US v. Leach

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1878

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Gary E. Leach was convicted of cyberstalking and extortion and subsequently sentenced to a term of forty-two months in prison, followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. The supervised release included a condition prohibiting Leach from working or volunteering in any capacity that would put him in direct contact with children without prior approval from his probation officer. Leach appealed his sentence and the condition of his supervised release, raising several arguments.

First, Leach argued that the district court erred in not providing him with sufficient notice of its intention to impose an upwardly variant sentence. However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that a sentencing court is not required to give the parties advance notice before imposing an upwardly variant sentence. The court also noted that the factors justifying the upward variance were plainly apparent from the record.

Second, Leach argued that his sentence was procedurally flawed due to the lack of a sufficient explanation to justify the above-guidelines sentence. The First Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the district court had identified relevant factors justifying an upward variance and explained why the guidelines did not adequately account for each factor, given the idiosyncrasies of the case at hand.

Third, Leach argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit disagreed, finding that the sentence fell within the "wide universe of supportable sentencing outcomes."

Finally, Leach challenged the condition of his supervised release that prohibited him from working or volunteering in any capacity that would put him in direct contact with children. The First Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the condition was reasonably related to protecting the public from future crimes by Leach. The court also noted that the condition was not overly restrictive, as it only required Leach to secure advance approval from a probation officer for such activity if it would put him in direct contact with children.

Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed Leach's sentence and the conditions of his supervised release.

US v. Walker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1929

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Shaun Walker appealed his 36-month sentence for participating in a failed Hobbs Act conspiracy to rob a home business. Walker raised four objections to his sentence, including challenges to enhancements for economic loss and possession of dangerous weapons and denials of reductions for incomplete conspiracy and mitigating role. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found no error in the enhancements for economic loss and dangerous weapon possession, as well as the denial of incomplete conspiracy reduction. However, the Court vacated and remanded for resentencing on the issue of the mitigating role reduction. The Court was unable to affirm the district court's denial of the reduction due to a lack of explanation, and was unable to conclude that any error in the district court's application of the reduction was harmless. Therefore, the case was remanded for the district court to reevaluate Walker's role in the conspiracy.

Meyer v. Seidel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2221

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed a plaintiff's 2019 complaint against art dealers for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and rescission in connection with his 2001 purchase of an allegedly forged painting. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as time-barred and ruled that the plaintiff's fraud claim could not be granted relief. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that he was on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud before bringing the suit. The appellate court agreed with the district court that claims for breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission were time-barred under New York law. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the fraud claims were time-barred and in denying the plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

US v. Paylor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-7861

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Keyon Paylor, appealed from the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which denied his petition to vacate his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Paylor had entered a guilty plea, which he later sought to vacate, asserting that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He claimed that law enforcement officers involved in his arrest planted the firearm and stole thousands of dollars from him, and that his plea was induced as a result of egregious law enforcement misconduct. The district court denied his petition, concluding that Paylor did not produce enough evidence to establish that information regarding former Detective Daniel Hersl’s misconduct materially influenced his decision to plead guilty. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's decision and vacated it, concluding that Paylor is entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing in order to attempt to gather evidence to support his claim. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.

Netflix v. Babin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40786

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction against a Texas state prosecutor, Lucas Babin, who had initiated criminal charges against Netflix for promoting child pornography through its film, Cuties. The court found that Babin had acted in bad faith, as he multiplied the initial indictment into four after Netflix asserted its First Amendment right, selectively presented evidence to the grand jury, and charged Netflix for a scene that involved an adult actress. The court rejected Babin's argument that the indictments were validated by grand juries, finding that Babin's selective presentation of evidence undermined the independence of the grand juries. The court also noted that Netflix had shown that the prosecution was likely a bad faith prosecution, which constituted an irreparable injury, and that an injunction protecting First Amendment rights was in the public interest. The court ruled that these factors justified the district court's decision not to abstain under the Younger doctrine, which generally requires federal courts to refrain from interfering in ongoing state proceedings.

USA v. Jefferson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30690

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Palma L. Jefferson Jr.'s suppression motions and his sentence related to his conviction for various drug trafficking charges, and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case arose after an anonymous tip led to a police investigation of Jefferson. The police did not find the described vehicle transporting drugs, but the tipster provided additional information leading to Jefferson's residence. The tipster provided live directions via video chat, allowing the police to locate Jefferson's apartment. When police approached Jefferson, they claimed he admitted to having cocaine and a firearm in his apartment, which led to his arrest.

Jefferson challenged the legality of his arrest, the search of his apartment, and the use of his initial confession. He argued that his initial stop by the police amounted to a de facto arrest without probable cause and that the officers unlawfully entered and searched his apartment without a warrant. He further argued that his confession, if made, was unlawfully obtained. Jefferson also challenged the calculation of drug quantities and the application of a dangerous weapon enhancement in his sentence.

However, the court found that Jefferson's initial stop by the police was an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion, not a de facto arrest. Even if the officers unlawfully entered and searched his apartment, the evidence obtained could still be admitted under the independent source doctrine, as it could be obtained through other lawful means. The court also upheld the drug quantity calculation and dangerous weapon enhancement in Jefferson's sentence.

USA v. Schultz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-11039

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Between November 2020 and February 2021, Adam Joseph Schultz and his co-conspirators engaged in a scheme to fraudulently obtain vehicles using stolen login credentials from car dealerships. They purchased and paid for these vehicles with the dealerships' money and then used the purchase documents to pick up the vehicles. Schultz pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison, which he appealed. This case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Schultz's appeal was based on two claims: first, that his April 2021 offense of being stopped while driving a stolen vehicle should have been classified as relevant conduct rather than criminal history, and second, he should have received a reduction for a partially completed offense under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. He argued that the April 2021 offense shared similarities with the offense he was convicted for and that the partially completed offense reduction should apply because he intended a larger offense for which he was not charged.

The court rejected both of Schultz's arguments. The court reasoned that the April 2021 offense was not similar enough to the offense of conviction to be classified as relevant conduct, and that the partially completed offense reduction did not apply because Schultz had completed all elements of the charged crime. The court affirmed Schultz's sentence, but remanded the case to the district court to clarify a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and written judgment regarding whether the sentence would run concurrently or consecutively with any sentences imposed in his state cases.

Mack v. Bradshaw

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3201

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which denied Clarence Mack's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Mack was convicted of aggravated murder in relation to a 1991 carjacking and was sentenced to death. His habeas petition alleged that prosecutors suppressed material evidence, introduced false testimony, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The appellate court found that Mack had not demonstrated any violation of his constitutional rights. Material evidence was either disclosed, non-existent, not favorable, or immaterial. Mack failed to show that the prosecutor knowingly used a false, material statement to obtain the conviction. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted, and he failed to establish his actual innocence to excuse the default. Lastly, the court found that the exclusion of certain testimony did not render Mack’s trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, the court denied all claims raised by Mack and affirmed the lower court's decision.

United States v. Esteras

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3422

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

This case concerns an appeal by Edgardo Esteras against the district court’s decision to revoke his supervised release and sentence him to 24 months in prison. Esteras had pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, violating the conditions of his supervised release by committing domestic violence and possessing a firearm.

Esteras argued that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him. He claimed that the court should not have considered three subfactors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when crafting his sentence: “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected his argument, citing the precedent set in United States v. Lewis. The court stated that a district court judge who considers the mentioned factors does not necessarily impose a procedurally unreasonable sentence. The court also noted that the judge could not ignore respect for the law but consider a defendant’s need to respect the terms of supervised release. The court affirmed the district court’s revocation order.

