Gomez v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2632

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: MENASHI

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner appealed from the denial of his successive Section 2255 motion challenging his conviction and accompanying sentence for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). In his motion, Petitioner argued that his  924(c) conviction was invalid in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). The district court denied the motion because it determined that Petitioner’s Section 924(c) conviction rested on the valid predicate crime of murder. The district court further held that its Pinkerton instruction—which permits a jury to convict a defendant of a substantive offense committed by his co-conspirators—did not undermine the validity of the Section 924(c) predicate.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that intentional murder under New York law, even when the conviction is based on a Pinkerton theory of liability, qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning of Section 924(c). Under a Pinkerton theory, the defendant is convicted of the substantive offense—not of conspiring to commit the offense—so he has committed a crime of violence if the substantive offense is a crime of violence. Because Pinkerton does not transform a substantive offense into a conspiracy offense, it does not implicate Davis.

United States v. Junius

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2208

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Coach and Junius were involved in a drug distribution operation in North Philadelphia from 1992-2001. Coach was head of the operation and engaged in multiple acts of violence, including several homicides. Junius engaged in long-term drug distribution and acts of violence, including homicides. In 2003, Coach pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), section 848(e)(1)(A), plus other counts. Junius pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base section 846, and intentional killing in furtherance of a CCE. The court sentenced Coach to 60 years and Junius to 40 years and denied all motions to correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, for compassionate release, and for sentence reduction under the First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194.

The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of their First Step Act motions. A conviction under 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A) for murder in furtherance of a CCE is not a “covered offense” under the First Step Act. The sentences on the defendants’ separate offenses are to run concurrently; each defendant’s drug-related murder sentence could be treated discretely, so the sentencing package doctrine does not apply.

In re: Grand Jury 2021 Subpoenas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-1654

Opinion Date: November 22, 2023

Judge: FLOYD

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

While representing a client, Jane Roe , Appellant attorney John Doe engaged in settlement negotiations with the University of Maryland Medical System (UMMS). The negotiations between Doe and UMMS proceeded poorly. Among other things, Doe also made any settlement between Roe and UMMS contingent on his personal receipt of an additional $25 million that would effectuate his retention by UMMS as a private consultant of sorts. A grand jury indicted Doe, charging him with attempted extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1951 and 1952. Shortly thereafter—at the government’s request—the grand jury issued multiple subpoenas duces tecum to the lawyers and firms that assisted in Doe’s representation of Roe—and in the formation of the alleged extortion scheme. Doe and Roe moved to quash the subpoenas. That court then granted in part a subsequent motion filed by the government to compel production. Doe and Roe now appealed asking the court to reverse the district court’s orders first denying their motions to quash and then compelling production.

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal as to Doe for lack of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Doe’s arguments given the Supreme Court’s effective narrowing of the Perlman doctrine. The court otherwise affirmed discerning no reversible error and ordered the parties must proceed to comply with the disputed subpoenas duces tecum in accordance with the district court’s order compelling production and this opinion.

US v. Richard Carter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4442

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: QUATTLEBAUM

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After committing armed robbery with an unidentified accomplice, Defendant pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and a firearm charge pursuant to an agreement with the government. At sentencing, the district court warned that Defendant’s decision to name his accomplice would be a “critical part” of its sentencing determination. When Defendant declined to name his accomplice, the district court imposed a sentence at the top of Carter’s Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by imposing a harsher sentence due to his failure to identify his accomplice and drawing adverse inferences from that failure. He further alleged that this Fifth Amendment violation rendered his sentence procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
 
The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal to the extent he challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. The court explained that the district court had no substantial reason to believe that Defendant’s identification of his accomplice would be incriminating beyond the plea itself. Defendant was asked to name his accomplice in specific conduct for which he had already been convicted or received immunity in his federal case and for which his state charges were dismissed.
 
The court explained that Defendant’s self-incrimination concerns would have merited further analysis had he raised them before the district court. But he did not, and the district court was left without any substantial reason to believe that Defendant’s identification of his accomplice was likely to be incriminating. Defendant’s reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege comes too late. Thus, his Fifth Amendment challenge fails.

