United States v. Colon-Cordero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 22-1171, 22-1172

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant, Luis Ángel Colón-Cordero, was convicted of violating the terms of his supervised release and charged with new criminal conduct, including the possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Colón-Cordero to an upwardly variant sentence for his new criminal conduct and a maximum term of imprisonment for violating his supervised release, which were to run consecutively. Colón-Cordero appealed, challenging the sentences as unreasonable.

The appeals court vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. The court held that the district court had not adequately justified or explained its upward variance from the sentencing guidelines in the new criminal conduct case. Specifically, the appeals court found that the district court had not adequately engaged with the mitigating impact of Colón-Cordero's intellectual disability, despite this being a primary argument presented by his defense.

In the case of the revocation sentence, the appeals court held that the district court's finding that Colón-Cordero was "constantly engaging in the illegal use of controlled substances" during his supervised release period was clearly erroneous. The record showed that Colón-Cordero had only tested positive for drug use twice during his release period, contradicting the district court's characterization of his drug use as constant. The court concluded that this error may have affected the sentencing outcome. The case was remanded for resentencing to a different judge.

FTX Trading, Ltd. v. Vara

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-2297

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Criminal Law

This case involves the bankruptcy of FTX Trading Ltd., a multibillion-dollar cryptocurrency company that suffered a severe financial collapse. The collapse triggered criminal investigations revealing fraud and embezzlement of customers' funds, leading to the conviction of Samuel Bankman-Fried, FTX's primary owner. Following the financial collapse, the United States Trustee requested the appointment of an examiner to investigate FTX's management as per 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2). The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, interpreting the appointment of an examiner as discretionary under the statute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The Appellate Court held that the appointment of an examiner under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2) is mandatory when requested by the U.S. Trustee or a party in interest, and if the debtor's total fixed, liquidated, unsecured debt exceeds $5 million. The Court based its decision on the plain text of the statute, ruling that the word "shall" in the statute creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. The Court also held that the phrase "as is appropriate" in Section 1104(c) refers to the nature of the investigation and not the appointment of the examiner. The case was remanded with instructions to order the appointment of an examiner.

United States v. Carrington

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-7138

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, defendant Theodore Carrington appealed from the district court's order finding him "subject to the [civil-commitment] provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246," as well as alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Carrington's claims on the merits. The district court's order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable collateral order.

Carrington had been indicted for transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce. His erratic behavior during his detention and arraignment hearing led to a motion for a competency evaluation under § 4241(a) and (b), which concluded that Carrington was mentally incompetent to stand trial. He was subsequently committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment under § 4241(d)(1), with the intention to restore his competency for trial. Months later, the government filed a certificate for civil commitment under § 4246 in a different district court.

Carrington argued that the delay in his evaluation process rendered the district court's order invalid and that this rendered him no longer in the Attorney General’s legitimate custody when the court made its finding. However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear these claims, as the district court's order was not a final judgment nor an appealable collateral order. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court's finding that Carrington was "subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246" had no legal effect on Carrington's continued custody or eventual civil commitment, and therefore was not an appealable collateral order. As such, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.

United States v. Everett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4536

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Reshod Jamar Everett, appealed his multiple convictions and sentences for six drug distribution and firearms offenses. The charges arose from his involvement in extensive criminal activities related to drugs and firearms in Cumberland County, North Carolina. Everett unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence seized from his residence, claiming that the authorities violated the "protective sweep" exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant mandate. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 480 months in prison, plus supervised release.

On appeal, Everett challenged the denial of his suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting three of his convictions, and his 480-month prison sentence. The Court of Appeals rejected each of Everett's contentions and affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the protective sweep of Everett's residence was justified due to the circumstances, including the fact that Everett was a substantial drug dealer with a known connection to firearms. The Court also held that there was substantial evidence to support Everett's convictions, even under a plain error review. Finally, it concluded that Everett's 480-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable, given the seriousness of his offenses, his conduct between the time of the offenses and sentencing, and the need to deter similar conduct in the future.

United States v. Smart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4209

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Trezith Smart, appealed his drug-trafficking convictions, arguing that his prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence from two traffic stops. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Smart's arguments, affirming his conviction.

With respect to the Speedy Trial Act claim, the court determined that sufficient time was excluded under the Act's provisions to reduce the number of days between Smart's initial appearance and his arraignment on the superseding indictment to 70. Specifically, the court pointed to the delay caused by a continuance granted when Smart's attorney withdrew due to a conflict of interest. The court found that the continuance served the "ends of justice" and the court had set forth its reasoning on record, thereby meeting the requirements of the Act.

Regarding the motion to suppress evidence from the two traffic stops, the court held that both stops were constitutional. The court found that the officer who conducted the first stop had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, justifying the extension of the stop and the deployment of a drug-sniffing dog. The court also found that the second stop was justified by the suspicious movements of Smart, including his handling of a trash bag that was later found to contain cocaine residue.

The court thus affirmed Smart's drug-trafficking convictions.

United States v. Smart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4209

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Trezith Rashad Smart, appealed his drug-trafficking convictions. He argued that his prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the district court erred in not granting his motion to suppress evidence from two traffic stops.

Smart was initially stopped for speeding in Louisiana in 2017. During this stop, a drug-sniffing dog was deployed and alerted officers to the presence of cocaine in Smart's car. Smart was later linked to a drug dealing operation in Virginia and further evidence of drug trafficking was gathered during a second stop in 2018. He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.

On appeal, the court rejected Smart's arguments. It held that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, noting that delays in the proceedings, including changes of counsel and the complexity of the case, were justified and fell within the exceptions provided in the Act. It also held that both traffic stops were constitutional. Specifically, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the first traffic stop and deploy a drug-sniffing dog based on Smart's extreme nervousness, inconsistent answers about his travel plans, and the presence of a gas can in his car, which the officer, based on experience, associated with drug trafficking. Consequently, the court affirmed Smart's conviction.

US v. Curtis Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: WALKER

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Curtis Davis, had been arrested and charged with drug and firearm offenses after law enforcement officers executing a search warrant observed him attempting to place baggies of controlled substances into an air vent. More baggies of controlled substances, firearms, cash, cell phones, and additional controlled substances were found in the residence. The district court denied Davis's motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court found that the search warrant was valid at least as to evidence of firearms offenses. The controlled substances found on Davis's person and in his bedroom were lawfully seized either incident to Davis's arrest or because they were in plain view of the officers conducting the search. Furthermore, Davis's cell phone was lawfully seized as an instrumentality of drug trafficking found in plain view. The court emphasized that for a cell phone to be seized in plain view, the "additional evidence or indicators" of criminality have significant work to do to establish probable cause. In this case, Davis's phone was found in the residence along with substantial quantities of controlled substances that were packaged for distribution, cash, firearms, and ammunition, all found on Davis's person or in his bedroom. This evidence provided law enforcement with sufficient probable cause to seize Davis's cell phone. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

US v. Hart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-4534

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: RICHARDSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Kenneth Hart was convicted of drug dealing, sex trafficking, and witness tampering. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by failing to indict him for the witness tampering charge within thirty days of his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act on the witness tampering conviction, but rejected his evidentiary challenges.

