Herrow v. Attorney General United States of America

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-1854

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: Roth

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Yahye Herrow, a member of the minority Bandabow Tribe in Somalia, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his claims for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Herrow, who had been granted asylum in 2000, was ordered to be removed following his 2018 conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the BIA's determination that "Repatriated Minority Somalis" did not constitute a cognizable social group for the purpose of withholding of removal. However, the court found that the BIA had failed to consider evidence favorable to Herrow's CAT claim, which contended that he was likely to face torture upon return to Somalia and that the Somali government would acquiesce to such torture. The court granted Herrow's petition in part and remanded the case to the BIA for a more comprehensive review of the evidence related to his CAT claim.

Rosemond v. Hudgins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-7188

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: Agee

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a federal case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the petitioner, James Rosemond, appealed a district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. Rosemond, who was serving multiple life sentences for offenses related to drug trafficking and murder, claimed that his continued detention was unconstitutional because then-President Donald Trump had commuted his sentence to time served during a phone conversation with two of Rosemond's supporters, Jim Brown and Monique Brown. The Browns signed declarations stating that during the December 2020 call, they believed President Trump had decided to commute Rosemond's sentence. However, no clemency warrant or official record of clemency for Rosemond exists, and his clemency petition is still listed as "pending" on the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney website.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rosemond’s petition. The court held that while a written document is not constitutionally required for a presidential commutation, the evidence provided by Rosemond, namely the Browns' declarations, did not establish that President Trump actually commuted his sentence. The court found that President Trump's alleged statements during the phone call were forward-looking and indicative of a desire to commute Rosemond's sentence in the future, rather than a declaration of a completed act of clemency. The court also noted the established practice of documenting acts of presidential clemency, which was consistently followed by President Trump throughout his presidency, and emphasized the constitutional separation of powers, which vests the clemency power exclusively in the President.

Timms v. U. S. Attorney General

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-6338

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: QUATTLEBAUM

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a case involving Gerald Wayne Timms, who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, following his sentence for a child pornography conviction. During his civil commitment, Timms was convicted of and sentenced for two separate federal crimes. After serving the prison terms for these offenses, his civil commitment continued. Timms argued that his civil commitment should have ended when his first criminal sentence started, and he claimed that certain conditions of his criminal confinement violated the requirements of the Act. He also contended that the application of the Act violated his constitutional rights.

However, the court held that a person ordered to be civilly detained after a finding of sexual dangerousness remains committed until a court finds that he is no longer sexually dangerous and that an intervening criminal sentence has no impact on the civil commitment. The court also held that the Attorney General did not fail to meet his statutory obligation to detain Timms in a suitable facility and that the Attorney General was not required to seek recommitment following Timms' sentences. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Timms' petition for habeas corpus relief.

US v. Castellon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4055

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Diaz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had to decide whether a defendant could waive his right to be physically present at a resentencing hearing, and whether such an order denying his request for resentencing in absentia is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The defendant, Heverth Castellon, argued that he could waive his right to be present at the resentencing hearing per Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(1)(B), which allows a defendant who is voluntarily absent during sentencing to waive his right to be present. The district court had ruled that the Rule allows a defendant to exercise this right only by "absconding or disrupting the [sentencing] proceedings."

While the court explained that the text of the Rule and their previous precedent suggest that a noncapital defendant can voluntarily waive his right to be present at sentencing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This is because the district court's order compelling the defendant's presence at resentencing did not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the defendant’s right to waive his presence at resentencing was not an "important right" that would be lost irreparably if review awaited final judgment, which is a necessary condition for invoking the collateral order doctrine. Therefore, the court could not entertain the defendant's appeal until after the imposition of a sentence.

US v. Robinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4588

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: NIEMEYER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the appellant, Ricky Demarco Robinson, challenged the enhanced sentence he received for possession of a firearm by a felon. The enhancement was based on U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which increases the advisory sentencing range when the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions qualifying as either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense.” Robinson argued that his prior conviction for North Carolina assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation should not be deemed a "crime of violence," even though a previous ruling (United States v. Rice) had categorized it as such. Robinson claimed that the Rice decision was no longer binding because it relied on an analysis that the Supreme Court later prohibited in United States v. Taylor. The Taylor decision rejected an analysis that depends on survey evidence as to how the crime is “normally committed or usually prosecuted.”

The Court of Appeals disagreed with Robinson's contention. It concluded that the Rice decision remains valid and binding because it was based on an interpretation of the text of the North Carolina assault by strangulation legislation and on North Carolina case law. The court stated that the Rice decision’s reference to survey evidence was only used to confirm the holding and was not fundamental to it. Consequently, the court affirmed Robinson’s enhanced sentence, ruling that his prior North Carolina conviction for assault by strangulation qualifies categorically as a conviction for a crime of violence.

US v. Wiley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4458

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Diaz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Maurice Owen Wiley, Jr., for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence. Wiley and his coconspirators planned to rob the owners of a restaurant, believing the owners kept the business's profits at their home. Wiley drove the group to the owners' home, where they exchanged gunfire with the owners, resulting in the death of one of the owners. Wiley appealed his convictions on several grounds.

First, he argued that his indictment for conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence failed to state an offense and that the district court constructively amended it. The court rejected this argument, stating that the indictment alleges the statutory conspiracy offense proscribed by § 924(o) by mirroring the statute’s wording, and the government is not required to specify a predicate crime of violence offense in an indictment for a § 924(c) offense.

Second, Wiley contended that the district court erred in denying his Batson challenges (claims that the prosecution excluded jurors on the basis of race). The court found no clear error in the district court's denial of Wiley's Batson claim.

Third, Wiley argued that the district court violated his due process rights by not allowing him to define “reasonable doubt” in his closing argument. The court rejected this argument, stating that the district court has broad authority to limit closing argument to ensure that it doesn’t impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial.

Lastly, Wiley challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. The court found there was sufficient evidence that Wiley entered into an agreement that contemplated both Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm to execute the robbery. Additionally, the court found there was sufficient evidence to show that Wiley and his coconspirators targeted the proceeds of a business engaged in interstate commerce.

United States v. Silva

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30821

Opinion Date: February 12, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an appeal by Evaristo Contreras Silva, a Mexican citizen who was convicted of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). Silva entered the United States unlawfully and was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2018. He was informed of his illegal status and given an I-94 form. Silva argued that he believed he was lawfully in the U.S. based on the I-94 form and his interactions with immigration officials. In February 2022, Silva was found in possession of a firearm after a domestic violence call from his wife. He was subsequently charged and convicted for firearm possession as an illegal alien.

