United States v. Melendez-Hiraldo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1863

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Montecalvo

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the 194-month sentence imposed upon Defendant after he pled guilty to using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally or substantively unreasonable.

On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred by making conflicting statements about his applicable guidelines sentence and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was "unmoored from any particular factor." The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant's 194-sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United States v. Perez-Greaux

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1699

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction for possession of a machine-gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and remanded the case for a new trial as to that count, holding that the jury should have been instructed about Defendant's knowledge of the characteristics of the firearm he possessed.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a machine-gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The First Circuit vacated the convictions in part, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims for pretrial and trial error; and (3) the district court improperly instructed the jury that the government was not required to prove that Defendant knew the firearm he possessed was a machine-gun.

Pesikan v. Attorney General United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 20-3307

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Jordan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In 1992, Pesikan a six-year-old citizen of Bosnia, along with his mother, fled Bosnia. In 1998, they entered the U.S. as refugees and gained lawful permanent resident status. In 2017, Pesikan caused a car accident. A responding officer found a half-consumed bottle of whiskey on Pesikan’s driver’s seat and marijuana in the door pocket. A blood test of Pesikan revealed the presence of cocaine, marijuana, alprazolam, and a ,054 blood alcohol content. Pesikan was convicted in Pennsylvania of DUI six counts; the court merged the DUI counts into Count 2–for driving while under the influence of marijuana.

Pesikan was charged with removability as an alien convicted of violating a law relating to a controlled substance, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which asks whether a noncitizen has been convicted of a violation of any law relating to a federally controlled substance. Pesikan argued that, applying the categorical approach to comparing state and federal crimes, Pennsylvania’s DUI statute is broader than the federal law because it allows for convictions based on the use of substances that are not federally controlled. The IJ held that the Pennsylvania statute is divisible, applied the modified categorical approach, and denied a motion to terminate. The BIA dismissed Pesikan’s appeal. The Third Circuit granted a petition for review. Because the identity of the specific controlled substance is not an element of the Pennsylvania DUI statute, that statute is indivisible and cannot serve as the basis for Pesikan’s removal.

United States v. Packer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2554

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Jordan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Packer was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, and a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846. He was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release. After Packer’s release from prison, the court modified the conditions of Packer’s supervised release on three occasions in response to Packer's admissions that he continued to abuse methamphetamine. In 2022, Packer’s former girlfriend, Jones, forwarded to a probation officer threatening voicemail messages that Packer had sent to her. The probation office petitioned for revocation of Packer’s supervised release, citing the “crime of terroristic threats,” a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment under Pennsylvania law. Packer attempted to justify his behavior and testified that Jones had no reason to believe that he would hurt her.

Following the presentation of evidence, the court found that Packer had violated his supervised release and that the U.S.S.G. term was 21-27 months’ imprisonment. Before inviting Packer to speak, the court stated its intention to impose a 24-month sentence. The judge then invited Packer to speak. The Third Circuit affirmed the revocation and sentence, rejecting an argument that the court denied Packer his right of allocution by announcing the sentence it intended to impose before allowing him an opportunity to speak. Neither Packer nor his counsel raised an objection at the sentencing hearing.

USA v. Carr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20337

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of numerous federal drug offenses related to his ownership and operation of a Texas pharmacy that was, in reality, an illegal pill mill. On appeal, Defendant’s arguments for overturning his convictions largely concern four audio recordings that, after being vetted by a government filter team, were turned over to the prosecution. Defendant contends that the recordings intruded into privileged conversations with his attorney and prejudiced his defense and that, as a result, his indictment should have been dismissed.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing in the government’s conduct here rises to the level of shocking or outrageous behavior that would justify dismissal under the Due Process Clause. The court wrote that before releasing the recordings, the filter team contacted Defendant’s lawyer to ask whether he intended to assert a privilege— while explaining they did not believe the recordings were privileged. When Defendant’s lawyer did not respond for over a week, the filter team did not take this silence as license to go forward. Because Defendant’s lawyer said that he would do so only after this second set of correspondence, the team moved the district court to authorize the release of the recordings. And even when the district court prematurely granted that authorization the next day, the team still did not release the recordings because they believed Defendant would take corrective action. The court found that this hardly constitutes conduct that is “outrageous” or fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant cannot demonstrate any error, much less “clear or obvious” error, in the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.

