United States v. Buoi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1518

Opinion Date: October 13, 2023

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343, and one count of making false statements to a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.

Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury of Defendant's intent to defraud for his wire convictions; (2) there was sufficient evidence of Defendant's intent to influence a financial institution; and (3) there was no adequate record with which to determine the effectiveness of counsel's decisions, and therefore, Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were dismissed without prejudice.

United States v. Donald

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1723

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant on federal drug- and gun-related charges, holding that the district court erred by failing to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to law enforcement because the government failed to satisfy its burden to show that Defendant validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute those drugs; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement immediately following his arrest, arguing that the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant understood his Miranda rights and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived them. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government failed to show that Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and this error was not harmless.

Cook v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 16-4107

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioners appealed from orders of the district court denying their petitions for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, following their 2012 convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence – specifically, the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy – that caused the death of another person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) and (j). On appeal, Petitioners contend that the district court erroneously enforced the collateral-attack waivers in their plea agreements, which they argue are unenforceable in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
 
The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal and explained that subsequent changes in the law do not allow Petitioners to back out of their valid agreements with the government; the waivers are enforceable. The court explained that a waiver of the right to bring a postconviction challenge is presumptively enforceable, even after the legal landscape shifts. A defendant who wishes to maintain his right to collaterally attack his conviction in the event of unforeseen legal developments may, of course, attempt to negotiate more favorable waiver terms with the government before pleading guilty. But where the waiver itself is clear, unambiguous, knowingly and voluntarily entered, and supported by consideration – here, the government’s agreement not to pursue charges or arguments that could have resulted in a much higher sentence – the terms of the plea agreements must be enforced.

United States v. Gates

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2134

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the forty-five-year sentence imposed by the district court following her guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to sexually exploit a child and two substantive counts of sexual exploitation of a child. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred when it (1) predetermined her sentence at the outset of the sentencing proceeding, (2) failed to verify at sentencing whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the presentence investigation report, (3) miscalculated her offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and (4) imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s contentions that the district court predetermined her sentence and imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment. The court also rejected Defendant’s claim that the district court’s purported miscalculation of her offense level under the Guidelines warrants remand in this case. With respect to Defendant’s remaining argument, the court agreed that the district court failed to verify whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the PSR in advance of sentencing, as is required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A). The court concluded that the error was not prejudicial.

United States v. Alpha Painting & Construction Co., Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Dockets: 19-3774, 19-3679

Opinion Date: September 22, 2023

Judge: Theodore Alexander McKee

Areas of Law: Construction Law, Criminal Law, Government Contracts, White Collar Crime

In 2018, Kousisis and Alpha Painting were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The charges arose from false documents filed concerning “disadvantaged business enterprise” status in transportation construction projects for which the U.S. Department of Transportation provided funds through the Federal Highway Administration to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The district court imposed a 20-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), which corresponds to a loss of $9.50 million-$25 million, noting that the actual loss to the government was not measurable at the time of sentencing and concluding that Alpha’s “ill-gotten profits” represented an appropriate measure of loss.

The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions. The defendants secured PennDOT’s money using false pretenses and the value PennDOT received from the partial performance of those painting and repair services is no defense to criminal prosecution for fraud. The court vacated the calculation of the amount of loss for sentencing purposes, noting the extreme complexity of the case. The victim’s loss must have been an objective of the fraudulent scheme; it is insufficient if that loss is merely an incidental byproduct of the scheme. The court separately vacated a forfeiture order of the entire profit amount on the contracts.

US v. Garfield Redd

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-6957

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: WYNN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment, applying the sentencing enhancement provided by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), after finding that Defendant had three qualifying predicate convictions for a “serious drug offense” or “violent felony.” But after the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, striking down the “residual clause” of ACCA’s violent-felony definition as unconstitutional, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015), Defendant filed a Section 2255 motion to vacate his ACCA sentence. He argued that Maryland first-degree assault—which formed the basis for two of his ACCA predicate offenses—was not a “violent felony” under ACCA. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, and he appealed.
 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s Section 2255 motion, vacated Defendant’s ACCA sentence. The court explained that it is quite plain from Maryland’s statutory scheme and from the case law interpreting it, that reckless conduct is included. Therefore, Defendant’s inability to point to a specific case is not dispositive. Rather, the terms of the statute and the decisions of Maryland courts show that a Maryland prosecutor could bring charges for first-degree assault against a defendant for recklessly committing an assault with a firearm. The court concluded that the Maryland first-degree-assault statute sets out an indivisible offense and that one of the modalities of that offense—assault with a firearm—can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness.

USA v. Foreman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-50986

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: Edith Brown Clement

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of transporting illegal aliens and conspiracy to transport illegal aliens. But the government used inadmissible evidence to prove that the person being transported was in the United States unlawfully. Defendant challenged the district court’s ruling admitting the G-166F into evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment.
 