On appeal, Silva argued that the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was unlawfully in the U.S. when he possessed the firearm. He based his belief on the I-94 form, advice from his immigration attorneys, adherence to his bond conditions, and various applications to change his status after his arrest.

However, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Government provided sufficient evidence that Silva knew he was in the U.S. unlawfully when he possessed a firearm according to the standard set in Rehaif v. United States. The court considered Silva's unlawful entry, his detention by DHS, his admission of unlawful entry in an application for status adjustment, and the pending status of his immigration applications at the time he possessed the firearm. The court concluded that although there was evidence supporting Silva's belief of lawful presence, it did not justify a judgment of acquittal as the evidence was not definitive and the issue was appropriately presented to the jury.

USA v. Dinkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30249

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to order Marty Johnson, the owner of a mental health rehabilitation clinic, and Keesha Dinkins, an employee of the clinic, to pay $3.5 million in restitution. Johnson and Dinkins had pleaded guilty to charges related to a fraudulent billing scheme targeting Medicaid that lasted from 2014 to 2018. On the day before their jury trial was set to begin, both defendants pled guilty to their respective charges and agreed in their plea deals to recommend $3.5 million in restitution. However, after their pleas were accepted, both defendants objected to the restitution order, arguing that it was erroneous. Johnson challenged the loss and restitution calculation while Dinkins argued that the entire loss should not have been attributed to her. The court held that the defendants were bound by the plea agreements they had made and affirmed the district court’s order for each defendant to pay $3.5 million in restitution. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the pleas, the restitution amount did not exceed the actual loss, and the district court appropriately used the total loss amount when calculating Dinkins’s sentence.

USA v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30242

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case involved Marty Johnson, the owner of a mental health rehabilitation clinic, and Keesha Dinkins, an employee of the same clinic. Both defendants fraudulently billed Medicaid for illegitimate services between 2014 and January 2018. On the day their jury trial was scheduled to begin, Johnson pled guilty to conspiracy to commit healthcare and wire fraud, and Dinkins pled guilty to misprision of a felony. Each of their plea agreements stipulated a loss of $3.5 million and recommended that the judge order $3.5 million in restitution to the government. The district court accepted the defendants' recommendations and ordered each to pay $3.5 million in restitution. After receiving the benefit of their plea bargain, both defendants argued that the $3.5 million order was erroneous. Dinkins also contended that under the sentencing guidelines, the entire loss should not have been attributed to her. The court held the defendants to the plea bargain they had made and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals determined that the district court's restitution order was valid under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).

USA v. Ortega

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50100

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Clement

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, Miguel Angel Ortega, who pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, appealed the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. The enhancement was based on a conversation he had with his wife regarding a letter of support she was writing for his sentencing proceeding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated Ortega's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

The court reasoned that Ortega's conduct, i.e., advising his wife about what to say in her letter to the court and in her statement at the sentencing hearing, did not constitute obstruction of justice. The government had argued that Ortega was unlawfully influencing a witness's testimony and directing his wife to attribute his conduct to drug addiction, which she lacked personal knowledge of. However, the court found no evidence that Ortega urged his wife to provide false or misleading information. It also noted that the facts Ortega instructed his wife to include in her statement were all supported by the factual record.

The court clarified that the obstruction-of-justice enhancement applies if: (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.

In this case, the court concluded, the government failed to show that Ortega's conduct met these requirements. Therefore, the court vacated Ortega's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.

United States v. Allen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-2158

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: NALBANDIAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involved defendant Antwaun Allen who was found guilty of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The defendant had been involved in a police sting operation where he sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant. At sentencing, he requested a downward variance from his Guidelines range, arguing the government's role in his offense, criticizing the Guidelines' treatment of meth purity, and pointing out mitigating offense and character traits. Ultimately, he was sentenced to 108 months, at the bottom of his Guidelines range.

On appeal, Allen puts forth three arguments: (1) his sentence is procedurally unreasonable as the district court failed to address the government's provocation of his offense, (2) his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court ceded its sentencing discretion to Congress, and (3) his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court relied solely on the meth's weight and purity, neglecting his "whole person."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all three arguments. The court held that the district court properly addressed all non-frivolous arguments raised by Allen, did not cede its discretion to Congress, and did not abuse its discretion in weighing sentencing factors. The court affirmed Allen's sentence of 108 months.

United States v. Belcher

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1650

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: GIBBONS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Deaunta Belcher who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for his participation in a murder-for-hire scheme, hindering the investigation of a federal offense, and two other offenses. Belcher appealed his conviction, arguing that his murder-for-hire conviction was invalid because the government and the court constructively amended the indictment, and therefore he was sentenced for a crime he was not charged with. He also claimed that his obstruction conviction was invalid due to the government's prejudicial variation from the indictment at trial. Lastly, Belcher argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the obstruction charge.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the government constructively amended Belcher's superseding indictment as to his charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), the federal murder-for-hire statute. However, the court found that despite the constructive amendment, Belcher was not entitled to relief because he was aware from the outset that the government was pursuing an enhanced penalty under the "death results" statutory enhancement of § 1958(a).

Regarding the claim of indictment variance, the court held that the government did not impermissibly vary the superseding indictment with reference to evidence uncovered at trial in response to Belcher's motions for acquittal. Thus, the court found no prejudicial variance.

Lastly, the court found that the government offered sufficient evidence at trial to convict Belcher of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) because the evidence showed that Belcher tried to deceive law enforcement from the outset by suggesting that the shooter killed the victim because he was an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

Moorer v. City of Chicago

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1067

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this federal case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Thomas Moorer, who had been arrested and indicted on charges including murder and attempted murder, challenged the constitutionality of his pretrial detention, claiming that there was no probable cause for his arrest. Moorer was ultimately acquitted by a jury of all charges. The defendants in the case were officers of the Chicago Police Department.

The case arose from a fatal shooting that took place in an apartment shared by multiple people. Multiple witnesses, including Edwin Ramos, whose brother Edward was killed in the shooting, identified Moorer as the perpetrator. Edwin informed the police that the man who entered the apartment was nicknamed “Boom.” Moorer was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree murder and other crimes, and a grand jury returned a 135-count indictment against him.

