Table of Contents
|
United States v. Cheveres-Morales
Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
|
United States v. Davila-Reyes
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
|
United States v. Navarro-Santisteban
Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
|
United States v. Quiros-Morales
Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
|
United States v. Pastore
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
|
USA v. Shah
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
|
McMullen v. Dalton
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
|
United States v. Jade LaRoche
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
|
United States v. Kevin Green
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
|
United States v. Paul Swehla
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
|
United States v. Warren Mackey
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
|
USA V. JOHN BARLOW
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
USA V. JUAN CABRERA
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
United States v. Streett
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
|
Mucktaru Kemokai v. U.S. Attorney General
Criminal Law, Immigration Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
|
USA v. Henry Martin Steiger
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
|
California v. Trent
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
California Courts of Appeal
|
In re Casey
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
California Courts of Appeal
|
Parris J. v. Christopher U.
Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Family Law
California Courts of Appeal
|
Sandoval v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County
Criminal Law
California Courts of Appeal
|
Caswell v. Colorado
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Colorado Supreme Court
|
Dorsey v. Colorado
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Colorado Supreme Court
|
Idaho v. Monroe
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
|
Idaho v. Ramos
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
|
State v. Goens
Criminal Law
Kansas Supreme Court
|
Clark v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Maryland Supreme Court
|
In re Impounded Case
Criminal Law
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
|
State v. Stone
Criminal Law
Minnesota Supreme Court
|
Powers v. Mississippi
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Mississippi
|
State v. Harris
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Missouri
|
Aldape v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
|
Floyd v. State, Dep't of Correction
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
|
Kelley v. Kelley
Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
|
Kirkpatrick v. NDDOT
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
North Dakota Supreme Court
|
State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Ohio
|
State v. Toran
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Supreme Court of Ohio
|
South Carolina v. Brown
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
South Carolina Supreme Court
|
South Carolina v. Heyward
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
South Carolina Supreme Court
|
State v. Black Cloud
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
South Dakota Supreme Court
|
State v. Robinson
Criminal Law
Tennessee Supreme Court
|
De La Rosa v. Texas
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
|
State v. Centeno
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Utah Supreme Court
|
|
Criminal Law Opinions
|
United States v. Cheveres-Morales
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
20-1245
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Selya
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The First Circuit vacated Defendant's new sentence after concluding that it could sua sponte consider a claim of error not timely raised by Defendant, holding that the district court committed plain error during sentencing.
Defendant pled guilty to two carjacking offenses and a firearm count. The district court varied upward and imposed concurrent sentences of eighty-seven months on the carjacking counts and a consecutive sentence of 108 months on the firearm count. The First Circuit remanded for resentencing. The district court ultimately imposed concurrent sentences of 132 months' imprisonment on the carjacking counts and a consecutive sentence of 108 months' imprisonment on the firearm count. The First Circuit vacated the sentence, holding (1) this Court may sua sponte raise an error that constitutes a violation of the mandate rule; and (2) the resentencing court in this case committed plain error under this Court's holding in United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999).
|
|
United States v. Davila-Reyes
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
16-2089
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
David J. Barron
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The First Circuit granted the government's petition for rehearing en banc in these consolidated appeals regarding Defendants' 2016 convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501 et seq. (MDLEA), holding that 46 U.S.C. 70503(e)(1) does not limit the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Defendants pleaded guilty unconditionally to the underlying charges, but a panel of the First Circuit vacated the convictions and ordered the underlying charges dismissed. The government petitioned for rehearing en banc. The First Circuit granted the petition, vacated the panel's ruling, and affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that section 70503(e)(1) merely limits the substantive reach of the MDLEA and that Defendants' claims on appeal failed.
|
|
United States v. Navarro-Santisteban
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
21-1735
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Montecalvo
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The First Circuit vacated the decision of the federal district court revoking Defendant's term of supervised release and ordering him to return to prison for an additional two years, holding that resentencing was required on the proper record.
