US v. Colcord

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1550

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, defendant Jason Colcord, appealed his sentence for knowingly accessing and viewing over 900 child pornography images. Colcord pled guilty to this charge and was subsequently sentenced to 145 months imprisonment, which was near the low end of his advisory guidelines sentencing range, followed by five years of supervised release. The defendant challenged his sentence on the grounds that the court's decision not to impose a downward variance was substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court's sentence was substantively reasonable. It noted that the district court had considered the nature of the offense, the need to protect the public, the defendant's personal history, and the need for punishment and deterrence, all of which are factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court rejected Colcord's argument that the district court conflated his conduct with those who committed more serious crimes depicted in the images and videos, stating that the comments were referring to Colcord's role as a consumer of child pornography.

The court also rejected Colcord's argument that insufficient weight was given to his personal mitigating circumstances, stating that the district court was within its discretion to find that these factors were outweighed by the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public.

Lastly, the court dismissed Colcord's argument that the district court should have accepted the parties' joint recommendation of a 120-month sentence. The court stated that the district court is not bound by the parties' recommendations as to the length of the sentence to be imposed. The court also found no evidence that the district court had imposed the sentence based on personal disgust towards the offense, as claimed by the defendant.

Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's sentence of 145 months imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.

US v. Centeno-Morales

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-6607

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Angel Centeno-Morales, a federal prisoner with a long history of criminal offenses involving drugs and violence, filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) after his wife, who was the primary caregiver for their minor son, died of COVID-19. Centeno-Morales argued that his wife’s death constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for release and that a reassessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors also favored his release given his changed circumstances and his post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct. The district court agreed that the death of Centeno-Morales’ wife constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief, but found that the § 3553(a) factors strongly weighed in favor of his continued incarceration. Centeno-Morales appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Centeno-Morales' motion for compassionate release. The court found that the district court had properly evaluated the relevant § 3553(a) factors and provided sufficient reasoning for its decision. The court emphasized that Centeno-Morales had failed to meet his burden of persuasion to show that the § 3553(a) factors justified a modified sentence. The court further noted that the same judge who sentenced Centeno-Morales also ruled on his motion for compassionate release, which suggested the judge had a comprehensive understanding of Centeno-Morales' circumstances.

US v. Evans

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4181

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

The defendant, Rodriquies Evans, was convicted of four criminal offenses related to his involvement in a multistate conspiracy to transport and distribute methamphetamine and other controlled substances. The district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 80 years in prison. The Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals found that the district court had erred in calculating Evans’s Sentencing Guidelines range and vacated his sentence, remanding the case for resentencing. The court determined that the district court had incorrectly attributed nearly three kilograms of crystal methamphetamine seized from a co-conspirator to Evans. The court held that for sentencing purposes under the Sentencing Guidelines, only acts that fall within the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake can be considered relevant conduct. The district court had attributed the drugs based on the broader standard of substantive liability under Pinkerton, which allows a defendant to be held liable for the acts of co-conspirators if they are within the scope of the overall conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The court also found that the district court had erred in applying a threat enhancement in calculating Evans's Sentencing Guidelines range, as the possession of a firearm enhancement could not by itself be the basis for a threat enhancement.

US v. Huskey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-4565

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit involving four defendants—Dricko Dashon Huskey, Renaire Roshique Lewis, Jr., Alandus Montrell Smith, and Jonathan Wray—all were members of the United Blood Nations (UBN) gang and were charged with conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act and related crimes. They were all found guilty following a trial. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, alleging various procedural and substantive errors. The Court of Appeals, after considering each of the defendants' arguments, affirmed the district court's judgments. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, and that the defendants' challenges to certain evidentiary rulings, closing arguments, jury instructions, and sentencing decisions lacked merit.

US v. Lewis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4291

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Richard Lewis, a man convicted in 2004 for conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs and unlawful firearm possession. Lewis began serving two concurrent 5-year terms of supervised release in 2010 after serving roughly seven years in prison. During the supervised release, Lewis was arrested and convicted under state law for three counts of manufacturing or distributing illegal drugs and sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment. Based on these violations, the district court revoked Lewis’s supervised release and sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his state sentence. Lewis appealed, arguing that the district court improperly considered the need for punishment and the seriousness of the violation, which he contended are factors prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with Lewis's arguments. It held that the district court did not base Lewis's revocation sentence predominantly on the retributive factor, and the sentence was not plainly unreasonable. It also rejected Lewis's argument that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines must be struck down as inconsistent with § 3583(e). The Court explained that Lewis's argument relied on the incorrect premise that "the offense" in § 3553(a) should be read as including the defendant’s supervised release violation. The Court affirmed the district court's revocation sentence.