The court held that the government failed to indict Hart for witness tampering within the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day window. So it vacated only Hart’s witness-tampering conviction and remanded the case for resentencing on the four counts added by the superseding indictment. Hart also contended that the district court erred by allowing certain prejudicial evidence at trial, but the court disagreed and affirmed the district court’s rulings on these evidentiary challenges.

US v. Newby

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4018

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, defendant Martrey Antwain Newby, who was initially sentenced for six non-violent drug crimes, appealed his sentence modification under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court had included discretionary conditions of supervised release in its written judgment that were not orally announced during the sentencing hearing, which was considered to be an error according to a precedent set by United States v. Rogers (2020). The main issue in this appeal was that the court during Newby's resentencing under the First Step Act, carried forward the same conditions of supervised release that were not orally announced in the initial sentencing hearing.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court could not have imposed any new discretionary conditions of supervised release in Newby’s First Step Act proceeding, as the only type of modified sentence authorized by the First Step Act is a reduced one. The court also noted that Newby's conditions of supervised release which were never announced in his presence and were part of his written judgment, were nullities according to the Rogers precedent. The court argued that because these conditions were never imposed, they could not be carried forward in the district court's amended judgment.

The Fourth Circuit ultimately vacated the amended judgment and remanded for resentencing, upholding the principle that discretionary conditions of supervised release must be orally announced during the sentencing hearing. This decision may be specific to the unique circumstances of this case and may not necessarily apply to all cases involving the First Step Act or conditions of supervised release.

United States v. Tighe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50332

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: Graves

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's denial of Lucas James Tighe's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After being convicted and sentenced for possession of stolen firearms, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and conspiracy to possess stolen firearms, Tighe alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed that his trial attorney, Sharon Diaz, did not consult with him about filing an appeal. The Court of Appeals, applying the Strickland test, found that Diaz failed to adequately consult with Tighe about the potential appeal, which was considered professionally unreasonable. Furthermore, the court found that Tighe demonstrated a reasonable interest in appealing, given the unexpected severity of his sentence and his request to Diaz to ask the court to run his federal sentence concurrently with his forthcoming state sentence. The court also determined that Tighe had shown there was a reasonable probability that he would have timely appealed, but for Diaz's deficient performance. As a result, the court found that Tighe had successfully made an ineffective assistance of counsel claim which entitled him to an appeal. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant an out-of-time appeal and reenter Tighe's criminal judgment.

United States v. Dorsey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5082

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Chattanooga, Tennessee, Al Dorsey celebrated New Year's Eve by firing a gun into the air. This action was recorded by nearby cameras, and the police were dispatched. Dorsey was detained and found in possession of a firearm. As he had prior felony convictions, he was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. In determining his guidelines range, his base offense level was calculated as 24 due to having at least two prior convictions for a "crime of violence," specifically two prior Tennessee convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery and one for robbery. Dorsey appealed this, arguing his facilitation offenses were not "crimes of violence."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with Dorsey's argument. The court held that Dorsey's prior convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery were indeed "crimes of violence" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court relied on its previous decision in United States v. Gloss, which interpreted the term "crime of violence" to cover the Tennessee crime of facilitating aggravated robbery. The court rejected Dorsey's argument that Gloss was in conflict with earlier or later decisions. The court concluded that facilitating aggravated robbery requires a knowing state of mind, not just a reckless one, and thus meets the definition of "crime of violence" under the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to treat Dorsey's facilitation offenses as "crimes of violence," leading to a higher base offense level for sentencing purposes.

Jewell v. Boughton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3082

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2015, DeShawn Harold Jewell was convicted of robbery by use of force and bail jumping, following a robbery outside a Milwaukee tavern. A DNA match from a hat left at the scene and a photo identification by the victim led to his arrest, but Jewell argued that the photo array procedure did not adhere to best practices. During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court if the numbering system of the photo array matched that of a photo "six-pack" shown at trial. The trial court, without consulting the parties, answered "No." The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict. Jewell challenged this ex parte communication, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the trial court's error was harmless. Jewell sought habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court reasoned that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had not unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in its harmlessness analysis, and that the ex parte communication did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.

USA v. Wilcher

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1400

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: PRYOR

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Joseph Wilcher, was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor and travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual activity after he drove across state lines to meet someone he believed was a fifteen-year-old girl, who was actually a federal agent. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois sentenced Wilcher to a custodial prison term and a term of supervised release. In explaining the sentence, the district court only discussed the seriousness of the offense and did not address any of Wilcher's arguments for mitigation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the district court erred in its sentencing. The appellate court held that the district court had relied on the seriousness of the offense as the sole justification for the sentence, including the term of supervised release. However, the seriousness of the offense is not a factor that courts can consider when imposing a term of supervised release. The appellate court also found that the district court had failed to consider Wilcher's principal mitigation arguments. The appellate court concluded that the district court's failure to adequately explain the sentence precluded meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated Wilcher's sentence and remanded the case for a full resentencing hearing. The court clarified that on remand, the district court could not consider the seriousness of the offense when imposing a term of supervised release and must consider Wilcher's principal mitigation arguments.

United States v. Anderson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1602

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Glen Robert Anderson pleaded guilty to two counts of production and attempted production of child pornography, one count of enticement of a minor, and one count of interstate communication with intent to extort. The district court sentenced him to 20 years in prison and 12 years of supervised release, which is above the statutory minimum sentence of 15 years. Anderson appealed, contending that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the sentencing. The court had carefully assessed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and had explained its reasoning for choosing a sentence above the statutory minimum. The court had considered the nature and seriousness of Anderson's crimes as aggravating factors, while also taking into account mitigating factors such as Anderson's history of abuse and mental health issues. The court had not relied solely on the advisory Guidelines, which recommended a life sentence, but had used them as a starting point and then varied downward based on the specific circumstances of the case. Thus, Anderson's sentence was not deemed substantively unreasonable.

United States v. Carneal

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1627

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Alexzander Michael Carneal, who pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of child pornography and was ordered to pay restitution to twenty-one identified victims. Carneal appealed the restitution order, arguing that the government's request for restitution was untimely and breached his plea agreement, which stated that the government may seek mandatory restitution within 60 days of discovering new losses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed with Carneal's interpretation of the plea agreement. The court held that the government's request for restitution was not untimely, as it did not involve "new" or "further" losses that were discovered after the plea agreement, but rather the original losses identified before the sentencing. The court further held that the plea agreement was not breached, and that Carneal's waiver of his right to appeal any restitution order associated with his sentence was valid and enforceable. As such, the court dismissed Carneal's appeal of the restitution order.

USA V. GAMBINO-RUIZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-50303

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: BYBEE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, José Gambino-Ruiz, was convicted and sentenced for illegal re-entry into the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Gambino-Ruiz appealed his conviction, arguing that the removal order, which was the basis for his charge, was improper under the Immigration and Nationality Act. He also contested his sentence, claiming that the district judge considered impermissible factors in denying a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

The Court ruled that Gambino-Ruiz was properly subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and therefore did not violate his due process rights when he was removed via expedited proceedings in 2013. He was properly convicted of illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Furthermore, the Court affirmed his sentence, ruling that Gambino-Ruiz did not demonstrate that his was a rare circumstance where the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is due after the defendant has proceeded to trial.