Defendant was convicted of a drug crime, sentenced, and placed on supervised release. The district court later revoked Defendant's supervised release term on ordered him returned to prison for two years, finding that Defendant made unlawful death threats in violation of a condition of his release. The First Circuit affirmed the order revoking Defendant's term of supervision but vacated Defendant's revocation sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the district court erred by admitting certain testimony and that the error may have affected the court's decision to impose an upwardly variant sentence.
|
|
United States v. Quiros-Morales
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1643
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
Selya
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release, holding that because the district court did not undertake an evaluation of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors remand was necessary.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of heroin, cocaine, cocaine base and marijuana. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment. After Congress passed the First Step Act amending the compassionate-release statute Defendant moved for either compassionate release or a sentence reduction. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Defendant's compassionate-release motion could not proceed as a matter of law; and (2) this Court declines Defendant's request to grant his motion for compassionate release.
|
|
United States v. Pastore
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket:
18-2482
Opinion Date: October 2, 2023
Judge:
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction on charges including attempted murder in aid of racketeering and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Defendant argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses on which the conviction was based are not “crimes of violence” in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction remains valid even after Davis and Taylor because one of the predicate offenses underlying the conviction – attempted murder in aid of racketeering – is a categorical crime of violence. The court explained that here, unlike Hobbs Act robbery, the crime of second-degree murder cannot be committed through the mere threat of force and must instead involve the actual use of force. Since attempted murder requires both an intent to use physical force and a substantial step towards the use of physical force, it satisfies the “attempted use . . . of physical force” element under section 924(c), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A), and thereby qualifies as a crime of violence.
|
|
USA v. Shah
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
21-10292
Opinion Date: October 2, 2023
Judge:
Priscilla Richman
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime
|
Seven codefendants appeal their various convictions stemming from a multi-million-dollar healthcare conspiracy involving surgery-referral kickbacks at Forest Park Medical Center in Dallas, Texas. They challenge convictions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), the Travel Act, and for money laundering. The defendants in this case are, with three exceptions, the surgeons whom Forest Park paid to direct surgeries to the hospital—Won, Rimlawi, Shah, and Henry. One exception is Forrest— she is a nurse. Another is Jacob—he ran Adelaide Business Solutions (Adelaide), a pass-through entity. The other is Burt—he was part of the hospital’s staff. Defendants raise many of the same issues on appeal, often adopting each other’s arguments.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the state law at issue here is the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS). Here, it does not matter if the physician was acquitted because there could still be sufficient evidence in the record that defendants “offer[ed]” a benefit in violation of the TCBS regardless of whether any physician accepted it. Further, the court explained that even assuming no rational jury could have found a single conspiracy, the surgeons fail to show that this error “prejudiced their substantial rights.” Henry and Forrest do not raise this point at all. Won and Shah address it only briefly and fail to provide any record citations to support the proposition that “clear, specific, and compelling prejudice” resulted in an unfair trial.
|
|
McMullen v. Dalton
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
20-3273
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
Brennan
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
McMullen was convicted under Indiana law of possession of cocaine and marijuana. In preparation for sentencing, McMullen’s attorney, Lewis, said he “really didn’t do anything independently to develop any mitigation” and “just relied” on the PSR although he knew McMullen “came from a seriously troubled background.” Lewis did not consider having a mental health professional evaluate McMullen, who was given a 50-year sentence, largely based on his criminal history. State courts rejected his claim of ineffective assistance. The district court denied his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.
The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although in 2021, an Indiana trial court modified McMullen’s sentence and placed him on probation, the issue was not moot. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to “Strickland.” Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond reliance on the PSR, and talking to a relative. The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling. On remand, the district court must consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances.
|
|
United States v. Jade LaRoche
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-2969
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
LOKEN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law
|
Defendant’s mother called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was “acting up.” A Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer was dispatched to the home, learning on the way that Defendant had an active tribal arrest warrant. Defendant’s mother invited Defendant into the living room and told Defendant to join them. The officer told Defendant he was “going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” Defendant fled to the garage, pursued by the officer, where Defendant knocked the officer down and escaped. Defendant was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact. The district court sentenced Defendant to 44 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by Defendant-- occurred in his mother’s home, a non-custodial atmosphere. The officer testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. Defendant fled only after the officer later told him he would be arrested, confirming that Defendant initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to “interrogation” unless “their point is to enhance the defendant’s guilt.” The court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.
|
|
United States v. Kevin Green
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-2919
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
WOLLMAN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
A jury convicted Defendant and co-Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, as well as individual counts of possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl. Co-Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their request for a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies. Co-defendant contends that the district court erred by ordering him to be handcuffed and shackled throughout the trial and by admitting into evidence portions of a post-arrest interview. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his possession with intent to distribute conviction.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the lack of any substantial prejudice stemming from the absence of a multiple-conspiracies instruction and the presence of sufficient single-conspiracy supporting evidence leads the court to conclude that no reversible error occurred with respect to the drug quantity finding. Further, the court wrote that given co-Defendant’s noncompliant behavior in jail and during transport, the district court acted well within its discretion by ordering that co-Defendant be shackled and handcuffed during trial and by taking appropriate precautions to minimize any prejudice to co-Defendant.
