United States v. Colon-De Jesus

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1528

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's twenty-four-month sentence for violating conditions of his supervised release, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

In 2014, Defendant pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to sixty months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. After Defendant reentered the community on supervised release he was arrested on firearms charges. The new arrest triggered revocation proceedings in his supervised release case. After a final revocation hearing, the district court found that Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release and sentenced him to twenty-four months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of procedural error; and (2) Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable.

United States v. Savage

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Dockets: 14-1493, 14-2677, 14-3975

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Jordan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Under Kaboni’s leadership, the KSO gang sold drugs. While Kaboni was incarcerated, Kidada coordinated KSO activities. Northington was a KSO drug dealer and enforcer, causing one murder and committing another. Merritt sold drugs for the gang, often with his cousin, KSO member Lewis. In 2004, Kaboni told Kidada of his concern that KSO member Coleman was cooperating with the police. Kidada told Lewis that Kaboni had ordered him to “firebomb the Colemans’ house.” Lewis enlisted Merritt; the cousins filled gas cans and headed to Merritt’s house to get a gun. At 4:08 a.m., a Philadelphia officer stopped them for speeding but allowed them to leave. The two then parked near the Coleman house, carried the cans to the house, kicked in the door, and fired shots. Merritt ran inside and threw a lit gas can, causing a “big explosion.” He then exited the house, throwing another can. Lewis left a message on Kidada’s phone: “It was done.” .Six people, ages 15 months to 53 years, were killed. Coleman entered witness protection. Court-authorized recording devices near Kaboni’s cell and in the visitation room intercepted Kaboni’s conversations with his friends and other inmates and recorded Kaboni making vulgar statements about the deaths and threatening to kill others.

Kidada, Northington, and Merritt were convicted of combinations of RICO conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering (and conspiracy), retaliating against a witness, and using fire in the commission of a felony. The Third Circuit, after affirming Kiboni’s convictions and death sentence, affirmed their convictions and life sentences. The court upheld a refusal to grant Kidada a new trial based on a conflict allegedly held by one of her attorneys, the admission of Kaboni’s statements, evidentiary rulings, the rejection of a “Batson” challenge, jury instructions, and the denial of motions to sever.

US v. Antonio McDaniel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-7579

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: KING

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 and, in the alternative, coram nobis relief. His Section 2255 motion and his coram nobis petition were both denied by the district court. In this appeal, Defendant challenged only the denial of his petition for coram nobis relief, asserting that the court erred and abused its discretion in so ruling. Defendant maintains that he is entitled to a writ of coram nobis because (1) he was convicted in that very court in 1993 under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), (2) he has served his sentence for that offense, and (3) the sole predicate for his 1993 conviction — a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 111 — is no longer a crime of violence.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two issues involve (1) whether a violation of Section 111(b) constitutes a crime of violence and (2) whether Defendant has shown that his 1993 conviction does not rest on a Section 111(b) violation. The court wrote that an error of the most fundamental character has not been shown, Defendant is not entitled to a writ of coram nobis, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying coram nobis relief. The court explained that Defendant was obliged to show that his 1993 conviction rested solely on Section 111(a). Defendant has not carried that burden, and he therefore has not satisfied the fourth requirement for coram nobis relief.

US v. Diana Toebbe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4689

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: NIEMEYER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to communicate, transmit, or disclose Restricted Data of the United States Navy relating to Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines with the intent to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation. At sentencing, the district court calculated her Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Defendant to 262 months imprisonment, which was at the bottom of that range. Defendant contends that “the district court so severely infected the sentencing [and] the sentencing process that [her] due process rights were violated during the course of the sentencing hearing to an extent that could not have been contemplated by, and transcends, the appeal waiver.” She also contends that the government, in its appellate brief, breached the plea agreement and therefore that the agreement “is now void” and the “waiver in it is invalid.” The government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.
 
The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Defendant had failed to make a sufficient showing to avoid the clear terms of her plea agreement, which she acknowledges she entered into knowingly and intelligently. The court also concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement. Further, the court noted that the plea agreement provided further that once the district court exercised its authority to sentence Defendant, the government was authorized to advance arguments on appeal in support of that sentence.

US v. Quotez Pair

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4269

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: WILKINSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Following a series of COVID-19-related continuances and other setbacks, Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of fentanyl distribution. Defendant argued that these delays violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Defendant also argues the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, in total, 357 days of 401 days were properly excluded. This means that, at most, only 44 days accrued towards Defendant’s speedy trial clock. The court concluded that Defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated. Moreover, the court noted that Defendant has not “shown, or even argued, that any evidence was damaged or lost, that any witnesses could not be found, or that his case was harmed in any manner by the delay.” Further, the court wrote that substantial evidence supports Defendant’s convictions. Much of the evidence at trial came from the testimony of the confidential informant who purchased the drugs from Defendant. This informant testified that he knew Defendant because they had a mutual friend whose apartment they both frequented. He also testified that he and Pair had discussed doing business together prior to the informant cooperating with law enforcement. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party below, any reasonable finder of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of distributing fentanyl.

USA v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30421

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Stephen A. Higginson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery, obstruction of commerce by robbery, and using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death. Defendant was charged alongside several others. The district court severed the trial of the then-capital defendants. Defendant’s first trial, in July 2021, ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict. At his retrial in March 2022, a jury convicted Defendant of each of the three counts charged. Defendant appealed.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it rejected Defendant’s assertion that his substantial rights were affected “because the government’s case was almost entirely premised on DNA evidence.” The court explained that the government also presented eyewitness testimony that, on the morning of the robbery, Defendant helped load a bag of firearms into the vehicle used in the robbery, and the government properly introduced a statement from a non-testifying co-defendant that Defendant was one of the shooters who emerged from the vehicle. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s vague assertion does not establish that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.”

