Cruzado v. Alves

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1027

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In November 2010, Mario Cruzado was brought in for questioning by Boston police regarding the death of Frederick Allen III, a gay, African-American man. During the interview, Cruzado used a racial slur when referring to a picture of Allen. In 2012, Cruzado was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing Allen and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Cruzado's conviction was based, in part, on the recorded police interview, which was admitted as evidence to show Cruzado's racial animus and thus his motive for the killing. Cruzado appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that the admission of the recorded police interview violated his right to due process.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) consolidated Cruzado's appeals and denied them, holding that the state trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The SJC also stated that Cruzado's argument that the admission of the racial slur violated his due process rights was unavailing, as the slur came from his own mouth. Cruzado then filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

In an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Cruzado argued that the admission of the recorded police interview violated his right to due process. The Court held that Cruzado's due process rights were not violated, as the racial slur held substantial probative value in demonstrating whether the crime may have been partially motivated by racial animus. The Court also noted that the potential prejudicial effect of the racial slur was mitigated by the trial judge conducting an individual voir dire of potential jurors to eliminate potential bias and that Cruzado did not request a limiting instruction to disregard or not infer anything from his use of the racial slur. Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's rejection of Cruzado's petition for habeas relief.

US v. Perez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1121

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns the appeal of Gilbert Perez, who sought to have his federal drug conviction overturned on the basis that the United States District Court for the District of Maine had incorrectly denied his motion to suppress the outcomes of a warrantless search of his backpack. Perez argued that the search was not justified under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The District Court, relying on a previous case (United States v. Eatherton), had upheld the search. Perez contended that subsequent Supreme Court decisions had undermined the validity of Eatherton.

On the night of his arrest, Perez had been seen acting suspiciously in a McDonald’s parking lot in Lawrence, Massachusetts. When he left the lot, carrying a backpack, he was monitored by state troopers. He was seen exiting a taxi, and large quantities of cash were found in the vehicle, arousing suspicion that he had been involved in a drug transaction. When Perez returned to the McDonald’s lot, he was approached by Trooper Jason Conant, who identified himself as a state trooper. Perez ran but was caught, and the backpack was removed from him and searched. The search revealed it contained fentanyl and cocaine. Perez was subsequently indicted on a federal drug-related charge.

In his appeal, Perez maintained that the backpack's search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagreed, affirming the judgement of conviction. It concluded that neither of the Supreme Court cases cited by Perez had invalidated the Eatherton ruling. The panel also rejected the notion that Perez's backpack could be considered separate from his person at the time of arrest. As such, it fell within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

USA v. Brumfield

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30238

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In an appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, two defendants, Robert Brumfield and Jeremy Esteves, convicted for their roles in a 2013 armed truck robbery in New Orleans, challenged the district court's denial of their motion for a new trial. This motion was based on their claim that the Government had suppressed evidence related to the credibility of two witnesses, which they argued violated the rules established in Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States. In addition, Brumfield separately claimed that the Government failed to correct false testimony and also appealed his sentence.

The Court found that the new evidence was not material in Brumfield's case, his claim of false testimony was without merit, and his sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. However, the Court concluded that the new evidence was material as to Esteves, and thus his Brady claim required further consideration by the district court. Consequently, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of Esteves’s Brady claim.

United States v. Carter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-2009

Opinion Date: December 27, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kejuan Pharrell Carter was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Carter contended that the district court failed to consider his policy argument for a downward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. This argument was grounded in the notion that the Guidelines' focus on drug quantity and purity disproportionately punished low-level offenders due to an increase in the average purity of methamphetamine in circulation since the implementation of the Guidelines.

However, during the sentencing hearing, Carter only briefly referred to his policy argument and primarily focused on his life experiences and characteristics. Upon sentencing, the district court asked if all non-frivolous arguments had been addressed, and both Carter and the government, through their respective counsels, affirmed they had. Carter's appeal claimed that the district court had failed to address his policy argument, but the appeals court held that Carter had either waived this right or invited the error by agreeing that all his arguments had been addressed.

The appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that there was no "manifest injustice" that warranted a review of the claimed error, as Carter did not allege a violation of his constitutional rights, and the alleged error did not stem from an obvious mistake such as a Guidelines miscalculation. The court further noted that the strategic decisions of the parties during sentencing, including which arguments to emphasize, reasonably influence the court's response. Thus, Carter's decision to focus primarily on his life experiences and characteristics at the sentencing hearing contributed to the district court's emphasis on these aspects.

United States v. Browne

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3333

Opinion Date: December 27, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentences of Theodore Browne and Karley Ann Smith, both of whom had pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Browne claimed that the district court erred in determining that he transported 10 pounds of meth, which influenced his base offense level. However, the Appeals Court ruled that the district court's approximation of the drug quantity, based on witness testimonies, was not clearly erroneous. Browne also argued that the district court wrongly applied a 4-level role enhancement, contending that there was insufficient evidence to show he was an "organizer or leader" of the conspiracy. The Appeals Court disagreed, ruling that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous based on witness testimonies. Smith argued that the district court abused its discretion by considering late-filed evidence in the government’s sentencing memorandum, which resulted in the imposition of an obstruction enhancement and the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The Appeals Court ruled that Smith had sufficient time to review and respond to the challenged exhibits, and that the district court did not err in finding obstruction of justice and rejecting the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

United States v. Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1816

Opinion Date: December 27, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant, Daryl Stephen Jones, III, who appealed his sentencing after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Jones had absconded from a residential reentry facility where he was serving a previous sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. He was arrested six months later in Des Moines, Iowa, with a loaded handgun and extra ammunition. The district court sentenced Jones to 84 months’ imprisonment with 3 years of supervised release, to be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment or supervised release imposed for the then-pending escape charge in the District of Kansas.

In his appeal, Jones claimed procedural error and argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, affirmed the sentence. The court found no clear error in the district court's application of a four-level sentencing enhancement for Jones' possession of a firearm in connection with the escape felony, as well as its calculation of two criminal-history points for Jones' 2013 controlled substance possession offense. The court also determined that because the district court was aware of its authority to depart downward based on the alleged overrepresentation of Jones' criminal history and there was no allegation of an unconstitutional motive, its decision not to depart was unreviewable. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Jones' sentence was substantively reasonable, noting that a sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal.

United States v. Maxwell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2655

Opinion Date: December 27, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, defendants Antione Deandre Maxwell and Chavee E’Laun Harden were convicted of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery. Maxwell was additionally convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions, and Harden additionally argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, in denying his request for an implicit bias instruction, and in calculating his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

The court affirmed the convictions due to overwhelming evidence of the defendants' involvement in the robbery, including their presence at the scene of the crime, their possession of stolen goods and firearms, and their actions before and after the robbery. The court also held that the district court correctly denied Harden's motion to suppress evidence, finding that the officers' entry into his home without a warrant was justified due to the exigent circumstances surrounding the presence of unattended children and the likely presence of an armed robbery suspect. The court also rejected Harden's request for an implicit bias instruction, stating that it was within the district court's discretion to decide how best to address the risk of racial bias. Finally, the court found no error in the district court’s calculation of Harden’s sentencing range, considering his role in the robbery, his perjury during trial, and his attempts to influence a witness to lie for him.

USA V. FORTENBERRY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50144

Opinion Date: December 26, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of former congressman Jeffrey Fortenberry for making false statements during an investigation into illegal campaign contributions. Fortenberry was interviewed by federal agents in his Nebraska home and his lawyer's office in Washington D.C., who were based in Los Angeles, California, where the alleged illegal contribution activity occurred. He was charged in California, tried, and convicted there. Fortenberry argued that the district court incorrectly denied his motion to dismiss the case because venue was improper in the Central District of California. The district court held that a violation of making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) occurs not only where the false statement is made, but also where it has an effect on a federal investigation. The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation, holding that such an effects-based test for venue in a § 1001 offense has no support in the Constitution, the text of the statute, or historical practice. The court held that the false statement offense is complete when the statement is made, and it does not depend on subsequent events or circumstances, or whether the recipient of the false statement was in fact affected by it in any way. The court reversed Fortenberry's conviction without prejudice to retrial in a proper venue.

