United States v. Arce-Ayala

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1511

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, defendant Samuel Arce-Ayala, a leader of a drug trafficking organization, pled guilty to federal charges related to drug trafficking and firearm possession. He believed, based on his plea agreement and statements made by his lawyer and the district court, that his federal sentence would reflect "credit" for the prison time he served for related non-federal criminal convictions. However, after entering his guilty plea, Arce-Ayala discovered that such credit could not reduce his sentence below the applicable mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. He moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, arguing that he didn't understand the consequences of his guilty plea, but the district court denied the motion.

The United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit vacated Arce-Ayala's criminal judgment of conviction. The court held that Arce-Ayala did not have sufficient "knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea" because he was told by his defense counsel and the district court that the time he spent in Commonwealth custody would be credited toward his federal sentence. He did not know that the mandatory minimum prison sentence set an inviolable floor as to the amount of credit he could receive for time served on the Commonwealth sentences. As such, his plea violated a "core concern" of Rule 11, which requires a defendant to understand the consequences of a guilty plea, and must be set aside. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.

United States v. Gross

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4442

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves defendant Anthony Gross, who was convicted for unlawful possession of a firearm after shooting and injuring a man in his family's driveway. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina sentenced Gross to 63 months in prison and three years of supervised release. Gross appealed his sentencing, challenging the court's calculation of the sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. He disputed the application of a sentencing enhancement for causing "serious bodily injury" and the use of the aggravated assault guideline. Gross also argued that the court should review its finding of serious bodily injury de novo (from the beginning).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court's finding of serious bodily injury should be reviewed for clear error rather than de novo. The court reasoned that adopting a de novo standard would challenge the authority of fact-finders. The court found that the district court did not err in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines, stating that the injury inflicted by Gross on the victim involved "extreme physical pain," which is sufficient to classify as "serious bodily injury" under the Guidelines.

Additionally, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to apply the aggravated assault guideline, as the victim had indeed sustained serious bodily injury. The court underscored the importance of deference to the district court's fact-finding role, emphasizing that it is not the role of the appellate court to reassess the district court's factual findings. The court concluded that the evidence presented was ample for the district court to find that the victim had sustained serious bodily injury, thus affirming Gross's sentence.

Tong v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-70008

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1998, Chuong Duong Tong was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas for killing a police officer during a robbery. After exhausting his appeals in state court, Tong filed a federal habeas corpus petition. He argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of childhood sexual abuse. He also challenged the trial court's management of the jury selection process.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Tong's claims were without merit. The court determined that Tong's claim of ineffective assistance was procedurally defaulted, meaning it was not properly raised in state court and therefore could not be considered in federal court. The court also rejected Tong's argument that the district court should have granted a stay to allow him to return to state court to exhaust this claim. Additionally, the court found that Tong's challenge to the jury selection process was procedurally defaulted and that he had not shown cause to excuse this default.

In reaching these conclusions, the court noted that Tong's trial counsel had conducted a thorough investigation, including interviewing Tong and his family members, and had retained experts to assist with the case. The court also considered the fact that Tong had used his peremptory challenges during jury selection and had not identified any biased juror who was seated as a result of the change in procedure.

Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Tong's request for a stay, denied his motion for an additional certificate of appealability on his ineffective assistance claim, and affirmed the denial of his writ of habeas corpus on his jury selection claim.

United States v. Chiasson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30053

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case concerned the appeal of Taylor Chiasson against an above-guidelines sentence imposed by the district court. Chiasson was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty to this offense. His Presentence Report (PSR) listed his extensive criminal history, including 14 prior adult convictions and 19 arrests from 2008 to 2020 that were either dismissed or had no recorded disposition. At the sentencing hearing, the district court varied upward by 25 months, sentencing Chiasson to 96 months imprisonment. The justification was that the guidelines did not capture the extent of Chiasson’s past criminal history. Chiasson appealed, arguing that the court erred by considering testimony by two non-victim witnesses and by relying on “bare arrests” in Chiasson’s record.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. First, it ruled that the district court did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by allowing two non-victim witnesses to testify on behalf of the government at sentencing. The court found that Rule 32 does not restrict a district court’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3661 to permit testimony relevant to sentencing. Secondly, it held that Chiasson failed to show that the district court relied on any "bare arrest" records in imposing the sentence. The court found that the district court had ample factual support in the PSR for each prior arrest or conviction it referenced when imposing an upward variance. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err by considering Chiasson's arrest history as it was not dealing with a 'bare arrest record.'

United States v. Hays

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3294

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal related to a Fourth Amendment issue involving a warrantless search of a vehicle. The defendant, Charles Hays, was stopped by the police while driving, and his passenger was found in possession of methamphetamine. The police officers then searched the vehicle's interior but found no drugs. However, under the hood of the car, inside the air filter, they discovered more methamphetamine.

Hays was indicted and later moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officers did not have probable cause to search under the hood and in the air filter. The district court denied his motion, and Hays subsequently pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, including all parts of the vehicle where there is a fair probability contraband could be concealed, as long as there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of illegal activity. The court found that given the totality of the circumstances, including the passenger's possession of methamphetamine, Hays's previous drug-related arrest, and the presence of a screwdriver in the car - a tool known to be used for hiding drugs in vehicles - officers had a fair probability to believe that methamphetamine could be concealed in the car, including under its hood.

United States v. Hueston

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1057

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case arose from a tipster's information that led to an investigation and subsequent search of David Hueston's apartment in Marion, Indiana. The search, which was conducted under a warrant, produced drugs, cash, a gun, and ammunition. Hueston was charged with various drug-related offenses. He sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that the detectives deliberately or recklessly made misleading omissions and misrepresentations to obtain the search warrant. The district court denied Hueston's motion after conducting a Franks hearing, and Hueston appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that though the affidavit supporting the search warrant contained omissions and inaccuracies, it was not clear that the detectives acted with deliberate intent or recklessness to mislead the judge who issued the warrant. The court noted that the detectives' consultation with a prosecutor both before and after drafting the affidavit argued against a finding of intent to mislead. The court also found that the good-faith exception applied, meaning that the police officers acted in good faith reliance upon a facially valid warrant. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Hueston's motion to suppress the evidence.