USA v. Irias-Romero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-40565

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Stephen A. Higginson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A Border Patrol Agent was conducting inspections and noticed two people in a truck. At trial, the Agent testified that he first asked the driver, Defendant, whether he was a United States citizen. Defendant responded that he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Defendant answered that the passenger was his wife and a United States citizen, and he gave the Agent a marriage certificate. After looking at the marriage certificate, the Agent asked the passenger if she was legally present in the United States, and she said that she was not. A jury found Defendant guilty of transporting within the United States an alien who “has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law.” On appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction as based on insufficient evidence. Defendant argued that the Government failed to prove the first element of this offense.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a rational jury could infer that Defendant illegally entered or remained in the United States from the testimony confirming that she was illegally present in the country. When the Agent asked the passenger if she was illegally present, she answered yes. During Defendant’s post-arrest interview, Defendant said that he heard from the passenger that she was “illegal.” And the passenger corroborated at trial that Defendant knew that she was in the United States illegally when he went to pick her up.

USA v. Kerstetter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10253

Opinion Date: September 25, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, he argued that a sentencing enhancement that requires certain prior convictions be for offenses committed on different occasions could not be applied unless the facts supporting it were charged in the indictment and admitted by the accused or proved to a jury. He also argued that his prior convictions did not qualify for the enhancement.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s argument that the indictment must allege, and evidence at trial must prove, the facts of the commission of qualifying offenses on different occasions has long been rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Moreover, the court wrote that two of Defendant’s prior convictions were for the Texas offense of burglary of a building. It has been settled that convictions for Texas burglary qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA.

L. C. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-6105

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks.

United States v. Bauer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3240

Opinion Date: September 25, 2023

Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Medical Malpractice, Professional Malpractice & Ethics, White Collar Crime

Bauer worked as a physician for over 50 years, most recently in pain management at ANA. Bauer’s practice, which included regular prescribing controlled substances, became the subject of a DEA investigation. Bauer was indicted for knowingly or intentionally” distributing or dispensing controlled substances “except as authorized,” 21 U.S.C. 841(a), concerning 14 patients. The prosecution’s expert, Dr. King, opined that Bauer did not sufficiently establish a diagnosis and ignored “red flags.” Each patient had a history of at least two mental health conditions; several had histories of illegal drug use. Bauer drastically exceeded recommended thresholds and prescribed opioids together with other controlled substances. One patient died from an accidental overdose. None showed improvement. A drug task force officer alerted Bauer that a patient was selling his pills. Bauer did not terminate the patient but provided additional prescriptions. Several pharmacies would not fill his prescriptions. Dr. King opined that Bauer prescribed opioids “in most cases” to support “addiction and dependency,” “without a legitimate medical purpose.”

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bauer’s convictions and 60-month sentence (below the Guidelines range). A jury could reasonably find that Bauer knew his prescriptions were without authorization, satisfying the mens rea requirement clarified by the Supreme Court in 2022. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instruction on the good-faith defense. The court rejected Bauer’s challenges to the exclusion of his proffered expert witnesses and his argument that he had a constitutional right to testify as an expert in his own defense.

United States v. Christopher Stowell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2234

Opinion Date: September 22, 2023

Judge: KOBES

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court designated him an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that his predicate offenses were not committed on different occasions, a requirement for the armed career criminal sentencing enhancement. Alternatively, Defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment required a jury to find that he committed his predicate offenses on different occasions.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s PSR shows a 2004 burglary conviction and two 2006 battery convictions. According to charging documents, the battery offenses involved different victims and occurred on different days, one on or about March 8 and the other on or about March 11. Defendant argued that the 2006 convictions were committed on the same occasion because he was arrested and convicted on the same dates for both offenses. The court explained that the multi-day gap separating the battery offenses strongly supports a finding that Defendant committed them on different occasions. Accordingly, the court held that all things considered, the district court did not err when it concluded that Defendant committed his prior offenses on different occasions.