Winters v. Taskila

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-2615

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Da’Rell Winters, a convicted petitioner, sought to appeal the district court's denial of his habeas relief application. However, due to the delayed receipt of the district court's decision, he did not file his appeal in time. When he finally filed the appeal notice, he explained his delay but did not formally request to reopen the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that his explanation was sufficient for the district court to consider his appeal notice as a motion to reopen, thus deeming his appeal timely.

The case's facts reveal that in 2014, Winters was convicted for armed robbery. After exhausting his appeals in Michigan state courts, he applied for habeas relief in a federal court in 2018. He represented himself and raised various claims, including insufficiency of evidence and errors in jury instructions and sentencing.

The federal district court denied Winters's habeas application and a certificate of appealability on March 10, 2021. Due to a mailing error, Winters received the court's decision only on May 18, 2021. He filed a notice of appeal on June 1, 2021, which was after the 30-day deadline for filing an appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal as untimely.

Winters later moved the district court to reopen the appeal period, which the court granted. It retroactively construed his June 1 notice of appeal as a motion to reopen, making his appeal timely. The Sixth Circuit agreed with this interpretation, concluding that Winters's appeal was timely and directing the Clerk's Office to set a briefing schedule for considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability in this appeal.

USA v. Bingham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2172

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the sentencing of Senque Bingham, who had pleaded guilty to drug offenses. Bingham had requested "safety-valve" relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) at sentencing, meaning he sought a sentence below the statutory minimum because he met certain criteria, including not having possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. However, the district court found Bingham ineligible for safety-valve relief, because he fulfilled the criteria for a firearms enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which applies if a dangerous weapon was possessed in connection with the offense.

The appellate court found that the district court had erroneously conflated the scope of the safety-valve no-firearms condition with the broader scope of the Sentencing Guidelines firearms enhancement. The court clarified that the safety-valve no-firearms condition is narrower than the firearms enhancement, as the latter may apply even if a co-conspirator's possession of a firearm was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, but not induced by them. The court held that eligibility for a firearms enhancement does not automatically disqualify a defendant from safety-valve relief.

Because the district court's error in conflating these two provisions could have affected its sentencing decision, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether the error was harmless. Thus, the court vacated Bingham's sentence and remanded the case back to the district court for resentencing.

USA v. Claybron

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2665

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant-appellant, Rickey Claybron, was convicted on counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm-related offenses. He appealed his sentence, arguing that Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and that a retroactive amendment in the Sentencing Guidelines should have been applied to lower his criminal history category and consequently, his sentencing range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Claybron's firearm-related convictions, ruling that Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). However, the court agreed with Claybron's argument about the retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. It ruled that because the amendment would reduce his Guidelines range and it was retroactive, Claybron's sentence for the robbery counts should be reconsidered. The court found that remand for resentencing was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, given the lower Guidelines range Claybron would have had if the amendment had been in effect at sentencing. Consequently, while Claybron's convictions and sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were affirmed, the sentence imposed on his convictions for the Hobbs Act robbery counts was vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Sentencing Guidelines amendments.

USA v. McGhee

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3306

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

This case involves Daryl McGhee, who was charged with several federal offenses related to possession of a firearm and cocaine. The charges arose after the police received a 911 call from McGhee's wife reporting domestic violence and alleging that McGhee had left their house carrying a gun and a leather bag. The police followed footprints in the snow to find McGhee and later found the bag, which contained the gun and cocaine, under a nearby dumpster. During the trial, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois issued an order prohibiting McGhee from testifying about the domestic violence incident, even to deny the allegation, threatening to jail him and his defense counsel if they violated the order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that while the district court's decision to limit McGhee's testimony was valid as it avoided turning the trial into a domestic dispute, the order was overly broad as it completely silenced McGhee, leaving the jury to potentially conclude that he did hit his wife. Despite this, the appellate court concluded that the exclusionary order did not have a substantial influence over the jury and did not result in a verdict inconsistent with substantial justice. The court expressed concerns about the district court's treatment of McGhee's defense counsel but ultimately affirmed the district court's judgment.

USA v. Tovar

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3024

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, the defendant, Michael Angelo Tovar, was found guilty of various drug and firearm charges and was sentenced to 101 months in prison. He appealed his sentence, raising three issues: one surrounding his attempts to withdraw his guilty plea for the firearm charges and two concerning the calculation of his sentence.

Tovar had sold cocaine to a confidential source twice and was arrested with cocaine and a large amount of cash on his person. A subsequent search of his home found further cash, a firearm, ammunition, and more drugs. Tovar pleaded guilty to all charges but later attempted to withdraw his guilty plea for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, arguing that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied these motions but removed his counsel from the case.

Tovar also contested the district court's calculation of his sentence. The court had applied a "controlled substance offense" enhancement based on Tovar's prior Illinois cannabis conviction and had converted the cash found on Tovar's person and in his home to its equivalent marijuana weight as suspected drug proceeds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. It found no error in the district court's denial of Tovar's motions to withdraw his guilty plea and the calculation of his sentence, including the application of the "controlled substance offense" enhancement and the conversion of the cash to its equivalent marijuana weight. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying Tovar's request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

USA v. Underwood

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1303

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Henry Underwood, had chosen to represent himself in a trial where he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. During the trial, Underwood refused to answer a question during cross-examination and was subsequently held in criminal contempt. He was convicted of the charged offense and appealed against the conviction, arguing that his pretrial waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary and that the criminal contempt finding was improper.

The court rejected both arguments. First, it found that the defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. It took into consideration the extent of the court's formal inquiry into the defendant's waiver, evidence in the record showing the defendant understood the dangers of self-representation, the defendant's background and experience, and the context of the choice to proceed pro se.

Secondly, the court found that the criminal contempt finding was appropriate because the defendant had improperly refused to testify on cross-examination in the judge’s presence, which met the literal requirements of Rule 42(b) that permits summary disposition of criminal contempt. Furthermore, the court held that by choosing to testify, the defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and could not refuse to answer questions relevant to his testimony.

The decision of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Grady

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2415

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Michael Grady and Oscar Dillon, III were convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, attempted obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. They were sentenced to 226 and 187 months’ imprisonment, respectively, and each to 5 years of supervised release. The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing various issues including that their indictments should have been dismissed on Speedy Trial Act grounds, that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions, and that the court erred in denying their motions to substitute counsel of their choice.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions. First, the court found no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, as the delays in the case were justified due to its complexity. Second, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendants' convictions for drug conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, and attempted obstruction of justice. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ motions to substitute counsel of their choice. Specifically, the court found that the potential conflict of interest was unwaivable due to the attorney's previous representation of a key government witness in the case. Therefore, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences of the defendants.

ELDEN V. NIRVANA L.L.C.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-55822

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, plaintiff Spencer Elden, who as a baby was photographed naked in a pool for the cover of Nirvana’s album Nevermind, sued Nirvana L.L.C., Universal Music Group, and others. Elden claimed that he was a victim of child pornography due to the photograph and sought personal injury damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018). The district court dismissed Elden's lawsuit, stating that it was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b)(1) (2018).

However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that because each republication of child pornography may constitute a new personal injury, Elden’s complaint alleging republication of the album cover within the ten years preceding his action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court drew a parallel between the personal injury caused by defamation and the injury caused by republication of child pornography, noting that victims of child pornography may suffer a new injury upon the republication of the pornographic material. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.