United States v. Bagola

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2533

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Valentino Bagola, serving a life sentence for two counts of first-degree murder, was required to pay $9,000 in restitution through monthly installment payments during his incarceration. When Bagola received funds as part of a federal COVID-related stimulus payment, the government filed a motion to release these funds to apply towards his restitution obligations. Bagola objected, arguing that the funds were not garnishable. However, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled in favor of the government, ordering the turnover of $924.60 from Bagola's trust account towards his restitution obligations. The court concluded that the funds were not exempt under 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1) and there was a valid lien against these funds. Bagola appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court did not err in determining that the stimulus funds constituted "substantial resources" under § 3664(n). Bagola’s contention that applying stimulus funds to restitution was improper and threatened prison security by negatively impacting inmate morale was raised for the first time on appeal and did not meet the plain error standard for review. The court also found that the amount of the funds, over $900, could be considered substantial relative to Bagola's usual monthly installment amounts. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling that the stimulus payment funds were subject to turnover towards Bagola's restitution obligations.

United States v. Daye

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1048

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jermaine Steven Daye pleaded guilty to arson, having set a fire in the hallway of an occupied apartment building. The presentence investigation report recommended classifying Daye as a career offender due to two previous convictions for Domestic Abuse Assault, Enhanced (DAAE) under Iowa Code § 708.2A(3)(b). However, Daye objected to this classification, arguing that the DAAE convictions were not "crimes of violence" within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines. The district court agreed, finding that DAAE is not categorically a crime of violence and thus Daye was not a career offender. Daye was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment, an upward variance from the advisory sentencing guidelines range of 60 to 63 months. The Government appealed, claiming Daye is a career offender.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether DAAE has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, defining a crime of violence. The Government argued that DAAE is divisible and thus could be considered a crime of violence. However, the court found the Government's argument insufficient and waived it, thus applying the categorical approach to DAAE. According to this approach, the court looks at the abstract requirements for a conviction rather than the defendant's actual conduct and determines if a conviction necessarily had a physical force element for the crime to qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause.

The court noted that under Iowa law, DAAE is an enhanced assault statute that imposes increased penalties for conduct that violates Iowa's simple assault statute and which is committed against someone within a domestic relationship. The court concluded that a defendant could be found guilty of DAAE by committing three simple misdemeanor domestic abuse assaults, which the Government conceded were not crimes of violence. Thus, the court determined there was a non-fanciful, non-theoretical manner by which a person could be convicted of DAAE without so much as the threatened use of physical force. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision, holding that DAAE is not categorically a crime of violence and that Daye was not a career offender.

United States v. Oliver

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3214

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Mickael Oliver, was convicted of six firearms-related felonies following a jury trial and was sentenced to 204 months of imprisonment. The crimes committed by Oliver involved a series of firearm transactions in Kansas City, Missouri, during which Oliver sold various firearms to a paid confidential informant. The transactions escalated to an attempted sale that turned violent when Oliver pointed a gun at the informant and kept both the money and the firearms. Oliver was subsequently charged and convicted of possessing a stolen firearm, unlawfully possessing a firearm as a drug user, dealing in firearms without a federal license, robbery of United States property through the use of a deadly weapon, using and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime, and selling a firearm to a convicted felon.

On appeal, Oliver challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, specifically, the counts that he robbed U.S. property and brandished a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime. The court, reviewing de novo, found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. They determined that a reasonable jury could find that Oliver intended to commit a robbery, as he kept both the money and the firearms after threatening the informant with a gun. Furthermore, the court found that the evidence showed Oliver brandished a firearm during the crime, as he pointed a gun at the informant's head.

As for the other charges, the court found that Oliver did not provide convincing argument or citation to authority to challenge them. Regardless, the court noted that the evidence of Oliver's guilt on those charges was impressive, with Oliver having stipulated at trial that he sold and possessed firearms without a federal license while illegally using a controlled substance, conceded that he sold firearms to a convicted felon, and possessed recently stolen firearms.

The court concluded that Oliver's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence were without merit and affirmed his convictions.

USA V. MARIN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50154

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed two defendants’ convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which prohibits the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered vessel. The defendants were arrested after their speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000 kilograms of cocaine, was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Ecuador. The vessel carried no nationality flag, but both defendants verbally claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel. The Ecuadorian government neither confirmed nor denied the nationality. The United States treated the vessel as stateless and exercised jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction, arguing that the relevant provision of the MDLEA under which jurisdiction was exercised is unconstitutional because it conflicts with international law regarding when a vessel may be treated as stateless. The court held that the definition of “vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA does not conflict with international law, and thus affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment.

USA v. Pugh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-13136

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns Tia Deyon Pugh, who was charged with impeding law enforcement during a civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) during a protest in Mobile, Alabama. She smashed a police car window with a baseball bat, thus obstructing law enforcement officers in their official duties during the civil disorder. Pugh challenged the constitutionality of Section 231(a)(3) on four grounds, arguing that it: (1) exceeds Congress’s power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, (2) is a substantially overbroad regulation of activities protected by the First Amendment, (3) is a content-based restriction of expressive activities in violation of the First Amendment, and (4) is vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Pugh was found guilty by a jury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Pugh’s conviction. The court held that Section 231(a)(3) does not exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as the statute's jurisdictional element is sufficient to limit its scope to constitutional applications. The court also found that the statute does not violate the First Amendment as it does not broadly prohibit protected speech and expressive conduct. Furthermore, the court ruled that the statute is not a content-based restriction and does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause due to vagueness. The court concluded that the statute constitutionally applies to Pugh's conduct, and she may not challenge the statute on vagueness grounds based on its application to others.

Faulkner v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 2

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

John Faulkner was convicted of rape, introduction of a controlled substance into the body of another, and tampering. After injecting the victim with ketamine, Faulkner had non-consensual sex with her and later tried to persuade her to recant her police statement. Faulkner appealed the convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for the tampering conviction, and challenging two evidentiary rulings. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision.

The court found that there was substantial evidence to support the tampering conviction. It held that Faulkner's attempts to have the victim recant her statement to the police were inducements to lie.