The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction for transporting illegal aliens but affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that an alien-smuggling investigation report is not “essentially ministerial” as this court found the I-213 to be in Noria. 945 F.3d at 860. Instead, it is a criminal investigation report—the sort of document the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court therefore found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the G-166F into evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the court explained that it is the government’s burden to establish that using the challenged investigative report was constitutional. The government has not met that burden here. Therefore, admitting the G-166F into evidence violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court explained that whether the men in Defendant’s car were actually illegal aliens is not relevant to any element in the conspiracy to transport illegal aliens charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy.

USA v. Harris

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30030

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.
 
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him.

USA v. Renteria

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50242

Opinion Date: October 12, 2023

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with and convicted of (1) producing child pornography, (2) committing that offense while being required to register as a sex offender, (3) possessing child pornography, and (4) sex trafficking of a child. All four charges involved his conduct with “Minor Victim-1” or “the Minor.” Defendant appealed his conviction for Count 4, sex trafficking of a child. He maintains that in light of Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014), 18 U.S.C. Section 1591 should not be interpreted to reach his conduct, which he terms a “purely local sex offense.”
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that overturning Defendant’s conviction under Bond requires him to show three things: (1) that allowing his conviction would “significantly change the federal-state balance,” (2) that Congress has not included a clear indication that they meant to reach “purely local crimes,” and (3) that his is a purely local crime. The court explained without expressing any view on (1) or (3), it determines that Defendant failed to demonstrate (2). Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes.” The court explained that it is not alone in adopting a broader interpretation of Section 1591 despite Bond. Because Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes,” Defendant’s argument under Bond fails.

USA v. Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10316

Opinion Date: October 13, 2023

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of sex trafficking of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). On appeal, he challenged the introduction of evidence pulled from his cellphone using Cellebrite technology. He claimed that the district court erred by permitting a police investigator to introduce the Cellebrite extract without first being qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when law enforcement uses Cellebrite to pull information from a phone, and a lay juror would require no additional interpretation to understand that information, the party does not need to introduce the evidence through an expert. The court explained that all the investigator testified to was how he downloaded the information from the phones using Cellebrite technology. At no point did he speak to the reliability of the software, except that he double-checked some of the reports by looking directly at the source material in the phones themselves. To that end, he did not state any information on how Cellebrite operated in a technical sense, nor information that was beyond the knowledge of an average cell phone user. Without a showing of specialized knowledge, the mere use and understanding of a Cellebrite extract at trial is insufficient to require an expert. Operating a Cellebrite device and understanding its report require knowledge in the realm of a reasonably tech-savvy layperson, regardless of the investigator’s testimony that he was a “certified” operator and analyzer.

United States v. Roberts

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3587

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: John K. Bush

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Roberts was convicted for federal crimes relating to the death of Caldwell, who was in a child-custody dispute with his ex-wife (Roberts’ girlfriend). Roberts tried to kill, or at least seriously harm, Caldwell by luring him through false guise to a remote location. Caldwell escaped but was later murdered after a family counseling session.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Roberts’ arguments under the Confrontation Clause, federal evidentiary rules, and the attorney-client privilege, that the district court improperly admitted evidence related to the earlier attack and other incriminating proof and his two constitutional challenges to the interstate stalking statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. 2261A, claiming that it exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that the counts of his conviction are multiplicitous. Testimonial statements are allowed into evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), for “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused . . . the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Caldwell was the declarant of the written-witness statement and an affidavit, which were to be used against Roberts, who intentionally caused Caldwell’s unavailability as a witness. The court also upheld the admission of “excited utterances’ made by Roberts to Caldwell’s attorney.

United States v. Terry

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1961

Opinion Date: October 13, 2023

Judge: John M. Rogers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Terry pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing a mixture containing fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and was sentenced to 57 months of imprisonment, at the high end of his U.S.S.G. range. He challenged the imposition of the Guidelines’ two-point enhancement for maintaining premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). Without the two-level enhancement, the Guidelines range would have been 37-46 months.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Terry sold fentanyl from the address and permitted the head of the conspiracy to use his property for drug distribution. The district court adopted the facts in the PSR, stating “the government’s argument as related to the facts which justify the enhancement, are spot on correct.” The PSR listed multiple activities involving Terry’s residence. The conclusion does not change even if no drugs were ever recovered from the house, there is no evidence that Terry cooked, manufactured, or packaged drugs there, no tools of the trade were found at his house, no money was seized from his house, and Terry had other legitimate employment. Distributing drugs “need not be the sole purpose” for the premises; it need only be one of the primary uses for the premises.

Tousis v. Billiot

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2211

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The DEA placed a tracking device on Tousis’s car. On June 2, agents believed that Tousis would go to Turner’s Aurora home to procure drugs. They watched Tousis enter Turner’s garage carrying a bag, and then leave carrying the bag, which had changed in appearance, suggesting a drug transaction. The Sheriff’s Department attempted a traffic stop. Tousis fled; the tracking device showed 115.2 miles per hour on I-88. Agent Billiot, driving an unmarked car, followed Tousis off the highway. Tousis was then driving at normal speeds, but taking evasive actions. At a red light, Billiot activated his emergency lights and siren, and pulled in front of Tousis’s car, 10-25 feet away. Billiot grabbed his firearm, exited his car wearing a DEA vest, and ran toward Tousis’s car, shouting commands.