United States v. Martinez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1167

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, Domingo Martinez Jr. was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the admission of a narcotics detective’s testimony about Santa Muerte shrines, claiming the testimony violated his First Amendment rights. He also objected to the district court’s instruction to the jury to disregard a robocall inadvertently played during the trial, rather than declaring a mistrial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court found no error in the admission of the detective's testimony relating to Santa Muerte, noting it was based solely on the detective's law enforcement experience, not personal self-study. Moreover, the testimony was relevant to the issue raised by Mr. Martinez's entrapment defense, whether he was predisposed to drug trafficking. The court also found no error in the district court's treatment of the robocall interruption. The district court had instructed the jury to disregard the interruption twice and recessed the trial briefly to ensure it would not happen again. The court of appeals found no indication that the jury had time to process the robocall or that it affected the outcome of the trial.

United States v. Ramos

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-6071

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that impounding a vehicle from a private property without a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale violates the Fourth Amendment. The defendant, Isaac Ramos, was arrested after an altercation at a convenience store. His truck was impounded from the store's parking lot, and a subsequent inventory search revealed a machine gun and ammunition. Ramos was charged with unlawful possession of a machine gun and being a felon illegally in possession of ammunition. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the impoundment of his truck violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied his motion, and he appealed.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the impoundment was not supported by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. The court considered five factors: whether the vehicle was on public or private property; if on private property, whether the property owner had been consulted; whether an alternative to impoundment existed; whether the vehicle was implicated in a crime; and whether the vehicle’s owner and/or driver had consented to the impoundment. The court found that all of these factors weighed against the reasonableness of the impoundment, and thus, it violated the Fourth Amendment. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to grant Ramos’s suppression motion and conduct any further necessary proceedings.

The State of Georgia v. Meadows

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-12958

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered an appeal by Mark Meadows, former White House chief of staff under President Donald Trump, who sought to move his state criminal prosecution to federal court. The state of Georgia had indicted Meadows for crimes related to alleged interference in the 2020 presidential election. Meadows argued that because these actions were taken in his official capacity, they should be heard in federal court according to the federal-officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The district court denied this request because Meadows' charged conduct was not performed under the color of his federal office. The court of appeals affirmed this decision. It ruled that the federal-officer removal statute does not apply to former federal officers and even if it did, the alleged actions leading to this criminal action were not related to Meadows’ official duties. The court concluded that the former chief of staff’s role does not include influencing state officials with allegations of election fraud or altering valid election results in favor of a particular candidate, regardless of the chief of staff's role with respect to state election administration. Therefore, Meadows was not entitled to invoke the federal-officer removal statute.

USA v. Hurtado

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-12702

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case involved Asdrubal Quijada Marin and Juan Carlos Acosta Hurtado, two Venezuelan nationals who were apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in the Caribbean Sea. They were convicted after a bench trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, pursuant to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.

On appeal, Marin and Acosta Hurtado challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the evidence should have been suppressed due to violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They also contended that their detention at sea for 48 days prior to indictment constituted unnecessary delay and outrageous government conduct.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Marin and Acosta Hurtado under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act because Cameroon, the flag nation of the vessel, had consented to United States jurisdiction over the crew of the vessel. It also held that the Northland’s stop and search of the Zumaque Tracer did not violate the Fourth Amendment, so the District Court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation. The Court also held that the District Court did not err in denying Acosta Hurtado’s motion to dismiss based on unnecessary delay arguments. Lastly, the Court held that Acosta Hurtado's claim of outrageous government conduct was meritless.

USA v. Sotis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10256

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, International Law, International Trade

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the case involved Peter Sotis, who was convicted for violating export controls. He had conspired to export diving equipment, specifically rebreathers, to Libya without a license, despite the Department of Commerce requiring a license to export certain products to Libya that implicate the United States’ national security interests.

Sotis challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support each count of his conviction, the opinion testimony presented at trial, and the reasonableness of his 57-month sentence. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove willfulness, to prove that he and another individual had acted in conspiracy, and to prove that the rebreathers were closed-circuit, which would have resulted in a material and prejudicial variance from the indictment. He also claimed that one expert witness and one lay witness invaded the province of the jury by opining on an ultimate issue in the case.

The Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Sotis had sufficient knowledge of the illegality of his conduct to have willfully violated the export control laws. The Court also found that the government sufficiently proved that Sotis conspired with another individual to violate the export control laws. Moreover, the Court rejected Sotis's argument that there was a material variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.

Regarding the expert and lay witness testimonies, the Court held that the testimonies were not improper. The Court also found that the district court did not err in applying the sentencing guidelines and that Sotis's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. As a result, the Court affirmed Sotis's conviction and sentence.

P. v. Rojas

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S275835

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case of The People v. Fernando Rojas, the Supreme Court of California addressed the issue of whether the application of Assembly Bill 333 to the gang-murder special circumstance in section 190.2(a)(22) of the California Penal Code constituted an unlawful amendment of Proposition 21, which had previously defined the term "criminal street gang".

The defendant, Fernando Rojas, was convicted of first degree murder and was found to have committed the crime while being an active participant in a criminal street gang, which made him subject to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under section 190.2(a)(22). While Rojas's appeal was pending, the state legislature passed Assembly Bill 333, which substantially narrowed the definition of "criminal street gang" for the purposes of section 190.2(a)(22).

The lower courts disagreed on whether the application of Assembly Bill 333 would constitute an unlawful amendment of Proposition 21, which had been passed by the voters and was therefore protected from legislative amendment without a two-thirds majority vote of each house of the legislature or approval by the voters.

The Supreme Court of California concluded that the application of Assembly Bill 333 to the gang-murder special circumstance did not violate the limitation on legislative amendment in Proposition 21. The Court reasoned that the voters who enacted Proposition 21 intended to impose a specific punishment for gang-related murder while relying on an existing statutory provision to define "criminal street gang". The Court found no indication that the voters intended to adopt a fixed definition of "criminal street gang" and held that applying Assembly Bill 333's narrower definition did not change the punishment for those convicted of the gang-murder special circumstance. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

P. v. Diaz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B319020(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves the defendant, Jose Diaz, who was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting a street vendor, William Garcia, to death over a dispute about selling on someone else's turf. Diaz appealed his conviction, arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District concluded that police had ample probable cause to arrest Diaz, noting that Diaz, with his distinctive neck tattoo, was observed in an incriminating location at an incriminating time. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct. However, Diaz successfully raised issues about his sentence. The court decided to remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the recent ruling in People v. Tirado and Senate Bill No. 81 have any bearing on Diaz’s sentence. The court otherwise affirmed Diaz's conviction.

P. v. Saldana

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097966(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case is an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court of Yolo County, California. The defendant, Silverio Saldana, was found guilty of possession for sale of a controlled substance and was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison as a three-strikes offender. The court also imposed and stayed four prior prison term enhancements. Nearly a decade later, Saldana's defense counsel moved to strike the four prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 1172.75 and requested a full resentencing under that statute. The trial court struck the previously stayed enhancements but declined to conduct a full resentencing because of the enhancements' status as stayed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, held that the defendant was entitled to full resentencing. The court noted that even though the enhancements were stayed, they were part of the sentence and could potentially increase the sentence under certain circumstances. Therefore, striking the enhancements provided some relief to the defendant by eliminating that potential. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with section 1172.75 and all current sentencing statutes that apply to the defendant.

