US v. De La Cruz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1189

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: GELPÍ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

James De La Cruz was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and 400 grams or more of fentanyl. He pleaded guilty to both counts and was subsequently sentenced to 108 months in prison. De La Cruz appealed the sentence, arguing it was substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court noted that the sentence was within the properly calculated sentencing guideline range and considered the dangerous nature of fentanyl, the large quantity involved in the transaction, and De La Cruz's role as a manager in the drug trafficking organization. Moreover, the court rejected De La Cruz's argument that his sentence was disproportionate to sentences for violent crimes and that he was unfairly punished for the potential harm caused by the drugs, not actual harm. The court also dismissed his claim of sentencing disparity with a co-defendant, noting that De La Cruz and his co-defendant were not identically situated. Lastly, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering deterrence when determining De La Cruz's sentence.

United States v. Aquart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2763

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Judge: RAGGI

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the life imprisonment sentence of Azibo Aquart, who was found guilty of multiple federal homicide and drug trafficking crimes. The court had previously affirmed his conviction but vacated his death sentence, remanding the case for a new penalty proceeding. On remand, the government decided not to pursue the death penalty, and Aquart was resentenced to life imprisonment. Aquart appealed, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to address new challenges to his conviction and in sentencing him for both drug-related murder and drug conspiracy, which he argued constituted double jeopardy. The Appeals Court rejected both arguments, ruling that the district court correctly applied the mandate rule and that Aquart's double jeopardy argument was without merit.

United States v. Reyes-Arzate

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-320

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: LEE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Ivan Reyes-Arzate, the defendant-appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to a drug offense before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. He was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and was also subjected to a special assessment and forfeiture. His defense counsel filed an Anders brief seeking to withdraw from the appeal on the basis that any appeal would be frivolous due to the defendant's plea agreement, which included a valid waiver of the right to appeal any sentence of 293 months or less. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, deferred a decision on the motion to withdraw and ordered the defense counsel to submit a supplemental brief. The court found that the defense counsel's brief only addressed the validity of Reyes-Arzate's appeal waiver and did not discuss the scope of the waiver, particularly as it related to non-imprisonment components of the sentence such as the term and conditions of supervised release. The court clarified that when filing Anders briefs, defense counsels should address all aspects of a defendant’s conviction and sentence that are not unambiguously waived. The court deferred decision on the motions and ordered the defendant-appellant's counsel to file a supplemental brief addressing whether the non-imprisonment components of the sentence, which are not unambiguously covered by the appeal waiver, present any non-frivolous issues for appeal.

USA v. Lingala

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2060

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: HARDIMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the appellant, Narsan Lingala, was charged with four counts related to the attempted murder of his ex-wife. On appeal, Lingala argued that the District Court made jurisdictional, procedural, constitutional, and evidentiary errors. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the conviction. Lingala had argued that federal agents had improperly manufactured federal jurisdiction to prosecute a primarily local crime, but the Court of Appeals found that Lingala himself had initiated interstate travel and used facilities of interstate commerce, which satisfied the jurisdictional element of the statute. Lingala also argued that the District Court should have severed the murder-for-hire counts from the witness tampering counts, but the Court of Appeals found that these charges were connected in a common scheme or plan. Furthermore, Lingala argued that the prosecution team should have been disqualified because they had access to documents seized from Lingala, but the Court of Appeals found that Lingala could not show that the prosecution team had relied on these documents. Finally, Lingala argued that letters he had written to his co-conspirator were inadmissible, but the Court of Appeals found that these letters were properly authenticated, not unfairly prejudicial, and not in violation of the Confrontation Clause or hearsay rules. As a result, the Court of Appeals affirmed Lingala's conviction.

US v. King

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4865

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: BALLOU

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In South Carolina, the defendant Darrius Andrez King pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon after firing a handgun in the air outside a crowded nightclub. During the plea colloquy, the district court did not inform King about the significance of supervised release—that if he violated it, he could face additional prison time exceeding the statutory maximum period for the underlying offense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 does require the district court to inform defendants who intend to plead guilty about the effect of supervised release. However, the court decided not to vacate King’s plea, concluding that the omission did not affect his substantial rights. The court reasoned that there was no indication that King would have tried to withdraw his plea if he had been correctly informed about the potential consequences of violating supervised release, especially given the strength of the case against him. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.

USA v. Pena

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10167

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Eric Salvador Pena, a convicted felon, sold a firearm to a confidential informant working for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). He was subsequently arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the district court applied an enhanced offense level as the firearm sold was capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine, offering a guideline range of 51 to 63 months of incarceration. Pena objected, arguing that the firearm could not function with a fully loaded magazine and therefore did not meet the definition of being "capable of accepting a large capacity magazine".

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Pena's argument. It held that the firearm in question met the definition because it could accept and function with a magazine containing more than 15 rounds of ammunition, even though it had jammed during a test when fully loaded. The court also determined that the district court had not erred procedurally or substantively in sentencing. It affirmed the district court’s decision to impose a 63-month sentence of incarceration and 3 years of supervised release.