The court also affirmed the rulings on the evidentiary issues. Faulkner had wanted to introduce evidence of prior sexual relations with the victim to argue that their relationship was consensual. The court held that this evidence was irrelevant because the charge was rape of a physically helpless victim.

Furthermore, Faulkner wanted to introduce evidence that he and the victim obtained a marriage license. The court found that this evidence would confuse the jury and was irrelevant, given that the victim's consent was not at issue.

The court rejected Faulkner's additional arguments not ruled on below, holding that they had been waived as they were not raised or ruled on in the lower court.

Kimball v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 3

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal from the Supreme Court of Arkansas, appellant Fred Kimball Sr. was convicted by a Benton County jury on two counts of rape, for which he received two concurrent life sentences. Kimball appealed on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the prosecution of the charges against him. The statute of limitations in effect when Kimball committed his crimes allowed for prosecution up to the victim’s twenty-fourth birthday, if the offense was not reported to the police or a prosecutor. This period was extended in 2011 and again in 2013 when the statute was amended to allow the prosecution for rape committed against a minor victim to be commenced at any time.

Kimball was charged with the rape of three girls, all his granddaughters, prior to 2010. The issue of whether Kimball’s crimes were time-barred was tried by the court prior to his jury trial. Kimball argued that the case involving all three victims should be dismissed because the statute of limitations had run. He asserted that the crimes he was charged with took place no later than 2003, and the statute of limitations in effect lapsed six years later because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a report had not been made.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the charges involving Kimball’s rape of two of the victims. The court reasoned that all three victims testified they did not speak to law enforcement prior to the 2020 investigation. While there was evidence of an investigation into Kimball’s sexual assault of one of the victims, neither of the officers involved in the case recalled that the investigation ever extended to the other victims. The court also rejected Kimball's arguments that certain statements made by family members constituted a report to law enforcement. The court concluded that the statements lacked definitive knowledge of a specific crime or a specific victim.

Smith v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 1

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the appellant, Marlon Smith, was appealing his conviction and life sentence for first-degree murder. His appeal centered around two main arguments. Firstly, he contended that the lower court erred by not granting his motion for mistrial after a witness testified that he had previously been in prison. Secondly, he argued that the court erred by not granting his motion for a directed verdict, asserting that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish his intent to commit the murder.

The court affirmed the conviction and life sentence. With regards to the first argument, the court held that a mistrial was not warranted as a curative instruction to the jury could have resolved the issue. The court also noted that the appellant failed to ensure that such an instruction was given. Regarding the second argument, the court held that there was substantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence, to support the jury's conclusion that the appellant intended to commit the murder. The court held that the appellant's post-event actions, including his flight from the scene and subsequent lies to the police, were also evidence of his intentional act. Therefore, the court found no error in the lower court's denial of the appellant's motion for a directed verdict.

L.C. v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B331041(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law, Juvenile Law

In early 2022, a three-year-old child, L.C., was taken from his mother, D.C., after she was arrested for transporting fentanyl pills with L.C. in the car. After the juvenile court removed L.C. from his mother's care, D.C. returned to Mexico on the advice of her criminal defense attorney. Despite being in Mexico, D.C. maintained a relationship with L.C. through weekly video calls and completed necessary programs as part of her case plan, including a drug treatment program, individual counseling, and parenting classes. However, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services expressed concerns about the validity of her drug tests performed by Mexico's child protection agency. At a 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court terminated D.C.'s reunification services, citing her failure to return to California for drug testing and other services, speculation about L.C.'s developmental services in Mexico, and D.C.'s refusal to surrender herself in response to an arrest warrant.

L.C. sought relief, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that returning him to his mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety or well-being. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven agreed with L.C. and found that the mother had complied with her case plan, maintained a bond with L.C., and that Mexico's child protection agency could provide services to the mother and L.C. Therefore, the court granted the petition, vacated the juvenile court's termination of reunification services, and ordered a new review hearing to consider any developments since the last hearing.

People v. Fouse

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085131(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Darlene Renee Fouse, who was convicted in 2006 for several crimes, including attempted murder of a peace officer, appealed a resentencing order under Penal Code section 1172.6. Fouse was originally convicted as a getaway driver in a series of violent home invasion robberies. After her petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, the court vacated her two convictions for attempted murder of a peace officer, as she was deemed not culpable under the amended law. Instead, the court redesignated the offenses as two counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer and added a conviction for felony evading a peace officer.

Fouse argued that the court erred in redesignating the attempted murders as assaults with a firearm on a peace officer and in adding a conviction for evading a peace officer, as the jury had convicted her of the target offenses of robbery. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District agreed with Fouse, stating that since the target offenses (robbery) were charged and Fouse was convicted of them, the statute required the court to resentence Fouse on the remaining charges. It did not permit the court to redesignate the attempted murder convictions to other offenses. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings.

People v. Frias

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B322762A(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Alexander Alberto Frias, was convicted of stalking. Frias appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The trial court denied the first three requests on the grounds that the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, with four different attorneys had handled Frias’s defense at his request. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Frias's fourth request. At the time of the fourth request, the case had been pending for three-and-a-half years, the case was set for trial, and the prosecutor and deputy public defender had announced they were ready for trial. An attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial. The trial court's concerns that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial and that Frias would seek to substitute new counsel were not sufficient grounds to deny Frias's request to have retained counsel of his choice. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on the trial court's denial of Frias's right to counsel of his choice. However, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Frias's conviction for stalking and remanded for a new trial.

People v. Dye

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 2

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this criminal case, James Herman Dye was charged with murdering a woman over forty years ago. During pretrial hearings, Dye indicated that he might present evidence suggesting another person, an alternate suspect, committed the crime. The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified that the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Discovery and Procedure Before Trial”) Rule 16(II)(c) requires a defendant to disclose the nature of any defense, including an alternate suspect defense, prior to trial. The Court also clarified that the requirement to disclose the nature of a defense includes identifying any alternate suspects, along with their addresses if they are to be called to testify at trial. However, the Court found that the lower court's order for Dye to disclose "all evidence" related to the alternate suspect defense was overbroad. The Court ruled that the prosecution should conduct its own investigation into any alternate suspect identified. The Court also held that disputes over the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence should be resolved prior to trial. The Court therefore vacated the lower court’s discovery order and directed the lower court to follow the procedures outlined in its opinion.

