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Ayala v. Alves
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1924
Opinion Date: October 25, 2023
Judge:
Sandra Lea Lynch
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting Plaintiff's petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus on his claim that his state court trial counsel was ineffective, holding that the district court erred in applying the standard set forth under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed Petitioner's conviction and the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his state court trial counsel was ineffective. The federal district court granted the petition. The First Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) Petitioner did not meet his burden to show that the SJC's factual determinations were unreasonable, regardless of which standard applied; and (2) the SJC's decision was not an unreasonable application of the law.
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Gulluni v. Levy
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1862
Opinion Date: October 30, 2023
Judge:
Gelpi
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Joshua Levy, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, in this case challenging the denial by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) of Levy's request for information related to a federal police misconduct investigation, holding that there was no error.
Anthony Gulluni, District Attorney for Hampden County, Massachusetts, sent DOJ a letter (Touhy request) requesting all Springfield, Massachusetts Police Department (SPD) reports and documents supporting DOJ's specific and general findings in an attempt to identify SPD officers who were subject to the DOJ's findings of specific instances of misconduct and general failures within SPD's practices. DOJ denied Gullini's request in accordance with Touhy regulations. Gullini appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to its review of DOJ's denial of Gullini's Touhy request; and (2) did not err in finding that DOJ's privilege grounds were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
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Quinones-Pimentel v. Cannon
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1307
Opinion Date: October 27, 2023
Judge:
Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motions to dismiss the underlying lawsuit seeking money damages pursuant Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for alleged unconstitutional searches and seizures, holding that the district court did not err.
Plaintiffs claimed three Bivens causes of action for money damages related to the searches and seizures. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that the claims arose within a new Bivens context and that special factors counseled toward denying relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims arose in a new factual scenario of Bivens and involved special factors.
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United States v. Anonymous Appellant
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1597
Opinion Date: October 31, 2023
Judge:
Selya
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Health Law
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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Anonymous Appellant (AA) should be civilly committed upon the expiation of his prison sentence, holding that AA was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
Seventy-three-year-old AA had a history of incarceration spanning more than five decades. During his incarceration AA began to exhibit psychotic symptoms and was diagnosed with having schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and antisocial personality disorder. Based on the concerns of a risk-assessment panel the government filed a petition for the civil commitment of AA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4246. The district court granted the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.
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United States v. Cahill
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1763
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Sandra Lea Lynch
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and his sentence of seventy-two months in prison, varying upward from the applicable guideline sentencing range (GSR), holding that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant's guilty plea and that there was no error in sentencing.
On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court failed to create a sufficient record demonstrating that his guilty plea was constitutionally valid and in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court's acceptance of Defendant's guilty plea was valid; and (2) Defendant's seventy-two-month sentence was substantively reasonable.
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United States v. Carvajal
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1207
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Rikelman
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to 120 months in prison in connection with his conviction of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of fentanyl, holding that the records supported the district court's rulings.
On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court considered impermissible evidence in determining his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in determining that Defendant was not entitled to a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility; (2) the district court did not err in considering Defendant's acquitted conduct at sentencing; (3) Defendant's sentence was neither implausible nor indefensible; and (4) the district court did not err in imposing a variance.
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United States v. Lajeunesse
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket:
22-178
Opinion Date: November 1, 2023
Judge:
LEVAL
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant appealed a judgment of conviction entered by the district court convicting him on his plea of guilty to possession and receipt of child pornography, and (b)(1), and obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2), contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a probation officer’s search of his cell phone and a further search by New York State Police and that the trial court erred in failing to allow him allocution at sentencing.
The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction but rejected the government’s argument and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Defendant argued that resentencing is required because he was not afforded his right to allocute. He argued that the court’s failure to provide allocution calls for automatic resentencing, even under plain error review, given that he made no objection during the sentencing proceeding. The government’s brief focuses on enforcement of his waiver of appeal and advances no argument against ordering resentencing in the event we do not enforce the appeal waiver. The court concluded that it should remand for resentencing, as Defendant has made a reasonable argument that he is entitled to resentencing, and the government has made no argument to the contrary. Because the government makes no argument to the contrary, the court explained that it does so without ruling as to the appropriate standard of review for an unpreserved claim of failure to grant allocution. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate his sentence and resentence, affording him the right of allocution.
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US v. Ali Amin
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
23-4283
Opinion Date: October 30, 2023
Judge:
WILKINSON
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant n served five years in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS. He was released in 2020 subject to a lifetime of supervised release. Three years later, the district court found that Defendant had violated numerous conditions of his supervised release. The court sentenced him to a year’s imprisonment and reimposed a lifetime of supervised release. Defendant brought several challenges to this sentence.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant claims the lifetime term of his supervised release is an “extreme and unusual remedy” that should be “viewed critically.” He suggests that lifetime release should typically be affirmed only in cases involving “child pornography or violent crimes.” But the appropriateness of lifetime supervised release in one serious class of cases does not render it inappropriate for another. Defendant combined extremist ideology and technical sophistication to build widespread support online for ISIS’s brutal campaign of terror and violence. He simultaneously coaxed men into traveling to Syria with deadly consequences. Upon his release from prison, Defendant continued to spread toxic messages online, including a call to “exterminate” all non-believers of ISIS’s jihadist ideology—the vast majority of the global population. It was eminently reasonable for the district court to reimpose a lifetime of supervised release under these circumstances.