United States v. Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1212

Opinion Date: November 22, 2023

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Brown created a driver’s license with his photo and someone else’s identity and made credit cards using that identity, pulling account numbers from the dark web. Brown used those fraudulent documents to purchase 25 firearms, which he sold. Brown subsequently walked into a gun store, picked out a firearm, and presented a fraudulent license and credit card. The store employee recognized Brown and called the police. As police arrived, Brown drove away in a rented U-Haul. During the ensuing traffic stop, officers found Brown’s fraudulent license and false credit cards in a wallet on the passenger seat; a gun that had been reported stolen was between the front seats. After being arrested, Brown recruited a friend to continue his scheme. The friend used fraudulent cards to purchase 39 firearms. The two fraudulently purchased $56,000 in guns over three months.

Brown pled guilty to aggravated identity theft, using a false ID during the purchase of a firearm, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), 1028A(a)(1), 1343, 1349. The court enhanced Brown’s sentencing range based on the stolen firearm in the U-Haul, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), and imposed a 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the enhancement would apply even without the stolen firearm in the U-Haul. Fraudulently purchased firearms are “stolen” for purposes of the enhancement.

United States v. Crespo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5902

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Chad A. Readler

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

During a traffic stop, Tellez agreed to a car search. After the search, the officer asked, “Do you have your wallet?” Tellez handed it over. Inside, the officer discovered three Visa gift cards, each with numbers written on the back, which the officer believed was indicative of fraud. The officer asked whether he could swipe the cards. Tellez agreed but then said, “I don’t give permission.” The officer nevertheless swiped the cards. The numbers did not match the cards, indicating they had been altered. Tellez was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the U.S., bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. He moved to suppress all evidence derived from the wallet search but did not challenge the officer’s decision to swipe the cards.

After reviewing a video recording of the traffic stop and the officer’s testimony, the court denied Tellez’s motion, concluding that Tellez’s gesture of handing over his wallet reflected his nonverbal, voluntary consent. Tellez entered a conditional guilty plea. Tellez objected to the intended loss calculations used to derive his Guidelines offense level. The three cards had been used to spend or withdraw an average of $1,400 per card. The probation office calculated the intended loss by multiplying the number of accounts associated with Tellez—303, including 300 other accounts found on a thumb drive in Tellez’s possession—by $1,400. The court agreed with the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and Tellez’s 70-month sentence.

United States v. Bryce Vittetoe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2930

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a police search of a vehicle after concluding Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reportedly stolen vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed under the alternative rationale that the search was reasonable under the automobile exception. The court explained that a reasonable officer would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle at the time of the search. The court further wrote that because the vehicle was reported stolen, officers could search it for evidence of it being stolen. Additionally, the court noted that officers may consider the known criminal history of a suspect in conducting the probable cause analysis. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and the district court was ultimately justified in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court wrote that It follows that it would not exclude the evidence obtained from the storage unit because the warrant to search the unit was based on probable cause from the evidence obtained during the valid search of the car.

United States v. Daniel Bonilla

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3006

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to a 132-month term of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that because he was arrested without probable cause when officers placed him in handcuffs during an investigative stop, the evidence seized from his backpack must be suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to run from the scene. When Detective Love asked for permission to search his suitcase, Defendant was calm and cooperative, giving the impression that it was “not a big deal.” However, as an additional officer started asking him questions, he showed physical signs of nervousness. Defendant already knew that the K-9 had alerted to his suitcase. Then, as Love was searching the suitcase, Defendant asked to go brush his teeth, which would have allowed him to leave the scene with his backpack, out of the officers’ sight. Given the change in Defendant’s demeanor over a short period of time, the perceived attempt to discard contraband outside the presence of the officers, and the other factors that aligned at least in part with drug-trafficking behavior, the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to flee.

United States v. Michael Coulson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1690

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: MELLOY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant le 120c(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 920c(b) (2012). He later failed to register as a sex offender in Iowa and pleaded guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, Defendant argued the “categorical approach” applies to his SORNA tier analysis.
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it held pursuant to the categorical approach, that his prior statute of conviction is “overbroad” in relation to SORNA’s Tier III listed comparator offenses. The court held for the first time, in line with a consensus of authority from other circuits, that the categorical approach applies to SORNA’s tier analysis. Further, the court agreed with Defendant that the application of the categorical approach resulted in his classification as a Tier I offender. The court explained that turning to the application of the categorical approach, the present case leaves no room for the United States’ suggested and generalized broadening of the analysis based on SORNA’s use of the term “comparable.”
 
Here, the offense of conviction is unambiguously broader in scope than the SORNA comparators. The offense of “forcible pandering” employs the defined term “prostitution,” which may be found based on “sexual contact.” “Sexual contact” includes over-the-clothes touching. Such contact falls outside the scope of SORNA’s Tier III comparator offenses as found in 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241 and 2242, both of which require a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 2246 and which does not include over-the-clothes touching.

