, defendant Gonzalo Aguilar appealed his conviction of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and assault in the first degree. Aguilar asserted that the trial court erred by not including a reinstruction on the justification defense in its response to a jury note, and that the court's interested witness charge violated his constitutional right to due process.

The Court of Appeals of the State of New York disagreed with Aguilar's claims. The court held that the trial court's response to the jury's note was meaningful and appropriate. It reasoned that the jury's note had specifically requested the definitions of the charges, not a reinstruction on the justification defense. Furthermore, the court noted that the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the jury's request and had significant discretion in determining the scope and nature of its response. The court also pointed out that the jury did not seek further instruction or clarification after the recharge, indicating that the trial court's response was satisfactory.

In addition, the court found that Aguilar's argument concerning the interested witness charge was unpreserved as it had not been raised in the trial court and no exception to the preservation rule applied in this case. Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division.

People v Boone

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00928

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Curran

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In two cases, People v Boone and People v Cotto, the Court of Appeals of New York State ruled on a central question related to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The question was whether the 30-day deadline for conducting a risk level classification hearing should be measured from the date an offender is released from the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), even if proceedings to civilly commit the offender under the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA) are pending or contemplated. The court ruled that the deadline should indeed be measured from the offender's release by DOCCS upon the completion of a prison sentence, irrespective of whether the state is considering instituting, or has already instituted, proceedings under SOMTA. The court also ruled that offenders are not denied due process by having a SORA hearing at a time when they may be civilly committed under SOMTA.

In both cases, the defendants had been convicted of sex offenses against minors and were sentenced to prison terms. Prior to their release dates, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders classified both as level three (highest risk) offenders. Before the SORA hearings were held, the Attorney General filed petitions to civilly commit both defendants. The defendants argued that the SORA hearings were premature and violated their right to due process because they were not permitted to challenge their SORA risk assessment at a meaningful time—i.e., when they would actually be released into the community. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, concluding that the hearings were not premature and did not deny the defendants due process.

People v Ramirez

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00848

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Cannataro

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case of People v. Ramirez, Fernando Ramirez, the defendant, was convicted of causing a three-car collision while intoxicated, resulting in one death and four serious injuries. During the trial, which took place amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, safety protocols such as social distancing and mask-wearing were implemented. The defendant objected to these measures, claiming they impeded his ability to fully observe the facial expressions of prospective jurors, thereby infringing on his rights to be present at all material stages of his trial and to meaningfully contribute to his defense. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that neither a defendant's right to be present during jury selection nor due process requires that a defendant have a simultaneous, unobstructed view of the entirety of every prospective juror's face during jury selection. The Court affirmed that the safety protocols did not violate the defendant's right to be present and observe the jury selection process, and there was no violation of due process.

The defendant also requested a mistrial after observing the deceased victim's surviving spouse crying in the courtroom. He argued that this could induce undue sympathy from the jury. However, the trial court denied the motion, as the crying was not conspicuous and there was no indication the jury was aware of it. The court further offered a curative instruction to prevent sympathy, which the defense counsel declined. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that there were no grounds for a mistrial.

People v Seignious

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00927

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Garcia

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with burglary in the second degree as a sexually motivated felony, which required the prosecution to prove both that the defendant committed the burglary and that his motivation was his own sexual gratification. The trial court also charged second-degree burglary as a lesser included offense. The defendant was acquitted of the sexually motivated felony but convicted of second-degree burglary. The Appellate Division reversed the burglary conviction, stating that the prosecution had so limited their theory of the case to the sexually motivated felony that the defendant did not have adequate notice to defend against the lesser offense. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed the Appellate Division's decision.

According to the Court of Appeals, the lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary was properly submitted to the jury. The court held that the prosecution had not abandoned their pursuit of a conviction for second-degree burglary, nor had they so restricted their theory of the crime that the defendant was deprived of notice. The court also stated that the indictment charging the defendant with second-degree burglary as a sexually motivated felony provided sufficient notice of the lesser included offense. As such, the defendant's conviction of burglary in the second degree and sentence were reinstated, and the case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the defendant's excessive sentence claim regarding that conviction.

People v Watts

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00926

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case of a sex offender diagnosed with severe schizophrenia and psychosis, the New York Court of Appeals held that due process does not require a competency examination before a sex offender's risk level can be determined under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The defendant, who was found not mentally fit to stand trial, argued that his risk classification hearing should have been adjourned until he was deemed competent to understand the proceedings. The court disagreed, stating the numerous safeguards already provided under SORA, including the rights to notice, counsel, disclosure of relevant information, and an opportunity to object and present evidence at a hearing, adequately balance the interests involved. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the classification hearing was premature under SORA itself, holding that SORA authorizes risk-level determinations "[30] calendar days prior" to a registrant's release from incarceration, regardless of pending civil commitment proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to designate the defendant as a level two (moderate risk) sex offender.

