United States v. Valdez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 22-1543, 22-1552

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the defendant-appellant, Augusto Valdez, who appealed from his guilty plea and conviction for which he received 120 months' imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Valdez raised two issues: firstly, he asserted that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he conspired only with a confidential source and not a co-conspirator, and that the court did not ensure that he knew he couldn't conspire illegally with a government agent. Secondly, he sought to vacate his sentence because the district court should have, on its own initiative, verified his eligibility for the safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court found that Valdez knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and was not misled about the nature of the conspiracy charge, thereby rejecting his argument that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. His argument that he could not be convicted for conspiring only with a government agent was rejected because the facts revealed two true conspirators: Valdez and a Texas source. The court also found that Valdez waived his right to argue for the application of the safety valve because he failed to object to the PSR and requested the mandatory minimum sentence, which was inconsistent with his later argument for the application of the safety valve.

US v. Cowette

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1534

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a drug trafficking case, the defendant, Amanda Cowette, appealed the district court's denial of her motion to suppress statements she made to law enforcement officers on July 16 and 17, 2018. Cowette argued that she unequivocally invoked her Fifth Amendment right to counsel and any subsequent questioning by law enforcement officers was in violation of that right. She contended that the district court's ruling to the contrary was in error. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with Cowette and held that she properly invoked her Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The court found that the phrase "I guess" used by Cowette did not create any ambiguity in her clear invocation of her right to counsel. The court vacated the decision of the district court in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

US v. Menendez-Montalvo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1687

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case, Ángel Menéndez-Montalvo, while serving a term of supervised release arising from his conviction for a federal firearm offense, violated the conditions of his release by breaching Article 3.1 of Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Law. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to determine whether a violation of Article 3.1 is a "crime of violence" as used in section 7B1.1(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that it is not because Puerto Rico courts have applied the law to encompass less-than-violent force. As such, the court vacated Menéndez's sentence because the district court had held to the contrary in calculating a sentencing range that was higher than it should have been. The court further clarified that its decision does not prevent the district court from considering Menéndez's conduct while on supervised release as it bears on the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Carpenter v. Allen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1057

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In Carpenter v. Allen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined a case involving a dispute over the return of seized property following the completion of a criminal case. The plaintiff, Grist Mill Capital LLC ("GMC"), filed a motion for return of property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) against the government. The property in question consisted of financial documents seized by the Department of Labor during a criminal investigation and prosecution of Daniel E. Carpenter.

The district court granted GMC's motion in part, ruling that the government failed to demonstrate a need to keep the seized materials given that Carpenter's criminal conviction had been affirmed and his petition for certiorari denied by the Supreme Court. The district court ordered the government to destroy the materials rather than return them to GMC, citing the presence of third parties' personal identifying information used by Carpenter in his fraudulent scheme.

The government appealed the district court's order, arguing that it needed to retain the materials due to Carpenter's pending collateral attack on his criminal convictions. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order, finding that the government had demonstrated a legitimate need to retain the property to defend against Carpenter's pending Section 2255 motion and to preserve evidence for a potential retrial if the motion succeeded. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion and dismissed GMC's cross-appeal as moot.

USA v. Amos

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 20-3298

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Shiheem Amos appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a firearm, which was found after he was stopped by police officers who suspected him of being involved in a disturbance reported at a nearby location. Amos argued that he was seized without reasonable suspicion, and therefore the firearm should not have been admissible in court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Amos was not seized until after he attempted to flee from the police officers, and at that point, the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize him based on his attempt to flee. Thus, the firearm was admissible, and the motion to suppress was correctly denied.

Amos also challenged his 62-month sentence, which included an enhancement for a previous state court conviction that was classified as a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court records did not specify which subsection of the Pennsylvania aggravated assault statute Amos had been convicted under, but the government argued that all possible subsections qualified as a crime of violence. However, the Third Circuit held that one of the subsections, which can be violated by a failure to act, does not meet the definition of a crime of violence because it does not require the use of violent force. Therefore, the court vacated Amos's sentence and remanded for resentencing without the crime of violence enhancement.

USA v. Caraballo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-1976

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves an appeal by Michael Caraballo who was sentenced for an aggravated assault. He challenges the District Court's finding that the injuries sustained by his victim amounted to serious bodily injury rather than bodily injury under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which resulted in a higher guideline range for Caraballo.

The case arose from an incident where Caraballo, an inmate, assaulted another inmate with a five-inch metal shank, causing the victim to sustain a number of puncture wounds, a fractured mandible, and abrasions. Caraballo pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon, aiding and abetting, and possessing contraband in prison. During the sentencing hearing, Caraballo's counsel objected to the five-level sentencing enhancement for causing serious bodily injury. The District Court overruled the objection and sentenced Caraballo on the low end of the range, which was 63 months. Caraballo appealed, arguing that the injuries caused to the victim constituted bodily injury, not serious bodily injury.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase "serious bodily injury" as used in the relevant guideline is ambiguous. Therefore, it turned to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of the phrase in the commentary to the Guidelines. The court held that the reasonableness, character, and context of the Sentencing Commission's interpretation entitles it to controlling weight. Applying the commentary definition, the court held that the District Court did not commit clear error by concluding that the victim's injuries constituted serious bodily injury rather than bodily injury. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

USA v. Coach

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2267

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Daniel Coach and Clifton Junius, who were both involved in a drug distribution operation, appealed the denials of their motions for sentence reduction under the First Step Act. They argued that their convictions for intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal conspiracy were "covered offenses" under the Act, and hence, they were eligible for sentencing relief for their convictions under that statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with the appellants' arguments, holding that drug-related murder under 28 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered offense under the First Step Act.

The appellants also argued that their murder and drug charges on which they were sentenced were interdependent, so they were eligible for sentence reduction under the sentencing package doctrine. The court disagreed, stating that the sentencing package doctrine does not apply to this case because the sentences imposed on Coach and Junius for murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise were imposed independently from their cocaine base distribution charges and were not part of a sentencing package. The court affirmed the lower court's decision denying the motions for sentence reduction.

USA v. Jordan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2153

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard an appeal by Mark Jordan regarding his conviction for armed bank robbery and associated gun charges. The main issue was whether armed bank robbery can be considered a "crime of violence" under a federal gun statute. Jordan argued that armed bank robbery could be committed recklessly, and therefore should not count as a crime of violence.

The court, however, found that the federal armed bank robbery statute is divisible into different crimes, and the specific crime that Jordan pleaded guilty to required purpose or knowledge, not recklessness. Therefore, using the modified categorical approach, the court held that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence. The court also held that whenever a federal crime is predicated on committing another crime, the elements of the predicate crime are considered elements of the first crime as well.

In regards to the facts of the case, Jordan committed three bank robberies, during two of which he fired a gun. He was charged with three counts of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and two gun charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He pleaded guilty to all five counts and was sentenced to 318 months in prison. He later challenged his sentence, arguing that § 2113(d) is not a "crime of violence" under § 924(c), which is what the court ultimately disagreed with.

US v. Brent Brewbaker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4544

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Brent Brewbaker, appealed from his conviction of a per se antitrust violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act, as well as five counts of mail and wire fraud. Brewbaker had asked the district court to dismiss the Sherman Act count for failure to state an offense, but the court denied his motion. The court of appeals reversed Brewbaker’s Sherman Act conviction, finding that the indictment failed to state a per se antitrust offense as it purported to do. The court, however, affirmed his fraud convictions and remanded the case for resentencing.

The legal basis for the case was Brewbaker's argument that the indictment should have been dismissed because it did not state a per se Sherman Act offense, a claim that the appellate court agreed with. The court explained that the indictment alleged a restraint that was both horizontal and vertical in nature, which does not fit neatly into either category as per existing case law. The court further noted that the Supreme Court had not yet clarified how to analyze an agreement between two parties with both vertical and horizontal aspects. The court concluded that the indictment did not allege a restraint that has been previously held to be per se illegal, nor one that economics showed would invariably lead to anticompetitive effects, and thus failed to state a per se violation of the Sherman Act.