United States v. Yellowhorse

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2011

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Timothy Chischilly gathered five relatives to get something “off his chest.” To the shock of the relatives, Chischilly confessed that he and his girlfriend, defendant-appellee Stacey Yellowhorse, had killed a woman. The relatives told law enforcement about Chischilly’s confession, and the accounts were largely consistent: Chischilly had admitted: he held the woman down while Yellowhorse bludgeoned the woman with a sledgehammer or mallet; and he and Yellowhorse pinned the woman down with nails and a hammer. Authorities later found parts of the woman’s skeletal remains in various locations, including a fire pit next to Chischilly’s house. Despite confessing to the murder, Chischilly pleaded not guilty. That plea led the district court to set Chischilly’s trial after Yellowhorse’s. At Yellowhorse’s upcoming trial, the government wanted Chischilly to testify about what he told his relatives. Because his statements were self-incriminating, however, the government expected Chischilly to invoke the Fifth Amendment if he was called as a witness. So the government asked the district court to allow the relatives to testify at Yellowhorse’s trial about three of Chischilly’s statements. Chischilly's statements would ordinarily constitute inadmissible hearsay; the hearsay exception would apply only if Chischilly's statements harmed his penal interest and had corroboration. The government argued the district court applied the wrong test by assuming that Chischilly’s statements about Yellowhorse’s involvement were not self-inculpatory. Yellowhorse disagreed, adding that the excluded parts were also inadmissible because the court shouldn’t have found corroboration. In the Tenth Circuit's view, the district court’s approach contradicted its precedent. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider the admissibility of Chischilly’s statements to his relatives.

In re: Dennis v. Alabama)

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: SC-2023-0146

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This case stemmed from a cold-case murder that took place in 1981. An armed robber broke into a gas station where Russell Douglas was working, shot him several times, robbed the station, and fled. Douglas's murderer eluded capture. Then, some 30 years later, forensic scientists retested DNA evidence found at the crime scene and turned up a match to the respondent here, Nathaniel Dennis, who was serving a 600-year sentence in Virginia for an unrelated crime. In 2011, an Alabama grand jury indicted Dennis for the murder of Douglas, and he was transferred to Alabama to stand trial. In 2019, after a series of pretrial delays, Dennis was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during a burglary. Dennis appealed, arguing that the delay between his indictment and trial violated his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, holding that the over-eight-year period between 2011 and 2019 required the trial court to "presume" that the delay prejudiced Dennis's liberty interests -- even though Dennis had not put forward any affirmative evidence of prejudice and likely could not have done so because he was already serving a 600-year sentence in Virginia. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded this was error: the speedy-trial inquiry turns on how much delay has been caused by the government, not the bare amount of time between the indictment and trial. In this case, the portion of the delay caused by government negligence fell well short of the amount needed to justify a presumption of prejudice. Absent that presumption, Dennis' speedy-trial claim failed. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded for consideration of the other arguments Dennis raised in his appeal.

People v. Salazar

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S275788

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: Groban

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal declining to remand this case for resentencing in light of a new law that was enacted after Defendant had been sentenced but while his appeal was still pending, holding that the court of appeal erred.

At issue was Senate Bill No. 567, which created a presumption that the sentencing court shall entered a lower term sentence when, inter alia, a "psychological, physical, or childhood trauma" contributed to the offense and set forth the circumstances when a sentencing court may depart from the lower term presumption. Defendant was found guilty of false imprisonment by violence or menace and sentenced to seven years and four months in prison. While Defendant's appeal was pending, Senate Bill 567 was passed, amending Cal. Pen. Code 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (A). The Supreme Court remanded this case for resentencing, holding that the court of appeal erred by finding that the record clearly indicated that the trial court would not have imposed a lower term sentence if it had been aware of the scope of its discretionary powers under the current section 1170 at the time Defendant was sentenced.

California v. Christianson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081330(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Kelety

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant-appellant Ryan Christianson as an inmate potentially eligible for relief under California Penal Code section 1172.75, but the trial court corrected the original sentence by administratively striking section 667.5(b) enhancements that had been stayed by the original sentencing court, and thus concluded resentencing was unnecessary. On appeal, the parties asked the Court of Appeal to decide whether section 1172.75 applied in cases like this, where the abstract of judgment on which an inmate was currently serving time included one or more section 667.5(b) enhancements that were previously imposed but stayed. To this, the Court concluded that it did and that therefore resentencing was required. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying Christianson’s request for resentencing.