United States v. Martinez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-7054

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Rossman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Ricardo Martinez was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of distribution of methamphetamine. He appealed the sentence he received, contending the district court miscalculated his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Martinez claimed the district court erred, first, by adding a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense, and second, by refusing to apply a two-level “safety-valve” reduction under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(18) and 5C1.2. The Tenth Circuit agreed Martinez was entitled to the safety-valve reduction but otherwise found no error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

USA v. Diana Robinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10949

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: ROSENBAUM

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

TASER International, Inc., obtained an injunction against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with Phazzer Electronics or its officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys” (the “2017 injunction”). The injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from distributing or causing to be distributed certain stun guns and accompanying cartridges that infringed on TASER’s intellectual property. At the time of the TASER-Phazzer Electronics litigation, Steven Abboud controlled Phazzer Electronics, and Phazzer Electronics employed, among others, Defendant. In 2018, after the district court found Abboud in contempt for violating the 2017 injunction, Abboud and Defendant went to work for other entities with “Phazzer” in their names. Based on that activity, the district court found Defendant (and others) in contempt of the 2017 injunction. At issue on appeal is whether the 2017 injunction extended broadly enough to bind Defendant and prohibit her conduct under the theories of liability that the government has pressed and the district court decided
 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the record cannot sustain Defendant’s conviction.  The court explained that the district court did not make factual findings about whether Defendant was a key employee. Nor did it determine whether she so controlled Phazzer Electronics and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 injunction that it would be fair to say she had her day in court on that injunction.

Andrews v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 129

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's petition and amended petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus wherein Defendant alleged that the Arkansas Department of Correction illegally changed his discharge date, holding that the circuit court correctly denied the petition and amended petition.

After being sentenced in 2007, Defendant was paroled in 2015. Defendant was taken into custody a year later. In his petition and amended petition Defendant alleged that after revocation of his parole and his return to prison, he was informed that his discharge date had been illegally moved. The circuit court denied the petition for failure to state a claim for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus.

Carroll v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 125

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's two petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus wherein Appellant asked the circuit court to declare that he was entitled to parole and to direct his release on parole from the Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC), holding that there was no error.

Appellant filed petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus asserting that the ADC violated Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-615(h), which was codified as section 16-93-1302(f) at the time Appellant committed the crime of rape, by denying him parole. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that the issues raised therein was been addressed and resolved in Carroll v. Hobbs, 442 S.W.3d 834 (Ark. 2014). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion by denying and dismissing Appellant's petitions for declaratory and mandamus relief.

Petty v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 131

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Womack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court, holding that remand was required to accurately settle the record, specifically concerning Defendant's exhibit 1, a conventionally-filed physical disk that was submitted as part of the record but contained no files.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a fifteen-year enhancement for firearm use. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial during the guilt phase of trial. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that remand was required to rectify gaps in the record.

Tilson v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 127

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari and/or prohibition requesting relief from the Court after the circuit court denied Petitioner's motions to dismiss the charges against him, holding that an extraordinary writ was not necessary in this case.

Petitioner, who was charged with aggravated robbery and other charges, moved to dismiss the charges for a violation of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1, asserting that he was not brought to trial within twelve months from the date of his arrest. Petitioner also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the juvenile division retained exclusive jurisdiction. The circuit court denied both motions. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's ensuing petition for writ of certiorari and/or prohibition, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Petitioner's motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for violation of his speedy-trial rights.

California v. Bratton

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E078627(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

At age 16, defendant Tory Bratton confessed to robbing a local market, with an accomplice, shooting the clerk dead, and taking $184. At his trial, his counsel argued that defendant’s confession was false and that he did not participate in the robbery at all. However, trial counsel did not argue that, even if defendant did participate, he was not the shooter. Defendant was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, with a personal firearm use enhancement and felony-murder special circumstances. He appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. When defendant filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, the trial court denied it; it ruled that the Court of Appeal's opinion in defendant’s direct appeal showed that he was the actual killer. The State conceded that this was error, but that the error was harmless because the record of conviction established defendant was the actual killer. Anticipating this response, defendant argued that, under standard principles of issue preclusion (a/k/a collateral estoppel), preclusion did not apply here because: (1) Whether defendant was the shooter was not actually litigated; (2) Trial counsel had an incentive not to contest whether defendant was the shooter; (3) The significance of whether defendant was the shooter was small at trial but, due to the then-unforeseeable enactment of section 1172.6, has since become great; (4) Section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law that warranted reexamination of whether defendant was the shooter. The Court of Appeal agreed that standard principles of issue preclusion applied here. However, the Court held that the issue of whether defendant was the shooter was actually litigated. Moreover, trial counsel did have an incentive to contest this issue; evidently, he simply made a tactical decision not to. Because trial counsel did have an incentive to contest the issue, it did not matter that it was unforeseeable that the issue would have additional future consequences. And finally, while section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law, the Legislature intended that it not constitute an exception ipso facto to issue preclusion.