The court also rejected Brewbaker's claim that the jury instructions on the Sherman Act count "infected" the jury’s consideration of the fraud counts, noting that the fraud counts were not dependent on finding Brewbaker guilty under the Sherman Act. It further cited the presumption that juries follow instructions, and found no extraordinary situation to overcome this presumption. Therefore, the fraud convictions were affirmed.

US v. Henderson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4235

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Eric Henderson, a convicted felon, was charged with one count of possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Henderson pleaded guilty to the charge, but objected to the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing.

The court held that the district court erred in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. This enhancement was based on Henderson's possession of a firearm "in connection with another felony offense," namely, possession of a firearm while under a domestic violence protective order. The court noted that a person cannot be punished more severely for violating multiple provisions of § 922(g) with the same act of possession.

The court also ruled that the district court made a mistake in applying a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines for reckless endangerment during flight. The court found that Henderson's conduct did not meet the definition of recklessness as established by prior court decisions, which require "flight-plus-something more" for the enhancement to apply. In Henderson's case, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate reckless behavior or substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury during his flight.

US v. Kemp

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4185

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Daniel N. Kemp, Sr. was charged with nine counts of sexually abusing his adopted children. Kemp pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse under a plea agreement and the remaining charges were dismissed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina sentenced Kemp to life imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release. Kemp appealed his conviction and sentence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Kemp's conviction. The court found that the district court's plea colloquy did not comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in multiple respects, but Kemp failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. As for Kemp's sentence, the Court of Appeals found that the district court improperly failed to orally pronounce multiple discretionary conditions of supervised release that it subsequently imposed in Kemp's written judgment. This constituted error under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), violating Kemp's right to be present at sentencing. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated Kemp's sentence and remanded for the district court to resentence the defendant.

US v. Roy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4312

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, sentencing Joshua Aaron Roy to 120 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release for unlawful possession of a firearm and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl. The court rejected Roy's claim that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, holding that the district court did not rely on clearly erroneous facts or evidence outside the record. The specifics of the case involved Roy driving his stepdaughter and her partner in the latter's vehicle, suspected by law enforcement to be transporting narcotics. Following a traffic stop, the officers seized 447 fentanyl capsules weighing 61.98 grams from the partner. Roy was subsequently arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm after being identified on surveillance footage following a report of shoplifting. The court found that the district court's statements about the lethality of fentanyl and the connection between the two offenses constituted permissible reliance on facts within the record. It concluded that any error in the reference to multiple firearms did not alter the court's understanding that Roy had possessed a single firearm and was therefore harmless.

US v. Taylor-Sanders

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-4604

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Insurance Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the case involved defendant Glenda Taylor-Sanders, a licensed insurance agent, who pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. Taylor-Sanders had used her position to defraud several trucking companies and an insurance finance company, BankDirect Capital Finance, by misappropriating funds meant for insurance premiums and obtaining loans under the guise of non-existent insurance policies. She used the funds for personal expenditures, leading to the lapse of some of the trucking companies' insurance policies.

In her plea agreement, Taylor-Sanders agreed to pay full restitution to all victims harmed by her relevant conduct, and she waived all rights to contest the conviction and sentence in any appeal, unless it was due to ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. However, she later attempted to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that she didn't fully understand the implications of her plea and that she never acted with the requisite intent to defraud. The district court denied her motion to withdraw the plea, concluding that her claim was not credible and that she had not provided a fair and just reason to withdraw her guilty plea.

After being sentenced to 66 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $700,000 in restitution, Taylor-Sanders appealed her conviction, sentence, and the restitution order. She argued that her guilty plea wasn’t knowing and voluntary, that the district court miscalculated her offense level, and that the district court made several errors when awarding restitution.

The Court of Appeals found that Taylor-Sanders's guilty plea and plea waiver were valid and the issues she raised on appeal fell within the scope of her appeal waiver. The court distinguished between claims that a sentence is "illegal" because the district court lacked the authority to issue the sentence (which remain reviewable despite an appeal waiver) and claims that a sentence was "imposed in violation of law" because it has otherwise merely "been touched by a legal error" (in which case the court will enforce the appeal waiver). The court dismissed Taylor-Sanders's appeal in its entirety.

USA v. Jackson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10803

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the appellant, Brian Jackson, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his guilty plea for attempted interference with commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Jackson and two co-conspirators had attempted to rob a convenience store, and in the course of the incident, the store was closed for about three hours, causing it to lose $600 in potential earnings. Jackson argued that the record did not sufficiently show that the attempted robbery impacted interstate commerce.

The court, however, ruled that Jackson's plea agreement contained sufficient factual admissions to satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. It noted that Jackson admitted to attempting to rob the store with the intent to affect interstate commerce. In addition, the court found that the temporary closure of the store resulting from the attempted robbery affected interstate commerce, as it depleted the store's assets by $600, impeding its ability to engage in future interstate commerce. The court also inferred from the record that the store likely dealt in goods originating from outside Texas and therefore engaged in interstate commerce.

Jackson's argument that he would not have pled guilty if he had known the facts were insufficient under the commerce element was dismissed by the court. The court noted that Jackson had pled guilty despite believing that the facts were insufficient to support the commerce prong, and he had admitted that his purpose in pleading guilty was to avoid potential conviction under a statute carrying longer sentences.

The court thus found no reversible error and affirmed the lower court's decision.

USA v. Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10198

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Derrick Durrell Jones, a convicted felon, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Jones argued that the law under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. Addressing the Commerce Clause argument, the court stated that their circuit precedent has consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and that Jones had not presented any Supreme Court decisions that had expressly overruled this.

In response to the Second Amendment argument, the court noted that Jones' challenge came in light of a new test for assessing the constitutionality of a statute under the Second Amendment as set forth by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. However, the court pointed out that it had previously held that § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment, and a concurring opinion in Bruen had stated that the decision should not cast doubt on prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. The court also observed that there was no binding precedent holding that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional, and that two other federal circuits have reached conflicting conclusions on the issue.

Given these considerations, the court concluded that Jones had failed to demonstrate that the district court’s application of § 922(g)(1) constituted clear or obvious error, and thus affirmed the decision of the lower court.

USA v. Pierre

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20515

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves James Pierre, the sole doctor at a Houston pill mill, who was convicted of multiple federal drug crimes. He was charged with seven counts of unlawfully distributing and dispensing controlled substances and one count of conspiring to do the same. Pierre's defense argued that he had been deceived by the clinic's employees and only provided medicine for people he believed were in pain. However, the jury did not believe him and he was convicted on all counts.

Pierre appealed his conviction on two grounds: that the district court erred in admitting improper profiling evidence and in instructing the jury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the testimony about the mill operations was not profiling evidence, as it helped the jury understand the evidence. The court also held that any error in the jury instructions did not affect Pierre's substantial rights, as there was overwhelming evidence to prove that Pierre knew the prescriptions he was writing were medically unauthorized.

Wilson v. Midland County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50998

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In an appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Erma Wilson sought to overturn the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas which dismissed her federal civil rights suit against Midland County, Texas, and individuals Ralph Petty and Albert Schorre. Wilson was convicted of cocaine possession 22 years prior and she maintained her innocence, claiming that the cocaine found was not hers. The case revolved around her claim that she was denied due process since the assistant district attorney in her case, Ralph Petty, was also moonlighting as a law clerk for the judge presiding over her trial. Wilson was sentenced to eight years of community supervision which derailed her dream of becoming a nurse.

Upon review, the Fifth Circuit held that Wilson's claim is barred by the "favorable termination" rule from Heck v. Humphrey. The rule states that a convicted party cannot seek § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment without first showing that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal or otherwise declared invalid. The court noted that Petty’s dual role indeed constituted a conflict of interest that violated Wilson's constitutional right to a fair trial. However, under the court's precedent, noncustodial plaintiffs, such as Wilson, must meet the favorable-termination requirement, even if it’s practically impossible for them to do so. The court found that it was bound by prior circuit precedent and could only affirm the lower court's decision. The court noted that only the en banc court or the United States Supreme Court could deliver a different result. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Carson v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3419

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which had denied Adam Carson's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Carson had been convicted of robbing a bank and tampering with a witness, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In his motion, Carson argued that his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to initiate plea negotiations and by committing several mistakes during the trial. He also claimed that he did not knowingly waive his right to testify. The Court of Appeals held that Carson's ineffective-assistance claims failed because they lacked grounds for prejudice. The court ruled there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Carson's case would have been different if his attorney had acted differently. The court also held that Carson had not demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to testify, as he did not object on the record to his attorney's statement that he did not want to testify.