US v. Maynard

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4178

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerned Everett Maynard, a police officer in West Virginia, who was convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law. This conviction was based on his use of excessive force against an arrestee, Robert Wilfong, which resulted in Wilfong being hospitalized with a broken nose and lacerations on his upper head. During the trial, witnesses were required to wear face masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Maynard appealed his conviction, arguing that the mask requirement violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and that the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements for obstruction of justice and for causing "serious bodily injury."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the mask requirement did not violate Maynard's Sixth Amendment right, as the protection against the spread of COVID-19 is an important public policy interest and the reliability of the witnesses’ testimony was assured. This was because the witnesses were under oath, cross-examined, and the jury could observe their demeanor. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the injuries inflicted on Wilfong constituted "serious bodily injury," and affirmed the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, finding that a defendant's perjurious testimony at trial is relevant to sentencing because it reflects on a defendant’s criminal history, willingness to obey the law, and general character.

US v. Ortiz-Orellana

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 16-4844

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, White Collar Crime

The court case involves defendants Juan Alberto Ortiz-Orellana and Minor Perez-Chach, who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR). Ortiz and Perez were part of a gang known as MS-13 and were separately charged with murders related to their involvement in the gang in Maryland. Ortiz was also convicted of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and murder resulting from the same crime. Perez, on the other hand, was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government seizure of historical cell site location information (CSLI) without a warrant did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights due to the good faith exception. The court also upheld the use of summary exhibits and denied the defendants' claim that their sentences were substantially unreasonable. The court agreed with Ortiz that his firearm convictions must be vacated because the underlying offenses for each VICAR count could not qualify as a "crime of violence" after a recent ruling. The court also rejected Ortiz's claim that his RICO and VICAR convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing on certain counts.

US v. Pettus

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4281

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the appellant, Reggie Pettus, who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The controversy revolves around the sentencing of Pettus by the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. Pettus challenged his sentence on four grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found one of his challenges to be meritorious, leading to the vacating of the district court’s judgment and remanding the case for resentencing.

The main issue of discussion in the appeal was the district court's application of an obstruction of justice enhancement to Pettus's sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not provide a sufficient explanation of its rationale for applying the enhancement, leaving the appellate court unable to conduct meaningful review. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for resentencing with a clear rationale for any applied enhancements. The court also addressed other issues that may arise during resentencing, including the application of a robbery cross-reference and objections to the proposed conditions of supervised release.

United States v. O'Lear

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3835

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Thomas O’Lear, was convicted of healthcare fraud, making a false statement in connection with healthcare services, and aggravated identity theft. O’Lear ran a company that provided mobile x-ray services to residents in nursing homes. However, he used the company to defraud Medicare and Medicaid programs by billing for fictitious x-rays using the identities of nursing-home residents. When an audit revealed the fraud, O’Lear attempted to conceal it by forging staff names and duplicating x-rays in the patient files.

On appeal, O’Lear raised several questions. Firstly, he questioned whether his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by excluding individuals who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 from the jury pool. The court ruled that the unvaccinated do not qualify as a “distinctive group” that can trigger Sixth Amendment concerns. Secondly, O’Lear questioned whether the nursing-home residents were “victims” of his fraud under a “vulnerable victims” sentencing enhancement, even though the monetary losses were suffered by Medicare and Medicaid. The court ruled that the residents were indeed victims, as O’Lear had used their identities and health records without their permission, which constituted taking advantage of them.

O’Lear also challenged his two aggravated-identity-theft convictions and objected to his 180-month sentence on various grounds, but these arguments were also dismissed by the court. Ultimately, the court affirmed O’Lear's conviction and sentence.