ADAMS v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1207

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Justice Ellington delivered the opinion on the case of Isaiah Adams who was found guilty by a Fulton County jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Laron Lowe and the aggravated assault of Ronda Dobson. Isaiah and his co-defendants were charged with murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, criminal damage to property in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury found the Adams brothers guilty on all counts, and Isaiah was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, among other sentences for the other charges. Isaiah filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Isaiah argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of Isaiah's arguments and affirmed the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial. The Court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Isaiah participated in the crimes and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in denying Isaiah’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

BRADLEY v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A0010

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Benjamin Bradley was convicted for multiple crimes, including the malice murder of Dequavious Harris, aggravated assault on Clarence Lewis and Quaimaine Harris, aggravated battery of Ricky Davis, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. These crimes occurred following the theft of Bradley's car. On appeal, Bradley argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with Bradley's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence, which included eyewitness testimonies and surveillance footage, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradley was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. The court also rejected Bradley's argument that the State's case was based solely on circumstantial evidence, stating that the eyewitness testimonies were direct evidence.

Regarding Bradley's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court held that Bradley failed to demonstrate both that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Bradley did not identify additional witnesses that should have been called for his defense, nor did he articulate how he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to pursue other defenses.

RAMIREZ v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0905

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Georgia confirmed the conviction of a woman, Amalia Ramirez, for the malice murder of her elderly mother, Himilce Ramirez, whom she was the sole caregiver for. Evidence showed that Himilce Ramirez died due to severe neglect, including sepsis, necrosis, stage-four bedsores, and parts of her body fusing together from lack of movement. The defendant argued that her conviction was not supported by evidence since there was no proof of malice. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Ramirez acted with malice. The court concluded that the prolonged and severe neglect, leading to Himilce's death, constituted malice under the law. Consequently, the court affirmed the conviction.

REMLER v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1075

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In 2019, Justin Remler was convicted for felony murder and aggravated assault related to the death of Tristan Mitchell, a two-year-old child. Remler, who was alone with Tristan in the hours prior to his death, challenged his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, stating that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury, and Remler's trial counsel was not ineffective. The court highlighted that Remler's argument that alternative hypotheses, such as the child's father causing the injuries or the child's death being caused by an enlarged heart, were reasonable was a question for the jury. The court concluded that it was within the jury’s purview to reject these alternative hypotheses as unreasonable given the evidence presented. The court also found that Remler's trial counsel's focus on one defense theory was objectively reasonable professional conduct, and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance.

SHELLMAN v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1089

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellant, Isaac Antonio Shellman, was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during a crime in connection with the shooting death of his wife, Shanelle Shellman. On appeal, Shellman argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a journal found at the crime scene.

The court determined that the evidence was indeed sufficient to support Shellman’s convictions. The jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable Shellman’s alternative hypothesis that he was framed by a police officer. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the journal entries under Rule 807. The entries had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness because they detailed in Shanelle’s own words her volatile relationship with Shellman, and there was no evidence that she had a motive to fabricate her statements when she wrote them.

The court found that the entries were material because they provided evidence about the nature of the relationship that sheds light on Shellman’s motive in committing the offenses charged. Shellman had not shown that the State could have reasonably procured other, more probative evidence of motive than the victim’s own writings describing acts of domestic violence, or that the interests of justice were not best served by the journal’s admission. Therefore, the court affirmed Shellman's convictions and sentence.

STATE v. FRANKLIN

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0842

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the case at hand involves Dequavius Dexter Franklin who was indicted for murder and related offenses. Franklin had made a statement to law enforcement while in a hospital, which the prosecution sought to admit as evidence. However, the trial court suppressed this statement, citing that due to Franklin's medication, medical condition, and overall physical circumstances, the statement was not voluntary. The State appealed this decision, arguing that the statement was voluntary.

The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the trial court erred in its ruling. It clarified that a defendant's medical condition alone is not sufficient to render a statement involuntary. The court explained that for a statement to be deemed involuntary, there must be evidence of coercive conduct by law enforcement. In this case, the court found no such evidence of coercive police conduct. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order suppressing Franklin's statement, ruling it as voluntary and admissible.

STATE v. RANDALL

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1118

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Georgia, the State appealed a lower court's decision to suppress evidence of Antonio Rodrick Randall's refusal to submit to a blood test following his arrest for driving under the influence. The lower court had suppressed this evidence on constitutional grounds. In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the lower court's order suppressing the evidence, finding that the lower court unnecessarily resolved Randall’s constitutional challenge. On remand, the lower court again suppressed the evidence on constitutional grounds. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided that the lower court should have first evaluated Randall's argument that exclusion of the evidence was warranted under Georgia's Rule 403 (which allows relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice) before reaching his constitutional claims. The Supreme Court of Georgia therefore vacated the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WEEMS v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1179

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Fulton County, Georgia, Rufus Weems was convicted for two counts of malice murder and other crimes related to the deaths of Christopher Welch and Chloe Dowdy. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Weems challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the denial of his motion for a new trial, and the trial court's refusal to allow a witness to testify remotely. He also claimed the trial court made an improper comment on the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld Weems's convictions. The Court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Weems's convictions, including the defendant's familiarity with one of the victims, the location of the victims' bodies, and the defendant's departure from the scene after the shooting. The Court rejected Weems's alternative hypothesis that another person was the shooter, finding it unreasonable based on the evidence presented.

The Court also held that the trial court did not err in denying Weems's motion for a new trial. The Court ruled that the trial court correctly applied the standard for granting a new trial and that its decision was not subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Regarding the refusal to allow a witness to testify remotely, the Court found that the trial court was required to sustain the State's objection under the relevant Superior Court rule. Lastly, the Court found that the trial court's repetition of a witness's testimony while ruling on an objection did not constitute an improper comment on the evidence. As such, the Court affirmed Weems's convictions.