United States v. Kechego

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-2041

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: LARSEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Jason Kechego, an inmate at a federal detention center in Michigan, who was convicted of second-degree murder for killing fellow inmate Christian Maire. Kechego appealed against several of the district court's rulings during his trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to hold a Remmer hearing, a hearing to examine whether the verdict was tainted by external influences. The court also held that the district court did not err in accepting a partial verdict, where the jury unanimously convicted Kechego of second-degree murder, acquitted him of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and failed to reach unanimity on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

The court further held that the district court did not err in refusing to give a voluntary-manslaughter instruction, as there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the lesser offense. The court also affirmed the district court's exclusion of Kechego's expert's testimony on retrograde extrapolation, a technique for estimating prior blood-alcohol content based on a later measurement, which was done as a discovery sanction. Finally, the court held that any error in excluding evidence of a phone call that Kechego received two weeks before the killing was harmless.

Adams v. Reagle

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-1730

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case at hand, the plaintiff, Benjamin Adams, an inmate at Indiana’s Plainfield Correctional Facility, sued the current and former commissioners of the Indiana Department of Corrections and various other officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Adams was sentenced to a prison term of 30 years for attempted murder and a consecutive term of four years for involuntary manslaughter. He was assigned to work in the prison kitchen, but that assignment was rescinded due to concerns that he might use the assignment to smuggle drugs into the prison. He was later charged with offense A-100 for engaging in criminal gang activity related to an assault in the prison. Disciplinary Hearing Officer J. Peltier found Adams guilty of that offense on March 16. He was ordered to spend one year in disciplinary segregation, 365 days of his earned good time credits were revoked, and he was demoted from credit-earning class 1 to class 3.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appellate court concluded that Adams' claim of First Amendment retaliation lacked sufficient evidence to suggest that the defendants were motivated by a retaliatory intent to pursue the assault charge against him. The court also held that Adams was not deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, as prison disciplinary hearings require only informal due process, which leaves substantial flexibility in the hands of prison administrators. Regarding the Equal Protection claim, the court found no evidence that Adams was treated differently based on his race. Lastly, the court concluded that the defendants could not be held liable for violating Adams' Eighth Amendment rights as there was no evidence that they had control over the conditions of restrictive housing where Adams was placed.

United States v. Bennett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1542

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, James Bennett was convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to 300 months in prison. Bennett appealed, challenging both his conviction and sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the initial judgement.

Evidence showed that Bennett was involved in a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy with Khrista Erdman. They would travel out-of-state to acquire large amounts of methamphetamine, which Bennett would then distribute, a fact supported by text messages, location data, and testimony from another co-conspirator, Kenneth Crook. Moreover, a significant amount of methamphetamine was found in Bennett's backpack.

Bennett argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, but the court found that the combination of co-conspirator testimony, seized drugs, and corroborating data was enough to support the verdict.

Bennett also contended that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on multiple conspiracies, as he had been involved in smaller distributions before joining Erdman and Cook for larger-scale trafficking. The court found no prejudice from the absence of such an instruction, particularly given that Bennett was able to argue the point of multiple conspiracies during the trial.

Regarding his sentence, Bennett claimed that the court wrongly denied him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. However, the court stated that he consistently maintained that he was not guilty of the charged conspiracy, which negated his claim for a reduction.

Lastly, Bennett objected to the calculation of drug quantity for his sentence. The court, however, found that the drug quantity seized from Bennett was enough to support the court's finding. Even though the jury found him guilty of conspiring to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine, the sentencing court was able to attribute a larger drug quantity based on a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found the 300-month sentence to be reasonable, given the severity of the offense and Bennett's criminal history.

United States v. Ivey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1706

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision to deny defendant Ki-Jana Kolajuan Ivey's motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his cell phone. Ivey, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm following a traffic stop in which officers discovered a gun under his seat. Officers also obtained a warrant to search Ivey's phone, finding photos and videos of him with other firearms. Ivey argued that the search of his phone was not supported by probable cause and that the warrant was too general, violating the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause given the circumstances of the traffic stop, Ivey's possession of the phone, and his prior social media activity displaying firearms. Additionally, the court concluded that the warrant was sufficiently particular, as it specified the phone to be searched and the information to be seized. The court noted that the presence of unrelated information on Ivey's phone did not transform the warrant into an impermissible general warrant.

United States v. March

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1279

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Raymond Lee March appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home during a police search. March had pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a prohibited person, but retained his right to appeal the suppression issue. The police had executed a search warrant at March's home based on information that March's nephew, Edwin Goodwin, was storing firearms at March's home. During the search, the police seized two firearms and some marijuana.

March argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant, which was based on the discovery of two marijuana stems in his trash and the information about Goodwin's firearms. The district court had ruled that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, and alternatively, even if probable cause was lacking, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.

The Court of Appeals did not address the existence of probable cause, but agreed with the district court that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was sufficient to resolve the appeal. The court held that even if the affidavit for the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, the evidence should not be suppressed because the officer had obtained the search warrant from a judge in good faith and had reasonably relied on the judge's determination of probable cause. The court found that the information in the affidavit justified reasonable reliance on the judge's determination of probable cause. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied March's motion to suppress the evidence.