The facts of the case are as follows: Gambino-Ruiz, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally several times. Each time, he was apprehended by border patrol agents and subsequently deported through expedited removal proceedings. In 2020, he was again found in the U.S. illegally and was charged with illegal re-entry of a removed alien. His motions to dismiss the charges and to suppress his admissions to the border patrol agents were denied, leading to a trial where he was found guilty. At sentencing, Gambino-Ruiz's request for a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was denied, leading to his appeal.

United States v. Dawson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-8064

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by prolonging a traffic stop to determine whether the driver of a rental vehicle was authorized to drive it. The driver, Jerry Dawson, was pulled over for speeding, and during the stop, the officer discovered marijuana and two pounds of methamphetamine in the vehicle. Dawson argued that the officer had no reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity and therefore had no authority to detain him beyond the time necessary to issue the speeding ticket.

The court held that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment because checking a rental agreement is an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop. The court found that this inquiry is part of an officer's mission during a traffic stop and does not constitute an "unrelated investigation." Therefore, the officer was justified in continuing to detain Dawson to determine whether he was authorized to drive the rental car.

Dawson also appealed his 70-month imprisonment sentence, arguing that the district court erred in concluding it could not adjust his sentence to account for his pretrial time served for a relevant offense. The court dismissed Dawson's appeal of his sentence, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a discretionary refusal to depart from the sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Kearn

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-3029

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Jonathan Kearn, was initially indicted on three child pornography offenses involving his own children. He faced up to 30 years’ imprisonment for these charges. However, the government offered a plea agreement for a 10-year sentence if Kearn pled guilty to one of the counts. Following a six-minute conversation with his trial counsel about the plea agreement, Kearn decided to reject the offer and proceed to trial. He was then convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 24 years in prison. After exhausting his appeals, Kearn filed a pro se motion arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining phase.

The district court granted Kearn's motion, finding that his trial counsel provided deficient advice about the proposed plea deal, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Kearn would have pleaded guilty. The court ordered the government to reoffer the plea. It then accepted Kearn’s guilty plea, vacated the prior judgment, and resentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Kearn's trial counsel's brief discussion with him was inadequate to explain the complexities of the plea and that counsel had given Kearn inaccurate and misleading information. The court also found that given the substantial difference in sentencing exposure—20 years—and the evidence suggesting Kearn was amenable to pleading guilty if he had been adequately advised, the district court reasonably found that Kearn would have accepted a properly presented plea deal and avoided trial.

United States v. Swan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-6132

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, John Miguel Swan, appealed the district court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The case originated from a grand jury indictment of Swan for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan initially plead guilty, but five months later, the district court allowed Swan's plea counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel. Swan later wrote a pro se letter to the district court asserting his factual innocence and indicating that his plea counsel had compelled him to plead guilty. This appeal focuses on the claim that plea counsel materially misrepresented the nature of Swan's right to a jury trial, which, Swan argued, rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.

The court found that Swan’s plea counsel informed him that all minorities would be removed from his jury and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. This was seen as a material misrepresentation about Swan’s right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means. The court determined that under these circumstances, Swan’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case back to the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea for further proceedings.

United States v. Daniels

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10408

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: LAGOA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Jonathan Daniels, who was found guilty of ten counts of Hobbs Act robbery and sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. Daniels challenged the conviction on several grounds. He argued that the district court erred by not accepting his proposed jury instruction on eyewitness identifications, that cumulative evidentiary errors prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him under Count 7 of the superseding indictment. He also contended that the sentence he received was unreasonable. The Court of Appeals disagreed with all of Daniels' arguments, finding that the district court had not abused its discretion in its jury instruction, that there were no cumulative errors that compromised Daniels' right to a fair trial, and that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict him under Count 7. The court also found that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. The court thus affirmed Daniels' convictions and sentence.

STATE OF ARIZONA v SANTILLANES

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-23-0042-PR

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2011, Daniel Santillanes was convicted of a felony charge for facilitating the sale or transportation of marijuana in Arizona. In 2020, Arizona voters passed Proposition 207, which permitted the expungement of certain marijuana-related offenses. Following this, Santillanes sought to have his felony marijuana conviction expunged and his civil rights restored, including his right to possess a firearm. The trial court granted his request. The state then appealed the decision, questioning whether they had the right to do so.

The main issue under consideration by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona was whether the state had the right to appeal the trial court's decision to expunge Santillanes's record and restore his civil rights. The court concluded that the state did indeed have the right to appeal this expungement order under A.R.S. § 13-4032(4). The court found that an order expunging records of a felony conviction affects the substantial rights of the state, and therefore, the state has the right to appeal such a decision.

The Supreme Court vacated parts of the lower court's opinion and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings, consistent with the remainder of the appellate court's opinion.

Petty v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 5

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: WOMACK

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the first-degree murder conviction and life imprisonment sentence of Justin Petty, who appealed on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied his requests for a mistrial. The mistrial requests arose from a witness's unanticipated reference to Petty's prior jail time, which Petty argued violated a pretrial order prohibiting discussion of his prior bad acts. The trial court ruled that the violation was minor since the term "jail," as used in this context, did not indicate a conviction. Furthermore, the trial court had instructed the jury to disregard the statement, and the jury agreed to do so. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning, concluding that the mention of "jail" was not significantly prejudicial, and that the prosecutor had not intentionally elicited the prohibited information. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that there had been no abuse of discretion in denying Petty's mistrial motions.

People v. Helzer

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S132256

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of California, the defendant, Glen Taylor Helzer, pleaded guilty to five counts of murder and multiple other charges, including robbery, kidnapping, and conspiracy. After a penalty trial, the jury sentenced him to death for the five counts of murder. The murders were particularly gruesome, involving kidnapping, robbery, and dismemberment of the bodies. The defendant argued that he was under the influence of methamphetamine and suffering from a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crimes. On appeal, the defendant raised several issues, including the exclusion of a potential juror due to their views on the death penalty, the denial of a proposed question during jury selection, and the admission of graphic evidence including photographs of the dismembered bodies and the sound of a power saw used in the dismemberment during the prosecution's closing argument. The court affirmed the judgment, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings and that any error was harmless. The court held that the photographs and the sound of the saw were relevant to the circumstances of the crimes and did not unduly prejudice the jury. The court also held that the removal of a potential juror due to their views on the death penalty did not violate the defendant's right to a representative jury.

Chavez v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B332361(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two, defendant Carlos Chavez was indicted with violent felonies and a gang enhancement. However, after the indictment, the California Legislature amended the definition of the gang enhancement, adding new elements. Chavez moved to dismiss the gang enhancement allegations, arguing that the evidence presented to the grand jury did not support these newly added elements. The issue was whether dismissal was required. The Court held that it was not. The Court found that a trial court has the inherent authority to reserve ruling on a motion to dismiss, to resubmit gang allegations to the grand jury for the prosecution to present evidence bearing on the new elements, and to thereafter rule on the motion by reviewing the sufficiency of that new evidence. Because the trial court here—in substance, if not form—followed this procedure, the Court denied Chavez's petition for a writ of mandate.

