United States v. A.R.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1700

Opinion Date: September 14, 2023

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court ordering A.R., who was adjudicated delinquent in a proceeding under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031-5042, detained in a juvenile institution until he reached the age of twenty-one, followed by a term of juvenile delinquent supervision, holding that remand was required.

A.R., who was born in 2003, was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to his admission of aiding and abetting an attempted robbery of a motor vehicle and five carjackings, each of which would have been a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2119 had A.R. been an adult. On appeal, A.R. primarily challenged the district court's order of a detention period rather than a probationary one. The First Circuit affirmed as to the court's imposition of detention but reversed and remanded as to two other matters, holding (1) A.R.'s disposition was both procedurally and substantively reasonable; (2) the district court erred in failing to recommend that A.R. be placed in a local detention facility; and (3) the district court erred in imposing a term of detention and supervision that together exceeded the applicable statutory maximum.

United States v. Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-1782

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: SACK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition after previously having been convicted of a felony. The district court determined that Defendant’s recommended range of imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines was 15 to 21 months. On July 7, 2021, the court nevertheless sentenced Defendant principally to an above-Guidelines sentence of 48 months of imprisonment. Defendant argued that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain its rationale for the sentence it imposed on Defendant and because the district court’s stated justifications were insufficient to support the sentence imposed.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court explained that to hold that Defendant’s sentence was not ultimately reasonable, the court would need to conclude that the sentence he received was “shockingly high.” Defendant argued that his sentence meets that standard because, inter alia, he had a difficult upbringing, completed many rehabilitative program hours while in prison, and does not have a lengthy history of violence. The court explained that these facts weigh in Defendant’s favor and likely were part of the district court’s reasons for not sentencing Defendant to a 70-month imprisonment term as the government requested and as Defendant received when he was convicted of the same offense in 2005. However, they are not strong enough to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when sentencing Defendant to a 48-month imprisonment term. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not commit any plain procedural error when imposing Defendant’s sentence.

United States v. Hunt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-3020

Opinion Date: September 20, 2023

Judge: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the months following the 2020 presidential election, Defendant-Appellant threatened prominent elected officials in several posts on various social media platforms. A jury convicted Defendant of one count of threatening to assault and murder members of Congress. The district court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of nineteen months. On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, a jury instruction, the partial closure of the courtroom due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and his sentence.

The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the constitutional fact doctrine’s requirement that courts “determine for themselves whether the fact-finder appropriately applied First Amendment law to the facts” is inapplicable where, as here, the First Amendment is not implicated. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.
 
Defendant also argued that the district court violated his right to a public trial by excluding his father from the courtroom during the trial. The court explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants in a criminal prosecution the right to a public trial. However, the court reasoned as a general matter, courts may constitutionally close a courtroom under certain circumstances. Applying the relevant four-part test, the court found that the district court did not plainly err by excluding Defendant’s father from the trial courtroom.
 
Defendant also challenged the district court’s sentence on the ground that it improperly considered a rehabilitative purpose in sentencing him to prison. The court explained that in sentencing Defendant, the district court did not impermissibly consider rehabilitation. Rather, it considered the factors prescribed by 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a)

Durham v. Kelley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3187

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Julio M. Fuentes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Durham, a prisoner with lumbar stenosis, received epidural steroid injections for pain and was prescribed a walking cane. In 2020, Durham was sent to a quarantine unit without his cane. For 10 days, Durham repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested his cane because he was in severe pain. His requests to see a doctor and to use a shower chair were ignored. Durham fell in the shower. Durham filed suit, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).

The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Durham’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their capacity as state officials barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Durham failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, having failed to plausibly allege that the prison officials were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm”; and Durham failed to state ADA and RA claims, having failed to show that he is a qualifying individual with a disability. The Third Circuit vacated. Durham is a “qualified individual” and the provision of showers in prison is an activity that must be made accessible to people with disabilities. Durham sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had knowledge that his federally protected ADA right was substantially likely to be violated. A state program that accepts federal funds waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to RA claims. Durham adequately alleged deliberate indifference.