USA v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1264

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court looked at the appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The defendant, Johneak Johnson, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government appealed a pretrial ruling by the District Court, which excluded evidence of a laser sight attached to the firearm. The District Court had ruled that the evidence would cause unfair prejudice to the defendant, outweighing its probative value. The government's proposal to limit the laser sight evidence to reduce any risk of unfair prejudice was also denied by the District Court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, ruling that the District Court had incorrectly assessed the balance between the probative value of the laser sight evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice. The Court of Appeals held that the laser sight evidence was central to proving a key disputed element of the offense – possession of the firearm. It also found that the laser sight evidence tended to corroborate the testimony of the government's eyewitnesses, which was critical given the defense's intended strategy of attacking their credibility.

The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court's assessment of the risk of unfair prejudice, holding that the government's proposed limits on the laser sight evidence should minimize any risk that it will cause the jury to view the defendant as unduly dangerous. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding the laser sight evidence under Rule 403 and remanded the case for further proceedings.

USA v. Thompson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2254

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the defendant, Patrick Thompson, was convicted of making false statements about his loans to financial institutions. Thompson took out three loans from a bank totaling $219,000. After the bank failed, its receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and a loan servicer, Planet Home, attempted to recoup the money owed by Thompson. However, Thompson disputed the loan balance, insisting that he had only borrowed $110,000. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of making false statements to influence the FDIC and a mortgage lending business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.

On appeal, Thompson argued that his statements were not “false” under § 1014 because they were literally true, and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him. He also claimed that the government constructively amended the indictment and that the district court lacked the authority to order him to pay restitution to the FDIC.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Thompson's arguments and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that under its precedent, § 1014 criminalizes misleading representations, and Thompson's statements were misleading. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's conviction and that the indictment was not constructively amended. Finally, the court held that the district court properly awarded restitution to the FDIC, as the FDIC had suffered a financial loss as a direct and proximate result of Thompson's false statements.

Wesley v. Hepp

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2968

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

This case concerns Johnnie Wesley, who was brought in for questioning by Wisconsin police in connection with a murder investigation. Wesley invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interrogation, and the interrogation ceased. However, he was interrogated two more times, during which he made incriminating statements implicating himself in the murder. Wesley was subsequently charged with felony murder. He moved to suppress the incriminating statements on two grounds: (1) the officers did not honor his initial invocation of his right to remain silent, and (2) he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The motion was denied and Wesley was convicted. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to Wesley’s case. The court determined that Wesley's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" after he invoked it during the first interrogation, and that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The court reasoned that Wesley's statements during the third interrogation could reasonably be interpreted as exculpatory, rather than as an invocation of silence.

Brewer v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3452

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Thomas Brewer's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Brewer, who had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, sought to challenge the legality of his 10-year prison sentence for the latter charge. He argued that voluntary manslaughter did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). However, the appellate court rejected this argument. It held that voluntary manslaughter does constitute a crime of violence as it involves a higher level of mens rea or mental state (depraved heart recklessness or general intent to kill) than ordinary recklessness, which the Supreme Court in Borden v. United States deemed insufficient to meet the use-of-force criteria for a crime of violence. The court also relied on its prior decision in McCoy v. United States which held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court concluded that Borden did not supersede McCoy as it did not address whether an offense committed with depraved heart or extreme recklessness has as an element the use of force against the person of another. The court also rejected Brewer's reliance on United States v. Lung’aho, which held that arson is not a crime of violence, noting that second-degree murder, if committed with a mental state of depraved heart or extreme recklessness, requires “more risk and culpability” than arson.

United States v. Worthington

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2218

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1996, Duane D. Worthington was charged with several crimes related to a robbery he committed in Iowa. The government sought enhanced penalties due to his past convictions for robbery and attempted robbery, which they argued constituted “serious violent felonies” under federal law. Worthington pled guilty to all four counts and received a sentence of 425 months in prison. Years later, the Supreme Court ruled that increasing a statutory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)’s residual clause violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. Following this ruling, Worthington sought to challenge his sentence, arguing that his past convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The district court vacated his sentence and ordered a resentencing hearing. The court determined that Worthington was a "career offender" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) and imposed a new sentence of 420 months. Worthington appealed, arguing that the district court erred in calculating his advisory sentencing range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court was bound by the appellate court's prior decision that denied Worthington authorization to challenge his career offender status. Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing to recalculate Worthington’s advisory sentencing range under the newer version of the Guidelines.