Fulks v. Watson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3308

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Inmate Chadrick Fulks filed a lawsuit against several prison officials at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging constitutionally deficient medical care, the use of excessive force, and a sexual assault. The district court concluded that he had successfully exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to only two claims. During the course of the litigation, the court found that Fulks had knowingly submitted a forged document and provided perjured testimony. As a sanction for this misconduct, the court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court noted that even though dismissal prevented Fulks from litigating his allegation of sexual assault, there were other remedies available to him, such as through the Bureau's Office of Internal Affairs or under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. The court concluded that while the district court's decision was severe, it was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the entire action as a sanction for Fulks's submission of a forged document and perjured testimony.

USA v. Navarrete

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3230

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Miguel Navarrete, a felon, was charged with possessing a firearm, which he could not lawfully do. Navarrete was arraigned, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced by video under the CARES Act, which permitted such proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic. He consented to the video proceedings during the arraignment and guilty plea, and all necessary findings were made. He was sentenced to 58 months’ imprisonment, a term below the range calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines. Navarrete appealed the sentence, arguing that he should be resentenced because he did not appear personally in court and did not formally consent on the record to the video sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's argument did not meet the requirements for "plain error" reversal. The court reasoned that Navarrete had, in fact, enjoyed the substantial part of the entitlement secured by Rule 43(a), and the absence of a formal consent on the record to a video appearance that was evidently voluntary on the defendant’s part did not call the justice system into disrepute. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that failure to obtain on-the-record consent for video sentencing was a structural error that required automatic reversal. The court held such an error to be a "discrete defect," not affecting the entire conduct of the proceedings or necessarily rendering the outcome unreliable. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's sentencing decision.

United States v. Bermel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3092

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard an appeal from Jacob Bermel, who had pleaded guilty to two child pornography offenses following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found on a camera he had hidden in his daughter's bathroom. Bermel argued that the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the camera and its memory card violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the district court found that the seizure was justified by exigent circumstances and that the search was lawful due to the daughter's consent.

On appeal, Bermel made three arguments: (1) minor children cannot consent to a search of their parents' property, (2) even if minors can consent, his daughter lacked such authority, and (3) the district court erred in finding that his daughter had consented to the search of the camera and memory card.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It rejected Bermel's first argument, stating that there is no legal precedent for a per se rule that minors cannot consent to a search of their parents' property. The court also found that the daughter had apparent authority to consent to the search given her joint access and control over the camera and its memory card. Finally, the court determined that the daughter had indeed consented to the search of the camera and its memory card. The court noted that lack of verbal response did not negate consent and the scope of her consent reasonably extended to the camera's memory card.

United States v. Betts

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1012

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Chad Betts's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. Betts, a felon, was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition after a drug dog alerted to his vehicle during a traffic stop. He appealed the district court's decision, arguing that reasonable suspicion did not exist to extend the traffic stop.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on a combination of factors: Betts’s quick speaking, profuse sweating, and rapid, shallow breathing; his possession of a torch-style lighter, which the officer knew was often used to heat drugs like methamphetamine; Betts’s unusual travel plans and his history of drug-related offenses. These factors, viewed as a whole, justified the officer's suspicion that Betts was in possession of illegal drugs by the time the officer left Betts seated in the patrol car and walked back to Betts’s vehicle to question the passenger. As a result, the court concluded that the extended stop was justified, and the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained during this stop.

United States v. Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2343

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction against Richard Lee David Brown for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Law enforcement found Brown in an apartment during the execution of a search warrant, along with drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a cell phone that Brown admitted was his. Brown appealed his conviction, alleging multiple pre-trial and trial-related errors. However, the court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Brown's claims that he was improperly denied a jury instruction regarding "mere presence," that the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues. The court held that the instructions given to the jury were adequate and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that Brown's claims of ineffective assistance were best left for a post-conviction relief proceeding, such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court concluded that none of the alleged errors either individually or cumulatively warranted reversal of the conviction.

United States v. Goodman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3499

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of William Goodman for distribution of fentanyl resulting in death and unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. Goodman appealed his conviction on the grounds that the district court improperly admitted hearsay testimony from the deceased user’s girlfriend and wrongly instructed the jury regarding Goodman’s prior convictions.

The court rejected Goodman's first argument, ruling that his co-conspirator's statements, relayed through the girlfriend's testimony, fell under the co-conspirator exclusion under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as they were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute drugs. The court also dismissed Goodman's second argument, finding that the expanded list of uses for evidence of Goodman's prior convictions under Rule 404(b) did not prejudice the defendant and thus did not warrant a new trial. The court affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Ralston

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3352

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined an appeal by John Lee Ralston, who was charged with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm after a search of his residence. The search was conducted under a warrant that was primarily issued based on criminal activity suspected of another person, Colton Varty, who was believed to be residing on the same piece of property but in a different residence. Ralston argued the warrant did not establish probable cause that evidence would be located inside his house.

The district court had denied Ralston’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his residence, ruling that even though the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers acted in good faith, relying on the Leon good-faith exception. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's decision.

The Court of Appeals held that the Leon good-faith exception did not apply in this case. The court found that the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in evidence connecting Ralston and his residence to the suspected criminal activity of Varty that no reasonable officer would have relied upon a warrant that was issued based on it. The Court of Appeals concluded that without evidence that Varty had access to Ralston’s residence or facts pointing to a fair probability that Ralston’s residence contained stolen property or was being used to fence stolen property, the Leon good-faith exception could not apply. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court with directions to vacate Ralston’s guilty plea and grant his motion to suppress.

United States v. Ready

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3101

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Bradley Ready, appealed his sentence following his guilty plea for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The court affirmed the district court's decision.

During a search of Ready's residence, law enforcement officers found drug paraphernalia, scales, a loaded hunting rifle, and three bags of methamphetamine. Ready was subsequently charged and pleaded guilty to both counts. At sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office recommended grouping the drug and gun counts together and applying a two-level enhancement due to the possession of a dangerous weapon. Ready objected to this enhancement, but the district court overruled this objection.

On appeal, Ready argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon and applied the wrong standard in determining his eligibility for safety valve relief. The appellate court found no error in the district court's conclusions.

The appellate court held that the district court did not err in applying the enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, as it was not "clearly improbable" that the rifle found in Ready's bedroom was connected to the distribution of methamphetamine from his home. The court also held that the district court did not err in its application of the standard for determining Ready's eligibility for safety valve relief. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed.

United States v. Trice

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1406

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Tiano N. Trice, was appealing against a decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern. The dispute arose after Trice was arrested while on supervised release, leading to the revocation of his supervised release for domestic assault and child endangerment. Trice was sentenced to a 24-month imprisonment period, followed by 12 months of supervised release.

In his appeal, Trice did not challenge the domestic assault violation but contested the child endangerment finding and the district court's factfinding and credibility determinations. The incident involved Trice and the mother of his children, Clareshanda Chamberlain, getting into a heated argument in the presence of their children, during which Trice lifted the bed Chamberlain was in and dropped it to the ground. The children, scared by the altercation, fled from the house or hid.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the district court's factual findings and credibility determinations were not erroneous. The court also rejected Trice's argument that hearing the assault, as opposed to actually seeing it, is insufficient to trigger child endangerment, stating that Iowa law does not make this distinction. The court concluded that Trice was aware his children were present during the assault on their mother, which constitutes child endangerment under Iowa law. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Trice committed child endangerment and did not abuse its discretion in revoking Trice's supervised release. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

USA V. ESQUEDA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50170

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the Central District of California, defendant-appellant Christopher Esqueda was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence collected during an undercover operation. Undercover agents, with Esqueda's consent, entered his motel room to conduct a controlled purchase of a firearm. The agents secretly recorded the encounter using audio-video equipment concealed on their persons. Esqueda argued that the secret recording of the encounter exceeded the scope of the "implied license" he granted when he consented to the officers' physical entry, hence infringing upon his Fourth Amendment rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred. It relied on longstanding Supreme Court precedents asserting that an undercover officer who physically enters a premises with express consent and secretly records only what he can see and hear by virtue of his consented entry does not trespass, physically intrude, or otherwise engage in a search violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones, which outline a property-based, trespassory test for Fourth Amendment violations, do not disturb this principle.