As Tousis moved the car forward, with nothing between Billiot and Tousis’s car, Billiot fired a single shot. The bullet struck the steering wheel; a fragment hit Tousis in the neck as he was maneuvering his vehicle away from Billiot. Tousis’s car then accelerated and struck a light pole. Tousis died. Officers recovered 300 grams of cocaine from Tousis’s car.

In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Billiot qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The material undisputed facts demonstrate that Billiot fired the fatal shot fearing for his own safety and for that of the public if Tousis resumed his reckless flight. There was no precedent warning Billiot that his actions amounted to excessive force.

United States v. Agbi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2573

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Internet Law, White Collar Crime

Agbi, born and raised in Nigeria but a resident of the U.S. since 2016, acted as a middleman in a scheme to use fake online dating accounts to solicit hundreds of thousands of dollars from unwitting elderly people. Agbi collected cash at his Indianapolis apartment, took his “cut,” and transferred the rest to accounts in Nigeria. More than 30 months after his arrest, Agbi’s counsel notified the government that Agbi intended to pursue a duress defense, claiming, for the first time, that members of the conspiracy located in Nigeria had threatened Agbi’s family. The district court granted a motion to preclude the defense. At trial, two of the scheme’s victims testified that they were deceived into believing that they were in relationships and sent “hundreds of thousands of dollars.” Secret Service agents described the details of a controlled delivery and Agbi’s subsequent interview.

Agbi was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; use of a fictitious name in furtherance of mail fraud, section 1342; conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 1341, 1349; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 1956(a)(1), 1956(h) and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence supporting each count was legally sufficient to support a conviction. The district court appropriately employed the obstruction of justice enhancement based on its finding that Agbi knowingly submitted a “fake” police report concerning threats against his family.

United States v. Fieste

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1739

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Fieste was charged with threatening to assault and murder two federal judges, three former U.S. presidents, and the current President. She is currently incompetent to stand trial. Fieste's mental illness causes her to experience delusions. In custody, Fieste refused the antipsychotic medication that experts believe will restore her competence. The government obtained permission to involuntarily medicate her to render her competent to stand trial. The order was stayed pending appeal.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed but remanded. Fieste’s pretrial detention is insufficient to overcome the government’s interest in prosecution although Fieste’s anticipated Guidelines range is 12-18 months and she will “likely face a sentence of time served” if convicted. The district court properly conducted a holistic assessment to conclude that the proposed treatment plan is substantially likely to render Fieste competent and that the side effects are substantially unlikely to significantly interfere with her ability to participate in the proceedings. The order permitted Fieste to be medicated with “long-acting injectable anti-psychotic medication, along with other medications” suggesting impermissible flexibility to administer unspecified medications. The district court must provide a dosage range based on the expert’s recommendation or some other appropriate evidence, whether directly in its order or by incorporating a sufficiently detailed treatment plan.

United States v. Medrano

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3219

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A supplier shipped substances containing detectable amounts of methamphetamine, cocaine, and MDMA from California to Indiana, where Medrano and others used the U.S. Post Office and a post office employee to distribute the drugs in Indiana. Officers tracked Medrano to an Indiana motel and attempted to arrest him. Medrano fled and led officers on a high-speed chase. Medrano evaded arrest, but officers found his truck and took a co-conspirator into custody. They obtained a warrant to search Medrano’s motel room and found his burner phone; drug paraphernalia including scales, baggies, and substances used to dilute methamphetamine; and the key to a post office box, which Medrano had received from a post office employee. Officers tracked Medrano to another motel. Medrano again led officers on a high-speed chase and avoided arrest. Officers executed a search warrant for Medrano’s motel room and found drug paraphernalia, and another phone belonging to Medrano. Officers finally arrested Medrano at an Indiana residence, where they discovered methamphetamine, paraphernalia, and a third phone, containing text messages between Medrano and “Rob Marshalltown.” The texts were later introduced at trial.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Medrano’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Any error in admitting the text messages was harmless, given the totality of the evidence.

United States v. Storme

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2615

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Storme faced multiple charges of cyberstalking and unauthorized intrusion into a cell phone. He was ordered released on bond into the custody of his mother subject to conditions. He immediately attempted suicide. Months later, Pretrial Services reported that Storme had violated his curfew over 30 times and had been arrested for allegedly stalking a fourth woman. Storme was abusing alcohol and expressing suicidal ideation. The court did not his revoke release. Storme's mother moved to Virginia. The court did not appoint a new custodian. Months later, the court received a report from Storme’s therapist, expressing concern that Storme would kill himself if he thought the court might deny his motion to dismiss. Storme then began transferring assets to his mother and appeared multiple times in court to watch unrelated proceedings before his assigned judge.