P. v. Trammel

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166756M(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a criminal case in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, the defendant, Terrell Trammel, was convicted of multiple charges arising from his violent relationship with his former girlfriend, M.T. Trammel first appealed his aggregate 12-year prison term sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously failed to stay the punishment for two convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The appellate court agreed and remanded the case for a full resentencing. On remand, the trial court corrected its errors and resentenced Trammel to a total prison term of 12 years, four months.

Trammel then filed a second appeal arguing that his new sentence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy in the California Constitution. The appellate court agreed with Trammel, finding that the addition of four months to his sentence upon resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the errors in his original sentence were not the result of "unauthorized leniency" that might have warranted a harsher sentence under the exception outlined in People v. Serrato. The court also found that the amended abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect Trammel's total custody credits at the time of resentencing.

The court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to modify the sentence and impose a total aggregate sentence of 11 years, four months, and to determine Trammel's actual total custody credits as of the time of his resentencing. The court also instructed the trial court to order the clerk of the superior court to prepare a second amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes.

Walsworth v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098517(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, directed the Superior Court of Sacramento County to dismiss the case of Adam Walsworth. Walsworth was previously convicted, but his conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. The remittitur (official court document that returns a case to a lower court) was issued on October 27, 2022, and received by the court clerk on November 1, 2022. However, Walsworth was not brought to trial within 60 days of the remittitur filing, a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial.

The Superior Court argued that the 60-day speedy trial period had not passed because the remittitur was filed when the sentencing court received it on February 1, 2023, not when it was received by the court clerk. The appellate court disagreed, holding that, under the California Rules of Court, a document is deemed filed when it is received by the court clerk. As such, the remittitur was filed on November 1, 2022, and the 60-day speedy trial period expired on December 31, 2022.

No good cause for the delay was provided, and the court noted that risks of clerical error or neglect must rest with the prosecution, not the defendant. Thus, the court concluded that Walsworth's case must be dismissed due to violation of section 1382 of the Penal Code, which mandates dismissal when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days after the filing of the remittitur in the trial court, unless good cause for the delay is shown.

People v. Sanders

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 62

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the district court's order to suppress inculpatory statements made by the defendant, John J. Sanders Jr., in a case involving alleged sexual assault on a child. The district court concluded that Sanders's statements were elicited during a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings and were not voluntary. The People appealed, challenging the district court's ruling on custody but failing to sufficiently challenge the court's separate ruling on voluntariness. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, stating that even if they agreed with the People on the issue of custody, they must affirm the district court's suppression order due to the unchallenged finding of involuntariness.

BATES v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0881, S23A1225, S24A0055

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the justices decided on the case involving Tavius Bates, Octavious Jordan, and Jeremy Southern who were convicted of crimes stemming from the shooting death of Nicholas Hagood. The crimes occurred on March 26, 2014, and the defendants were indicted on eight counts each, including malice murder, armed robbery, felony murder, hijacking a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony.

The jury found Southern guilty of all counts while Bates, Jordan, Willis, and Fortson were found not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the remaining counts. The defendants were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. Bates, Jordan, and Southern each filed appeals arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain their convictions. In addition, Bates contended that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a detective testified that Jordan mentioned "the other subjects" in his statement to the police, which Bates claimed violated his rights under Bruton v. United States. Southern argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury about conspiracy as there was no evidence of a conspiracy, and by allowing a jailhouse informant to testify because the informant was acting as an agent of the State and he obtained incriminating information from Bates without counsel present.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions of Bates, Jordan, and Southern. The court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the convictions, Bates did not preserve his Bruton claim as he accepted the trial court's curative instruction and did not renew his motion for a mistrial after the instruction was given, and there was no error in instructing the jury about conspiracy because there was at least slight evidence of a conspiracy. The court also ruled that the jailhouse informant was not an agent of the State as there was no evidence of an agreement between the informant and the State.

BEARD v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0906

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, James Leon Beard III, appealed his convictions for felony murder and a firearm offense resulting from the shooting death of his wife, Angela Bishop. He contested that the trial court erred by not giving the jury a no duty to retreat instruction and by providing the jury with a sequential unanimity instruction on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. He also argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative prejudice from the trial court’s errors and his trial counsel’s deficiencies warranted a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the appellant's claims. The court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on no duty to retreat affected his substantial rights or that the court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the lesser offense, thus not showing plain error. The court also concluded that the appellant failed to show deficiency and prejudice necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court ruled that the assumed trial court error and assumed deficiencies by trial counsel did not entitle the appellant to a new trial and affirmed the lower court's decision.

CHAMBLISS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0802

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Raymond Chambliss was convicted of felony murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend, Tonia Herring, during an argument. On appeal, Chambliss raised several claims. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on simple assault and lesser offenses, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request charges for these lesser offenses.

The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, disagreed with Chambliss's arguments. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Chambliss's felony murder conviction. Regarding the instructional errors, the court concluded that Chambliss had not shown that the given instruction on simple assault contained any obvious legal error and had not established that the trial court obviously erred by failing to charge the lesser offenses of felony or misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. Lastly, the court found no merit in Chambliss's claims of ineffective assistance since he had not established that counsel performed deficiently by failing to request charges on lesser offenses that were not available to him.

Consequently, the court affirmed Chambliss's conviction.

CLEMENTS v. THE STATE (two cases)

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0857, S23A1030

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellants, London Clements and Eric Velazquez, were jointly tried for murder and other offenses connected to the shooting death of Hall County Deputy Sheriff Blane Dixon on July 7, 2019. Clements was convicted of felony murder, and Velazquez was convicted of malice murder and other crimes. On appeal, Clements argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary count and the felony murder count predicated thereon and that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to grant his motion for new trial on the general grounds. Velazquez contended on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault on a peace officer, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict as there was insufficient corroboration of his co-conspirators’ testimony, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The court affirmed the convictions in both cases.

GATES v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1158

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the State violated Joseph Robert Gates's right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. The records, which were obtained after a car accident involving Gates, contained results of blood alcohol content (BAC) tests performed by the hospital where Gates was treated. The State used these records to charge Gates with several offenses, including driving under the influence. Gates filed a motion to suppress his medical records, but the trial court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that Gates's medical records, including the BAC test results, were protected by the right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution. The court further concluded that the State's use of an ex parte court order to obtain Gates's medical records was more akin to the use of an ex parte subpoena, which had previously been held to violate the right to privacy, rather than an ex parte search warrant, which had been deemed permissible. The fact that the court order was not based on probable cause, nor did it comply with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a search warrant, further supported this conclusion. Therefore, the court concluded that the State had violated Gates's right to privacy by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's denial of Gates's motion to suppress.

JIVENS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1078

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Laquan Hasuan Jivens was convicted for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Kathy Henry. Jivens appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, admitting photographs of model firearms and of Jivens with firearms, denying his motion for mistrial after the State elicited testimony of his potential gang affiliation, granting the State’s motion in limine excluding evidence of Henry’s drug use, and denying his motion for mistrial based on the State’s allegedly improper closing arguments.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions. The Court held that the trial court did not err in failing to give a voluntary manslaughter charge because the evidence did not support such a charge. The court also concluded that it is highly probable that any error in admitting the firearm-related photographs did not contribute to the verdict. The court found that Jivens did not preserve for appellate review the issue related to evidence of gang affiliation. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Henry’s drug use, and that Jivens waived any objection to the State’s alleged improper arguments.