USA V. KLENSCH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50222

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, William Klensch, appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of transportation of an illegal alien. Klensch argued that he was entitled to a minor-role reduction in his sentencing, contending that he had no knowledge of the full smuggling operation and was paid only a small sum for his part. The district court denied this reduction because Klensch was the one physically transporting the individuals. However, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying a minor-role reduction, as the court did not conduct a proper comparative analysis of Klensch’s conduct. The court noted that the district court's explanation did not indicate it considered the factors required for a minor-role reduction. As such, the appellate court vacated Klensch’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in regard to the minor-role reduction.

Additionally, Klensch argued that the district court erred by imposing a dangerous-weapons enhancement because he did not possess the stun gun in his car in connection with his illegal smuggling activity. The appellate court rejected this argument, as Klensch acknowledged having the stun gun within his reach while transporting the two men. The court ruled that even if the district court applied an incorrect standard of proof by not requiring the Government to prove a nexus to the stun gun, this error was harmless. As such, the district court's imposition of the dangerous-weapons enhancement was affirmed.

USA v. Kincherlow

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11980

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court reviewed the conviction of the defendant, Jirard Kincherlow, for coercing or enticing a minor into engaging in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant had connected a fourteen-year-old girl, J.D., with adult men to engage in sexual activity for money, and advised her on how to make more money as a prostitute through social media messages. The defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the district court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that a variance between the language of the indictment and the jury charge denied him due process notice of the charge against him.

The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. The court ruled that presenting the opportunity or paying money for a minor to engage in prostitution qualifies as inducement under § 2422(b), and the defendant's actions went beyond merely offering an opportunity. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court found that the district court did not err in its instructions to the jury regarding the definition of "induce". Lastly, the court held that the variance between the indictment and the proof did not affect the defendant's substantial rights and his ability to defend himself. Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction.

USA v. McCoy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-13838

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Reginald McCoy, who was charged in 1990 with conspiracy to possess and possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2019, McCoy filed a motion to reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, which allows some defendants to have their sentences reevaluated under reduced statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses that were implemented after their sentences became final. He argued that he should be able to object to the drug-quantity finding made at his original sentencing as he did not have reason to do so at the time because he did not know that the statutory sentencing thresholds would be lowered in the future. However, the district court denied McCoy's motion, concluding that it lacked the authority to reduce the sentence because McCoy was already serving the lowest statutory penalty available to him under the Fair Sentencing Act, which was life imprisonment. The court also ruled that it would not have exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence even if McCoy was eligible due to the large quantity of crack cocaine attributable to him and his "ongoing and excessive disciplinary infractions" while incarcerated.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the First Step Act does not grant authority to relitigate a drug quantity finding made at the original sentencing. It also rejected McCoy's argument that the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act via the First Step Act violates due process. The court reasoned that it is impossible for courts to provide notice of a hypothetical future law whose passage is uncertain and whose operative text is uncertain. The court concluded that McCoy was not entitled to notice in 1991 of what the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act would provide decades later.

USA v. Donald Trump

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-3190

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Election Law

In a case involving former U.S. President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has partially upheld and partially vacated a lower court's order restricting Trump's public statements about the trial. The case stems from Trump being indicted for conspiring to overturn the 2020 presidential election through unlawful means and for obstructing the election’s certification. Trump had posted numerous statements on social media attacking potential witnesses in the case, the judge, and the prosecution team. The lower court issued an order restraining the parties and their counsel from making public statements that "target" the parties, counsel and their staffs, court personnel, and "any reasonably foreseeable witness or the substance of their testimony." On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the order insofar as it prohibited all parties and their counsel from making public statements about known or reasonably foreseeable witnesses concerning their potential participation in the investigation or in the criminal proceeding. The court also upheld the order to the extent it prohibited parties and their counsel from making public statements about counsel in the case other than the Special Counsel, members of the court’s staff and counsel’s staffs, or the family members of any counsel or staff member, if those statements were made with the intent to materially interfere with the trial or with the knowledge that such interference was highly likely to result. However, the court vacated the order to the extent it covered speech beyond these categories. The court found that the order was justified by a sufficiently serious risk of prejudice to an ongoing judicial proceeding, that no less restrictive alternatives would adequately address that risk, and that the order was narrowly tailored to ensure the fair administration of justice while also respecting Trump's First Amendment rights.

HARMON v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 179

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Rodney Dale Harmon was convicted of multiple drug-related felonies and sentenced to forty years in prison. During the execution of a search warrant at Harmon's residence, an HBO documentary film crew was present. The footage of the search, however, could not be obtained. Harmon, in his appeal, claimed that the presence of the film crew violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He filed a petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, which was denied by the circuit court.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court stated that although Harmon argued that the presence of the HBO documentary film crew violated his Fourth Amendment rights, a constitutional violation alone does not trigger the application of Rule 37. The court also stated that issues related to the legality of evidence obtained are not of such a fundamental nature as to void the judgment. The court further noted that Harmon's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this argument as the remedy for such a violation in the context of a criminal trial is not established law. The court concluded that Harmon's petition conclusively showed that he was entitled to no relief and therefore, the circuit court did not err by dismissing the petition without a hearing.

JONES v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 189

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this criminal case before the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the appellant, Fredrick Jones, was convicted by the Pulaski County Circuit Court of first-degree murder, first-degree battery, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of cocaine with the purpose to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, fleeing, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Jones was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison for the first-degree murder, sixty years in prison for first-degree battery, and an aggregate term of forty years on the remaining convictions, all to be served concurrently.

The case resulted from an incident on April 25, 2020, where Jones shot a man and subsequently fled from the police the next day when the victim's daughter identified him. During the high-speed chase, Jones ran a red light, striking a van occupied by Jose and Virginia Hernandez. Jose Hernandez died from his injuries and Virginia Hernandez suffered serious physical injuries. The police discovered firearms and cocaine in Jones's vehicle after the crash.

Jones appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree battery, arguing that the state had failed to prove that these crimes were committed "in furtherance of" his fleeing from police. He contended that while he drove his vehicle at a high speed and ran a red light to evade the police, the collision with the victims' vehicle and the resulting injuries did not promote his flight.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's convictions. The court held that there was substantial evidence proving that Jones, with the intent to evade the police (the underlying felony), caused the death of Jose Hernandez and seriously injured Virginia Hernandez in the process of fleeing. The court explained that for a conviction of felony murder, the defendant's primary goal must be the commission of the underlying felony, not the murder or battery itself. The court found that Jones's primary intent was to flee from the police, and in the course of and in furtherance of that flight, he caused the death and serious physical injuries. Therefore, the court ruled that the circuit court properly denied Jones's motions to dismiss.

RICKERT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 191

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case heard before the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the appellant William Tod Rickert was appealing his convictions from the Faulkner County Circuit Court for three counts of rape. Rickert was sentenced as a habitual offender to three life sentences, to be served concurrently. Rickert's main arguments for the appeal were that the circuit court erred by not directing verdicts on each of the three counts of rape; the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior bad acts under the pedophile exception; and the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the certified copy of his prior Indiana convictions.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the victim’s uncorroborated testimony describing penetration may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a rape conviction, even when the victim is a child. The court also noted that scientific or medical evidence is not required. The court rejected Rickert's argument that the testimony of prior victims was inadmissible due to their gender difference and the time gap, citing previous cases where such testimonies were upheld. The court also found that the lower court did not err in admitting the certified copy of Rickert's Indiana convictions for the molestation and confinement of a previous victim.