Moorer claimed that the witness identifications were unreliable and that police failed to properly investigate his alibi. He argued that the prosecutors would have concluded there was no probable cause if they had been properly informed of all the facts known to the officers.

However, the Court of Appeals found that the officers did have probable cause to arrest and detain Moorer, based on seven independent witness identifications. The court noted that the question for pretrial detention is not whether the officers have proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime, but whether a reasonable person would have a sound reason to believe the suspect committed a crime. The court concluded that Moorer had not identified any facts known to the defendants that would eliminate probable cause.

Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the district court, which had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

USA v. Christophel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1542

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Rovner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Christopher Christophel, was convicted of knowingly attempting to persuade, induce, or entice a minor to engage in sexual activity. He was convicted based on his online communications with an undercover federal agent who was posing as a 15-year-old girl. Christophel appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that, in his view, misstated the elements of the offense.

The specific issue on appeal was whether the language of a particular jury instruction, which stated that the government did not need to prove that the defendant intended to have sex with the minor, only that he intended to entice the minor to have sex with him, accurately summarized the law. Christophel contended that this instruction described a wider range of behavior than that proscribed by the statute.

The appellate court held that, when viewed in its entirety, the jury instruction did not misstate the law. Although the term "causing ... assent" might suggest unintentional conduct when read out of context, when read in the context of the entire instruction, it was best understood as a shorthand reference to the specific conduct described in the first paragraph of the instruction: knowingly taking a substantial step with the intent to commit the offense of enticement of a minor.

Even if the jury instruction could have been clearer, the court found that Christophel was not prejudiced by any potential error. Given the overwhelming evidence of Christophel's intent, any potential error would have been harmless. The court affirmed the judgment.

USA v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2932

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Wood

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Adrian L. Johnson was pulled over by a Deputy Sheriff for driving with a suspended license. The officer's trained dog indicated the presence of a controlled substance in Johnson's car, leading to a search of the vehicle. The officer found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and two handguns. Johnson was subsequently charged with possession of drugs with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He moved to suppress all evidence, arguing that the search of his car violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, and Johnson pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that the officer did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop to conduct the dog sniff, and that the subsequent search of Johnson's car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officer had probable cause to search the car because the dog's alerts indicated the presence of contraband. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Estate of Nash v. Folsom

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2860

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal by several Missouri public officials who were denied qualified immunity by a lower court regarding five claims arising from a murder prosecution. The murder case, involving Donald Nash who was eventually convicted for the murder of Judy Spencer, was reopened in 2007, 25 years after the crime occurred. The officials based their case on a theory that DNA evidence found under Spencer's fingernails belonged to Nash, which they asserted could not have remained present if Spencer had washed her hair after their last encounter.

Nash was convicted and spent 11 years in prison until the Missouri Supreme Court set aside his conviction in 2020. The charges were dismissed after DNA testing on the shoelace used to strangle Spencer supported Nash’s noninvolvement. Nash and his wife filed a lawsuit against the officials, claiming violations of rights including unlawful arrest and detention, fabrication of evidence, failure to investigate, violations of rights of access to courts, and violation of the right to familial and marital associations.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the appeals on the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, finding that the omission of certain exculpatory facts from the probable cause affidavit negated probable cause for Nash's arrest. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim alleging violation of the right to familial and marital associations, as this was not a clearly established constitutional right in 2008. The court dismissed the officials' appeal on the remaining claims due to lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of material fact to be resolved by a jury.

United States v. Rogers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1461

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Dewanis Rogers, sought a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. Rogers had been found guilty in 2008 of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a protected location, following two or more prior felony drug convictions. He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, as prescribed by statute. In 2022, Rogers requested that his sentence be reduced under the provisions of the First Step Act. The district court denied this motion, determining that Rogers was ineligible for relief under the Act. Rogers appealed this decision, disputing his ineligibility.

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that even if Rogers was eligible for relief under the First Step Act, the district court could not have lawfully reduced his sentence due to the mandatory term of imprisonment prescribed by statute. The court explained that Congress had not expressly repealed the mandatory punishment for Rogers’s offense in the First Step Act, and that the change in law cited by Rogers did not appear in the sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 made retroactive by the First Step Act. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision.

GUZMAN-MALDONADO V. GARLAND

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-9

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Hurwitz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Israeil Guzman-Maldonado, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of three counts of armed robbery under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1904(A) in 2019. He was sentenced to concurrent eight-year terms for the first two counts and two years of probation for the third. In 2022, an immigration judge ordered Guzman's removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense and two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising from a single scheme. Guzman appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal, prompting him to petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit denied Guzman's petition for review, concluding that a conviction for armed robbery under A.R.S. § 13-1904(A), for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year, is categorically an aggravated felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), thereby giving rise to removability. Applying the categorical approach, the court compared the elements of the generic federal crime and of Arizona armed robbery and concluded that Guzman’s conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1904(A) necessarily required proof of each element of generic theft. The court rejected Guzman's arguments that the Arizona statute encompasses "consensual" takings or the theft of services, both of which would have made it broader than generic theft.

Sherman v. Gittere

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 16-99000

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Bumatay

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case of Donald Sherman, who was convicted of robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder in Nevada, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decision to deny Sherman's habeas corpus petition. Sherman had argued that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the trial court excluded certain impeaching evidence about Dr. Bauer’s daughter, whom Sherman had dated.

Sherman claimed that this evidence would have countered the prosecution's narrative that Sherman had murdered Dr. Bauer out of spite for his daughter after their breakup. Instead, he argued, the evidence would have shown that he was manipulated into confronting Dr. Bauer.

The Ninth Circuit found that Sherman's argument was not presented to the district court and, in any case, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) deferential standard of review was applicable because Sherman did not rebut the presumption that the Nevada Supreme Court adjudicated his federal constitutional claim on the merits.

On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that Sherman did not show that the Nevada Supreme Court's denial of his right-to-present-a-complete-defense claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The panel found that the Nevada Supreme Court's rulings on the exclusion of the evidence were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The panel also concluded that the Nevada Supreme Court's alternative conclusion that any error was harmless was not unreasonable.