USA V. GALECKI

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-10288

Opinion Date: December 27, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law, White Collar Crime

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the drug-trafficking and money-laundering convictions of Benjamin Galecki and Charles Burton Ritchie for their distribution of "spice," a synthetic cannabinoid product. The defendants were found guilty of manufacturing and distributing spice through their company, Zencense Incenseworks, LLC. The drug-trafficking charges were based on the premise that the cannabinoid used, XLR-11, was treated as a controlled substance because it was an "analogue" of a listed substance. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that their convictions should be set aside due to Fourth Amendment violations, insufficient evidence, and vagueness of the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986. However, the court reversed their mail and wire fraud convictions due to insufficient evidence. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

USA V. GUERRERO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-10042

Opinion Date: December 26, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the defendant, Christopher De Leon Guerrero, was convicted on two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was sentenced to ten years in prison and five years of supervised release. Guerrero appealed his conviction and sentence.

Guerrero's conviction was based on his online conversations with a fictional 13-year-old girl named "Emily," who was actually a federal agent. He made plans to meet "Emily" at Andersen Air Force Base for sexual activities. Guerrero argued that he could not be charged under Guam law for actions that took place on a federal enclave, Andersen Air Force Base. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing a precedent set in United States v. Lopez.

The court affirmed Guerrero’s convictions under § 2422(b) by referencing another predicate offense, not specified in the indictment, with which he could have been charged. They concluded that both of Guerrero’s convictions could be supported by § 13.10, the Guam criminal attempt statute.

As for the sentence, the court agreed with both parties that Guerrero’s sentence should be reversed, vacated, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of three special conditions imposed on his supervised release. These conditions were that Guerrero must not go to places where children under the age of 18 are likely to be, must not view or possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, and must participate in a sex offense-specific treatment program.

The court affirmed the convictions but reversed, vacated, and remanded the sentence to the district court for reconsideration of the three special conditions of supervised release.

USA V. SPROAT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-10249

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Securities Law

In this case, Robert Sproat was convicted on ten counts of securities fraud. On appeal, Sproat argued that the district court improperly coerced the jurors into reaching a unanimous guilty verdict by instructing them to return the next day after they had reported an impasse in their deliberations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting Sproat's argument. The court held that merely instructing a jury that reported an impasse to return the next day is not unconstitutionally coercive. The court found that the district court's instruction to return did not amount to an Allen charge, an instruction encouraging jurors to reach a unanimous verdict. The court explained that no such encouragement was explicit or implicit in the district court's instruction.

The court also observed that the district court had not asked the jury to identify the nature of its impasse or the vote count before excusing them for the evening, and that any theoretical risk of coercion was cured by the partial Allen instruction the district court gave the following day, emphasizing the jurors' freedom to maintain their honest beliefs and their ability to be excused if they could not overcome their impasse. The court concluded that the district court's instruction to return the next day and the partial Allen instruction the following day did not coerce the jurors into reaching a unanimous guilty verdict.

United States v. Conley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5112

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

In this case, Pamela Kathryn Conley appealed her sentence for bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. She argued that the district court incorrectly calculated her loss amount for the bank fraud offense, and that the court erred in accepting her guilty plea for aggravated identity theft.

Conley had applied for loans at seven financial institutions using false employment and salary information, and in some cases, she forged the signatures of financial institution employees to create false lien releases for vehicles she used as collateral. She pled guilty to 24 counts of bank fraud and 4 counts of aggravated identity theft.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the district court had erred in calculating the loss amount for the bank fraud offense. The court vacated Conley's sentence for bank fraud and remanded for resentencing on those counts. The court determined that the district court had relied on disputed facts in the presentence report to calculate Conley's U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range for bank fraud, which was procedurally unreasonable.