Thus, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision and Rickert's convictions. The court also conducted a Rule 4-3(a) review due to the life sentences and found no other prejudicial errors.

Rodriguez v. Super. Ct.

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S272129

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

In the case, a defendant, Mario Rodriguez, was charged with several felonies, each carrying a maximum sentence exceeding two years. In 2018, Rodriguez was found mentally incompetent to stand trial and committed to a state hospital. After a certificate indicating his restoration to competency was filed within the two-year time limit, Rodriguez was returned to court. However, due to COVID-19 restrictions, his hearing to confirm his competency did not take place within the two-year period. Rodriguez sought to dismiss the charges against him, claiming the time for commitment had run out.

The Supreme Court of California held that under the relevant statutes, the time between the filing of a certificate of restoration of mental competency and the court's ruling on that certificate counts towards the two-year maximum commitment period mandated by section 1370(c)(1) of the California Penal Code. Therefore, the filing of a certificate of restoration does not end the period of mental incompetency commitment.

The court sent the case back to the Court of Appeal to decide whether the two-year limit was exceeded in this case, and if so, what remedy Rodriguez might be entitled to. The court did not decide whether Rodriguez was entitled to the remedy of dismissal he sought, or whether and how the issue of tolling may affect Rodriguez's entitlement to any relief.

P. v. De La Rosa Burgara

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H049363(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, the defendant, Mariano Alejandro De La Rosa Burgara (De La Rosa), was initially sentenced to an aggregate stipulated sentence of eight years in prison after pleading no contest to charges of assault with a deadly weapon and hit-and-run driving resulting in permanent, serious injury. On appeal, De La Rosa argued that the postsentencing enactment of Senate Bill 567, which altered the requirements for imposition of an upper term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), necessitated a remand for resentencing.

The court agreed with De La Rosa, concluding that defendants who received an upper term pursuant to a plea agreement that included a stipulated sentence are entitled to a remand under Senate Bill 567. The court found that the changes brought about by Senate Bill 567, which made the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment unless aggravating circumstances stipulated to by the defendant or proven true beyond a reasonable doubt justified imposition of an upper term, applied retroactively to De La Rosa's nonfinal judgment. The court also noted that the implementation of these new requirements could result in a complex series of decisions by the parties and the trial court on remand.

Thus, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). However, the court did not decide whether De La Rosa could be sentenced to a prison term greater than the aggregate eight-year term agreed to in the original plea agreement, leaving that issue for the trial court to consider on remand.

P. v. Hall

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165406(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case concerns Gary Marcus Hall, who was convicted on two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years. Hall was a registered sex offender and lived with the victims' grandfather. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, which included the upper term on one of the two counts. Hall challenged his sentence on three grounds. Firstly, he claimed the court mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation. Secondly, he argued that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded. Lastly, he contended that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to a jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District held that Hall's sentence was not constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege sentencing factors in aggravation. The court also ruled that Hall knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to jury trial, including as to aggravating facts, and his aggravated sentence is constitutionally permissible for that reason. The court further concluded that even if Hall did not sufficiently waive his constitutional jury trial right, the trial court found at least one aggravating factor—recidivism—on a basis consistent with the Sixth Amendment and therefore his aggravated sentence is not constitutionally infirm. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment.

P. v. Lagunas

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061812(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In California, Maximino Delgado Lagunas was convicted of second-degree murder after he struck and killed a six-year-old girl while driving under the influence of alcohol. Lagunas had been previously convicted of driving under the influence in 2007 and 2015 and was warned that if he continued to drive while intoxicated and hit someone, he could be charged with murder. On the day of the incident, Lagunas was driving at high speeds in a residential neighborhood, failed to negotiate a turn, and did not apply his brakes, ultimately killing the child. On appeal, Lagunas argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on a lesser related offense (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated). The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three disagreed with Lagunas' claims, finding substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life, affirming the trial court’s judgment.

P. v. Ruiz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324477(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the State of California, the Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six heard the third appeal in the sentencing of Frank Ruiz. Originally, Ruiz was sentenced to 18 years in prison, but this was increased to 28 years after a 10-year consecutive sentence for a firearm-use enhancement was reinstated. The decision to reinstate the sentence was made because the trial court's stay of execution of the sentence was unauthorized. However, the court was directed to reconsider whether to strike the firearm-use enhancement and a five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. The trial court refused to strike either enhancement, resentencing Ruiz to an aggregate term of 28 years.

This sentencing was appealed twice. The second appeal was dismissed, but the sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567, which amended section 1170. On remand, Ruiz was sentenced to an aggregate term of 23 years. Ruiz appealed again, contending that the true finding on the gang enhancement allegation must be vacated and that in selecting the upper term for both the conviction of assault with a firearm and the firearm-use enhancement, the trial court relied on aggravating factors that are inapplicable pursuant to S.B. 567. He also contended that he is entitled to additional days of custody credit, that the aggregate sentence imposed on remand could not have exceeded the 18-year aggregate sentence originally imposed, and that the matter must again be remanded for resentencing because of a recent amendment of section 1385.

The court agreed with Ruiz's contention regarding the gang enhancement allegation and vacated the true finding on the allegation, remanding the matter to afford the People an opportunity to retry the allegation. The court also agreed that Ruiz was entitled to additional days of custody credit and modified the judgement to award him more credit. However, the court disagreed with Ruiz's other contentions and affirmed the judgement in all other respects.

People v. Carter

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082219(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the state of California, Robert Otto Carter Jr. appealed the denial of his request for a full resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Carter was originally sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and the trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing under the new law. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in California agreed that section 1172.75 required the trial court to conduct a full resentencing, and that the People (prosecution) are not entitled to withdraw their assent to the plea bargain if the trial court further reduces Carter’s sentence on resentencing. The court concluded that section 1172.75 applies to all sentences, including those imposed as part of a plea bargain, and that the prosecution may not withdraw from the plea agreement if the court imposes a lower sentence on resentencing. The court thus reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a full resentencing.

People v. Manzoor

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164739S(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case concerns Junaid Manzoor, who pleaded guilty in 2006 to a felony violation of attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290 of the Penal Code. Almost 14 years later, the trial court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. After the Legislature amended section 290 to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor filed a petition for relief from the registration requirements. The court summarily denied his petition. On appeal, Manzoor argued that due to the amendments to section 290, he was entitled to relief from the registration requirements because the reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor placed him in "tier one" under the statute. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order denying Manzoor's petition for relief. The court held that the reduction of Manzoor’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor did not qualify him for relief from the registration requirements, because subdivision (e) of section 17 of the Penal Code bars courts from granting such relief when the defendant was found guilty of an offense for which lifetime registration is required, and the amendments to section 290 do not reflect a legislative intent to create an exception to this rule.

People v. Super. Ct. (Guevara)

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B329457(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In California, Edgardo Ortiz Guevara was sentenced to 28 years to life under the "Three Strikes" law, due to his third strike being a nonserious, nonviolent felony. He also had prior prison term enhancements. When the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36) (Reform Act) was enacted, Guevara petitioned for relief from his life sentence, but the trial court denied his petition due to concerns of public safety. Later, Guevara moved to have his prior prison term enhancements struck under Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that he was entitled to have his three strikes life term reduced to eight years, double the term for his current offense, irrespective of the denial of his section 1170.126 petition. The trial court agreed and reduced his life term to eight years.

The People petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six for a writ of mandate or prohibition seeking to direct the trial court to recall its sentence and reinstate Guevara’s 25-years-to-life sentence. The appellate court granted the writ, finding that Guevara's interpretation of section 1172.75 would result in a repeal of section 1170.126 for inmates serving an indeterminate term with a prior prison enhancement, which would be unconstitutional. It also stated that Guevara’s prior prison term enhancements were struck, but not his 25-years-to-life term mandated by the Reform Act, which remains in effect as Guevara was found to be a danger to the public. Therefore, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its order recalling Guevara’s sentence and imposing a second strike sentence, and to reinstate Guevara’s three strikes sentence of 25 years to life in prison.