Mungin v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13616

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In 1993, Anthony Mungin was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Mungin argued that his lawyer was ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Mungin presented four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Two were initially raised in his federal habeas petition, while the other two were added later. The court found that the first two claims failed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and habeas caselaw. The other two claims were deemed inadmissible in federal court because they did not relate back to the initial habeas petition and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The court corrected its precedent on the standard of review, stating that under Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, 560 U.S. 538 (2010), they review those decisions de novo. The district court's denial of Mungin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.

USA v. Gatlin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 19-14969, 20-14149

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case reviewed, Jason Gatlin was convicted of sex trafficking of a minor, production of child pornography, and witness tampering in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appeal focused on several issues including the evidence supporting the convictions, the district court's action in directing the jury to continue deliberating after they reached an inconsistent verdict, the proper application of sentencing enhancements and the reasonableness of the sentence, and whether the order of restitution violated Gatlin's constitutional rights.

The court affirmed Gatlin's convictions and sentences for sex trafficking of a minor and production of child pornography. The court found there was sufficient evidence to support these convictions. However, the court reversed Gatlin's conviction for witness tampering, finding that the evidence only established a remote or simply hypothetical possibility that the witness's recantation statements would reach a federal officer.

Regarding the sentencing, the court affirmed the district court's application of the custody, care, or supervisory control enhancement and the repeat offender enhancement. It also found Gatlin's life sentence was reasonable.

As to the restitution order, the court also affirmed it, holding that it did not violate Gatlin's Sixth Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its calculation of the restitution amount and did not violate Gatlin's rights.

USA v. Alford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3023

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Russell Alford, who was a participant in the Capitol protest on January 6, 2021, appealed his convictions and sentence for four misdemeanors. The misdemeanors were related to his unauthorized entry and conduct within the U.S. Capitol. Although Alford's behavior while in the Capitol was neither violent nor destructive, he was convicted for his role in disrupting the Congress's electoral certification and endangering public safety.

Alford raised two issues in his appeal: the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for disorderly or disruptive conduct and the reasonableness of his twelve-month sentence. The court affirmed his convictions, noting that a jury could rationally conclude that his unauthorized presence as part of a mob contributed to the disruption of the Congress's proceedings. The court also affirmed his sentence, stating that the district court was within its discretion in imposing a within-Guidelines sentence after considering the circumstances.

The case underscores that disorderly or disruptive conduct, as defined by relevant statutes, can include non-violent and non-destructive actions if they are likely to endanger public safety or create a public disturbance. Even passive conduct can be deemed disorderly or disruptive, depending on the context. The court also emphasized that sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct are not inherently unreasonable, especially when the defendant's conduct during trial or other factors may justify a greater sentence.

STATE OF ARIZONA v AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-23-0053-PR

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed a case involving Jose Agundez-Martinez, who was prosecuted as an adult for sexual assault and child molestation offenses he committed as a child between the ages of ten and twelve. The crimes came to light after Agundez-Martinez turned eighteen, and he was indicted at the age of twenty-three. Agundez-Martinez argued that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him once he turned eighteen, thereby depriving the superior court of its only mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Arizona held that Proposition 102, known as the "Juvenile Justice Initiative," and the legislation implementing it did not prohibit the state from prosecuting adults for crimes committed when they were juveniles. The court stated that a crime is a crime, regardless of the age of the offender at the time of the offense, and the determination of whether it is adjudicated as a "delinquent act" or prosecuted as a criminal charge depends entirely on the status of the offender at the time the state initiates proceedings.

Consequently, the court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence Agundez-Martinez for his criminal offenses since he was an adult when indicted. However, the court expressed concern about the lengthy adult prison sentences initially imposed for acts committed by a young child and urged the legislature to provide statutory directives for such situations. The case was remanded to the superior court for resentencing.

P. v. Hall

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165406M(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In California, a defendant, Gary Marcus Hall, convicted of two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years, challenged his sentence on several grounds. He argued that the court (and the parties) mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded, and that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the defendant's 10-year prison sentence, rejecting all his arguments. The court found that the defendant had waived his objections by failing to raise them at trial. It also held that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated by the trial court's reliance on a properly established aggravating factor—namely, the defendant's prior convictions.