USA v. Mora-Carrillo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-51125

Opinion Date: September 14, 2023

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the country after a previous deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(a) & (b)(2). He claimed that the district court wrongly denied his request for a jury instruction about duress and inappropriately applied an enhancement to his sentence for obstruction of justice. Mora argues that the district court’s finding did not address all the elements of perjury. The district court stated that “this Defendant lied under oath to that jury” and that “he obstructed justice.” Defendant posits that this does not address whether the lie was willful or material.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the defendant must present proof of each element to receive a jury instruction on duress. The court wrote that even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, he has not presented proof that he was in danger at the moment of his offense. The court reasoned that there is no reason to believe that he was detained, followed, or surveilled in the interim between his abduction and the commission of the offense.
 
Further, the court explained that the obstruction of justice enhancement applies if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct.” The court wrote that it found that the district court’s finding “encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.”

USA v. Recio-Rosas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40720

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Defendant a citizen of Mexico, has been deported from the United States repeatedly over the past three decades. The list of crimes he has committed in the United States is extensive. Most recently, Defendant pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after a prior deportation. At the time of this offense, Defendant was 51 years old, but had only spent one year of his adult life in Mexico, his country of citizenship. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Defendant’s recommended range spanned from 3 years and 10 months (46 months) to 4 years and 9 months (57 months). The district court sentenced Defendant to 6 years (72 months). Defendant challenged his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Government concedes that the district court mistakenly counted six prior theft convictions when there were only four and mistakenly suggested that Defendant had served 7 years for a 1991 vehicle burglary conviction when he actually served 10 months of the 7-year sentence. These, the Government admits, were obvious errors. Yet the Government argues, and we agree, that these misstatements did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. Nor did they impugn the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the proceedings. Further, the court wrote it has previously affirmed the substantive reasonableness of a 72-month sentence for illegal re-entry. Thus, the court concluded that this sentence was substantively reasonable, as well.

USA V. RICHARD MARSCHALL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-30048

Opinion Date: September 20, 2023

Judge: Collins

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) for shipping misbranded drugs in interstate commerce. Along with other challenges, Defendant contended that the district court erred in concluding that the charged offense did not require proof that Defendant knew that the drugs he shipped were misbranded. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, and the district court denied that motion.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The panel first held that the text of the various provisions of the FDCA at issue does not contain any language that imposes a scienter requirement of the sort that Defendant advocates. The panel then addressed whether there are convincing reasons to depart from the presumption that Congress intended to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, even when Congress does not specify any scienter in the statutory text. The panel concluded that such convincing reasons are present here. The panel wrote that this is the unusual case in which a public welfare offense lacks a scienter element even though it is a felony with moderately severe potential penalties, given the confluence of circumstances: (1) Congress augmented, into a felony, a predicate misdemeanor offense that concededly lacks a scienter requirement; (2) it did so by adding, not a scienter requirement, but a prior conviction requirement; (3) this action contrasts with Congress’s explicit addition of a scienter requirement in the other clause of Section 333(a)(2); and (4) the prior conviction requirement largely serves the same purposes as an express scienter requirement.

United States v. Coates

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-3122

Opinion Date: September 18, 2023

Judge: Michael R. Murphy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2019, defendant-appellant Larry Coates was caught possessing child pornography. At the time, he was serving supervised release for Kansas-state child exploitation violations. Coates pleaded guilty to a single count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). In anticipation of sentencing, the probation office prepared a presentence investigative report (“PSR”) which recommended a pattern of activity enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5). Coates objected to the enhancement, reasoning it could only apply if the Guidelines' commentary’s definition of pattern was used. In doing so, Coates advocated the district court rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), which determined courts could only defer to commentary accompanying executive agency regulations when the associated regulation was “genuinely ambiguous.” Absent express guidance from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court declined to apply Kisor and it did not otherwise believe the commentary inconsistent with the guideline. The Tenth Circuit confirmed this approach in United States v. Maloid, 71 F.4th 795 (10th Cir. 2023). Concurring with the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

United States v. Jackson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7015

Opinion Date: September 18, 2023

Judge: Stephanie Kulp Seymour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

Defendant-appellant Michael David Jackson was convicted and sentenced for several offenses stemming from the sexual abuse of his young niece, including two counts of possession of child pornography. On appeal Jackson argued, and the government conceded, that the possession convictions were multiplicitous and violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. To this the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and therefore remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate one of these convictions. Jackson also challenged his sentence, contending: it was procedurally unreasonable because the application of several sentencing enhancements constituted impermissible double counting; and it was substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit noted the district court will have discretion to consider the entire sentencing package on remand. The Court rejected these challenges and concluded that the sentence imposed was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