P. v. Gonzalez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F084952(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: DETJEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal, the defendant, Francisco Gonzalez, was challenging the court's decision that his previous conviction constituted a "strike" under the "Three Strikes" law, following amendments to the law by Assembly Bill No. 333. The Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal in the State of California affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that the defendant's previous conviction, which was for a gang-related felony, remained a "strike" under the Three Strikes law, despite changes to the law. The court made this decision based on the language of the law, which stipulates that the status of a prior conviction as a strike is determined by whether the prior offense qualified as a strike at the time of the prior conviction.

The defendant also contended that the court's decision to impose upper-term sentences based on specified factors in aggravation was unauthorized. The court rejected this argument, stating that the court had properly considered the defendant's prior convictions as factors relating to the defendant and that this did not involve an unconstitutional delegation of power. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment against the defendant.

People v. Campos

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F084307(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

This case involves a dispute over the use of electronic information evidence in a murder trial. The defendant, Christian Steve Campos, was charged with premeditated murder and convicted of second-degree murder. He argued that electronic evidence, obtained by the government from his Facebook account and cellphone records under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), should have been suppressed because he was not properly notified of its acquisition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, agreed that the government did not properly notify the defendant pursuant to the CalECPA, but concluded that suppression of the evidence was unwarranted. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed the judgment. The court found that while the government did violate the CalECPA's notice provisions, the purpose of the CalECPA was achieved despite the notice error because the efforts of law enforcement to obtain the defendant's electronic information were eventually made known to him before trial began. As a result, the court concluded that suppression of the evidence was not the appropriate remedy for the notice violations.

People v. Cartwright

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080606(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: DATO

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In San Diego, California, Kevin Eugene Cartwright was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, robbery, burglary, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and owning or possessing ammunition as a prohibited person. Cartwright appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress video footage from the City of San Diego's "City IQ" streetlight camera program and evidence derived from the footage. Cartwright contended that the police conducted a warrantless search when they accessed the streetlight camera footage and any evidence obtained as a result of the footage should be considered "fruit of the poisonous tree."

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, disagreed with Cartwright's argument. The court held that Cartwright did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when he traversed a public right of way in downtown San Diego in the middle of a business day. The court found that the streetlight cameras only captured short-term movements and did not create a retrospective database of everyone's movements across the city. The court concluded that the police did not conduct a "search" when they accessed footage from the City of San Diego's streetlight cameras, and there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment against Cartwright.

People v. McCray

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166084M(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, James McCray, appealed from a 2022 order that recommitted him for another one-year term under a statutory scheme governing violent offenders with mental health disorders. McCray argued that there was insufficient evidence that he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others due to a severe mental health disorder, that he voluntarily absented himself from his recommitment trial, and that the trial court failed to obtain from him a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, found that McCray's appeal was moot due to his subsequent recommitment in 2023. However, the court decided to address the trial court's failure to engage in a robust enough oral colloquy with McCray to establish that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. The court concluded that the record is insufficient to support the determination that McCray made a valid waiver of his right to a jury. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal as moot but found that McCray's waiver of his right to a jury trial was not knowing and intelligent.

People v. Medrano

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324567A(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Vincent Medrano, appealed an order denying his second Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. Medrano had been convicted in 1991 of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. He was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a firearm enhancement. In 2019, he filed his first section 1172.6 petition, which was denied and affirmed on appeal. He then filed a second section 1172.6 petition, which was also denied, prompting this appeal.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California affirmed the denial of Medrano's second resentencing petition. The court concluded that its earlier decision that relief under section 1172.6 is unavailable to a petitioner concurrently convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder involving the same victim represented the law of the case. This holding conclusively established at the prima facie stage that Medrano was not entitled to resentencing based on his second 1172.6 petition. The court found that any new evidence that Medrano could introduce at a potential hearing would not affect this principle of law. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying Medrano's resentencing petition.

People v. Smyth

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097934(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: RENNER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In California, a man named Clifford James Smyth, who was categorized as a tier two sex offender, sought to be removed from the California sex offender registry. However, at the time of his petition, he was living and registered as a sex offender in Oregon, not California. The Superior Court of Glenn County denied his petition, stating that he was not currently registered as a sex offender in California. On appeal, Smyth argued that the denial of his petition violated equal protection and was contrary to the legislative intent of California's sex offender registration laws.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the California law, which was restructured to establish three tiers of registration for sex offenders, only allowed people registered in California to petition for termination from the California sex offender registry. The court disagreed with Smyth's argument that excluding out-of-state registrants from obtaining relief was contrary to the legislative intent and was absurd. The court reasoned that as someone not registered in California, the legislative concerns did not apply to Smyth.

Furthermore, the court rejected Smyth's equal protection claim, concluding that out-of-state registrants are not similarly situated to California registrants for purposes of the California law, as they do not contribute to the problems identified by the Legislature when it decided to adopt the statute. The court also noted that even if out-of-state registrants were similarly situated, the distinction between the two groups would survive the requisite degree of scrutiny as there was a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and a legitimate governmental purpose.

People v. Smith

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 3

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Judge: GABRIEL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the court had to decide whether Anthony Robert Smith had waived some of the claims he had raised in a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion by not pursuing certain claims in later briefings and at a postconviction hearing. The court also had to consider whether counsel could abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without first obtaining the defendant’s informed consent, and whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to do so.

Smith was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on a child and promotion of obscenity to a minor. After his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, Smith filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. After appointed counsel filed a Supplemental Motion for Post-Conviction Relief that did not include some of Smith's pro se claims, the postconviction court found that Smith had waived those omitted claims.

On appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed the postconviction court’s decision, concluding that Smith’s claims were preserved because they were not superseded by counsel’s motion. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that Smith abandoned the claims he stopped pursuing. The court also decided that counsel, as the “captain of the ship,” has the authority to make strategic decisions, including which claims to pursue. Therefore, counsel may abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without the client’s informed consent. The court did not rule on whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to abandon such claims.

Terreros v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 435, 2022

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2019, Jose Terreros was left in charge of his girlfriend's children. Upon returning home, his girlfriend was informed by her four-year-old daughter that Terreros had sexually abused her. The girlfriend immediately asked Terreros to leave and called the police. She later discovered concerning web searches on Terreros's phone, which he had left behind, including queries about how long saliva and fingerprints remain on bodies and clothes, and whether police can detect if a child has been raped. Based on this, investigators obtained a warrant to search Terreros's phone. They searched his messages, messaging apps, photos, videos, internet search history, GPS coordinates, and incoming and outgoing calls without any date restrictions. On trial, Terreros was found guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Child and Dangerous Crime Against a Child, but not guilty of Rape First Degree. Terreros appealed his conviction, arguing that the warrant was overbroad and that the verdicts were inconsistent. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware agreed with Terreros regarding the warrant, finding it to be a general warrant and thus unconstitutional. The court held that all evidence obtained from the phone should have been suppressed. The court also remanded the inconsistent verdicts issue back to the lower court for further consideration, as it had not been fully addressed by the State. The court reversed Terreros's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

People v. Chatman

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129133

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, the court deliberated on the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. The defendant, Micheal D. Chatman, was charged with four counts of first degree murder in relation to the shooting death of Ricky Green. The State sought to introduce statements made by Dominique “Dee” Collins, who was unavailable for trial, under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule and the sixth amendment confrontation clause. The lower court allowed Collins’s statements to be introduced, ruling him unavailable and that the State had made reasonable, good-faith efforts to secure his presence at trial. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of felony murder and sentenced to prison. The appellate court affirmed the decision. The defendant appealed, arguing the State failed to demonstrate good faith efforts to procure Collins’s presence at trial.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that when the State seeks to introduce hearsay under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, the State must demonstrate that the witness is unavailable and that reasonable, good-faith efforts were made to procure the witness’s attendance by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, despite Collins's intention not to be found, the court found that Detective Christian utilized the information available to him in an ongoing attempt to locate Collins, thus meeting the requirement of reasonable, good-faith efforts. Therefore, the court found no error in the admission of Collins’s statements.