State v. Fischer

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 29

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Crothers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota had to decide whether the district court had implicitly accepted a plea agreement by accepting a guilty plea from the defendant, Devin Fischer. Fischer had initially entered a plea agreement with the State, in which he would plead guilty to a reduced charge of menacing, with the remaining charges of burglary, reckless endangerment, and tampering with physical evidence being dismissed. The district court accepted Fischer's guilty plea, but ultimately rejected the plea agreement after hearing victim impact statements and viewing video evidence of the crime. Fischer was subsequently tried and found guilty of terrorizing and reckless endangerment.

Fischer appealed, arguing that by accepting his guilty plea, the district court had implicitly accepted the plea agreement. The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed, ruling that a court can accept a guilty plea without accepting an associated plea agreement. The court found that the district court had acted within its discretion to separately consider the guilty plea and the plea agreement.

Fischer also argued that the district court judge should have recused himself after making a comment that, after viewing the video evidence, he did not see how Fischer could be found not guilty of all charges. The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected this argument, finding that the judge had not demonstrated bias as the comments were made outside of the presence of the jury and were a necessary part of the judge's explanation for rejecting the plea agreement.

The court affirmed Fischer's convictions for terrorizing and reckless endangerment, as well as the district court's denial of Fischer's motion for recusal.

State v. Rinde

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 33

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Rozalyn Rinde appealed from a criminal judgment after the district court revoked her probation and resentenced her. Rinde was initially charged with five counts, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult. She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to 360 days with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, with all but 63 days suspended for two years of supervised probation. However, after multiple violations of her probation, the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to 360 days on the misdemeanor count and to five years on the felony count. Rinde argued that the court imposed an illegal sentence, exceeding the maximum penalty allowed at the time of her original offenses. She also claimed that the sentence violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court had not imposed an illegal sentence. The court stated that the determining factor in applying the statute governing probation revocation (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6)) was the date of the original convictions and sentencing, not the date of the offense. Since Rinde’s original conviction and sentencing occurred after the August 2021 amendment of the statute, which removed the restriction on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant in the case of a suspended sentence, the court was not limited by the pre-amendment version of the statute. Therefore, the court was within its rights to resentence Rinde to five years on her felony count. The court also rejected Rinde's claim of an "ex post facto application," stating that the amendment did not increase the maximum possible punishment for her crime, nor did it make an innocent act criminal, aggravate the crime, or relax the evidence required to prove the offense. As such, the court affirmed the lower court's decision.

In re T.D.S.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-595

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: DETERS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a juvenile, T.D.S., knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before providing statements to the police. The statements related to a homicide investigation involving another juvenile.

The case originated from an incident in 2019, where the Police responded to a report of shots fired in an apartment building and discovered a male juvenile, S.G., with gunshot wounds. The police investigation led them to T.D.S., who was then 15 years old. During questioning at T.D.S.'s mother’s house, T.D.S. initially denied involvement in the shooting but later admitted to accidentally shooting S.G. while playing with a gun. After these statements, T.D.S. was read his Miranda rights and questioned further. He was subsequently charged with several offenses including murder and felonious assault.

T.D.S. argued that the juvenile court should have granted a motion to suppress all the statements he made to the police officers, contending that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. After considering the totality of the circumstances, including T.D.S.'s age, prior criminal experience, and the nature of the police interrogation, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower courts' decisions that T.D.S. had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The court found that the police did not engage in coercion and that T.D.S.'s waiver was not involuntary.

T.D.S. also argued that his post-Miranda statements should be presumed inadmissible under the court's previous reasoning in a case called State v. Farris. However, the court found that T.D.S. had not properly raised this argument in the lower courts, so it was forfeited. Even if he had preserved the argument, the court found that the record did not support his claims under the Farris case.

Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts, finding that T.D.S.'s post-Miranda statements were properly admitted at trial.

State v. Nicholson

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-604

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Fischer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case of State v. Nicholson, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentences for the aggravated murders of two individuals. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, as it demonstrated that the defendant acted with prior calculation and design. Additionally, the court found no error in the trial court's decision to admit certain evidence, such as photographs from the crime scene and testimonies about the defendant's relationships with the victims. Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's arguments regarding the adequacy of the jury instructions and the admission of victim-impact evidence, among other issues. The court concluded that the defendant did not establish any grounds for reversal of his convictions or sentences.