California v. Mazur

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081331(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Buchanan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant-appellant Matthew Mazur appealed his third sentencing for multiple criminal offenses arising out of a fraudulent investment scheme. The sole issue raised on appeal of his reduced 23-year prison sentence was that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss a five-year white-collar enhancement for loss greater than $500,000. Mazur argued the trial court was required to dismiss this enhancement because its imposition “result[ed] in a sentence of greater than 20 years.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

California v. Nunez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061346(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: Goethals

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After hearing a rumor that Cesar Gonzalez had raped a child, and after being encouraged by a close friend to exact revenge, appellants Daniel Gallegos and Gustavo Nunez, Jr., chased Gonzalez and beat him with metal pipes as he lay on the ground. Gallegos then stabbed Gonzalez six times in the back, killing him. A jury convicted Gallegos of first degree murder, and Nunez of assault with a deadly weapon. Both appealed, Gallegos arguing the trial court erred when, in response to a jury question during deliberations, it instructed the jury that in order for provocation to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder, the provocation must come from the victim, not a third party. As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded the court’s instruction was correct, and any potential error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence that the murder was premeditated, deliberate, and willful. Gallegos and Nunez also both contended the trial court erred when it declined to dismiss their prior strike convictions under California v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996), and then sentenced them under the Three Strikes law. To this the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on Gallegos’s motion and therefore affirmed the judgment as to him. As for Nunez, however, the record indicated the court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing discretion; the appellate court therefore remanded the matter so the court could exercise its informed discretion as to whether to dismiss Nunez’s prior strikes. The judgment was otherwise affirmed.

H.B. v. Superior Court of Solano County

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168069(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Hiramoto

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

According to H.B., Hall “mentally and physically” abused H.B. “every day [she] was under his control for over [three and a half years].” Hall made H.B. “work for him,” providing “sexual services to customers” and charging “from $80 to $1,000 per customer.” She “earned approximately $300 daily” but Hall “took all of this money.” After Hall pleaded no contest to human trafficking and pimping, H.B. sought restitution of $340,500: $31,336 for stolen Social Security payments and damage to her credit score, $340,500 for money she received for acts of prostitution, and accrued interest.

In declining to make the award as to the prostitution earnings under Penal Code 1202.4(p), which does not expressly authorize restitution for a victim’s labor where that labor is itself proscribed by law, the court stated: “public policy arguments favor H.B.’s position, but … public policy decisions are for the legislature.” The court of appeal vacated, citing the statutory language: “Upon conviction for a violation of [s]ection 236.1, the court shall … order the defendant to pay restitution to the victim in a case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct.” The court also noted that the law contemplates measuring restitution by the defendant's profit.

P. v. Allen

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324207M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: BALTODANO

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. He contends the trial court erroneously denied his petition at the prima facie stage because the record of conviction shows that jurors were instructed on now-invalid theories of murder and attempted murder at trial.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law if, for example, the jury instructions show that jurors were not instructed on any theory of liability affected by Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189. The court explained that the trial court here correctly concluded that Defenadnt was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. The court instructed jurors on two theories of liability at trial: direct aiding and abetting and conspiracy. If the jury adopted the former theory, Defendant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief because jurors would have had to conclude that he harbored the intent to kill. Further, under current California law, “conspiracy to commit murder may be based on an agreement to kill '“a human being” ’ who is not specifically identified.” That Defendant and his coconspirators did not conspire to kill the victims specifically is not relevant.

P. v. Banks

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B312618(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: YEGAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 penalizes human trafficking of a minor. It targets a person who preys upon, and forces, a minor to engage in commercial sex acts for the person’s financial benefit. The penalty for this crime is fifteen years to life imprisonment. That was the sentence imposed here. Defendant appealed the judgment after a jury convicted him of human trafficking of a minor (“Doe”) for a commercial sex act and found true the allegation that the offense involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury. Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle, (2) he has standing to challenge the search of Doe’s cell phone, (3) the evidence is insufficient that he used force or fear to induce Doe to engage in commercial sex, (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during argument, (5) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted pandering, and (6) the cumulative impact of the “errors” requires reversal.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed. First, the court found that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant used force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury as set forth in section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2). Further, the court explained here there is no substantial evidence that Defendant was guilty of the lesser offense of attempted pandering but not the greater offense of trafficking of a minor.