People v. Frey

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 128644

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision, affirming the trial court's decision to allow the postconviction counsel to withdraw and to dismiss the postconviction petition. The defendant, Russell A. Frey, was convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Frey filed a pro se postconviction petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and a proportionate penalties claim. The trial court appointed counsel for Frey, who later moved to withdraw, arguing that Frey had no meritorious claims. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the appellate court vacated and remanded the case, holding that postconviction counsel did not provide reasonable assistance when he failed to address one of Frey's claims. However, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that Frey failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance arising from counsel's Rule 651(c) certificate, and therefore, the motion to withdraw was not deficient. As such, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the trial court's orders allowing postconviction counsel to withdraw and dismissing Frey's postconviction petition.

In Re Detention of Schuman

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1521

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa addressed whether the district court erred in ordering the placement of a sexually violent predator in a transitional release program over the State’s objection. The State argued that the offender was ineligible for that program without a relapse prevention plan (RPP) accepted by his treatment provider at the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) as required by Iowa Code section 229A.8A(2)(d) (2022). The district court determined that the offender’s plan, approved by the offender’s expert, satisfied that statutory requirement. The State appealed, asserting that the court erred by substituting its judgment for that of CCUSO’s staff.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that a writ of certiorari is the proper form of appellate review, and granted the petition. On the merits, the court held that the district court erred by substituting its judgment for that of CCUSO’s staff. The court agreed with the State that the offender was ineligible for placement in the transitional release program because his treatment provider at CCUSO had not accepted his proposed RPP. The court also rejected the offender's substantive due process claims. Consequently, the court sustained the writ and vacated the district court’s ruling.

State v. Flack

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 115964

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Kyle Trevor Flack, was convicted of capital murder, first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. The jury sentenced him to death after finding two aggravating factors that were not outweighed by mitigating circumstances. The defendant appealed his convictions and sentence, raising several issues. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the convictions and the sentence. The court found that the defendant did not unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent in his repeated statements to "take me to jail" during a custodial interview as they were context-dependent and did not clearly state to stop the interview. The court also found that the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to present a defense by denying his requests for continuance, and the court did not err in denying the defendant's for-cause challenges to certain jurors. The court further found no prosecutorial error during the guilt phase or the penalty phase of the trial. The court rejected the defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to his death sentence, and also rejected his challenges under sections 1 and 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. The court concluded that there were no errors that warranted reversal of the defendant's convictions or sentence.

Gordon v. State

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 7

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: HORTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Mario Gordon appealed a judgment that denied his petition for post-conviction review in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. In the underlying case, Gordon had pleaded guilty to multiple charges pursuant to a plea agreement with a sentencing cap. This was based on his attorney's advice that Gordon would likely receive a sentence significantly more lenient than the one the court ultimately imposed. Gordon's attorney had advised him that if he agreed to a twelve-year cap, the sentence would likely be eight years without suspension or ten years with a portion of the sentence suspended. However, the court imposed a sentence of twelve years without suspension, leading Gordon to argue that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Gordon's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. The Court found that the attorney's advice was a strategic decision that was not "manifestly unreasonable," as Gordon was aware that he could receive up to a twelve-year sentence but chose to proceed with the twelve-year cap option in hopes of obtaining probation. The Court also found that Gordon could not demonstrate that his plea was involuntary as he was informed during the plea colloquy that he could be sentenced to up to twelve years. Furthermore, the Court found that Gordon's attorney was not required to object to the sentence when it was imposed, as Gordon had acknowledged that he understood the terms of his plea agreement. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment denying Gordon's post-conviction review petition.

State of Maine v. Dana A. Healey

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 4

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: LAWRENCE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Dana A. Healey appealed his conviction for domestic violence assault. Healey argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion by not allowing him or his attorneys to conduct a voir dire examination of the jury and by denying his requests to cross-examine the victim about her recanted domestic violence allegation against another person and the text messages that she sent to Healey after his arrest. Healey contended that these rulings violated his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses against him.

The court acknowledged Healey's concerns but ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Healey’s request to cross-examine the victim about her recanting a domestic violence allegation against another person. The court also found that the trial court erred in excluding at least one of the victim’s text messages to Healey: the message stating, “We’re even.” However, the court determined that, despite this error, there was sufficient, independent evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The court based its decision on the testimony of the responding officer and a witness who saw the incident, as well as the 9-1-1 call made by the witness. These pieces of evidence, the court concluded, provided sufficient support for the jury's verdict, regardless of the excluded text messages. Therefore, the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the excluded evidence would not have affected the jury's verdict. As such, the court affirmed Healey's conviction and sentence.

State v. Thistle

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 6

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: STANFILL

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics, Trusts & Estates

In the State of Maine v. Dale F. Thistle, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction of Dale Thistle, an attorney, for theft by misapplication of property. Thistle was hired by Donna Friend, personal representative of the estate of Gilman Friend, to explore a potential wrongful death suit against emergency responders. Thistle negotiated a settlement of $390,000, which he deposited into his Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Account (IOLTA). Thistle then misappropriated the funds, failing to distribute the owed amount to Gilman's children, and instead frequently withdrawing money for personal expenses.

Thistle appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for acquittal due to a statute of limitations defense, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, the State committed prosecutorial error, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.

The Supreme Judicial Court rejected all of Thistle's arguments. The court found that Thistle had waived his statute of limitations defense by admitting facts that tolled the limitations period. The court also held that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments did not constitute error. Finally, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Thistle intentionally or recklessly failed to pay the settlement funds to Gilman's children and used the money as his own, thereby committing theft by misapplication of property.

Commonwealth v. Mcfarlane

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13430

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: GAZIANO

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the defendant, Denzel McFarlane, convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and other related charges, appealed for a new trial. He based his appeal on the fact that a police officer who had arrested and testified against him was found civilly liable for false arrest and false imprisonment in an unrelated lawsuit. McFarlane argued that the existence of the civil lawsuit against the officer was exculpatory information that the prosecution should have disclosed to the defense but failed to do so.