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Terry v. Hooper
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
21-30638
Opinion Date: October 31, 2023
Judge:
Stephen A. Higginson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of juvenile molestation in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Section 14:81.2. Petitioner appealed of the denial of his Section 2254 petition challenging those convictions and his sentence—specifically, his claim on appeal that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient for a conviction on the last count.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court wrote that it did not find that the state court was objectively unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on Count III. The court explained that the evidence was clearly sufficient for a rational jury to find that the described acts were “lewd and lascivious”—and Petitioner’s alternative explanations do not disturb this conclusion. Petitioner’s counsel’s argument, for instance, that it can be normal for adults to “squeeze and pinch” a child’s behind under their clothes flies in the face of common sense. Petitioner provided examples of when such behavior might occur—such as when a child needs help with the restroom—are far afield of the facts before the court. Equally unavailing is counsel’s suggestion that acts must be painful in order to be obscene or indecent. Finally, Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that any molestation occurred in Louisiana as opposed to Mississippi. The court explained that the place of the crime is not an element of the offense of molestation of a juvenile under Louisiana law.
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Jones v. Bottom
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
22-5121
Opinion Date: October 30, 2023
Judge:
Chad A. Readler
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Jones was convicted of robbery in Indiana, Kentucky, and federal courts. Jones’s Kentucky plea deal agreed to a commencement date for Jones’s accrual of time-served credits, not when officers actually took Jones into custody, as would ordinarily be the case, but on an earlier date. The sentencing court failed to adopt the plea agreement and ordered the Department of Corrections to calculate Jones’s time-served credit in accordance with “this judgment,” which made no mention of the negotiated agreement, and “the law.” The court did not provide Jones the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Jones did not appeal or seek correction of his sentence. Jones unsuccessfully asked prison administrators to honor the plea agreement’s time-served provision; doing so would have violated the judgment of conviction. Jones asked the sentencing court for clarification. The court ratified the administrators’ calculations. Jones did not appeal. The court subsequently instructed that Jones be given credit in accordance with the agreement. Jones was then released.
Jones filed suit, alleging that Kentucky prison administrators violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through their alleged deliberate indifference to the prospect of incarcerating him beyond the length of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of the defendants’ qualified immunity motions. The defendants—state corrections officials—neither caused nor contributed to Jones’s over-incarceration nor could they unilaterally remedy the matter, which was dictated by court orders.
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United States v. Pemberton
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
21-3224
Opinion Date: November 1, 2023
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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Pemberton sold methamphetamine to an undercover informant and pleaded guilty to distributing drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Ordinarily, distributing the quantity of drugs Pemberton admitted to distributing carries a 10-year minimum sentence. The district court ruled that his 2003 conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery under Indiana law was a “serious violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F), subjecting him to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Although Pemberton had not agreed that his co-participant would carry a weapon, and his co-participant was never convicted, the court reasoned that the facts of his crime included a dangerous weapon that caused serious harm (his coconspirator fired a gun during the robbery, hitting a bystander), and his plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery precluded him from denying his involvement in a conspiracy.
On appeal. Pemberton argued that Indiana’s crime of conspiracy is not a categorical match to the federal conspiracy counterpart of section 3559(c)(2)(F) and not a “serious violent felony” meriting the enhanced minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pemberton raised his argument for the first time on appeal and therefore forfeited it. He has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred when it determined his prior conviction was a serious violent felony,
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United States v. Williams
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-3099
Opinion Date: October 30, 2023
Judge:
ROVNER
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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Williams pled guilty to four counts under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); (b)(1)(B), based on his role in a large-scale methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. The government portrayed Williams as a major supplier to other dealers and individual users, asserting that he was responsible for the distribution of more than 48 kilograms (105 pounds) of methamphetamine over the course of the conspiracy. The government’s investigation linked three deaths to methamphetamine supplied by Williams. Laboratory testing of different batches of drugs supplied by Williams and confiscated by law enforcement indicated that the tested drugs were between 96 to 100% pure methamphetamine. Ten people who purchased significant quantities of methamphetamine from Williams testified at his sentencing hearing about the quantities of drugs they bought from him. Several also testified about threats he made to them to induce payment and about his possession and use of firearms. Officers had also orchestrated a controlled buy with audio and visual recording in which Williams’ associate provided the source with approximately 20 grams of methamphetamine.