However, the court affirmed Conley's convictions for aggravated identity theft. Conley had argued that the court erred in accepting her guilty plea for this offense in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dubin v. United States. But the appeals court found that any potential error in accepting the guilty plea was not plain or obvious under current, well-settled law.

United States v. Guinn

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5072

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant Christopher Guinn appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual abuse and assault, arguing that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his prior nonsexual abuse under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 413. He also contested his 240-month sentence, arguing that the district court miscalculated his criminal-history category, which led to the wrong advisory Guidelines range.

The court affirmed Guinn's convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court found that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Guinn’s previous sexual assaults against his former girlfriends under Rule 413. However, the court agreed with Guinn that his sentences for two prior convictions should have been counted as a single sentence because they were not separated by an intervening arrest. This error led to an incorrect calculation of Guinn's criminal-history category, which in turn affected his sentencing range. The court remanded the case for resentencing under the correct criminal-history category.

United States v. Stepp

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2029

Opinion Date: December 26, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In February 2021, police officers found Justin Stepp, a convicted felon, with a gunshot wound in a car driven by his girlfriend, along with a firearm in the car’s console and ammunition under the passenger seat. A subsequent search of Stepp’s home uncovered more ammunition. Stepp was charged and convicted by a jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he constructively possessed the firearm or ammunition, and that the court erred by including his 2002 conviction in its calculation of his base offense level. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed Stepp’s conviction and sentence. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stepp had constructive possession of the ammunition found in his home. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding Stepp’s 2002 conviction fell within the applicable fifteen-year lookback period for calculating his base offense level.

USA v. Fey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11373

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants, David Fey and Shari Lynn Gunter, were convicted of distributing methamphetamine and conspiring to kill and killing a witness to their crimes. The court was required to decide on three issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that Fey had attempted to hire someone to kill a witness cooperating with federal officials and if so, whether that error was harmless; (2) whether the district court plainly erred by declining to instruct the jury on spoliation; and (3) whether the district court erred by overruling Fey and Gunter’s objection to testimony about a coconspirator’s death and by declining to declare a mistrial.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all three issues. First, it held that, although the prosecutors failed to identify the testimony about Fey's solicitation of a witness's murder as evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), this error was harmless. The court reasoned that Fey and Gunter had ample notice of this testimony before trial and there was sufficient evidence to support the juries' convictions on the charges related to the witness's murder, even without this testimony.

Second, the court found that the district court did not plainly err in declining to give a spoliation instruction to the jury about the destruction of the victim's tissue samples. The court noted that, even if such an instruction could be given in a criminal trial, it would be required only when the absence of material evidence is predicated on bad faith, not negligence.

Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in overruling Fey and Gunter’s objection to testimony about the overdose death of a coconspirator. The court reasoned that the testimony did not imply that Fey and Gunter were involved in the coconspirator's death and did not prejudice their substantial rights. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial.

USA v. Mohammed

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3072

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, International Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered an appeal by Khan Mohammed, who had been convicted of international drug trafficking and narcoterrorism and sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. The district court later vacated the narcoterrorism charge, and upon resentencing for the drug trafficking charge, applied a terrorism enhancement under Section 3A1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines, again resulting in a life sentence.

Mohammed appealed this new sentence, arguing that the district court committed legal and factual errors in applying the terrorism enhancement, and used the wrong burden of proof. The appellate court affirmed Mohammed’s sentence. The court found no plain error in the lower court's application of Section 3A1.4, rejecting Mohammed's argument that the language of the statute had been abrogated and that the enhancement should only apply to convictions of federal crimes of terrorism. The court also held that the district court did not err by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to conduct that was the subject of Mohammed's vacated conviction, even if the case involved extraordinary circumstances. Lastly, the court upheld the district court's factual findings that supported the application of the terrorism enhancement, declining to disturb findings that had already been upheld on appeal.