The district court heard arguments, then, without advance notice, revoked Storme’s pretrial release and ordered him detained, without making supporting findings. Storme began slamming his head to the floor and urging the marshals to kill him. In a holding cell, he tried to hang himself. After review by the Seventh Circuit, the government filed a motion to revoke. The district court granted its motion, finding probable cause to believe that, while on release, Storme committed crimes and otherwise violated his release conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the court reached the correct conclusion, based on the ongoing threat to the community, despite procedural irregularities under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. 3142(d)).

United States v. Jacob Monteer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3659

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with attempted bank robbery involving assault with a dangerous weapon. The district court found Defendant guilty of the five offenses and sentenced him to 230 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any offense; the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress involuntary custodial statements he made to an FBI agent; and the district court erred by failing to include the term “knowingly” in reciting the elements of the Count II, III, and IV offenses when explaining its decision during a post-trial hearing.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court considers the evidence submitted at trial and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining whether the government has proved the offenses charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the indictment charged that Defendant “knowingly” brandished and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count II), “knowingly” discharged and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count III), and “knowingly” discharged and used an AR-15 rifle during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count IV). The court explained that neither filed a post-trial motion challenging the court’s findings and conclusions even though stand-by counsel was granted a one-month extension of time to do so. The evidence that Defendant committed these three offenses “knowingly” was overwhelming. There was no error, plain or otherwise.

United States v. Lorenzo Lemons, Sr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2753

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: ERICKSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), after law enforcement discovered a gun on him during an investigatory stop. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, claiming the officers’ mistaken belief that he was a wanted fugitive nine inches taller than him rendered the stop unreasonable. The district court denied his motion and sentenced him to a term of 37 months’ imprisonment.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed explaining that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the mistaken identification justified the detention. The court explained that here, the Officers had sufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion justifying Defendant’s detention. First, the time of the encounter. It was 12:30 a.m. when the Officers began their surveillance, and they detained Defendant at approximately 1:50 a.m. Second, the encounter took place in a high-crime area. The Officers were aware of multiple reports of subjects in that neighborhood with firearms, and the apartment Defendant freely entered was associated with an armed and dangerous fugitive. Third, Defendant’s behavior when he became aware of law enforcement’s presence.

THOMAS CREECH, ET AL V. JOSH TEWALT, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-35069

Opinion Date: October 13, 2023

Judge: BENNETT

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff is an Idaho prisoner facing execution by lethal injection. He challenged Idaho’s execution practices. He alleged that these practices: 1) interfere with his ability to challenge the State’s method of execution as cruel and unusual punishment; 2) inhibit his ability to seek clemency; 3) inflict mental anguish; 4) increase the risk of an unconstitutionally painful execution; 5) treat similarly situated prisoners unequally; 6) violate the separation of powers under the Idaho Constitution; and 7) contravene Idaho Code Section 19-2716’s requirement that the director of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) establish procedures governing executions. On remand, and in light of then-co-plaintiff’s scheduled execution, the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the district court violated the rule of mandate by denying leave to amend in connection with the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint. The court explained that although its decision in Pizzuto I noted parenthetically that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend the complaint, the court did not foreclose the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or address whether, in connection with such a dismissal, further amendment would be futile. The court agreed with the district court that amendment of several of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the First Amendment claims based on access to execution-related information.

USA V. DANIEL DRAPER

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 17-15104

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Nguyen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that his Section 924(c) conviction and its mandatory 15-year consecutive sentence should be vacated because his predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does not qualify as a crime of violence.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The panel wrote that for purposes of Section 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to human life. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter requires at least an “extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of mind. The panel held that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s Section 2255 motion.

California v. Allen

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E079475(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: Menetrez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Joshua Allen appealed his convictions for possessing a controlled substance while armed with a firearm and possessing an unregistered and loaded firearm while in a vehicle. He argued on appeal that the laws violate dthe Second Amendment as interpreted by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __ [142 S.Ct. 2111] (2022). The Court of Appeal rejected the constitutional challenges, and published its analysis concerning possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm to confirm that California v. Gonzalez, 75 Cal.App.5th 907, 912-916 (2022) remained good law. Nevertheless, the Court vacated Allen’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because the Court agreed with the parties that Allen’s sentence violated Penal Code section 654.

California v. Coca

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E079703(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: Menetrez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The San Bernardino County District Attorney (the District Attorney) appealed a trial court order granting Karla Coca’s petition under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate a misdemeanor conviction. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Coca failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “the conviction . . . being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” The Court accordingly reversed the order.

California v. Manzo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E079991(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Codrington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff-appellant, The Riverside County District Attorney, appealed a trial court’s dismissal of three felony charges against defendant-respondent Danny Manzo due to evidence lost during the prosecution’s five-year delay in prosecuting the case after filing charges against defendant. Because there was no evidence that the loss of evidence prejudiced defendant, the Court reversed the order dismissing the complaint.