P. v. Reyes

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085582(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 16, 2023

Judge: LEVY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to a charge of second-degree murder. Appellant admitted as true an enhancement allegation regarding the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Appellant to prison for 15 years to life. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing in the trial court, claiming he could not be convicted of murder based on the 2019 changes to the law. After giving the parties a chance to brief this issue, the court denied the petition, concluding Appellant was ineligible for resentencing because his conviction had occurred after Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective.
 
The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition. The court explained that Appellant is ineligible for resentencing for two reasons. First, in order to be resentenced, the charging document filed against Appellant must have allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid. This requirement is not met here. The prosecution filed the information against Appellant in 2020. Thus, when this criminal proceeding was initiated, the prosecution was precluded from proving the murder charge under a theory of imputed malice. This deficiency amply demonstrates that the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s petition for resentencing. Further, when Appellant entered his change of plea, the now invalid theories of murder liability had already been eliminated. Consequently, Appellant has already received the benefits of Senate Bill No. 1437.

People v. Trammel

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166756(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Bowen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Trammel was sentenced to 12 years in prison: the upper term of eight years for kidnapping, a consecutive 16 months for burglary, a consecutive eight months for making criminal threats, and a consecutive two years for a June 2017 domestic violence conviction (one year for the conviction plus a year on an attached arming enhancement). The court imposed concurrent three-year terms for two remaining domestic violence convictions and concurrent time-served sentences for misdemeanors.

The court of appeal concluded that the court erred by imposing separate punishment for both domestic violence and simple assault, based on the same incident. The trial court conducted a full resentencing, noting that new sentencing laws (effective January 2022) applied. The court reviewed a mitigation assessment and resentenced Trammel to 12 years and four months–eight years for kidnapping; a consecutive 16 months for burglary; a consecutive two years for a 2017 domestic violence conviction–one year for the conviction plus a year on the attached arming enhancement; and consecutive one-year terms on the remaining domestic violence counts. The court stayed the punishment for criminal threats and misdemeanors. The court found that the lower term or middle term would be inappropriate because Trammel showed no remorse.

The court of appeal again remanded. The imposition of a longer sentence on remand violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy. The court rejected Trammel’s request for another full resentencing hearing before a different judge, finding no showing of vindictiveness.

Idaho v. Oldenburg

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49358

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Following the State’s dismissal of criminal charges against him, Nickolaus Oldenburg moved the district court to seal the criminal court file pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-3004(10). The State did not contest the motion. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it did not have the authority to seal Oldenburg’s case file under section 67-3004(10) and, therefore, could not grant his request. As a result of its analysis, the district court denied Oldenburg’s motion. The Idaho Supreme Court held the district court correctly concluded that the legislature could not independently vest the district court with the authority to seal Oldenburg’s court file. "The control of court records resides within the prerogative of this Court, and this Court has adopted I.C.A.R. 32 to govern a defendant’s request to seal court records. ... When the statute is procedural, it is viewed as an attempt 'to control this Court’s processes' and is classified as an impermissible overreach into the authority of this Court to develop its own procedures." Thus, the district court correctly found that Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) impinged on the Supreme Court’s prerogative to make its own rules which governed its own procedure. Accordingly, the decision of the district court was affirmed.

State v. Amisi

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0624

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI) and eluding, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence about a preliminary breath test (PBT) and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

During the underlying jury trial, the district court admitted a portion of an officer body cam video showing Defendant agreeing to a PBT, after which the edited video jumped to Defendant's arrest for OWI. The Supreme Court held (1) this juxtaposition of the PBT and arrest violated Iowa R. Evid. 5.403 because it had minimal probative value while strongly implying that Defendant had failed the PBT, but the error was harmless; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's eluding conviction.

State v. Cyrus

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-0828

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress and convicting him of firearm violations, holding that the law enforcement officer who arrested Defendant did not unlawfully seize Defendant.

After a woman called the police to report a suspicion car parked in front of her home an officer responded in a patrol car and pulled alongside the parked car. The officer walked over to talk to the driver, smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana, and searched Defendant and the car. In his suppression motion, Defendant argued that the officer did not unlawfully seize him. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer's conduct in this case did not constitute a seizure, and once the officer detected the odor of burnt marijuana he had a lawful ground to detain and search Defendant and the car.

