United States of America v. Sims

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-3015

Opinion Date: February 5, 2024

Judge: PÉREZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the appeal of Defendant-Appellant Dewey K. Sims from a sentencing judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. Sims had pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The district court imposed a term of imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. The release was subject to a special condition that prohibited Sims from associating with "any member, associate, or prospect of the Jungle Junkies, or any other criminal gang, club, or organization", a condition which Sims challenged as lacking support for its imposition from the district court or the record itself, and being impermissibly overbroad and vague. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that neither the district court’s comments during the sentencing hearing nor the record showed that it fulfilled the requirements necessary to impose the special condition of supervised release in question. Therefore, the Court vacated the special condition and remanded the case for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to further explain its reasoning or develop the record as needed.

USA v. Long

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-3033

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on an appeal by the U.S Government against the decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to exclude certain evidence in a child pornography case involving Roderick Long. Long was indicted for knowingly possessing child pornography involving victims under 12 years old, and the evidence in question included a video montage and four photos alleged to have been found on Long's electronic devices. The District Court excluded the exhibits on the grounds of Rule 403, citing the risk of unfair prejudice, cumulativeness, wasting time, and potential jury confusion. However, the District Court made its decision without viewing the exhibits, relying on written descriptions provided by the parties.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had committed procedural error by not viewing the evidence before deciding on its admissibility, stating that it was far from obvious that the risk of unfair prejudice from the disturbing nature of the exhibits substantially outweighed their probative value. The Court of Appeals further noted that the cumulativeness, potential for wasted time, and possible jury confusion did not make it obvious that the exhibits failed Rule 403’s balancing test. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case back to the District Court for a new Rule 403 balancing after viewing the exhibits proffered by the Government.

USA v. Stewart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-3014

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Gilroy St. Patrick Stewart was pulled over by Trooper George Tessitore for driving a vehicle with heavily tinted windows and a partially obstructed license plate, both violations of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had to determine whether the officer unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop, thereby violating Stewart's Fourth Amendment rights.

Upon pulling over Stewart, Tessitore asked for his driver's license and the vehicle’s registration. Stewart produced an Ohio driver's license and a vehicle that was registered to a Hazel Sparkes of Baldwin, New York. Stewart claimed the vehicle belonged to his aunt. Tessitore then questioned Stewart about his travel plans. During the stop, Tessitore discovered that Stewart had a history of arrests, including a money laundering arrest made by the Drug Enforcement Agency. Tessitore also noted that Stewart was driving on I-80, a well-known drug trafficking corridor, and that there was an air freshener hanging from Stewart's rear-view mirror, often used to mask the smell of narcotics.

Stewart was subsequently charged with possession of five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, after 20 kilograms of cocaine were found in a hidden compartment in his vehicle. Stewart moved to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an unlawful search, a motion that was denied by the District Court.

Upon review, the Court of Appeals held that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he extended the length of the stop, due to a combination of factors including Stewart's evasive and inconsistent answers, the darkly tinted car windows, the car's registration to a third party, Stewart's prior arrests, his travel along a known drug corridor, and the air freshener in his vehicle. As such, the officer did not unconstitutionally prolong the traffic stop, and Stewart's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the District Court’s order denying Stewart's motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop.

United States v. Joel Smithers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4761

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: GREGORY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The case involves Joel Smithers, who was a doctor of osteopathy and was convicted on 861 counts associated with his opioid prescription practices. He was sentenced to a total of 480 months in prison. Smithers was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance without authorization. Authorization is defined by Drug Enforcement Agency regulations as a prescription issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. Following his conviction, the Supreme Court in Ruan v. United States clarified the mens rea required to convict someone of unauthorized dispensing or distributing of a controlled substance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that, in light of the Ruan decision, Smithers' jury instructions were incorrect, and the errors were not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial.

US v. Perry

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4684

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Adonis Perry, was arrested in 2017 for possessing a firearm as a felon and for possessing marijuana after he was found with both during a traffic stop. While awaiting trial, Perry repeatedly tried to convince his girlfriend, a key witness for the government, to refuse to cooperate, leading to four witness-tampering and obstruction-of-justice charges. Perry was found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to 210 months and three years of supervised release. Perry appealed his conviction and sentence on several grounds, including that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. They found that Perry was not unconstitutionally seized during the traffic stop, his girlfriend had authority to consent to the search of his phone, the charges against him should not have been dismissed due to the failure to preserve dashcam footage, the evidence supporting his convictions was sufficient, his convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, his counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, and his sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

Gutierrez v. Saenz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-70009

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Southwick

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1999, Ruben Gutierrez was convicted of capital murder in a Texas state court and sentenced to death. Since 2011, Gutierrez’s efforts to secure post-conviction DNA testing have been denied in state and federal court. In this federal case, Gutierrez claimed that a certain limitation in Texas’s DNA testing statute was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, ultimately concluded that Gutierrez did not have standing to make this claim. The court found that even if the DNA testing statute was declared unconstitutional, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had already held that Gutierrez would have no right to DNA testing. The court reasoned that any new evidence would not overcome the overwhelming evidence of Gutierrez's direct involvement in the multi-assailant murder. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for the complaint to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

United States v. Duffey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10265

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2009, defendants Corey Deyon Duffey, Jarvis Dupree Ross, and Tony R. Hewitt were convicted on numerous counts of conspiracy, attempted bank robbery, and bank robbery, as well as using a firearm in furtherance thereof, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Following several appeals, resentencings, and unsuccessful motions to vacate their sentences, the defendants appealed once again, this time arguing that § 403 of the First Step Act should apply to their resentencing. This Act eliminates sentence stacking, so each defendant would be subject to only the five-year mandatory minimum sentence set by § 924(c) rather than the 25-year mandatory minimums for every additional § 924(c) conviction that they were serving.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that § 403 of the First Step Act does not apply to the defendants' resentencing. The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the phrase "a sentence" in § 403(b) of the Act, which the court concluded refers to any sentence that has been imposed for the offense, even one that was subsequently vacated. Therefore, because sentences for the defendants' offenses had been imposed upon them prior to the First Step’s Act’s December 21, 2018 enactment date, § 403(a) of the First Step Act does not apply to their resentencing.