P. v. Berry-Vierwinden

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081861M(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 26, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2010, Ryan Berry-Vierwinden was convicted of first degree murder in the state of California. Berry-Vierwinden did not commit the murder himself but was convicted as an aider and abettor. The prosecution argued that he and Benjamin Medina, the actual murderer, had planned to murder the victim, Krishana F., by means of lying in wait. Berry-Vierwinden was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.

In 2022, Berry-Vierwinden filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows defendants to petition for resentencing if they could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder due to legislative changes made effective January 1, 2019. Berry-Vierwinden claimed that he was eligible for relief because the jury instructions given at his trial permitted the jury to convict him of first degree murder by imputing malice to him based solely on his participation in a crime.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition for resentencing. The court noted that at the time of his trial in 2010, California law did not allow a direct aider and abettor to be convicted of a lying-in-wait murder on an imputed malice theory. The court reasoned that the legislative changes made in 2019 did not change this aspect of the law. Thus, Berry-Vierwinden's argument that he could not presently be convicted of murder due to the changes made in 2019 was not valid. As such, he did not meet the requirements to establish a prima facie case for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.

P. v. Campbell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A162472A(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, the appellants, Stephon Anthony, Rafael Campbell, Samuel Flowers, and Anthony B. Price, were seeking relief from their first degree murder convictions on multiple grounds. The court found that the trial court was entitled to consider the jury's intent-to-kill findings at the prima facie stage, but that these findings did not preclude relief as a matter of law. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. Furthermore, the court agreed with the People that recent amendment of the gang statutes requires retrial or resentencing on gang-related special-circumstance and enhancement allegations. The court also ordered a remand to strike the multiple-murder special circumstance for Campbell, Flowers, and Price, and to reconsider sentencing on their Vehicle Code convictions in light of recent legislative changes. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to strike the enhancements and prior strikes.

P. v. McCray

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166084(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The court case in question involves James McCray, a violent offender with mental health disorders (OMHD), who has been committed to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) since 2005. McCray appealed a 2022 order recommitting him for another one-year term, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he represented a substantial danger to others due to his severe mental health disorder, that he voluntarily absented himself from his recommitment trial, and that the trial court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury from him before the trial.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four dismissed McCray's appeal as moot since the recommitment order he appealed from had expired and he had been recommitted for another year. However, the court addressed his claim that the trial court failed to ensure he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial, given its recurring importance.

Upon review, the court found that the trial court relied entirely on McCray's counsel's brief questioning about his understanding of the right to a jury trial and did not take any steps to ensure McCray fully understood the significance of a jury trial and the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial. The court concluded that McCray did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial, and highlighted the importance of the court directly informing an OMHD defendant about the right being waived to ensure a meaningful record of the defendant's understanding of a jury waiver.

P. v. Ramirez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H049957(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case being reviewed, Alfredo Ramirez was found guilty of multiple counts of sexual offenses against minors and was sentenced to 107 years in prison. Ramirez appealed, arguing that the evidence obtained from his phone, which was unlocked using his fingerprint, was obtained unlawfully and violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also argued that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse victims’ responses, incorrectly instructed the jury, and imposed fines without determining his ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed with Ramirez and affirmed the judgment. The court held that using Ramirez's fingerprint to unlock his phone did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment or violate his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court also found no violation of Ramirez's due process rights. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury or in admitting the expert testimony. Finally, the court found that Ramirez had forfeited his right to challenge the imposed fines and fees due to his failure to object at sentencing.

State v. Pickell

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-21-0000530

Opinion Date: December 26, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals upholding the conviction of Michael Pickell for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. The case centered around the legality of a traffic stop initiated by a Maui County police officer who observed Pickell executing a U-turn at a highway intersection with left turn only markings and signage but no signage explicitly prohibiting U-turns. Pickell argued that in the absence of an express sign prohibiting U-turns, as required by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-82(c), the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. The court held that the Maui County ordinance, which requires drivers to follow the directional movements exhibited on markings and signage at intersections, was neither preempted by HRS § 291C-82(c) nor in conflict with it. Therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on a violation of the Maui County ordinance, and the motion to suppress evidence from the stop was properly denied.