United States v. Proto

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3424

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, William Howard Proto, Jr., appealed his conviction on drug trafficking and firearms charges. Proto's appeal was based on the contention that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior arrest and conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which prohibits the use of a defendant’s prior act to prove his character in order to show that on a particular occasion he acted in accordance with the character. However, the rule permits such evidence for proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

The case originated from two incidents in 2021 where Proto was found in possession of drugs, firearms, and a large amount of cash. Proto's prior conviction in 2016 was for a similar offense, where he was found in possession of a firearm and methamphetamine.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 404(b) evidence. The Court reasoned that the evidence of Proto's prior conviction was relevant to a material issue at trial, was similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged, was supported by sufficient evidence, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The Court also noted that the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the evidence, and dismissed Proto's argument that such instructions are ineffective, citing Supreme Court precedent. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

United States v. Riaski

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1338

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Judge: WOLLMAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Linda Riaski, who was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, appealed the denial of her request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware. The case involves a search warrant that was issued based on an affidavit prepared by Deputy Sheriff Jerry Brisky, who relied on information provided by a confidential informant (CI). The CI claimed to have observed Riaski packaging methamphetamine for distribution and to have seen Riaski with a black 9 millimeter handgun. The search of Riaski's residence resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine and firearms.

Riaski's appeal was based on the argument that the district court erred in denying her request for a Franks hearing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. She claimed that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was misleading because it omitted information about the CI’s credibility, her criminal history, her drug use, the financial arrangement between her and Deputy Brisky, and certain facts alleged in Riaski’s own affidavit.

The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Riaski failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that Deputy Brisky intentionally or recklessly omitted facts with the intent to mislead the issuing judge, and that the affidavit, even if supplemented by the omitted information, could still support a finding of probable cause. The court reasoned that the omitted information about the CI's criminal history and drug use would not have altered the probable cause determination, as the affidavit had already provided a basis for the CI’s reliability, disclosing that she previously had provided accurate information and had made controlled purchases under Brisky’s supervision. The court also found that the omission of the details and existence of the agreement between Brisky and the CI did not render the affidavit misleading. The judgment was affirmed.

United States v. Watkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3564

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Henry Watkins Jr., was stopped while driving by a police officer due to a mismatched license plate. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and eventually found cocaine, ecstasy, and a loaded 9-millimeter handgun in the vehicle. Watkins was the sole occupant at the time. He was subsequently indicted and convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Watkins appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that there were errors in his sentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as Watkins was the only person in the vehicle and made movements consistent with hiding the gun. Therefore, the court affirmed Watkins's conviction. However, the court found procedural errors in Watkins's sentencing, as the district court presumed the Guidelines range to be reasonable and adopted a sentence without considering the factors in § 3553(a). The court vacated Watkins's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion.

USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-10109

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: SANCHEZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a criminal case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Conrado Virgen-Mendoza, was convicted for conspiracy to aid and abet his brother, Paulo Virgen-Mendoza, in his flight to Mexico to avoid prosecution for the murder of a police officer. This was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073. Conrado appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court had made a reversible error by allowing the government to argue during closing statements that each co-conspirator did not need to have knowledge about Paulo’s intention to travel to Mexico.

Conrado also argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had knowledge of and specifically intended to further Paulo's escape to Mexico. Furthermore, he contested that the district court had abused its discretion by allowing the government to read transcripts of his interviews with law enforcement to the jury without also admitting into evidence the Spanish-language interview recordings.

The appellate court held that, since the substantive offense of flight to avoid prosecution under § 1073 never occurred, the government was required to prove that the conspirators knew of the fact giving rise to federal jurisdiction, i.e., that they were aiding Paulo’s flight into Mexico to avoid prosecution. The court concluded that any misstatement of the law by the government did not materially affect the verdict, as the brief misstatement was neutralized by the district court’s instructions to the jury.

The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Conrado knew about and specifically intended to help Paulo cross the border to Mexico to avoid prosecution. Lastly, the court ruled that even if the district court had erred by not admitting the Spanish-language interview recordings into evidence, the exclusion did not materially affect the verdict. Thus, the court affirmed Conrado's conviction.

United States v. Swan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-6132

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: MORITZ

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction of John Miguel Swan, who had pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a material misrepresentation made by his plea counsel. His counsel had told him, just before he decided to plead guilty, that all minorities would be removed from his jury, and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. The court held that this misrepresentation about Swan's right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. The court found that the misrepresentation was not corrected during the district court’s plea colloquy nor negated by Swan’s prior experience in the criminal-justice system. As such, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, vacated Swan's conviction, and remanded for the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea and for further proceedings.

FRANKLIN v. STATE

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 9

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Judge: Hiland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2020, Deputy James Oswald found Rhys Franklin asleep in a parked car on the side of the road. Franklin exhibited signs of intoxication, admitted to drinking, and refused to submit to a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and later refused to submit to any chemical tests at the detention center. At his jury trial, Franklin's defense counsel moved for a mistrial twice, first when Deputy Oswald mentioned a portable breath test (PBT) result in response to the defense's questioning and second when another officer, Omar Gonzales, voluntarily mentioned that a PBT was administered. Both motions were denied by the Scott County Circuit Court. Franklin was convicted of DWI and refusal to submit to a chemical test. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the State's petition for review.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for a mistrial. The court found that the defense's questioning invited Deputy Oswald's mention of the PBT result, which made it an invited error that the defense could not complain about. In the case of Gonzales's statement, the court found that it was not a foreseeable response to the prosecution's question and was not deliberately induced by the prosecution. Furthermore, the mention of the PBT without the results was viewed as a harmless error, given the substantial evidence of Franklin's guilt. The court also pointed out that any potential prejudicial effect of the officers' statements could have been mitigated by a curative instruction, which the court offered but the defense declined. The court affirmed the convictions and vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

In re Duong

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B325525(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: ROTHSCHILD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2003, Anh The Duong was sentenced to death by a jury, after being found guilty of multiple murders. In 2015, Duong filed a habeas corpus appeal, and in 2020, his conviction and sentence were upheld by the California Supreme Court. However, his habeas corpus petition was transferred to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Following an agreement with the district attorney, his death sentence was vacated, and he was a resentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Despite this, Duong sought to appeal the denial of the remaining claims in his habeas corpus petition, arguing that he was entitled to do so under the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (Proposition 66).