State ex rel. Mitchell v. Honorable Cooper

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-22-0227-PR

Opinion Date: September 18, 2023

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition seeking post-conviction relief (PCR), holding that Petitioner's natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner was sixteen when he shot and killed two people. He was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to natural life for one murder and life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the other murder. Petitioner later filed the PCR petition at issue, claiming that his natural life sentence violated Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). The PCR court determined that a colorable claim existed and that and that a Valencia evidentiary hearing was warranted. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's ruling and dismissed the PCR petition, holding that Petitioner did not present a colorable claim for relief under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) because his natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller and there had not been a significant change in the law that, if applied to Petitioner's case, would probably overturn his sentence.

Davis v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 119

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Karen R. Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of mandamus directing Honorable Quincy Ross, circuit judge, to issue an order acting on Petitioner's habeas petition within thirty days of the date of this opinion, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the writ.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to theft of property and was sentenced to sixty months' imprisonment as a habitual offender. In his mandamus petition, Petitioner asserted that Judge Ross had failed timely to act on his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court granted the writ because Petitioner's habeas petition had been pending since 2021, no action had been taken, and the State's response offered no explanation for the extended delay.

Gonder v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 122

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Webb

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's pro se motion to vacate and dismiss judgment and commitment order due to lack of jurisdiction filed under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, holding that there was no error.

In his motion, Appellant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him because he did not engage in the criminal conduct contemplated by Ark. Code Ann. 5-54-119 and because the elements of section 5-54-119 were not established. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that the trial court did not clearly err when it found that Appellant did not state a cause of action under section 16-90-111(a).

Harmon v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 120

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Rhonda K. Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's petition to correct an illegal sentence, holding that Petitioner failed to establish either that his sentence was illegal on its face or, at the time of sentence, that the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to manslaughter and robbery and stipulated that he was a habitual offender. Petitioner was sentenced to sixty months in prison for manslaughter and 480 months for robbery, with his sentences to run consecutively. Petitioner later filed a petition for relief from an illegal sentence, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's sentence fell within the maximum prescribed sentence and was legal on its face and that the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Petitioner's petition on all grounds.

Todd v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 121

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Womack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying and dismissing Petitioner's petition to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err.

In his section 16-90-111 petition, Petitioner alleged that consecutive sentences imposed upon revocation of suspended sentences in eight separate cases were illegal. Ark. R. Crim. Code 37.2(c) required Petitioner to file a Ark. R. Crim. Code 37.1 petition challenging the revocation of his suspended sentences within sixty days of the mandates issued by the court of appeals in May and July 2016. Petitioner, however, filed his petition to correct an illegal sentence almost four years later, in February 2020. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition because Rule 37.1 had superseded it, and Petitioner's petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.

California v. Burns

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080779(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In August 2010, after the California v. Samaniego, 174 Cal.App.4th 1148 (2009) and California v. Nero, 181 Cal.App.4th 504 (2010) were decided, defendant Brandon Burns was convicted on one count of first degree murder arising out of his participation with a codefendant in a gang-related shooting. The jury was instructed using the now-disapproved version of CALCRIM No. 400, but his counsel did not argue he was guilty of a lesser crime than the codefendant. Neither did the attorney argue the instruction was given in error. In 2022 however, Burns petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming he “could not presently be convicted of murder…because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” He argued that based on the error in former CALCRIM No. 400, the jury might have convicted him based on some “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” This possibility, he argued, required he be granted an evidentiary hearing. Even accepting Burns’ argument regarding the flaw in the earlier version of CALCRIM No. 400, the Court of Appeal found the alleged error he identified had nothing to do with the 2018 and 2021 legislative changes that gave rise to section 1172.6’s petition process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Burns failed to establish a prima facile case for relief under section 1172.6.

California v. Morones

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C095560(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

While his two teenaged children were across the hall, defendant Anthony Morones, Jr., fired a gun outside a bathroom window. After he was arrested and a complaint was filed against him, he attempted to persuade his children to lie to law enforcement about the incident. A jury found defendant guilty of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm, two counts of misdemeanor child endangerment, felon in possession of a weapon, and two counts of dissuading a witness. On appeal, defendant contended his witness dissuasion convictions under Penal Code section 136.11 should have been reversed because the statute only applied to efforts to dissuade a witness prior to charges being filed. He also contended the trial court erred when it failed to properly instruct the jury on elements of the offenses and consider section 654 in sentencing. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed two of defendant’s convictions for witness dissuasion, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.