State v. Ward

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124458

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the State of Kansas, Robert Lowell-Lawrence Ward, the defendant, attempted to withdraw his 2013 plea of no contest to various crimes, eight years later in 2021. The district court summarily denied his motion, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmatively upheld these rulings. The Court found that Ward's motion to withdraw his plea was untimely and procedurally barred, as he failed to prove "excusable neglect," a necessary condition to overcome the one-year time bar for such motions as per Kansas statute K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3210(e). The Court clarified that a motion's untimeliness does not necessarily prevent its consideration, provided the defendant can demonstrate excusable neglect for the delay, which the defendant failed to do. The Court emphasized that a district court cannot bypass this procedural requirement and directly address the merits of an untimely motion without first determining the presence or absence of excusable neglect. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower courts, but for different reasons, focusing on the procedural bar rather than the merits of the motion.

Matter of C.M

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 255N

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the decision of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, committing the appellant, C.M., a youth, to the custody of the Department of Corrections for placement in a state youth correctional facility until the age of 18. The appellant was charged with sex offenses against three of his high school classmates and he appealed the decision on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to make objections to the admission of various hearsay statements.

The court concluded that the appellant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of hearsay statements did not result in substantial prejudice. The court noted that the state presented sufficient admissible evidence to the jury that proved the same facts as the prior consistent statements and bus records. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's counsel vigorously challenged the complaining witnesses' testimony by highlighting inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony, as well as aspects of the investigation. As a result, the court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel and affirmed the lower court's decision.

State v. Hamernick

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 249

Opinion Date: December 27, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case involves an appeal by Bryce Caleb Hamernick, against his conviction for Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWOC) in the Fourth Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court of Montana considered whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that to find Hamernick guilty, it needed to determine that he was simply aware of the high probability that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse.

The court's decision mainly revolved around the interpretation of the term "knowingly" used in the Montana Code Annotated (MCA) to define the mental state required for the crime of SIWOC. The District Court had used two different definitions of "knowingly" for the two elements of the crime. For the act of sexual intercourse, the court used the "conduct-based" definition, that Hamernick must have been aware of his conduct. For the element of "without consent," the court instructed that Hamernick must have been aware of a high probability that the sexual intercourse was without consent, which the appellant argued lowered the state's burden of proof.

The Supreme Court of Montana found that the District Court erred in its instruction. It held that the crime of SIWOC is a conduct-based offense, necessitating an "awareness of conduct" mental state. The court stated that the crime does not consist of sexual intercourse with a high probability the other person does not consent; rather, it is sexual intercourse with the awareness that it is without that person’s consent. The Supreme Court of Montana thus reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

State v. Martinez

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 251

Opinion Date: December 27, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law

In the case, Jose Martinez Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, for two counts of incest, criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, solicitation to commit tampering with witnesses or informants, and three counts of criminal contempt. This case arose from allegations by Martinez's stepdaughter, S.M., that he had been sexually abusing her since she was 10 years old. The trial court allowed the admission of statements made by S.M. to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) and a physician, despite Martinez's objection that their admission violated his right of confrontation as S.M. was not present to testify at the trial.

The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Martinez's conviction. It held that S.M.'s statements to the physician were nontestimonial and made for purposes of medical treatment, and thus, were admissible under Montana Rule of Evidence 803(4). However, the court found that S.M.'s statements to the SANE were testimonial and their admission violated Martinez's right to confrontation. Nevertheless, the court ruled that this error was harmless given other evidence produced at trial and because the SANE's testimony was cumulative.

The court's decision reflected the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements in the context of the right to confrontation, and the admissibility of statements for purposes of medical treatment under the rules of evidence. The court also demonstrated the application of the harmless error doctrine in the context of a Confrontation Clause violation.