USA V. PARKINS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50186

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Owens

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A man named Brett Wayne Parkins was convicted of aiming a laser pointer at a police helicopter. Police officers searched Parkins's apartment without a warrant after obtaining consent from his girlfriend. Parkins, who was present but not at the doorway of his apartment, verbally objected to the search. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must be physically present and expressly refuse consent to nullify a co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search. The court clarified that physical presence does not require the defendant to stand at the doorway — presence on the premises, including its immediate vicinity, is sufficient. The court ruled that Parkins was physically present on the premises and had expressly refused consent, so the search of his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court upheld the district court's denial of Parkins's motion to suppress his pre-arrest and post-arrest statements because Parkins was not subject to interrogation for his pre-arrest statements and his post-arrest statements at the police station were not a product of the unlawful search of his apartment. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.

United States v. Morales-Lopez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-4074

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: BALDOCK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the District of Utah's decision to dismiss the charge against Jonathan Alexander Morales-Lopez, who was accused of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). This statute prohibits any person who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm.

The district court held that the phrase "unlawful user" in the statute is unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to the facts of Morales-Lopez's case. However, the appellate court disagreed on both counts.

First, the appellate court held that the district court erred in considering whether § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional on its face. The court cited longstanding precedent that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot pose a facial challenge to it.

Second, the appellate court held that the district court erred in finding § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional as applied to Morales-Lopez's conduct. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence of a temporal nexus between Morales-Lopez's drug use and his possession of a firearm.

The facts of the case are as follows: Morales-Lopez and another man were caught stealing firearms and ammunition from a store in Utah. Morales-Lopez was found with a stolen gun and methamphetamine. He also admitted to using drugs regularly in the month prior to his arrest.

The appellate court concluded that the phrase "unlawful user" in § 922(g)(3) is clear in its application to Morales-Lopez's conduct and that the district court should reinstate the jury’s verdict. The case was remanded back to the district court with instructions to proceed accordingly.

Bowen v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11744

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a dispute that arose from a gang-related murder, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was called to examine whether the placement of two suspects (who were allegedly involved in the same crime) in a room together constituted an interrogation under Miranda rights. The case involved Jimmie Bowen, a member of the New Moneii gang, who was convicted for the murder of Pierre Roche and injuring two others. After his arrest, Bowen invoked his right to counsel, at which point the police ceased questioning him. However, they moved him to another room where Bernard Jones, another member of the gang and the alleged getaway driver, was present. The ensuing conversation between Bowen and Jones resulted in Bowen making incriminating statements, which were used in his trial. Bowen appealed, arguing that his placement in the room with Jones violated his Miranda rights. The district court agreed with Bowen, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision. The appeals court found that the Supreme Court's precedent was unclear on whether placing two suspects in a room together constitutes an interrogation under Miranda. The court held that because reasonable jurists could disagree about whether Bowen was "interrogated" in the interview room, federal courts lack the power to overturn his state criminal conviction. The appellate court further noted that the fact that Bowen incriminated himself does not necessarily mean it was "reasonably likely" that he would do so when Jones was placed in the room. The court concluded that the case fell into a gray area not clearly defined by Supreme Court precedent, and thus, Bowen's challenge did not warrant federal habeas relief. As such, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Calhoun v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10313

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Carnes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Thanquarius R. Calhoun was appealing the denial of his federal habeas petition following his conviction for felony murder and other crimes in the state of Georgia. Calhoun had led police on a high-speed chase that resulted in a passenger's death after law enforcement used a Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT) maneuver to stop his vehicle.

Calhoun's appeal argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel did not present a defense or request a jury instruction on the theory that the PIT maneuver, and not his own actions, was the proximate or intervening cause of the passenger's death.

Under Georgia law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, a defendant's act is not the "legal cause" of an injury or damage if some other act "intervenes." However, if the intervening act "could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrong-doer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrong-doer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act." In other words, proximate cause is not affected by a reasonably foreseeable intervening cause.

The Eleventh Circuit, giving deference to the Supreme Court of Georgia's interpretation of Georgia law, found that the PIT maneuver was reasonably foreseeable given Calhoun's reckless behavior during the police chase. As a result, the use of the maneuver did not break the causal chain linking Calhoun's actions to the passenger's death. Thus, Calhoun had not carried his burden to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if his counsel had argued that the PIT maneuver was an intervening cause. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Calhoun's habeas petition.

Rudolph v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 21-12828, 22-10135

Opinion Date: February 12, 2024

Judge: GRANT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed appeals from Eric Robert Rudolph, who had pled guilty to six federal arson charges and four counts of using a destructive device during a crime of violence in order to avoid the death penalty. As part of his plea deal, Rudolph had waived his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence, and to collaterally attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding. Despite this, Rudolph filed two petitions for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to vacate several of his sentences. He argued that his convictions for using an explosive during a crime of violence were unlawful in light of new Supreme Court precedent.

The Eleventh Circuit found that Rudolph’s § 2255 motions were, in fact, collateral attacks on his sentences, which his plea agreements did not permit. The court held that § 2255 is a mechanism for attacking sentences, not convictions. The court also rejected Rudolph's argument that his appeal waivers were unenforceable because he hadn't known he was waiving the right to collaterally attack his convictions, pointing out that the waivers explicitly included motions under § 2255. The court further declined to adopt a so-called "miscarriage of justice" exception to the enforceability of appeal waivers, which some other courts have recognized. The court affirmed the district courts' decisions denying Rudolph’s § 2255 motions.

Ephriam v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 21

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: HUDSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the defendant, Kevonce Ephriam, was appealing his conviction for capital murder. Ephriam was convicted for the death of his three-month-old son, whom he had custody of at the time of the incident. The child sustained numerous injuries, including bruises to his head, forehead, face, neck, and tongue; abrasions to his nose and neck; a torn frenulum; fractured ribs and vertebrae; and hemorrhaging in the soft tissue along his spinal column and on his neck, abdomen, and chest. Ephriam attempted to explain some of the injuries as accidents or results of his attempts to perform CPR, but his explanations were refuted by medical experts.

Ephriam argued that the State did not present sufficient evidence for capital murder and that his son's death could have been accidental. He also argued that the jury had to resort to speculation and conjecture to determine that he knowingly caused his son’s death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

The court affirmed the conviction, finding that substantial evidence supported the capital-murder conviction. The court reasoned that the defendant admitted to threatening to harm the child and the mother, and his explanations for the child's injuries were refuted by medical experts, which led the jury to reasonably conclude that the injuries were not accidental but were inflicted by the defendant. The court also stated that there was no dispute that the child was under fourteen and that Ephriam was over eighteen at the time of the murder, fulfilling the age criteria for capital murder under Arkansas law.

Hundley v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 19

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: BAKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In 1980, Thernell Hundley was convicted of capital murder and rape, and received a life sentence without parole. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders were unconstitutional, and Hundley's life sentence for capital murder was vacated. However, during his incarceration, Hundley had committed four additional felonies. As a result, the Jefferson County Circuit Court in Arkansas ruled that Hundley was ineligible for parole based on Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-607(c)(5), which states that inmates classified as fourth offenders are not eligible for parole.

Hundley appealed this decision, arguing that his rape conviction should be vacated as it was merged with the capital murder charge, that he should be eligible for parole under the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act, and that his parole eligibility should be determined by the law in effect when he committed his first crimes in 1979. He also challenged the inclusion of his two Class D felony convictions in determining his parole eligibility.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the circuit court's decision. The court ruled that Hundley's separate conviction for rape was not illegal and could not be vacated. The court further held that Hundley's parole eligibility was correctly determined based on the law in effect at the time he committed his last two felonies in 1988 and 1989, not the law at the time of his original crimes. The court also clarified that Hundley's parole ineligibility was based on his convictions for capital murder, rape, attempted first-degree murder and first-degree battery, not his two Class D felonies.

Neal v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 16

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: BAKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the first-degree murder conviction of Ricky Lewis Neal, a blind man who was sentenced as a violent-felony habitual offender to life imprisonment. The case arose from the death of Neal’s fiancée, Alice Cawley. Neal had expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel multiple times and sought to represent himself before trial. He also objected to the admission of hearsay evidence in the form of a lost voicemail from the victim saying that Neal was trying to kill her. The court ruled that Neal did not unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation, as his statements indicated that he was simply dissatisfied with his counsel and wanted new counsel, rather than wanting to waive his right to counsel. Regarding the hearsay evidence, the court found that the victim’s statement expressing fear of Neal fell within the hearsay exception for a declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, or sensation in Rule 803(3) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In re H.D.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082187(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant, Tommy Bonds, who was stopped by Officer Ryan Cameron of the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) leading to his arrest for a misdemeanor concealed firearm violation. Bonds claimed he was stopped because he was Black and filed a motion for relief under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, alleging racial bias in his stop. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the motion, accepting the officer's testimony that race played no role in his decision to stop the vehicle as he could not determine the race of the occupants from outside. The court did not consider the possibility of implicit bias, i.e., unconscious bias that could be influencing the officer's decisions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, held that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether the officer intended to discriminate on the basis of race, rather than considering the possibility of implicit bias. The Court of Appeal stated that the Racial Justice Act addresses both intentional and unintentional racial bias. The court remanded the case back to the trial court to conduct a new hearing, considering whether the officer's actions exhibited implicit bias on the basis of race.

The appellate court also commented on the admissibility of statistical evidence regarding police practices, stating that according to the Racial Justice Act, such evidence is admissible for determining whether a violation of the Act has occurred.

Mosby v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E080924M(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: MILLER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, the issue at hand revolves around the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA). The petitioner, Michael Earl Mosby III, was charged with the drive-by shooting of Darryl King-Divens, along with a gun enhancement and three special circumstances, including having committed multiple murders. The District Attorney sought the death penalty for Mosby, who had been previously convicted in Los Angeles County of two additional murders and attempted murder. Mosby filed a motion claiming that the District Attorney's decision to seek the death penalty violated the CRJA, which prohibits seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction on the basis of race. The trial court denied Mosby's motion, ruling that he had failed to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under the CRJA.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The court held that under the CRJA, a defendant must present not only statistical evidence of racial disparity in the charging of the death penalty but also evidence of nonminority defendants who were engaged in similar conduct and were similarly situated but charged with lesser offenses, to establish a prima facie case. The court found that Mosby had met his burden of establishing a prima facie case under the CRJA. Therefore, the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing at which the District Attorney could produce evidence of the relevant factors that were used to determine the charges against the nonminority defendants who were involved in similar conduct, and who were similarly situated to Mosby; and to provide any race-neutral reasons that it considered in deciding to charge Mosby with the death penalty.

P. v. Paul

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B320488(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Moor

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves Jeremiah Paul, who was convicted of possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction. Paul had pleaded no contest following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm by the trial court, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. He contended that the evidence of the firearm should have been excluded because law enforcement officers discovered it only after they unlawfully detained him to verify his parole status. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five found that the initial encounter between Paul and the officers was indeed an unlawful detention. The court pointed to several factors leading to this conclusion such as the positioning of the officers that blocked Paul from leaving, the officers approaching Paul from both sides of his car and shining their flashlights into his car, and the fact that the officers approached Paul while he was on his phone in a legally parked vehicle. The court held that these factors would lead a reasonable person to believe they are not free to leave, thus constituting a detention. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and vacated its order denying Paul's motion to suppress evidence. The court concluded that the officers would not have obtained Paul's parole status if they had not first unlawfully detained him and thus, the firearm was not lawfully obtained and should be suppressed.

People v. Cartwright

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080606M(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: DATO

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Kevin Eugene Cartwright, was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, robbery, burglary, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a prohibited person owning or possessing ammunition. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus 50 years to life, and a determinate prison term of 20 years four months. On appeal, Cartwright contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress video footage from the City of San Diego’s “City IQ” streetlight camera program and evidence derived from that footage. The Fourth Appellate District Division One of the Court of Appeal for the State of California affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that Cartwright did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when he traversed a public right of way in downtown San Diego in the middle of a business day. The court found that accessing the recordings from the City’s streetlight cameras did not amount to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, consequently, did not require a warrant. The court distinguished the cameras in this case from the aerial surveillance images and integrated police department systems addressed in other precedents, stating that the City's camera program stands alone and does not reveal the transit patterns of people throughout the county. The court concluded that the police did not conduct a "search" when they accessed footage from the City's streetlight cameras and, accordingly, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

People v. Kimble

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097389A(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the defendant, Kelly Vaughn Kimble, who was sentenced to 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement, sought resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483. He argued that the trial court erred in resentencing him under Senate Bill 483 without applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He further contended that he was entitled to application of the Reform Act’s revised penalties at his resentencing. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District disagreed. The court held that the Reform Act created a specific resentencing process for offenders sentenced under the former Three Strikes law, which requires consideration of various factors, such as the offender's criminal history, disciplinary record, and other relevant information. The court further noted that the Reform Act provided the only path for relief under the Reform Act for defendants who had already been sentenced. Thus, the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to automatic resentencing under the Reform Act as part of his resentencing under Senate Bill 483. The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

McGuiness v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 438, 2022

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: Legrow

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Kathleen McGuiness, an elected state official in Delaware, was indicted and tried on various criminal charges related to her conduct while in office. She was convicted of three charges and acquitted of two others. She appealed, claiming that the trial was fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the trial was fair and rejected most of McGuiness's arguments. However, the court agreed with McGuiness that the legal insufficiency of one of the charges resulted in a spillover of evidence that prejudiced the jury’s consideration of a closely linked charge. Therefore, the court reversed McGuiness's conviction for Official Misconduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the trial court's decisions and McGuiness's convictions on all other charges.

Creech v. State

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 51229

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the dismissal of a successive post-conviction petition for relief filed by Thomas Eugene Creech, an inmate sentenced to death in 1995 for the murder of fellow inmate David Jensen. The district court had dismissed Creech's petition as untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719, which requires capital defendants to file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known within forty-two days of the filing of the judgment imposing the death sentence. Creech argued that his death sentence, which was imposed by a judge without the participation of a jury, was unlawful based on the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the U.S. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. He also claimed that societal norms have evolved to the point where his judge-imposed death sentence is now deemed cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Supreme Court held that Creech failed to articulate a claim based on information he did not know or could not have reasonably known within the forty-two day period, thus upholding the district court's dismissal of his petition as untimely.

Creech v. State

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50336

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, the appellant, Thomas Eugene Creech, appealed the district court's decision to dismiss his successive post-conviction petition as untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719. Creech argued that his petition was timely due to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, which he believed represented a triggering event that restarted the forty-two-day period for filing a petition under Idaho Code section 19-2719. Creech was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of a fellow prisoner in 1981. He filed multiple appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief, all of which were denied. His current petition relates to his 1995 death sentence.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss Creech's successive petition as untimely. The court held that the Shinn v. Ramirez judgment did not constitute a triggering event to restart the forty-two-day period for filing a petition under Idaho Code section 19-2719. The court noted that Shinn v. Ramirez interpreted federal law and did not have any bearing on state statutes, such as Idaho Code section 19-2719. Furthermore, the court rejected Creech's argument that the alleged ineffective assistance of his initial post-conviction counsel should excuse his failure to timely raise a trial ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court held that under existing Idaho law, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not excuse a failure to raise issues that should have been reasonably known. Therefore, Creech's petition was untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719.

Teising v. State of Indiana

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-CR-00055

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Molter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the theft convictions of Jennifer Teising, a former township trustee. Teising had been convicted on 21 counts of theft after she moved out of the township she represented and continued to collect her salary while working remotely. The court held that the state did not present sufficient evidence that Teising had the required criminal intent for theft, specifically that she believed she was not supposed to continue collecting her salary. Therefore, the court ruled that without criminal intent, the only available remedies were civil, such as a quo warranto action to remove Teising from office or a conversion claim to recover allegedly misappropriated money.

State of Iowa v. Laub

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1530

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: McDonald

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the state of Iowa, a police officer investigated a suspected case of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The officer pulled over the suspect, Colby Laub, and obtained a search warrant to collect a breath specimen for chemical testing after Laub refused to participate in field sobriety testing. The chemical testing showed that Laub had a blood alcohol content well above the legal limit, and he was subsequently arrested. Laub moved to suppress the evidence of the chemical breath test, as well as statements he had made to the officer, arguing that the officer was required to invoke the statutory implied consent procedure and give him the opportunity to refuse to provide a sample, rather than proceed with a search warrant. The district court agreed with Laub and granted his motion on the grounds that the officer had no statutory authority to obtain a search warrant to collect and test bodily specimens, and that doing so violated Laub's constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. The state appealed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court erred in holding that the statutory implied consent procedure is the only way a law enforcement officer can obtain a bodily specimen and conduct chemical testing in investigating an OWI case. The court noted that the officer's decision to obtain a search warrant instead of invoking the statutory implied consent procedure did not violate the defendant's rights to equal protection or due process. The court also disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the statute, stating that the statutory implied consent law is not the exclusive means by which a law enforcement officer can obtain a breath sample in an OWI case. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's suppression ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State of Iowa v. McMickle

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1531

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: McDonald

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the defendant, Morgan Marie McMickle, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). McMickle was stopped by law enforcement after rear-ending another vehicle and leaving the scene. The investigating officer obtained a search warrant to collect a blood sample from McMickle for chemical testing, which showed a blood alcohol content over three times the legal limit. Additionally, McMickle repeatedly asked to speak to her lawyer but was denied. She later filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the use of a search warrant instead of the statutory implied consent procedure violated her rights, and that her right to counsel was violated under Iowa Code section 804.20.

The district court granted McMickle's motion, determining that the officer's use of a search warrant was not authorized, that the officer had no statutory authority to collect and test bodily specimens, and that the officer's actions violated McMickle's constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. Additionally, the court found that the officer's refusal of McMickle's requests to speak to her lawyer violated her rights under section 804.20. As a result, the court ordered the suppression of McMickle's statements and the results of the blood test.

However, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the statutory implied consent procedure was not the exclusive means by which an officer can investigate suspected OWI offenses, and that a law enforcement officer's decision to obtain and execute a search warrant did not violate a suspect's constitutional rights. The court also ruled that although McMickle's rights under section 804.20 were violated, the blood test results should not have been suppressed because they were obtained through a legally issued search warrant, independent of any violation of section 804.20. The case was remanded back to the lower court.

State of Iowa v. T.J.W.

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0805

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: McDermott

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa examined a case where a defendant, T.J., was ordered to pay restitution after the court had already dismissed and expunged all charges upon completion of a deferred judgment. T.J. had pleaded guilty to criminal mischief and was placed on unsupervised probation as part of the deferred judgment. After successfully completing the terms of the deferred judgment, the court dismissed and expunged the charge. However, later that day, the court set a hearing for restitution and two months later ordered T.J. to pay over $6,000 in restitution to the victim.

The main question before the court was whether it had the authority to impose a restitution order after the charges had been dismissed and expunged. The court concluded that it did not. The court found that a dismissal and expungement of a criminal charge after successful completion of probation under a deferred judgment should be treated no differently than other situations where a defendant is discharged from probation. The court stated that if a court unconditionally dismisses all pending charges, there's no need for sentencing or any other action by the court before the judgment becomes final. That finality terminates the court’s jurisdiction in the matter.

In this case, the court determined that no statutory or constitutional provision empowered the district court to retain jurisdiction to order restitution after dismissing and expunging criminal charges. Therefore, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to enter the restitution order after it dismissed and expunged the lone charge in the trial information, and as a result, the order was void. Hence, the writ of certiorari was granted, and the restitution order was vacated.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. DAVIS

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0178-DG

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In November 2013, Ahmad Rashad Davis was indicted for Medicaid fraud and theft by deception for defrauding Medicaid of $14,505.36 by falsifying timesheets over two years. In May 2014, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Davis entered into a plea agreement in which Davis agreed to plead guilty to Medicaid fraud, and in exchange, the Commonwealth recommended to the trial court that Davis's theft by deception charge be dismissed. The trial court accepted Davis's guilty plea and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, probated for three years or until restitution was paid in full, and dismissed the theft by deception charge. In December 2021, Davis filed a petition to expunge the theft by deception charge. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the charge was dismissed in exchange for Davis's guilty plea to Medicaid fraud, making it ineligible for expungement under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 431.076(1)(b). The circuit court granted Davis's petition without holding a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and reversed the decisions of the lower courts.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a circuit court can look beyond the sentencing court's final judgment to determine whether a dismissal was granted in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge. The court ruled that the circuit court erred in failing to do so in Davis's case. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the circuit court's order granting expungement.

Couch v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0237-MR

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: VANMETER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Bennett D. Couch was convicted by the Kenton Circuit Court for possession and transfer of child pornography in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 531.335 and 531.340. The conviction was based on evidence procured through search warrants for Couch's Tumblr account, apartment, cell phones, and computers. The investigation was initiated after the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) reported that three pornographic images of children were being circulated online, which were traced back to Couch's IP address. Couch challenged the constitutionality of KRS 531.330’s presumption as to minority and the legality of the search of her apartment.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice VanMeter, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Couch's constitutional challenge was not considered as she failed to provide the required notice to the Attorney General. Regarding the legality of the search, the court determined that the search warrant affidavits provided substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude that probable cause existed to issue the original search warrant, despite Couch's claims that the affidavits lacked probable cause, failed to identify the criminal statutes violated, and did not establish a nexus between the criminal activity and her apartment. The court also dismissed Couch's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and failure of the trial court to properly consider the Presentence Investigation Report due to lack of procedural compliance.

Helmick v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0504-MR

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: KELLER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2024, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case of Kory E. Helmick who was convicted by a Greenup County jury of two counts of sodomy in the third degree, one count of sodomy in the first degree, one count of sexual abuse in the first degree, and one count of unlawful use of an electronic communication system to procure a minor to engage in sexual or other prohibited activity. The victim, J.K., was a minor in foster care who lived with Helmick and Helmick’s husband intermittently from the age of 13 to 15. Helmick appealed his conviction, arguing three points of error: the trial court's denial of his request to postpone the trial, insufficient proof supporting the sodomy in the first degree conviction, and violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy due to convictions for both sodomy in the first degree and in the third degree.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected all three allegations. First, the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Helmick's request to postpone the trial. The request was based on the desire to conduct a forensic analysis of the victim's cell phone, but the court found Helmick had ample time to conduct this analysis before the trial and did not provide an affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained from the phone, which was required for such a request.

Second, regarding the sufficiency of the proof for the sodomy in the first degree conviction, the court found that there was more than a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the conviction. The victim's testimony that he was "incapacitated" and "incapable of moving" due to alcohol intoxication was seen as evidence that he was physically helpless during the sexual abuse, a requirement for a conviction of sodomy in the first degree.

Finally, the court rejected Helmick's double jeopardy claim, finding that his convictions for sodomy in the first and third degrees were based on separate criminal acts and thus did not violate his right to be free from being tried twice for the same offense.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky therefore affirmed the judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court.

Greer v. State of Minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-0915

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: Chutich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In July 1998, Ronald Lewis Greer was implicated in the murder of Kareem Brown by at least five witnesses. He was charged with one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder. Greer claimed he was not the shooter and that he was at a friend's house at the time of the murder, but a jury found him guilty of both charges in May 1999. Greer was sentenced to life in prison, and on appeal, the conviction was upheld. Over the next few years, Greer filed three petitions for postconviction relief, all of which were denied.

In 2021, Greer filed a motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his sentence was unlawful as he was sentenced for two degrees of the same crime. The district court granted Greer's motion in part, vacating his second-degree murder conviction. Greer appealed this decision, claiming that the court should have held a sentencing hearing when it vacated his second-degree murder conviction. This appeal was denied.

In 2023, Greer filed a fourth petition for postconviction relief, asking the district court to vacate his first-degree murder conviction, reinstate his second-degree murder conviction, and resentence him. The district court denied Greer's petition, citing it as time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4 (2022), and procedurally barred under the rule announced in State v. Knaffla.

In a decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, the court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Greer's petition was time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4 (2022), as it was filed more than two years after the later of the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence or an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal. As such, the court did not address whether Greer’s claims were also barred by Knaffla or reach the merits of Greer’s claims. The court also rejected Greer's claim that the district court's 2021 order vacating his second-degree murder conviction provided him an additional two years within which to bring a petition for postconviction relief.

State of Minnesota vs. Snyder

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0318

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: Anderson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2020, Jaye William Snyder was charged with third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct following an assault on an impaired victim. Snyder was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and was given a 140-month prison sentence. Due to a previous conviction of the same offense in 2016, he was also placed on lifetime conditional release after his prison term, as mandated by Minnesota Statutes § 609.3455, subdivision 7(b). Snyder appealed, arguing that the lifetime conditional release made his offense punishable by life imprisonment, which should have required the State to charge him by indictment rather than a criminal complaint, as per Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.01, subdivision 1. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that their precedent in State v. Ronquist, which limited the indictment requirement to offenses punishable by life imprisonment before a sentencing enhancement is applied, remained good law and applied to Snyder's case. The court held that a lifetime conditional release did not invoke the indictment requirement of Rule 17.01, subdivision 1, and affirmed the decision of the lower court.