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, dismissed Duong's appeal. The court interpreted Proposition 66, which expedites the appellate process in death penalty cases, as being applicable only to individuals who are under a death sentence at the time of their appeal. Since Duong's death sentence had been vacated and he was serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole when he filed his appeal, the court found that he was not entitled to the benefits of Proposition 66.

In re K.B.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098376(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: BOULWARE EURIE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The case arises from an appeal by a minor, K.B., from the juvenile court's order denying his request to dismiss a juvenile justice petition and seal records pertaining to his commission of several criminal offenses, for which he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation. K.B. argued that he had met the requirements for "satisfactory completion" of probation and therefore, the petition should be dismissed and records sealed despite his subsequent admission for possessing marijuana for sale, an infraction.

The central legal issue in this case was the interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, subdivision (c)(1), which provides that a subsequent wardship adjudication during probation does not preclude satisfactory completion unless it stems from "a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District disagreed with the juvenile court's interpretation of the statute that any juvenile adjudication, even an infraction, precludes satisfactory completion of probation.

The appellate court held that the language of the statute, when considered in light of its purpose and to avoid absurd results, meant that the limiting phrase "for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude" applies equally to juvenile wardship adjudications and adult convictions. Hence, K.B.'s infraction did not preclude satisfactory completion of probation. The court reversed the juvenile court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition and seal all records pertaining to the dismissed petition.

In re M.B.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166408(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: Streeter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this juvenile wardship proceeding in California, defendant M.B. admitted to attempting murder and related enhancement allegations. M.B. was committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a four-year baseline term of confinement and a maximum term of confinement of 22 years to life. On appeal, M.B. challenged the court's jurisdiction to modify an earlier order setting the maximum term of confinement at four years. He also argued that the indeterminate 22 years to life term was unauthorized and that his precommitment credits should be applied against his four-year baseline term rather than against the maximum term of confinement.

The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter the challenged order and rejected M.B.'s argument that equal protection principles required application of precommitment credits against the baseline term. However, the court agreed with M.B. and the Attorney General that the 22 years to life maximum term of confinement was unauthorized. As such, the court modified the juvenile court's order to specify the maximum term of confinement as 22 years and otherwise affirmed the order.

In re R.M.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B327716(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: LAVIN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three, the mother (B.S.) appealed the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over her child (R.M.) under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and (g), based on her and the father's incarceration.

The parents were arrested on murder charges, and no prior arrangements had been made for the care of their minor child. The child was taken into protective custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. The court exercised jurisdiction over the child because it believed the parents had not made plans for the child's care prior to their arrest.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the court's exercise of jurisdiction was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the parents' incarceration alone was not sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court stressed that the law does not require parents to make an appropriate advance plan for the child's ongoing care and supervision to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found that the Department didn't prove that there was something more than the mere fact of the parents' incarceration to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court found that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that jurisdiction was appropriate. Therefore, the court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders were reversed.

Mosby v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E080924(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: MILLER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves Michael Earl Mosby III, an African-American man charged with multiple murders, including a drive-by shooting, by the Riverside County District Attorney's Office in California. The District Attorney sought the death penalty in Mosby's case. Mosby filed a motion claiming that the decision to seek the death penalty violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, which prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race. The motion was denied by the trial court, which ruled that Mosby had failed to make a prima facie showing of a violation as required under the Act.

Mosby then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order denying his request for a hearing on his Racial Justice Act claim and to enter a new order granting an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court agreed in part with the trial court that Mosby was required to present not only statistical evidence of racial disparity in the charging of the death penalty by the District Attorney but also evidence of nonminority defendants who were engaged in similar conduct and were similarly situated but charged with lesser offenses, to establish a prima facie case.

However, based on the evidence presented in this case, which included factual examples of nonminority defendants who committed murder but were not charged with the death penalty in cases involving similar conduct and who were similarly situated, e.g., had prior records or committed multiple murders, and statistical evidence that there was a history of racial disparity in charging the death penalty by the District Attorney, the appellate court concluded that Mosby met his burden of establishing a prima facie case under section 745, subdivision (a)(3). Therefore, the appellate court granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

People v. Brooks

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080776(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: CASTILLO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case involves Adrian Lamont Brooks, who was found guilty of inflicting corporal injury on his domestic partner, R.J., and committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. On appeal, Brooks argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that R.J. had invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because she was never called and sworn. He also asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to replace a juror who was allegedly biased. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The appellate court found that R.J. had validly asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege through her counsel and that the juror's potential bias did not warrant removal. The court also held that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury regarding R.J.'s refusal to testify.

People v. Dain

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168286(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: Miller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, the court analyzed a second appeal involving a defendant, Yacob Dain, who was found guilty of home invasion robbery, kidnapping, assault with a firearm, and other offenses. The trial court also found that he had two prior convictions for active gang participation that qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes law.