California v. Esparza

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080703(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After defendant Christopher Esparza was pulled over for a Vehicle Code violation, a detective who specializes in gang enforcement recognized him and two of his passengers as members of a City Heights gang. The detective thought one of the passengers, Delfino Osnaya, was likely to be armed and told the other officers they needed to search him. After their patdown of Osnaya yielded a loaded gun, the officers searched Esparza as well and found another loaded weapon. Esparza contested the constitutional validity of his detention and search, arguing: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when they conducted his patdown; and (2) his detention was unreasonably prolonged because it lasted longer than necessary for the officers to issue him a citation for the Vehicle Code violation. The Court of Appeal found the detention lasted a mere seven minutes, during which the officers proceeded expeditiously consistent with reasonable concerns for officer safety. "The totality of the circumstances known to the initial investigating officer justified those concerns, which were only heightened as additional factors came to light during the course of the traffic stop."

California v. Panighetti

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C095100(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 25, 2023

Judge: Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Wesley Panighetti and Jill Doe met in 2000 and began dating. According to the Court, the couple practiced bondage, discipline, sadism, and masochism (BDSM) together. When defendant went beyond the scope of Jill’s consent, his conduct became criminal. A jury rejected the argument that, by virtue of a written agreement to consent to BDSM at all times, Jill had irrevocably agreed to allow defendant to dominate all aspects of her life. The jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses, attempting to dissuade a witness, and residential burglary. He challenged those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his multiple requests for new counsel pursuant to California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (2) instructing the jury it could consider prior uncharged offenses involving Jill Doe; (3) inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in imposing a 280 year-to-life sentence; and (4) failing to calculate and award presentence custody credit. After review, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to award presentence custody credit but otherwise affirmed.

P. v. Fisher

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323408(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 25, 2023

Judge: MOOR

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in count 1, second-degree murder in count 2, and attempted murder in count 3. He admitted the truth of the personal firearm use enhancements in each count. Counts 4 and 5 and the special circumstance allegations were dismissed pursuant to the plea. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 25 years to life in count 1, plus two years for the firearm enhancement. On February 1, 2021, Defendant executed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied Defendant’s petition in a written memorandum of decision. Defendant appealed.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. However, the court modified the trial court’s memorandum of decision and minute order to reflect that Defendant, and not D.M., is the petitioner in this matter. The court explained that there is no merit to Defendant’s argument that the trial court engaged in premature fact-finding. The trial court reviewed and relied upon the plea colloquy, which is part of the record of conviction. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that he only admitted that he was guilty of murder and attempted murder, which did not require that he harbor malice at that time. The court wrote that regardless of whether Defendant was required to admit to being the actual killer/attempted murderer, or could stipulate to particular facts without admitting them, the only reasonable view of the record here is that Defendant did admit that he was the actual killer/attempted murderer.

P. v. Lee

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323940(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 27, 2023

Judge: BENDIX

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder, attempted murder of two counts of robbery, and one count of receiving stolen goods and found firearm enhancements true. This is Defendant’s second petition; the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of his first one. Subsequently, the Legislature amended former section 1170.95, expanding it to provide relief to defendants convicted under any theory in which malice was imputed to them based solely on their participation in a crime. The Legislature also amended the statute to encompass defendants convicted of attempted murder and manslaughter. Defendant filed his second petition under the amended statute, seeking resentencing for his murder and attempted murder convictions.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that although recent case law has held that a conviction for provocative act murder requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice, this was not the case when Defendant was convicted in 1994. Under the then-applicable Supreme Court authority, a defendant could be convicted for a killing by a third party provoked by an accomplice’s actions with malice aforethought, regardless of the defendant’s personal mental state. Defendant’s jury was so instructed. The court therefore concluded Defendant may have been convicted under a theory of imputed malice, and thus, he is not barred as a matter of law from relief under section 1172.6. The court rejected Defendant’s contention, however, that he is entitled to relief for his attempted murder conviction, which did not implicate the provocative act doctrine nor any theory of imputed malice.

People v. Bingham

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A163112(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Jackson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Bingham was charged with infliction of corporal injury on a romantic partner (Pen. Code 273.5(a)). The victim did not testify at trial, but her 911 call was admitted into evidence. Bingham argued that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding the victim’s prior convictions and inconsistent statements made after her 911 call, which Bingham offered for impeachment. He also argued that his case should be remanded for resentencing based on recent changes in the law.