JONES v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0948

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, Cynthia Jones was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection to the shooting death of her husband, Kenneth Jones. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed her conviction. Cynthia appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to give a jury instruction on self-defense. The court assumed, without deciding, that there was slight evidence of self-defense and that the trial court may have erred in declining to instruct the jury on self-defense. However, the court held that even if there was such an error, it was harmless. The court explained that a nonconstitutional instructional error is harmless if it is highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict even if the trial court had given the instruction. After examining the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that it was highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict even if the trial court had given the self-defense instruction. The court found the evidence supporting Cynthia's claim of self-defense was weak, as there was no evidence that Kenneth wielded a weapon on the night of the shooting or that Cynthia believed it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent death or great bodily harm to herself. Therefore, Cynthia failed to show that the trial court's assumed error in declining to provide a self-defense instruction contributed to the jury's verdict.

LEE v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A1097

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Georgia, Edward Lee was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to a series of offenses committed between December 15, 2011, and January 19, 2012. On appeal, Lee argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial based on the grounds that his co-indictee mentioned Lee’s prior imprisonment during his testimony and that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose evidence about a fourth man involved in one of the crimes. Lee also claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's comments on the veracity of witnesses and arguments about facts not in evidence during closing arguments.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that Lee waived his right to appeal the denial of his mistrial motions because he failed to make the motions contemporaneously when the issues arose during the trial. The court also rejected Lee's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, ruling that the prosecutor's comments were permissible as they were based on reasonable inferences from the evidence and not statements about the prosecutor’s personal beliefs. The court also stated that the decision not to object to a part of a prosecutor's closing argument is a tactical one and that failure to object must be patently unreasonable to be deemed deficient. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, thereby upholding Lee's conviction.

SCOGGINS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0894

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In July 2015, Christopher Reid Scoggins and co-defendant Fred Jason Charles were indicted for the murder of Stephanie Daniel and other related offenses. The jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. Scoggins was sentenced to life without parole for malice murder, plus additional time for other crimes. Scoggins appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on concealing the death of another or hindering the apprehension of a felon.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Scoggins' convictions. Even though it was not conclusively established which defendant shot Daniel, the court found sufficient evidence of Scoggins' involvement in the crime. This was based on the fact that Scoggins was present at the time of the shooting, fled the scene with Charles, and made no attempt to seek medical aid for Daniel, which the court viewed as an indication of shared criminal intent.

Additionally, the court held that Scoggins' trial counsel was not ineffective. The court stated that neither concealing the death of another nor hindering the apprehension of a felon were included within any of the offenses with which Scoggins was charged. Therefore, it was not deficient for Scoggins' trial counsel to not request instructions on these offenses.

SCOTT v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0861

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the convictions of Milton Nathaniel Scott for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Jerrica Porter. Scott had appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence one of his custodial statements in which he admitted to shooting Porter but claimed the shooting was an accident. He also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling a hearsay objection to testimony that characterized his initial statement that Porter shot herself as implausible and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to testimony and evidence that suggested he was involved in a gang.

The Supreme Court found that even if there was error in the admission of Scott's custodial statement, Scott failed to show harm from the admission because the State introduced into evidence a recording of a jailhouse phone call in which Scott repeated his claim that his shooting of Porter was an accident. The court also found that because Scott's defense was accident and the admission of the hearsay testimony and the evidence to which his trial counsel did not object was not relevant to that defense, these claims did not warrant a reversal.

Lastly, the court determined that even if Scott's trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to evidence and testimony suggesting Scott's gang involvement, Scott failed to establish that this alleged deficiency prejudiced him. Therefore, the court affirmed Scott's convictions.

THE STATE v. SHROPSHIRE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23G0310

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia had to determine whether a unit-of-prosecution analysis or a required evidence analysis should be used to address the question of merger as to one count of aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation. Tony Shropshire was convicted of aggravated child molestation, two counts of child molestation, incest, and first-degree cruelty to children, based on incidents that occurred in 2001 with his five- or six-year-old niece. Shropshire argued on appeal that the two child molestation counts should have merged into the aggravated child molestation conviction. The Court of Appeals applied a unit-of-prosecution analysis and agreed, merging the counts and vacating Shropshire's convictions and sentences for aggravated child molestation and child molestation. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated this part of the Court of Appeals's judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that a unit-of-prosecution analysis should be applied to determine whether the two counts of child molestation (the same crime) merge. However, as child molestation and aggravated child molestation are different crimes, a required evidence analysis should be applied to determine whether these two different crimes merge. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a unit-of-prosecution analysis rather than a required evidence analysis to this question. The case was remanded for the Court of Appeals to apply the correct analyses.

WATERS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0893

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction of Roy Lee Waters for felony murder related to the shooting death of his longtime girlfriend, Melvina Dunlap. Waters appealed on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court wrongly denied his motion for a new trial, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not adequately investigating his insanity defense.

The court found that the jury was authorized to reject Waters’s insanity defense based on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of any conflicts in the evidence, including the testimony of a forensic psychologist who evaluated Waters and determined he was criminally responsible at the time of the shooting. The court also found that the trial court did not err in denying Waters's motion for a new trial based on "general grounds".

On the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that Waters's trial counsel was not deficient for failing to further investigate the insanity defense by procuring an expert to testify about Waters’s criminal responsibility at the time of the shooting, and even assuming that counsel was deficient in failing to procure an expert to testify about the side effects of Waters’s prescription medications, Waters failed to establish prejudice. Hence, the conviction was affirmed.

SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 50987

Opinion Date: December 18, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding.

State v. Rambo

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48949

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, Tyler Reece Rambo was convicted on three counts of aggravated assault upon a peace officer following an incident with police at a city park in Idaho. Rambo appealed his conviction, challenging several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings concerning the admission of evidence at his trial. Rambo argued that the court erred in excluding evidence of a civil lawsuit against the Coeur d’Alene Police Department, admitting body camera footage of his gun discharging, excluding body camera footage of officers returning fire, prohibiting him from testifying about the trajectory of a bullet, and prohibiting him from showing the jury his bullet scars. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the majority of the district court’s rulings and determined that the district court's one erroneous relevancy determination regarding the exclusion of body cam footage indicating that Rambo’s gun did not discharge a second time, was harmless. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Rambo’s judgment of conviction.

State of Iowa v. Gordon

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1062

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Iowa, the appellant, David Gordon, a minor at the time of committing his crimes, was charged with theft in the first degree and willful injury resulting in bodily injury. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years in prison for the theft conviction and five years for the assault conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. Gordon appealed the sentence and also filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the sentence under Iowa Code § 902.4. The district court reconsidered the sentence and placed Gordon on probation for up to five years. Gordon then filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging his resentencing, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion by not granting him a deferred judgment in its initial sentencing, and then by wrongly concluding that it lacked the authority to do so under § 902.4 when resentencing him.

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the initial sentencing. It found that the district court had considered and weighed the arguments for and against a deferred judgment, and had thoroughly explained its reasoning for the sentence imposed. As for Gordon's argument about the district court's power to defer judgment when reconsidering a sentence under § 902.4, the Supreme Court held that a deferred judgment involved more than a sentence. It involved the deferring of a judgment adjudicating guilt as well as a sentence. The court concluded that the district court correctly interpreted its authority under § 902.4 when it determined that it could not defer judgment when reconsidering Gordon's sentence. Therefore, the court affirmed Gordon's conviction and sentence and annulled the writ of certiorari.