State v. Wittenberg

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0037

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court and court of appeals did not err in finding that Defendant was not seized before the law enforcement officer who eventually arrested him discovered his probable intoxication and that Defendant was lawfully detained on grounds of probable intoxication.

In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that he had been seized when the officers partially blocked him in while he was parked in a parking lot, trained a spotlight on him, and shined flashlights into his car from both sides. The trial court concluded that Defendant had not been "seized" before the police discovered his intoxication. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the officers' actions were not "sufficiently coercive" to constitute a seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was lawfully detained because the officers did not seize him before his intoxication was observed.

State v. Kerrigan

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123862

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of driving under the influence, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the results of an evidentiary breath test (EBT) based on a violation of his statutory right to counsel under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1001(c)(1).

In his motion to suppress, Defendant alleged that he invoked his right to counsel at least two times before the EBT was administered but that law enforcement failed to honor his statutory right to counsel after he submitted to the EBT. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a pre-EBT request for counsel is not sufficient to invoke the post-EBT right. The district court subsequently found Defendant guilty of driving under the influence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 8-1001(c)(1) is ambiguous as to the timing of a post-EBT request for counsel and permits the post-EBT right to counsel to be invoked either before or after the EBT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a person properly to invoke the statutory right to post-EBT counsel, the plain language of the amended statute requires the person to make a request for counsel after administration of the EBT.

State v. Ruiz

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123260

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Cory T. Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Defendant's felony theft charge as multiplicitous and reversed the ruling of a panel of the court of appeals reversing that decision, holding that the State's theory of felony theft was insufficient as a matter of law on the facts of this case.

Defendant was charged with one count each of felony theft and violation of the Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax Act. The district court dismissed the felony theft charge on multiplicity grounds. The panel reversed, concluding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the court to bind Defendant over on felony theft. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's arguments regarding the asserted incompatibility between statutory theft and a statutory Tax Act violation were unavailing.

State v. Covington

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2023 ME 72

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of default and forfeiture of $17,815 in cash bail entered after the trial court denied Defendant's motion to set aside the forfeiture of that portion of his deposited cash bail, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to set aside the forfeiture.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion because the bail bond did not explicitly warn him of forfeiture as a potential consequence for violating the condition of his release that he commit no violation of a bail condition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, on the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion as to $17,815 of his deposited cash bail.

Commonwealth v. Troche

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12984

Opinion Date: November 16, 2023

Judge: Wendlandt

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, argued assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that the trial judge prejudicially erred when it denied defense counsel's request to conduct a voir dire examination of a key witness.

On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the judge erred in denying his request to conduct a voir dire examination of a key prosecution witness when defense counsel received an anonymous text message suggesting that a witness had falsely identified Defendant as part of a plot to frame him. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the judge erred in denying defense counsel's request to conduct a voir dire examination of the key identification witness, and the error was prejudicial.

Bennett v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CA-01313-SCT

Opinion Date: November 16, 2023

Judge: Ishee

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In February 2003, Devin Bennett was found guilty of capital murder, and a jury sentenced him to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Bennett’s conviction and sentence on appeal. In 2006, Bennett sought leave from the Court to file a motion for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that Bennett was entitled to seek post-conviction relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial. Bennett filed his PCR petition on October 1, 2008, and an amended petition on May 16, 2012. On March 25, 2021, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing, and it ultimately denied Bennett’s amended petition. Bennett appealed again, but the Supreme Court upheld the denial: "while counsel might be faulted for not more thoroughly investigating the alternative mitigation case Bennett presented at the PCR hearing, we cannot find any reasonable probability that doing so would have led to a different outcome. In fact, although Bennett had fifteen years to assemble an alternative mitigation case, we agree with the trial judge that the additional evidence would have hurt Bennett more than it helped him."

Lollis v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00711-SCT

Opinion Date: November 16, 2023

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Nathan Lollis and his codefendants, Marcel Smith and Charles Wells, were convicted by jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Lollis received a life sentence for murder and twenty years for conspiracy to commit murder. The trial court denied Lollis’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. He appealed, raising sufficiency of the evidence as the sole issue on appeal. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Dap

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 466

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and unlawful discharge of a firearm, holding that there was no reversible error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's motion for new trial; (4) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not sufficiently pled; and (5) the cumulative error doctrine did not apply in this case.