California v. Molina

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061280(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Goethals

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the middle of the global COVID-19 pandemic, a jury convicted Dominic Molina of committing various sexual crimes against his girlfriend’s young daughter. Molina contended that COVID-19 safety protocols implemented at trial, particularly the use of masks and socially distanced seating arrangements, deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial, and further that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by asking the trial court to disclose to prospective jurors that he was in custody. The Court of Appeal found neither argument had any merit, and affirmed the judgment.

California v. Quan

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061191(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Goethals

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In October 2010, Quang Van Quan was convicted by jury on three counts of first degree murder, and found true two felony murder special circumstance allegations that the murders took place during the commission of a burglary, robbery, or attempted robbery. Quan petitioned for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) based on changes made by the Legislature to limit accomplice liability under the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Quan’s petition and found Quan was ineligible for resentencing. In his briefing, Quan raised numerous claims of error by the trial court. The Court of Appeal addressed none because the Court found Quan was correct that his constitutional and statutory rights to be personally present at the hearing were violated, and the Court agreed the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying his resentencing petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.

California v. Saavedra

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061556(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant Jose Saavedra appealed an order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now Pen. Code, § 1172.6). He contended he made a prima facie claim for relief and, therefore, the trial court erred by not issuing an order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeal affirmed because the factual basis for Saavedra’s guilty plea established as a matter of law that Saavedra was ineligible for relief.

P. v. Aguirre

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323282(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: BALTODANO

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Ventura County District Attorney charged Defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm, ammunition and a machine gun. As to each charge, it was alleged that Defendant suffered a 2021 prior strike conviction for possessing a firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section 186.22 to require evidence that the firearm possession provides more than a reputational benefit to the street gang. Because no such evidence supported Defendant’s prior conviction, the trial court concluded that it no longer qualified as a strike. Defendant pleaded no contest to the three charges against him and was sentenced to two years in state prison. The district attorney appealed.
 
The Second Appellate District vacated the judgment and reversed the order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the strike allegations. The court explained that when it enacted Assembly Bill No. 333, the Legislature found that gang enhancements have not been shown to reduce crime or violence. The Legislature also found that these enhancements have been applied inconsistently and disproportionately against people of color. They have additionally been applied to minor crimes and have been used to “legitimize severe punishment.” However, the court explained that while these are valid concerns, it is not the province of the court to apply legislative concerns to a statutory scheme the Legislature has left unchanged.

P. v. Simmons

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B309921(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 12, 2023

Judge: GILBERT

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant appealed his conviction, by jury, of the attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder and fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly. It acquitted Appellant of a second count of attempted murder on the same victim. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison plus a 20-year enhancement term for the firearm use and a concurrent term of 27 months on the evading conviction. Appellant contends that numerous evidentiary, procedural, and instructional errors occurred at his trial. Further, the court noted that a primary issue is the contention that the prosecutor violated the RJA, section 745 and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue at the sentencing hearing.
 
The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that the Legislature acted within its law-making authority when it declared in the RJA that the use of racially discriminatory language in a criminal trial constitutes a miscarriage of justice, that the prosecutor violated the statute when she referred to Appellant’s complexion and “ambiguous ethnic presentation” as reasons to doubt his credibility, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to bring this statutory violation to the attention of the trial court at the earliest possible opportunity. The court found that because Appellant’s trial counsel failed to raise the violation at the sentencing hearing, the trial court has not yet had the opportunity to exercise its discretion to select which of the enumerated remedies it would impose. Consequently, the court remanded the matter to the trial court so it may exercise its discretion in this regard.

People v. Coddington

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166124(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Humes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2016, Coddington was charged with assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury and making a criminal threat, with special allegations of great bodily injury and allegations: that Coddington previously had been convicted of a serious felony, had a prior strike conviction, and had served three prior prison terms. Coddington pleaded guilty to the assault with the special allegation of great bodily injury, admitting the allegations, including one prison prior. The court sentenced Coddington to 13 years: the lower term of two years for the assault, doubled because of the prior strike, plus three years for great bodily injury, plus five years for the serious felony allegation, plus one year for the prison prior.

In 2022, Coddington moved to be resentenced, based on the intervening elimination of sentence enhancements for prison priors unless the prior term was for a sexually violent offense, Penal Code 1172.75(a). The court reduced Coddington’s sentence to 12 years, the entire relief Coddington had requested. On appeal, Coddington first argued that he was entitled to further reductions under Senate Bill 1393, giving courts discretion to dismiss or strike a prior serious felony allegation, and Senate Bill 81, which specifies factors that the court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements. The court of appeal remanded for a full resentencing, noting that if the court indicates that it will further reduce Coddington’s sentence, the prosecution may withdraw its assent to the plea agreement.

People v. Pittman

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A161815(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 13, 2023

Judge: Goldman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Pittman was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison for a 1993 second-degree murder. Pittman, then 21 years old, committed the crime with two others, who were 16 and 17 years old. At a 2017 parole hearing, Pittman provided new inculpatory statements. Later, the trial court relied on Pittman’s parole hearing testimony to conclude he was not entitled to relief under Penal Code section 1172.6,1 which allows individuals to petition for relief if they were convicted of murder under theories invalidated by Senate Bill 1437 (natural and probable consequences doctrine of murder liability); the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder under California law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. A court “may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law [and] new or additional evidence” offered by either party.