Akima v. Peca

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-2058

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After being stopped for a broken headlight, Akima was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated based on his performance on a three-part field sobriety exam and a preliminary breathalyzer test. Arresting Officer Peca determined that he failed the assessments but had both administered the field sobriety tests improperly and misread the breathalyzer. Akima blew a blood alcohol content of 0.02, well below the legal limit of 0.08; Peca read the result as 0.22 and arrested him, causing Akima, a Japanese citizen, to lose his work visa and be deported. A blood test confirmed the Officer’s error. Akima sued, alleging constitutional violations. Peca moved to dismiss, citing qualified immunity.

The district court permitted Akima’s constitutional claims to proceed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Officer Peca lacked probable cause to believe Akima’s license was not in his immediate possession or that he was intoxicated. A reasonable jury could find that while driving without any apparent difficulty, Akima was stopped for a broken headlight; perhaps due to evident communication barriers, Akima took the atypical step of exiting his vehicle. Akima acknowledged he had been drinking “just a little bit,” registered 0.02 on a breathalyzer, exhibited a temperate and responsive demeanor, and maintained steady speech and gait. He completed three field sobriety tests.

Grote v. Kenton County, Kentucky

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5133

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

During his booking at Kenton County Detention Center, Grote could not complete paperwork while standing nor be photographed due to his agitated state. By the time he was examined by LPN Brand, Grote was constantly shaking and twitching and was covered in sweat. With officers, Grote denied that he had taken any substances but told Brand that he had taken a half gram of methamphetamine. Grote’s oxygen level was 89 percent; he was hyperventilating. Brand was unable to take any other vital signs. Brand does not recall communicating to anyone her assessment that Grote was detoxing. Deputies conducted sporadic checks on Grote in his cell before an inmate reported that Grote was unconscious and foaming at the mouth. Grote suffered multiple cardiac arrests and did not regain neurological function before dying. A doctor testified that Grote’s overdose would have been obvious to a layperson and that the situation required urgent medical care. Grote had a blood methamphetamine concentration 14 times higher than “the lowest reported lethal dose.”

The KCDC defendants testified received no training on recognizing signs of an overdose or detox and could not call 911 immediately in the event of an inmate overdose, but instead were to notify shift managers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of a section 1983 suit. A jury could find that the medical provider was deliberately indifferent to Grote’s need for medical attention, but not that the deputies acted unconstitutionally.

James v. Corrigan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1507

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

James picked up Herald and Hickerson in a silver car. Driving around, the men got high and plotted to rob the Contreras home. At a gas station, Hickerson picked up black ski masks. Herald went home. Hours later, two armed, masked men invaded the Contreras home and shot Adrian five times, killing him. Adrian’s brothers returned fire, hitting Hickerson. The other intruder escaped in a silver car. Around 4 a.m. that day, James arrived at his friends’ house in a silver car, telling them he had attempted a robbery with Hickerson and that Hickerson had been shot. James later told Herald that he “left Johnny” and had thrown his gun in a lake. Police found a black ski mask two blocks from the Contreras house, with James’s DNA on it.

James was convicted of felony murder, home invasion, assault, and firearm offenses. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that Herald’s testimony was supported by “the location of the weapon” and that a “weapon” found near the crime scene had James’s DNA on it. No evidence supported those findings. Police never found the second intruder’s gun and did not find James's DNA on any weapons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of James’s federal habeas petition. Even serious errors do not warrant habeas relief by themselves. Petitioners need to show a violation of the Constitution or federal law. James has not.

United States v. Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3603

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Castro-White died from a drug overdose. Detective Sivert noticed that Castro-White’s phone had many missed calls from Karaplis, who implicated others but lied to Sivert by denying any involvement. Later, after admitting his involvement, Karaplis described the drug dealer, “Red,” Red’s car, Red’s phone number, and, using Google Maps, the specific home where he bought drugs from Red. Sivert traveled to this home and spotted a nearby car p that fit Karaplis’s description and was registered to “Russell Davis,” called “Big Red.” Karaplis identified Davis’s picture with “100 percent” confidence. Sivert had Karaplis set up a phone call with Davis to discuss Castro-White’s death. Sivert then obtained a warrant to search Davis’s Garden Avenue home. During the search, police found the phone and illegal drugs. Davis unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence and was given a mandatory life sentence.

The Sixth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing about what Sivert told the magistrate in person. Although the magistrate described his general practice, he lacked a “specific recollection” of Davis’s case. Sivert was “sure” that he had conveyed the many facts connecting Davis to the home. The court again denied Davis’s motion, despite finding that the affidavit failed to establish a probable-cause nexus between Davis and the home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sivert uncovered overwhelming evidence tying Davis to the home and the magistrate (not Sivert) bore any blame for failing to transcribe the additional oral testimony.

United States v. Jamison

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1840

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Mathis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2019, Flint, Michigan officers recovered ammunition and three firearms from Jamison’s suspected residence. Jamison was charged as a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government referenced the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA) in the indictment. Jamison pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.

At sentencing, the district court found that Jamison had prior convictions that were violent felonies under the ACCA: a 1994 conviction as a juvenile in Michigan for second-degree murder and for felony firearm; a 2011 Michigan conviction for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and for felony firearm; and a 2012 federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 188-month sentence. Michigan’s felony-firearm statute is a “violent felony” under the ACCA when a juvenile is convicted of that offense for possessing a firearm while committing second-degree murder because the second-degree murder element requires a level of culpability almost indistinguishable from purposeful or knowing, and necessarily involves the use of force.