The court of appeal affirmed and remanded. While the trial court erred in excluding the impeachment evidence, the error was harmless. Under Evidence Code section 1202, when a hearsay statement by a declarant who is not a witness is admitted into evidence by the prosecution, an inconsistent hearsay statement by the same person offered by the defense is admissible to attack the declarant’s credibility. However, even if the victim’s statements recanting what she said in the 911 call and her prior convictions were admitted, it is not reasonably probable that Bingham would have obtained a more favorable outcome, considering all the evidence. The court remanded for resentencing under amended Penal Code section 1170(b), which limits the court’s ability to impose an upper-term sentence; the amended law applies retroactively to Bingham’s case.

People v. Bodely

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H050142(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 27, 2023

Judge: Bamattre-Manoukian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Bodely entered a supermarket, grabbed $75 out of a cash register, and ran to his car. Andre ran to Bodely’s driver’s side window and put his arm inside the car. Bodely drove away, knocking Andre onto the hood. Andre fell and struck his head on the pavement, resulting in his death. While the taking of the $75 was charged as burglary, the prosecution argued that it could be characterized as robbery. The jury was instructed that Bodely could be found guilty of murder if the “killing was done with malice aforethought or occurred during the commission or attempted commission of burglary or robbery,” and that the “unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime or as a direct causal result of burglary or robbery is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime.” The court of appeal affirmed Bodely's convictions for first-degree felony murder, burglary, and an unrelated robbery.

Senate Bill 1437 took effect in 2019, allowing a person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek resentencing. Bodely filed a petition, asserting that he could not presently be convicted of murder because of amendments to Penal Code 188 and 189. The prosecution cited section 189(e)(1): A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of (robbery or burglary) in which a death occurs is liable for murder if “[t]he person was the actual killer.” The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief. Bodely’s conviction could not have been based on an impermissible accomplice liability theory; there is no evidence in the record or the jury instructions of another participant.

People v. Davenport

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165093(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 27, 2023

Judge: Streeter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Hardiamon testified at a preliminary hearing that she had a child with Davenport. On January 4, 2007, Hardiamon left the child with Davenport and spent the day with West, Hardiamon’s cousin by marriage. Around 11:00 p.m., West drove Hardiamon home. They talked in the car for a few minutes before Hardiamon saw Davenport and said, “Oh, shit, my baby daddy.” Davenport opened the car door and pointed a gun at West. The gun went off without pauses between shots. West left. Hardiamon went inside and told her mother, her brother, and his girlfriend that Davenport had just shot someone. Davenport called Hardiamon and told her that he saw West crash and West was dead. A half-mile from Hardiamon’s residence, an officer found West slumped over dead in the driver’s seat.

Davenport pleaded no contest to second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. In 2020, Davenport petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. On a third remand, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Davenport was West’s actual killer and was ineligible for resentencing. Davenport claims the court erroneously admitted into evidence the transcript of Hardiamon’s preliminary hearing testimony, which was hearsay, with no showing of witness unavailability. The court of appeal affirmed. The Legislature did not grant qualifying offenders under section 1172.6 a new trial but chose a procedure requiring trial judges to decide the critical factual questions based–at least in some cases—on a cold record.

People v. Peterson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A163458(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Rodriguez

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2020, Lafayette City Councilmember and former Mayor, Burks, and his wife, Ackley, hosted an open house in their home in support of a school bond measure. The invitation stated Burks was “hosting this event as an individual resident of Lafayette and a father of school-aged children.” Peterson attended and had an “odd” and “stilted” conversation with Ackley in which Peterson referred to Ackley's birthday. Peterson later reposted on his Facebook page a family photo from Ackley’s public Facebook page. In the comments, Peterson wondered where they hid the girls during the open house. He mused, “They live near Burton Valley School … Burks, has a different name than his wife, I wonder what their daughters’ last name is?” Burks felt Peterson “could be a threat” to his wife and daughters. Later, Ackley received a “confusing” letter and check in the mail from Peterson, again mentioning the daughters. The rambling letter was a screed against local politics.

Peterson was convicted of stalking and sentenced to two years of probation, with one year of home confinement. The court of appeal reversed. Peterson’s speech acts were constitutionally protected activities. A reasonable listener would not have found Peterson’s speech or speech-related acts a true threat of violence.