The primary legal issue was whether the existence of a pending civil lawsuit against a police officer must be disclosed by a prosecutor as exculpatory evidence. The court held that the existence of a pending civil lawsuit against a police officer does not need to be disclosed by a prosecutor as exculpatory evidence. The court reasoned that until a finding of liability has been made, a pending civil lawsuit constitutes an unsubstantiated allegation of police misconduct that does not tend to negate the guilt of the defendant. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of McFarlane's motion for a new trial.

In addition, the court established that while a prosecutor has no duty to inquire into pending civil lawsuits against a prosecution team member, the duty of inquiry does require that prosecutors inquire about the existence of any findings of civil liability related to the performance of a police officer's duties. In other words, if a police officer has been found liable in a civil lawsuit, the prosecution has a duty to discover that information and potentially disclose it to the defense.

Commonwealth v. Padilla

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13411

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, a Superior Court judge in Massachusetts sought guidance from the Supreme Judicial Court on three questions involving the pretrial confinement of a juvenile charged with murder. The juvenile, who was sixteen years old when he was charged with second-degree murder, was initially held without bail at a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility due to a "courtesy" arrangement with the county sheriff. As the juvenile neared his eighteenth birthday, he was informed that he would be moved to an adult facility. In response, a Superior Court judge released him on personal recognizance on the murder charge and set bail on a related non-murder charge, ordering that he stay at the DYS facility.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was asked to determine: 1) whether a Superior Court judge can commit a person under age eighteen charged with murder to DYS's care as a pre-trial detainee; 2) if not, can a Superior Court judge set bail on a charge related to, but other than murder, so that the person under eighteen is not held on bail on the murder charge and is committed to DYS's care; and 3) if the answers to questions 1 and 2 are "No," is the last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 68 (which mandates that juveniles charged with murder be committed to the custody of the sheriff) unconstitutional?

The Supreme Judicial Court declined to answer the third question due to mootness, as the defendant had since turned eighteen and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Regarding the first two questions, the court referred to its previous ruling in Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth and affirmed that a Superior Court judge does not have the authority to commit a juvenile defendant charged with murder to the custody of DYS, nor can they sidestep this requirement by committing the juvenile to DYS on a related non-murder offense. Therefore, the answers to the first and second questions were "No."

Commonwealth v. Scanlon

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13375

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The case involves the Commonwealth's appeal of a judgment by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which upheld a lower court judge's decision to disqualify a prosecutor, Matthew Green, from a murder case. The defendant, Blake Scanlon, had been indicted on murder charges and was also later charged with soliciting to commit witness intimidation and murder. One of the solicitation targets was Green, the prosecutor for the initial murder indictment. The basis for Green's disqualification was not because he was a victim in the solicitation case, but because he made himself a potential witness at trial. This was due to his interactions with a jailhouse informant, with whom Scanlon was incarcerated and who claimed Scanlon solicited him for a murder-for-hire plot. In exchange for the informant's cooperation, Green advocated for lighter sentences and bail conditions for him in separate legal proceedings. The defendant argued that these actions made Green a potential witness, either to confirm or dispute the informant's claims, or to question the informant's credibility due to bias in favor of the Commonwealth. The lower court judge agreed and disqualified Green from the case. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that Green's disqualification was an error, as he was only a potential witness, and that other means could be used to present the necessary information at trial. The Commonwealth also argued that the disqualification raised separation of powers concerns by interfering in the executive branch's discretion to choose a prosecutor. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, affirming the lower court judge's decision. It found that the level of Green's involvement with the informant's legal proceedings was extensive, making him more than just a potential witness, and that the judge's decision did not constitute an intolerable interference in the executive branch.

Graham v. District Attorney for the Hampden District

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13386

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: GAZIANO

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, six plaintiffs -- two criminal defense organizations, two defense attorneys, and two former criminal defendants -- filed a petition against the District Attorney's Office for the Hampden District in Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged multiple failures by the District Attorney's Office, primarily stemming from its handling of evidence of misconduct within the Springfield Police Department (the department). The U.S. Department of Justice had previously conducted an investigation and found that officers in the department, particularly those within the narcotics bureau, routinely falsified police reports and engaged in a pattern of excessive force.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the District Attorney's Office, through certain discovery policies, committed a breach of both the duty to disclose evidence that tends to exculpate defendants and the duty to investigate or inquire about such evidence. Specifically, the court identified three problematic practices: 1) disclosing adverse credibility findings made about the department's officers only on a discretionary basis; 2) withholding instances of officer misconduct from disclosure where a specific bad act cannot be clearly attributed to a particular officer; and 3) failing to gain access to all documents known to have been reviewed by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

To rectify these breaches, the court ordered the District Attorney's Office to obtain access to all categories of documents known to have been reviewed by the DOJ and disclose them to the plaintiffs. From there, case-by-case adjudication can begin to address the claims of individual defendants affected by the department's misconduct. In issuing this order, the court emphasized the importance of a prosecutor's dual duties -- to disclose and to investigate -- in upholding the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Gilbert vs. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-1560

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Judge: MOORE, III

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the appellant, Larry Jonnell Gilbert, was convicted of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. Gilbert then sought postconviction relief, alleging that the State's DNA expert gave false testimony at trial. The district court granted Gilbert a new trial without explicitly addressing whether Gilbert's claim was procedurally barred under the rule from State v. Knaffla, which states that all matters raised in a direct appeal and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. The state appealed this decision and the court of appeals reversed it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a district court abuses its discretion by granting a petition for postconviction relief without explicitly determining whether the claim is procedurally barred and offering a sufficient explanation to support a determination that the claim is not procedurally barred. Applying this to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the district court abused its discretion by not explicitly determining whether Gilbert's claim was procedurally barred under Knaffla before granting postconviction relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, but on different grounds.

Regarding the merits of Gilbert's claim about alleged false expert testimony, the court expressed no opinion, as it determined that Gilbert's postconviction claim was procedurally barred under Knaffla.

Christopher Stewart v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00107-SCT

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi heard an appeal by Christopher Stewart who was convicted on two counts of sexual battery against his two preteen nieces. Stewart argued that he was entitled to a new trial because he was not physically present at a pretrial tender-years hearing due to COVID-19 restrictions and also claimed that the evidence presented was insufficient. The court affirmed both convictions and sentences. It held that Stewart's virtual attendance at the hearing due to the COVID-19 pandemic did not constitute reversible error as he was able to cross-examine the witnesses at the trial where he was physically present. The court referred to a similar case (Kentucky v. Stincer) where the Supreme Court found no Confrontation Clause or due-process violation for a defendant's exclusion from a pretrial hearing. As for the sufficiency of the evidence, the court rejected Stewart's claim that the State had to prove all three methods of penetration (vaginal, anal, and oral) as charged in the indictment. The court found that there was evidence of all three types of penetration and, in any case, the State only needed to prove one form of penetration to establish the offense of sexual battery.

Davis v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00696-SCT

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case of Jameco Davis and Jacqlaurence Jackson, who were convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Both men contested their convictions and sentences. They argued that the trial court made errors in adding a firearm enhancement to their sentences, in failing to follow proper procedures to review a Batson challenge (a challenge against racial bias in jury selection), and that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Jackson additionally argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever and have separate trials, and that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial.