United States v. Taylor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5064

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Richard Allen Griffin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Taylor pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 400 or more grams of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, section 841(a). The PSR recommended sentencing enhancements for maintaining premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12); being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants, 3B1.1(a); and using fear, impulse, friendship, affection, or some combination thereof to involve another individual in the illegal purchase, sale, transport, or storage of a controlled substance, 2D1.1(b)(16)(A).

Over Taylor’s objections and following testimony from several witnesses, the district court applied those enhancements, calculated his Guidelines range to be 324-405 months, and sentenced him to a prison term of 385 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Taylor stipulated to facts concerning his connection to his co-conspirators’ residences that provided a foundation for the application of the drug house enhancement. The court noted testimony about Taylor’s role atop his distribution network and that he “essentially blackmailed” at least one participant.

United States v. Zakhari

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5328

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Helene N. White

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Zakhari, in a program to become a cardiothoracic surgeon, engaged in online sexually explicit conversations with a profile (boredcrbgirl) created by a detective, claiming to be a 15-year-old girl. He received an image of an officer. Zakhari sent an Uber to take boredcrbgirl to his apartment for sex. The officer arrived at Zakhari’s residence in the Uber. Zakhari was arrested. The detective interrogated him after giving the Miranda warnings. Zakhari said, “I can answer some questions and then maybe call.” After responding to basic questions, he said: My sister’s an attorney. Asked if he wanted to call her, Zakhari said “yeah,” then paused. The detective interjected that such a call would end the questioning. Zakhari continued to answer questions and made incriminating statements.

Zakhari was convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), attempting to transmit an obscene image to a minor, section 1470, and attempting to produce child pornography sections 2251(a)(e). Zakhari unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements. The court declined to strike the third charge on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

The Sixth Circuit vacated the convictions. The suppression motion should have been granted. The factual context shows Zakhari had “lawyerly assistance” in mind in wanting to call his sister and the invocation was not ambiguous. The court abused its discretion in failing to require the government to substantiate its explanations concerning Count 3. Zakhari showed enough to presume vindictiveness.

United States v. Bases

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 23-1530, 23-1530

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

Pacilio and Bases were senior traders on the precious metals trading desk at Bank of America. While working together in 2010-2011, and at times separately before and after that period, they engaged in “spoofing” to manipulate the prices of precious metals using an electronic trading platform, that allows traders to place buy or sell orders on certain numbers of futures contracts at a set price. It is assumed that every order is bona fide and placed with “intent to transact.” Spoofing consists of placing a (typically) large order, on one side of the market with intent to trade, and placing a spoof order, fully visible but not intended to be traded, on the other side. The spoof order pushes the market price to benefit the other order, allowing the trader to get the desired price. The spoof order is canceled before it can be filled.

Pacilio and Bases challenged the constitutionality of their convictions for wire fraud affecting a financial institution and related charges, the sufficiency of the evidence, and evidentiary rulings relating to testimony about the Exchange’s and bank prohibitions on spoofing to support the government’s implied misrepresentation theory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants had sufficient notice that their spoofing scheme was prohibited by law.

United States v. Price

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2061

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Jackson-Akiwumi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2011, Price pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the ACCA to 15 years’ imprisonment, in high-level security facilities. Price, as a gay man (before transitioning) and later as a transgender woman, was hospitalized multiple times due to violence by other inmates. Price was transferred several times, to meet her security and programming needs and spent most of her time in the special housing unit—sometimes for protection, but often for discipline because of her belief that she had to fight and “be tough” to protect herself. Her sentence was reduced. After Price’s release, she worked full-time and obtained substance abuse therapy but lost her placement at a halfway house because of rule infractions, started using drugs, missed drug tests, and eventually fled after stabbing a man. In 2022, the U.S. Marshals arrested Price in Iowa.

At her supervised release revocation hearing, the court acknowledged the risk of harm to Price, imposed a prison sentence slightly below the statutory maximum, and recommended that the Bureau of Prisons consider Price’s safety and gender transition when selecting her incarceration facility. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her 18-month sentence. The district court adequately considered Price’s unique vulnerability.

United States v. Prieto

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3070

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Prieto, a convicted felon, arranged several firearms transactions with a confidential source (CS). During the first transaction, which resulted in a completed sale, the CS informed Prieto that he was on parole and suggested that he had outstanding warrants. Prieto continued to contact the CS and eventually sold several more firearms to the CS.

Prieto pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 19 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The PSR recommended and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the application of enhancements to Prieto’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5), for “trafficking” firearms, applied because Prieto transferred two or more firearms to the CS and knew or had reason to believe the CS was an individual whose possession of the firearms would be unlawful; under section 2K2.1(b)(1)(B), because Prieto’s conduct involved eight firearms; and for obstruction-of-justice. With these enhancements, Prieto’s guidelines range was 140-175 months’ imprisonment. Upholding the 120-month sentence, the court rejected arguments that the government did not prove that the CS actually was on parole, or that he, Prieto, had reason to believe the CS remained on parole when he transferred the guns and that he should not be held accountable for eight firearms because—for three of them—he merely offered (but failed) to sell them to the CS.

MAUREEN MCDERMOTT V. DEBORAH JOHNSON

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 17-99005

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Wardlaw

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death after a California jury found her guilty of attempted murder and first-degree murder, finding true the special circumstances of lying in wait and murder for financial gain. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) habeas petition. In the petition, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during penalty-phase closing arguments by referencing Biblical verses to persuade the jury to impose a death sentence. Applying the extremely deferential standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The panel granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After conducting a comparative juror analysis, the panel concluded that, under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the California Supreme Court’s finding that the trial court did not err in determining there was no purposeful discrimination was an objectively reasonable determination of the facts.