Behrens v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0060-MR

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Bisig

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree sexual abuse, incest, sodomy, and other offenses and sentencing him to a total of fifty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the tampering instruction did not yield a verdict that violated the unanimous jury requirement; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's renewed motion to sever the child pornography charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of adult messaging app communications; and (4) the Commonwealth's comments during closing arguments did not warrant reversal.

Jenkins v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00754-SCT

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Michael K. Randolph

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Rita Ann Jenkins appealed her conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), third offense. She argued the trial judge erred by granting a jury instruction that eliminated the prosecution’s burden to prove she was “driving in a state of intoxication that lessen[ed] [her] normal ability for clarity and control.” She also argued the trial judge erred by denying a jury instruction that presented her theory of defense. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Jenkins’ conviction and sentence.

Saunders, et al. v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-CA-00584-SCT

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

This appeal stemmed from the Mississippi Legislature’s passing and the Governor’s signing of House Bill 1020. The catalyst for the Legislature’s passing of House Bill 1020 was described as the “sweltering, undisputed and suffocating” crime problem in Jackson, Mississippi—a problem that has “crippled the criminal justice system.” While political and social controversy surrounded this bill, the bulk of the bill’s provisions, which are aimed at improving public safety and bolstering judicial resources in Jackson, were not at issue. Section 1 of House Bill 1020, directed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Chief Justice to appoint four additional (and unelected) circuit judges to the existing Seventh Circuit Court District—the district comprised of the City of Jackson and all of Hinds County—for a term ending December 31, 2026. The second challenged provision, Section 4 of House Bill 1020, was a more ambitious endeavor that created a new statutory inferior court, much like a municipal court, to serve the CCID. Petitioners, and Jackson residents, Ann Saunders, Sabreen Sharrief, and Dorothy Triplett (collectively, Saunders) claimed both provisions violated Mississippi’s Constitution. The Hinds County Chancellor J. Dewayne Thomas, who held hearings on Saunders’s challenges, disagreed and dismissed her complaint. Saunders appealed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the chancellor that the creation of the CCID inferior court in Section 4 of House Bill 1020 was constitutional. But the Court agreed with Saunders that Section 1’s creation of four new appointed “temporary special circuit judges” in the Seventh Circuit Court District for a specified, almost-four-year term violated the State Constitution’s requirement that circuit judges be elected for a four-year term.

In re H.M.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 180

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying the motion filed by H.M., a youth held in detention, seeking to dismiss a formal petition brought by the State to adjudicate H.M. as a delinquent youth, alleging one count of misdemeanor resisting arrest and three counts of assault on a police officer, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion.

As grounds to dismiss the petition H.M. argued that the State filed it one day beyond the seven-day time limit for such petitions against detained youths in Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-1401(2). The youth court declined to dismiss the petition, concluding that the State had good cause to file the petition and to detain H.M., outside the seven-day deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the good cause exception in section 41-5-1401(2) applies to the youth court's decision not to dismiss an untimely petition charging a youth held in detention; and (2) the youth court properly denied H.M.'s motion to dismiss.

State v. Sneed

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 181

Opinion Date: September 26, 2023

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant based on the counts of strangulation of a partner, assault of a partner, and child endangerment, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Dr. Tiffany Kuehl to testify about the legal and medical definitions of strangulation; (2) did not abuse its discretion by admitting Defendant's statements made in a separate legal proceeding; (3) did not err in assuring that no prejudicial juror misconduct occurred; and (4) erred in allowing a brief statement of the make-up of the population of the high-risk, violent crimes pod of the jail, but the error was harmless.

State v. Reznicek

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 272

Opinion Date: September 22, 2023

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of misdemeanor shoplifting and her sentence of a $100 fine, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.

On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction and that the county court erred in allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony regarding an out-of-court statement. The district court affirmed, holding, among other things, that the hearsay statement was properly admitted under the hearsay exception in Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-803(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant's hearsay exception and allowing the disputed testimony; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction.

Patterson v. Las Vegas Municipal Court

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 35

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ petition filed by Petitioner challenging the decision of the Las Vegas Municipal Court denying Petitioner's request for attorney fees and litigation expenses after criminal charges against him were dismissed and withdrawn, holding that the municipal court correctly determined that it lacked authority to award attorney fees and litigation expenses.