The court of appeal reversed and remanded. Pittman’s parole hearing testimony could be considered by the trial court and all of the evidence, taken together, could constitute substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s decision if there were no other circumstances warranting consideration. However, Pittman’s youth is a relevant factor in assessing whether he formed the requisite mental state for conviction, which the trial court did not consider.

Colorado v. Seymour

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 53

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: William W. Hood, III

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two months after an apparent arson left five people dead, the Denver Police Department (“DPD”) had no suspects. They employed an unconventional investigative technique: a “reverse-keyword warrant.” Google disclosed to DPD a list that included five Colorado internet protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with devices that had searched for the location of the fire in a roughly two-week period before it occurred. Based in part on this information, law enforcement eventually charged Gavin Seymour and two others with multiple counts of first degree murder. Seymour moved to suppress the fruit of the warrant, arguing that it lacked probable cause and particularity. The trial court denied Seymour’s suppression motion. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, finding: (1) under the Colorado Constitution, Seymour had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his Google search history even when revealed only in connection with his IP address and not his name and that, under both the Colorado Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, he also had a constitutionally protected possessory interest in that same history; (2) Seymour’s Google search history implicated his right to freedom of expression; (3) the warrant at issue adequately particularized the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (4) the warrant required individualized probable cause and that its absence here rendered the warrant constitutionally defective; and (5) law enforcement obtained and executed the warrant in good faith, so the evidence shouldn’t be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. "At every step, law enforcement acted reasonably to carry out a novel search in a constitutional manner. Suppressing the evidence here wouldn’t deter police misconduct."

Givens v. City of Chicago

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 127837

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Overstreet

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2012, Givens, Dudley, and Strong burglarized a store and attempted to escape by backing a van out of a closed garage door, striking a police officer. Chicago police officers fired their weapons at the van, resulting in Strong’s death and injuries to Dudley and Givens, who were convicted of felony murder, aggravated battery to a peace officer, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle.

Dudley, Givens, and Strong’s estate sued the City, alleging the use of excessive force. With respect to Dudley and Givens, the circuit court granted Chicago summary judgment based on the collateral estoppel effect of their prior criminal proceedings. The estate’s lawsuit resulted in a partial verdict for the estate. The circuit court granted Chicago’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) based on the jury’s answers to special interrogatories. The appellate court reversed, holding that collateral estoppel did not bar Dudley and Givens from litigating their claims and the circuit court erred in vacating the verdict.

The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that collateral estoppel did not bar the suit by Dudley and Givens. Chicago did not establish with “clarity and certainty” that the identical question was decided in the earlier proceeding The court reinstated the JNOV. The circuit court properly held that the jury’s special finding related to an ultimate issue of fact upon which the rights of the parties depended and was clearly and absolutely irreconcilable with the verdict returned.

People v. Lane

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 128269

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Neville

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

June agreed to watch her sister Jwonda’s children so that Jwonda could visit her friend, Natasha Johnson. Jwonda’s boyfriend, Lane, drove her and her children to June’s apartment, but they argued. Jwonda did not meet Johnson as planned. When Johnson called Jwonda, she heard Lane yelling at her. Johnson went to June’s apartment and left about an hour later. She notified the police about the domestic disturbance. Officers went to June’s apartment. Jwonda and Lane started to leave by the back door. A gun in Lane’s hand discharged, killing Jwonda. Jwonda was pregnant. Her fetus died with her.

Lane testified that the gun discharged accidentally. June and Johnson testified that Lane had the gun in his hand as he yelled at Jwonda that she must not leave with Johnson and that Lane threatened to kill Jwonda. The court found Lane guilty of first-degree murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child and held that 720 ILCS 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) mandated a sentence of natural life in prison because Lane had murdered more than one victim. The appellate court affirmed.

The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the sentence. Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) does not apply because the trial court found Lane guilty of only one murder. The sentencing provisions do not change the classification of the offense with which a defendant has been charged and convicted. Intentional homicide of an unborn child is not murder. It is a separate offense with a separate definition.

People v. Lighthart

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 128398

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Overstreet

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Lighthart had dated both Buchanan and the victim, who was known to have access to large amounts of money. Lighthart drove the victim to a residence, knowing that Buchanan was there intending to rob the victim. Buchanan beat the victim, demanding money, and eventually shot him to death. Lighthart then injected the victim with a solution that contained Drano or attempted to do so. After cleaning the scene, they disposed of the body by setting it on fire inside the victim’s Jeep in a rural field. In 2004, Lighthart, then 23, entered a partially negotiated plea of guilty to first-degree murder, in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a sentencing cap of 35 years. Lighthart filed a motion to reduce her 35-year sentence and, subsequently, an untimely pro se motion to withdraw her plea, asserting that she was the victim of domestic violence and ineffective assistance of counsel. After an 11-½ year delay following remand and changes in counsel, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of her 725 ILCS 5/122-1 post-conviction petition as untimely.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. An ineffective notice of appeal from a negotiated guilty plea, which is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction due to failure to follow procedural requirements (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)) triggers a six-month limitations period for bringing a postconviction petition. However, under the circumstances, Lighthart could not have been culpably negligent in the untimely filing of her petition.