United States v. Mason

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5083

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-Appellant Anthony Mason was convicted by a jury of assault of an intimate or dating partner by strangulation and Oklahoma first-degree burglary. The Presentence Report (PSR) initially calculated an offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of III, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment. But when a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the guideline range, as was the case here, the statutorily required minimum was the guideline sentence. For convictions of first-degree burglary, Oklahoma state law imposed a sentence “not less than seven (7) years.” Accordingly, the PSR recommended a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment, 21 months more than the initial advisory guideline range. Mason objected to the PSR sentence, arguing that his eligibility for a suspended or deferred sentence under the Oklahoma sentencing scheme meant that it did not impose a “true mandatory minimum.” Finding no reversible error in the calculation of Mason's sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

United States v. Parson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5056

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Michael R. Murphy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Edward Parson was convicted by jury of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Parson argued: (1) the district court erred in admitting expert testimony about the process of child-sexual-abuse disclosures and the characteristics and behaviors of children who make such disclosures; and (2) the district court erred in admitting specific testimony of the expert that children are four times more likely to omit facts than to make up facts in the process of disclosing abuse. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, and his second claim of error was unpreserved and Parson failed to demonstrate an entitlement to relief under the difficult-to-satisfy plain error standard. Thus, the district court’s judgment of conviction was affirmed.

USA v. Thomas Robertson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-3062

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: PAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant participated in the riot that took place on January 6, 2021, at the United States Capitol. The riot interrupted and delayed Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote that determined the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. A jury convicted Appellant of obstructing the vote certification in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted “corruptly,” as Section 1512(c)(2) requires. He also challenged his 87-month sentence, making new arguments on appeal that the district court erred in applying two specific offense characteristics for obstruction of the “administration of justice.”
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Robertson acted “corruptly,” and the district court did not plainly err in applying the specific offense characteristics. The court explained that the interpretations of “corruptly” posited by Appellant and the Fischer concurrence appear to confuse sufficiency with necessity: Their proposed definitions of “corruptly” may be sufficient to prove corrupt intent, but neither dishonesty nor seeking a benefit for oneself or another is necessary to demonstrate “wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil” behavior within the meaning of Section 1512(c). The court wrote that it declined to adopt the limited constructions of “corruptly” proffered by Appellant and the Fischer concurrence, which each insist that the broad concept of “corrupt” intent must be proved in only one way.

California v. Das

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096982(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Wiseman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Joseph Das appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding the stated factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea refuted the allegations in his petition for resentencing, rendering him ineligible for relief. While the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s assessment that the stated factual basis, if true, demonstrated defendant stabbed the attempted murder victim with the intent to kill, defendant did not stipulate to the factual basis or otherwise admit the truth of the facts recited by the prosecutor. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding at the prima facie stage and reversed for that reason.

California v. Hupp

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E079389(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Menetrez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Paul Hupp was convicted by jury on four counts of violating Penal Code section 69 based on threatening statements he made to four judges. On appeal, Hupp raised an issue of first impression: Is a judge an “executive officer” within the meaning of section 69, which makes it a crime to attempt to deter, by means of any threat, an executive officer from the performance of a legal duty? The Court of Appeal concluded the answer was no: in this context, “executive officer” unambiguously refers to an officer of the executive branch, and judges are not part of the executive branch. The Court therefore agreed with Hupp that his convictions had to be reversed.

California v. LaRoche

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097431(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Jeffrey LaRoche deprived Antonio Davila a hunting trophy. Following a plea, LaRoche was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, receiving a stolen vehicle, and second degree burglary. Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to an aggregate term
of two years eight months in state prison. LaRoche challenged the amount of restitution ordered to Davila for his loss. Davila claimed the loss of the ram’s head (the trophy)amounted to $7,500, which included the cost of the associated hunting trip, taken approximately 10 years prior. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred when it included the hunting trip as an economic loss because the experience was not property lost as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. "While the statutory framework for victim restitution is broad, we conclude it is not so broad as to include costs attendant to the acquisition of the stolen property."

People v. Hampton

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165957(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Humes

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Weeks after Hampton left his employment at a restaurant, the restaurant was robbed. During Hampton's January 2022 trial, the judge dismissed two jurors for reasons related to COVID-19 and seated the two remaining alternate jurors. After jury deliberations began, the judge was called away by a personal emergency. Another judge took her place. A juror subsequently tested positive for COVID-19. Hampton claimed that the original judge had made an off-the-record ruling prohibiting remote deliberations. After consulting the original judge, the substitute judge denied a mistrial and permitted the COVID-positive juror to deliberate remotely for one day, after which the jury returned its verdicts. The foreperson disclosed that the jury agreed on the verdicts while all the jurors were present in person; during the remote deliberations, the jury discussed only the lesser weapon enhancements on which it hung. Hampton was convicted of felony counts of second-degree robbery and false imprisonment but acquitted of accompanying firearm enhancements, and placed on probation for three years.

The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the substitute judge improperly relied on ex parte communications with the original judge and that the jury deliberations in which one juror participated remotely were unauthorized and unconstitutional. The judges’ communications were ethical and did not deny Hampton a fair trial. Any error in permitting the jury to deliberate remotely for one day was harmless because that deliberation did not result in a finding of guilt.