P. v. Suazo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F082140(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: DETJEN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant, while having an elevated blood-alcohol level, drove his 2008 Ford Focus at a high rate of speed off the highway, through a fence, and into agricultural equipment parked in an adjacent yard. His passenger was ejected from the vehicle and killed. Defendant was charged and convicted with various offenses related to this incident. On appeal, among other claims, Defendant contends remand is required for the court to resentence him in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 731 (Senate Bill No. 567), and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 695 (Assembly Bill No. 124), and the court erred in ordering restitution in favor of Garton, the agricultural equipment company whose property was damaged in the collision, because the company was not a direct or derivative victim of a crime of which Defendant was convicted.
 
The Fifth Appellate District remanded the matter for resentencing consistent with Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124. However, the court affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that as the People concede, Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124 are ameliorative changes in law that apply retroactively to Defendant. Here, the trial court imposed an upper-term sentence on count 5, thus implicating Senate Bill No. 567. Additionally, Defendant’s statement in mitigation, submitted to the trial court at sentencing, suggests defendant may have a history of childhood trauma, including childhood abuse, thus potentially implicating Assembly Bill No. 124.

People v. Aguilar-Jimenez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H050153(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 15, 2023

Judge: Lie

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Aguilar-Jimenez was charged with two counts of murder (Penal Code 187(a)), DUI, and driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more and causing injury. A magistrate concluded that Aguilar-Jimenez did not have the requisite state of mind for implied malice murder.Two weeks later, the district attorney recharged the same two murder counts, stating that the magistrate had not made factual findings but reached legal conclusions to which the superior court owed no deference. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of implied malice and dismissed. The district attorney filed a felony complaint, charging Aguilar-Jimenez with two counts of murder

The court dismissed the murder counts under the “two-dismissal rule” (Penal Code section 1387), which “bar[s] further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has been twice previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute” with exceptions. The court of appeal reversed. The exception under section 1387(c)(3) applies; there had only been one prior termination—when the superior court previously granted the section 995 motion. As the magistrate did not make factual findings that were “fatal to the allegation that the offense was committed,” the prosecutor was authorized to recharge the murder counts under section 739. When the prosecutor refiled the charges in case C1922671, the prosecutor commenced a second prosecution—not a third.

State v. Butler

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20702

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Andrew J. McDonald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it dismissed Defendant's pending criminal charges and, therefore, was without jurisdiction to entertain the State's motion to open the judgment and reinstate the charges, holding that criminal courts do not have jurisdiction to open a judgment following a dismissal.

After Defendant was charged with risk of injury to a child and breach of the peace in the second degree the court granted his application to participate in a supervised diversionary program for individuals with psychiatric disabilities. The trial court later dismissed the charges against him. The State moved to open the judgment of dismissal on the grounds that Defendant failed to satisfactorily complete the diversionary program. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that the dismissal was erroneous. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the matter when it rendered the judgment of dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the State's motion to open the judgment and reinstate the charges.

State v. Robles

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20452

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Seeley

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court finding Defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a motor vehicle.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) any claimed error on the part of the trial court in violating Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment by allowing the chief medical examiner to testify about the results of the victim's autopsy, which the chief medical examiner had not performed himself, was harmless; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a vehicle in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 29-38(a).

Zack v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-1233

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Francis

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the postconviction court summarily denying the claims in Michael Duane Zack, III's fourth successive postconviction motion and denied Zack's motion for stay of execution and request for oral argument, holding that Zack was not entitled to relief.

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Ravonne Smith and was scheduled for execution on October 3, 2023. In his successive postconviction motion Defendant claimed that his execution should be barred under the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court summarily denied the claims as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Zack's motion for stay of execution and request for oral argument, holding that the postconviction court did not err by summarily denying Defendant's claims as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless.

Adams v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0758

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Leon Adams IV (“Leon”) was convicted by jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Laron Lowe and the aggravated assault of Ronda Dobson. Leon contended: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel had an actual conflict of interest arising out of his joint representation of Leon and his co-defendant and brother, Isaiah Adams. For the reasons set forth below, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Adams' convictions.