|
|
United States v. Paul Swehla
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-3443
Opinion Date: October 2, 2023
Judge:
LOKEN
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Defendant was convicted of distributing morphine within 1,000 feet of a school. He was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment followed by 6 years of supervised release. Defendant began supervised release in September 2021. He was arrested and charged in Iowa state court with Domestic Abuse Assault for pushing his fiancée into a wall while inebriated. His fiancee requested a no-contact order, The United States Probation Office filed a petition to revoke supervised release that day. Probation filed an amended petition to revoke supervised release. He now appealed the revocation sentence, arguing the district court erred in imposing an overly broad no-contact order restricting communication between Defendant and his fiancée. At the end of the hearing, the court stated it would modify Special Condition 8. The court directed Probation to prepare and circulate revised language to counsel for both parties and stated, “If the parties object when it’s finally written out, please let me know, and we’ll try to arrive at appropriate wording.” Defendant made no objection to the final wording of Special Condition 8, either before or after Judgment was entered.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant, with a long history of alcohol abuse, admitted he assaulted his fiancee while he was literally falling down drunk. By limiting contact, Special Condition 8 seeks to protect the victim from further harm. Fiancee had requested a no-contact order from the state court, subject to a specific exception the district court incorporated in Special Condition 8.
|
|
United States v. Warren Mackey
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-1590
Opinion Date: October 2, 2023
Judge:
KELLY
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
A jury convicted Defendant of one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12 and one count of abusive sexual contact. He appeals, challenging two evidentiary rulings at trial and the restitution order.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions but remanded to the district court for further proceedings to resolve the parties’ disputes about the amount, if any, of restitution owing. The court wrote that the government argued that restitution for lost wages was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. Section 2248 and that the amount was supported by documentation submitted in advance of sentencing. The district court did not hold a hearing. Instead, it entered an order that stated that it had “reviewed the presentence report concerning restitution” and the parties’ briefs and found that “the government’s requested restitution is authorized by law and is unrebutted by any evidence.” The court explained that the burden lies with the government to “demonstrate[e] the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense.” Without any findings from the district court to resolve Defendant’s objections, the court wrote that it was unable to review whether the government met its burden of establishing restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.
|
|
USA V. JOHN BARLOW
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
22-30030
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
Callahan
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to 77 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant raised three challenges to the district court’s sentencing calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States. The panel wrote that the determination of a sentencing enhancement based on a new offense can be made by a judge without a jury and by a standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no mandatory minimum sentence at play, and the enhancement still placed Defendant’s Guidelines range within the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty; and that Defendant received all the notice that is required for the enhancement.
The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that he used or possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense under Montana law for purposes of applying the enhancement. The panel concluded that the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.
|
|
USA V. JUAN CABRERA
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
21-50259
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Milan D. Smith, Jr.
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Defendant was found guilty of attempted illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1325 and attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. On appeal, he argued that the district court violated his rights to a fair trial and sentence.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a statement he made to a Border Patrol agent about coming to the United States to find work. Defendant argued that the statement, which he made while between border fences, should have been suppressed because he was “in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning prior to his admission. The panel held that the stop here met the requirements of Terry, and the agent’s question about Defendant’s purpose for being in the United States did not exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403, the testimony of Defendant’s only proposed witness, a Tijuana immigration attorney, whom Defendant intended to call as a lay witness to testify about the “factual situation in Tijuana in November 2019”. The panel wrote that neither the record nor the witness’s testimony could establish that Defendant knew of the long lines, and the district court’s concern about distracting the jury was reasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions on the requisite intent for a Section 1326 conviction.
|
|
United States v. Streett
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-2056
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
David M. Ebel
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Defendant-Appellant Bentley Streett was arrested for, and eventually pleaded guilty to, various counts of child pornography and sexual activity with minors. His actions were discovered by the mother of one of the minors from whom Streett attempted to solicit pornography, prompting the mother to contact the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. An investigation ensued, resulting in the production of Streett’s cell phone records, followed by his arrest and a search of his home, computers, and phones. Streett appealed, arguing: (1) the search warrant permitting the search of his home lacked probable cause, and that the search could not be justified by an exception to the requirement that officers obtain a legitimate warrant; and (2) the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss counts 3 through 7 of his indictment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Streett's motion to suppress and motion to dismiss.