Additionally, the court ruled that the district court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for physical restraint of a victim during a robbery to defendant Duffey's sentence, as the court's findings showed that in each robbery, the bank managers were held at gunpoint and moved to the vault.

Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision that it did not have jurisdiction to vacate defendant Hewitt's remaining § 924(c) convictions, as these convictions fell outside of the authorization for Hewitt’s motion to vacate his sentence.

As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues.

USA v. Malmquist

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50872

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Higginson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Shawn Malmquist appealed his conviction and sentence of 151 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Malmquist argued that the Government had breached a clause in his plea agreement, specifically, the Government's promise to recommend a three-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the Government's breach of the plea agreement did indeed constitute a plain error, as it affected Malmquist's substantial rights and called into question the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Considering these findings, the Court of Appeals vacated Malmquist's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Cabbage

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3889

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: THAPAR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Phillip Cabbage, was convicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Cabbage had been orchestrating drug shipments from cartel suppliers to street-level dealers. During his sentencing, he initially objected to a three-level enhancement recommended by the probation officer on the grounds that he did not have control over another person. However, he later withdrew this objection and agreed to a two-level enhancement. Cabbage was sentenced to 210 months in prison, within the Guidelines range calculated with the two-level enhancement.

On appeal, Cabbage argued that the two-level enhancement should not have been applied, thereby challenging the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The court held that because Cabbage had agreed to the enhancement and subsequently withdrew his objection to it, the doctrine of invited error applied. Cabbage had contributed to any mistake by agreeing to the role enhancement. The court emphasized that parties in an adversarial system bear the burden of proving facts and presenting their best case. Therefore, if a party agrees that a certain set of facts presents their best case, it is not a manifest injustice for a court to hold them to that agreement. The court concluded that factual errors agreed to by the defendant are not sufficiently grave to constitute manifest injustice. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and held Cabbage to his agreement.

USA v. Harvey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2538

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Rovner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Demetrius Harvey, pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. The court had to decide whether a 4-level enhancement was proper under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) because Harvey transferred a firearm to a confidential source (CS) who he had reason to believe was a felon. Harvey initially challenged the enhancement, arguing that the purchaser's statement that he was a convicted felon was an insufficient basis for Harvey to conclude that the purchaser was, in fact, a convicted felon. On appeal, Harvey changed his argument, claiming he was not told that the CS was a felon until the transaction was complete.

The court concluded that even under the less onerous standard, Harvey's claim could not succeed. The enhancement was proper if the evidence before the district court supported the determination that the transfer of the firearm by the defendant occurred "with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with" the felon-in-possession offense. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the district court and upheld the 4-level enhancement.

United States v. Heard

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1522

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Kobes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Kaycee Heard, appealed his 180-month sentence for involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy that transported oxycodone and fentanyl pills from Michigan to North Dakota for distribution. Heard pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, and his sentence exceeded his Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Heard's appeal centered around three key claims: the district court miscalculated his criminal history score, wrongly applied a Guidelines enhancement for his role in the conspiracy, and issued an unreasonable sentence.

The Court of Appeals rejected all three of Heard's claims. First, the court found that the district court was correct to assess a criminal history point for a two-year probation term Heard served under Michigan’s Holmes Youthful Trainee Act. Despite Heard's argument that this sentence should not have counted towards his criminal history score as no conviction was entered and the underlying charges were dismissed, the Appeals Court ruled that Heard's admission of guilt by pleading guilty meant the probation term was correctly counted as a "prior sentence".

Second, the Appeals Court upheld the district court's application of a three-level enhancement for Heard's role in the conspiracy, finding that Heard had exhibited sufficient managerial or supervisory authority to warrant this enhancement. The court pointed to evidence that Heard had recruited co-conspirators, used a co-conspirator’s apartment as a stash house, directed a co-conspirator to travel to get pills for distribution, and received proceeds from the pills’ sale.

Finally, the court found Heard's sentence to be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court had varied up from the Guidelines range based on Heard's conduct in pretrial detention, including his participation in a prison riot and assaults on two inmates. The Appeals Court found no clear error in the district court's determination that Heard had participated in the riot, and concluded that the 180-month sentence was within the realm of reasonableness given Heard's drug trafficking and pretrial detention misconduct. The court also rejected Heard's claim that his sentence created unwarranted disparities with his co-conspirators, stating that the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities refers to national disparities, not differences among co-conspirators. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment.

United States v. Ingram

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1514

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Kobes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cortez Ingram pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Both parties recommended an 87-month sentence, but the district court for the Eastern District of Missouri imposed a 123-month sentence and three years of supervised release. Ingram appealed, arguing that the court was bound by the plea agreement to sentence him to 87 months and that the court erred in departing upward to impose an above-guidelines sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The plea agreement was nonbinding on the court and was not converted to a binding agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Therefore, the court did not err in declining to accept the parties' sentencing recommendation.

Ingram also argued that the district court erred in departing upward to impose an above-guidelines sentence. The court of appeals found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21 based on Ingram's possession of cocaine and a loaded firearm during his arrest in 2022 (the uncharged conduct). The district court was not prohibited from considering this conduct in sentencing Ingram.

Finally, Ingram believed he should have had access to the probation officer's sealed sentencing recommendation. The court of appeals found that under local rules and administrative order in the Eastern District of Missouri, the probation officer's sentencing recommendation was not to be disclosed. Therefore, the court did not err in failing to disclose the sentencing recommendation to Ingram.

The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Lester

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2176

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2006, Charles H. Lester, Jr. was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. After serving a portion of his supervised release term, the United States Probation Office filed a report recommending the early termination of Lester's supervision, citing his low risk of recidivism and compliance with the conditions of his supervision. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied this request, asserting that it did not have the authority to terminate Lester's supervised release early due to the requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) that a five-year term of supervised release be imposed, which the court interpreted as precluding early termination under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court held that the language of § 841(b)(1)(A) requires the imposition of a five-year term of supervised release, but does not impact a district court's ability to later terminate an individual's supervised release after the individual has served at least one year, as provided in § 3583(e)(1). Thus, the district court retained discretion to consider whether Lester's supervised release could be terminated early under § 3583(e)(1). Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

United States v. Radermacher

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1243

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A defendant, John Radermacher, was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine by a jury in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Radermacher appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing two main points: firstly, that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior drug conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and secondly, that the court wrongly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence.

In reviewing the first argument, the Appeals Court noted that while evidence of past crimes is generally not admissible to prove a person's character, it can be admitted for other purposes, such as proving motive, intent, or knowledge. In this case, Radermacher's prior conviction was relevant to his knowledge of the drug conspiracy and his intent to join it. The court also noted that the prior conviction was sufficiently similar in kind to the crime charged, and although there was a considerable gap of time between the two offenses, most of that time Radermacher was incarcerated. Therefore, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

As for the second argument, the Appeals Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence that led to Radermacher's conviction. In order to establish guilt for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, three elements must be present: the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant's intentional joining of it. The court determined that there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find Radermacher guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Richardson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1179

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: Stras

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case concerns the defendant, Roylee Richardson, who was convicted by a jury for witness tampering and possessing a firearm as a felon. After his arrest for attacking his then-girlfriend and shooting at her would-be rescuer, Richardson made several recorded jailhouse calls attempting to persuade her to recant her testimony or refuse to testify. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support Richardson's conviction on both counts of witness tampering.

The court explained that witness tampering involves two elements: knowingly intimidating, threatening, or corruptly persuading another person, and intending to influence, delay, or prevent another's testimony in an official proceeding. The court found that Richardson's actions met these elements. In the calls, he attempted to corruptly persuade his ex-girlfriend to lie or refuse to testify, and he feared the impact her testimony would have on his case, demonstrating his intent to influence her testimony.

Furthermore, the court addressed Richardson's argument about the admission of his multiple prior felony convictions. The court noted that one element of a felon-in-possession charge requires the possessor to have a prior felony conviction. Richardson refused to formally admit his prior felony convictions, thereby necessitating the government to prove this element. The court found that the government appropriately presented evidence of his multiple prior felony convictions to establish that Richardson was a felon and was aware of his status as a felon at the time. The court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the government's introduction of multiple prior convictions and three mug shots as evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Totaro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3521

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to increase the monthly restitution payment of Ronald Totaro, who was convicted in 2001 of sixty-one counts of various crimes including mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and racketeering. The court ruled that the increase from $200 to $1,000 was justified by Totaro's financial circumstances, his willful failure to comply with the initial restitution order, and the fact that he still owed nearly $2 million to his victims. Totaro had argued that the increase was too substantial and that his early release and receipt of Social Security payments did not constitute a "material change" in his financial situation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing the substantial assets shared by Totaro and his wife, which included their home, a $45,000 vehicle, and over $80,000 in savings. The court also noted Totaro's pattern of trying to evade his obligations and consequences for his behavior.

United States v. Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2149

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: Benton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Ricky Timothy Williams was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Williams appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by giving a supplemental instruction to the jury that he believed went beyond the scope of the jury's question and was duplicative of instructions already given.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, stating that the district court has the discretion to respond to a jury's request for a supplemental instruction. The Court of Appeals found that the instructions given by the district court, when taken as a whole, fairly and adequately instructed the jurors on the applicable law. They also found that the supplemental instruction was not unnecessarily duplicative, and that district courts are not prohibited from giving duplicative instructions where reinstruction will assist the jury.

The Court of Appeals also noted that the jury's note to the court made clear that they were confused about the meaning of a phrase from the final instruction. The district court clarified this confusion by providing a supplemental instruction using language from the final instructions already given, and the Court of Appeals found this to be within the district court's discretion.

United States v. Devereaux

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1203

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Ebel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a criminal appeal, the defendant, Kenneth Devereaux, challenged his sixty-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argued that the district court erred in treating his prior conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury as a "crime of violence" and using that conviction to increase his base offense level. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with Devereaux and the government that the district court had erred. The court concluded that the differing mental states (intentional or reckless) that could constitute a violation of the assault statute were different means of committing a single, indivisible offense, rather than elements of separate offenses. The court applied the Supreme Court's guidance in Mathis v. United States and its own post-Borden decision in United States v. Benally to reach this conclusion. As a result, because the least criminalized conduct the assault statute proscribes is recklessness, a conviction under the statute does not categorically involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. Therefore, the court vacated Devereaux's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

USA v. Sanfilippo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11175

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Lagoa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Joseph Sanfilippo, the defendant, appealed his conviction for wire fraud, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because it was issued after the expiration of the federal statute of limitations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Sanfilippo's appeal. The court reasoned that Sanfilippo had entered an unconditional guilty plea to one of eight counts in the indictment and, under precedent, waived his ability to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. The court found no evidence in the record indicating that the district court and the government had consented to Sanfilippo reserving his ability to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, which would be required for a conditional plea under Rule 11(a)(2). Therefore, the court concluded that Sanfilippo's plea was not conditional under Rule 11(a)(2), and he had waived his ability to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

USA v. Trump

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3228

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, former President Donald Trump was appealing a district court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment against him. The indictment was based on his actions contesting the results of the 2020 presidential election and interfering with the constitutional transfer of power to his successor. Trump argued that, as a former President, he was immune from prosecution for his official actions while in office.

The appeals court disagreed and affirmed the district court's decision. It held that former presidents are not immune from federal criminal prosecution for their official acts. The court concluded that the Constitution, federal statutes, and history do not support the existence of such immunity. The court also noted that former President Trump's actions in question, if proven, constituted an unprecedented assault on the structure of the U.S. government.

Additionally, the court rejected Trump's contention that his impeachment and acquittal by the Senate for the same or closely related conduct bar his subsequent criminal prosecution under principles of double jeopardy. The court held that impeachment is a political process and does not result in criminal punishment, and the crimes alleged in the indictment differ from the offense for which Trump was impeached. Thus, the court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not apply.

These holdings allowed the criminal prosecution against Trump to proceed.

Farmer v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 10

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: WOMACK

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Jason Farmer, an inmate, appealed the denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, which he filed alleging ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel, as well as prosecutorial, juror, and judicial misconduct. Farmer was previously convicted of several crimes and sentenced to a cumulative term of twenty-two years in prison, a conviction and sentence that were affirmed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. In this appeal, Farmer argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to deny his petition because it failed to first issue an order on his petition to proceed in forma pauperis (as a poor person) in accordance with Rule 72 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. He relied on a previous court decision, Ward v. Hutchinson, to support his argument.

However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas disagreed with Farmer's interpretation. It clarified that the cited case, Ward v. Hutchinson, pertained to a civil-rights complaint, not a postconviction petition, and in that case, the complaint was not file-marked or entered on the docket, unlike Farmer's petition. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision to deny and dismiss Farmer's petition. It held that the circuit court had jurisdiction to determine whether Farmer had stated a colorable cause of action because his petition was properly filed and placed on the docket. The Supreme Court of Arkansas further explained that a writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Farmer's claims, however, went beyond the face of the judgment and were therefore not cognizable in habeas proceedings.

Williams v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 7

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: KEMP

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Arkansas, defendant Robert J. Williams, Jr. appealed his conviction for capital murder and aggravated assault. Williams argued that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for continuance, violated his rights to a speedy trial, and improperly denied his Batson challenge during jury selection. The Supreme Court of Arkansas disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision.

On the issue of the continuance, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion for continuance. The court found that the State acted with due diligence and the affidavit submitted by the State substantially complied with the requirements set forth by law.

On the issue of speedy trial, the court conducted a de novo review to determine whether specific periods of time were excludable under the speedy-trial rules. The court found that Williams was brought to trial within the twelve-month period required by the rules. Therefore, the court held that Williams's right to a speedy trial was not violated.

Finally, on the issue of the Batson challenge, the court held that the trial court properly allowed the State to strike a juror based on a race-neutral reason, that is, the juror's lack of involvement in the judicial process. The court deferred to the trial court's ability to gauge the State's demeanor and credibility, finding no error in the denial of the Batson challenge.

Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower court, finding no prejudicial error.

Woodruff v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 8

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: KEMP

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1992, Darren Woodruff, the appellant, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole in Arkansas. In 2023, he appealed pro se, claiming that his sentence was illegal because he was not convicted of an underlying felony and the sentencing order lacked the subsection of capital murder of which he was convicted. The circuit court denied his petition, stating that the sentence was not illegal on its face and that the punishment for capital murder had not been exceeded.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision. Firstly, the court noted that the statute in effect when Woodruff committed the offense in June 1991 did not require an underlying felony. Therefore, his claim that his sentence was illegal because he was not convicted of an underlying felony was not valid. Secondly, the court held that Woodruff's claim that the sentencing order lacked the subsection of capital murder was not a matter that implicated the facial validity of the judgment and was therefore subject to the time limitations set out in Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c). Since Woodruff filed his petition approximately thirty years after the judgment in his case was affirmed, his petition was not within the required time limits. Thus, the court concluded that his sentence was not illegal, and his petition was not timely.

In re Vaquera

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S258376

Opinion Date: February 5, 2024

Judge: Groban

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2019, the California Supreme Court ruled that the defendant, Oscar Manuel Vaquera, did not receive fair notice of the sentence that the prosecution was seeking in his case, which violated his right to due process. Vaquera was charged with two counts of a sex offense covered by California's "One Strike" law and was convicted on both counts. In the habeas corpus proceeding, Vaquera challenged the 25-year-to-life sentence the trial court imposed for the second count.

The prosecution had initially requested a sentence of 15 years to life for the second count, but later argued for a 25-year-to-life sentence under a different provision of the One Strike law. Vaquera contended that the imposition of the 25-year-to-life sentence violated due process because he did not receive fair notice that the prosecution intended to seek that sentence. The California Supreme Court agreed with Vaquera and ordered the trial court to resentence him to 15 years to life for the second count.

The Court ruled that the One Strike allegation in Vaquera's case did not provide him with fair notice that the prosecution was seeking a 25-year-to-life sentence under the specific provision of the law based on the victim's age. The Court held that due process requires an accusatory pleading to inform the defendant of the particular One Strike sentence the prosecution is seeking and of the factual basis it intends to prove to support that sentence. In this case, the prosecution did not provide fair notice of its intent to seek the longer One Strike sentence, which violated Vaquera's due process rights.

People v. Jimenez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081267(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: KELETY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case heard by the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, the appellant, Esteban Jimenez, was convicted of evading an officer while driving recklessly and leaving the scene of an accident. The court also found true a prior strike allegation. Jimenez appealed the conviction on two grounds: (1) that the prosecutor improperly exercised a peremptory challenge in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 and state and federal constitutions; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) (leaving the scene of an accident).

The appellate court held that the prosecutor did not violate section 231.7 or Jimenez's constitutional rights by exercising the peremptory challenge. The court assessed the reasons given by the prosecutor for the challenge and found no evidence of bias related to the prospective juror's membership in a cognizable group.

However, the appellate court agreed with Jimenez's second argument, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Jimenez violated Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a). The court found that there was no evidence that Jimenez had knowingly and willfully left the scene or whether Jimenez had provided the information to the wall owner and police as required.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed Jimenez's conviction for evading an officer while driving recklessly and the prior strike allegation, but reversed his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. The case was remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the conviction on that count and to prepare an amended abstract of judgment.

Martinez v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 6

Opinion Date: February 5, 2024

Judge: Hood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, Arnold Roman Martinez stole a bicycle from the garage of C.T. Pursuing Martinez in his car, C.T. pulled in front of Martinez, leading to a collision that damaged C.T.’s vehicle. Martinez was subsequently ordered to pay restitution for the damage to the car as part of a plea agreement in a criminal case. Martinez contested the restitution order, arguing that he did not proximately cause the car damage.

The Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard of review for evaluating a district court’s determination of proximate cause for restitution is clear error, not abuse of discretion as had been applied by the lower courts. The court reasoned that the proximate cause inquiry is primarily a fact-based determination, and that trial courts are better situated to resolve such disputes. It also noted that the statutory language and structure suggest that the standard of review should allow for expedient resolution of restitution decisions.

Applying this standard, the Supreme Court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that Martinez had proximately caused the car damage. The court determined that C.T.’s actions were foreseeable and not grossly negligent, and that Martinez had participated in the events leading to the collision. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that Martinez was obligated to pay restitution.

Trappman v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2021-1479

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: CANADY

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Florida held that multiple punishments can be imposed for distinct acts springing from successive impulses to violate a single criminal prohibition in the course of a single criminal episode. In this case, the Petitioner, David William Trappman, was convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer and aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer during a single encounter. The first conviction was a result of Trappman shoving an officer, and the second conviction came from Trappman siccing a pit bull on the same officer. Trappman argued that the protection against double jeopardy precluded his dual convictions and sentences as they were part of a single criminal episode. The court disagreed, concluding that the shoving of the officer and the subsequent siccing of the dog on the officer were distinct criminal acts for which separate punishments were properly imposed. The court disapproved of previous cases that failed to apply the distinct acts test, which focuses on successive impulses.

HARPER v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0810

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: MCMILLIAN

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2003, Terry Harper and Emmanuel Ruiz were convicted by a jury of murder and related charges connected to the shooting deaths of Joe Luhrman, David Carty, and Tracy Glover in 2001. Harper appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to due process was violated due to the almost 20-year delay between his conviction and his direct appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after the State referenced a response he gave to police questioning that he contends was previously excluded and prejudicial, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorneys failed to obtain and introduce evidence that he was suffering a severe injury to his dominant hand at the time of the shootings.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court applied the four-part balancing test from Barker v. Wingo to Harper's claim of a due process violation due to the delayed appeal. Although the court found that the delay was lengthy and Harper consistently asserted his right to appeal, it ultimately held that Harper failed to show actual prejudice from the delay. Regarding the mistrial motion, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as the jury was given prompt curative instructions, and the prosecutor acted in good faith. Lastly, the court denied Harper's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as he failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different if his medical records were introduced into evidence.

HOLMES v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0936

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, the appellant, Shomari Tahir Holmes, appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the death of his 20-month-old son and for cruelty to children in the first degree against his son's three-year-old half-sister. The appellant was found guilty but mentally ill by a jury. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting an audio recording of an interview conducted by a psychiatrist and expert witness for the State, and that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on a verdict of “guilty but with intellectual disability.”

The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected both of appellant’s claims and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the audio recording of the interview. The court reasoned that the appellant put his mental condition at issue, and the recording only addressed the purpose of the interview and did not constitute an opinion or inference about appellant’s mental state at the time of the crime.

Furthermore, the court held that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on a verdict of “guilty but with intellectual disability.” The court explained that the appellant's counsel initially requested the instruction but later withdrew the request at the charge conference. Under Georgia law, when a defendant requests a specific jury instruction at the outset of trial but later withdraws the request during the charge conference, the defendant has affirmatively waived any right to the charge. Therefore, the appellant's claim concerning the charge failed.

JACKSON v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0854, S23A0855

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Dedric Jackson and Dimitrius Castle were found guilty of felony murder and other related crimes after the fatal shooting of Norman Ray Moore, Jr. at a party. Jackson appealed, arguing that he received ineffective legal assistance in several ways. He alleged that his trial lawyer withdrew a request for a jury charge on justification, failed to request a charge on defense of habitation, did not object to evidence of a prior crime and bad character, and did not object to specific witness testimonies and jury instructions. Jackson also argued that the trial court should have given a jury charge on justification, even though he withdrew the request. Castle argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for battery, his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request certain jury instructions and by calling a defense witness, and that the trial court erred by not merging the aggravated assault verdict into the felony murder conviction. The court rejected all these arguments and affirmed the convictions in both cases.

LEE v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: PINSON

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the case under review, the appellant, David Wallace Lee, was convicted of two counts of malice murder related to the shooting deaths of Meghan Bowen and James Harden. The appellant argued on several grounds, including insufficiency of evidence, trial court errors, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the appellant's convictions. The evidence demonstrated a history of abuse, jealousy, and threats by the appellant towards Bowen, which escalated in the months leading up to the murders. The appellant's claims of trial court errors were also rejected, as the court found no abuse of discretion in the admission of testimony regarding the appellant's possession of a gun similar to the murder weapon and found no actual conflict of interest necessitating the disqualification of an assistant district attorney.

Further, the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also rejected. The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.

Therefore, the court affirmed the appellant's convictions and sentence.

MORRELL v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1166

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellant, Karonta Morrell, appealed his convictions related to the shooting death of Jonathan Lang. The appellant was found guilty of multiple charges including malice murder, felony murder, criminal attempt to murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, along with several consecutive prison terms for other counts.

On appeal, Morrell argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the record contained several deficiencies, preventing a full and fair appellate review. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Morrell’s malice murder conviction. The court found that the jury could easily find that Morrell was present during the crime, as several eyewitnesses placed him there and his own statements also placed him there. Morrell’s argument that his actions were justified or that, at most, he was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter based on provocation was dismissed. The court explained that fighting is not the type of provocation that would support a voluntary manslaughter jury charge.

Regarding Morrell's claim of an incomplete trial record, the court found no merit as all transcripts and exhibits at issue were included in the appellate record. Morrell's claim that periodic “indiscernible” notations made the record “incomplete” was dismissed as he cited no authority requiring court reporters to transcribe the contents of recordings admitted as exhibits. Therefore, the court held that Morrell failed to show how any deficiencies in the record have harmed him.

PAYNE v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1205

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, appellant Austin Levi Payne appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the death of one-year-old Journey Cowart. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Payne's convictions. The court reasoned that since Payne and the victim's mother, Brandy Boyd, were the only caretakers of the child during the time the fatal injuries were inflicted, the jury could reasonably conclude that either Payne, Boyd, or both were responsible for the injuries. The court also refuted Payne's arguments regarding the exclusion of evidence about Boyd's drug use and the failure to give a requested jury charge on grave suspicion. Finally, the court dismissed Payne's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that Payne failed to show that his trial counsel performed deficiently.