New Jersey v. Tiwana

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-36-22

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: Solomon

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On April 28, 2020, defendant Amandeep Tiwana, while driving in Jersey City, struck a police officer and collided with two police cruisers. Defendant and three injured officers were transported to Jersey City Medical Center. Defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.268%, three times the legal limit. Detective Anthony Espaillat of the Regional Collision Investigation Unit of the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office arrived at the hospital and spoke first to the injured officers in the emergency room. Two uniformed police officers were stationed outside the curtain separating defendant’s bed from other patients. Detective Espaillat walked up to defendant’s bed, introduced himself as a detective with the Prosecutor’s Office, and explained that he was assigned to investigate the accident. Espaillat testified that, as soon as he had spoken, defendant immediately complained of chest pain and said “she only had two shots prior to the crash.” Espaillat directed defendant not to make any other statements. He clarified that he did not come to the hospital to ask her questions and that he wanted to interview her at a later date at the Prosecutor’s Office. The entire interaction lasted “less than five minutes.” The next day, defendant went to the Prosecutor’s Office and invoked her Miranda rights. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court consideration was whether the detective’s self-introduction to defendant at her bedside in the hospital initiated a custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent warranting the administration of Miranda warnings. Pretrial, the State moved to admit defendant’s statement at the hospital. The trial court denied the State’s motion and the Appellate Division affirmed. Both courts found that a custodial interrogation occurred at the hospital and the detective’s failure to give Miranda warnings rendered defendant’s statement inadmissible. The Supreme Court reversed: defendant was in custody at the hospital in light of the police presence around her bed area. But no interrogation or its functional equivalent occurred before her spontaneous and unsolicited admission. Miranda warnings were therefore not required, and defendant’s statement -- that she “only had two shots prior to the crash” -- was admissible at trial.

People v. Brown

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05973

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Jenny Rivera

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals held that requiring Defendant, who was not a sex offender, to register as a sex offender and comply with the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) in this case violated his due process rights and did nothing to further SORA's legislative purpose to protect the public from actual sex offenders.

Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree for stealing money at gunpoint from his aunt in the presence of his ten-year-old cousin. Defendant's crime was a SORA-eligible crime and brought Defendant within the statutory definition of "sex offender," thus subjecting him to mandatory sex offender registration. The SORA court found that Defendant was not a sex offender and posed no sexual threat but determined that it was constrained by People v. Knox, 12 NY3d 60 (NY 2009), to impose the SORA requirement. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that applying SORA to Defendant violated his due process rights by impinging on his liberty interest to be free of his improper designation and registration as a sex offender.

People v. Cabrera

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05968

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, holding that the record did not support the trial court's conclusion that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), when he was handcuffed and questioned by law enforcement officers.

On appeal, Defendant argued that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police while handcuffed and the physical evidence found in his vehicle because the officers failed to read him his Miranda rights prior to questioning him and because he never voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings when he answered questions by the police officers and therefore, Supreme Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his responses to the officers' questions; and (2) the Miranda violation when Defendant was stopped and handcuffed did not render his later written consent to search his vehicle involuntary.

People v. Cuencas

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05974

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction on two counts of murder in the second degree and one count of robbery in the second degree, holding that the warrantless entry into Defendant's home was not based on consent, and therefore, the suppression court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

Defendant was indicted on several charges including kidnapping, robbery, and felony murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry into his home was unlawful. The suppression court denied the motion. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the warrantless entry into the apartment in which Defendant was found by police officers and arrested violated Defendant's rights under the New York and United States Constitutions.

People v. David

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05970

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, holding that Defendant's first challenge was unreviewable and that there was no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.

On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that that the inventory search conducted by the police that recovered the handguns giving rise to his conviction was invalid and that Supreme Court improperly allowed prejudicial testimony at his trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) neither of Defendant's first two arguments provided grounds for reversal; and (2) Defendant's argument that N.Y. Penal Law 265.03(3) is facially unconstitutional under N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S Ct 2111 (2022), was unpreserved for appeal.

People v. Garcia

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05969

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, holding that none of Defendant's contentions on appeal provided grounds for reversal.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion such that the jurors' "ability to follow and apply the law" by limiting Defendant's opportunity to explore the jury's potential biases related to the use of guns for self-defense; (2) did not improperly curtail the questioning of the fifth panel of potential jurors; and (3) did not err by not vacating Defendant's sentence under N.Y. C.P.L. 440.20.

People v. Jordan

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05957

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: Garcia

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming Defendant's convictions for second degree robbery and petit larceny, holding that admission of a criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was error, and the error was not harmless, thus entitling Defendant to a new trial.