People v. Pacheco

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 127535

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Cunningham

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Pacheco was convicted of aggravated assault and other offenses after he tried to hit a Joliet police officer with his car. During the incident, the officer shot and injured Pacheco. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court violated Pacheco’s right to confrontation by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the officer who shot Pacheco as to whether the officer believed he could lose his job if the shooting was found to be unjustified and finding the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion in limine to bar defense counsel from asking the officer and his partner why they did not write police reports regarding the incident.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded. The limitation imposed on the officer’s cross-examination was necessary to avoid a highly prejudicial outcome to Pacheco–the admission of testimony that a review panel had found the shooting to be justified. Cross-examination was not otherwise limited. Because of department policy, the officers had no choice about writing reports and their failure to do so was irrelevant to any question of bias or credibility. The question would have distracted the jury from the question of determining the guilt or innocence of Pacheco.

Williams v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-CR-00283

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence of consecutive prison terms totaling forty-nine years in connection with his conviction of two counts of child molesting, holding that Defendant did not waive his right to be physically present at sentencing.

Following his conviction, Defendant became sick and could not be transported to the courthouse for sentencing. Defendant's original sentencing hearing was continued to a new date, but before the new sentencing date, Defendant was hospitalized for a leg amputation. On the day of the sentencing hearing, the trial court, court reporter, prosecutor, and defense counsel traveled to the hospital and concluded that Defendant waived his right to be present at the hearing. The trial court proceeded to sentence Defendant. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding that, under these circumstances, this Court could not condone a sentencing hearing at a hospital.

State v. Erdman

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-1594

Opinion Date: October 13, 2023

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court granting the State's delinquency petition against Defendant and its motion to waive jurisdiction to allow for Defendant's prosecution as an adult, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting the waiver and that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction.

One month after his seventeenth birthday Defendant committed second-degree sexual abuse. The juvenile court issued an order waiving jurisdiction, concluding that there were not reasonable prospectives for rehabilitating Defendant if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction and that the waiver was in the bests interests of Defendant and the community. Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a rational fact finder could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed second-degree sexual abuse based on the evidence presented; and (2) the juvenile court's waiver decision was supported by the evidence and reasonable.

State v. Colgrove

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0718

Opinion Date: October 4, 2023

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree intentional felony murder while committing burglary, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts, including first-degree intentional felony murder while committing burglary. The trial court imposed a life sentence with eligibility for release after thirty years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove his intent to kill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstantial evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for first-degree intentional felony murder.

State v. Thompson

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 194

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Shea

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a probation home visit, holding that the district court did not err in denying the suppression motion.

Defendant was convicted of bail jumping and received a deferred sentence of four years. After a probation home visit resulted in the discovery of a "significant amount of methamphetamine" by a probation officer the State petitioned to revoke Defendant's deferred sentence. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the discovery of the drugs found in her home was the result of an unlawful search. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the officer did not violate the reasonable protocols for a probation home visit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that what began as a home visit turned into a search pursuant to the officer's plain view observation of drug paraphernalia, which provided probable cause for the search.

People v. Cerda

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05305

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Lynch

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court applying New York's Rape Shield Law, N.Y. C.P.L. 60.42, to exclude forensic evidence proffered by Defendant to demonstrate that that the evidence the prosecution was seeking to attribute to him was consistent with masturbation or sexual contact with a third-party, holding that the trial court erred in applying the Rape Shield Law in this case, depriving Defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse arising from allegations that he digitally penetrated his minor relative's vagina and fondled her breasts. The jury convicted Defendant of the sexual abuse charge related to the alleged digital penetration of the complainant's vagina. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly excluded the forensic evidence under CPL 60.42. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's exclusion of the forensic evidence at issue deprived Defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.

State ex rel. Rarden v. Butler County Common Pleas Court

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3742

Opinion Date: October 17, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.

Appellant was convicted of escape, retaliation, and other offenses and sentenced to 26.5 years in prison. Appellant later brought the current action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his sentencing entries and to grant any other relief to which he was "entitled." The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to raise his claim that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be expressly informed of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding and that the trial court's failure to do so in his case rendered his sentence void.