RASHAD v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0864

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In 2018, Hassan Shareef Rashad was indicted for numerous charges including the malice murder of two-year-old Adrian Mitchell. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld Rashad's conviction. The evidence presented at trial showed that Rashad, who was in a romantic relationship with Adrian's mother, Sydney Dean, was the only adult present when Adrian suffered fatal injuries. Witnesses reported observing concerning behavior between Rashad and Adrian, including verbal abuse and physical punishment. In October 2017, Adrian was taken to the hospital with a fractured leg, which doctors concluded was likely caused by non-accidental trauma. In April 2018, Adrian was found unresponsive and later died from what doctors concluded were non-accidental, significant force injuries. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find Rashad guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of Adrian. Rashad's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also rejected.

REDDING v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1018

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia was asked to review the conviction of Merrick Redding, who was found guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of Joseph Davis. Redding appealed his conviction several times, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. The Court had previously vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for fact-finding and legal conclusions on the speedy trial issue. On remand, the trial court again denied Redding's speedy trial motion, leading to the current appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia examined the trial court’s application of the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo and Doggett v. United States to evaluate Redding's constitutional speedy trial claim. The factors are: the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant.

In its analysis, the Court found that the trial court erred in weighing the length of delay and the reasons for delay as neutral. It should have weighed these factors against the State since the delay was uncommonly long and solely attributable to the State. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to weigh neutrally the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial and to weigh the prejudice factor heavily against Redding.

Because the trial court misapplied the law and made factual errors, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court's order denying Redding’s speedy-trial motion and again remanded the case for the trial court to resolve the speedy-trial claim. The Court noted that the trial court may still have discretion to deny Redding’s motion after properly weighing the factors. It did not address any other claims of error raised by Redding.

VENDREL v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1024

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The defendant, Luis Vendrel, was convicted for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Nova Jill Saffles. Vendrel appealed his convictions, arguing that he suffered a constructive denial of his right to counsel or otherwise received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He claimed that his counsel failed to interview defense witnesses before trial, failed to prepare him to testify, and failed to conduct factual research or consult with experts to prepare to challenge the prosecution’s forensic evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that Vendrel failed to establish that any of these alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance prejudiced his defense. Therefore, the court affirmed Vendrel's convictions. The court held that the defendant did not meet the stringent standard to raise a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, as he did not demonstrate that his counsel entirely failed to subject the State’s case to adversarial testing. Instead, the court applied the two-part Strickland test and found that Vendrel failed to show that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient or that this deficient performance prejudiced him.

State v. Wilson

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCAP-22-0000561

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: EDDINS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Christopher Wilson was charged with offenses related to carrying a firearm and ammunition in public without the appropriate license in Hawaii. In response, Wilson challenged the constitutionality of the relevant Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 134-25 (2011) (pistol or revolver) and § 134-27 (2011) (ammunition), arguing that these laws violated his rights under the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and its equivalent in the Hawaii constitution, article I, section 17. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed the charges, agreeing with Wilson's argument. The State appealed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii concluded that Wilson was only entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the laws he was charged with violating. As such, Wilson could challenge HRS § 134-25 and § 134-27, but not HRS § 134-9, which pertains to licenses to carry firearms and which Wilson had not attempted to comply with.

The court found that the text, purpose, and historical tradition of the Hawaii Constitution do not support an individual right to carry firearms in public. The court reasoned that the language of article I, section 17, which mirrors the Second Amendment, ties the right to bear arms to the context of a well-regulated militia. It does not extend this right to non-militia purposes. The court also considered Hawaii's history of strict weapons regulation and the intent of Hawaii's framers.

Based on these considerations, the court held that HRS § 134-25 and § 134-27 do not violate Wilson's right to keep and bear arms under article I, section 17 of the Hawaii Constitution and the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court vacated the lower court's dismissal order and remanded the case back to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit.

State v. Green

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49079

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: BRODY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Idaho Supreme Court upheld a conviction of a man named Troy Dale Green for various offenses, including trafficking in methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm. Green appealed his conviction, arguing that the testimony of a detective who had not personally performed the extraction of data from his cellphone violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court disagreed, ruling that the detective's testimony did not violate Green's rights because the detective had sufficient knowledge and experience to analyze the extracted data and independently conclude that the data came from Green's phone. The court also rejected Green's argument that the text messages from his phone were not properly authenticated under Idaho's rules of evidence. The court found that the detective's testimony, along with that of two other detectives, sufficiently authenticated the text messages. The court affirmed Green's conviction.

State v. Parsons

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50523

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: MOELLER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, defendant William Parsons was convicted on three felony counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and one misdemeanor count of disseminating harmful material to a minor. The prosecution's case was largely based on video evidence from two interviews with the minor victim, conducted by a medical social worker at a children's evaluation service that specializes in abuse cases. The victim did not testify at the trial. On appeal, Parsons argued that the admission of the video evidence violated his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause, as he was not given an opportunity to confront his accuser.

The court agreed with Parsons, concluding that the videos were submitted to the jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The court found that the primary purpose of the victim's interviews was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution, rather than to provide medical care. Therefore, the statements in the interviews were testimonial in nature. Since the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the victim, the court held that it was error to admit the videos at trial. The court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision.

State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Circuit Court

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-OR-00311

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Molter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2022, Richard Allen was charged with the murder of two teenage girls in Indiana. Due to his inability to afford a lawyer, the trial court appointed public defenders Andrew Baldwin and Brad Rozzi to represent him. After about a year, the special judge overseeing the case grew concerned about the effectiveness of Baldwin and Rozzi and disqualified them over Allen's objections, replacing them with new public defenders and postponing Allen's trial by nine months to give the new lawyers time to prepare.

Allen then hired two appellate attorneys who filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Indiana Supreme Court, asking for the reinstatement of Baldwin and Rozzi, a trial start within seventy days, and a new special judge. The Indiana Supreme Court granted Allen's request to reinstate his original counsel, but denied his other two requests.

The court found that the trial court did not demonstrate that disqualifying Baldwin and Rozzi was a necessary last resort after considering the prejudice to Allen. Furthermore, Allen's request for a trial within seventy days was denied because he did not make this request in the trial court. Finally, the court denied Allen's request to replace the special judge, as he did not provide sufficient evidence to suggest that the special judge was biased or prejudiced.