Following a first appeal, the court remanded the matter for resentencing. The prosecution retried only one of the prior convictions, which was again found to be a strike and a serious felony conviction. The trial court then granted Dain's motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction. The People appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law.

Dain argued that Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), which directs trial courts to consider specified mitigating circumstances when deciding whether to dismiss an “enhancement” in furtherance of justice, should apply to decisions about dismissing a prior strike conviction under the Three Strikes law. However, the appeal court disagreed with this argument, stating that section 1385(c) does not apply to the decision whether to dismiss a strike under the Three Strikes law.

The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction because Dain cannot be deemed outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to dismiss the five-year enhancement under section 667(a) and imposing the middle term for the principal offense of home invasion robbery.

The court reversed the order dismissing the prior strike conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to resentence Dain as a person who has suffered one prior strike conviction.

People v. Franco

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324852(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

A sex offender, who was convicted in the 1980s and had lived a law-abiding life for 37 subsequent years, petitioned the trial court to be removed from California’s registry of sex offenders. The People opposed the petition, arguing that one of the offender’s sex crimes would render him ineligible for removal from the registry if prosecuted today under a statute enacted 21 years after his conviction. The court had to decide whether a petition for removal from the sex offender registry could be denied on the grounds that the offender's underlying sex crime also constitutes a different, later-enacted sex crime that requires lifetime registration. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two held that the trial court erred in giving controlling weight to the nature of the underlying sex offenses and ignoring the defendant's lack of reoffending over the years. The court's decision was reversed, and the defendant was ruled eligible for removal from the registry.

People v. Underwood

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A162356(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: Miller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the early hours of New Year's Day in 1987, O'Neal Underwood and an accomplice mugged a pedestrian in Richmond, California. During the mugging, Underwood's accomplice stabbed the victim, who subsequently died from his wounds. Underwood was convicted of first degree murder and robbery and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Years later, the Legislature amended the murder statutes to limit felony murder liability for persons who were not the actual killers. Underwood petitioned for resentencing under the new law. The trial court denied the petition, finding Underwood ineligible for relief because he aided and abetted murder with intent to kill and was a major participant in the underlying robbery, acting with reckless indifference to human life. Underwood appealed, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof, the prosecution's evidence does not prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law, and his attendance at the evidentiary hearing by speakerphone and without a means of confidentially communicating with his counsel violated his constitutional and statutory rights. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, agreed with Underwood that the prosecution failed to prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law because no substantial evidence supports a finding that he intended to kill or acted with reckless indifference for human life. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and instructed it to vacate the murder conviction and resentence Underwood in accordance with the appropriate section of the Penal Code.

State v. Kyle A.

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20721

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: DANNEHY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree, criminal mischief in the first degree, and threatening in the second degree, among other crimes. The defendant had unlawfully entered his brother's residence and caused significant damage within it. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had committed plain error by not identifying the specific crime or crimes he allegedly intended to commit when he entered the residence during the jury instruction on first-degree burglary.

However, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not committed plain error. The trial court's instruction accurately recited the elements of the burglary charge and clarified that the intent to commit a crime within the building is a distinct element. Furthermore, the court noted that although it is the better practice for trial courts to name the crime or crimes and define such elements in its instructions, it has never been clearly held to be mandatory.

Additionally, the court found that even if there was a patent error in the court’s instruction, the omission did not result in a manifest injustice. The evidence presented at trial established that the defendant had violently forced his way into the residence and caused extensive damage, which satisfied the intent element.

Davis v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Dockets: SC2021-1778, SC2022-0882

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case at hand, a Florida prisoner, Leon Davis Jr., under sentences of death, appealed the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief and also petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The crimes involved in this postconviction appeal occurred on December 13, 2007, at the Headley Insurance Agency in Polk County. Davis was sentenced to death following a jury trial for committing robbery, binding two women with duct tape, pouring gasoline on them, and setting them on fire. One of the women was pregnant. The Supreme Court of Florida, after reviewing the case, affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied Davis’s habeas petition. The Court found that Davis had not demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective or that the trial court erred in not ordering a competency examination. The Court also found that Davis's habeas claim was procedurally barred because it was a repackaged version of one of his postconviction claims.

Davis v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Dockets: SC2021-1779, SC2022-0883

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case under consideration, the appellant, Leon Davis Jr., a man sentenced to death, appealed the circuit court's denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief and also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The crimes in question involved murders that occurred at a gas station and convenience store in Polk County, Florida. Davis was sentenced to death following a bench trial, and his convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. In his appeal, Davis raised several issues, which included violations of the Giglio rule, the Brady rule, and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that Davis did not demonstrate any instances of counsel’s deficiency, and thus, there was no cumulative error analysis to conduct. The court also held that Davis failed to prove that the State knowingly presented false testimony or that the testimony was material, thereby negating his Giglio claim. With regard to the Brady claim, the court ruled that Davis failed to establish prejudice and that the Brady violation did not exist. The Supreme Court of Florida also denied Davis's habeas claim. Thus, the court affirmed the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief and denied Davis's petition for habeas corpus.

State v. Rodriguez

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49266

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2021, Gilberto Flores Rodriguez was found guilty of first-degree murder by a Cassia County jury for the 1995 killing of a 14-year-old girl. After the verdict, Rodriguez filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial after information came to light suggesting that a juror may have slept through parts of the trial. Rodriguez's argument was based on the belief that the juror's alleged inattentiveness amounted to juror misconduct and could have prejudiced the defendant. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that Rodriguez failed to meet his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that juror misconduct occurred. The court noted that there was much uncertainty over whether the juror was actually asleep during any stage of the trial. The court further held that even if it were to address the question of prejudice, Rodriguez's motion would still lack evidence. The court concluded that Rodriguez failed to establish the identity and duration of the specific testimony, argument, or instructions the juror missed. As a result, the court affirmed the order of the district court denying Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial.

People v. Huff

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 128492

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, Richard Huff, a convicted murderer serving a life sentence, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his life sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey. The petition was automatically advanced to the second stage due to the time limit, and counsel was appointed. However, appointed counsel did not amend the pro se petition and instead stood on the allegations in the petition. The Cook County circuit court dismissed the petition, and the appellate court affirmed. Huff argued that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by standing on a meritless petition, rather than moving to withdraw or amending the pro se petition. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that Huff failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance and affirmed the dismissal of the pro se petition. The court found no indication that Huff's postconviction counsel knew that his claim was frivolous or patently without merit. The court also noted that while Huff's claim was ultimately unsuccessful, there was no duty for his counsel to withdraw under these circumstances.

Spells v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-CR-00232

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: Goff

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2021, Tailar Spells was arrested and charged with Level 6 felony battery by bodily waste and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. A $250 cash bond was set, which was deposited in full by a third party, and both Spells and the depositor signed a cash-bond agreement, permitting the court to retain all or part of the cash to pay for public defense costs and any fines, costs, fees, and restitution that the court may order Spells to pay if convicted. Spells was convicted on the battery charge but acquitted of resisting law enforcement. The court imposed a sentence, including a $20 fine and $185 in various fees and court costs, and later granted a request to apply $245 from Spells's cash bond to her fine, costs, and fees. Spells appealed, arguing that the trial court had failed to adequately inquire into her ability to pay.

The Indiana Supreme Court held that under the cash-bond agreement, the court was allowed to retain the entirety of Spells's public defense costs without an indigency determination. However, the court could retain cash bail to pay most other fines, costs, and fees only after considering Spells's ability to pay. The indigency determination in Spells's case was found to be incomplete, thus warranting partial remand to the trial court. The court ruled that an indigency hearing is necessary before retaining cash bail to pay most other fines, costs, and fees. The court also clarified the standard for indigency determinations, noting that the record of such determination must disclose evidence of the defendant's assets, income, and necessary expenses.

State of Iowa v. Martin

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-0102

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: MCDERMOTT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case was heard by the Supreme Court of Iowa and involved an appeal by a defendant, Demetrias Martin, who was challenging the mandatory minimum term imposed with his sentence for first-degree robbery. The main issue in the case was the use of a risk assessment tool that categorized Martin as a "high" risk for violent recidivism and a "moderate/high" risk for continuous victimization. Martin argued that the district court abused its discretion by relying on these conclusions without any information about how the tool actually arrived at them.

In March 2019, Martin was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison with a requirement to serve at least 70% of his sentence under a statutory mandatory minimum. After a retroactive amendment to the robbery sentencing statute in June 2019, Martin was eligible for resentencing with a potential mandatory minimum as low as 50%. The amendment required the district court to consider certain factors when determining the mandatory minimum to impose, including a validated risk assessment.

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the lower courts, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the results of the risk assessment tool. The court found that Martin had notice of the risk assessment and had the opportunity to challenge it but failed to do so. The court held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by considering risk assessment information in a presentence investigation report where a defendant has notice of the risk assessment and fails to present evidence exposing some actual unsoundness in it. Therefore, the court rejected Martin's argument and affirmed the sentence imposed by the lower court.

In re Wrongful Conviction of Sims

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 126247

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: BILES

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a dispute originating from a domestic incident in 2016, Michael David Sims was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes, including felony interference with law enforcement. Sims appealed this conviction arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support it. Both Sims and the State recommended that the Court of Appeals reverse the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand the case for resentencing on a lesser misdemeanor interference offense. The Court of Appeals agreed and the lower court resentenced Sims and ordered the misdemeanor conviction to run concurrently with all other counts, declaring Sims' time served to be sufficient to satisfy his sentence.

Subsequently, Sims filed a wrongful conviction lawsuit, alleging he spent nearly a year in prison due to the invalid felony conviction. The State argued that Sims couldn't prove his interference charge was dismissed nor was he found not guilty on retrial, as required by K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B). The district court sided with the State and denied Sims' claim, ruling that the interference charge wasn't dismissed as envisioned by the statute.

The Supreme Court of the state of Kansas affirmed this decision. It held that although Sims' felony conviction was reversed, the interference charge was never dismissed, as the case was remanded and Sims was convicted of misdemeanor interference. The Court concluded that Sims failed to prove that his charges were dismissed or that he was found not guilty on retrial, as required by the wrongful conviction statute. Thus, Sims' claim for wrongful conviction was dismissed.

STATE EX REL. ROBINSON VS. VANNOY

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-KP-00812

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Darrell J. Robinson was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Robinson appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, arguing that the state suppressed material evidence that violated his due process rights. The evidence in question included undisclosed deals with jailhouse informant Leroy Goodspeed, serology reports and notes, other forensic evidence, and eyewitness accounts inconsistent with trial testimony.