BLIGE VS. TERRY

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a judgment from a lower court in a case involving extortion claims related to cryptocurrency. The case involves Christopher Terry, who sued Ava Blige, alleging she extorted cryptocurrency and money from him under threat of publishing his personal information. Blige failed to respond to court-ordered discovery requests, leading the district court to enter a default judgment in favor of Terry. The court found that Terry had established a prima facie case for conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, awarding him damages accordingly. The court also found that the factual allegations supported a claim for extortion, even though it was not specifically pleaded in the complaint. On appeal, Blige argued that the district court erroneously determined that she had impliedly consented to being sued under the unpleaded legal theory of extortion. The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed with Blige on this issue, stating that a defaulting party cannot be found to have impliedly consented to try claims that were not pleaded in the complaint. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that Blige wrongfully dispossessed Terry of the cryptocurrency and money for cars through extortive acts under the theories of conversion, unjust enrichment, and caused him emotional distress.

MCCORD VS. STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 59

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a case involving appellant David McCord, who was stopped by law enforcement due to a license plate frame partially covering the word "NEVADA." Law enforcement subsequently found contraband in McCord's car, leading to his conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance. McCord contested the legality of the traffic stop, arguing that the license plate frame did not constitute "foreign materials" as outlined in NRS 482.275(4), and that his license plate was "clearly legible" as the statute requires.

The court held that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" under NRS 482.275(4), and that a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. The court reasoned that the term "foreign materials" should not be interpreted to include all license plate frames, as this could potentially lead to arbitrary or pretextual traffic stops. It also determined that even though the license plate frame partially covered the word "NEVADA," the license plate was still legible as the essential information was readily identifiable.

The court concluded that the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to justify the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). Consequently, the district court had erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State of New Hampshire v. Roman

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0557

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the defendant, Nestor Roman, appealed his convictions of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), attempted AFSA, and misdemeanor sexual assault. The key issue in the appeal was whether the defense or the prosecution "opened the door" to allow testimony from a nurse who performed a Child Advocacy and Protection Program (CAPP) examination of the victim. The defense argued that the prosecution opened the door by introducing testimony about the existence of medical records from the CAPP examination, which created a misleading impression that there was medical evidence supporting the charges. The prosecution argued that the defense opened the door by asking specific questions about the nurse's findings documented in the records.

The Supreme Court held that the defense opened the door to the nurse's testimony. The court reasoned that the prosecution's mention of the existence of medical records did not create a misleading advantage, as the prosecution did not discuss the contents of these records, and therefore did not open the door. On the other hand, the defense's cross-examination of a detective about the specific findings of the CAPP examination was considered inadmissible hearsay and opened the door to the nurse's testimony to counter the prejudice caused.

The court also disagreed with the defense's argument that the admission of the nurse's testimony was overly prejudicial and served to bolster the victim's credibility. The court noted that the nurse's testimony was narrowly focused on her findings and did not establish whether the victim was sexually abused. The court concluded that the defense failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was an unsustainable exercise of its discretion or that it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. The court thus affirmed the defendant's convictions.

Everett v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 243

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Russell Everett Jr., the appellant, sought to appeal a district court's order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. Everett contended that he had not been served with two orders from his first post-conviction relief proceeding, thereby denying him the right to appeal those orders. He also alleged that the discovery of these orders constituted newly discovered evidence, and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his direct appeal.

Everett had been convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition and had been sentenced to two life sentences with the possibility of parole. His conviction was affirmed by this court. In his first application for post-conviction relief, Everett argued that the witness's testimony had been coerced by their family and that he had discovered new evidence that could overturn his conviction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of his right to a fair trial as the victim-witness did not attend the trial. The district court denied this application, and neither the order nor notice of entry of the order was served on Everett.