The court also found that Allen's petition presented extraordinary circumstances for which there was not an adequate appellate remedy. Thus, reviewing the trial court’s disqualification decision was appropriate through an original action. Moreover, disqualifying Allen’s counsel delayed his trial by at least nine months, and the trial court has already concluded that Allen’s pretrial confinement presents extraordinary challenges. Hence, the court concluded that Allen's petition presented the sort of extraordinary circumstances for which there is not an adequate appellate remedy.

Iowa v. Bailey

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1440

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: McDermott

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Iowa, the State of Iowa appealed against the district court's dismissal of an extortion charge against Jerome Bailey Sr. Bailey had demanded $10,000 from his former property manager, threatening to expose her for allegedly sending a registered sex offender to his house, which he claimed was a childcare facility. The district court dismissed the charge, concluding that Bailey's threats were made with the reasonable belief that he had a right to make them under Iowa's extortion statute. However, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court reasoned that the statutory defense in the extortion statute, which allows threats made with a reasonable belief of a right to make them, does not apply automatically at the motion to dismiss stage if there are disputed facts. The court found that whether Bailey had a reasonable belief that he could demand $10,000 for the alleged misconduct was a question for a jury to decide, not a matter for dismissal.

State v. Turner

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123097

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cardell Turner was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in relation to an incident where he pointed a gun at two individuals, but the gun did not fire. During trial, Turner testified that he pulled up his gun and attempted to fire only because he thought one of the men was about to shoot him. However, a self-defense instruction was not requested by the defense nor given by the court. The jury found Turner guilty on all counts. Turner argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his request for new counsel, not instructing the jury on self-defense, and not recusing itself due to alleged bias. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the lower courts' decisions on all issues. It found that Turner's disagreement with his counsel's strategy and frustration with the judge's rulings did not necessitate the appointment of new counsel or recusal of the judge. Additionally, the court determined that while a self-defense instruction would have been factually appropriate, its absence was not clear error requiring reversal, as there was significant evidence against Turner's self-defense claim and the jury verdict indicated that they would have rejected that defense.

State vs. Segura

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0163

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case of Elsa E. Segura, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Segura's convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder, under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability. The court also reviewed whether Segura was entitled to a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.

The State of Minnesota accused Segura of aiding and abetting in the kidnap and murder of Monique Baugh and the attempted murder of Baugh's boyfriend, J.M.-M., by luring Baugh to a fake house showing, where the principal perpetrators kidnapped her. Segura admitted to scheduling the house showing, but claimed she thought she was aiding in a drug business, not a kidnap-murder scheme.

The Supreme Court found that although there was sufficient evidence to sustain Segura's convictions for kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize and felony murder while committing a kidnapping, there was insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder. The court concluded that the jury instructions materially misstated the law and were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court reversed Segura's convictions for kidnapping and felony murder and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Burchill v. State

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 20

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: BAKER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Duane Burchill was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit deceptive practices, and one count of possession of dangerous drugs in 2017. Following his conviction, Burchill filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct during his trial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of Burchill's petition for postconviction relief.

Burchill's claim of ineffective assistance centered on two main arguments. First, he argued that the prosecutor repeatedly asked him to comment on the credibility of other witnesses by asking "were they lying" questions. Second, he alleged that the prosecutor posed questions suggesting his personal opinion that Burchill's testimony was not truthful.

The court, however, found that the "were they lying" questions were not improper because they had probative value in evaluating the credibility of a defendant who is claiming that everyone else is lying. The court also disagreed that the prosecutor had expressed personal opinions on Burchill's credibility. The court concluded that the prosecutor's questions were within the scope of permissible questions allowed on cross-examination. Therefore, the court found that Burchill's counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance.

The court did not find it necessary to address Burchill's claim of prejudice due to the failure of his counsel to object, as it had already determined that his counsel's performance was not deficient. Thus, Burchill's petition for postconviction relief was denied.

State v. Lara

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 856

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the defendant, Favion Lara, appealed from the District Court for Hall County, arguing that his sentences should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing before a different judge. Lara was convicted on five felony charges related to firing gunshots toward law enforcement officers.

The court found that there was no breach in the plea agreement. Lara claimed that a letter from a police officer (who was also a victim of Lara's crime) asking for a harsher sentence than the prosecution recommended was a violation of the plea agreement. The court disagreed, noting that the letter was treated as a victim's opinion, and the officer was not acting as an agent of the prosecution when submitting it. There was no evidence that the officer participated in the plea negotiations or consented to act on behalf of the prosecution.

Regarding Lara's claim of excessive sentences, the court found no abuse of discretion. The sentencing court considered the relevant factors, such as Lara's age, mentality, education and experience, social and cultural background, past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, the nature of the offense, and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.

Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

State v. Collins

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0306

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: DONOVAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction of Gregory M. Collins for selling a controlled drug resulting in death. Collins had appealed the conviction, arguing that the Superior Court erred by not recusing the Strafford County Attorney’s Office due to a conflict of interest and by denying his motions to dismiss the charge based on insufficient evidence. The conflict of interest arose from Collins' prior romantic relationship with a legal assistant in the Strafford County Attorney’s Office. The Supreme Court ruled that any conflict of interest from this relationship could not be attributed to the entire county attorney’s office, and the measures taken by the office were sufficient to avoid any appearance of conflict. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the court found that Collins had not met his burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The court held that there was enough evidence to support the finding that the decedent died of acute fentanyl toxicity and that Collins was the source of the lethal dose.

Lyons v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 19

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Crothers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, George Lyons appealed from a district court order dismissing his application for postconviction relief. Lyons had been convicted of gross sexual imposition in 2017, a conviction that was upheld on appeal. He filed an application for postconviction relief more than two years after his conviction became final, claiming newly discovered evidence and arguing that his conviction was barred by a statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition. The district court dismissed his application as untimely under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01, which requires such applications to be filed within two years of the conviction becoming final.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the dismissal. The court first noted that while postconviction relief is available for convictions obtained without jurisdiction, such claims must be brought within the two-year deadline, and no exception exists for claims challenging the district court's jurisdiction. Therefore, Lyons' claim concerning the statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition was untimely.