After calculating a U.S.S.G. range of 360 months to life range, the court imposed a 360-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning sentence disparities and the application of the enhancement for credible threats of violence.
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United States v. Wright
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-2922
Opinion Date: November 1, 2023
Judge:
Joel Martin Flaum
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Legal Ethics
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Pfister and Evans dealt methamphetamine in Illinois. In 2016, they traveled to Colorado approximately 20 times to buy meth from Wright. After Evans sold several ounces to Heavener, officers searched Heavener’s home and recovered over 50 grams of meth. Heavener knew that Evans got the meth from “Monica” in Colorado.
Wright was charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of meth and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing meth. She retained Garfinkel. In its opening statement, the government previewed testimony from Evans, Pfister, Heavener, and Deherrera, a Colorado-based middleman. Garfinkle also foreshadowed testimony from Deherrera, referring to him as the government’s witness. During trial, the government alerted the court that Deherrera had stated that Garfinkel had encouraged him to change his testimony. The government referenced Deherrera’s potentially exculpatory testimony but stated that it no longer planned to call him as a witness, noting that if Wright called Deherrera and he testified to being pressured to change his testimony, Garfinkel would have to take the stand to impeach him. Garfinkel denied Deherrera’s allegations. The court questioned Wright, who confirmed she agreed with Garfinkel’s strategy to not call Deherrera, understanding the possibility that Garfinkel was personally motivated. Deherrera did not testify. In closing arguments, Garfinkel described Deherrera’s absence as the missing link—a burden the government had to overcome to convict Wright. Wright was convicted and sentenced to 264 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no conflict of interest and sufficient evidence of conspiracy.
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United States v. Taleb Jawher
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-2844
Opinion Date: November 1, 2023
Judge:
MELLOY
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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While Defendant was working at a convenience store in St. Louis, a suspected shoplifter appeared to steal a piece of candy. Defendant pointed a loaded pistol at the man and chased him from the store. The pistol ultimately discharged and killed the man. Defendant initially pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5). The district court applied a homicide guideline cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(B). While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif v. United States. On remand, the district court again applied the second-degree murder guideline as the cross reference. Defendant now appeals his conviction.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record is more than sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Further, the court explained that the record adequately supports the guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge. Immigration authorities repeatedly informed Defendant that he lacked legal status. Moreover, the fact that he purposefully committed fraud in an effort to obtain legal status indicates an understanding that he lacked legal status. Further, the use of potentially deadly violence against another may demonstrate the malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction. Accordingly, whether Defendant purposefully shot the victim in the head, or accidentally shot the victim in the head while potentially fatally beating his head with a pistol, the district court permissibly concluded the mens rea rose above the baseline recklessness required for manslaughter and reached the level of malice required for murder.
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United States v. Walker
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-5076
Opinion Date: October 30, 2023
Judge:
Scott Milne Matheson, Jr.
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law
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Defendant-appellant Kenneth Walker appealed his conviction and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. Walker lived "off and on" with his adult niece, Victoria Dirickson. Walker asked Dirickson for a set of house keys. She declined because “[i]t was [her] only day off, and [she] really didn’t feel like getting out and making a copy” of the keys. Walker became “[r]eally aggravated,” and an argument ensued in the living room, which lead to the assault charges at issue in this case. A grand jury indicted Walker on one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. The indictment alleged Walker was a non-Indian and Dirickson was Indian. A jury found Walker guilty as charged. On appeal, Walker: (1) challenged the district court's jurisdiction because it erred in admitting Dirickson's Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood (“CDIB”) and tribal registration cards; (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of a medical expert; (3) the district court abused its discretion in failing to give a unanimity-of-means jury instruction; (4) abused its discretion in failing to consider sentencing disparities arising from a possible sentence in a state case; and (5) Plainly erred in imposing an anger management condition of supervised release due to insufficient notice, and improper delegation of authority to the Probation Office. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Walker's conviction and sentence.
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USA v. Kevin McCall
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
21-13092
Opinion Date: October 27, 2023
Judge:
BRASHER
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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While losing in a high-stakes poker game, Defendant allegedly used his cell phone to arrange an armed robbery to reclaim his losses. Because a cell phone was directly tied to the crime, no one disputes that there was probable cause to search that device. But the police went one step further. They secured a warrant to search an iCloud account that backed up the phone twelve hours before the poker game and robbery. The iCloud warrant permitted a search of almost all the account’s data with no time limitation. Based on evidence secured by that warrant, the government prosecuted, and a jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Given the warrant’s breadth and the account’s indirect link to the crime, Defendant argued that the district court should have suppressed the iCloud evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that although Fourth Amendment standards are largely settled, their application to developing areas of technology is not. Like judges, law enforcement officers operating in good faith may struggle to apply existing standards to new circumstances. That is where the exclusionary rule’s good faith exception comes in. The court explained that the government concedes that the iCloud warrant fell short in certain respects, but it argues that reasonable officers could have believed it to be valid. The court wrote that it agreed that the warrant was not so deficient in probable cause, particularity, or otherwise that it would be unreasonable for an officer to rely on it in good faith.