State of Iowa v. Iowa Juvenile Court for Plymouth County

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0326

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

This case from the Supreme Court of Iowa involves a juvenile, I.S., who was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography. The juvenile court initially waived its jurisdiction over the case, allowing it to be tried in the district court. However, the juvenile court later vacated its waiver and reclaimed jurisdiction over the case. The State sought a review of the juvenile court's decision to vacate its earlier order, arguing that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction or authority to modify or vacate the waiver order once it had been issued.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the juvenile court did not have the authority to reclaim jurisdiction over the case after it had waived it to the district court. The court found that there was no provision in Iowa law for such a "revocation of waiver." The court reasoned that once a case has been transferred or waived to another court, the transferring court loses jurisdiction over the parties. The court also noted that allowing a juvenile court to reclaim jurisdiction could lead to disruption of proceedings and friction between the district and juvenile courts.

Therefore, the court sustained the State's writ, vacated the juvenile court's revocation of its waiver of jurisdiction, and remanded the case, with the expectation that any further proceedings would occur in the district court.

State of Minnesota vs. Portillo

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-1621

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In a case heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the defendant, Christian Portillo, was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the State’s witnesses regarding evidence that the district court had previously ruled as inadmissible. The defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied by the district court. During the closing-argument rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant no longer held the presumption of innocence based on the evidence presented during the trial. The defendant did not object to this statement. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.

The defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial errors committed by the State. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the prosecutor's misstatement of the law did not affect the defendant's substantial rights.

Upon review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during the closing-argument rebuttal was a plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The court held that the defendant is entitled to a new trial as the error must be addressed to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.

Mills v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00617-SCT

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the conviction of the defendant, Adam Mills, for first-degree murder. The case stemmed from Mills brutally killing his girlfriend while allegedly under the influence of drugs. Mills appealed his conviction, arguing that he could not be convicted of first-degree murder because the evidence did not support a finding that he had the requisite mental capacity to form a premeditated intent to kill. Mills also contended that the trial court erred by admitting photographs and body camera footage from the crime scene.

The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photographs and body camera footage. It reasoned that the materials served a useful evidentiary purpose by providing the jury with visual evidence of the crime scene and the victim’s injuries, which could aid in determining Mills's intent. Regarding the defendant's argument about his mental capacity, the Court ruled that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a specific-intent crime such as first-degree murder. The Court held that the extent and nature of the victim's injuries, inflicted by Mills, were indicative of a deliberate design to kill.

Therefore, the Court affirmed Mills's conviction and life sentence for first-degree murder.

State v. Little Coyote

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 243

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law

In the State of Montana v. Sky M. Little Coyote, the Supreme Court of Montana dealt with an appeal by Little Coyote, who had been incarcerated and was appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. Little Coyote argued that his time served had been incorrectly calculated and that, when correctly accounted for, his sentence had already expired before the State filed its revocation petition. The State argued that Little Coyote was bound by an agreement he had entered into regarding the time served.

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the State's Petition for Revocation. The court found that Little Coyote's time served had indeed been inaccurately calculated. It ruled that the parties involved had been operating under a mutual mistake regarding the time Little Coyote had served. The court held that, when correctly calculated and credited, Little Coyote's sentence had expired nearly three months before the State filed its revocation petition. Thus, the disposition imposed on Little Coyote was deemed illegal as the lower court had lacked the authority to revoke or impose a disposition after the expiration of his sentence.

People v Butler

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 06468

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, two police officers observed Devon T. Butler, the appellant, engage in what they believed was a hand-to-hand drug transaction. After observing Butler fail to stop at a stop sign, the officers initiated a traffic stop. When Butler stepped out of his vehicle, the officers noticed a bulge in his pants, which Butler claimed was $1,000 in cash. When Butler refused the officers' request to search his vehicle, an officer used a Belgian Malinois, a narcotics-detection dog, to sniff-test the vehicle for drugs. The canine sniffed Butler's body, indicated the presence of narcotics, and the officers arrested Butler after a pursuit. The officers found a bag containing 76 glassine envelopes of heroin, which Butler admitted belonged to him. Butler moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, arguing that the officers' use of the canine to search his vehicle and person was unlawful. Following a hearing, the County Court denied the motion.

On December 19, 2023, the New York Court of Appeals held that the use of a narcotics-detection dog to sniff a defendant's body for evidence of a crime is considered a search and thus falls under the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remitted the case back to the County Court for further proceedings. The court ruled that the Appellate Division erred in affirming the judgement based on a ground not decided adversely to the defendant by the suppression court. The court also expressed uncertainty on whether the County Court's conclusion that the defendant "abandoned" the narcotics was based on its holding that the canine sniff was not a search and was "perfectly acceptable." As a result, the case was remitted back to the County Court for further proceedings and consideration of whether the abandonment of narcotics was lawful or unlawful.

State v. Alvarez

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 278PA21

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina heard a case regarding a traffic checkpoint where the defendant, Alvarez, was stopped, searched, and found in possession of illegal drugs. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was collected at an unconstitutional checkpoint. The trial court agreed with the defendant, ruling that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment as the State failed to provide a valid primary programmatic purpose for it. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed, holding that the officers at the checkpoint had an independent reasonable suspicion to stop Alvarez's vehicle, thus no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights occurred. This suspicion was based on Alvarez's behavior and driving, including his failure to maintain lane control. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion is an issue separate from the constitutionality of the checkpoint.

The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order. As a result, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court declined to comment on the constitutionality of the traffic checkpoint due to the presence of independent reasonable suspicion.

State v. Beck

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 264A21

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In April 2017, Isaiah Scott Beck, Daniel Silva, and Javier Holloway planned to rob a drug dealer in Boone, North Carolina. They initially did not have a specific target in mind. However, through a series of text messages, the trio agreed to rob a particular dealer, Mackenzie Beshears. On the day of the robbery, Silva met Beshears in her apartment while Beck and Holloway, wearing all black clothing and face coverings, broke into the apartment. The North Carolina Supreme Court had to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support Beck's conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit felonious breaking or entering.

The Court found that the evidence showed that the original plan was to rob Beshears in the parking lot, but that a new plan was formed in the time between Silva’s first and second appearances at the apartment complex. This new plan involved Silva entering Beshears’ apartment for the meeting, and Beck and Holloway breaking into the apartment. Therefore, a rational juror could find that Beck entered into two separate conspiracies: one to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and another to commit felonious breaking or entering.

As such, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Beck's motion to dismiss the charges against him, including the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. The Court therefore directed the Court of Appeals to reinstate Beck's conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.

State v. Fritsche

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 344PA21

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with interpreting N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A, which allows for the removal of a registered sex offender from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry ten years after initial registration. The defendant, Larry Fritsche, had argued that since he had registered as a sex offender in Colorado more than ten years ago, he was eligible for removal from the North Carolina registry. However, the trial court, using precedent set by the case In re Borden, denied his petition, stating that the ten-year period must be completed in North Carolina. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court determined that the term "county" in the relevant statutes refers to a county in North Carolina, not any state. The court also noted that the purpose of the Sex Offender Protection Registration Programs was to protect North Carolina communities, and this protection could not be ensured if sex offenders could avoid registering in North Carolina due to time spent on another state's registry. Therefore, the court held that the term "initial county registration" in section 14-208.12A requires ten years of registration in North Carolina, not simply ten years of registration in any state.