People v. Tippet

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 61

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, defendant Joseph James Tippet was initially charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing his father. However, due to a series of discovery violations by the Eleventh Judicial District Attorney's Office, Tippet's charge was reduced to second-degree murder by the district court as a deterrent sanction. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review this decision.

The People (prosecution) had a history of neglecting their discovery obligations, leading to multiple discovery violations in Tippet's case and others. Despite several warnings from various judges, the District Attorney's Office continued to neglect its discovery obligations. As a result, Tippet's defense counsel was unable to effectively prepare for his preliminary hearing.

The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Tippet's charge as a sanction for the District Attorney's Office's consistent neglect of its discovery obligations. The court emphasized the importance of the discovery process in advancing the search for truth and protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process. The court affirmed the sanction as a necessary deterrent to encourage the District Attorney's Office to modify its discovery practices. The court also rejected the People's argument that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the charge as a discovery sanction, explaining that the decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations was within the court's discretion.

In conclusion, the court discharged the rule to show cause, upholding the district court's decision to reduce Tippet's charge from first-degree murder to second-degree murder as a deterrent sanction for the District Attorney's Office's discovery violations.

Rose v. Commissioner of Correction

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20558

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the State of Connecticut, the petitioner, who was convicted of felony murder and other crimes, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2018, more than five years after his conviction was deemed final. The petitioner initially filed a timely habeas petition in 2012 but withdrew it due to dissatisfaction with his assigned counsel. When filing his 2018 habeas petition, the Commissioner of Correction moved for an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely under § 52-470 (c) and (e). The petitioner argued that good cause existed to excuse the untimely filing since his previous counsel had failed to inform him of the deadline to refile his petition. The habeas court dismissed the 2018 petition as untimely, a decision upheld by the Appellate Court.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court, concluding that the habeas court’s determination that no good cause existed was based on a clearly erroneous factual finding. The Court found that the habeas court wrongly assumed that the petitioner's previous counsel had advised him to refile his habeas petition immediately after withdrawing the first one. The Court also clarified that, under the totality of the circumstances, ineffective assistance of counsel can be considered an external, objective factor that could establish good cause to excuse the late filing of a habeas petition under § 52-470 (c) and (e). The case was remanded for a new hearing and a good cause determination under § 52-470 (c) and (e) in light of its factual findings with respect to the performance of prior habeas counsel.

Osgood v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 1, 2023 / 2, 2023

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware examined the Adult Expungement Reform Act and the Clean Slate Act, which expanded eligibility for expungement and created an automatic expungement process for certain Delaware criminal records. The Acts are applicable to "all criminal cases brought and convictions entered in a court in this State" and limit expungement to individuals with "no prior or subsequent convictions." The three petitioners, Alex Osgood, Osama Qaiymah, and Eric Fritz, requested expungement of their criminal records. However, the Superior Court denied their requests due to their prior or subsequent misdemeanor convictions from other states.

The issue the Supreme Court had to decide was whether the phrase "prior or subsequent convictions" in the Acts includes out-of-state convictions. The court ruled that "prior or subsequent convictions" refers only to Delaware convictions, not to out-of-state convictions. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in line with its opinion.

In reaching its decision, the court considered the specific language of the Acts, their purpose and legislative intent, as well as practical considerations. The court also noted that including out-of-state convictions could lead to inconsistencies and impracticalities.

Gonzalez v. State of Florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0740

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida denied a petition brought forward by Leonard P. Gonzalez, Jr., who requested a review of a nonfinal order by the circuit court. Gonzalez was convicted of home-invasion robbery and two counts of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to death. The circuit court set aside his death sentences, but denied any further relief. Following changes in Florida's death-penalty laws, Gonzalez sought an order declaring that the amended statute does not apply in his case, arguing against its application as unconstitutional and inconsistent with the presumption that substantive statutes apply prospectively. The circuit court disagreed and ruled that the amended statute would apply at his upcoming penalty phase.

Gonzalez then petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida, invoking its all-writs authority and authority to issue writs of prohibition, arguing against the circuit court's ruling that the new statute could be lawfully applied at his upcoming penalty phase. However, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the relief sought is not available by way of prohibition or its all-writs authority. The court concluded that the circuit court has jurisdiction to conduct the new penalty phase and that its decision to apply the new statute does not affect this jurisdiction. The court also clarified that its all-writs provision does not add appellate jurisdiction and is restricted to preserving jurisdiction that has already been invoked or to protect jurisdiction that likely will be invoked in the future. As such, Gonzalez's petition was denied.

State of Iowa v. Arrieta

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-1133

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Iowa, the defendant, Stephen Arrieta, a truck driver, was pulled over at a weigh station after his vehicle failed a "PrePass" check. During the stop, an Iowa Department of Transportation officer requested a K-9 unit to conduct a free air sniff of the truck and trailer. The drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the sleeper compartment of the cab, and Arrieta admitted to having marijuana inside. Arrieta was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance.

Arrieta appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the marijuana. His main argument was that the officer unlawfully extended the time of his stop, known as a Level 3 inspection, to allow the K-9 handler to arrive and search his truck. Arrieta cited Rodriguez v. United States, a Supreme Court case that ruled such extensions of traffic stops without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with Arrieta, finding that he was detained longer than necessary to complete the Level 3 inspection, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the officer had effectively completed his tasks before the arrival of the K-9 unit and that the 25-minute delay until the K-9 unit's arrival was unjustified. As such, Arrieta was improperly detained when the free air sniff occurred, and any evidence obtained as a result of the search should have been suppressed.

The court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court.

State v. Mitchell

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125254

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Devawn T. Mitchell was convicted for first-degree felony murder, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, two counts of felony fleeing and eluding, and misdemeanor fleeing and eluding. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the district court inappropriately found him competent to stand trial, failed to obtain a psychological evaluation before sentencing him, and incorrectly applied his "B" criminal history score to increase his mandatory minimum sentence.

The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decisions. In addressing Mitchell's competence to stand trial, the court determined that the district court had correctly followed procedure, ordering a competency evaluation and holding a hearing. The court found that Mitchell failed to prove he was incompetent and therefore upheld the lower court's finding of competence.

Regarding the failure to order a psychological evaluation, the Supreme Court noted that Mitchell did not explicitly request such an evaluation. As the request was not made, the district court was under no obligation to order an evaluation.

As for the application of Mitchell's criminal history score, the court ruled that the lower court correctly applied the score to Mitchell's mandatory minimum life sentence before parole eligibility. The court found that neither the plain language nor any reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibited the use of Mitchell's criminal history score to calculate his minimum life sentence before parole eligibility.

In sum, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed Mitchell's conviction and sentence.

BERRY V. COMMONWEALTH

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Dockets: 2022-SC-0181-MR, 2022-SC-0185-MR

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the conviction of Eric Berry, who was found guilty of first-degree burglary, first-degree sexual assault, two counts of fourth-degree assault, first-degree fleeing or evading, and resisting arrest. The court rejected Berry's appeal that his right to a speedy trial was violated, arguing that delays in his trial were due to valid reasons such as Berry's own actions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and personal reasons of his attorneys. The court also denied Berry's argument that the trial court erred in not giving an intoxication defense instruction, stating that while Berry was intoxicated during the incident, he clearly knew what he was doing and acted deliberately. The court further dismissed Berry's claim that his former testimony from a domestic violence hearing should have been allowed, as the Commonwealth did not have an opportunity to cross-examine him during that hearing. Additionally, the court found no error in the joinder of the April and December incidents for the trial, as Berry failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the record. Lastly, the court rejected Berry's claim for cumulative error, as they found no error in the other arguments presented.