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Turner and the State of Alabama ex rel. Angela Turner v. Ivey, et al.
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Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
Docket:
SC-2022-0538
Opinion Date: July 21, 2023
Judge:
Cook
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 2019, the Alabama Legislature passed -- and Governor Kay Ivey signed -- House Bill 380 ("H.B. 380"), which became Act No. 2019-393, Ala. Acts 2019. As enacted, H.B. 380 amended various Code provisions, including § 15-22-21(a), Ala. Code 1975, creating the position of director of the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles ("the Bureau"), and § 15-22-20(b), Ala. Code 1975, addressing the nomination and appointment processes for the members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board"). After H.B. 380 was enacted, Governor Ivey appointed Leigh Gwathney as chair of the Board pursuant to the new procedures set forth in § 15-22-20(b). In November 2020, the three-member Board convened and held a parole-consideration hearing for Angela Turner, an inmate who was serving a life sentence for murder. Following a review of Turner's file, the Board unanimously denied Turner's parole request. Around that same time, Governor Ivey appointed Cam Ward as the new director of the Bureau. In response to the Board's denial of parole, Turner filed suit against Governor Ivey, Ward, Gwathney, and the other members of the Parole Board, in which she sought a judgment declaring that Governor Ivey's appointment of Ward and Gwathney to their respective positions pursuant to the changes created by H.B. 380 violated the Alabama Constitution of 1901. She also, on behalf of the State of Alabama, petitioned for writs of quo warranto pursuant to § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975, alleging that Ward and Gwathney unlawfully held their respective positions. Finally, she alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all the defendants on the basis that she had been denied due process during her parole-consideration hearing. The circuit court dismissed Turner's claims with prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.
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Bishop v. State
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 150
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Hudson
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of capital murder and his sentence of life imprisonment without parole, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err by denying Defendant's motions to suppress evidence from the traffic stop because law enforcement had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm; (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress evidence from his detention and arrest because the same facts that provided reasonable suspicion for the initial stop provided reasonable suspicion for his pat-down and arrest; and (3) did not err by permitting the State to introduce videos containing statements made by law enforcement officers.
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Bridges v. State
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 157
Opinion Date: November 2, 2023
Judge:
Kemp
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction of capital murder, aggravated robbery, theft of property, and a firearm sentencing enhancement, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the above crimes and sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole plus ten years. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, holding (1) Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on the State's failure to negate his justification defense was unpreserved; (2) Appellant's argument that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial was unpreserved for appeal; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit certain language in its justification instruction to the jury.
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Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 153
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Hiland
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that the Arkansas Racing Commission's (ARC) decision to award the Pope County casino license to Cherokee Nation Business, LLC (CNB) and Legends Resort and Casino, LLC (Legends) was a "legal nullity, void and of no effect," holding that there was no error.
Gulfside Casino Partnership sought a declaratory judgment that the ARC's actions in awarding the license to CNB and Legends were unconstitutional, constituted and ultra vires act, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gulfside, ruling that the ARC acted ultra vires, in violation of amendment 100 to the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ARC acted ultra vires in issuing the license to CNB.
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Doerhoff v. State
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 149
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Karen R. Baker
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Appellant of first-degree murder and sentencing him to a term of life imprisonment, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court erred by giving a non-model jury instruction regarding justification and by refusing to give his proffered jury instruction regarding excessive force. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in submitting a non-model jury instruction to the jury; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit Appellant's proffered no-model excessive force instruction to the jury.
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Ward v. State
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 Ark. 158
Opinion Date: November 2, 2023
Judge:
Hiland
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for directed verdict on both charges.
Defendant was charged with capital murder with an enhancement for using a firearm and other offenses. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, possession of a defaced firearm, resisting arrest, fleeing, and obstructing governmental operations. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of two life sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for directed verdict as to his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer because there was sufficient proof presented to the jury that Defendant was capable of forming the requisite mental state given his provisional diagnosis of schizophrenia.
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California v. Flores
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
D081200(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: November 2, 2023
Judge:
Joan Irion
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant-appellant Edgar Flores appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing on his second degree murder conviction. The superior court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on the ground Flores was ineligible for resentencing because he had been convicted of provocative act murder. Flores contended the superior court erred by denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie review stage. He argued the instructions given at his trial allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder based on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice, namely, that he aided and abetted co-defendant Anthony Paez’s provocative act without himself acting with malice. Flores also argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to amend the petition after legislation made relief available to persons convicted of murder on any theory that imputed malice based solely on participation in a crime and by failing to make the instructional argument he urged here. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court.