The court found that the state did suppress evidence and this evidence was favorable to the defense. The court further found that the undisclosed evidence was material and its suppression undermined confidence in the verdict. Consequently, the court decided that Robinson did not receive a fair trial, resulting in a verdict unworthy of confidence. The court reversed Robinson's conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Labbe

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 15

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: DOUGLAS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Jacob R. Labbe Sr. was convicted by the trial court on one count of domestic violence stalking and two counts of violation of a protective order. Labbe appealed arguing that the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague, the evidence was insufficient to convict him of domestic violence stalking, the court erred in denying his request to dismiss the charges as de minimis, and the court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction. It held that the stalking statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The court found that the statute provided a clear definition of "course of conduct" and enough evidence supported a conviction for domestic violence stalking. It further held that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Labbe's request to dismiss the charges as de minimis. The court also found no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The court concluded that the First Amendment did not require the State to prove reckless disregard on the part of Labbe for the effect of his statements on the victim, as the charge was not based on the content of Labbe's communications but rather on his persistent unwelcome contact with the victim. Therefore, the court found no error in the trial court's instructions to the jury. The conviction was affirmed.

State v. Tripp

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 12

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: LAWRENCE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the conviction of Ralph A. Tripp Jr., who was found guilty of several drug-trafficking offenses, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and criminal forfeiture of property. Tripp appealed on the grounds that he should be immune from prosecution for his drug-related offenses, that there were errors in the State's conduct during its opening statement and closing argument, and that the jury was not provided with clear instructions. The court ruled that Maine’s immunity statutes did not apply in this case, that any prosecutorial error did not affect Tripp’s substantial rights, and that the trial court sufficiently corrected any potential confusion stemming from its initial jury instructions. The court therefore affirmed the judgment. The case involved Tripp and his wife, Amanda Tripp, who resided in a rooming house in Bangor. After the Tripps moved in, residents noticed an increase in visitors, found hypodermic needles outside the building, and frequently observed the Tripps letting visitors into the building. On one occasion, Tripp called 9-1-1 to report a person unconscious in one of the shared bathrooms of the rooming house. The person was later pronounced dead, and the cause of death was determined to be acute intoxication from multiple drugs. When the police executed a search warrant for Tripp’s room, they seized a handgun, various drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Tripp was subsequently charged with several offenses.

Commonwealth v. A.Z.

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13455

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: LOWY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, A.Z., who was involuntarily hospitalized for a competency determination under Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the involuntary commitment of a criminal defendant for a competency determination infringes upon a defendant's fundamental right to liberty and thus must satisfy strict scrutiny under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution. To pass strict scrutiny, the involuntary commitment must be the least restrictive means available to vindicate the governmental interest at stake. Therefore, it is unconstitutional for a court to hospitalize a pretrial defendant for a clinical evaluation and observation of competency, absent a finding by the judge, by clear and convincing evidence, that hospitalization is the least restrictive means available to adequately determine a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial. The judge in this case did not make such findings, so the court concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated.

Commonwealth v. Honsch

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12420

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1995, the bodies of a woman and her daughter were found in separate locations in Massachusetts and Connecticut. More than two decades later, the woman's husband was convicted for her murder. On appeal, he asserted that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity and deliberate premeditation, and challenged the admissibility of his daughter's murder evidence, the testimony of two latent print examiners, and the limitation on introducing a potential third-party culprit.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction. The court found no reversible error in the trial court's decisions and determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the husband was the perpetrator and committed the crime with deliberate premeditation. The court also ruled that the evidence of the daughter's murder was admissible to establish the identity of the perpetrator of the mother's murder. The court also found no issues with the testimony of the latent print examiners and did not find any unfair limitations on the defendant's ability to present evidence of a potential third-party culprit. Furthermore, the court ruled that the defendant's rights to confront witnesses were not violated by the testimony of the latent print examiners. Lastly, the court deemed that the defendant's argument on the degree of certainty expressed by the latent print examiners was unpreserved, and the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

Commonwealth v. McDermott

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13394

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: GAZIANO

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1982, William F. McDermott was convicted of first-degree murder. On direct review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the trial judge had erred in failing to instruct the jury that evidence of intoxication could be considered in determining whether McDermott acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty to support a verdict of first-degree murder. Instead of ordering a new trial, the court reduced the verdict to murder in the second degree.

In 2020, McDermott filed a motion for a new trial, claiming prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury instruction, and arguing that his sentence of life with the possibility of parole was unconstitutional. The Supreme Judicial Court found that while the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct, the errors did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court also held that McDermott's challenges to the jury instructions were estopped by prior postconviction rulings, and that his sentence was not unconstitutional.

The court affirmed the denial of McDermott's motion for a new trial.

State vs. Abdus-Salam

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: MCKEIG

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was tasked to interpret the statutory definition of a "dangerous weapon" as used in the case of Ayyoob Dawood Abdus-Salam, who was charged with two counts of second-degree riot for his alleged organization of two intersection "takeovers." During these events, several vehicles and large groups of pedestrians intentionally blocked off predetermined urban intersections, allowing drivers to perform dangerous stunts while crowds watched and filmed.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the term "likely" as used in the manner-of-use definition for "dangerous weapon" under Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2022), is unambiguous and means "probable or reasonably expected." Furthermore, the court found that the district court erred when it dismissed two second-degree riot charges against Abdus-Salam for lack of probable cause, as sufficient facts in the record precluded granting a motion for a judgment of acquittal if proved at trial. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, ruling that because a reasonable jury could conclude from the facts alleged by the State that the vehicles used in the "takeovers" were dangerous weapons, the charges should not have been dismissed.

