Peguero Vasquez v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-6380

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: DENNIS JACOBS

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the finding that he is removable on the ground that he committed a crime involving moral turpitude for which “a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.” 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The predicate offense, a 2017 conviction for possession of a forged instrument, is a Class A misdemeanor under New York law. In 2019, after his conviction, New York enacted Penal Law Section 70.15(1-a), which lowered the maximum possible sentence for Class A misdemeanors from one year to 364 days. Petitioner asserts that because the statute is retroactive for state law purposes, his prior conviction no longer constitutes a basis for removal because it is not a crime for which “a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed,” as required by the removal statute.
 
The Second Circuit denied Petitoner’s petition. The court wrote that it declines to give retroactive effect to New York’s modification of its sentencing scheme for purposes of federal immigration law. The removal statute focuses on the historical fact of an alien’s prior conviction and thereby consults the state law applicable at the time of the criminal proceedings, not at the time of the removal proceedings.

US v. Bryan Ogle

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4043

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: RUSHING

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At the time of his offense, Defendant had numerous prior felony convictions. The Government requested an enhanced sentence under ACCA. “ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of a firearms offense who has three or more prior convictions for either a 'serious drug offense’ or a 'violent felony.’” The Government argued that two of Defendant’s prior convictions qualified as serious drug offenses, which he does not dispute, and that his 2017 conviction for aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee Code Section 39-13-102 qualified as a violent felony. The district court agreed, overruling Defendant’s objection, and sentenced him to 210 months in prison. The only issue Defendant raised on appeal is whether his Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a violent felony.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that Defendant’s Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA. Defendant argued that aggravated assault cannot be a violent felony because the second element of the crime—simple assault—requires only de minimis force. While it is true that “de minimis physical force, such as mere offensive touching, is insufficient to trigger the ACCA’s force clause,” the court explained that Defendant overlooks the third, aggravating element of the offense. Each of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force.

USA v. Lincks

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10917

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to any sentence imposed in two unrelated state proceedings, and three years of supervised release. The Fifth Circuit dismissed his appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion seeking relief from his plea. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant appealed.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the Section 2255 motion. However, the court noted that this case reveals uncertainty in its caselaw regarding argument forfeiture, ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) in guilty pleas, and the nature of non-constitutional appeals in Section 2255 proceedings. The court explained that there are three issues. First, whether Defendant forfeited his argument that his counsel was ineffective in advising him about his guideline range. The court held that the answer was no. Second, the court explained that assuming that it reaches the merits of Defendant’s claim, whether he can prevail on it. Again, the court answered no. And third, whether Defendant is entitled to a COA on whether the district court abused its discretion by denying discovery.  The court explained that by treating Defendant’s request for a COA as a direct appeal, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Moreover, the court explained that it has now rejected Defendant’s guidelines-advice claim, and there is no indication either in his briefing or in the record that the discovery he seeks would conceivably produce a different result.

USA v. Reyna

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20163

Opinion Date: September 8, 2023

Judge: Stephen Higginson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise. Defendant waived the preparation of a presentence report (PSR), and the district court determined that a PSR was not necessary. The district court proceeded to sentencing directly after taking Defendant’s guilty plea. Pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release term, the district court stated that Defendant was “subject to the standard conditions.” Defendant’s written judgment included a list of the fifteen “standard” conditions of supervision listed in the Southern District of Texas’s standing order. Defendant appealed.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it discerned no error in the district court’s oral imposition of the standard conditions of supervised release contained in the district’s standing order, which mirror the conditions then listed in the written judgment. Furthermore, the court explained that even if it assumes the first three prongs of the plain-error test, Defendant has not met his burden in demonstrating that any claimed error affected “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Conner v. Reagle

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1780

Opinion Date: September 12, 2023

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Conner was convicted in Indiana state court for three counts of felony drug dealing and maintaining a common nuisance. Conner qualified as a habitual offender and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 72 years in prison. He had remained in custody pre-trial, but there was a delay of 1,029 days from the charging date (1,034 days from his arrest). Conner’s attorney never made a Sixth Amendment objection to the pretrial delays and Conner’s own objections were rejected because he was represented by counsel. State courts rejected his post-trial Sixth Amendment and ineffective assistance claims. Conner was advised by his postconviction counsel to postpone filing his federal habeas petition until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the petition for a writ of certiorari filed after his state postconviction proceedings. Conner relied on that advice, to his detriment. The one-year period in which to file the habeas petition continued to run while the certiorari petition was pending.

The district court dismissed his subsequent habeas petition as untimely, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the postconviction lawyer’s mistake was particularly grave but holding that Supreme Court and circuit precedent j foreclose equitably tolling the deadline.

United States v. Barker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2131

Opinion Date: September 11, 2023

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

At his Broadway home, Barker sold a confidential informant 109.8 grams of methamphetamine; a month later, Barker sold the CI another 106.4 grams. Barker’s primary residence was on Havens. Officers obtained search warrants for both residences to be executed on November 30. Barker flew to California that morning. His friend, Carr, and Carr’s children were staying at the Broadway residence. At 4:03 p.m., officers monitoring Havens stopped Barker’s SUV but found his wife inside; she called Barker, 4:11-4:14 p.m. Officers recorded Barker’s voice asking about a search warrant., Barker contacted Carr at 4:15. Officers watching the Broadway residence saw Carr exit the home with a trash bag, go next door, and return without the bag. Officers recovered a trash bag containing three firearms and 464 grams of methamphetamine. Carr stated that the bag belonged to Barker, who had instructed him to move it.

Barker pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). His PSR indicated an initial guidelines range between 151-188 months. The government then informed the probation office about Carr’s statements. An amended PSR more than tripled Barker’s drug quantity and recommended sentencing enhancements for possessing firearms in connection with drug trafficking; maintaining premises for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance; and obstruction of justice. His new guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court acknowledged that Carr was “not necessarily” a person who would tell the truth but observed several corroborating facts and imposed an underguidelines sentence of 300 months The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-1098

Opinion Date: September 14, 2023

Judge: VanDyke

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Petitioner has been a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States since 2003. Since that time, he has been convicted of various crimes, including theft, criminal trespass, a DUI, and, as relevant here, possession of heroin in violation of Oregon law. After he received a notice to appear (NTA) initiating removal proceedings, Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied the petition and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal.
 
The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court held that the agency did not err in concluding that the stop-time rule set forth in 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(d)(1)(B), which terminates accrual of the requisite seven years of continuous physical presence, is calculated from the date a petitioner committed the criminal offense that rendered him removable, rather than the date he was convicted. A lawful permanent resident becomes removable once he is convicted of a qualifying offense, and if the offense is committed within seven years of being admitted into the United States, the Attorney General lacks discretion to cancel removal. Here, Petitioner committed the offense a few months shy of satisfying the seven-year continuous residence requirement, but the conviction became final outside the statutory seven-year period. The panel held that the agency did not err in deciding that the stop-time rule is calculated from the date Petitioner committed the criminal offense that rendered him removable, rather than the date he was convicted.

USA V. CYNTHIA MONTOYA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-50129

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: Ikuta

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed her sentence on the ground that her due process rights were violated when the district court failed to pronounce certain discretionary conditions of supervised release in her presence.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The en banc court held that a district court must orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release, including those referred to as “standard” in U.S.S.G. Section 5D1.3(c), in order to protect a defendant’s due process right to be present at sentencing. In so holding, the en banc court overruled in part the opinion in United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006). The en banc court further held that the pronouncement requirement is satisfied if the defendant is informed of the proposed discretionary conditions before the sentencing hearing, and the district court orally incorporates by reference some or all of those conditions, which gives the defendant an opportunity to object. The en banc court vacated only the conditions of Defendant’s supervised release that were referred to as the “standard conditions” in the written sentence but were not orally pronounced. The en banc court remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to cure its error by orally pronouncing any of the standard conditions of supervised release that it chooses to impose and by giving Defendant a chance to object to them.

United States v. Leon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-1070

Opinion Date: September 11, 2023

Judge: Stephanie Kulp Seymour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Luis Leon was stopped by law enforcement after he was observed illegally driving in a passing lane. Leon was traveling eastbound on I-70 in Colorado when Colorado State Patrol Trooper Shane Gosnell observed him driving in the left lane while not passing another vehicle. Trooper Gosnell began to follow Leon’s 2006 Honda Ridgeline truck and noticed it had a Minnesota license plate. Trooper Gosnell initiated a traffic stop suspecting Leon was trafficking drugs. A search of his vehicle uncovered seventy-six pounds of methamphetamine, and Leon was charged with one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Following a failed motion to suppress, he pled guilty and was sentenced to seventy months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Leon challenged the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and investigate the suspected drug trafficking. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed and therefore reversed.

United States v. Veneno

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-2101

Opinion Date: September 12, 2023

Judge: Carson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

A district court conducted two hours of voir dire in a courtroom closed to the public and broadcasted live over an audio feed. After Defendant Quentin Veneno, Jr. objected, the district court concluded that the dangers of the COVID-19 pandemic justified its closure of the courtroom, but also provided a video feed for the rest of trial. Although Defendant objected to the initial audio-only feed after the initial two hours of voir dire, he never requested that the district court restart jury selection or moved for a mistrial. Defendant appealed both his conviction and challenged Congress’s constitutional authority to criminalize the conduct of Indians on tribal land, whether a previous conviction can be a predicate offense for 18 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) convictions, and whether admission of other-act evidence met the rigors of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.

Charles Edward Jones v. USA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-13365

Opinion Date: September 14, 2023

Judge: LUCK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2002, the grand jury indicted Petitioner for (1) armed bank robbery, (2) knowingly carrying, using, possessing, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and (3) possessing a firearm as a felon. The government then filed a notice that Petitioner qualified for the enhanced sentence under section 3559. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner then filed in the district court a second section 2255 motion. The issue here is whether the Supreme Court has announced a “new rule of constitutional law” that applies to the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. section 3559.
 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for Petitioner’s motion to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that its decision is narrow, and it has not decided whether the three-strikes law’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court wrote that it has not decided whether the three-strikes law’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Further, the court explained that it has not decided whether Petitioner met his burden under Beeman. Instead, the court’s review was limited to the threshold question of whether Petitioner has met the jurisdictional requirements of section 2255(h)(2).
 
The court reasoned that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's second section 2255 motion only if he could establish that a new constitutional rule supported his claim. But no decision from the Supreme Court has announced the new rule that Petitioner needs. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide whether Petitioner’s motion had any merit.

USA v. James Lamount Graham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11809

Opinion Date: September 8, 2023

Judge: GRANT

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of various drug crimes. Now on appeal, Defendant attacked his indictment, claiming that the grand jury’s probable cause determination was rendered defective by the district court’s special procedures related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Under these procedures, grand jurors met in three separate federal courthouses but were joined together by videoconferencing. Defendant also argued that the wiretaps used to gather evidence against him did not meet the statutory necessity requirement.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the COVID-19 accommodations that Defendant criticized introduced no fundamental error into his prosecution. The court wrote that Defendant does not claim that they affected the grand jury’s decision in any way. As for the statutory necessity claim, the district court did not clearly err in deciding that the wiretaps were necessary. The court further explained that a review of the wiretap affidavits themselves shows that they provided more than enough explanation to comply with the law. After describing the investigation’s history and goals, the affidavits comprehensively outlined the “Need for Interception” and discussed “Alternative Investigative Techniques.” They exhaustively detailed why previous sources of information and reasonable alternative methods—including physical surveillance, cameras, interviews, undercover agents, subpoenas, search warrants, trash searches, and more—would not suffice. The court found that such thorough and specific affidavits easily satisfy the legal requirements.

California v. Slaton

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096437(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 11, 2023

Judge: Stacy E. Boulware Eurie

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Curtis Slaton was convicted by jury of murder. The prosecution’s theory in the case was that defendant committed the murder because he affiliated with a gang that wore blue and the victim wore red—a color associated with a rival gang. The trial court allowed the prosecution to present limited gang evidence to advance this theory, including screenshots from a music video that, among other things, show defendant affiliating with a known gang member, displaying a symbol of the gang, and holding up a blue bandana. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court wrongly admitted these screenshots for three reasons: (1) this evidence was inadmissible to show his potential motive for the charged murder; (2) they were highly inflammatory and carried minimal relevance; and (3) a new statute governing the admission of music videos and other forms of creative expression—which became effective after the trial here— applied retroactively and requires reversal. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

Cruz v. City of Merced

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F083402(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: POOCHIGIAN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Labor & Employment Law

Appellant, a former police officer, was terminated from the Merced City Police Department (Department) based on allegations he conducted an illegal search, submitted a false police report, and committed perjury at a court hearing. Appellant appealed to the personnel board (Board), which found the City of Merced (City) failed to show Appellant had submitted a false police report or had conducted an illegal search. However, the Board found that Appellant was not truthful in explaining certain details concerning the search. Consequently, the Board rejected the majority of charges against Appellant, but sustained portions of charges relating to his untruthfulness. The Board recommended that Appellant not be terminated, but instead that he be demoted without backpay. The Merced City Manager reversed the decision and upheld Appellant’s termination. The trial court rejected Appellant’s challenges to the city manager’s decision.
 
The Fifth Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred in upholding several of the charges against Appellant. The court explained that while it upholds several other charges, it remanded for the trial court to determine whether the surviving charges are sufficient to support the consequence of termination. The court upheld the court’s apparent finding that Appellant intentionally opened the bag and that Appellant’s testimony that the bag opened inadvertently as a result of how he grabbed the straps was untruthful. The court wrote that it cannot affirm the judgment because the possibility remains that the trial court could conclude, in its independent judgment, that the surviving charges are insufficient to support Defendant’s termination (i.e., that the termination decision was an abuse of discretion).

P. v. Escobedo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B322608A(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 12, 2023

Judge: YEGAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant purports to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, co-Appellant purports to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.
 
The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals. The court held that the orders appealed were non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained, the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s orders.

People v. Manzoor

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164739(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: Bowen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2006, Manzoor pleaded guilty to a felony violation of Penal Code sections 288.2 and 6641 for attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. The prosecutor dismissed a count that alleged Manzoor attempted to commit a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290(a)(2)(A). Almost 14 years later, the court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor, section 17(b).

After section 290 was amended to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor sought relief from the registration requirements. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the petition, rejecting Manzoor’s argument that the section 290 amendments reflect a legislative intent to relieve a defendant whose section 288.2 felony conviction has been reduced to a misdemeanor from the lifetime obligation to register. Under both the current and pre-2021 versions of section 290, a felony conviction of section 288.2 requires lifetime registration and misdemeanor violations of section 288.2 are not mentioned; section 17(e) continues, both before and after the amendments, to prohibit a court from “reliev[ing] a defendant of the duty to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290” where the defendant is charged with an offense for which registration is required under Section 290, and for which the defendant was found guilty.

People v. Pomar

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167241(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: Chou

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics

Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Jenkins left the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office to join the campaign to recall Boudin, the then-San Francisco District Attorney. After leaving the Office, Jenkins spoke to a reporter about a homicide case being prosecuted by the Office in which the victim was her husband’s cousin. Jenkins criticized the Office for its lax approach toward prosecuting the alleged killers, Mitchell and Pomar. Jenkins faulted the Office for dropping felony gang charges against the two and for failing to detain Pomar—which she claimed allowed Pomar to commit additional crimes, including attempted murder. After Boudin was recalled, Jenkins became the District Attorney. The Office instituted an “ethical wall” to prevent Jenkins from influencing its prosecutions of Mitchell and Pomar. Mitchell and Pomar moved to disqualify the entire Office from that case, Penal Code 1424.1 Pomar also moved to disqualify the Office from his separate prosecution for the additional crimes mentioned by Jenkins in the newspaper article.

The court of appeal affirmed the disqualifications of the Office from both cases. The trial court reasonably concluded that Jenkins’s animosity toward Pomar extended to the other case; that, due to Jenkins’s public statements, the cases had become inextricably intertwined in the eyes of the ADAs, and the public; and that Jenkins’s belief that the prosecution of Pomar was doomed due to the lack of gang charges would likely influence ADAs “consciously or unconsciously” to be more aggressive in prosecuting Pomar.

Medina v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 46

Opinion Date: September 11, 2023

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner Delano Medina pleaded guilty to felony menacing even though he maintained his innocence of that charge. He did so in exchange for the dismissal of several other criminal cases. The trial court found that Medina’s plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. But because Medina agreed to waive the establishment of a factual basis for menacing under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), the trial court did not make a finding as to whether strong evidence of Medina’s actual guilt existed. Medina later moved to withdraw his plea as violative of due process, arguing that a defendant cannot waive proof of a factual basis when entering an "Alford" plea. The postconviction court denied his motion, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether an Alford plea required a trial court to make a finding of strong evidence of actual guilt to pass constitutional muster. The Court found no such requirement, rather, holding that the establishment of a factual basis for the charge under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), provided that the plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Court therefore affirmed the division’s judgment, albeit on slightly different grounds.

State v. Velasquez-Mattos

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20683

Opinion Date: September 12, 2023

Judge: Richard A. Robinson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain testimony pursuant to the constancy of accusation doctrine; (2) the trial court did not err in excluding impeachment evidence of pending criminal charges against the State's key witness; and (3) the first degree of sexual assault charge was not ambiguous and therefore did not violate Defendant's right to jury unanimity under the Sixth Amendment.

Damren v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0015

Opinion Date: September 14, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court summarily denying Appellant's second successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the postconviction court did not err in denying Appellant's motion as untimely.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Appellant later filed his second successive motion for postconviction relief, claiming that newly discovered evidence rendered his death sentence unreliable. The postconviction court summarily denied the motion as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish the timeliness of his successive postconviction petition.

State v. Bautista

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-21-0000395

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: Eddins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, conviction, and sentence related to sentencing in this case, holding that the circuit court erred by not articulating a clear and comprehensive rationale for each of Defendant's consecutive sentences.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled no contest to three felony counts. The court sentenced Defendant to consecutive five-year terms on each count for a total of fifteen years. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, thus rejecting Defendant's jurisdictional and sentencing challenges. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and the circuit court's judgment related to sentencing and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) if the State files a complaint in district court and that court lawfully commits the case to circuit court then the circuit court has jurisdiction; and (2) the circuit court did not provide adequate independent grounds to impose each consecutive sentence.

Bracali-Gambino v. Idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50430

Opinion Date: September 11, 2023

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, Guy Bracali-Gambino pleaded guilty to possession of major contraband in a correctional facility. On direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed his conviction and sentence. Bracali-Gambino subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing in relevant part that his trial counsel had coerced him into pleading guilty, provided erroneous legal advice regarding sentencing enhancements for persistent violators, and failed to investigate the prosecution’s evidence. Bracali-Gambino contended, that considering these errors, his trial counsel had been ineffective. Except for a portion of one of Bracali-Gambino’s claims (Claim II), the district court summarily dismissed his claims relevant to this appeal without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The district court also ultimately dismissed the one remaining claim following an evidentiary hearing. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Bracali-Gambino’s petition for post-conviction relief. Claim II failed because Bracali-Gambino specifically disclaimed, while under oath at his change of plea hearing, that anyone (which included his defense counsel) had coerced or pressured him into pleading guilty. Claim III failed because Bracali-Gambino’s conclusory allegations were not sufficient to show that he was prejudiced by the purported erroneous legal advice. Finally, Claim VI failed because Bracali-Gambino did not provide a sufficient explanation as to how certain testimony would have contradicted the State’s evidence that he attempted to possess major contraband.

Louisiana v. Lee

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-KK-01827

Opinion Date: September 8, 2023

Judge: Crichton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In October 2003, the state charged defendant William Lee, Jr. with one count of second degree murder. In 2007, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In October 2021, defendant and the District Attorney filed a “Joint Motion to Amend Conviction and Sentence Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.10.” In the motion, the parties stipulated to certain facts relating to the cause of the victim’s death: they agreed that new evidence obtained in May 2020 would have bolstered defendant’s case at trial by supporting the defense theory that the victim’s fatal injuries were caused by her falling on her own accord. Based on this new evidence, the parties agreed that “a fair and just resolution” of the case would be to amend defendant’s conviction from second degree murder to manslaughter, and for the court to vacate the life without parole sentence and impose a sentence of 35 years imprisonment at hard labor. The district court granted the joint motion, vacated defendant’s second degree murder conviction and the previously-imposed life without parole sentence, accepted defendant’s guilty plea to manslaughter, and imposed the agreed-upon 35-year sentence with credit for time served. In March 2022, the Louisiana Attorney General filed a pleading entitled, “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Vacate Post-Conviction Plea Agreement as Unconstitutional.” The Attorney General argued that Article 930.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutionally permitted courts to grant clemency to criminal defendants, a power that was expressly and exclusively granted to the governor. To this the Louisiana Supreme Court concurred, and reversed the district court and reinstated defendant's second degree murder conviction.

McCollum v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-KA-01276-SCT

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Charles McCollum was convicted by jury on one count of grand larceny for stealing several items from property owned by Brian Mangum. He appealed, claiming the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his residence, allowing prejudicial hearsay, and denying McCollum’s motion for a mistrial. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Dowd

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 170

Opinion Date: September 12, 2023

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court imposing costs, surcharges, and fees as recommended by Defendant's presentence investigation report in connection with his conviction of felony driving under the influence pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-401, holding that remand was required.

Despite Defendant's objections that he could not afford to pay, the district court imposed a $5,000 fine, several costs, surcharges and fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the court to strike the costs, surcharges, and fees from the judgment, holding that the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence at the sentencing hearing in concluding that Defendant had the ability to pay because his assets outweighed his liabilities.

State v. Garcia

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 74

Opinion Date: September 8, 2023

Judge: Michael G. Heavican

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for four counts of first degree murder, four counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony, and one count of burglary and his sentences of death for each of the four murder convictions, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.

On appeal, Defendant assigned 130 separate assignments of error generally comprising fifteen separate topic areas. The Supreme Court discussed the assignments of error and then affirmed, holding (1) this Court could not determine on direct appeal whether counsel was ineffective in certain respects; and (2) as to Defendant's remaining assignments of error, they were unavailing.

South Carolina v. Miller

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28178

Opinion Date: September 13, 2023

Judge: Kittridge

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Petitioner Robert Miller, III was convicted of murdering eighty-six-year-old Willie Johnson. Following the murder, Petitioner—who was fifteen years old at the time—confessed four times: twice to his close friends and twice to law enforcement. All four confessions were admitted at trial, three without objection. This appeal centered around the voluntariness of Petitioner's fourth and final confession to two agents of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). After examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the fourth confession, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Petitioner's free will was not overborne, and his confession was voluntary. It therefore affirmed.

In re T.V.T.

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 22-0388

Opinion Date: September 8, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the State must prove that the victim did not consent in order to show that a child under the age of fourteen had the requisite intent to commit aggravated sexual assault of another child under fourteen, holding that the statutory text of Tex. Penal Code 22.021(a)(1)(B), (2)(B) foreclosed the court's result.

At the time of the offense in this case, the accused was thirteen years old and the complainant was twelve. At issue was whether the victim's consent may inform the determination of the accused individual's mens rea when both the accused the the complainant are under fourteen and close in age. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's adjudication order and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the victim's consent could not inform the determination of the accused's mens rea under section 22.021(a)(1)(B), (2)(B).

Ashby v. State

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 19

Opinion Date: September 14, 2023

Judge: Hagen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal from the denial of a post-conviction determination of factual innocence pursuant to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court, holding that further proceedings were required in accordance with the legal standards set forth in this opinion.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child for allegedly abusing her son, Kevin. Approximately one decade later Defendant recanted his statements. Based on the recantation, Defendant filed his petition for a post-conviction determination of factual innocence. The district court denied the petition after holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) Kevin's recantation, if believable, was sufficient to prove Defendant's factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the district court erred in denying the petition without weighing all of the relevant evidence, assessing credibility, or making an ultimate finding on the recantation's veracity; and (3) to the extent the district court made an implicit credibility determination, it was based on a clearly erroneous factual finding that certain facts were disputed.

Vermont v. Wheelock

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 VT 52

Opinion Date: September 8, 2023

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In October 1987, defendant William Wheelock, III shot and killed James Brillon with a shotgun. He was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to seventeen-years-to-life, with a split sentence to serve seventeen years. Following defendant’s release from probation in 1999, his Vermont probation officer (PO) filed three separate violation-of-probation (VOP) complaints against him in 1999, 2002, and 2003. In 2004, after the third VOP complaint was filed the year before, the VOP court concluded that defendant violated three probation conditions, revoked probation, and imposed the original sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant remained incarcerated since his 2003 arrest on the most recent VOP complaint, more than twenty years ago. In April 2018, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the 2004 revocation decision. The PCR court granted the petition and permitted defendant to appeal the 2004 violations and revocation of probation to this Court. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the probation violations and reversed and remanded the court’s revocation of probation. "When the VOP court revoked defendant’s probation after failing to consider all of the evidence but following consideration of prior conduct, in contravention of 28 V.S.A. § 303(b), it clearly prejudiced defendant’s defense and adversely affected the integrity of the judicial process. ... we conclude that defendant is entitled to a new probation-revocation-disposition hearing."

Shawn v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 89

Opinion Date: September 8, 2023

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition filed under the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act alleging that he was factually innocent of three convictions because the victim recanted her trial testimony, holding that the district court did not clearly err.

After he was convicted of five counts of sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor involving two victims Appellant petitioned the district court asserting that he was factually innocent based on the victim's recantation. After a hearing, the district court found that Appellant did not offer clear and convincing evidence of his innocence and denied the petition on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis for this Court to disturb the district court's ruling.