State v. Lancaster

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 240A22

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the defendant, Darren O'Brien Lancaster, was charged with multiple offenses, including two counts of "going armed to the terror of the public." The charges stemmed from incidents at two locations where Lancaster was reported to be waving a firearm and causing a disturbance. He was found guilty and sentenced to a minimum of fifteen months and a maximum of twenty-seven months in prison.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the indictment charging Lancaster with "going armed to the terror of the public" was deficient because it did not allege that the crime occurred on a public highway, which the Court of Appeals considered to be a necessary element of the crime based on its previous decision in State v. Staten. As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated Lancaster's conviction for this charge and remanded the case for resentencing.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the crime of "going armed to the terror of the public" does not require the conduct to occur on a public highway. Rather, the elements of this common law crime are that the accused (1) went about armed with an unusual and dangerous weapon, (2) in a public place, (3) for the purpose of terrifying and alarming the peaceful people, and (4) in a manner which would naturally terrify and alarm the peaceful people. The Supreme Court found that the indictment against Lancaster adequately alleged facts supporting each of these elements. Therefore, the indictment was not deficient, and Lancaster's conviction for "going armed to the terror of the public" was reinstated.

State v. Tucker

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 113A96-4

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the case of the State of North Carolina v. Russell William Tucker, the defendant argued that his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death should be overturned due to alleged discrimination in jury selection. He asserted that newly discovered evidence, a continuing legal education handout and a statistical study, supported his claim of purposeful discrimination. However, the defendant had failed to raise a Batson claim (a claim of discrimination in jury selection) during his original trial or in previous post-conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the defendant’s claim was procedurally barred and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant killed a security guard and shot two police officers in 1994. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. During jury selection, the defendant raised objections to the State’s peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors. The trial court found that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and the defendant did not raise a Batson claim on direct appeal or in previous post-conviction proceedings.

In this appeal, the defendant argued that the handout and study constituted newly discovered evidence that would support a Batson claim. The defense argued that these materials showed a pattern of racial discrimination in jury selection in North Carolina. However, the Court held that the defendant's claim was procedurally barred because he could have raised a Batson claim during his original trial or in previous post-conviction proceedings but failed to do so. The Court also found that the handout and study did not constitute newly discovered evidence and did not show that the defendant was prejudiced by the alleged discrimination. Therefore, the Court concluded that the defendant’s Batson claim was procedurally barred and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

State v. Wilson

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 187A22

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the defendant, Jahzion Wilson, was charged with first-degree murder under the felony-murder theory, with the underlying felony being attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. Wilson argued that he was entitled to a jury instruction on second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. However, the court held that in order for a defendant to be entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense, there must be a conflict in the evidence of the underlying felony and the evidence must support the lesser-included offense. The defendant's own statements denying his involvement in the crime are not sufficient to create a conflict in the evidence. In this case, the court found that there was no conflict in the evidence supporting the underlying felony of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, thus, Wilson was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree murder. The court modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

State v. Woolard

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 208PA22

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In North Carolina, Melvin Woolard Jr. was arrested by Captain Rodney Sawyer for driving while impaired (DWI). Before his trial, Mr. Woolard filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the arrest, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to suspect him of drunk driving. The District Court agreed and granted his motion. The State appealed the decision to the Superior Court, which also found that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The case was then taken to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina examined the evidence and found that Captain Sawyer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Woolard for impaired driving. The court noted that Mr. Woolard had been driving erratically, swerving over the centerline multiple times, and veering onto the road's shoulder. Additionally, the officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Woolard's breath and inside his truck, observed his red and glassy eyes, and heard his admission to having consumed some beers before driving. Mr. Woolard also exhibited all six possible indications of impairment on a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test administered by the officer.

Based on these facts, the court concluded that an objectively reasonable officer in Captain Sawyer’s position would have suspected Mr. Woolard of impaired driving. Consequently, Mr. Woolard’s arrest satisfied the Fourth Amendment. The court therefore reversed the District Court's decision to suppress the evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State v. Bearce

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 231

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2021, Mark Bearce was charged with two counts of driving under the influence resulting in death and four counts of reckless endangerment. In October 2022, Bearce pled guilty to the two driving under the influence charges in exchange for the dismissal of the reckless endangerment charges. The district court sentenced Bearce to a 12-year prison term for the first count and a 20-year term with 8 years suspended for the second count, with the sentences to be served consecutively. In December 2022, Bearce filed a motion to amend the judgment, claiming he was not given credit for time served. The court amended the judgment, giving Bearce credit for 15 days of time served. In January 2023, Bearce filed another motion for a reduction of his sentence, which the court granted in April 2023, amending his sentence so that the two counts would run concurrently. However, the court did not provide reasons for this reduction.

The State of North Dakota appealed this decision. The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision to reduce Bearce's sentence but noted that the lower court had erred by not stating its reasons for the reduction in writing, as required by North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure 35(b). The Supreme Court also noted that it could not reverse or modify a criminal judgment in a way that would increase the defendant's punishment, as per North Dakota Century Code § 29-28-35. The Supreme Court also concluded that the lower court did not err in reducing Bearce's sentence without considering the victim's rights, as neither the victim nor anyone else had asserted these rights.

State v. Hamilton

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 233

Opinion Date: December 15, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case presided by the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant, Michael Dean Hamilton, was charged with hindering law enforcement under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-03(1)(b) by providing transportation and money to an individual involved in an abduction crime in Virginia. Prior to the trial, Hamilton and the State reached a plea agreement, but the district court rejected it, citing insufficient factual basis for Hamilton's guilty plea. Instead, the district court accepted an open plea from Hamilton. On appeal, Hamilton argued that the district court had abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement and then accepting the open plea, despite both requiring a factual basis. He also claimed that the court had relied on impermissible sentencing factors, including information outside the record and inferences from the record.

In its decision, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Hamilton's claim regarding the rejection of the plea agreement was waived when he entered an open guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The court stated that after entering an open plea without conditions, a defendant could only challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea. Therefore, Hamilton could no longer challenge the non-jurisdictional defects of the district court's rejection of the plea agreement.

Regarding the sentencing factors, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not commit an obvious error when it considered information outside the record and relied on its personal knowledge about Amber alerts in deciding Hamilton's sentence. The court stated that Hamilton had not demonstrated that the factors considered by the court were a clear deviation from the applicable statutory provisions, case law, or rules of evidence. As a result, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

State ex rel. Spencer v. Forshey

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-4568

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2016, Brian N. Spencer was convicted of possession of heroin and marijuana with a firearm specification, and having a weapon while under disability by a Franklin County Court of Common Pleas jury. On the day of the trial, Spencer requested a new attorney, claiming that his appointed counsel was colluding with the prosecutor. When the court refused, Spencer decided to represent himself, despite warnings about the risks. Following his conviction, Spencer appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his right to counsel was violated, but the court affirmed the lower court's ruling.

In 2022, Spencer filed a habeas corpus complaint in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that his convictions and sentence are void because the trial court violated his right to counsel. The court dismissed the complaint and Spencer appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh District's dismissal of the complaint. The Supreme Court held that even if the trial court had violated Spencer’s right to counsel, it did not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. A violation of the defendant’s right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, but it does not result in a sentence that is void for the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court further noted that Spencer had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal of his convictions and sentence, which he had already pursued. Thus, his convictions and sentences were not void and he was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

State v. Parkerson

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069918

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the defendant, William Jack Parkerson, had been convicted of assault in the first degree and sentenced under Oregon’s dangerous offender statutes. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court had violated ORS 161.735 by sentencing him as a dangerous offender without reviewing new presentence investigation and psychological evaluation reports specifically prepared for this case. He also argued that the determinate part of his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence allowed by ORS 161.605 and OAR 213-008-0003(2).