The Supreme Court found that the firearm enhancement portions of the sentences should be vacated, as the sentence for first-degree murder, life in prison, was greater than the five years provided for in the firearm enhancement statute. The court disagreed with the remaining arguments, stating that the trial court's failure to follow proper procedures for a Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous and did not prejudice the defendants, and there was no evidence to support the claim that the trial court's cumulative errors denied Jackson a fair trial. The court also found that the evidence was enough to support the verdict. The court thus vacated the firearm enhancement portions of the sentences, and affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences.

Douglas v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00859-SCT

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this criminal case heard by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Willie Douglas was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender for two counts of sale of less than two grams of cocaine. The cocaine was sold to a confidential informant, Ronald Keen, during two controlled purchases that were orchestrated and monitored by law enforcement officers from the Batesville Police Department. The substances bought during these controlled purchases were tested and confirmed to be cocaine by the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory.

On appeal, Douglas raised multiple issues, including an illegal sentence, improper indictment, denial of the right to self-representation, bias of the trial judge, and credibility of witnesses, among others. The Supreme Court of Mississippi found all his claims to be without merit. It held that there was no violation of Douglas's constitutional rights and the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to uphold the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the conviction and life sentence.

State v. Lorenz

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 12N

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: Rice

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

David Abraham Lorenz was convicted in 2003 for operating an illegal drug lab and possessing illegal drugs in the state of Montana. His initial sentence was partially suspended, but multiple violations led to the suspension being lifted and further sentencing in 2005 and 2014. In 2020, the State sought to revoke his suspended sentences again. Lorenz, who initially represented himself, requested counsel in July 2021. However, prior to the dispositional hearing in August 2021, his attorney, Michael Haase, filed a motion to withdraw. Lorenz consented to this but then indicated he did not want to proceed without a lawyer. Despite a perceived conflict, Haase continued to represent Lorenz in the hearing, and Lorenz was resentenced after his suspended sentences were revoked.

Lorenz appealed, arguing that the District Court had not adequately investigated his complaint about his lawyer. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed, ruling that Lorenz had not directly raised any issues about Haase's effectiveness or requested a substitution of counsel. The court further noted that Lorenz had agreed to Haase's motion to withdraw, then reaffirmed his desire for Haase's representation during the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the District Court's decision.

State v. Tunnell

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 11N

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant, Cody Ray Tunnell, appealed from his conviction and sentence for driving under the influence as a fourth offense and criminal endangerment. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial court erred by not allowing Tunnell to cross-examine a witness, Sandra Hyer, about her prior conviction for false reporting, which Tunnell argued was relevant to her credibility for truthfulness.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Montana Rule of Evidence 609 prohibits the introduction of prior convictions to impeach a witness, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Tunnell to introduce Sandy's prior conviction for false reporting. The court noted that the trial court correctly advised Tunnell that while he could not introduce the conviction itself, he could inquire about the details and circumstances surrounding the conviction as permitted under Montana Rule of Evidence 608(b). The court also rejected Tunnell's argument that a prior case, State v. Martin, supported his position, concluding that the Martin case also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of a witness to the facts surrounding her prior conviction and prohibiting the introduction of her conviction itself.

State v. Clark

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 736

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court heard an appeal from Angelina M. Clark who was convicted for terroristic threats and third-degree sexual assault. Clark argued that her trial before an all-male jury violated her constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. She also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for terroristic threats and that her trial counsel was ineffective.

The court held that Clark waived any objection to the all-male jury by failing to challenge the jurors for disqualification during the trial. It also determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Clark's conviction for terroristic threats. The court found that Clark's claim of ineffective counsel was without merit as the statements her counsel failed to object to were not hearsay, and any objection to them on hearsay grounds would have been meritless. Finally, the court rejected Clark’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine to exclude certain testimony, as she failed to show she suffered prejudice as a result of this alleged failure.

The court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that Clark's claims were without merit.

State v. Horne

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 766

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The defendant, Tristan T. Horne, was charged with attempted possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. As part of a plea agreement, Horne was admitted into a problem-solving court program (Wellness Court) designed to assist defendants with mental health diagnoses. The program defers sentencing and provides treatment, supervision, and judicial oversight. Successful completion of the program may result in the defendant being allowed to withdraw their plea and have their charges dismissed. However, if the participant is removed from the program or withdraws before successful completion, the conviction stands and the case proceeds to sentencing.

Throughout Horne's participation in the program, he repeatedly violated program requirements. These violations included missed drug tests, dishonesty with probation officers, not completing community service hours ordered by the District Court, failing to successfully complete multiple residential treatment programs, testing positive for marijuana, removing his court-ordered GPS monitoring device, and failing to report to jail as ordered after leaving a treatment program. Following these violations, the State moved to remove Horne from the program. The District Court accepted Horne's admission to the violations and removed him from the program. Subsequently, Horne was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

On appeal, Horne challenged his removal from the program, the fact that the District Court did not order a presentence investigation before sentencing him, and the length of his sentence. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, finding no reversible error. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in removing Horne from the program given his multiple failures to comply with program requirements. The Supreme Court also held that the District Court did not plainly err in not ordering a presentence investigation before sentencing Horne. Lastly, the Supreme Court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Horne.

State v. Tvrdy

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 756

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Transportation Law

In this case, Patrick Tvrdy was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 to 16 years' imprisonment following a vehicle-motorcycle collision that resulted in the death of the motorcycle driver, Brady Sweetser. Tvrdy appealed on three grounds: that the district court used erroneous jury instructions relating to motor vehicle homicide instead of manslaughter, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the jury instructions correctly stated the law and were not misleading. The court noted that the law in Nebraska does not consider a victim's negligence as a defense to manslaughter unless that negligence is the sole proximate cause of the death. This principle was correctly reflected in the jury instructions.

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court found that there was enough evidence to support Tvrdy's conviction. The court emphasized that an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. The court found that there was sufficient evidence of Tvrdy's intoxication and that there was never enough time for Tvrdy to complete his left turn without causing Sweetser, who had the right of way, to collide with him.

As to the sentence, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court. Tvrdy's sentence was within the statutory limits for his offense, and the court noted his criminal history of multiple speeding and possession of marijuana offenses, as well as a driving under the influence offense.

State v. Rouleau

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-0310

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Judge: MACDONALD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Timmy J. Rouleau, was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault following a jury trial in the Superior Court of New Hampshire. The case involved claims that the defendant sexually assaulted the victim multiple times when she was between the ages of ten and thirteen. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case focusing on the trial court's decision to admit evidence about an Amazon "wish list" containing sexually oriented items. The defendant argued that the evidence was not intrinsic to the charged crimes and should not have been admitted.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the wish list evidence was not intrinsic to the charged crimes, and thus, its admission was an error. However, the court ruled that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reached this conclusion by considering the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt presented at trial, including the victim's detailed testimony of the repeated sexual assaults. The court also noted that the wish list evidence comprised a small portion of the victim's testimony and was not mentioned in the State's closing argument. Therefore, even though the evidence was admitted erroneously, it did not affect the verdicts, and the court ultimately affirmed the convictions.