Commonwealth v. Chisebwe

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 4-7 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: DOUGHERTY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Daniel D. Chisebwe, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support the summary convictions of Daniel Chisebwe for violating two provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code: 75 Pa.C.S. §1511 (Carrying and exhibiting driver’s license on demand) and 75 Pa.C.S. §1311 (Registration card to be signed and exhibited on demand). Chisebwe repeatedly refused to produce his driver’s license and registration card after being stopped for speeding and did so only about twenty-five minutes into the traffic stop, when the police were about to remove him from his car and take him to the police station.

The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The Court found that the phrase "upon demand" in the relevant statutory provisions required Chisebwe to produce his driver’s license and registration card immediately or nearly immediately when requested by a police officer. Chisebwe's delayed production of these documents, about twenty-five minutes into the traffic stop, was far from prompt and therefore did not satisfy the statutes.

The Court also held that the safe-harbor provisions of the statutory provisions did not apply to Chisebwe. These provisions permit a driver to produce his license and registration card either at the office of the police officer or the office of the issuing authority, which did not happen in this case. Instead, Chisebwe produced the documents on the side of the road, which did not comport with the specific office-production requirements of the safe-harbor provisions. The Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court upholding Chisebwe’s judgment of sentence.

State V. Foshay

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 12

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of South Dakota heard the case of Steven Foshay, who was deemed incompetent to stand trial on four criminal charges in 2017. He was committed to a state facility for competency restoration treatment, which remained unsuccessful over the years. In 2021, Foshay requested the dismissal of his charges, citing South Dakota Codified Law (SDCL) 23A-10A-14, which mandates the dismissal of a defendant’s criminal charges when there is no significant probability that the defendant will become competent to proceed in the foreseeable future. The circuit court denied his motion, and Foshay appealed.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit court's decision. The court found that the circuit court had erred by not dismissing Foshay's charges in accordance with the relevant statute, given the undisputed testimony that there was no substantial probability that Foshay would become competent in the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the entry of an order dismissing the criminal charges against Foshay. Any further determinations regarding Foshay's commitment would need to be addressed through a civil commitment proceeding.

State v. McGuire

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0984-19

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: RICHARDSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ruled that a peace officer can legally arrest a suspect, without a warrant, for killing another person while driving intoxicated, even if the accident did not occur in the officer's presence. This interpretation is based on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1), which allows any peace officer to arrest a person found in a “suspicious place” and the circumstances reasonably show that the person is guilty of a felony or breach of peace.

The case involved Sean Michael McGuire, who was arrested on suspicion of causing another person's death by driving while intoxicated and failing to stop and render aid. Prior to his arrest, McGuire hit a motorcycle, causing the death of its driver, then drove to a nearby gas station where he was later found by the police. The police officer noted that McGuire exhibited signs of intoxication and had "red glassy eyes" and "an odor of alcohol coming from his person." As a result, the officer formed probable cause to believe that both a felony and breach of the peace had occurred.

The court found that McGuire's arrest met the requirements of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1) and thus reversed the court of appeals and the trial court’s suppression of McGuire’s arrest and all evidence arising from it. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.

State v. Armstrong

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 5

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: REIBER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the State of Vermont appealed the superior court’s dismissal of charges against defendant Michael Armstrong on speedy-trial grounds. It had been more than nineteen years since the charges against defendant were first brought and more than fifteen years since defendant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding that the State had failed in its obligation to reevaluate defendant’s competency, thereby violating defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the delay was primarily due to defendant's incompetency, which was not attributable to the State, and the State had no duty to seek a reevaluation of the defendant's competency absent an indication of changed circumstances. The Court concluded that the defendant did not make a sufficient claim of denial of his right to a speedy trial, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charges, and remanded for further proceedings.

State v. Denzel Lafayette

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 6

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Vermont, the defendant, Denzel Lafayette, was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation by luring a child, and carrying a weapon while committing a felony. The case revolved around an incident in which Lafayette had sexual intercourse with a 15-year old girl, whom he had been communicating with on Facebook. Lafayette had also allegedly shown her a firearm during their encounter.

The jury found Lafayette guilty of sexual assault and carrying a weapon while committing a felony. On appeal, Lafayette argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court committed an error by not instructing the jury that it had to find that the carrying of the gun was related to the sexual assault.

The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with Lafayette's claims. The court found that the victim's testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Lafayette guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of sexual assault. It further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for carrying a weapon while committing a felony, as the gun had the potential to facilitate the sexual assault. The court also found no error in the jury instruction, as the relationship between the carrying of the weapon and the sexual assault was self-evident. Therefore, the court affirmed both of Lafayette's convictions.

However, the court agreed with Lafayette's contention that certain probation conditions were overbroad and unduly restrictive. The court remanded the case to the trial court to strike one probation condition and to make findings, modify, or strike portions of two other challenged conditions.

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