Second, the court rejected Lyons' argument that the newly discovered evidence exception to the two-year deadline applied. The court found that Lyons had failed to provide competent admissible evidence to support his claim that the new evidence was discovered after trial. As such, the court held that Lyons had failed to meet his burden to obtain an evidentiary hearing in the district court.

Lastly, the court declined to address Lyons' ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he did not provide any argument or explanation concerning this claim in his brief.

State v. Good Bear

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 18

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision finding Erica Good Bear guilty of terrorizing, a class C felony. Good Bear appealed the judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, improper admission of hearsay evidence, and denial of her right to confront a witness. The alleged hearsay evidence was two statements made by the victim's four-year-old child, both of which were recounted by other witnesses. The first statement was recounted by the victim, and the second was recounted by the responding police officer. The court concluded that both statements fell under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule, making them admissible. The court also found that the second statement did not violate Good Bear's right to confront her accuser, as it was not considered "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment. The court determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict of guilty on the terrorizing charge.

State v. Grissett

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28192

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: KITTREDGE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In South Carolina, the case revolves around the interpretation of a law concerning the calculation of the one-year maximum Community Supervision Program (CSP) revocation sentence. The key question is whether inmates arrested for alleged CSP violations should receive credit towards their potential CSP revocation sentence for the time they spent in jail awaiting the adjudication of the CSP violation charge. The Petitioner, Stacardo Grissett, violated the terms of his CSP and was denied credit for roughly six months he spent in jail awaiting his CSP revocation hearing. His appeal was dismissed as moot because he had completed his CSP revocation sentence and original sentence by the time it reached the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, chose to review the case due to its potential for repetition and the need for clarification. The court ruled that inmates must be given credit for any time served awaiting their CSP revocation hearing towards their CSP revocation sentence. The court's decision hinged on the interpretation of Section 24-21-560(C), which states that an inmate who is incarcerated for a CSP violation is not eligible to earn credits that would reduce the sentence. The court held that time served does not "reduce" a sentence, but only affects the date on which the sentence begins, thereby ruling in favor of the Petitioner.

State v. Eady

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: M2021-00388-SC-R11-CD

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Blackburn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

A man, David Wayne Eady, who was charged with multiple robberies in Nashville over a month, appealed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals which denied his motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office from prosecuting his case. Eady argued that the District Attorney General's office should be disqualified because the District Attorney had represented him in a previous case approximately thirty years earlier. The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed, finding that the District Attorney did not have an actual conflict of interest under the Rules of Professional Conduct because the current case and the previous case were not "substantially related." The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the appearance of impropriety should disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, noting that the Rules of Professional Conduct did not retain the concept of appearance of impropriety.

Eady also argued that his trial was improperly conducted as a single trial for multiple offenses under the theory that the separate crimes were all parts of a larger, continuing plan. The Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed with Eady on this point, finding that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the offenses. The court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan, and remanded the case for a new trial on one of the counts.

BECERRA v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0280-22

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: Newell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the trial court mistakenly permitted an alternate juror to participate in the jury's deliberations and vote on the defendant's guilt. The defendant, charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, argued that this violated constitutional and statutory provisions requiring a jury to consist of twelve people and prohibiting any person from being with the jury while it was deliberating. On review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the presence and participation of an alternate juror during jury deliberations did not violate the constitutional or statutory requirements regarding the size of a jury. However, the Court held that the alternate juror’s presence and participation during deliberations did violate the statutory prohibitions against a “person” being with the jury while it is deliberating and conversing with the jury about the case. As such, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to conduct a harm analysis, i.e., to determine whether the alternate juror's presence and participation during deliberations had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict.

Park City v. Woodham

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 3

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Pohlman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case at hand, Robert Evan Woodham was convicted for failing to yield to stationary emergency vehicles in violation of Utah Code subsection 41-6a-904(2). The conviction was upheld by the district court, after which Woodham appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing that the district court did not rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, which is a requirement for appellate review under Utah Code § 78A-7-118(11). Woodham then petitioned the Supreme Court of Utah, arguing the district court implicitly ruled on his constitutional argument.

The Supreme Court of Utah clarified that an implicit ruling by the district court on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is sufficient to permit appellate review under Utah Code subsection 78A-7-118(11), overruling a contrary holding by the Utah Court of Appeals in Murray City v. Timmerman. However, the Court agreed with the appellate court's decision in Woodham's case, stating that he did not preserve a constitutional challenge to the emergency vehicle statute, and therefore, the district court did not implicitly rule on its constitutionality. Consequently, the dismissal of Woodham's appeal due to lack of jurisdiction was affirmed.

Sample v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 220445

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: MANN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case of Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr., who was convicted of attempted robbery. Sample challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification from a victim based on a single photo showup, which he deemed impermissibly suggestive and thus unreliable. Sample also contested the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him.

The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower courts, agreeing that the single photo showup, while generally viewed with suspicion, was not impermissibly suggestive in this case. The court found that the police officer's comment before showing the photo did not make the identification virtually inevitable, and was more of an expression of suspicion than a definite assertion. In evaluating the case, the court applied the five factors from Neil v. Biggers to assess the likelihood of misidentification, and found that all five factors weighed in favor of the victim’s identification reliability.

Sample also argued that the DNA evidence and the victim's identification were insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court disagreed, noting that the trial court had considered and rejected Sample's theory of secondary DNA transfer due to a lack of supporting evidence. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the DNA evidence, eyewitness identifications, and Sample's proximity to the scene of the crime. The court affirmed Sample's conviction for attempted robbery.

Charles A. Santistevan v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 17

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the conviction of Charles Anthony "Tony" Santistevan for multiple counts of sexual assault and one count of voyeurism. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the state to introduce evidence that Santistevan's sexual relationship with the victim, R.S., began when she was a minor. This evidence was introduced under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence (W.R.E.) 404(b), which allows evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for certain purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Santistevan argued that the introduction of this evidence was an abuse of the district court's discretion, but the Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the evidence was relevant and admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) to show an ongoing scheme or plan and to demonstrate Santistevan's course of conduct, and to provide a complete story to the jury about the relationship between Santistevan and R.S., thereby aiding in determining the issue of consent in the sexual assault charges.

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