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P. v. Medrano
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
B324567(Second Appellate District)
Opinion Date: October 30, 2023
Judge:
YEGAN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances finding, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury found true allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had been armed with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a firearm enhancement. Defendant filed his first section 1172.6 petition. After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). Defendant again appealed an order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court’s holding is the law of the case and conclusively established at the prima facie stage that Defendant is not entitled to resentencing based on his second 1172.6 petition. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that, by applying the law of the case doctrine, the court would be shutting our eyes to a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice.
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Chestnut v. Dixon
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Court: Florida Supreme Court
Docket:
SC2023-0719
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and pro se barred Petitioner, an inmate in state custody, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred and sanctioned.
Petitioner was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Including the habeas corpus petition in the instant case, Petitioner filed thirty-one pro se petitions with the Supreme Court, and the Court never granted Petitioner the relief he sought in his filings. The Supreme Court held that Petitioner had abused this Court's limited judicial resources, concluded that Petitioner's habeas petition was a frivolous proceeding, and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar.
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Levin v. State
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Court: Florida Supreme Court
Docket:
SC2023-0616
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court pro se barred Petitioner, an inmate in state custody, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred and sanctioned.
Petitioner was convicted of lewd and lascivious sexual battery of a victim twelve to fifteen years old lewd and lascivious exhibition using a computer and traveling to meet a minor for sex. Including the habeas corpus petition in the instant case, Petitioner filed nineteen pro se petitions with the Supreme Court, but the Court never granted Petitioner the relief he sought in his filings. As to the current action seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner had abused this Court's limited judicial resources, concluded that Petitioner's habeas petition was a frivolous proceeding, and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar.
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Jenkins v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0534
Opinion Date: November 2, 2023
Judge:
Peterson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether Larry Jenkins’ unequivocal statement that he would not talk to law enforcement without a lawyer was a valid invocation of his Miranda rights. The trial court concluded that the statement came at a time that Jenkins was not being interrogated and at which no interrogation was imminent, and thus it was “anticipatory” and invalid under a line of precedent from several federal courts of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by extending that precedent to the circumstances in this case. The Court found that at the time that Jenkins invoked his Miranda rights, he (1) was in custody for the crimes at issue in this case, (2) had been given Miranda warnings, (3) had already been subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement on the way to the jail, and (4) was going through the booking process. "Whether or not the booking process itself was custodial interrogation, the facts of this case show that a reasonable person in Jenkins’s position would have believed that interrogation was at least imminent." Accordingly, the Supreme Court held his unequivocal invocation was valid, the State’s failure to honor it rendered his custodial statements inadmissible, and the State failed to show that the use of that inadmissible evidence was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Jenkins’s convictions; because the evidence against him was constitutionally sufficient, he could be retried.
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Regan v. Georgia
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Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Docket:
S23A0686
Opinion Date: November 2, 2023
Judge:
Colvin
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Appellant Cody Regan appealed his sentence of 20 years in prison, with one year to serve, for one count of felony child molestation, following his non-negotiated guilty plea. Regan argued he improperly received a felony sentence for child molestation, in violation of his rights to equal protection under the United States and Georgia Constitutions, because he was similarly situated to people receiving misdemeanor sentences for aggravated child molestation. Regan also argued his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the federal and state constitutions, because his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the sentencing scheme for child molestation set out at OCGA § 16-6-4 (b), as applied to Regan, violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These sentencing provisions provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 14 years old (among other conditions), but the misdemeanor sentencing provisions for aggravated child molestation provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 13 years old. Because the victim in this case was 13 years old, Regan did not qualify for the misdemeanor sentence he would have received if he had instead committed aggravated child molestation. "There is no rational basis for such disparate treatment." The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying Regan's motion in arrest of judgment, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for Appellant to be resentenced for misdemeanor child molestation under OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (2). Because the Court resolved Regan's challenges to his sentence on federal equal-protection grounds, it did not reach his
cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims.
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State v. $2,435 in U.S. Currency
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Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Docket:
23S-CR-00072
Opinion Date: October 31, 2023
Judge:
Goff
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this action seeking to confiscate money under Indiana's civil forfeiture statute, holding that the right to a jury trial applies in such an action.
The State filed a complaint to forfeit $2,435 in cash that police officers recovered after stopping Alucious Kizer for a traffic violation, alleging that the money had been "furnished or intended to be furnished" in exchange for a crime, that it had been "used to facilitate" a crime, or that it was "traceable as proceeds" of a crime. Kizer requested a jury trial. The State moved to strike the demand, arguing that no such right existed under either the Indiana or United States Constitution. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Kizer was not entitled to trial by jury. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Ind. Const. Art. I, 20 protects the right to a jury trial for in rem civil forfeitures; and (2) therefore, Kizer had a constitutional right to trial by jury.
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State v. Church
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
22-0089
Opinion Date: October 27, 2023
Judge:
McDonald
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, obstructing prosecution, and abusing a corpse, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving a verdict-urging instruction in this case.