In re M.T.H.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 26

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: McGrath

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves an appellant, M.T.H., who was arrested for criminal endangerment after he pulled the steering wheel in his mother's vehicle while she was driving. M.T.H. was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and paranoid schizophrenia. Following his arrest, the State filed a petition for M.T.H.'s involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital (MSH) for up to three months. The District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, Ravalli County, ordered his commitment and authorized MSH to involuntarily administer medications to M.T.H. This led to an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.

The Supreme Court of Montana had two main issues to consider. The first issue was whether the District Court erroneously determined that a signed waiver constituted a sufficient record to commit M.T.H. The Supreme Court found that M.T.H.'s waiver and the District Court’s order committing him were sufficient to constitute an intentional and knowing waiver under the relevant statute. The court emphasized that the record reflected that M.T.H. understood his procedural rights and had a clear presence of mind to consider his position logically.

The second issue was whether the District Court erroneously authorized MSH to administer involuntary medications to M.T.H. The Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in this aspect. It emphasized the importance of due process protections and noted that the State must demonstrate a need for involuntary medication before a court may authorize it. In this case, the State did not make this necessary showing. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision in part but reversed its decision to authorize involuntary medication for M.T.H.

State v. Palmer

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 25

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: Rice

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The defendant, Jacob Palmer, was found guilty of felony Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA) by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, following an incident where he attacked his girlfriend, K.Y., with whom he had been in a relationship for over a decade. During his trial, evidence was presented regarding prior altercations between Palmer and K.Y. Palmer appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, challenging the District Court's decision to admit this evidence.

The issue before the Supreme Court of Montana was whether the District Court had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Palmer's prior altercations with K.Y. in his PFMA trial. The Supreme Court held that the District Court had not abused its discretion. The court reasoned that the evidence of Palmer's previous altercations with K.Y. was relevant and admissible under Montana Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court explained that such evidence can provide context about the complex dynamics of domestic violence, including the cycle of abuse and the reasons why victims such as K.Y. might not immediately report the abuse or might be reluctant to discuss the abuse with law enforcement. The court further determined that the probative value of this evidence was not significantly outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect against Palmer. As such, the court affirmed the District Court's decision to admit the evidence and upheld Palmer's conviction.

Willson v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 7

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada was reviewing a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order from the district court. Petitioner Lina Marie Willson had been convicted of obstructing a public officer. This conviction arose from an incident where Willson had yelled at police officers from her front yard while they were attending to a separate incident involving a potentially suicidal juvenile. Willson appealed her conviction, arguing that the law under which she was convicted, NRS 197.190, was unconstitutionally vague or overly broad.

The court held that NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad, either on its face or as applied to Willson. The court interpreted the law to apply only to physical conduct or fighting words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the performance of their duties. Although the court found that Willson's claims failed, it did acknowledge that her claims implicated the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190.

The court therefore granted the petition and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of certiorari upholding the constitutionality of NRS 197.190 and instructing the district court to reconsider Willson's direct appeal. The purpose of this reconsideration was to determine whether, given the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient evidence existed to support Willson's conviction.

State v. Maxi

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0613

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: DONOVAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled in a case where the defendant, Jean M. Maxi Jr., was convicted and sentenced for two crimes: attempted felonious sexual assault (FSA) and certain uses of computer services prohibited. Maxi appealed, arguing that the two charges constituted the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The defendant also argued pro se that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the appellate defender failed to consider his research or argue a double jeopardy violation under the U.S. Constitution.

The court found that, as charged, the two offenses required different evidence to prove different elements and did not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The court also dismissed the defendant's pro se arguments as insufficiently developed for review. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision and affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for both charges.

State v. Palmer

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-539

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Transportation Law

In December 2019, a taxicab driver, Phillip Palmer, shot a heavily intoxicated passenger, Nicholas Young, following a dispute over cab fare. The incident escalated into a physical altercation at a gas station, where Young shoved Palmer twice, causing him to fear for his life. Palmer, who had begun carrying a gun in his cab after hearing about a driver who had been shot by a passenger, fired two shots at Young, hitting him in the neck. Young survived his injuries. At trial, Palmer admitted to the shooting but claimed self-defense. The trial court denied Palmer's request for a self-defense jury instruction, finding Palmer's statements about his means of escape not credible and determining that a reasonable person would not have believed they were in danger of being killed by Young under the circumstances. Palmer was acquitted of attempted murder but found guilty of felonious assault and a firearm specification.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had improperly weighed the evidence when performing a sufficiency analysis. The court found that Palmer had presented legally sufficient evidence for each element of self-defense and was therefore entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. The evidence presented, if believed, could convince a trier of fact that Palmer was acting in self-defense. Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial on the felonious-assault charge and accompanying firearm specification.

Daniel v. State

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0037-22

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: McClure

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Transportation Law

In Texas, the appellant was stopped by an officer for failing to remain in a single lane of traffic. After the officer smelled alcohol on the appellant's breath and observed signs of intoxication, he obtained a warrant for a blood sample, which showed a blood alcohol content of .174. The appellant was subsequently indicted for felony driving while intoxicated. The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellant was convicted. The appellant appealed, and the Third Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was unlawful because the appellant's failure to maintain a single lane was not unsafe.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered whether a mistake of law should apply when an officer conducts a search or seizure under an ambiguous law. The court held that the officer's reasonable misinterpretation of the law did not undermine the reasonable suspicion required to conduct the traffic stop. The court noted that at the time of the stop, there was no controlling interpretation of the relevant section of the Texas transportation code from the Court of Criminal Appeals and the intermediate courts were split in their interpretations. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Chace v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 20

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Daniel A. Chace, who appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search warrant executed after 10:00 p.m. The incident began when law enforcement stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation, driven by Mr. Chace’s brother. A search of the vehicle following a K-9 unit’s drug alert resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. That evening, the officers requested a search warrant for the driver's residence, where Mr. Chace was temporarily staying. The search warrant was executed shortly after 10:00 p.m., leading to the discovery of more drugs and paraphernalia in Mr. Chace's backpack.

Mr. Chace argued that the evidence should be suppressed because the search of the residence violated Rule 41 of Wyoming's Rules of Criminal Procedure, which restricts the execution of search warrants to between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., unless express authorization for a different time is provided based on good cause. The Supreme Court of Wyoming, however, affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the nighttime search did not prejudice Mr. Chace and that law enforcement did not intentionally and deliberately disregard the limits in Rule 41(e)(1). The court maintained that a violation of Rule 41 alone does not necessarily equate to a Fourth Amendment violation and does not always invoke the application of the exclusionary rule.