Petitioner was arrested and charged with obstructing a police officer and a traffic violation. Petitioner successfully moved to dismiss the obstruction charge, and the traffic violation charge was subsequently withdrawn. Petitioner then filed an application for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.0393. The municipal court denied the request for lack of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that municipal courts lack authority under section 41.0393 to award attorney fees and litigation expenses to the prevailing party in a criminal action.

Isac v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 181

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Sidhassan Yaqub-Sharif Isac appealed an order denying his application for post-conviction relief. Isac was born in Somalia. He came to the United States when he was eight years old and has lived in country for roughly 20 years. He was not a United States citizen. In 2020, he was charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under suspension. He pleaded guilty and the district court sentenced him to 360 days imprisonment. He did not appeal. At the time of his plea he had roughly 25 other convictions, including drug and alcohol related crimes. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement subsequently detained Isac pending proceedings to deport him to Somalia. Isac filed an application for post-conviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. He alleged Fourth Amendment violations based upon the length of the traffic stop leading to the charges. He later filed an amended petition asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of a conviction. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

North Dakota v. Johnson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 180

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Johnson was convicted by jury of felonious restraint and domestic violence-bodily injury. On appeal, Johnson argued the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the charge of felonious restraint. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

State ex rel. Howard v. Watson

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3399

Opinion Date: September 27, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to request numbers 2, 3, and 4 from Jeffrey Howard's August 2022 public records request and denied the writ as to the remaining public records requests, holding that Howard was entitled to mandamus in part.

Howard, an inmate, brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to produce records and documents in response to several records requests. Howard sought an award of statutory damages as to each request. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to three public records requests; and (2) denied the writ as to the remaining requests because Howard no longer sought mandamus relief as to those public records requests.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, K., Aplt.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 24 EAP 2022

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Kevin Jackson appealed a superior court judgment which vacated a pretrial order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (suppression court) and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The suppression court granted Jackson’s motion to suppress evidence recovered after a police officer detained Jackson via what was known as a Terry stop. While the suppression court concluded that the officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain Jackson, the superior court reached the opposite conclusion. The superior court's judgment was affirmed by operation of law because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was evenly divided. The opinion in support of affirmance agreed with the superior court's conclusion that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Jackson under the particular facts of this case. The opinion in support of reversal noted that it was "critical that courts and practitioners in this area of the law be cognizant of the burden that rests with the Commonwealth to justify a warrantless search or seizure when it seeks to do so based upon a 'high-crime area;' ... If we assume for the purpose of analysis that the Commonwealth established with empirical evidence that the area where Jackson was stopped constituted an area known for disproportionately regular gun violence, that evidence would not be relevant because it does not tend to make it more probable that Jackson was engaged in gun violence. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, the Fourth Amendment requires the government to explain how reasonable suspicion relates to the individual’s conduct taking place in the location or area, for instance, by showing that his conduct was unique and, therefore, suspicious."

Pennsylvania v. McGee

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 17 WAP 2022

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted appeal in this matter to consider whether the Superior Court erred in holding that a trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct a patent and obvious error in a sentencing order when the defendant’s request for correction was filed outside the time limitations of the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). In November 1994, Appellant Rodney McGee fatally assaulted Barry Williams. In 1996, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea multiple accounts for acts against multiple people; court stated that Appellant’s aggregate sentence for all of the offenses was 32 1⁄2 to 65 years. On the same day that Appellant entered his plea and the trial court orally imposed the above sentence, the trial court issued a three-page typed document titled “Order” (“typed sentencing order”) that was inconsistent with what the court orally imposed on the record. Decades later, on June 3, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, and counsel was appointed. On August 5, 2020, Appellant filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” arguing that there was an obvious incompatibility between the two orders. Finding that the orders in question were “patently erroneous” and “contrary to common sense,” the trial court concluded that amendment of the orders was proper, as the time limits of the PCRA did not apply. The Commonwealth appealed the trial court’s decision to the Superior Court, asserting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s Motion because the underlying claim was cognizable under the PCRA, and had been filed outside the PCRA’s jurisdictional time constraints. In a unanimous memorandum opinion, the Superior Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, finding no "patent and obvious error" in the trial court's sentencing orders. The Court did not reach the question of whether a trial court’s inherent authority to correct patent and obvious errors in the record is subject to the time limitations of the PCRA.