People v. Ortiz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H050117(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Danner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ortiz, born in 1960, was charged with 18 sex crimes committed against several minors in 2004-2018. In 2022, the jury found Ortiz guilty on multiple counts and found true the multiple-victim enhancement allegation. Ortiz was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 225 years to life.

The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by overruling Ortiz’s Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a Black prospective juror (S.H.). The record includes exchanges demonstrating S.H.’s inability to answer or understand questions, failure to answer questions, confusion, reluctance, timidity, and evasiveness. The trial court’s confirmation finding is supported by substantial evidence and the statutory explanation requirement was fulfilled. There was no violation of Ortiz’s constitutional rights. The court upheld the admission of testimony from a defense character witness about her daughter’s midtrial disclosure of molestation by Ortiz as probative of her opinion of Ortiz’s character and properly provided context for a change in her opinion. The CALCRIM 1193 jury instruction that expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any crimes, was proper.

People v. Shah

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A162676(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Markman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law, White Collar Crime

In 2008-2010, Shah engaged in fraudulent transactions involving three luxury condominiums owned by Hwang, ultimately using the property to obtain over $2 million in loans. Shah was convicted of multiple crimes. Enhancement allegations, including taking a property valued over $3.2 million and special findings, including a pattern of white-collar crime. were found true. A 2015 restitution order remains unpaid. Hwang filed a civil action against Shah and, in 2018, secured a civil judgment—over $3.8 million.

In 2021, the trial court levied property under Penal Code 186.11, the “Freeze and Seize” law, which is intended to prevent a defendant from disposing of assets pending trial, and then use the assets to pay restitution after conviction. Shah argued that a trial court must seize any properties under section 186.11 no later than the sentencing hearing.

The court of appeal affirmed. Shah sought to import time limitations into the statute and ignored the legislative purpose of section 186.11 and California’s over-arching statutory framework for restitution in criminal cases. California recognizes restitution for crime victims as a constitutional right. The court’s authority does not change even after the Courts of Appeal decide a criminal case. The lack of a disposition formally remanding Shah’s original appeal for further proceedings was no bar to the trial court’s levying order.

Peoplew v. Ponder

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166053(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Miller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Venson, her fiancé Mitchell, and her 11-year-old daughter were at a house party when a car pulled up. Ponder, an 18-year-old high school senior, got out and started shooting. Ponder admitted killing Venson, claiming he was reacting to a man pulling a gun on him. Ponder was convicted of second-degree murder, assault with a firearm, and shooting at an inhabited building. Ponder moved to strike firearm enhancements in the furtherance of justice (Penal Code 1385). The trial court made extensive findings regarding Ponder’s neurodevelopmental disorders, immaturity, and history of trauma and struck the enhancement for the assault offense, but declined to strike the 25-year-to-life enhancement (section 12022.53(d)) associated with the murder conviction.

In 2021, the court of appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion. On remand, the trial court struck that murder enhancement and imposed the lesser included enhancement. Ponder was resentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court failed to follow recent amendments to the sentencing laws, The record unmistakably shows the trial court would not sentence Ponder differently if it believed A.B. 518, amending section 654 and giving the trial court discretion, applied. Section 1385(c)(2), amended by Senate Bill 81 does not require dismissal of an enhancement when a mitigating circumstance is present unless the sentencing court finds dismissal would endanger public safety.

Colorado v. Walthour

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 55

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Hart

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On November 18, 2022, Ashleigh Walthour drove her car off a snowy road into some trees. She ran the four or five blocks to her home and called the Aurora Police Department. When the police arrived at Walthour’s home to speak with her, she smelled like alcohol and had slurred speech, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes. She admitted to having consumed a shooter of Jack Daniels and was unable to perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Walthour was arrested and taken to the Aurora City Jail, where she consented to a blood test. The police submitted Walthour’s blood sample to the CBI for processing on November 23. Walthour appeared in court for the first time on January 6, 2023. At that hearing, she notified the court that she would seek the assistance of the Public Defender’s Office. The court set a second hearing for February 6. However, at the second hearing, Walthour explained that she had not qualified for a public defender and would be representing herself. At the same hearing, the State said it had not yet received the blood test results from the CBI but that they “should” have the results “hopefully within the next week or two.” The court set a third pretrial conference for March 7 and directed the prosecution to disclose the test results by February 28 at 5 p.m. The prosecutor did not have any test results to disclose on that date. The trial court announced that it would suppress blood alcohol test results when no trial had been set and the prosecution had not yet received the results of the test from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”). A day later, on March 8, the prosecutor received the blood test results from the CBI. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(I)(b)(3), which required prosecutors to disclose the results of scientific exams such as blood alcohol tests to defendants “as soon as practicable but not later than [thirty-five] days before trial,” did not support the trial court's preemptive suppression. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Garnett v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 376, 2022

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Traynor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After arresting Aaron Garnett in whose care were three young children, the police promptly sought to locate the children’s parent or guardian. This search, initiated before sunrise on a cold and rainy day, led the police to a house where they were told the children’s mother lived and was sleeping. Once there, the police knocked, then banged, on the front door and loudly announced their presence. When no one answered, one of the officers went to the rear of the house where, after another round of knocking and announcing, the officer noticed the back door was unlocked. He pushed open the unlocked door and, peering into the interior of the residence with the benefit of a flashlight, saw a motionless body under a blanket at the foot of a stairway. Joined now by fellow officers, he entered the residence and found the lifeless body of Naquita Hill, the mother of one of the children whose welfare had motivated the police’s visit. Seven or so hours later, Garnett confessed that, during a heated argument, he had choked Hill until she slumped to the floor and beat her with his fist after that. After a jury trial, Garnett was convicted of Naquita Hill’s murder. He appealed, but the Delaware Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Garnett's conviction.

Bell v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22G0747

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Cortney Bell was convicted by jury of second degree murder, second degree cruelty to children, and felony contributing to the dependency of a minor in connection with the death of her infant daughter, Caliyah. The Court of Appeals reversed Bell’s convictions for second degree murder and cruelty to children on appeal, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support those charges. It affirmed her conviction for felony contributing to the dependency of a minor, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Bell’s conviction on that charge. Because the Supreme Court concluded, based on the facts of this case, that the evidence was insufficient to authorize a jury to conclude that Caliyah’s death was proximately caused by Bell’s conduct as alleged in the indictment, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Eubanks v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0519

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jessica Eubanks was convicted by jury of felony murder. Eubanks lived with her boyfriend, Shawn Hughes, and Shawn’s sister, Amy Hughes, who had severe developmental disabilities. Eubanks used heroin and methamphetamine and kept a large supply of heroin in the home. One evening when Shawn was out, Eubanks invited two people to the home to buy heroin. During the transaction, which she conducted in the main part of the home, some of the drug spilled “all over the place” and Eubanks tried to clean it up. Then she went out, leaving Amy home alone. The next morning Amy was found dead of heroin toxicity. Eubanks appealed. "Although Eubanks’s conviction tests the limits our felony-murder statute places on that offense," the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that based on precedent and the unusual facts of this case that the evidence was sufficient to authorize her conviction. "Eubanks’s possession of heroin with intent to distribute was dangerous to human life under the circumstances of this case because it was foreseeable that keeping a large amount of a deadly drug in a home where a highly vulnerable person lived, and engaging in drug transactions in areas that person could freely access, could lead to that person being fatally exposed to the drug." Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Hardy v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0443

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Deveric Hardy was convicted of malice murder for the November 2016 shooting death of Kyree Smith. He appealed that conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to introduce evidence that Smith had a violent character and by failing to request a jury instruction on accomplice corroboration. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hardy's judgment of conviction.

Rooks v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0801, S23A0783

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellants Joshua Rooks and Quatez Clark were convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2016 shooting death of Christopher Dean. Rooks contended the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Clark similarly contended the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on certain counts; he also claimed the court erred by failing to grant his motion for new trial on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 and by admitting under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) evidence showing that he participated in another murder 11 days after Dean’s murder and that he committed marijuana- and firearm-related crimes about two months after Dean’s murder. Finding no reversible error in either case, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed convictions in both cases.

State v. Brown

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0324

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for first-degree robbery and willful injury causing serious injury, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Defendant's convictions stemmed from his role in the baseball bat attack of a man outside his apartment complex, and a surveillance camera captured some of the altercation. The Supreme Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of first-degree robbery based on the victim's testimony and the corroborating surveillance video evidence of the attack; (2) the district court's failure to merge the convictions was not erroneous; and (3) Defendant was not prejudiced by the district court's decision to continue the trial for nine days due primarily to juror illness.

State v. Cook

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-0522

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree robbery and willful injury causing serious injury, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court imposed an illegal and unconstitutional sentence by failing to merge his two convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of willful injury causing serious injury; and (2) the district court did not err by not merging the willful injury causing serious injury conviction with the first-degree robbery conviction because there are additional elements of willful injury causing serious injury that are not encompassed within the elements of first-degree robbery under the dangerous weapon alternative.

In re Wrongful Conviction of Baumgarner

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125552

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Dameon Baumgarner's wrongful conviction claim seeking compensation under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-5004, holding that Baumgarner was "imprisoned" for purposes of the wrongful conviction compensation statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g).

Baumgarner was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to a ten-month prison term, suspended. After Baumgarner was released from jail, the court of appeals reversed his conviction. Thereafter, Baumgarner brought this action alleging a wrongful conviction under section 60-5004, under which he was required to establish that he was "convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned." The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that Baumgarner had not been "imprisoned" because he was not confined in a Kansas Department of Corrections facility. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Baumgarner was imprisoned for purposes of the wrongful conviction statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g), which contemplates sixty days imprisonment in a county jail as a condition of probation in felony cases.

Quinn v. State

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124674

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Marla J. Luckert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court judge summarily denying Defendant's motion for relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 and refusing to appoint him counsel, holding that the court of appeals properly affirmed Defendant's convictions based on res judicata principles.

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape and sentenced to 272 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant later brought his pro se motion under section 60-1507, asserting that his trial counsel did not adequately probe the alleged victim's veracity and that the alleged victim lied. The court summarily dismissed Defendant's case as untimely without appointing Defendant an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that Defendant's motion failed based on res judicata.

State v. Hopkins

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124851

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that the award of credit under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6615(a) is not limited to time spent "solely" in custody for the charge for which the defendant was being sentenced, thus affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of premeditated first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a hard fifty sentence on count 1 and sentenced count 2 to run concurrently. The court declined to grant Defendant any jail time credit. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because Defendant spent 572 days in jail while his case was pending he must be awarded 572 days in jail time credit against his hard 50 sentences; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a downward departure sentence.

State v. Jordan

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124724

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of, among other crimes, one count of first-degree felony murder based on the underlying inherently dangerous felony of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant failed to establish that the jury instructions on his fleeing-and-eluding charge created an alternative-means crime by listing more than one felony for which he was attempting to elude capture; (2) the grand jury indictment substituted by the State for a pending criminal complaint was sufficient to invoke the district court's jurisdiction under established precedent; (3) the substitution of the indictment complied with Defendant's due process rights; (4) the prosecutor did not err during closing argument by telling the jury that a State's witness had no motive to be untruthful; and (5) the cumulative error doctrine did not apply.

Louisiana in the interest of D.W.

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-CK-01654

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to review the court of appeal’s determination that the State failed to prove that 16-year-old D.W. was the person who entered a sheriff’s vehicle and stole firearms from inside it, and therefore that the evidence was insufficient to support the delinquency adjudication for burglary involving a firearm, La. R.S. 14:62, and theft of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:67.15. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the State presented sufficient evidence that D.W. was a principal, in accordance with La. R.S. 14:24, to these felony-grade delinquent acts regardless of whether he personally entered the vehicle and took the firearms that were inside it himself. Therefore, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the delinquency adjudication and dispositions imposed by the juvenile court, which were then affirmed.

Harris v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-01113-SCT

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Griffis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Charlie Harris appealed his life sentence and the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. In 2001, Harris was convicted of depraved heart murder and sentenced to life without parole. His conviction and life-without-parole sentence were affirmed on appeal. The trial court did resentence Harris to life in prison: "It appears that Mr. Harris has been an exemplary prisoner while he was incarcerated. However, the sentence of the [trial] [c]ourt at the time was that of murder. At the time of his sentence, there was no differentiation between depraved heart murder and deliberate design murder. The appellate courts have already addressed this issue and it was not—the sentencing was not retroactive. This court will sentence the Defendant according to the law at the time that he went to trial and was originally sentenced and should be sentenced, in this Court’s estimation. The Defendant will be sentenced to a term of life in prison." In his amended motion for reconsideration, Harris argued his life sentence exceeded the current maximum sentence for a depraved heart murder conviction under the Louisiana legislature’s revisions to the murder statutes. Harris asked the trial court to set aside his life sentence and grant him a new sentencing hearing. The trial court denied the motion. Harris timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.

State v. Letherman

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 196

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Mike McGrath

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's felony sentence imposed in connection with his conviction for felony driving under the influence (DUI) per se, holding that the presentence investigation report (PSI) in this case did not constitute competent proof if its accuracy is challenged.

The district court found Defendant guilty of DUI per se and filed a PSI. The district court relied on the PSI and ordered a felony sentence of five years' incarceration with three years suspended. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that Defendant's sentence was unlawful because the district court erred by taking the disputed PSI, without further of Defendant's prior convictions, as competent proof of Defendant's prior convictions.

State v. Hammond

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 362

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court overruling Defendant's motion to suppress and convicting her of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia following a stipulated bench trial, holding that the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant's motion to suppress.

In denying Defendant's suppression motion, the trial court concluded that Defendant consented to a search of her vehicle, in which certain illegal items were found, and that a subsequent search of Defendant's person occurred incident to a valid arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) probable cause existed to arrest Defendant, and the subsequent search of her person occurred incident to a valid arrest; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error.

New Hampshire v. Chandler

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Dockets: 2019-0314, 2021-0314

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Keith Chandler was convicted by jury on five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, two counts of attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and two counts of felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion in limine to preclude the admission of a printed image of electronically stored information; (2) denied his motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) failed to disclose records following in camera review. THe New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded for the trial court to review the confidential records in accordance with the standard set forth in New Hampshire v. Girard, 173 N.H. 619 (2020). "When the trial court conducted its in camera review, it did not have the benefit of our opinion in [Girard]. We agree with the parties that this case should be remanded for the purpose of having the trial court review any undisclosed records again, in accordance with the standard set forth in Girard. If the trial court concludes that the records do contain evidence that should have been disclosed to the defense, the court may release that evidence to the parties with any necessary protective order, taking into account the victim’s rights ... If the court releases any evidence to the parties, the court should then provide the parties with an opportunity to make arguments as to whether a new trial is warranted."

People v. Douglas

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05350

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Singas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the firearm found in the vehicle he was driving, holding that the People sustained their burden of demonstrating that the inventory search protocol in this case met "the constitutional minimum."

Two New York Police Department officers observed Defendant commit multiple traffic infractions while driving, stopped him, and arrested him for carrying a gravity knife in his pocket. At the precinct, the officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and recovered a firearm from the truck. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm on the grounds that the NYPD's inventory search protocol was unconstitutional. The motion was denied, and Defendant pled guilty to criminal possession of a firearm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to overcome the People's proof establishing a valid inventory search protocol.

Stevens v. N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05351

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's grant of rulemaking authority to the Commission on Forensic Sciences was sufficient to authorize the Commission's promulgation of the Familial DNA Search (FDS) Regulations codified at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 6192.1 and 6192.3.

In 2017, the DNA Subcommittee submitted to the Commission a recommendation to authorize familial DNA searches. The Commission adopted the recommendation, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) formally adopted the recommendation as part of the FDS Regulations. Petitioners brought this N.Y. C.L.P.R. 78 proceeding arguing that Respondents lacked statutory authority to promulgate the FDA Regulations, therefore violating the New York Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had the statutory authority to promulgate the FDS Regulations.

State v. Julius

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 95A22

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Berger

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and finding no error in her criminal trial, holding that the search for evidence in this case violated the Fourth Amendment and that remand was required.

Defendant was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession with intent o manufacture, sell, or deliver methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the search and subsequent seizure of contraband did not comport with the Fourth Amendment; and (2) remand was required for the trial court to determine if the evidence should be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule.