JOHNSON V. COMMONWEALTH

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0236-MR

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the convictions of Jaikorian J. Johnson for second-degree manslaughter and four counts of first-degree wanton endangerment but reversed the sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase due to palpable error in the victim impact statement. Johnson was convicted for shooting dead one person and injuring another, arguing self-defense. On appeal, Johnson raised three issues: the exclusion of two witnesses' testimony regarding the victim's alleged criminal scheme at the time of shooting; the failure to direct verdicts on all four counts of wanton endangerment; and the impropriety and prejudicial nature of the victim impact statement. The court held that the exclusion of character evidence of the victim was not an abuse of discretion because it was irrelevant and inadmissible under KRS 404(b). The court also held that the directed verdicts for the four counts of wanton endangerment were justified because substantial danger existed for the people in the vicinity when Johnson fired his gun. However, the court found palpable error in the victim's mother's impact statement, which included biblical references urging the death penalty and unproven accusations of witness intimidation, thereby seriously affecting the fairness of the proceedings.

RIGGLE V. COMMONWEALTH

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-SC-0510-MR

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

Three sisters, Danielle, Angela, and Alyssa, were placed in the custody of their aunt, Kathy Riggle, and her husband, William Kenneth Riggle Sr. (Senior) in 2009 due to their parents' struggles with drug abuse. For the eight years they lived with the Riggles, the sisters alleged that they were sexually abused by Senior and his son, William Kenneth Riggle Jr. (Junior). The abuse was reported in 2017 after the girls were returned to the custody of their mother. Senior was charged with and convicted of multiple counts of sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and intimidating a participant in the legal process. The trial court imposed a 70-year sentence in line with Kentucky law. Senior appealed, raising four allegations of error.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. It held that the trial court correctly admitted testimony from two other minor girls who had experienced inappropriate sexual conduct from Senior, as this evidence demonstrated a pattern of conduct and was not merely proof of propensity. The Court also ruled that the testimony from Angela's school counselor was admissible for rehabilitative purposes, as it was offered to explain an inconsistency in Angela's testimony, not to verify the truth of her allegations. The Court further held that any issues with jury instructions regarding unanimity did not rise to palpable error, given the overwhelming weight of evidence against Senior. Finally, the Court found that the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal on certain counts, as the Commonwealth had produced more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the charges.

SANCHEZ V. COMMONWEALTH

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0385-MR

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case at hand, Jose Sanchez was convicted of five counts of first-degree rape and four counts of third-degree rape. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed these convictions, holding that the text messages and videos were properly authenticated. The court also found that Sanchez was not entitled to a missing evidence instruction regarding his cellphone, as the data extracted from it was preserved, and the phone itself contained no evidence. However, the court reversed and vacated the trial court's imposition of public defender fees against Sanchez, ruling that the imposition of public defender fees was an error as the trial court failed to hold a hearing and determine that Sanchez should not continue to be considered an indigent person. The court also held that the cumulative error did not occur in this case.

STEPHENS V. COMMONWEALTH

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0244-MR

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the defendant, Gregory Stephens, was convicted of first-degree rape and being a persistent felony offender in the second-degree. The conviction was based on the testimony of the child victim, Amy, and was supported by the testimony of additional witnesses who recounted Amy's prior hearsay statements and vouched for her credibility. Stephens appealed, arguing that the inclusion of these hearsay statements and credibility endorsements rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed, reversing and remanding the case.

The court found that the evidence against Stephens consisted entirely of Amy's statements. There was no physical evidence, and the only other possible witness, Amy's mother, did not testify. The court held that the prosecution was erroneously allowed to elicit testimony from additional witnesses to bolster Amy's testimony, amounting to palpable error. Furthermore, the court found that multiple witnesses were improperly allowed to vouch for Amy's credibility.

The court also noted that the deputy jailer's testimony about the impact of the rape on Amy during the guilt phase was improperly admitted. The court stated that such victim impact evidence is not permissible during the guilt phase of the trial.

The court concluded that the combined errors of hearsay bolstering, vouching testimony, and victim impact testimony rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and demanded a reversal of the conviction. The case was remanded for a new trial.

STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. JOSE M. SAGASTUME

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-K-01824

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed a conviction for domestic abuse battery involving strangulation. The defendant, Jose Sagastume, was found guilty by a unanimous jury and sentenced to three years imprisonment with two years suspended, followed by two years of probation. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause against two potential jurors: a retired police officer and a former assistant district attorney. However, the defense counsel did not object when the trial court denied these challenges.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, stating that despite the lack of formal objection, the defense counsel's reasons for the challenges and subsequent use of peremptory challenges to remove the jurors were sufficient to preserve the issue for review.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed, ruling that according to the Code of Criminal Procedure art. 800(A), a defendant must object contemporaneously to a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause in order to assign it as an error on appeal. The court found that the defense counsel's acquiescence without objection did not meet this requirement. Therefore, it reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal, reinstated the conviction and sentence, and affirmed them. The court emphasized that the legislature's language in Article 800(A) was clear: an objection must be made at the time of the ruling, and the nature and grounds for the objection must be stated at that time.

Maine v. Pelletier

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2023 ME 74

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Taylor A. Pelletier was convicted of multiple crimes, including two counts of kidnapping with a dangerous weapon, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of domestic violence threatening with a dangerous weapon, and one count of domestic violence terrorizing with a dangerous weapon. The trial court found Pelletier guilty based on evidence from a home security system and the victim's testimony, which the court found credible.

Pelletier appealed his conviction, raising three main issues: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his kidnapping conviction, the sufficiency of the indictment for the first count of kidnapping, and the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss for alleged discovery and Brady violations.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the kidnapping conviction. The court held that Pelletier had confined the victim inside the house for a substantial period, which went beyond the time necessary to commit the assaults. The court also found that the indictment adequately stated the charges against Pelletier, giving him sufficient notice to prepare his defense. Lastly, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pelletier's motion to dismiss for discovery and Brady violations. The court held that the trial court's sanction of a continuance was sufficient to mitigate any prejudice caused by the State's late disclosure of evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hart

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13217

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Joshua Hart, and his girlfriend, Brittany Smith, entered the home of an elderly couple, Thomas Harty and his wife, Joanna Fisher, intending to steal their car and money. The couple ended up fatally attacking both Harty and Fisher, and then fled the state in the victims' vehicle. Hart was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder, and he appealed on several grounds.

Hart argued that his confession to law enforcement was involuntary and should have been suppressed, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed. The court found that Hart's confession was voluntary based on the circumstances of the interrogation, his experience with the criminal justice system, and his own actions and statements during the interrogation.

Hart also argued that the trial should have been moved to another venue due to pretrial publicity. The court disagreed, stating that the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the pretrial publicity caused either presumptive or actual prejudice. The court found that less than 20% of potential jurors were excused due to pretrial publicity, and the judge took extensive steps to protect Hart's right to a fair trial.

Hart further contended that a statement made by the deceased victim, Fisher, to her nurse, which was relayed to the jury through the nurse's testimony, should have been excluded from evidence as it was hearsay and violated his right to confront witnesses. The court determined that Fisher's statements were non-testimonial and thus did not violate the confrontation clause. The court also found that even if Fisher's statements were admitted in error, there was no prejudice because the Commonwealth presented other compelling evidence of the facts relayed in Fisher's statements.

Finally, Hart argued that his sentences of life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel or unusual punishment because he was under 25 years old at the time of the crimes. The court rejected this argument, finding no reason to extend the prohibition of life sentences without parole for juveniles to individuals under the age of 25.

Accordingly, the court affirmed Hart's convictions.

Dampier v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-00280-SCT

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In 2004, De’Andre Dampier was convicted of a capital murder committed during an auto-dealership robbery when he was 16 years old. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole, which was the only statutory sentence available at the time. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that imposing mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. Based on this ruling, the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Dampier’s request to seek post-conviction relief from his life-without-parole sentence. However, before the trial court addressed any of the factors from the US Supreme Court decision, it vacated Dampier’s life-without-parole sentence. Dampier then requested that a jury be convened to decide if he should be sentenced to life with or without parole, but the trial judge denied this request. After a hearing in which the trial judge considered the factors from the US Supreme Court decision, the judge reimposed a sentence of life in prison without parole.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that Dampier did not have a statutory right to be sentenced by a jury. The court emphasized that the decision to be made by the trial court was whether Dampier was entitled to post-conviction relief from his life-without-parole sentence, imposed for a crime committed when he was a juvenile. The court also agreed with the lower courts that the trial judge did not err by denying Dampier’s request for jury sentencing. Furthermore, the court agreed with the lower courts that the trial court did not err by ruling that, after a careful consideration of the factors from the US Supreme Court decision, life without parole was an appropriate sentence for Dampier’s crime.