State vs. Nowicki

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100041

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On March 21, 2019, David Scott Nowicki was discovered unconscious in a vehicle in a ditch off Interstate 70 in Saline County, Missouri. After conducting field sobriety tests, Sergeant Dunfee concluded that Nowicki was impaired and arrested him. Nowicki was later transported to the Saline County jail, where he admitted he had been driving the vehicle but denied using alcohol or drugs in the last 72 hours. A jury trial was scheduled to determine whether Nowicki was guilty of driving while intoxicated. Before the trial, the circuit court was required to determine whether, if the jury found Nowicki guilty, he would be subject to an enhanced sentence due to prior convictions that qualified as intoxication-related traffic offenses (IRTOs). The state argued that Nowicki had four prior convictions that each qualified as an IRTO. As a result, the state contended Nowicki should be sentenced as a chronic offender. The jury found Nowicki guilty and the circuit court sentenced him as a chronic offender to five years in the department of corrections. Nowicki appealed the circuit court's judgment, arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each of his four prior convictions qualifies as an IRTO.

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each of Nowicki's prior convictions was an intoxication-related traffic offense. The court found that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct underlying Nowicki's 1986, 1990, and 1994 convictions involved him actually, physically driving a vehicle while intoxicated. Accordingly, the court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for resentencing.

Rupnow v. State Auditor

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 14

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the state of Montana, William James Rupnow Jr., a licensed bail bondsman, was accused of criminal offenses after he tried to apprehend a client, Victorianne Dahl, who had violated her bail conditions. Dahl had consistently been late with payments and had violated other conditions of her release. Rupnow resorted to using pepper spray in his attempt to detain Dahl, leading to the State charging him with felony assault with a weapon and aggravated assault. Rupnow was ultimately acquitted on the aggravated assault charge, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the assault with a weapon charge. In response, Rupnow filed a lawsuit against the Montana State Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance, Mike Winsor, Jennifer Hudson, and XYZ government subdivision, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of his rights under the Montana Constitution. The defendants requested the case be dismissed based on prosecutorial immunity, a motion which the District Court granted. Rupnow appealed the decision, arguing that as a bail bondsman, he had the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Rupnow's case. The Court found that Montana's statutory scheme for pre-trial release, or bail, did not provide bail bondsmen with an unfettered right to remit a bail bond client to jail without an outstanding warrant. The Court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to grant bail bondsmen arrest authority that far exceeded that of law enforcement officers. Therefore, Rupnow did not have the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant, meaning there was probable cause to charge Rupnow with the crimes he was accused of. The Court concluded that Rupnow's claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process failed as a matter of law.

Chittenden v. Justice Court of Pahrump Township

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: Westbrook

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A criminal defendant in Nevada, Jamie Marie Chittenden, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking the dismissal of charges against her because her preliminary hearing was scheduled 76 days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The district court denied the petition because it found that good cause existed for this delay. Chittenden appealed this decision, arguing that the delay violated her statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days. The Court of Appeals of Nevada concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it found good cause for the extreme delay in scheduling Chittenden’s preliminary hearing. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Chittenden’s petition for a writ of mandamus on other grounds. The court held that when deciding whether good cause exists to delay a preliminary hearing, the justice court must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to conditional pretrial liberty against the interests of the State and the needs of the court. The court also must make findings on the record to justify any delay of the preliminary hearing and undertake efforts to ensure that the hearing is held as soon as practicable.

Commonwealth v. Taylor

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 40 MAP 2022

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Judge: TODD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a violation of a juvenile defendant's Fifth Amendment right is subject to appellate review for harmless error. The case involved Nazeer Taylor, who was charged with several serious felony offenses as a juvenile. The juvenile court transferred Taylor's case to adult criminal court, considering Taylor's refusal to admit guilt for his alleged offenses as a factor in its decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania previously held that such consideration violated Taylor's Fifth Amendment right. In this appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the violation constituted a structural error, not subject to a harmless error review. Given Taylor's current age of 27, neither the juvenile nor the adult criminal court had the statutory authority to conduct a new certification hearing. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court reversing Taylor's conviction and discharging him.

State v. Paule

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 2

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Judge: Matthew B. Durrant

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the petitioner, Elbert John Paule, was charged with murder, obstruction of justice, reckless endangerment, and assault following a fatal shooting incident involving a friend. The jury acquitted Paule on all charges except obstruction of justice. Paule challenged his conviction, arguing that the obstruction of justice conviction was legally inconsistent with the jury’s determination that he was not guilty of the other crimes. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the lower court's ruling.

The Supreme Court held that to be convicted of obstruction of justice, a defendant need only perform an obstructive act with the requisite intent. Proof of a separate crime is not necessary. The court concluded that because a violation of Utah’s obstruction of justice statute requires only that a defendant act with the requisite intent—it does not require proof of a separate criminal offense—the jury’s verdict was not legally impossible. Furthermore, the court found that Paule's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in failing to seek a more detailed unanimity instruction.