Oregon v. Reed

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069360

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Duncan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Deborah Reed moved to suppress evidence resulting from a police interrogation. In her motion, defendant asserted that police officers violated Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution when they interrogated her in compelling circumstances without first advising her of her Miranda rights. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the interrogation did not occur in compelling circumstances. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the trial court convicted defendant of multiple drug offenses. Thereafter, defendant’s probation in an earlier case was revoked based in part on the evidence resulting from the interrogation and her new convictions. Defendant appealed both the judgment of conviction and the judgment revoking her probation, challenging the trial court’s conclusion that the interrogation did not occur in compelling circumstances. The appeals were consolidated, and the Court of Appeals affirmed both judgments. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the interrogation occurred in "compelling circumstances."

Lee v. Weber

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 S.D. 54

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: Myren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying the State's motion to dismiss the second petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by David Lee in 2004, holding that Lee's claim for habeas relief must be denied.

Lee brought his second habeas corpus petition in 2004, alleging that his habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a certificate of probable cause in his first habeas corpus proceeding. It wasn't until 2019, however, that Lee served the State with the provisional writ. The State moved to dismiss the writ, arguing that after the expiration of the statutory 30-day period for filing a motion for a certificate of probable cause under S.D. Codified Laws 21-27-18.1, the court did not have the authority to issue a certificate of probable cause. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Lee had no right to appeal absent a certificate of probable cause issued by the habeas court or a member of the Supreme Court, and Lee had no right to a certificate of probable cause; and (2) even if Lee's habeas counsel was ineffective, it did not deprive Lee of any constitutional or statutory right that may be vindicated in a habeas corpus proceeding.

In re University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-91,715-01

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: Newell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW) sought and received two sealed ex parte orders from the District Court of Jones County on behalf of Real Party in Interest, Dillion Compton. One order compelled Relator University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston (UTMB) to conduct brain imaging on the Real Party in Interest and directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to arrange transportation for that brain imaging. The other order (which was no longer at issue), compelled TDCJ to provide certain confidential records to OCFW. OCFW sought the orders pursuant to its post-conviction investigation into the Real Party in Interest’s capital murder conviction and sentence. UTMB and TDCJ challenged the ex parte orders by filing a motion to set aside the discovery orders in the trial court. After initially granting the motion to set aside the discovery orders and then holding a hearing, the trial court ultimately denied the motion to set aside the discovery orders and entered an order reinstating the original ex parte orders. Relator sought leave from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to petition for mandamus relief: to vacate the remaining ex parte order regarding the brain imaging and transportation for the brain imaging of the Real Party in Interest. Because the trial court was without authority to enter the order at issue ex parte, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted Relator’s motion for leave to file and conditionally granted mandamus relief.

Commonwealth v. McBride

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 220715

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: McCullough

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction, after a jury trial, of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, and possession of heroin and Furanylfentanyl with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, holding that Rule 3A:15 does not preclude a trial court from timely reconsidering a motion to strike.

At issue in this appeal was whether Rule 3A:15 or the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a trial court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike that the trial court granted in error. The court of appeals concluded that, once a court grants a motion to strike, the court is foreclosed from reconsidering its decision under Rule 3A:15, which requires the court to enter an order of acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rule 3A:15 does not prevent a court from reconsidering its ruling on a motion to strike; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts a court's authority to reconsider a motion to strike, but those limitations were not implicated in this case.

Moison v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 220536

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery by a parent under Va. Code 18.2-67.3 and four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child under Va. Code 18.2-370.1 but vacated the portion of the court of appeals' opinion deciding that Laurie Lee's proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi, holding that the court erred in part.

In affirming Defendant's convictions the court of appeals defined alibi as a defense based on the physical impossibility of committing a crime and held that Lee's proffered testimony served as an alibi because it placed Defendant outside of the room where the offenses occurred. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion deciding that the proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi but affirmed the otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling on the merits of this case because Defendant waived his challenge that the proffered testimony was offered for impeachment.

Freeland v. Marshall

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-0109

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: Hutchison

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's requested writ of mandamus against Respondent, the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, holding that the circuit court erred in denying a writ of mandamus.

In his self-represented petition for a writ of mandamus Petitioner asserted that the Commissioner had a duty to "develop a policy directive and/or operational procedure" that was in compliance with W. Va. Code 15A-4-17(i), which was passed during the 2018 legislative session. The circuit court denied the requested writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 15A-4-17(i)(2) imposed upon the Commissioner a clear legal duty to adopt a written policy effectuating the purposes of "this subsection," which included the entirety of subsection (i); and (2) Petitioner had no other adequate remedy at law.

State v. Finley

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-0023

Opinion Date: October 16, 2033

Judge: Bunn

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.

Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine.

State v. Finley

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-0023

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: Bunn

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.

Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine.

Stevenson v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 99

Opinion Date: October 18, 2023

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Appellant was not entitled to credit for time spent on probation when he was resentenced in a probation revocation proceeding.

Defendant admitted to the State's allegations of probation violations, and his probation was revoked and sentence reinstated. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that he was entitled to credit for time spent on supervised probation, inclusive of inpatient substance abuse treatment and participation in Treatment Court. The district court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently moved both a second and third time to correct an illegal sentence, without success. Defendant appealed the district court order denying his first request to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied the motion.