State v. Buttolph

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 238

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves Tylor Buttolph who appealed his conviction of stalking. Buttolph had been charged with eight counts of felony stalking, allegedly occurring between October 17, 2019, and April 6, 2020. For each count of stalking, the State listed only one act of misconduct. However, the stalking statute requires a "course of conduct" involving two or more acts. The State used evidence of prior, uncharged conduct to prove the "course of conduct" element.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the conviction. The court held that Buttolph's constitutional right to due process was violated when the State used an act not charged in the information to prove "course of conduct" for the offense of stalking. The court reasoned that the State cannot shift its theory of criminality on the day of trial without violating Buttolph's fundamental right to due process. The charging document was silent as to the second act constituting the course of conduct element of the offense, and thus, there was no "statement of facts constituting the offense charged".

State v. Bixby

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 549

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Clay Y. Bixby, was convicted for driving under the influence (DUI), which was his third offense. He contended that the district court had erred in using evidence of his two prior DUI convictions to enhance his sentence. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this claim.

The court noted that the state had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses underlying Bixby’s previous convictions occurred within 15 years of the date of his current offense, as required for sentence enhancement. The court also rejected Bixby's claim that his South Dakota DUI offense was not sufficiently similar to his Nebraska DUI offense to be valid for sentence enhancement. The court determined that Bixby’s South Dakota DUI offense, as statutorily defined in South Dakota, would have been a violation of the Nebraska DUI statute and was thus valid to be used for sentence enhancement.

Lastly, the court rejected Bixby's argument that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors before sentencing. The court explained that under the precedent set in State v. Vann, any conviction record obtained after Gideon v. Wainwright is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Once the government establishes the existence of a prior conviction, it becomes the defendant’s burden to prove that he or she did not have counsel and did not waive the right to counsel at the time of conviction. The court concluded that Bixby's South Dakota DUI conviction was valid for sentence enhancement under this precedent, even though the record did not show whether Bixby had or waived counsel at the time of his sentencing in that case.

The court ultimately affirmed the sentence enhancement and Bixby's conviction for DUI, third offense.

People v Bay

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 06407

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2021, Michael Bay was arrested for alleged harassment of his mother. After the prosecution filed a certificate of compliance (COC) indicating readiness for trial, the defense discovered that the prosecution had not provided all required discovery materials. The defense argued that the prosecution's readiness statement was illusory due to the belated disclosure. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York held that since the prosecution failed to show they had exercised due diligence and made reasonable efforts to identify mandatory discovery before filing the COC, the COC was not proper when filed, and the prosecution's declaration of trial readiness was therefore illusory. Consequently, the court reversed the County Court order, granted the defendant's motion for dismissal based on speedy trial rules, and dismissed the accusatory instrument.

People v Perdue

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 06404

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In a criminal matter, the Court of Appeals of New York held that when the prosecution calls a witness who may make a first-time, in-court identification of the defendant, they must ensure that the defendant is aware of that possibility as early as practicable. This is to provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to request alternative identification procedures. If the defendant explicitly requests such procedures, a trial court may exercise its discretion to fashion any measures necessary to reduce the risk of misidentification. The ultimate determination of whether to admit a first-time, in-court identification, like any evidence, rests within the evidentiary gatekeeping discretion of the trial court. The court must balance the probative value of the identification against the dangers of misidentification and other prejudice to the defendant.

In this case, the defendant shot the victim in the leg during a house party. A neighbor, the witness at issue in this case, called 911 to report the shooting and provided a description of the shooter. No pretrial identification procedure was conducted with this witness. At trial, the victim and the neighbor identified the defendant as the shooter. The defendant objected to the neighbor's identification, arguing that the identification procedure was suggestive because there was only one person sitting in the courtroom who could possibly be the suspect. The court denied the defendant's request to preclude the neighbor's identification. The jury convicted the defendant of all charges and the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that the defendant was aware from pre-trial discovery that the witness might make a first-time, in-court identification and only sought preclusion of the identification. The court found that the witness's testimony and pretrial statements established the reliability of her first-time, in-court identification, and the lack of formal notice did not significantly prejudice the defendant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to preclude it.

FLORES v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0562-22

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, Roberto Medina Flores, was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault and later filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court had 75 days to rule on the motion, but due to the COVID-19 emergency order, the court extended the deadline. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion for a new trial. Flores appealed, and the court of appeals found the trial court erred in extending the deadline, as this 75-day period is jurisdictional, not procedural, and a trial court cannot create jurisdiction for itself where it would otherwise be absent, even based on an Emergency Order. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas unanimously agreed with the court of appeals, stating that the requirement for a court to have jurisdiction is not procedural and the 75-day jurisdictional deadline cannot be suspended. The trial court did not have the authority to preside over the hearing on the motion for a new trial, and its ruling is void. Therefore, the appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled by operation of law when the 75-day plenary period expired. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

State v. Valdez

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 26

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the defendant, Alfonso Valdez, was arrested and charged with kidnapping and assaulting his ex-girlfriend. During the arrest, officers seized Valdez’s cell phone. The police later obtained a search warrant for the phone, but were unable to access the contents as they could not decipher Valdez's passcode. When asked to provide his passcode, Valdez refused. At trial, the State elicited testimony about Valdez's refusal to provide his passcode and argued that this refusal undermined one of his defenses. Valdez was subsequently convicted.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the conviction, agreeing with Valdez that he had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to provide his passcode, and that the State violated this right by using his refusal against him at trial.

The State petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for certiorari, arguing that providing a passcode is not a testimonial communication, that the “foregone conclusion” exception applies in this case, and that the prosecutor's comments were permissible as a fair response to an issue that Valdez initiated.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the State on all counts. The court held that verbally providing a cell phone passcode is a testimonial communication under the Fifth Amendment and that the "foregone conclusion" exception, which arises in cases where an “act of production” implicitly communicates information, does not apply. The court also rejected the State's "fair response" argument, concluding that the State had elicited the testimony about Valdez's refusal to provide his passcode before Valdez had raised any issue involving the contents of his phone. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

Commonwealth v. Delaune

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230127

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.

Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.

The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration.

Schmuhl v. Clarke

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 211114

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, Andrew Schmuhl ("Schmuhl") appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At his trial, Schmuhl had claimed he was involuntarily intoxicated due to prescription medications at the time of committing a home invasion, which resulted in several criminal charges. His trial counsel argued that Schmuhl's involuntary intoxication was a separate defense from an insanity defense, which they chose not to raise. However, the trial court ruled that without an insanity defense, Schmuhl could not present expert testimony about his mental state, effectively barring his involuntary intoxication defense. Schmuhl was found guilty on all counts. Schmuhl later filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective due to misunderstanding the law regarding the admissibility of mental state evidence without an insanity defense. The habeas court ruled that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that Schmuhl was not prejudiced by their performance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the habeas court's decision, finding that Schmuhl's trial counsel's performance was objectively reasonable given the unclear state of the law at the time. The court noted that had trial counsel’s arguments been successful, they would have carried significant strategic benefits for Schmuhl, and that trial counsel's unsuccessful attempt to extend existing law for their client's benefit was not deficient.

Kessel v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 120

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

In a car accident resulting in the death of a motorcyclist, the driver, Yvonne Patrice Kessel, was convicted of one count of aggravated vehicular homicide. The State of Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Kessel’s proposed jury instruction, which suggested that the jury could consider the victim’s actions when determining proximate cause, was not a proper theory of defense. The Court found that Kessel was essentially arguing that the State failed to prove the proximate cause element of the charged offense, which it deemed a "claim of innocence" or "failure of proof" defense not warranting a special theory of defense instruction. The Court also ruled that the jury had been adequately instructed on the concept of proximate cause and that the instructions allowed both parties to argue their respective theories of the case. Thus, the Court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kessel’s proposed instruction.

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