On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court coerced the jury's verdict by giving a verdict-urging instruction after the court was informed that the jury was divided 11-1 and that one juror was not following the judge's instructions. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions, concluding that the jury's verdict was coerced. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the court of appeals erred in its coercion analysis and that the jury's verdict was not coerced under the circumstances.
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Carpenter v. Commonwealth
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-SC-0179-MR
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Lambert
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of unlawful use of electronic means to induce a minor to engage in sexual or other prohibited activities and six counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual act by a minor, holding that the convictions for possessing child pornography videos must be reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's four conviction resulting from possessing four videos containing child pornography and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion under Ky. R. Evid. 403 when it failed to review the child pornography videos before the videos were admitted into evidence and played in full; and (2) there was sufficient evidence proving that Defendant knowingly possessed child pornographic images and videos on his computer, and therefore, the trial court did not err by denying a directed verdict on those charges.
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Commonwealth v. Moreland
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Dockets:
2022-SC-0245-DG, 2022-SC-0414-DG
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Conley
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals concluding that the sentence Defendant negotiated upon a plea of guilty and instituted by the trial court was illegal, and therefore his probation revocation was also illegal, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that an illegal probation mandated release of Defendant from custody.
After Defendant entered into supervised probation according to his plea deal the Commonwealth sought to revoke his probation. Defendant responded that the sentence for probation after serving his prison term was illegal. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that it could not alter the sentence and revoked Defendant's probation based on the testimony of Defendant's probation officer. The court of appeals reversed, declaring the probation revocation unlawful. The Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly concluded that the simultaneous imposition of ten years' incarceration and ten years' probation subsequent to incarceration was illegal; and (2) with Defendant's underlying conviction and sentence of imprisonment being lawful, the remedy for an illegal order of probation is to remand for resentencing.
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Finch v. Commonwealth
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-SC-0432-MR
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Lambert
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, intimidating a participant in a legal process, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender and his sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the Commonwealth did not improperly comment on Defendant's right to remain silence during voir dire or deprive him of an impartial jury by making a burden-shifting argument to the venire should Defendant have chosen to testify; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to strike two jurors for cause; and (3) no cumulative error occurred because no prejudicial error occurred.
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James v. Commonwealth
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-SC-0299-MR
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Bisig
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder and tampering with a witness and his sentence of life imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the jury instructions did not yield a verdict that violated the unanimous verdict requirement, and the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial; (2) the opinion testimony of two police officers did not constitute palpable error; (3) testimony regarding parole eligibility and meritorious good time credit did not render the trial fundamentally unfair; and (4) the Commonwealth's comments during the penalty phase's closing argument did not constitute palpable error.
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Martin v. Commonwealth
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2021-SC-0399-MR
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Bisig
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for arson and attempted arson and otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in Defendant's favor as to the counts for arson in the first degree and attempted arson.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) hearsay statements regarding the victims' fear of Defendant were admissible under Ky. R. Evid. 803(3)'s state-of-mind exception; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (3) the trial court properly precluded Defendant from presenting an aaltperp defense; (4) the trial court properly admitted physical evidence; (5) Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charges of first-degree arson and attempted first-degree arson; (6) Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the charges for murder; (7) Defendant's burglary convictions did not violate double jeopardy protections; and (8) reversal was not required on grounds of cumulative error.
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Moulder v. Commonwealth
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Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-SC-0155-MR
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Conley
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions of rape in the first-degree, victim under twelve; sodomy in the first-degree, victim under twelve; sexual abuse in the first-degree, victim under twelve; and incest, holding that Juror A.R. should have been struck for cause.
During voir dire, when the Commonwealth asked the venire if anyone was uncomfortable with pornography, Juror A.R. made a physical indication. During a colloquy, the trial court asked several times if Juror A.R. could be fair and impartial. After one final time of asking whether Juror A.R. could remain fair and impartial, Juror A.R. affirmed that she could. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's failure to strike Juror A.R. for cause was an abuse of discretion.
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Pratt v. State
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Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Citation:
2023 ME 66
Opinion Date: November 2, 2023
Judge:
Lawrence
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for post-conviction review (PCR) arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, holding that Petitioner's conviction of domestic violence assault against her daughter must be vacated.
In her PCR petition, Petitioner argued that trial counsel's representation was ineffective by opening the door during opening statements to prejudicial evidence about her parenting practices and because he did not object to prosecutorial error at trial. The PCR denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that trial counsel's decision to open the door to evidence regarding Petitioner's parenting practices and his failure to object at trial to the prosecutorial error made his conviction unreliable and unworthy of confidence.
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Commonwealth v. Guardado
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Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-13315
Opinion Date: October 26, 2023
Judge:
Gaziano
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Judicial Court vacated a portion of its prior order remanding this case to the superior court for entry of judgments of not guilty on indictments charging unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, holding that this Court erred.
Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, firearms-related convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions and ordered that the superior court judge enter judgments of not guilty on the indictments, holding that, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Stat Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2122 (2022), which was entered after Defendant's convictions, the trial court judge erred when he failed to instruct the jury that Defendant lacked of a firearms license. The Court then granted the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration, vacated the relevant portion of its prior order, and remanded the case for a retrial on those indictments, holding that because the constitutional rule established in Bruen did not exist at the time Defendant was convicted, the Commonwealth should have an opportunity to retry Defendant.
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State v. Claus
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 MT 203
Opinion Date: October 31, 2023
Judge:
Laurie McKinnon
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant, holding that the district court did not err in determining that there was probable cause Defendant committed a crime that allowed the State to withdraw from the plea agreement and relieved the State's obligation to make a particular sentencing recommendation.
Defendant pled guilty to assault with a weapon, criminal endangerment, and theft pursuant to a plea agreement. The State recommended a twenty-year sentence with no time suspended and treatment of Defendant as a persistent felony offender (PFO). Prior to sentencing, the State informed Defendant that it would withdraw from its plea agreement recommendation based on alleged crimes Defendant committed while in custody. The district court ultimately permitted the State to diverge from its sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Defendant waived his right to challenge the timeliness of the PFO notice; and (2) did not err in determining that Defendant had breached the plea agreement and that the State was entitled to withdraw from the guilty plea and recommend a harsher sentence.
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Williams v. Frakes
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Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Citation:
315 Neb. 379
Opinion Date: October 27, 2023
Judge:
William B. Cassel
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and three of its officials regarding computation of Plaintiff's tentative mandatory release date (TRD), holding that there was no error.
Plaintiff, an inmate, filed an action for declaratory judgment alleging that DCS was responsible for actions infringing on her constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by concluding that her TRD was consistent with Nebraska statutes and case law. The district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-911 for Plaintiff's claims against DCS.
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New Hampshire v. Hellinger
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Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Dockets:
2022-0253, 2022-0589
Opinion Date: November 2, 2023
Judge:
Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant Julie Hellinger was tried on charges of disobeying a police officer (class A misdemeanor), and driving after suspension (violation-level offense). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the motor vehicle stop by the police was unlawful. Her motion was denied, and defendant was convicted on both charges. She appealed her conviction for disobeying an officer to the superior court, and
appealed her conviction for driving after suspension directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In superior court, defendant again moved to suppress. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals. After review, the Supreme Court reversed her circuit court conviction for driving after suspension, vacated the superior court order denying her motion to suppress, and remanded both matters. The State conceded the trial court erred with respect to the driving after suspension charge, agreeing that the officer did not have the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support a motor vehicle stop of defendant. If the stop was illegal, then the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not make findings "sufficient to purge the taint" with regard to the remaining charge.
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New Mexico v. Anderson
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Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
Citation:
2023-NMSC-019
Opinion Date: May 22, 2023
Judge:
Zamora
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The New Mexico Supreme Court explained its reasoning for reversing a district court's denial of the State's motion for pretrial detention of Defendant Joe Anderson. Anderson had been charged with first-degree murder. Under Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution, a defendant charged with a felony could be detained without bail prior to trial if the State demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the defendant was dangerous; and (2) no release conditions would reasonably protect the safety of any individual or the community. Here, the Court determined Defendant’s dangerousness was not disputed. At issue was the second prong of the pretrial detention inquiry: whether the State met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions could reasonably protect any individual or the community. The Court found the State presented reliable evidence that Defendant had an extensive criminal history that included crimes of violence, failures to appear, violations of probation, new charges while on probation, committing felonies while incarcerated, knowingly possessing a firearm while a felon, and noncompliance with pretrial services requirements. The Court held the district court abused its discretion when it denied the State’s motion without properly weighing the required factors under Rule 5-409(F)(6).
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New Mexico v. Antonio M.
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Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
Citation:
2023-NMSC-022
Opinion Date: July 27, 2023
Judge:
Bacon
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
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A jury found that Child-Respondent Antonio M. (Child) committed felony murder, attempted armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, child abuse, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The State charged Child as a participant in the fatal shooting of Fabian Lopez (Victim) at Frenger Park in Las Cruces. Uncontested evidence at Child’s adjudicatory hearing established that M.M. and two other participants killed Victim in his car in the course of a drug deal. During opening statements and closing arguments, defense counsel’s theory of the case was that the State could not present sufficient evidence of Child’s participation in the crime and that the robbery and resulting homicide were unplanned and unintended results of a simple drug purchase. Defense counsel did not challenge Child’s presence in the car that transported M.M. to and from the park. On appeal, Child challenged the admission of three in-court identifications under federal and state due process. The Court of Appeals reversed for plain error, finding that the in-court identifications were impermissibly suggestive and thereby violated Child’s due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court determine that identity was not at issue regarding the testimony of the three relevant witnesses and thus that Child’s due process rights were not violated by the relevant in-court identifications. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.