|
|
Mucktaru Kemokai v. U.S. Attorney General
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
21-12743
Opinion Date: October 2, 2023
Judge:
JORDAN
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Immigration Law
|
The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Petitioner is removable as an aggravated felon and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner petitions for review, arguing that his Massachusetts conviction for armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G) and therefore is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and granted in part. The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). However, the court agreed with the parties that a remand to the BIA is nevertheless required. The Attorney General has issued an intervening decision that might impact Petitioner’s request for withholding of removal, and the BIA should have the opportunity to consider the effect of that decision. The court wrote that Petitioner was sentenced to less than five years in prison. His aggravated felony conviction, therefore, does not per se constitute a particularly serious crime with respect to withholding of removal.
|
|
USA v. Henry Martin Steiger
|
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
22-10742
Opinion Date: October 3, 2023
Judge:
COOGLER
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Defendant appealed his sentence of 20 years of imprisonment following the revocation of his probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3565. Defendant argued that, where the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 12 to 18 months of imprisonment, his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. One of his arguments is that the district court failed to give a specific reason for imposing an upward variance to the statutory maximum.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The court wrote that upon finding that a defendant violated a condition of probation, a district court may revoke the term of probation and impose a term of imprisonment as long as the court considers the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), such as the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the “seriousness of the offense” and “afford adequate deterrence,” among others. The court noted that a district court commits a “significant procedural error” in imposing a sentence if it calculates the guidelines incorrectly, fails to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or, of particular relevance here, “fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” The court explained that the record reflects that the district court did not give any reason for why it was imposing an above-guideline sentence. The court explained that the district court’s statements at the conclusion of the revocation proceeding were not sufficiently specific to allow the court to understand why the district court imposed an above-guideline sentence.
|
|
California v. Trent
|
Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
C096306(Third Appellate District)
Opinion Date: October 3, 2023
Judge:
Krause
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
In 1999, a jury convicted defendant Patrick Trent of first degree murder and street terrorism, but found not true the enhancements that defendant had personally used a knife and that the murder had been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus eight months, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment. Defendant’s first degree murder conviction was later reduced to second degree murder in light of California v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014), resulting in the reduction of defendant’s aggregate term to 15 years to life plus eight months. Thereafter, in July 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now 1172.6), which the trial court granted in a written ruling issued February 28, 2022. On March 28, 2022, the trial court redesignated the murder conviction as assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury with a great bodily injury enhancement and resentenced defendant. Defendant timely appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) failing to retroactively apply Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to his substantive gang conviction; and (2) imposing a great bodily injury enhancement to the redesignated offense. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the abstract of judgment needed to be corrected to reflect conviction by jury. The Court also agreed with defendant that he was entitled to the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333, requiring reversal of his section 186.22 conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects.
|
|
In re Casey
|
Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
B321709(Second Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 28, 2023
Judge:
GILBERT
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Petitioner is serving a life term for the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Petitioner served 23 years and three months, the parole board granted him parole. The Governor reversed the parole board’s decision and denied Petitioner parole on the ground that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime. The superior court granted Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The People appealed from the court’s order granting the petition.
The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the Governor may rely on the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for his decision to deny parole, but the aggravated circumstances do not in themselves provide some evidence of current dangerousness. The failure to gain insight into the cause of the crime is a factor that shows a continuing threat to public safety.
The court wrote that here, there can be no dispute that the circumstances of the murder were aggravated. Petitioner and his companions brutally murdered a 15-year-old girl. The Governor found that Petitioner remains a current risk to the safety of society because he lacks insight to the cause of the crime. Petitioner explained that at the time he committed the murder, he was hurt and angry. He thought that violence against someone who could not hurt him was an appropriate response. Nothing Petitioner said explains the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. The Governor could reasonably conclude that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime
|
|
Parris J. v. Christopher U.
|
Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
B313470(Second Appellate District)
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
CURREY
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Family Law
|
Defendant appealed from the five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against him at the request of his former spouse, Plaintiff. He contended the trial court abused its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO because the record does not demonstrate he engaged in conduct rising to the level of abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). Defendant also asserted the trial court erred by ordering him to change the beneficiary of the $4 million insurance policy he owns on Plaintiff’s life from himself to a charity of her choice. Lastly, Defendant argued that the trial court’s order awarding $200,000 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff as the prevailing party under section 6344 must also be reversed.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO. In addition, the court rejected contentions regarding the life insurance policy. Thus, the court found that it has no reason to reverse the order awarding attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff. The court also concluded reversal is not required based on the denial of Defendant’s requests for a statement of decision. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that courts must apply an objective, reasonable person standard when deciding whether a person has “disturbed the peace of the other party” within the meaning of section 6320. Instead, the relevant inquiry is simply whether the person against whom the DVRO is sought engaged in “conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroyed the mental or emotional calm of the other party.”