Carter v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0522

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Carla Wong McMillian

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Rafael Carter appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea stemming from the murder of Terrance Fields during an armed robbery. The January 2016 term of court in which Carter entered his guilty plea expired on Friday, March 4, 2016, and a new term of court commenced on Monday, March 7, 2016. So both his March 11, 2016 and his October 11, 2021 motions to withdraw were filed after the expiration of the term of court in which he entered his plea. Nonetheless, Carter maintains that his convictions and sentences are void and illegal due to merger errors, thus providing the trial court with jurisdiction to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. The Georgia Supreme Court found Carter’s sentence was not void because his felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of law despite the trial court’s purported merger of those counts; the trial court has properly merged Carter’s conviction for the aggravated assault of Fields (Count 9) into his malice murder conviction (Count 1); no other merger error appeared; and each sentence imposed was within the range that the law allows. Therefore, the Court found the trial court properly dismissed Carter's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Hamilton v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0670

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Nuwrulhaqq Hamilton was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Felton. On appeal, Hamilton argued: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict as to the counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and (2) the trial court plainly erred by failing to give, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request, a jury charge on Hamilton’s good character. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hamilton’s convictions.

Kennebrew v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0530

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Following a reversal of his convictions on appeal and a retrial, Appellant Phillip Kennebrew was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the 2011 beating and stabbing death of Breyon Alexander. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence testimony from a witness who testified at Appellant’s first trial but was unavailable to testify at his second trial. Appellant contended the witness’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within the prior testimony hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (1), and that violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant further argued that, even if the witness’s prior testimony was not altogether inadmissible, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude double hearsay within that testimony. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s admission of hearsay statements made by the victim, which were admitted under the residual hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-807. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Salvesen v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0433

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Walter Salvesen, III was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Johnathan Martin. On appeal, Salvesen contended: (1) the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial photographs from Martin’s autopsy and the scene where Martin’s body was found; (2) the trial court erred by failing to recharge the jury on the lesser offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter when it recharged on malice murder and felony murder; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to the extent the foregoing alleged errors were not preserved for appellate review. The Georgia Supreme Court was not persuaded: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs; (2) the trial court acted within its discretion in solely recharging the jury on the definitions it requested and not the lesser offenses; and (3) Salvesen has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was deficient. The Court therefore affirmed Salvesen’s convictions.

Idaho v. Pendleton

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50078

Opinion Date: September 20, 2023

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Edo, a dog used by the Boise Police Department to detect controlled substances, alerted on defendant-respondent Shawna Pendleton’s vehicle during a traffic stop. Videos of the incident raised questions about the reliability of Edo’s performance. Through a series of discovery requests, Pendleton sought additional videos and police reports from past stops to challenge Edo’s reliability in detecting drugs. The district court, over repeated objections from the State, ultimately granted her motion to compel the evidence on finding it material to her defense.
On appeal, the State argued the district court abused its discretion by denying its motion for reconsideration because: (1) Pendleton failed to establish that the requested evidence was material to her defense; (2) the production of four-months’ worth of Edo’s reports and videos was unduly burdensome, and (3) not all of the requested evidence was within the prosecutor’s possession, custody, or control. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the State failed to show an abuse of discretion in compelling production of the videos and reports regarding Edo and his handler for the four months prior to Pendleton’s arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the evidence sought by Pendleton was material, not unduly burdensome, and in the “possession, custody or control” of the prosecution pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16.

People v. Lozano

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 128609

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Mary Jane Theis

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Chicago police arrested Lozano, who was subsequently charged with burglary and possession of burglary tools. Lozano moved to suppress evidence (a car radio, a wallet, and two screwdrivers) arguing that when the officers stopped, detained, and searched him, they neither possessed a warrant nor saw him committing any crimes and could not reasonably suspect that he had committed or was about to commit any crimes or that he was armed and dangerous. Officer Rodriguez testified that he and his partner were driving in an unmarked car, on patrol, and saw Lozano “running at a fast rate of speed” and holding his front pocket. It was raining and wet outside. Rodriguez made a U-turn and approached Lozano, who fled up the stairs of an apparently abandoned building. Rodriguez pursued Lozano and saw a “big bulge” in Lozano’s pocket. Rodriguez handcuffed Lozano, then touched his hooded sweatshirt and felt a rectangular box. He reached inside Lozano’s front pocket and recovered a wallet, two screwdrivers, and a radio. The wallet and radio had been taken from a parked car.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial and appellate courts and held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Lozano. The act of running in the rain while holding the front of his pocket did not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution.