People v. Coleman

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165198(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, the defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, appealed his conviction on the grounds that his trial counsel exhibited racial bias towards him in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He argued that his counsel's advice to testify in his natural linguistic style, which included the use of slang terms and a certain accent, displayed racial bias or animus. The court disagreed, ruling that advising a defendant to testify in an authentic and genuine manner did not indicate racial bias or animus and did not violate the Racial Justice Act. The defendant also argued that the trial court erred in imposing two sentence enhancements and a parole revocation restitution fine. The court agreed that the parole revocation restitution fine should be stricken, as the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The judgment was thus modified to remove the parole revocation restitution fine, but otherwise affirmed.

People v. Lashon

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A163074A(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the defendant, Menique Lashon, was convicted of one count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder, along with true findings of special circumstance allegations. Lashon sought to appeal her conviction under the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA). The court had initially found that Lashon had forfeited her right to bring a CRJA claim on direct appeal by failing to file a motion in the trial court before judgment was entered. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeal, instructing it to reconsider its decision in light of Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1118), which modified the CRJA to allow for additional avenues of relief for claims made on direct appeal.

After considering AB 1118's amendments to the CRJA, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed its original decision, stating that the long-standing procedural appellate rules governing forfeiture of issues continue to apply. The court further rejected Lashon's separate motion requesting that the appeal be stayed and the matter remanded to the superior court to allow her to file a CRJA motion, stating that they did not find good cause to grant this request. The court held that the general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in the trial court applied to Lashon's section 745 claim, which is under the CRJA. Furthermore, the court affirmed that a defendant may be found to have forfeited a section 745 claim of racial bias made for the first time on direct appeal in the absence of a showing that an exception to the forfeiture doctrine applies.

Sarmiento v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082443(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

This case concerns a defendant, Jeanette Sarmiento, who requested mental health diversion after being charged with attempted robbery. Sarmiento suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder, and stimulant use disorder, all of which have never been treated. Despite meeting many of the requirements for diversion, her request was denied by the Superior Court of San Diego County due to her history of drug abuse and the court's conclusion that she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public.

Sarmiento sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California. The court determined that her past failures in drug treatment did not predict her response to mental health treatment, since her underlying mental health conditions, which were the core of her substance abuse issues, were never previously addressed. The court also found that the trial court's concern about Sarmiento's lack of success in past attempts at substance abuse treatment did not support the finding that the recommended treatment would not meet her specialized needs. Further, the court found that the trial court misapplied the statutory criteria in determining that residual concerns for public safety could justify the denial of diversion.

Given these findings, the Court of Appeal granted the writ and directed the Superior Court to approve Sarmiento's request for mental health diversion. The court emphasized that the purpose of mental health diversion is to treat individuals with mental disorders in order to prevent them from entering and reentering the criminal justice system, and to protect public safety. The court concluded that the trial court's decision failed to follow the Legislature's direction to focus less on Sarmiento's past and more on the promise of her future and that of her community.

Hudson v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 303, 2022

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, defendant Kwesi Hudson, who was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, first-degree robbery, second-degree rape, and other crimes, appealed on two grounds. First, he challenged the Superior Court's decision to deny his pre-trial motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony on DNA mixture interpretation and technology. He argued that the STRmix software used to process the DNA was not scientifically reliable. Second, he contended that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress cell-site location information collected from cell tower dumps via ten search warrants. He claimed that these warrants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and Delaware statutory law. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found Hudson’s challenges to be without merit and affirmed his convictions and the decisions of the Superior Court. The court ruled that the DNA evidence was reliable and admissible, and that a Daubert hearing to test its admissibility was not necessary. Additionally, the court concluded that the cell tower warrants were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, as they were sufficiently particular and based on probable cause.

Everett v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0721

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2024, the Supreme Court of Florida heard an appeal from Paul Glen Everett, a prisoner sentenced to death for first-degree murder, burglary, and sexual battery. Everett sought to have DNA testing conducted on 15 items that he claimed were linked to an acquaintance, Jared Farmer, potentially implicating Farmer in the crimes for which Everett was convicted. He argued that such testing could potentially result in his acquittal or a finding of guilt on a lesser offense. The circuit court denied Everett's motion, and Everett appealed that decision.

Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial. The court found that Everett's motion did not meet the requirements set by Florida law, which necessitates a claim that the requested DNA testing "will exonerate the" defendant or "will mitigate the sentence." The Supreme Court also noted that Everett had confessed to the crimes, and his identity as the perpetrator was not in genuine dispute during his trial. The court rejected Everett's attempt to introduce new claims that his confession was false and that Farmer was involved in the crime. Even if DNA testing had shown Farmer's involvement, the court concluded there was no reasonable probability that Everett would have received a lesser sentence given the severity of his own admitted involvement.

Great Falls v. Kuntz

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 2

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Montana, Hannah Rose Kuntz was charged with Violation of a Protective Order and pleaded not guilty. The City of Great Falls requested multiple continuances due to witness unavailability, with the final one being due to a key witness being quarantined due to exposure to COVID-19. The trial was set for a date beyond the statutory six-month deadline for a speedy trial, prompting Kuntz to file a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. The Municipal Court denied the motion, citing good cause due to public health concerns and uncertainty about the ability to convene the requisite number of jurors due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Kuntz changed her plea to guilty and later appealed the Municipal Court's order to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's determination of good cause for delay.

Upon Kuntz's appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court found that the Municipal Court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that its legal conclusions were correct. It was determined that the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding trial scheduling and the COVID-19 pandemic provided good cause for the delay in Kuntz's trial. The Supreme Court also highlighted that the Municipal Court was in the best position to assess local trends and manage its docket in accordance with health risks. The court concluded that there was no prejudice to Kuntz and that the public health risks outweighed any potential prejudice, providing good cause to delay the trial two days beyond the deadline.

State v. Turner

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 661

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Bernard R. Turner for first degree murder. The court found no error in the trial court’s decision to grant the state’s motion to continue the trial due to the discovery of new evidence, a cell phone, a week prior to the original trial date. The Supreme Court stated that the timing of the state’s disclosure of the cell phone and its admission at trial did not violate Turner’s right to due process under Brady v. Maryland or Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-1912. The court also found that Turner waived his right to relief from the state’s belated disclosure by failing to request a continuance.

The court further determined that the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of a key witness who claimed Turner confessed to him, was sufficient to support Turner’s conviction. The court noted that a voluntary confession, with slight corroboration, can establish the corpus delicti as well as the defendant’s guilty participation.

Finally, the court rejected Turner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Turner claimed his trial counsel failed to zealously advocate for him and did not present an adequate defense. However, the court found these claims were insufficiently specific and that Turner failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense.

State v. Washington

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-29-22

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether the safeguards relating to eyewitness identification evidence should apply when lawyers meet with witnesses to prepare for trial. The case involved Brandon Washington, who was charged with two counts of attempted murder after shooting two people at a "Ladies Night" event. During the initial investigation, several witnesses selected Washington's picture from a photo array. Later, during trial preparation, an assistant prosecutor showed some witnesses the same photo array they had seen before or a single photo of Washington from Facebook. The witnesses later identified Washington in court. One witness identified Washington for the first time at trial.

The Supreme Court held that witnesses who have made a prior identification should not be shown photos of the defendant during trial preparation, neither new photos of the defendant for the first time nor, absent good reason, the same photos they previously reviewed. If a party can demonstrate a good reason to show witnesses a photo of the defendant they previously identified, the party must prepare and disclose a written record of what occurred. If, however, a witness has not previously identified a suspect, investigators can conduct an identification procedure during pretrial preparation in accordance with the principles set forth in State v. Henderson. In this case, the court remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing under United States v. Wade to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence.

People v Messano

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00097

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In New York, a man named Joshua Messano was indicted for second-degree criminal possession of a weapon after police officers discovered a loaded handgun in his car. Messano moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that it was found as a result of an unlawful detention and search. The police had initially detained Messano on suspicion of a drug transaction based on their observations of him engaging in a conversation with another man in an empty parking lot. They did not, however, observe any actual exchange of drugs. After detaining Messano, the police saw what they believed to be drug-related contraband in plain view on the driver's seat of his car, which led them to search the car and find the gun.

The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Messano based on their observations. The court also held that the drug-related contraband was not in plain view, as the officer only saw it after unlawfully detaining Messano. Therefore, the court concluded that the seizure of the gun was unconstitutional and the evidence should be suppressed. The indictment against Messano was dismissed.