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Torres v. Santistevan
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Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
Citation:
2023-NMSC-021
Opinion Date: July 24, 2023
Judge:
Barbara J. Vigil
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Petitioner Rufino Torres petitioned for habeas relief, contending the judgment and sentence which required him to serve consecutive, i.e., “stacked,” five-year terms of probation was illegal. Four different indictments were filed against Petitioner with sixteen crimes which occurred between June 1, 2010, and June 3, 2010. Petitioner received a twenty-seven year term of imprisonment, and there was no issue about whether the term of imprisonment imposed on each count was correct. The total term of twenty-seven years resulted from the fact that the district court imposed a sentence of incarceration for every crime charged in each case. Petitioner violated probation multiple times over the years following his sentencing. Acting pro se, on October 17, 2018, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition, asserting he was illegally sentenced, did not receive the proper credit calculations, and received ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court appointed an attorney to review the illegal sentence and credit calculation claims, but did not order the attorney to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court entered a procedural order on Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus in which the district court recalculated Petitioner’s credit for presentence confinement. Ultimately, the New Mexico Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief. The district court’s order consolidating the four cases resulted in a single judgment and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court because the February 21, 2017, order of discharge on suspended sentence, as amended, not only terminated Petitioner’s probation but also determined that Petitioner satisfied his criminal liability for the crimes charged, and discharged Petitioner from any obligation imposed by the judgment and sentence as of June 4, 2016. In addition, upon remand, the district court was directed to enter an amended judgment and sentence vacating two conspiracy convictions.
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State v. Hall
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Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Docket:
21-0904
Opinion Date: October 30, 2023
Judge:
Bunn
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Petitioner to ten to twenty-five years' imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual assault, holding that the circuit court's failure to explicitly discuss the mandatory mitigating circumstances listed in W. Va. Code 61-11-23(c) before ordering the final sentence was not prejudicial.
On appeal, Petitioner argued that the circuit court failed to consider the "mitigating circumstances" set forth in section 61-11-23(c) and that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Petitioner's substantial rights were not affected by the circuit court's failure to acknowledge and consider the statutory mitigating circumstances; and (2) Petitioner's argument that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate due to his age and mental capacity was unavailing.
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State v. Todd C.
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Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Dockets:
21-0969, 22-0278
Opinion Date: November 1, 2023
Judge:
Walker
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the amended sentencing order and the denial of Petitioner's motion for a judgment of acquittal, holding that there was no error in Petitioner's convictions or sentences.
Petitioner was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in a position of trust (counts one through four) and four counts of sexual abuse in the first degree (counts five through eight). Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The circuit court corrected Petitioner's sentence as to count four. In these consolidated appeals, Petition raised an ex post facto violation relative to the jury's instruction and, alternatively, sought a reduction in his sentence based on ex post facto principles baed on the fact that his criminal conduct that led to his conviction on count three occurred before the statute was amended to increase the penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence of sexual abuse after the statutory amendments to subject him to the harsher penalty; and (2) did not err in denying Petitioner's motion for a judgment of acquittal.
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Bunten v. State
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 WY 105
Opinion Date: October 31, 2023
Judge:
Kautz
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion in his criminal case for the return of property seized by law enforcement during the underlying criminal investigation, holding that remand was required.
Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and battery. Several months after he was sentenced Defendant filed a motion requesting suppression of items used as evidence in his case. The district court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over Defendant's motion in the criminal case because a post-conviction motion for return of property is a civil matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in declaring that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Defendant's motion for return of his property, nor did it have the legal authority to order return of the property because the motion was authorized by Wyo. R. Crim. P. 41(d), and the court should have received evidence to determine whether Defendant was entitled to return of the property.
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Peterson v. State
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 WY 103
Opinion Date: October 27, 2023
Judge:
Kate M. Fox
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that the district court did not err in ruling that res judicata barred Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree abuse of a minor and soliciting a minor to engage in sexual relations and sentenced to twenty years as to the sexual abuse conviction and to four to five years on the solicitation conviction, to be served consecutively. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the acts underlying his conviction were one continuous act and that his consecutive sentences violated double jeopardy protections. The district court denied relief ruling that res judicata barred the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a motion to correct an illegal sentence can be subject to res judicata; and (2) the interests of res judictata in finality and avoiding repetitive litigation were served in this case.
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Tucker v. State
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 WY 106
Opinion Date: November 1, 2023
Judge:
Kautz
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(a), holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant's motion was barred by res judicata.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and sentenced to twelve to twenty years in prison on each count, to be served consecutively. After unsuccessfully moving in 2015 to correct an illegal sentence, in 2022 Defendant filed the current motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his consecutive sentences were illegal because they exceeded the twenty-year statutory maximum sentence for aggravated vehicular homicide. The district court denied the motion on res judicata grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant already raised and litigated the claim presented in his current motion, the district court did not err in denying the Rule 35(a) motion on res judicata grounds.
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