In response to Everett's second application for post-conviction relief, the court summarily dismissed it. Everett subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's dismissal of Everett's second application for post-conviction relief. The court determined that Everett's claim of "newly discovered evidence" did not meet the statutory requirements as it did not pertain to his original conviction. Furthermore, the court found that Everett's appeal had been filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations for filing post-conviction relief claims, and no exception to this statute applied in this case. Additionally, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also deemed to have been filed after the statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court had not erred in dismissing Everett's claims for post-conviction relief and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Koon v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 247

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, Jerome Wesseh Koon, Jr. appealed from a district court judgment that denied his application for postconviction relief. Koon had been convicted of reckless endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, unlawful possession of a firearm, and terrorizing. His postconviction relief application was based on two main claims. Firstly, he argued that the district court erred by considering evidence outside the record, specifically the clerk's trial notes. Secondly, he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court rejected Koon's first argument, finding that the district court did not err in considering the clerk's trial notes. The court noted that the district court had provided notice to the parties of its intent to judicially notice the clerk's trial notes, and ultimately did not rely on the notes in its findings. The court also rejected Koon's argument that the district court's review of the clerk's notes automatically created a biased factfinder.

Regarding Koon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court found that Koon had failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had his counsel acted differently. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of postconviction relief.

State v. Nelson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 246

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Mathew Nelson, appealed his sentence for sexual assault, gross sexual imposition, and corruption of a minor. He argued that the district court relied on impermissible factors when determining his sentence and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The Court found that the district court had the discretion to consider the sentencing factors provided in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04 and that it had not relied on impermissible factors. The Court noted that there was evidence in the record to support the court’s consideration of Nelson’s ability to control his behavior when considering the length of his sentence and that the future harm caused by Nelson’s conduct was a permissible sentencing factor to consider.

The Court also found that Nelson’s argument that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment was not adequately articulated or supported, and therefore did not need to be addressed further. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s criminal judgments.

State v. Mills

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-4716

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, an appellant challenged his criminal convictions, arguing that the trial court had erred by failing to hold a competency hearing. The appellant's counsel had requested a competency evaluation prior to the trial, but the appellant refused to be transported to the treatment center for the evaluation. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that while the trial court should have held a competency hearing, the error was harmless because the record, when viewed as a whole, did not demonstrate sufficient indicia of incompetency. The court noted that the appellant had demonstrated understanding of the proceedings and had been able to articulate what his counsel had told him about the proceedings. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court, upholding the appellant's convictions.

State v. Swazey

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-4627

Opinion Date: December 22, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Michael Swazey Jr. was indicted for failing to pay child support. He filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment under Rule 12(C)(2) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the statutes he allegedly violated did not apply to him. The trial court declined to consider Swazey's motion on the merits, holding that the arguments raised were not permitted under Rule 12(C)(2) but should instead be presented at the close of the state’s case at trial. Swazey subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts.

On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held that Swazey’s Rule 12(C)(2) motion was proper and should have been considered on the merits. It also held that by entering a guilty plea, Swazey did not waive his right to raise a constitutional challenge on appeal.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision, stating that Swazey's motion to dismiss was appropriate under Rule 12(C)(2), and that his guilty plea did not waive his right to raise his constitutional challenge on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio remanded the case back to the trial court to consider Swazey's pretrial motion.

Alexander v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 127

Opinion Date: December 28, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming, appellant Darrell Leonardo Alexander claimed that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement after they entered his apartment without a warrant or his consent. The case revolved around the question of warrantless entry and consent.

The court held that the warrantless entry into Alexander's apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This was because the officers reasonably believed that Alexander's girlfriend, identified as E.B., had the apparent authority to consent to their entry. E.B. had called the police to report domestic violence, and when the officers arrived, she opened the door to the apartment and stepped inside, holding the door open for the officers. This action was seen as an invitation for the officers to enter the apartment.

The court also found that E.B. had given implied consent for the officers to enter the apartment based on her nonverbal gestures and actions, such as opening the door and stepping inside when asked about the location of her boyfriend. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court ruled that the officers' reliance on E.B.'s apparent authority to consent to their entry was reasonable. As such, the district court's decision to deny Alexander's motion to suppress the evidence was affirmed.

Justia Legal Resources: What Was New in 2023

Chris Skelton

Read about some of the highlights from what we accomplished this year in expanding our portal of free legal resources. We compiled a legal dictionary, 50-state surveys, and biographies of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, among other projects.

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