State v. A.J.H.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 1

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, the State of North Dakota appealed an order transferring a criminal case involving the defendant, A.J.H., who was charged with six counts of gross sexual imposition, to the juvenile court. The transfer was based on a newly amended definition of "Child" in the North Dakota Century Code, which the district court concluded applied to this case. However, A.J.H. moved to dismiss the State's appeals, arguing that there was no appealable order.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the transfer order qualifies as an appealable order under the state's laws. The State argued that the transfer order was effectively an order quashing the criminal information, a type of order that it could appeal. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the district court did not dismiss the case but simply transferred it to the juvenile court. The court also rejected the State's argument that the transfer order was an order made after judgment affecting any substantial right of the state, because no judgment had been entered in the case.

Based on these considerations, the Supreme Court held that the State did not have the right to appeal under the relevant statute, and dismissed the appeals for lack of an appealable order. The court also denied A.J.H.'s request for costs and attorney’s fees, finding that the State's appeal was not frivolous.

State v. Gietzen

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 5

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed a decision from the District Court of Burleigh County, which had granted a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal trial. The defendant, Matthew Gietzen, was charged with possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia that were found in a locked bag within a backpack during a vehicle search. The driver of the vehicle had consented to the search, but Gietzen, a passenger, did not give explicit consent. The district court held that the driver's consent did not extend to the search of Gietzen's backpack, particularly the locked bag containing contraband, because it was unreasonable to believe the female driver had authority to consent to a search of a locked bag containing men’s items. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with this assessment, stating that it is the officer's burden to obtain affirmative consent for a search when a constitutional protection applies and consent alone serves as the basis for the search. The court therefore affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, upholding the principle that a third party's consent to a search does not necessarily extend to personal items belonging to another individual.

State v. Gonzalez

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 4

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the state of North Dakota, Garron Gonzalez was initially charged with two counts of gross sexual imposition, both class A felonies, in September 2003. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on each count, all but 130 days suspended, and placed on probation for five years. The sentences were to be served concurrently. After his probation was twice revoked, Gonzalez was resentenced to additional time. However, in the second amended judgment, the sentences were to be served consecutively.

In 2012 and again in 2022, Gonzalez filed petitions for post-conviction relief. The court granted both petitions, finding that the sentences imposed in 2014 were greater than the time originally suspended and were therefore deemed illegal. In April 2023, a new sentencing hearing was held wherein Gonzalez was sentenced again to five years' imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively, thus totaling ten years.

Gonzalez appealed, arguing that his sentences are illegal under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6) because the amended judgment imposes more severe sentences than the original sentences and retroactively increases the punishment for his prior conduct.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Gonzalez's argument. The court found that the district court had effectively increased Gonzalez’s total term of imprisonment to 10 years, exceeding the suspended sentences originally imposed. Therefore, the sentences were deemed illegal under the pre-amended version of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6). The court reversed the decision and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion.

State v. Salou

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 6

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the State of North Dakota, defendant Ibrahim Salou was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance. Salou appealed his conviction, alleging the district court erred in allowing evidence obtained from his phone under Rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court noted that Salou had preserved his claims of error related to the relevance and unfair prejudice of the evidence but had not preserved his objection to the Rule 404(b) issue, meaning it would only be reviewed for obvious error. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the evidence was relevant and not more prejudicial than probative. The court further found that the district court did not obviously err in its handling of Rule 404(b) as Salou had not raised this issue at trial.

The Supreme Court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Salou's conviction. The court noted that the evidence indicated that the backpack containing marijuana was located at Salou's feet during a traffic stop, and neither he nor the driver claimed possession of the backpack. The packaging of the marijuana found in the backpack was similar in appearance to the marijuana shown in a photograph found on Salou's phone. As such, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to draw an inference that Salou was in possession of the backpack.

State v. Williamson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 7

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota heard an appeal from Robert Williamson, who was sentenced for probation violations related to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of luring minors by computer. Williamson had initially served approximately four and a half years of a 10-year sentence, with all but five years suspended, and was then released on probation. He was given "good time" credit by the Department of Corrections, which aids in reducing a sentence. However, after violating his probation conditions, Williamson was re-sentenced to a 10-year term with credit for 4 years and 181 days, without any consideration of his accrued good time.