State v. Pickens

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 276A22

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Earls

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant, a former chorus teacher at a middle school, of first-degree rape and first-degree statutory sexual offense with a child, Ellen, a middle school student, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

At issue on appeal, among other things, was whether evidence of Defendant's alleged rape of another student, Kathleen, was properly admitted during trial under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals to vacate Defendant's sentence and otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in admitting Kathleen's Rule 404(b) testimony; and (2) did not improperly consider Defendant's choice not to plead guilty and exercise his right to a jury trial when it imposed Defendant's sentence or when it imposed consecutive sentences on Defendant.

State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3832

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing two complaints Appellant filed seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that Appellant was not entitled to writs of mandamus or prohibition vacating his convictions and sentence.

Appellant filed both a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the trial court to vacate his criminal convictions and sentence and a complaint for a writ of prohibition against the trial court raising the same underlying issues. The court of appeals denied the writs, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to challenge any violation of his right to counsel; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a writ requiring the trial court to review issues related to the withdrawal of his counsel on direct appeal.

State ex rel. Payne v. Rose

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3801

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Kevin Payne against Kelly Rose, an inspector at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that Payne did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.

Payne, an inmate at RCI, sent a public-records request to Rose for a copy of, among other things, JPay support ticket number MACI 1220002928. Rose responded that she obtained the requested record and provided a copy of it to Payne. Payne brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Rose to produce the requested record and statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Payne received his requested record before instituting this action he never had a cognizable claim in mandamus; and (2) statutory damages did not accrue.

State v. Gwynne

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3851

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated its decision in State v. Gwynne, __ N.E.3d __ (Ohio 2022) (Gwynne IV) and affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in this sentencing dispute, holding that the court of appeals properly applied the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) in concluding that the record supported the trial court's consecutive sentence findings.

Appellant pleaded guilty to seventeen counts of second-degree burglary, among other offenses. The trial court made the findings required under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences and ordered the felony sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in Gwynne IV, holding on de novo review that the findings required by section 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive prison sentences on an offender must be made in consideration of the aggregate term. The Supreme Court then granted the State's motion for reconsideration, vacated its decision in Gwynne IV and affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive sentence findings, and those findings must be upheld unless they are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record; and (2) the appellate court properly applied that standard.

State v. Jordan

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3800

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(2), holding that a jury can reasonably infer that a defendant knew a victim to be substantially impaired so as to convict him of sexual imposition under the statute.

Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(1) and (2) for his sexual contact with woman who was blind and suffered from unspecified developmental disabilities. The jury found Defendant guilty of both counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for violating section 2907.06(A)(2), concluding that the victim was not substantially impaired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) knowledge of a victim's "substantial impairment" can be proved both by the defendant's knowledge of the victim's blindness and evidence of the nature of the interactions between the defendant and the developmentally disabled victim; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to find that Defendant knew that the victim's blindness, together with her developmental disabilities, substantially impaired her ability to appraise the nature of and control of Defendant's conduct.

Pennsylvania v. Conforti

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 794 CAP

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) court’s grant of relief to Appellee Michael Conforti, vacating his convictions for murder of the first degree, kidnapping, rape, criminal conspiracy to commit murder, criminal conspiracy to commit rape and criminal conspiracy to commit kidnapping and his resulting death sentence. Conforti’s convictions and sentence stem from the 1990 kidnapping, rape, and murder of Kathleen Harbison. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s determination that the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose another accused perpetrator, James Bellman’s psychological reports. Bellman testified against Conforti at Conforti's trial. Relevant here, immediately prior to a November 2021 PCRA hearing, the Commonwealth provided Conforti’s counsel with two mental health reports relating to Bellman from 1980. The reports were created as part of a criminal case Bellman had in Wayne County in 1979. Bellman was then evaluated by two psychiatrists, both of whom prepared written reports diagnosing Bellman as a sociopath. The PCRA court found that the reports “remained in the possession of the Commonwealth and only surfaced” during the PCRA hearing on November 5, 2021. As such, according to the PCRA court, none of the evidence of Bellman’s mental health issues was disclosed to Conforti’s defense counsel during trial. The PCRA court found that the information contained in the reports would have been extremely damaging to Bellman’s credibility. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court's determination the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose Bellman's psychological reports: "because of the importance of Bellman’s testimony, if those reports were properly disclosed there is a reasonable probability the result of Conforti’s trial would have been different, as it could have led the jury to discredit Bellman’s testimony and given more credit to Conforti’s testimony that he was not involved in Ms. Harbison’s murder. Conforti was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s nondisclosure."

Ex parte Couch, Hammons

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0422-22

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Appellants in consolidated cases filed pretrial writs of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of portions of the statutes they were charged under. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the cognizability of their pretrial claims and the meaning of “immediate release”—release from what? The Court held the facial challenges were cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if a grant of relief would result in immediate release from prosecution for an alleged offense. Release from prosecution for every alleged offense is not required. In Appellant Tonya Couch's case, the claim was not cognizable: if her indictments alleged one offense committed via four different, alternative, statutory manner and means, she challenged the constitutionality of two of those purported manner and means in her habeas application, leaving two unchallenged. If she were granted relief, her single-count indictment would still stand, and trial on it could still proceed. A grant of relief on her claim would not result in her release from prosecution for the offense alleged in her indictment. In Appellant Glenda Hammons’ case, her claim was cognizable because she challenged the constitutionality of the statute defining two counts of her three-count indictment. If she were granted relief, she would be released from prosecution for two alleged offenses, and trial on those counts could not proceed though trial on the third one could.

Webinar: Is Hyperconnectivity Helping or Harming the Legal Professional?

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In a fast-paced, always-connected world, it is no secret that technology plays a significant role in our daily lives. How is our constantly connected culture impacting the mental health of lawyers? How should the legal profession react? Join us in an upcoming webinar exploring the answers to these questions.

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