|
|
Sandoval v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County
|
Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
H050633(Sixth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Bamattre-Manoukian
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
In 2009, Sandoval was convicted of second-degree murder (Pen. Code 187) with a finding that Sandoval committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang and, as a principal, personally used a firearm. He was sentenced to 40 years to life. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought habeas relief. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition. On remand, the case was assigned to the same judge who had previously denied Sandoval’s petition.
Sandoval filed an unsuccessful peremptory challenge seeking to disqualify the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6(a)(2), which authorizes a motion to disqualify “following reversal on appeal of a trial court’s decision ... if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is assigned to conduct a new trial on the matter.” In a petition for mandamus relief, Sandoval argued that the remand for reconsideration of the resentencing petition constituted a “new trial.” The court of appeal rejected that argument. Although the remand did not foreclose the introduction of new evidence it contemplated that the trial court could consider evidence that had already been admitted at the Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
|
|
Caswell v. Colorado
|
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 CO 50
Opinion Date: October 3, 2023
Judge:
Samour
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Pursuant to a request from Lakewood Animal Control, a deputy with the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office (“LCSO”), conducted a welfare check on the animals at Constance Caswell’s residential property in Limon, Colorado, on March 15, 2016. Approximately two weeks later, LCSO deputies executed a search warrant at Caswell’s property. Based on the deputies’ search, the State filed a complaint charging Caswell with forty-three class 6 felony counts of cruelty to animals. Cruelty to animals was generally a class 1 misdemeanor, § 18-9-202(2)(a), but pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(I) of the statute, it was a class 6 felony if the defendant had a prior conviction for that crime. Each of the counts brought against Caswell identified her prior cruelty-to-animals conviction as a fact that elevated the classification of the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony and enhanced the applicable sentence. Before trial, defense counsel moved for bifurcation to prevent the jury from hearing about his client’s prior conviction for cruelty to animals. The trial court denied the motion as moot, however, ruling that the fact of a prior conviction was a sentence enhancer, not an element of the crime, which meant that it didn’t have to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts. During the sentencing hearing, Caswell conceded that she had previously been convicted of cruelty to animals. The trial court accordingly entered forty-three class 6 felony convictions. It then sentenced Caswell to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. The Colorado Supreme Court held that where, as was here, a cruelty-to-animals (second or subsequent offense) case (1) includes notice in the charging document of the prior conviction for cruelty to animals and (2) is treated as a felony throughout the proceedings—including in terms of its prosecution in district court (not county court), the right to a preliminary hearing (if eligible), the number of peremptory challenges, and the number of jurors - the Sixth Amendment doesn’t require that the misdemeanor - felony transforming fact in subsection (2)(b)(I) be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. "In sum, there was no error, much less plain error, here. Caswell’s right to a jury trial under the Colorado Constitution was not violated."
|
|
Dorsey v. Colorado
|
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 CO 51
Opinion Date: October 3, 2023
Judge:
Samour
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Charles Dorsey was convicted in 1997 of criminal attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree. As a result, Dorsey was required to register as a sex offender, which he did. Dorsey was obligated to re-register as a sex offender every year. In 2010, Dorsey was charged with a class 6 felony for failure to register as a sex offender. He ultimately pled guilty to a class 1 misdemeanor failure-to-register offense. Dorsey failed to re-register as a sex offender for a second time in 2017. This time, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The trial court reasoned the prior-conviction provision of subsection (2)(a) was a sentence enhancer that could be proved to the judge in the event of a conviction, not an element of the offense that had to be proved to the jury. After the jury found Dorsey guilty of the substantive charge, the trial court ruled, at the sentencing hearing, that the State had proved the fact of his prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, it entered a judgment of conviction on a class 5 felony. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred that the legislature intended to make the fact of a prior conviction a sentence enhancer, and that the Constitution did not require the fact of a prior conviction to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
|
|
Idaho v. Monroe
|
Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
Docket:
49255
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
Moeller
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
While a passenger during an unrelated traffic stop, defendant-appellant Audrey Monroe was recognized by a Bingham County Sheriff’s deputy as having an outstanding warrant. Pursuant to the warrant, the deputy attempted to take her into custody. In the course of the arrest, Monroe refused to release her phone, which was secured on her finger by a phone ring holder. As Monroe’s resistance escalated, she fell to the ground and began violently kicking, making contact with the officer. Ultimately, she was secured in the police cruiser. The incident was captured on video by the arresting officer’s body camera. For her conduct during the arrest, Monroe was charged with felony battery on a police officer. During trial, Monroe asked the district court for jury instructions regarding two misdemeanor offenses, asserting that they were lesser included offenses of the crime charged. The district court declined to give either instruction. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Monroe guilty of the felony charge. On appeal, Monroe argued the district court erred in failing to give the requested lesser included jury instructions. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