WILLIAMS v. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1159

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Georgia, defendant Eric Williams was convicted of malice murder and other offenses related to a 2017 shooting outside a nightclub. Williams appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing errors in the trial process and ineffective assistance of counsel. His allegations included that the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress evidence taken from his cell phone and improperly admitted a YouTube video as a demonstrative aid. He also claimed the court erred in admitting evidence of his refusal to submit to a gunshot residue test and in resentencing him under a recidivist provision.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Williams's convictions and sentence. It found no plain error in the admission of evidence regarding Williams's refusal to submit to the gunshot residue test. The court deemed any errors in admitting the YouTube video or denying the motion to suppress to be harmless due to the strong evidence against Williams. It also concluded that the trial court did not err in resentencing Williams under the recidivist provision. Finally, the court found that Williams failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced his defense.

State v. Crudo

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123559

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the State of Kansas v. Frank Raymond Crudo, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling against Crudo on all five arguments he presented. Crudo was pulled over for a non-functioning license plate light, and upon approaching the vehicle, officers smelled marijuana, leading to a search of Crudo's truck and attached camper. They found varying amounts of marijuana in different locations, leading to multiple charges against Crudo.

Crudo's arguments included: (1) the search of his camper was unconstitutional as it should not be considered part of his vehicle for the purposes of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, (2) the testimony of Lieutenant Ricard at his second trial should have been considered expert testimony and therefore inadmissible due to non-compliance with expert testimony rules, (3) the use of a permissive inference instruction was in error and affected the trial outcome, (4) his second trial for possession with intent to distribute marijuana violated double jeopardy principles, and (5) cumulative error.

On the first point, the court ruled that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception does not need to be "localized" to a specific area of the vehicle and therefore extended to the camper. On the second point, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Lt. Ricard's testimony as lay opinion testimony. On the third point, the court agreed that the permissive inference instruction was in error, but found it harmless. On the fourth point, the court found that Crudo's convictions for possession and distribution were based on separate acts and thus did not constitute double jeopardy. Lastly, because there was only one error (the permissive inference instruction), the doctrine of cumulative error did not apply.

State v. Klesath

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125717

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the defendant, Kristoffer L. Klesath, appealed his convictions for first-degree felony murder, intentional second-degree murder, and aggravated robbery. Klesath argued that the state failed to provide adequate evidence to support the aggravated robbery charge, and the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter and its accompanying imperfect self-defense. The case stems from an incident where Klesath engaged in a confrontation with Darton Fields outside a liquor store. Both men were armed with handguns. During the altercation, Klesath shot Fields, who subsequently died. Klesath then picked up Fields' dropped gun before fleeing the scene.

The court affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery, which in turn justified the felony murder conviction. The court further held that Klesath could not assert self-defense to negate the charge of aggravated robbery. The court reasoned that the crime of aggravated robbery does not contain an element that would justify the use of force in self-defense. Additionally, a defendant may not assert self-defense if the defendant is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony. As a result, the court did not need to consider Klesath's remaining challenges because the trial court merged his convictions for second-degree murder and felony murder, sentencing Klesath only on felony murder.

State v. Scheetz

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124054

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had overturned Mark Scheetz's convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, rape, sexual exploitation of a child, and victim intimidation. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the cumulative effect of various trial errors denied Scheetz his constitutional right to a fair trial. However, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in its analysis, as Scheetz failed to make a timely and specific objection at trial to preserve an evidentiary challenge for appellate review as required by K.S.A. 60-404. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found the internet search history evidence was relevant to establish Scheetz's sexual desire for underage girls, a required element of the sexual exploitation of a child charge. The Supreme Court also concluded the prosecutor did not commit error in his closing arguments as the panel had determined. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Scheetz's convictions.

Commonwealth v. Roark

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0386-DG

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case involving Steven Roark who was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and tampering with physical evidence, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had held that the jury instruction for manufacturing methamphetamine violated Roark's right to a unanimous verdict. In the case, the police had found Roark in a trailer with an active methamphetamine lab, along with multiple items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The jury instructions allowed for a conviction based on either of two theories under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1432 - either that Roark knowingly manufactured methamphetamine, or that he knowingly possessed two or more items of equipment or chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Roark argued that such instruction violated his right to a unanimous verdict. However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found no error in the jury instruction, concluding that both theories were supported by the evidence presented at trial, and thus did not violate Roark's right to a unanimous verdict. The court thereby affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court as to Roark’s manufacturing conviction.

Commonwealth v. Marrero

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13399

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the defendant, Elvio Marrero, was convicted of the murder of Pernell Kimplin based on evidence that included bloodstains on Marrero's leather jacket. The bloodstains were used by the prosecution to link Marrero to the crime and to support the testimony of a key witness. However, twenty years after the trial, DNA testing showed that the blood on the jacket did not belong to the victim. Marrero's motion for a new trial, based on these DNA test results, was initially denied by a lower court, but the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with that decision. The court found that the bloodstains were the strongest piece of physical evidence linking Marrero to the murder, and were used by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of a key witness with credibility issues. As such, the court held that the bloodstains on the jacket likely played a significant role in the jury's deliberations. The court concluded that, had the new DNA test results been available at the time of the trial and the prosecution had been unable to connect the bloodstains to the murder, there is a substantial risk that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Therefore, the court vacated Marrero's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Mattis

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-11693

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the defendant, Sheldon Mattis, was convicted of first degree murder among other charges, and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. At the time of the murder, Mattis was eighteen years old. He appealed his sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was an "emerging adult" (defined in this case as eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years old at the time of the crime), and should be entitled to the same protection as juvenile offenders, who receive a term of life with the possibility of parole.

The court considered whether their previous ruling in Diatchenko I, which concluded that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole in any circumstance would violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, should be extended to apply to emerging adults. The court reviewed scientific evidence showing that the brains of emerging adults are not fully mature and are similar to those of juveniles, and also considered the treatment of emerging adults in Massachusetts and elsewhere.

The court concluded that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for emerging adult offenders violates the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. As a result, the court invalidated the provisions of Massachusetts law that deny the possibility of parole to emerging adults. The court remanded the matter to the lower court for resentencing consistent with the court's opinion. The court also noted that this ruling does not suggest that emerging adults receiving the benefit of resentencing should be paroled once they have served a statutorily designated portion of their sentences. Instead, the parole board should evaluate the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, including the age of the offender, together with all relevant information pertaining to the offender's character and actions during the intervening years since conviction.