The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the defendant that the trial court had erred in sentencing him as a dangerous offender using old presentence investigation and psychological evaluation reports. The court held that ORS 161.735 requires the court to consider new reports prepared for the case. Therefore, the case was remanded to the lower court for resentencing.

However, the Supreme Court of Oregon disagreed with the defendant's argument that the determinate part of his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. The court concluded that the maximum determinate part of a dangerous offender sentence that may be imposed is twice the presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines, and thus, the 260-month determinate part of the sentence imposed by the trial court did not exceed the maximum allowed by the statute.

State v. Wilcox

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070063

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the defendant, Jason Thomas Wilcox, who was taken into police custody for public intoxication under ORS 430.399, a noncriminal statute. During this process, the police seized and inventoried his backpack, discovering a butterfly knife. As Wilcox had a prior felony conviction, he was charged and convicted for being a felon in possession of a restricted weapon under ORS 166.270(2). Wilcox appealed, arguing that the seizure of his backpack was unlawful under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the seizure was unlawful, and based its decision on a previous case, State v. Edwards.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred in its analysis because it treated the seizure as a criminal one rather than an administrative one. The Court pointed out that when a person or their property is seized under ORS 430.399, the seizure is administrative, not criminal, and such seizures must comply with a different set of constitutional standards. The Court also clarified that the state’s interference with a person’s possessory or ownership interests constitutes a seizure, regardless of whether the person objects to the interference.

The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the backpack was indeed a seizure. However, it did not decide whether the seizure was lawful, instead remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether ORS 430.399, or some other source of authority, authorized the seizure of defendant’s backpack and if so, whether that seizure was effectuated in accordance with the requirements of State v. Atkinson, which set the framework for assessing the constitutionality of an administrative search or seizure.

JOHNSON v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0056-23

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Transportation Law

In Bowie County, Texas, Zimbabwe Raymond Johnson was involved in a car accident where he collided with a utility pole and an antique truck. He continued to drive away from the scene until his vehicle was no longer operational. Upon the arrival of the police, Johnson provided identification information but did not have insurance. Consequently, he was charged with failure to comply with duties to provide information after an accident and was convicted of attempting to commit those offenses. The trial judge imposed a $200 fine for each offense and ordered Johnson to pay restitution of $200 for the utility pole damage and $10,000 for the vehicle damage.

On appeal, Johnson contested the restitution order, arguing that the offenses for which he was convicted did not cause the pole and truck damage. The court of appeals agreed and deleted the restitution awards. The State of Texas petitioned for a discretionary review of the decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that, under Article 42.037 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, restitution could be ordered only when the offense for which the defendant was convicted caused the damage. The court stated that there was no evidence to suggest that Johnson's failure to comply with his duties of providing information after the accident caused any of the damage. Although the court acknowledged that in some situations, a failure to provide information could cause damage (such as by delaying necessary medical help), such was not the case here. The court dismissed the State's concern that limiting restitution might motivate overcharging just to obtain restitution, stating that such concern could not dictate the resolution of the issue.

REED V. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0918-20

Opinion Date: December 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A Texas man, Brian Christopher Reed, was charged with sexual assault for allegedly penetrating the victim's sexual organ with his own without her consent. At trial, the jury convicted him of a lesser-included offense of attempted sexual assault. The jury charge for the lesser offense did not limit the means of penetration to his sexual organ, and the charge's definition of sexual assault mentioned that penetration could be committed "by any means." The jury also heard some evidence that Reed may have used his mouth, not his sexual organ. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, stating that the jury charge was erroneous and caused egregious harm to Reed because it expanded the theory of liability beyond the language of the indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' finding of egregious harm. The Court noted that while there was conflicting evidence as to whether Reed used his sexual organ or his mouth, the main issue in the case revolved around consent, not the means of penetration. The Court also emphasized that neither the prosecution nor the defense suggested to the jury that it could convict Reed if it thought he used his mouth. The Court thus concluded that the possibility that the jury charge error led the jury to find the defendant guilty of attempting to sexually assault the victim with his mouth instead of his sexual organ was "hypothetical at best." As such, the Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to consider Reed's remaining issues.

Kell v. Benzon

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 27

Opinion Date: December 21, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the appellant, Troy Michael Kell, appealed the district court's dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. Kell, while serving a life sentence for murder, had stabbed another inmate to death in 1994. He was convicted of aggravated murder, a capital offense, and sentenced to death. Following his conviction, Kell filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was dismissed by the district court.

Years later, during federal habeas corpus proceedings, Kell's attorneys discovered evidence that three jurors from his trial had communicated with the judge during sentencing deliberations without Kell or either party’s counsel present. One of these jurors remembered the judge stating that it was Kell’s burden to convince the jury that his life should be spared. This new evidence formed the basis of Kell’s second petition for post-conviction relief which he filed in 2018, over five years after the evidence was discovered.

The district court dismissed Kell's petition, applying the time and procedural limitations under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Kell argued on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing his petition based on these limitations. He claimed that his delay in filing was due to ineffective assistance of initial post-conviction counsel and that applying the PCRA’s time and procedural bars violated his rights under the Suspension Clause, Due Process Clause, and Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Kell had not shown that any shortcoming of his initial post-conviction counsel excuses the five and a half year delay in bringing this claim after discovering the alleged improper communication between the trial judge and jurors. The court also held that Kell had not demonstrated that the application of the PCRA’s time and procedural bars to his claim violated his constitutional rights. He was unable to show that the application of these bars prevented him from challenging his detention or left him unable to vindicate his substantive rights.

Croy v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 124

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Kristina Croy, a daycare operator, was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter following a six-day jury trial. The charges stemmed from an incident in which an eight-month-old infant, MG, in her care died due to positional asphyxia resulting from being improperly swaddled. Croy appealed, arguing, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Court affirmed the conviction, stating there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that swaddling MG posed a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, and that Croy had consciously disregarded that risk. The Court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a juror who had discussed the case with another juror prior to deliberations, violating the court's instructions not to prejudge the case. Furthermore, the Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive Croy of a fair trial when it declined her request to impose restrictions on how the State split its time between closing summation and rebuttal argument. The Court's decision was based on the particular facts of the case, noting that Croy could not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability the verdict might have been more favorable to her if the prosecutor had not been allowed to make a lengthy rebuttal argument.

Wright v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 122

Opinion Date: December 19, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Travis James Wright, found guilty of two counts of sexual exploitation of children, appealed the denial of his motion for sentence reduction by the District Court of Carbon County. He had been sentenced to two concurrent sentences of eight to ten years. Wright filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction, arguing prosecutorial misconduct, the proportionality of his sentence, and providing personal information and letters of support. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The court explained that it reviews rulings on motions for sentence reduction for abuse of discretion, and the sentencing judge is in the best position to decide about sentence modification. The court found that Wright's claims were not supported by cogent argument and were not appropriate under a Rule 35(b) motion, which cannot be used to attack the validity of a conviction or as a substitute for a properly filed appeal. The court also noted that productive behavior alone does not require the district court to grant a sentence reduction.