State v. Shea

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0432

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case argued before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the defendant, Joshua D. Shea, was convicted of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon. The case surrounds an altercation involving a road rage incident. According to Shea, the complainant approached him aggressively, to which Shea responded by unclipping his holster containing a firearm and rolling it up to his chest, warning the complainant that he had a firearm. The complainant claimed Shea pointed the gun at him, a claim Shea denied. Shea was thereafter indicted for criminal threatening.

On appeal, Shea argued that the trial court erred in its jury instruction concerning the statutory defense related to the display of a firearm. The trial court had told the jury to consider whether Shea could have safely left the area without any risk to himself or others, which Shea contended imposed on him a duty to retreat not mandated by the statute.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed with Shea, holding that the trial court’s jury instruction was incorrect. The court explained that the legislation only imposes a duty to retreat before using deadly force, not non-deadly force. The court found that the display of a firearm in this case constituted non-deadly force. Therefore, Shea was not required to retreat before displaying his firearm. The court concluded that the ability to retreat in lieu of displaying a firearm is not a relevant factor when determining whether a threat would be considered likely to cause serious bodily injury or death.

As a result, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed Shea’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Hoover v. NDDOT

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 8

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Daynen Hoover contested a district court judgment that affirmed a decision by the North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. This penalty was the result of Hoover being arrested for being in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, with a blood alcohol concentration of .085 percent by weight. The Department conducted an administrative hearing by video conference, during which they introduced eight foundational exhibits from the State Crime Laboratory. Hoover objected to this on the grounds that he and his counsel did not have copies of these exhibits to review and analyze. Despite these objections, the hearing officer admitted the exhibits and the Department subsequently suspended Hoover's driving privileges for 91 days.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the procedure used by the Department, which admitted exhibits into evidence without providing Hoover a meaningful opportunity to examine them, deprived him of a fair hearing. The court noted that the Department's notice of information did not offer copies of the exhibits or specifically identify which documents maintained by the Department or available on the attorney general's website would be introduced at the hearing. The court found that this violated the requirement for parties to be afforded an opportunity to examine exhibits before they are admitted into evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that the Department's procedures did not comply with state law and substantially prejudiced Hoover's procedural rights. The court's decision emphasized the importance of a party's ability to examine exhibits introduced against them as a critical procedural protection in adjudicative proceedings.

State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-221

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: Massa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The case involves appellant Soleiman Mobarak, who appealed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus against appellee, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey M. Brown. Mobarak had sought to vacate his criminal convictions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. The court of appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case and that Mobarak had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

In 2012, Mobarak was indicted on charges of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and aggravated possession of drugs. The charges alleged that Mobarak had possessed and sold a controlled-substance analog commonly known as bath salts. In his petition, Mobarak asserted that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his criminal case on several grounds including that there was no statute prohibiting the possession or sale of bath salts at the time his offenses were alleged to have occurred, and that the controlled-substance-analogs law was unconstitutionally vague.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District Court of Appeals' judgment dismissing Mobarak’s petition. The court held that Mobarak’s petition failed to state a mandamus claim because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and failed to show that the trial court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. The court found that by virtue of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2931.03, the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case. The court also noted that Mobarak’s arguments were similar to those raised and rejected in his prior appeals. The court stated that extraordinary writs may not be used as a substitute for an otherwise barred second appeal or to gain successive appellate reviews of the same issue.

State ex rel. Walker v. Ballinger

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-181

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves an appeal by an inmate, Keith Walker, against the Third District Court of Appeals' dismissal of his request for a writ of mandamus. Walker had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in 2020, for which he received the maximum sentence allowed by law. He later filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that the plea and the judgment of conviction were void due to the absence of a judge at his plea hearing, and the prosecutor's alleged role in accepting his plea and sentencing him. The municipal court judge, Teresa Ballinger, denied his motion. Walker then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, asking that his conviction be vacated as an illegal and void judgment. This was dismissed by the Third District Court of Appeals, who agreed with Judge Ballinger's argument that Walker had failed to submit an affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(A), and that his claim was not cognizable in mandamus.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Third District Court of Appeals was incorrect to dismiss the action based on a failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A)’s affidavit requirement, as the statute does not require a statement that the inmate has filed no such civil action or appeal. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's determination that Walker's claim was not cognizable in mandamus, as his argument essentially raised a nonjurisdictional defect for which he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals dismissing Walker's complaint.

State v. Bockus

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 4

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in a case involving a man who was convicted of assault and robbery following a jury trial. The defendant, Jason Bockus, appealed the conviction arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing out-of-court non-eyewitness identifications and denying his motion for acquittal. He also contended that the court improperly punished him with a harsher sentence for exercising his right to go to trial.

The primary issue in the case was whether the out-of-court identifications made by non-eyewitnesses, including family members and acquaintances of the defendant, should have been suppressed. The defendant argued that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive because the police officer showed the witnesses surveillance footage of the crime and then showed them a photo of the defendant. The defendant also argued that the police officer's failure to ask the witnesses not to discuss their own identifications with each other amounted to undue suggestiveness.

The court disagreed, finding that the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. The court noted that the police officer did not show unmasked depictions of the defendant until after each non-eyewitness viewed the surveillance footage and identified the defendant of their own accord. The court also found that the circumstances surrounding the identifications did not give rise to the danger of "irreparable mistaken identification."

Regarding the motion for acquittal, the court concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove the identity of the defendant and that he used physical menace to commit the crime. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the court imposed a harsher sentence because he exercised his right to trial, finding that the sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on improper or inaccurate information.

Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld the defendant's conviction and sentence.

Alvarado v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 9

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: GRAY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around Leopoldo Alvarado, who sought to terminate his duty to register as a sex offender after having registered for at least ten years, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304 of the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act. The District Court denied his petition on the grounds that the time he spent on probation did not count toward the ten-year statutory prerequisite.

However, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming disagreed and reversed the decision of the District Court. The Supreme Court found that the clear and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304 does not require probation to be completed before the ten-year registration period begins to run. The court ruled that probation is not listed as a tolling event, and the court will not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them.

The Supreme Court stated that the District Court should have considered whether Mr. Alvarado should be relieved of the duty to continue registration after demonstrating he had maintained a clean record by meeting all four conditions during the ten-year registration period. These conditions included having no conviction of any offense for which imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed, having no conviction of any sex offense, successfully completing any periods of supervised release, probation, and parole, and successfully completing any sex offender treatment previously ordered by the trial court or his probation or parole agent. The case was remanded for further consideration.

Kobielusz v. Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 10

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: FROELICHER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, Shaun T. Kobielusz appealed his convictions of three counts of voyeurism. Kobielusz contended that there was insufficient evidence of the element of “looking” for the jury to convict him of voyeurism, that the jury instruction given on the elements of voyeurism was improper, and that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress videos on a memory card given to law enforcement by his wife. The Supreme Court of Wyoming disagreed with Kobielusz's claims. They determined that the voyeurism statute does not require proof of “looking” at the captured images for a conviction. They also found that the jury instruction did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Lastly, they affirmed the district court's decision to deny Kobielusz's motion to suppress the videos, concluding that his wife had common authority over the memory cards and had the right to consent to their search. Therefore, the court affirmed Kobielusz's conviction.