|
|
Idaho v. Ramos
|
Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
Docket:
50470
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Stegner
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
While on patrol, Deputy Sheriff Brock Katseanes discovered an unattended car parked in the parking lot of a public boat launch. The car was unlocked, and its trunk and front windows were open. Katseanes learned the car was registered to April Ramos. Katseanes was eventually joined by five additional officers and a canine to search the surrounding area for Ramos, but they were unsuccessful in locating her. Due to his previous encounters with Ramos, Katseanes believed the car likely contained illegal drugs. The canine conducted a drug sniff; the dog did not alert during its sniff of the car’s exterior. The officers subsequently impounded the car and then conducted an inventory search of it prior to having the car towed. During the inventory search, the officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Ramos was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. She moved to suppress all evidence found during the inventory search of the car. The district court denied her motion. Ramos conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance but retained her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. As a result of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. Ramos timely appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment. "Absent clear instruction from the United States Supreme Court, we decline to expand Opperman’s 'community caretaking' rationale to include potential theft or property damage to the vehicle as an acceptable reason to impound a vehicle. ... an officer’s concern that the car will be subject to theft or property damage if it is not impounded—no matter how well-founded the concern may be—is irrelevant to the analysis as to whether the decision to impound the car is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the decision to impound Ramos’s car passed constitutional muster.
|
|
State v. Goens
|
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Docket:
124972
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Stegall
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and other offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes. He was sentenced to a hard twenty-five for his felony murder conviction and to 142 months' imprisonment for the remainder of the charges, to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed both Defendant's convictions and his sentences, holding that the trial court (1) did not commit clear error by not providing the jury with a cautionary instruction regarding the credibility of accomplice testimony; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by ordering Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively.
|
|
Clark v. State
|
Court: Maryland Supreme Court
Docket:
25/22
Opinion Date: September 12, 2023
Judge:
Shirley M. Watts
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's performance was deficient.
At issue was whether trial counsel's failure to object to an order prohibiting any consultation regarding the case between Petitioner and trial counsel during Petitioner's murder trial resulted in the actual denial of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held (1) prejudice was presumed under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable.
|
|
In re Impounded Case
|
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-13337
Opinion Date: September 28, 2023
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief under the statute.
Petitioner was charged with one count each of assault and battery and witness intimidation. After an evaluation, a doctor recommended that Petitioner be found incompetent to stand trial and that he remain in the Tewksbury State Hospital, where he had been involuntarily committed for evaluation. Petitioner's counsel stipulated to incompetency but objected to further commitment. Petitioner was ultimately involuntarily committed for an additional thirty days. Petitioner then brought this petition asking the single justice to vacate the involuntary commitment order. The single justice denied the petition without holding a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy.
|
|
State v. Stone
|
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Docket:
A21-1648
Opinion Date: September 27, 2023
Judge:
Chutich
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of one count of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person under Minn. Stat. 609.165, subd. 1b(a), holding that a dissembled and incomplete shotgun can meet the plain language definition of a firearm under section 609.165, subd. 1b(a).
Law enforcement officers discovered a disassembled twenty-gauge shotgun in Defendant's backpack, and a forensic scientist used a bolt and washer from a similar firearm to assembly and successfully fire the shotgun at issue. Defendant was found guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reach the commonsense verdict that it did.
|
|
Powers v. Mississippi
|
Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi
Citation:
2017-DR-00696-SCT
Opinion Date: September 28, 2023
Judge:
Josiah D. Coleman
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
A jury sentenced Stephen Powers to death for the attempted rape and murder of Elizabeth Lafferty. After the Mississippi Supreme Court denied post-conviction relief, Powers sought federal habeas relief at the federal district court. The district court stayed federal habeas proceedings to give the Mississippi courts an opportunity to rule on unexhausted claims. In general, Powers argued: (1) he was mentally incompetent; (2) he was denied his right to a fair, impartial jury; (3) trial counsel was ineffective during jury selection for not challenging the prosecution’s peremptory strikes based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (4) as a matter of federal due process, the attempted-rape evidence was insufficient; (5) trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective concerning the guilt phase; (6) trial counsel’s “total dereliction” at sentencing requires application of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), not Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); (7) even if Cronic was inapplicable, trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland; and (8) cumulative error. Taking each issue raised under careful consideration, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Powers' request for postconviction relief.