Williamson appealed the decision, arguing that his re-sentencing was illegal because it did not account for his good time credit. The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed, stating that a court does not have the authority to waive or limit good time awarded by the Department of Corrections, and any credit for sentence reductions must be stated in the criminal judgment. The court held that the lower court had illegally sentenced Williamson by failing to include his accrued good time in the re-sentencing. The case was reversed and remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with the opinion.

Commonwealth v. Dobson

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 24 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the appellant, Jeff Dobson, was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police in a high crime area due to a minor traffic violation. The driver of the vehicle had a suspended license and the other passenger had an active arrest warrant. Dobson had no outstanding warrants and did not exhibit any suspicious behavior. However, the police officer, Officer Duncan, conducted a pat-down search of Dobson solely on the basis of the high crime area designation. During the search, Officer Duncan found a firearm and subsequently arrested Dobson.

Dobson was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license, persons not to possess firearms, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, he filed a suppression motion challenging the constitutionality of the pat-down and the subsequent seizure of the gun and drugs. The trial court denied Dobson's suppression motion. Dobson was subsequently convicted on all charges and sentenced to an aggregate of six to fifteen years in prison.

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of Dobson’s suppression motion. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, held that the officer's justification for the frisk, being the high crime area designation, was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion that Dobson was armed and dangerous. The fact that Dobson was a passenger in a vehicle that was lawfully stopped in a high crime area for a minor traffic violation did not, by itself, establish reasonable suspicion. The court held that the evidence found should have been suppressed and the convictions vacated. The case was remanded for a new trial without the unconstitutionally obtained evidence.

Williams v. State of Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0099-23

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the defendant, Jemadari Chinua Williams, was charged with aggravated promotion of prostitution. The indictment against him followed the language of the relevant statute, which enumerated six potential methods of committing the offense. Williams filed a motion to quash the indictment on the grounds that the State was required to specify which of the six methods it would rely on to establish his guilt. The trial court denied the motion and Williams was convicted.

On appeal, Williams argued that the indictment was insufficient as it failed to specify the manner and means of committing the offense. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the State was required to pick one of the methods allowed by statute and alleged in the indictment to satisfy the notice requirement.

Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that the State is not required to elect between alternative statutory methods of committing an offense alleged in an indictment. The Court noted that the maxim requiring the State to specify the manner of commission applies when a statute defines an offense in multiple ways and is an exception to the general rule that statutory definitions do not have to be included in a charging instrument. The Court clarified that this rule can require the State to allege more detail in a charging instrument, but it does not require the State to abandon a manner or means in the charging instrument. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Williams's remaining points of error.

In re Kolts

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 1

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Rein Kolts appealed the denial of his petition for postconviction relief (PCR) arguing ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Kolts was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child and, despite two confessions, he rejected plea deals and was ultimately found guilty, receiving a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life. Kolts later filed a PCR petition alleging that his attorney failed to adequately inform him about the mandatory minimum sentence and did not advise him to accept the plea offer. The PCR court agreed that Kolts' counsel's performance was deficient but determined that Kolts did not suffer prejudice, as it was not probable that the original criminal trial court would have accepted Kolts' guilty plea. The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with the PCR court's decision, stating it erred by considering postconviction evidence in making its determination. The court concluded that in determining whether the criminal court would have accepted a plea agreement, the PCR court can only consider evidence that was available to the criminal court at the time it would have considered the plea. Therefore, the court reversed the PCR court's decision and remanded the case back to the civil division for reconsideration of Kolts' ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Larsen v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 4

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Wyoming, Remi Larsen was facing a misdemeanor charge for possession of a controlled substance. Larsen moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her apartment. The trial court granted Larsen's motion, ruling that she did not voluntarily consent to the search. The State appealed this decision, resulting in the district court reversing the trial court's order. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the district court abused its discretion when it initially granted the State's petition for an interlocutory writ of review. The Supreme Court explained that the district court should only grant such a review in "rare and unusual" cases that present questions of first impression, constitutional magnitude, and great public import. The court found that Larsen's case did not meet these criteria. The court's order was reversed, and the lower court was directed to reinstate the original suppression order.