Ex parte Areli Escobar

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-81,574-02

Opinion Date: September 27, 2023

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The United States Supreme Court remanded this case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider Applicant Areli Escobar’s false-testimony claim in light of the State’s confession of error. After receiving a motion suggesting that the parties had evidence not previously considered in these habeas proceedings, the Texas Court held the case for 30 days to allow supplementation of the record. Applicant filed supplemental materials with a cover sheet that listed five items. He failed to comply with the applicable appellate rule because he did not explain the significance of any of these items or why they could not have been filed earlier, but the Court nevertheless considered the new material. Upon consideration, the Court concluded the new material did not change its original assessment of Applicant’s false-testimony claim.

Ex parte Lucas Vieira

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0690-22

Opinion Date: September 27, 2023

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In July 2021, Appellant Lucas Vieira was indicted for aggravated assault by threat while acting as a public servant. The indictment alleged that the offense occurred on or about July 7, 2019. Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming the indictment was time-barred because it was filed more than two years after the date of the offense. The trial court denied Appellant’s habeas application, and Appellant appealed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the indictment was not brought within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and reversed judgments of the courts below.

McPherson v. Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0635-22

Opinion Date: September 27, 2023

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant DeSean McPherson was convicted of tampering, but the court of appeals agreed with him that the evidence of concealment was legally insufficient. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals misapplied the standard of review. To this, the Court found that it did: it re-weighed the evidence, rationalized its result by hypothesizing a weaker case than that presented in the record, and overlooked dispositive distinctions between this case and Stahmann v. Texas, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The Court therefore reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed that of the trial court.

Washington v. Avington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,398-1

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Yu

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner Dominique Avington argued his own trial testimony was sufficient to require a lesser included offense instruction for the shooting death of Terrance King. Specifically, Avington testified that although he fired his gun, he was not aiming directly at anyone, and he argued that his credibility should have been determined by the jury. The undisputed evidence at trial showed that the bullet that killed King did not come from Avington’s gun. As a result, Avington’s testimony about the direction of his aim did not create a question of fact for the jury as to whether he participated in King’s death under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder by extreme indifference. Consistent with Washington v. Coryell, 483 P.3d 98 (2021), the answer was yes. "The record shows that the trial court carefully reviewed all of the evidence admitted at trial in light of the charged offenses, properly instructed the jury on accomplice liability, and properly exercised its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter."

Washington v. McWhorter

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,691-3

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Respondent John McWhorter pleaded guilty in adult court to crimes he committed when he was a juvenile. He later moved for resentencing to enable the trial court to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth. The superior court granted the motion for a resentencing hearing, and the State appealed this order to the Court of Appeals. That court ruled that the superior court’s order was not appealable by the State, so it dismissed the appeal. The State filed a petition for review to the Washington Supreme Court, who reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to consider the State’s appeal.

Washington v. Valdiglesias LaValle

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,442-2

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Sheryl Gordon McCloud

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Respondent Vanessa Valdiglesias LaValle of two counts of criminal solicitation after she told her minor son, S.G., that he could be with her “forever” if he poisoned his father. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that Valdiglesias LaValle’s offer to live with S.G. “forever” if S.G. killed his father did not constitute a “thing of value” within the meaning of RCW 9A.28.030(1). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held the plain meaning of “money or other thing of value” in RCW 9A.28.030(1) unambiguously included both money and things that were not money but that, like money, possessed utility, desirability, significance, and/or economic value. "Nothing in the plain language or context of the statute indicates that 'other thing of value' must be limited to things with a traditional economic or market value."

Buckingham v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 92

Opinion Date: September 22, 2023

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for sentence reduction, holding that the district court erred in ruling that the motion was untimely but that the error was harmless.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of several crimes, including aggravated burglary. The court sentenced Defendant to a total of twelve to twenty years followed by seven years of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in ruling that Defendant's motion for sentence reduction was untimely, but the error was harmless; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for sentence reduction.

Martens v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 93

Opinion Date: September 28, 2023

Judge: Kautz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of failing to notify law enforcement of a change in his residential address, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support the conviction.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two violations of the Sex Offender Registration Act for failing to notify law enforcement of a change in his residential address. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was clearly sufficient to show that Defendant was required and failed to register two residential addresses.

Justia Ask A Lawyer by the Numbers: Second Quarter 2023

Justia Team

It’s time for another edition of Justia Ask A Lawyer by the Numbers! We took a look at the data for our free question-and-answer forum in the second quarter this year and are back to share insights with all of you. Check out this post to learn more.

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