|
|
State v. Harris
|
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Docket:
SC99977
Opinion Date: October 3, 2023
Judge:
Zel M. Fischer
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by the State of an order and judgment dismissing with prejudice criminal charges against Defendant, holding that there was no final, appealable judgment, and therefore, the State lacked statutory authority to appeal pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.200.
Defendant, who was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court sustained the motion in part and dismissed the murder and robbery charges with prejudice, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded those charges. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this was an improper appeal.
|
|
Aldape v. State
|
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 42
Opinion Date: September 28, 2023
Judge:
Kristina Pickering
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court accepting Appellant's plea of no contest to two counts of attempted lewdness with a child and imposed the special condition of probation mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q), holding subsection (q) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Upon accepting Appellant's no contest plea the district court placed him on probation and imposed the special condition mandated by subsection (q), which prohibits a defendant on probation for a sexual offense from accessing the internet without his probation officer's permission. On appeal, Appellant argued that the mandatory internet ban failed intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the mandatory internet ban and otherwise affirmed, holding that because Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q) is both mandatory and restricts more speech than necessary to serve the government's interest with no tailoring mechanism it is facially unconstitutional.
|
|
Floyd v. State, Dep't of Correction
|
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 37
Opinion Date: September 28, 2023
Judge:
Ron D. Parraguirre
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.355, Nevada's statute providing that an execution must be effectuated by injection of a lethal drug, is unconstitutional because it gives the Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections discretion to determine the process by which a lethal injection is administered, holding that there was no error.
Appellant, a death-row inmate, argued that section 176.355 lacked suitable standards because it afforded the Director complete discretion to determine the types, dosages, and sequencing of drugs to be used in the execution. The district court dismissed the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute, combined with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, provided the Director with suitable standards to determine the process by which a lethal injection is to be administered.
|
|
Kelley v. Kelley
|
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 39
Opinion Date: September 28, 2023
Judge:
Stiglich
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this child custody matter, holding that when parents with court-ordered joint legal custody of a minor child disagree on medical decisions concerning that child, the district court breaks the tie by determining which course of action is in the child's best interest.
The divorced parents in this case, who had joint legal custody of their eleven-year-old child, disagreed whether the child should be vaccinated against COVID-19. The court took note of government and professional groups' guidelines and research results regarding the safety of the COVID-19, accepted the child's pediatrician's recommendation, and found that vaccination was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's finding of best interest aligned with the factors adopted in this opinion.
|
|
Kirkpatrick v. NDDOT
|
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 ND 190
Opinion Date: October 2, 2023
Judge:
Daniel J. Crothers
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
|
William Kirkpatrick appealed a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges for one year for driving under the influence. Kirkpatrick argued the Department lacked authority to suspend his driving privileges because the arresting officer failed to forward the results of an analytical blood test report performed at the request of the officer to the Department. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred: Kirkpatrick’s alcohol-related breath and blood test results needed to be provided to the Department, and without them the Department did not have authority to suspend Kirkpatrick’s driver’s license. The Court reversed the district court’s judgment affirming the Department’s decision suspending Kirkpatrick’s driving privileges for one year.
|
|
State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court
|
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2023-Ohio-3534
Opinion Date: October 3, 2023
Judge:
Sharon L. Kennedy
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the Hocking County Common Pleas Court and Judge Dale Crawford in Appellant's action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims.
Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer. The court of appeals affirmed. About seven years later, Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that the trial court deprived her of her constitutional right to counsel and lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that res judicata barred this mandamus and prohibition action.
|
|
State v. Toran
|
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2023-Ohio-3564
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
Sharon L. Kennedy
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for felony charges stemming from an inventory search of an impounded truck that Defendant was driving when he was pulled over by a law enforcement officer, holding that the search was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Law enforcement performed an inventory search as to the truck at issue and found a handgun in the truck's right door panel. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the gun the trial court found him guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the state's evidence was insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the inventory search was lawful.