On appeal, the appellate division ruled that Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was not violated when the criminalist performed his own analysis about the creation of DNA profiles. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed, holding that because the record failed to establish that the testifying analyst had the requisite involvement with the DNA profiles the admission of the criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was erroneous, and the People did not establish that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to Defendant's conviction.

People v. Ortega

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05956

Opinion Date: November 20, 2023

Judge: Singas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of murder in the second degree, holding that the admission of two autopsy reports through an expert witness who did not perform the autopsies, combined with that witness's testimony, violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, but the error was harmless.

Defendant was convicted of murdering the two young children in her care by repeatedly stabbing them. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding (1) People v. Freycinet, 11 NY3d 38 (NY 2008), should no longer be followed because it is inconsistent with the demands of the Confrontation Clause as recently articulated by the Supreme Court; and (2) Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of the autopsy reports and the testimony of the witness at issue, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Pastrana

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05966

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Troutman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, and unlawful possession of marijuana, holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal were either without merit or unpreserved.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) the People met their burden at the suppression hearing to demonstrate the constitutional validity of the roadblock pursuant to which Defendant's vehicle was stopped; (2) the Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act should not be applied retroactively to Defendant's case to render the search of his vehicle unlawful; and (3) Defendant's remaining argument was unpreserved for appellate review.

People v. Rodriguez

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05972

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Jenny Rivera

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction, holding Supreme Court should have suppressed a gun as the product of an impermissible stop because the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that Defendant had violated the rules of the road while riding his bicycle.

Defendant was riding his bicycle down a road when police officers drove alongside him and asked him to stop. Defendant stopped and, in response to an officer's question, admitted that he was carrying a gun. Defendant pleaded guilty to a weapons charge. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) police interference with a bicyclist is a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense or probable cause of a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation; and (2) the officers in this case violated the New York and United States Constitutions when they stopped Defendant, and therefore, the indictment against Defendant must be dismissed.

People v. Telfair

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05965

Opinion Date: November 21, 2023

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Cal. Penal Law 265.03, holding that Supreme Court erred in permitting admission of prior bad acts evidence, and the error was not harmless.

On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S Ct 2111 (2022), rendered facially unconstitutional statute under which he was convicted and that the statute was constitutional as applied on several grounds. The Supreme Court (1) did not reach Defendant's constitutional arguments because they were unpreserved; but (2) held that Supreme Court erred in admitting evidence of alleged prior bad acts evidence under People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), and the error was not harmless.

Oregon v. C. P.

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069912

Opinion Date: November 17, 2023

Judge: Bushong

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

C.P. struck the victim on her head with a mallet, causing significant injuries. The issue on review was whether the juvenile court misconstrued the governing statute, ORS 419A.258, in ordering disclosure of confidential records in youth’s file to the victim before youth’s delinquency dispositional hearing. The Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that the victim was unable to show that disclosure was “necessary to serve a legitimate need” of the requesting party, as required by ORS 419A.258(7). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded after review of the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 419A.258 that the statute, properly construed, gave juvenile courts some discretion in weighing the interests at stake before determining whether and to what extent disclosure was necessary to serve a legitimate need of the person seeking disclosure under the circumstances of a given case. The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of what was necessary to serve a victim’s legitimate need and concluded that the juvenile court in this case acted within the range of discretion granted by the statute in ordering disclosure to the victim. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed and the juvenile court's order was affirmed.
court.

Pennsylvania v. Rizor

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Dockets: 33 WAP 2022, 32 WAP 2022

Opinion Date: November 22, 2023

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Jessica Rizor petitioned for post conviction relief, arguing her trial counsel provided inadequate advice with regard to a plea offer. According to Rizor, her trial counsel’s inadequate advice led her to proceed to a trial - where her life sentence was all but assured - in lieu of accepting a plea offer that would have resulted in a five and a half to thirty-year sentence. The Superior Court agreed and reversed the PCRA court order denying relief and remanded “for a new trial or entry of a plea.” The Commonwealth petitioned for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review, arguing that the PCRA court correctly denied relief and that the Superior Court’s decision rested on a faulty foundation which assumed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance rather than presuming the opposite. The Commonwealth further believed the Superior Court improperly ignored the PCRA court’s credibility determinations. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth, finding that the Superior Court erred in reversing the PCRA court order denying relief where Rizor failed to establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s alleged deficient advice, she would have accepted the plea deal. The Superior Court's judgment was vacated and the case remanded to address Rizor's remaining challenges.