State v. Russell

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2023 ME 64

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of gross sexual assault and four related crimes, holding that a specific unanimity instruction was necessary as to counts three and four.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in not giving a specific unanimity instruction. The State conceded that a specific unanimity instruction was necessary as to counts three and four. The Supreme Court (1) vacated Defendant's convictions as to counts three and four; and (2) affirmed the judgment on but vacated Defendant's sentences imposed on counts one, two, and five because the sentences may have been affected by the now-vacated convictions on counts three and four.

Commonwealth v. Fisher

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13340

Opinion Date: September 20, 2023

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree based on a theory of felony-murder, among other charges, holding that a police officer's identification testimony was admitted improperly, but its admission did not prejudice Defendant.

On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, among numerous other allegations of error. For the claimed errors, Defendant requested that the court reduce his verdict or order a retrial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a police officer's testimony identifying Defendant in a video recording at trial was improperly admitted, but the admission did not prejudice Defendant; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error.

Fordyce v. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-1619

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, following a jury trial, of gross-misdemeanor indecent exposure, holding that an individually who willfully and lewdly exposes himself in the privately-owned, partially-enclosed backyard of his home has done so in a "in any place where others are present" within the meaning of the indecent-exposure statute, Minn. Stat. 617.23, subd. 1.

After he was convicted, Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the State failed to prove that he was in a "public place, or in any place where others are present" within the meaning of the statute. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Defendant's actions occurred in a public place. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the privately-owned, partially-enclosed backyard of a home satisfies the "place" element of the indecent-exposure statute.

State v. Johnson

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-1360

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of falsely reporting a crime to a police officer, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that venue was proper in Waseca County.

Defendant's conviction was based on her false report to police that the father of her child had abused their child. Because Defendant was in Blue Earth County when she made the report she argued on appeal that venue was improper in Waseca County and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State met its burden to show venue based on the location of the officer receiving the false report; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction.

State v. Mosley

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1073

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered in the vehicle that Defendant was driving, holding that the totality of the circumstances supported probable cause to search the vehicle.

Law enforcement initiated a traffic stop after receiving a tip from an informant that a male in possession of a firearm was in the vehicle Defendant was driving. The district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the firearm on the grounds that the officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State met its burden and established probable cause to search the vehicle that Defendant was driving.

State v. Torgerson

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0425

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his vehicle, holding that the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, alone, is insufficient to create the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

After a traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle Defendant was convicting of possession of methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a minor and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the odor of marijuana, alone, is insufficient to create the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence of medium-strength odor of marijuana, on its own, is insufficient to establish a fair probability that the search would yield evidence of criminally-illegal conduct or drug-related contraband.

State v. Pine

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 172

Opinion Date: September 19, 2023

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping, sexual intercourse without consent, and partner or family member assault, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-303(2) is not facially unconstitutional because it permits a judge, rather than a jury, to apply factors that reduce the maximum penalty; (2) Defendant's level three offender designation was objectionable, not illegal, and Defendant did not properly reserve his objection to the designation during sentencing; and (3) Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that the maximum sentence for kidnapping was ten years based on mitigating factors and failing to object to Defendant's level-three sex offender designation.

State v. Boppre

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 203

Opinion Date: September 15, 2023

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Defendant's third motion for new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any of the claims of newly discovered evidence at issue in this appeal.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and four related felonies in 1989, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a series of motions for new trial and successive motions for postconviction relief, without success. Before the Supreme Court was Defendant's third motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the motion without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant's operative motion and supporting documents did not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.

State v. Dolinar

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 257

Opinion Date: September 15, 2023

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's plea in bar alleging that a trial on the pending charges for violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act would subject him to Double Jeopardy, holding that forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-431, as amended in 2016, is civil in nature, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar.

In his plea in bar, Appellant argued that he was already criminally punished for the same crime in a separate forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 28-431. In denying the plea in bar, the district court concluded that Appellant had failed to demonstrate he was punished by the forfeiture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sanction imposed by forfeiture under section 28-431 is civil and not criminal for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis.

State v. Gonzalez

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33

Opinion Date: September 14, 2023

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge against him for violation of his due process rights, holding that Defendant's due process rights were violated, but the district court abused its discretion in granting the extreme remedy of dismissal under the facts of this case.