|
|
South Carolina v. Brown
|
Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
Docket:
28179
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Donald W. Beatty
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Corey Brown was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit grand larceny, armed robbery, and kidnapping. In a post-trial motion, Brown moved for a new trial on several grounds, including the State's failure to disclose its negotiations with Shadarron Evans, the State's key witness. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed. Agreeing with the State, the court of appeals reversed the grant of a new trial, concluding that no plea offer had been extended and remanded the case to the circuit court to make specific findings as to whether the evidence was material to Brown's guilt under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Brown's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals. After that review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.
|
|
South Carolina v. Heyward
|
Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
Docket:
28182
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
Few
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
James Heyward was convicted of multiple crimes arising from the armed robbery, brutal beating, and murder of Alice Tollison during the burglary of her home. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Heyward's petition for a writ of certiorari to address the trial court's refusal to remove Heyward's leg shackles during the striking of the jury, and four evidentiary issues. As to three of the evidentiary issues, the authentication of a fingerprint card, the admission of gruesome autopsy photographs, and the State's use of Heyward's alias, the Supreme Court found the trial court acted within its discretion. As to the other evidentiary issue, a firearms expert's testimony Heyward's pistol was operational at the time of the crimes, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that if there was any error in the admission of that testimony it did not prejudice Heyward. As to the leg shackles, the Court found the trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion in determining whether Heyward should have been required to wear leg shackles in the presence of the jury. However, because the State conclusively proved Heyward's guilt through overwhelming evidence such that no rational conclusion could have been reached other than Heyward is guilty of these crimes, the Court nevertheless affirmed.
|
|
State v. Black Cloud
|
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 S.D. 53
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
Salter
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder and sentencing him to forty years in prison, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as concerning the prosecutor's effort to conceal the State's involvement in Defendant's transfer proceedings, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion to neutralize any error; (2) the circuit court acted within its discretion to denying Defendant's motion for mistrial; (3) viewed in their entirety, the instructions given to the jury correctly stated the applicable law; (4) the exercise of the circuit court's discretion did not contravene Defendant's right to present a complete defense; and (5) Defendant's sentence could not be described as grossly disproportionate to his crime.
|
|
State v. Robinson
|
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Docket:
M2021-01539SC-R11-CD
Opinion Date: September 29, 2023
Judge:
Page
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of criminal appeals reversing the trial court's sentence imposed in connection with Defendant's plea of guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication and other offenses, holding that the clear and precise language of the 2017 amendment to the probation eligibility statute, Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-303, prohibits all forms of probation for a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication.
Defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and driving without a license. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in prison, largely suspended to probation with periodic weeks of confinement for the first three years. The court of criminal appeals reversed and ordered Defendant to serve the full sentence in confinement, concluding that the 2017 amendment to the probation eligibility statute expressly prohibits probation of any kind for criminal defendants convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the clear and precise language of section 40-35-303 prohibits defendants convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication from receiving any form of probation, including periodic and split confinement sentences.
|
|
De La Rosa v. Texas
|
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Dockets:
PD-0197-22, PD-0198-22, PD-0199-22
Opinion Date: October 4, 2023
Judge:
Keel
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
Appellant Francisco De la Rosa was tried by jury for the non-consensual sexual assault and sexual assault of a child. The body of Appellant’s indictment charged him with three counts of sexual assault for non-consensual contact between his sexual organ and that of "LAM," and the abstract portion of the jury charge defined “sexual assault of a child” in terms of non-consensual sexual contact. The indictment’s caption called the counts sexual assault of a child, its application paragraph authorized conviction for sexual assault of a child, and the case was tried as if it were such a case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold the convictions. To this, the Court concluded the appellate court did, reversed the lower court’s judgments and entered a judgment of acquittal for each count of sexual assault.
|
|
State v. Centeno
|
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Citation:
2023 UT 22
Opinion Date: October 5, 2023
Judge:
Pohlman
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
|
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of rape, one count of aggravated assault, and two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his multiple claims of error.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in not withholding from jury deliberations a video exhibit of Defendant's police interview; (2) Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for a mistrial and a new trial arising out of a child witness's breakdown on the witness stand.
|
|
|
|
About Justia Daily Opinion Summaries
|
Justia Daily Opinion Summaries is a free newsletter service with over 65 newsletters covering every federal appellate court and the highest court in each U.S. state.
|
Justia also provides weekly practice area newsletters in 60+ different practice areas. All daily and weekly Justia Newsletters are free. You may request newsletters or modify your preferences by visiting daily.justia.com.
|
You may freely redistribute this email in whole.
|
About Justia
|
Justia’s mission is to make law and legal resources free for all.
|
|