Commonwealth v. Robinson

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-09265

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Jason Robinson, was convicted of first-degree murder on a joint venture theory of felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate offence, in connection with the shooting death of Inaam Yazbek. Robinson appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, claiming insufficient evidence and trial errors.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Robinson's conviction of murder in the first degree and the order denying his motion for a new trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict Robinson of felony-murder, as there was enough to permit an inference that Robinson knew that his co-defendant was armed during the commission of the armed robbery.

The court also found no error in the admission of certain evidence, rejected Robinson's claim that he was prejudiced by being tried with his co-defendant, and found no error in the jury instructions, the exclusion of certain third-party culprit and police failure to investigate evidence, or in the prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.

However, the court ruled that Robinson's sentence of life without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional because he was nineteen years old at the time of the offense. The case was remanded for re-sentencing in line with the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mattis.

Commonwealth v. Watt

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13279

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this Massachusetts case, the defendant, Nyasani Watt, was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses. After his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that his trial counsel had slept during critical portions of the trial, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to counsel. This motion was denied by a lower court judge without a hearing, and the denial was appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court determined that Watt had presented a new, substantial issue that it could not have considered in its previous review - namely, that his trial counsel had been sleeping during significant parts of the trial.

Upon reviewing the evidence, which included affidavits from several people who had observed the trial counsel sleeping, the Court found that the trial counsel did indeed sleep through a significant portion of the trial and possibly during an important aspect of the trial. The Court held that this constituted a constructive deprivation of Watt's right to counsel under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

The Court further ruled that this error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and thus the defendant's convictions were vacated, the verdicts were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.

State of Minnesota vs. Allison

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0793

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In Minnesota, a man convicted of taking pornographic photographs of a child was ordered by a district court to pay restitution for therapy costs and lost wages incurred by the child's mother. The appellant argued that the mother, as a secondary victim, was only eligible for restitution for losses suffered directly by the child. The State contended that under Minnesota Statutes section 611A.01, family members of the direct victim are part of a singular class of victims because when a child suffers, their parents suffer as well. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the State's argument and affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that Minnesota Statutes section 611A.01(b) creates a singular class of victims that includes the direct victims of a crime and, if the direct victim is a minor, those family members of the minor who incur a personal loss or harm as a direct result of the crime.

Hawkins v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-01250-SCT

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of Mississippi dealt with an appeal by George Hawkins who was convicted for sexual battery of a minor under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-95(2). This law requires the State to prove that the defendant was in a position of trust or authority over the minor when the crime was committed. Hawkins' appeal was based on the argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of him being in such a position over the victim, as he had no legal authority over her.

In 2014, Hawkins began dating Tonya Ingram and gradually became a part of her and her children’s lives, to the point where they even considered themselves to be common-law married. In the spring of 2015, Tonya and her children moved into Hawkins's home "as a family". Hawkins and Tonya filed their taxes jointly, claimed Tonya’s children as dependents, and contributed equally to the family’s finances. The victim, Jane, one of Tonya's children, trusted Hawkins, which ended when he sexually assaulted her one night.

The court found that while Hawkins did not possess any legal authority over Jane, a reasonable jury could have concluded that he was in a position of trust or authority over her based on the totality of the circumstances and their relationship. The court held that the list of individuals who are typically in positions of authority provided in Section 97-3-95(2) serves only as examples, and does not limit this to persons in positions of legal authority over the child. Therefore, the court affirmed Hawkins' conviction.

Ronk v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-DR-00269-SCT

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Timothy Robert Ronk, who was convicted of armed robbery and capital murder and sentenced to death, sought post-conviction relief for a second time. He claimed his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. The State of Mississippi, in response, requested an overruling of Grayson v. State, which held that ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-counsel claims are an exception to the bars in the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). The Supreme Court of Mississippi agreed with the State, citing a recent decision (Howell v. State) which invalidated all cases in which Mississippi courts had applied a "judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception" to the UPCCRA’s bars. Therefore, the court partially overruled Grayson and denied Ronk's request for post-conviction relief. The court determined that Ronk's claims, including that his trial counsel failed to investigate his case thoroughly and that the State suppressed evidence, lacked arguable basis, were insufficient to overcome the statutory bars, and did not meet the "newly-discovered-evidence" exception.

Merila v. Burke

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 4

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Billy Ann Merila, sought the expulsion of her business partner, Daniel Brian Burke, from their partnership, MBC. MBC is a business entity that owns a single piece of real property and rents it out for income. Merila alleged that Burke engaged in conduct that made it not reasonably practicable for her to carry on the business in partnership with him. Burke, a certified public accountant, was convicted on six charges of aiding and assisting tax fraud, unrelated to MBC, and sentenced to prison. He also unilaterally changed the partnership's depository without Merila's consent, limited her authority over MBC funds, refused to communicate with her directly, and appointed a third-party agent to act on his behalf. He also attempted to amend the partnership's tax returns and capital accounts without Merila's consent or knowledge.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Merila, finding that Burke's conduct made it not reasonably practicable for her to carry on the business in partnership with him. The court also ordered the parties to negotiate a purchase price for Burke's interest in MBC. Burke appealed the decision.

Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the relevant standard for expelling a partner is whether the partner's conduct has made it not reasonably practicable for the other to carry on the business in partnership, not whether the partnership suffered damages or harm. The Court found that Burke's refusal to interact with Merila, his unilateral decisions affecting the partnership, and his conviction of tax fraud constituted conduct that made it not reasonably practicable for Merila to carry on the business with him as a partner. It affirmed the lower court's decision to expel Burke from the partnership and order him to negotiate a purchase price for his interest in MBC.

State v. Peterson

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 5

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, defendant Nels Jerry Peterson appealed his conviction on the offense of sexual assault against his eleven-year-old step-granddaughter (Q.H.). The main contention was the District Court’s decision to permit evidence of Peterson’s prior sexual conduct with other young girls under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403. The court concluded that some of the evidence may have been admissible for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), but the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value as presented. The details of Peterson’s prior sexual misconduct were not more abhorrent than the current charge. However, the frequency and manner of the State’s references to them throughout the trial risked inducing the jury’s hostility toward Peterson, resulting in unfair prejudice. Further, the State did not meet its burden to show no reasonable possibility that its use of the tainted evidence might have contributed to Peterson’s conviction. Therefore, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

State v. Fair

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-20-22

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case State v. Calvin Fair, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to decide whether a prosecution for terroristic threats under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), based on a mens rea of recklessness, is constitutional. The defendant, Calvin Fair, following a conflict with the police, had made threatening statements on Facebook, including knowledge of where the police officers lived and what cars they drove. He was charged under a statute which made it a crime to threaten to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.

The court held that a mental state of recklessness is constitutionally sufficient for a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), as defined in this context as “morally culpable conduct, involving a 'deliberate decision to endanger another.’” The state must also prove that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed the message as threatening violence. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.

The court also held that the jury must unanimously agree on whether the defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. This was because the terroristic threats statute listed in the disjunctive two separately enumerated, alternative crimes of terroristic threats.

State v. Gartrell

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-31-22

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, defendant Curtis Gartrell fled from police near Newark Penn Station, leaving behind a suitcase containing handguns, ammunition, illegal narcotics, and cash. Gartrell was later apprehended and charged with possessory offenses and resisting arrest. He filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered from the warrantless search of the suitcase, arguing that he did not abandon the suitcase and therefore maintained standing to challenge the search. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that Gartrell's flight did not indicate an intention to abandon the suitcase. The State appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that Gartrell had abandoned the suitcase.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court applied the three-factor test from State v. Carvajal, which assesses (1) whether a person has control or dominion over the property, (2) whether the person knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any possessory or ownership interest in the property, and (3) whether there are other apparent or known owners of the property. The court found that Gartrell's flight from police and deliberate abandonment of the suitcase in a public place indicated a clear intent to relinquish his possessory interest in the bag. Furthermore, there was no evidence of anyone else's interest in the suitcase, including the person Gartrell referred to as "Spoon," who remained unidentified. Therefore, the court concluded that Gartrell lacked standing to challenge the seizure and search of the suitcase.

State v. Hill

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-41-22

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the State's witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), is not unconstitutionally overbroad, but it may have been unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, William Hill, in this case. Hill was initially convicted of first-degree carjacking and third-degree witness tampering. While detained awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the carjacking victim, A.Z., asserting his innocence and asking her to reconsider her identification of him as the perpetrator. A.Z. reported the letter to the police, resulting in a charge of witness tampering. The court concluded that Hill's letter did not explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely or withhold testimony, leading the Supreme Court of New Jersey to rule that it may have been unconstitutionally applied in Hill's case. The court vacated Hill's witness tampering conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge, but did not vacate his carjacking conviction.

State v. Johnson

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-134

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, Eric Johnson, filed a third, untimely, and successive petition for postconviction relief based on an affidavit from the victim, James Keith, who recanted his identification of Johnson as the assailant. Johnson argued that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering Keith's recantation before the statutory deadline and that, but for constitutional error at trial, he would not have been convicted. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the decisions of the lower courts, denying Johnson's petition for postconviction relief. The court held that Johnson failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering Keith's recantation within the statutory deadline. The court also held that Johnson failed to show that a constitutional error occurred at trial that led to his conviction. Specifically, the court stated that a conviction based on false testimony is not a constitutional violation unless the state had knowledge of the testimony’s falsity. The court therefore concluded that Johnson did not satisfy the requirements for filing an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).

State v. Odiah

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 22-296

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Somayina Odiah, the defendant, was appealing his conviction for one count of indecent solicitation of a child. The defendant had been communicating online with a person he believed to be a 14-year-old transitioning from male to female named “Alice.” However, “Alice” was a fictitious character created by the Rhode Island State Police for an undercover operation. The defendant was arrested after arranging to meet “Alice” in person. The defendant's argument on appeal focused on the claim that the state had not proven that “Alice” was “over the age of fourteen,” a necessary element for the charged offense.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the conviction. It held that even if “Alice” had turned fourteen on the day of the charged offense, under Rhode Island law, a person reaches their next year in age at the first moment of the day prior to the anniversary date of their birth. Therefore, “Alice” would have been considered to be exactly fourteen years old on the day before the charged offense. The court concluded that the defendant was planning to meet a fourteen-year-old child, with whom he had communicated about sexual activity, and that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the charge on the basis of the state not proving "Alice" was "over the age of fourteen." Thus, the defendant's judgment of conviction was affirmed.

State v. Benton

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28185

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the decision by the court of appeals in the case of Tommy Lee Benton, who was convicted for the murder of Charles Bryant Smith, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of first-degree arson, and one count of third-degree arson. Benton's first trial was declared a mistrial due to his failure to disclose his alibi, which he intended to support via his great-grandmother's testimony. Benton claimed that his second trial and ensuing convictions were barred by double jeopardy. The court, however, found that the mistrial was declared due to "manifest necessity," hence, there was no double jeopardy violation.

Benton also argued against the admissibility of gruesome crime scene photographs and certain text and Facebook messages. The court upheld the trial court's decision, asserting that the photographs provided important context to the testimony and other key evidence. The court noted that while the photographs were disturbing, any error in admitting them was harmless as they did not significantly contribute to the verdict. The court also affirmed the admissibility of the text and social media messages.

State v. William C.Sellers

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28188

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In South Carolina, a defendant, William C. Sellers, was convicted of murder in connection with the killing of Johnny Hydrick. The State presented evidence that Sellers personally murdered Hydrick during a burglary and robbery attempt to steal Oxycodone, guns, and cash from Hydrick's home. The State also presented an alternative theory that Sellers was guilty under the doctrine of "the hand of one is the hand of all" because he and another man agreed to carry out the burglary and robbery, during which one or both of them fatally beat Hydrick.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the lower court's decision. The court addressed two main issues. First, it considered whether the trial court's jury instruction defining malice partly as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" improperly shifted the burden of proof to Sellers. The court found that the instruction did not shift the burden because the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sellers acted "without just cause or excuse."

Second, the court examined whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support instructing the jury on Sellers' criminal liability under the doctrine of "the hand of one is the hand of all." The court found that the State had presented evidence that Sellers and another man had agreed to commit the burglary and robbery, and that both had beaten Hydrick during the course of these crimes. Thus, the instruction was supported by the evidence.

Therefore, the court affirmed Sellers' conviction for murder.

State V. Horse

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 4

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, the defendant, Robert Horse, appealed his conviction of third-degree rape. The defendant raised three main issues: the validity of a search warrant for location data from his phone, comments made during trial by the State about the victim’s motivation to testify, and opinion testimony given by the detective who investigated the case.

On June 4, 2019, the 14-year-old victim, D.M., reported that she was assaulted by a man named "Robert." She had spent the day with Robert, during which they drove around Rapid City, smoked marijuana, and drank alcohol. D.M.'s memory of the events was spotty due to her intoxication. She later identified Robert Horse from a photo lineup. A rape kit showed DNA matching Horse.

Detective Dupres, who led the investigation, obtained a search warrant for Horse's cell phone and separate warrants for his Google account to gather location data. The data, analyzed by FBI Agent Fennern, helped map out Horse's movements on the day of the alleged crime. Detective Dupres offered an opinion at trial that the assault occurred at Horse's residence.

The court held that there was probable cause to authorize the search warrant for the Google location data, although the exact warrants for this data were not included in the record before the court. The court also decided that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Horse’s objection to the State’s question regarding D.M.’s motive for testifying and in denying Horse’s motion for a mistrial based on the State’s comment. Lastly, the court ruled that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Detective Dupres to opine about the location of the crime.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's conviction of Horse for third-degree rape.

State V. Stevens

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 3

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In South Dakota, Todd Stevens was convicted on six counts related to drug possession and distribution. The state's key witness was Ashley Burgers, Stevens' former roommate and fellow methamphetamine user, who testified in exchange for immunity. Stevens' trial counsel did not request, and the court did not provide, corroboration or cautionary instructions for the jury regarding Burgers' testimony. On appeal, Stevens asserted that the lack of these instructions was plain error and also argued ineffective assistance by his trial counsel for failing to propose such instructions.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the absence of a corroboration instruction was plain error, but concluded that Stevens was not prejudiced by this error because the other evidence presented by the State thoroughly corroborated Burgers' testimony. The court also found that the failure of the circuit court to give a cautionary instruction sua sponte was not error, much less plain error. Lastly, the court held that Stevens' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was unsuccessful because the lack of prejudice in the plain error review precluded a successful claim on this issue.

NICHOLSON v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0963-19

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Harry Donald Nicholson Jr. was sitting in his parked truck at a gas station when he began throwing tissues out of his window. An officer noticed the litter, approached Nicholson, and asked him to pick up the tissues. After Nicholson provided his driver's license number and began picking up the litter, the officer was informed by dispatch that Nicholson had active felony warrants. It was disputed whether Nicholson heard this over the officer's radio. When the officer attempted to handcuff and arrest Nicholson, he managed to get back into his truck and drive away, crashing into another officer's vehicle in the process.

Nicholson was charged with aggravated assault of a public servant and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. He was convicted on both charges and sentenced to 60 years in prison. On appeal, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the aggravated assault charge but found that the jury instructions on the evading arrest or detention charge were improper and egregiously harmed Nicholson. The court reversed the evading arrest conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted Nicholson's petition for discretionary review on the conviction for evading arrest to clarify the elements of the evasion statute. The court reviewed the statute, which provides that a person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from someone he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator trying lawfully to arrest or detain him. The court had to determine whether the defendant must know that the attempted arrest or detention is lawful. The court concluded that the defendant does not need to have such knowledge.

The court found that the statute is ambiguous because it is susceptible to multiple interpretations. Considering the legislative history and purpose of the statute, the court interpreted the statute to not require the mental state of knowledge to be applied to the lawfulness of the detention or arrest. The court determined the elements of the evasion statute are: (1) a person (2) intentionally flees (3) from a peace officer or federal special investigator (4) with knowledge he is a peace officer or federal special investigator (5) with knowledge the peace officer or special investigator is attempting to arrest or detain the defendant, and (6) the attempted arrest or detention is lawful. The court affirmed the lower appellate court's decision to reverse Nicholson's evasion of arrest conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

State v. Green

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-1182-20

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this consolidated case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the 2017 amendments to Texas Penal Code Section 32.21, the forgery statute. The statute provides that a basic forgery offense is a Class A misdemeanor but includes provisions that can raise the offense to a state-jail felony or a third-degree felony based on the type of writing forged. The 2017 amendments added a new subsection (e-1) or the "value ladder" provision, which sets forth offense classifications based on the value of property or services the defendant sought to obtain through the forgery, ranging from a Class C misdemeanor to a first-degree felony. The court held that the value ladder provision is not discretionary but mandatory whenever a defendant forges a writing with the intent to obtain property or services. The court further held that the value ladder constitutes an element of the offense rather than a punishment-phase issue. However, the court disagreed with the court of appeals' application of Apprendi principles and rejected its conclusion that the State must plead and prove a non-statutory "purpose" element in a forgery prosecution under subsections (d) or (e). The court of appeals' judgments were vacated and the cases were remanded for further proceedings.

State v. Martinez

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,124-5

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In the State of Washington, two brothers, Alejandro S. Martinez and Eduardo S. Martinez, were charged with separate counts of sexually abusing their younger stepbrothers in their shared family home. The State of Washington sought to join the two cases for trial on the grounds that the charges and evidence were virtually identical, and to minimize the number of times the victims would have to testify. Despite objections from both brothers, the trial court granted the State's motion for joinder and both brothers were found guilty as charged. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the trial court abused its discretion when it improperly joined the two cases without first meeting at least one of the two bases for joinder under CrR 4.3(b)(3) — whether the offenses were part of a common scheme or plan, or were so closely connected in respect to time, place, and occasion. The court found that the brothers acted independently, were charged with separate criminal acts occurring at separate times, and there was no evidence they acted in concert or as part of a common scheme or plan. The court also found that Alejandro, but not Eduardo, was prejudiced by the joinder. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded Alejandro's case to the trial court for further proceedings. The court found no violation of Eduardo's constitutional right to due process.