After Defendant was charged with sexual assault the district court found him to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered him remanded to a psychiatric hospital for competency restoration treatment. After a delay of over 160 days during which he remained in jail, Defendant was transferred to the hospital. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that his continued detention in jail violated his due process rights. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court's precedent did not support the district court's conclusion that aggravated circumstances warranted dismissing the complaint against Defendant with prejudice; and (2) the district court neglected to balance the deterrent objectives of dismissal against society's interest in prosecuting criminal acts.

State v. Caffee

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 S.D. 51

Opinion Date: September 20, 2023

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree manslaughter and aggravated assault and sentencing him to life imprisonment, holding that Defendant's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter and aggravated assault. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to life without the possibility of parole for first-degree manslaughter and to a term of fifteen years for aggravated assault to run concurrently with his life sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing that his life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment and that the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing a life sentence without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

Continental Heritage Ins. Co.

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0018-23

Opinion Date: September 20, 2023

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Darrell David was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. David failed to appear at a trial setting, and a judgment nisi was entered for the forfeiture of a $10,000 bond. A final judgment of forfeiture was signed, forfeiting the bond and requiring the payment of $100 interest, $396 in court costs, and any reasonable and necessary costs incurred by the county for the return of the criminal defendant. The surety (Continental Heritage) filed a motion to correct costs. The motion contended the collection of civil filing fees was not authorized in bond forfeiture proceedings, identifying specific fees it claimed it should not have to pay, which were most of the fees in the bill of costs. The motion contended that authority to dispute costs was conferred by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.008. The parties litigated the issue before the trial court. The State took the position that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revise costs under Article 103.008 and also argued that the costs were legitimate. The surety took the position that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the costs and that it should have to pay only some of the court costs, which the surety believed totaled $94. The trial court ruled that it had jurisdiction to address the issue of court costs, but it denied the surety’s motion to revise the costs. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a surety can be liable—and is generally liable—for civil filing fees as court costs in a bond-forfeiture action when the State prevails. "But the surety is not liable for a filing fee that the State is entirely exempt from paying unless a statute nevertheless requires a civil defendant to pay the fee if the State prevails. The surety also cannot be required to pay a fee that improperly duplicates a fee already charged." The Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

State v. Barnett

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 20

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Pearce

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court rejecting the State's interpretation of Utah Const. art. I, section 8(1) to mandate that a judge deny bail to a defendant charged with a felony if that defendant is already serving probation on a felony conviction, holding that there was no error.

Defendant was serving probation when he was charged with felony crimes in both Salt Lake and Davis counties. At the Davis County bail hearing the State argued that Utah Const. art. I, section 8(1) mandates that a judge deny bail to a defendant charged with a felony if that defendant is already serving probation on a felony conviction. The district court disagreed with the State's interpretation and set bail. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that it could grant Defendant bail.

Washington v. Reynolds

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 100,873-2

Opinion Date: September 21, 2023

Judge: Sheryl Gordon McCloud

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Michael Reynolds Jr. received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for a crime he committed at age 33. The events triggering that sentence, though, were his two “strikes” under Washington’s “three strikes” law—one of which Reynolds committed at age 17, when he was a juvenile. If Reynolds’ current sentence constituted punishment for his earlier offense committed at age 17, then it would be unconstitutional under case law. But under the Washington Supreme Court’s more recent precedent, his current sentence did not constitute punishment for that prior offense. In Washington v. Moretti, decided two years after Bassett, the Supreme Court held that a “three strikes” sentence of mandatory life in prison without possibility of parole constituted punishment for the last crime or third “strike,” not the earlier first or second “strikes.” “And for years, we have held that our state’s 'three strikes’ law as applied to adults does not violate article I, section 14.2 That assessment could certainly change over time. But in this case, the parties have not asked us to overrule it.” The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Munda v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 90

Opinion Date: September 18, 2023

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of four counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree soliciting to engage in illicit sexual relations, attempt to commit sexual abuse o a minor in the second degree, and battery, holding that there was no abuse of discretion or cumulative error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting hearsay evidence in violation of Wyo. R. Evid. 802; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence in violation of Wyo. R. Evid. 403; and (3) because there was no error, there was no basis for Defendant's claim that evidentiary errors cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial.