U.S. v. Minter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-3102

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: BARRINGTON D. PARKER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was arrested in the Bronx after discharging a pistol. He was subsequently indicted for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, to which he pleaded guilty in April 2021. The government notified Defendant just before he entered his plea that it intended to seek an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence that, it claimed, had been triggered under the ACCA by Defendant’s three prior felony convictions in New York. The district court concluded that Defendant was not a career offender under the ACCA and therefore declined to impose a sentencing enhancement sought by the government. The issue on appeal is whether Defendant’s 2014 conviction under New York Penal Law Section 220.39(1) for the sale of cocaine was for a “serious drug offense” and therefore qualifies as a predicate offense for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that New York’s definition of cocaine is categorically broader than its federal counterpart, thus, Defendant’s cocaine conviction cannot serve as a predicate ACCA offense. The government argued that under Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, that even if the New York definition of cocaine is broadly construed to criminalize all its isomers, Minter must show a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that New York’s statute is broader in practice. The court explained that here, the New York statute applies on its face to all cocaine isomers; the CSA does not. In citing Hylton, the court wrote, “When the state law is facially overbroad, we look no further.”

United States v. Percoco

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-2990

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered in district court after a jury found him guilty of two counts of conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud (Counts Nine and Ten), and one count of solicitation of bribes and gratuities (Count Eleven). Finding no merit in the arguments raised on appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Defendant then petitioned the Supreme Court for review, asking that Court to decide, as pertinent to Count Ten, whether a private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decision-making can be convicted of honest services fraud. The Supreme Court reversed the court’s judgment – holding that the district court’s jury instructions, based on our decades-old decision in United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), were clearly erroneous – and remanded for further proceedings.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences on Counts Nine and Eleven, vacated his conviction and sentence on Count Ten, and remanded to the district court. The court explained that although the Supreme Court held that a private citizen “nominally outside public employment” can, in certain circumstances, be convicted of defrauding the public of honest services it nonetheless concluded that the Margiotta-based jury instructions given at trial in this case were erroneous, and that “it was far from clear that the erroneous jury instructions would be harmless.” The court explained that, on remand, the government has made no argument that the instructional error was harmless. Thus vacatur of Defendant’s conviction and sentence on Count Ten is therefore warranted.

Rogers v. Superintendent Greene SCI

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2601

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Matey

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Consumer Law, Criminal Law

Three men joined in a shootout, but only Rogers was convicted of murdering a bystander caught in their crossfire. At his trial, Rogers’s attorney did not object while the trial judge admonished a trial witness (Singleton) about perjury after that witness gave testimony favorable to Rogers. The attorney offered no arguments when Singleton changed his testimony and did not cross-examine Singleton about the change.
The Third Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Counsel’s failure to object to the trial judge’s admonishment, conduct he “did not think” was problematic, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under “Strickland” as did counsel’s later failure to cross-examine Singleton regarding his changed testimony. Counsel characterized Singleton as “a liar, trying to help his buddy out,” whose testimony would not be “determinative of the outcome of this case,” but Singleton was the only witness to ever claim Rogers shot first—the ultimate issue in the case. Had Rogers’s counsel objected to the trial judge’s admonishment of Singleton and cross-examined Singleton about his changed testimony, “a reasonable probability” exists that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Without Singleton’s testimony against Rogers, the prosecution’s remaining evidence was negligible.

Mendoza v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 12-70035

Opinion Date: August 31, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder by a Texas jury and sentenced to death. He later filed an application in district court for habeas relief. In an earlier appeal, because his initial counsel had a conflict of interest, the Fifth Circuit remanded for appointment of additional counsel and further development of potential claims of ineffective trial counsel. An amended application was filed, but the district court rejected all the new claims.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Petitioner’s motion for a Rhines stay. The court explained that as to the four claims for which the district court granted a COA, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s actions in investigating, compiling, and presenting mens rea and mitigating evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As to the remaining claims for which the court granted a COA, the court found that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the expert witness’s testimony, and Petitioner’s request for a Rhines stay is plainly meritless in this context.
 
The court explained that the expert’s testimony was not so unreasonable, as the expert also testified that Petitioner was still an adolescent and that his brain would not be fully developed until his mid-twenties, helping to explain his psychological condition. Further, the expert opined that Petitioner “has the potential to develop a sense of self and the potential for rehabilitation and some type of spiritual conversion.” Viewed as a whole, it was not deficient of trial counsel to believe this testimony would help Petitioner.

USA v. Hill

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10460

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Cory T. Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty by jury of conspiring with intent to distribute cocaine and distributing a detectable amount of a substance containing cocaine base. Defendant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires the Government must show that a defendant knew that the conspiracy involved a minimum quantity of the controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced to 480 months imprisonment on the first count and 240 months on the second.

Defendant appealed on several sentencing-related issues: (1) the district court imposed a “trial penalty” in sentencing him; (2) the district court erred in determining the quantity of drugs attributable to him, (3) the propriety of the jury charge and verdict form; and (4) the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The judge's comments referring to various codefendants' cooperative efforts did not indicate the court imposed a trial penalty. Further, a participant in a drug conspiracy is responsible for all drug quantities with which he was “directly involved,” as well as for quantities “involved in transactions carried out by other participants. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence that Defendant “knew or should have known [the drug amount that] was involved in the conspiracy[.]”

United States v. Lewis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 22-5593, 22-5800

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Based on a tip from foreign law enforcement, Kentucky Detective Gatson and federal agents went to Lewis’s home. Lewis invited them inside and signed a form, consenting to “a complete search of the premises, property or vehicle” and electronic devices. A forensic examiner arrived and generated a preview of Lewis’s laptop, which revealed file names indicative of child pornography; on Lewis’s cell phone, he found thumbnail images of Lewis’s cousin’s children bathing naked. Lewis reportedly stated that he did not know that it was illegal to look at child pornography, then invoked his Miranda rights but did not say that he was revoking his consent to search. Gatson obtained a warrant. A forensic search of the seized devices revealed evidence of child pornography on Lewis’s laptop, cell phone, and USB thumb drive.

The district court found that the search warrant failed to establish probable cause but that suppression was inappropriate because officers had relied on the warrant in good faith. Lewis conditionally pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The Sixth Circuit vacated. Lewis consented to the initial search of his laptop and cell phone and the officers’ account of that search and the preview generated were validly obtained and are admissible. All other evidence taken from Lewis’s electronic devices was obtained through searches and seizures that were not supported by a valid warrant. The warrant affidavit stated only Gatson’s conclusory belief that a suspect committed a crime and could not establish probable cause, which precludes the application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

United States v. Diggs

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1502

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: Kirsch

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

When a Chicago jewelry store opened, Diggs and two others exited a Lexus SUV bearing Michigan license plates and entered the store with guns raised. They subdued and handcuffed the security guard and dragged a sales associate to a back room where they handcuffed and pistolwhipped her. One man encountered another sales associate, put a gun to her head, and locked her in the bathroom. A fourth man, McClellan, sat in the Lexus and listened to the robbery on his cell phone before driving the men and more than $400,000 in watches and jewelry away. Diggs and McClellan were tried together and convicted; two men remain at large. Before trial, the court denied the spousal testimonial privilege to Diggs's wife, Adams (his girlfriend at the time of the robbery), finding that Adams fell within the joint-participant exception, The evidence showed that Adams became a co-conspirator on the day of the robbery and only withdrew days later when she told police that Diggs had used her car for the robbery.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After considering Adams’s testimony in relation to “all else that happened” at trial, an average juror would not find the government’s case significantly less persuasive without it. The admission of purportedly hearsay testimony by a DHS agent was also harmless error.

United States v. Tam

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2349

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Rovner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Tam participated in a scheme to launder funds from unlawful narcotics transactions by Mexican drug traffickers through bank accounts in China. In 2017, Tam participated in the transfer of around $1.4 million in narcotics proceeds. Tam was charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), money laundering, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, 1960(a). He pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. Tam’s written plea agreement acknowledged that Tam was subject to a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, projected a Guidelines range of 87-108 months’ imprisonment if the minor participant decrease was not applied, and 70-87 months if the court determined that the minor participant reduction was proper. The court imposed a sentence of 65 months’ imprisonment.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court failed to ask the questions required in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), that the error was not harmless, and that the court erred in denying a downward adjustment due to Tam’s minor role in the offense. The court recognized the factors that had to be considered, identified them explicitly, endorsed the facts set forth by the government and the application of those factors, and determined that the downward adjustment was not warranted.

United States v. White

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2296

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2017, White participated in several Indianapolis commercial armed robberies, primarily as a lookout. He also assisted his coconspirators by selecting and staking out the targeted premises and providing supplies, including (at least once) the gun. Eventually, undercover detectives spotted them attempting to rob a Verizon store. White pleaded guilty to three counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. Based on a sentencing range of 97-121 months, the judge imposed four concurrent 108-month terms of imprisonment.

The Seventh Circuit vacated White’s sentence. The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371, caps any term of imprisonment at 60 months. The judge must impose a new sentence on one count. Though she may restructure the entire sentence, she is not required to do so. The physical restraint enhancement was properly applied to one robbery conspiracy count. During the bank robbery, one of White’s accomplices wielded a handgun, grabbed a bank manager, and led him to the lobby at gunpoint, which is physical restraint under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The conduct underlying the second application of the enhancement is not physical restraint; during the robbery of a cellphone store, an accomplice wielded a gun and ordered an employee to move to another area. That error was harmless and did not alter the applicable Guidelines range.

United States v. Bradley Walker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3020

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: MELLOY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant shot a man in the chest and led police on a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood before his eventual capture. When arrested, he possessed a pistol, ammunition, and bags containing methamphetamine and fentanyl. One of the bags appeared to have been opened using teeth, and officers observed Walker becoming lethargic and losing consciousness. Officers administered two doses of Naloxone to revive him before transporting him to a hospital. Defendant eventually pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). The district court determined Defendant was an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e), and also determined his extensive and violent criminal history merited an above-Guidelines-range sentence. The district court ultimately varied from a guideline range of 188–235 months and imposed a sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.
 
The Eighth Circuit vacated the sentence imposed in this case and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the district court’s failure to specifically address the standard conditions of supervised release and the third special condition, which relates to the two special conditions that were orally pronounced, was a matter of mere oversight. As such, the court vacated that portion of the judgment and commitment order imposing the standard conditions of supervised release and the third special condition and remand to the district court for a resentencing, limited to the standard conditions and third special condition.

United States v. Darrius Redd

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1676

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, facilitating prostitution, and distributing methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) to a person under twenty-one. Most relevant for this appeal, the government relied on evidence related to the trafficking of A.E., who, at the time, was a college student and under twenty-one. According to the indictment, Defendant trafficked A.E. between approximately February 2 and March 14, 2020. Defendant argued he is entitled to a new trial on two of the three counts because the district court made evidentiary errors and the government deprived him of a fair trial.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there was no plain error. While Defendant relies on United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that a prosecutor may not urge the jury to convict so as to protect community values or deter other criminal conduct, this is not what occurred here. Rather, the government referenced Defendant’s victims, tracking the evidence presented at trial. And although the government stated someone should end Defendant’s behavior by telling him “no” and “enough is enough,” the context was recounting the evidence presented at trial. Indeed, the government concluded by urging the jury to rely on the evidence. The district court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte correct the government’s closing argument.

United States v. Maria Nava

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2914

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: ERICKSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant and co-Defendant were convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Co-Defendant was also convicted of illegal re-entry. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against her, and co-Defendant contends the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow witnesses who are Mexican nationals to testify by Zoom and admitted evidence of an unrelated assault with a firearm.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and vacated her conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the drug trafficking and firearms counts and remanded for proceeding. The court affirmed with respect to co-Defendant. The court explained that it is unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion by not considering a matter that should have been given significant weight by giving significant weight to something improper or irrelevant or if it committed a clear error of judgment. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of Defendant’s motion for a new trial as it relates to the drug trafficking conspiracy and related firearms count.

United States v. Rashaun Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2782

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted on three counts of drug possession with intent to distribute. On the morning of the trial, he decided to plead guilty to two of them in exchange for dismissal of the third. The district court performed the usual change-of-plea colloquy. Defendant said that his mind was “crystal clear” and that he was not on any medications or drugs. Yet some of his responses showed hesitation. He said he had little time to go over the plea agreement with his lawyer and felt rushed. On top of that, he regretted not taking an earlier plea offer made while his mother’s recent death weighed heavily on him. Still, the court found Defendant competent to proceed with his proposed plea and confirmed that he was satisfied with his attorney. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at sentencing when it allowed his lawyer to withdraw, neglected to appoint another one, and failed to warn Defendant about the risks of proceeding on his own.
 
The Eighth Circuit dismissed his appeal, finding that Defendant waived his right to challenge these issues. The court explained that recognizing the validity of appeal waivers provides defendants with an important bargaining chip. The court wrote that applying the miscarriage-of-justice exception here would weaken that presumption of validity and reduce Defendant's bargaining power. As such, the court found that in this case, there is a valid appeal waiver and no showing that a miscarriage of justice would result from its enforcement.

TONG V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-48

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: Milan D. Smith, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Petitioner filed a Section 2255 motion in the district court challenging her restitution order in a case in which Petitioner was convicted of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court dismissed the motion on the ground that restitution claims are not cognizable in a Section 2255 motion. Petitioner then filed a second-in-time Section 2255 motion asserting new grounds for relief. The district court denied it as an unauthorized second or successive motion filed in violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 2255(h). Pursuant to Circuit Rule 22-3(a), the district court referred the matter to this court, which opened the matter as an application for authorization to file a second or successive motion.


The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s s application for leave to file a second or successive motion. The panel held that the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s first motion constitutes an adjudication “on the merits” for purposes of the second-or-successive bar. The panel explained that when an initial petition or motion is dismissed because its claims cannot be considered by the court or do not otherwise establish a ground for habeas relief, regardless of their underlying merits, any later-filed petition or motion is second or successive. Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner's second motion raises claims that could have been adjudicated on the merits when she filed her first motion, that aspect of her second motion is second and successive for purposes of Section 2255(h). Because Petitioner has not argued or otherwise made a showing that she meets the requirements of Section 2255(h), the panel denied her application to file a second or successive motion.

United States v. Sumka

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7023

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Stephanie Kulp Seymour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Jeffery Sumka was sentenced to 137 months’ imprisonment for sexual abuse of a minor. At sentencing, the district court applied several enhancements over Sumka’s objection after finding that Sumka had undue influence over his victim, engaged in a pattern of illegal sexual conduct, and committed an offense involving a vulnerable victim. On appeal, Sumka challenged the application of these enhancements. After review, the Tenth Circuit found the court did not err in applying the enhancements and affirmed.

Ellis Louis Mashburn, Jr. v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10329

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: Charles R. Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2006, Petitioner pleaded guilty to murdering his grandmother and stepgrandfather. He was sentenced to death. After exhausting his direct appeals, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court agreed with Alabama and summarily dismissed Petitioner's petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C 2254, which was dismissed on abandonment grounds. As an alternate holding, the district court found that Petitioner's claims were too conclusory to get around AEDPA.

The Eleventh Circuit granted a COA on three issues, ultimately rejecting each on the basis that his claim were insufficient to overcome AEPDA deference to state court decisions.

Robert Shawn Ingram v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11459

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: JORDAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, Petitioner sought state post-conviction relief. As relevant here, he asserted that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him about the risks of not following through with his plea agreement and by not doing enough to persuade him to testify against his co-defendant. The Alabama courts rejected this ineffectiveness claim, ruling in part that Petitioner could not show prejudice resulting from his attorneys’ conduct. The district court denied Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition, concluding that the decision of the Alabama courts was not an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would have refused to testify against a co-Defendant, no matter what more his attorneys did, stands. Based on that finding, their ultimate conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance—which constitutes a ruling on a mixed question of law and fact—is not unreasonable under Section 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the court concluded that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would not have changed his mind no matter what more his attorneys might have done is entitled to a presumption of correctness. And that presumption has not been overcome by clear and convincing evidence.

USA v. James Reginald Talley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13921

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: BRASHER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in district court to one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The district court sentenced Defendant in 2016 to 100 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant completed his custodial sentence and began serving his three-year term of supervised release on May 10, 2018. Less than four months before his supervision was set to expire, his probation office filed a petition alleging that Defendant violated two conditions of his supervised release and asked the district court to issue a warrant for his arrest. The court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to serve an additional 18 months’ imprisonment “to be concurrent with any sentence already served or to be served” that a state court imposed. Defendant appealed.
 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The court explained that it rejected the government’s position that a term of supervised release is tolled while an offender absconds from supervision. Accordingly, Defendant’s supervised release term expired as scheduled in May 2021. Because his 2022 battery and resulting conviction did not occur until after that date, the district court lacked the authority to revoke Defendant’s supervised release on that basis. But because the district court nonetheless maintained jurisdiction to revoke his supervision based on his earlier violation, the court remanded for the court to decide whether to revoke Defendant’s supervision based on that violation alone and to decide what sentence to impose for that violation.

California v. Aranda

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061394(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Goethals

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Sabrina Aranda was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility. During jury selection, the State exercised a challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted she would hold police officers to a higher standard of credibility than other witnesses. Aranda objected to the challenge, but the trial court overruled her objection. The jury convicted Aranda. On appeal, Aranda argued the State's challenge for cause during jury selection was based on the juror’s general distrust of police officers, that this was a presumptively invalid reason to challenge a juror under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, and the trial court prejudicially erred when it overruled her objection to the challenge. The Court of Appeal determined that argument failed because section 231.7 applied only to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause.

California v. Harrell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E080838(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2001, petitioner Ronnie Harrell was charged with five felonies, including attempted murder, each with a firearm enhancement and a gang enhancement; a prior prison term enhancement and a strike prior were also alleged. He was allowed to enter into a plea bargain, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to robbery, with a firearm enhancement, and admitted a strike prior. He was sentenced to 28 years in prison — the term prescribed by the plea bargain. In 2023, Harrell filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Harrell was honorably discharged from the United States Army in 1981, and he claimed to suffer from several service-related disorders. The trial court denied the petition, relying on case law holding that a person serving a stipulated sentence was categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91. It rejected Harrell’s argument that recent amendments to section 1170.91 had abrogated that case law.
To this, the Court of Appeal found was error: the amendments deleted language from section 1170.91 that courts had previously relied on in holding that persons serving a stipulated sentence were ineligible. They also added new language allowing a trial court to reduce a conviction or a sentence “regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea
. . . .”

California v. Jenkins

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081246(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Kelety

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Rhonda Jenkins appealed an order recommitting her as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. Jenkins contended substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that she represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others because of her severe mental disorder. After careful review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed: the mental health experts who evaluated Jenkins expressed concern that she was not ready to leave the hospital due to her mental illness and level of functioning, and that she had unrealistic expectations about the challenges she would face. "They nevertheless failed to identify any history of dangerous behavior beyond her commitment offense in 1999 or explain how their concerns translate into difficulty controlling her dangerous behavior." Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins then-represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the Court reversed the trial court’s order recommitting her for an additional year.

California v. Narro

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E079444(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Miller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Anthony Narro molested two of his stepdaughters and one of his stepdaughter’s friends for a period of over 10 years. He was convicted of numerous sexual offenses and sentenced to 195 years to life. On appeal he argued: (1) the judgment should have been reversed because CALCRIM No. 1191B violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution by allowing jurors to rely on currently charged crimes to find he had the propensity to commit other currently charged crimes; and (2) the trial court erred by awarding restitution in the amount of $9,461.34 as noneconomic damages pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) in order for a victim’s mother to replace the furniture where the molestations had occurred because the furniture invoked painful memories. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment.

California v. Perez-Robles

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C095414(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Fermin Perez-Robles, a massage therapist, was convicted by jury on 16 counts of sexual penetration and sexual battery involving six clients and sentenced to 15 years in prison. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on 10 counts, including those for sexual battery by restraint; (2) the jury was not properly instructed on lesser included offenses on four counts; (3) the jury was improperly instructed on using other charged sex offenses as propensity evidence; (4) the prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument; and (5) the imposition of the upper term sentence on one count had to be reversed and remanded based on recent changes to Penal Code section 1170. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the evidence was insufficient to support one count (count 4); although there was sufficient evidence of restraint, the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses on two counts (counts 14 & 20); and the imposition of the upper term sentence on count 11 had to be vacated and remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment.

P. v. Rojas

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B325493(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 31, 2023

Judge: COLLINS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and gang and firearm enhancements and sentenced to a total term of 22 years. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The trial court granted the petition, vacated Appellant’s conviction, and resentenced him to the midterm of three years on the target offense of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The court awarded Appellant the same number of custody credits he was awarded at his initial sentencing and reimposed the same fines, fees, and direct victim restitution. Appellant contends the court erred in several respects. He primarily argued that he should have received additional custody credits for the time he served on his original sentence. Respondent Attorney General concedes Appellant is correct.
 
The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order in part, specifically to the calculation of Appellant’s custody credits and their application to his restitution and parole revocation fines. The court explained that where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.” In the specific context of a resentencing under section 1172.6, a person resentenced “shall be given credit for time served.” The court held that the trial court did not fulfill this obligation, rendering Appellant’s sentence unauthorized.

People v. Lashon

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A163074(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lashon was convicted of one count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder, together with true findings of special circumstance allegations of multiple murders. She was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Lashon argued the judgment was the result of the trial judge’s implicit racial bias against her and her trial counsel in violation of the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), Penal Code section 745.1, effective on January 1, 2021. She claimed that certain portions of the trial and sentencing proceedings constitute a prima facie showing for relief.

The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Lashon forfeited her section 745 claim on direct appeal by not filing a section 745 motion in the trial court before judgment was entered. The court did not address her argument that she has alleged a prima facie showing for relief under section 745. The CRJA was effective four months before Lashon’s trial began and sets forth the procedure for seeking relief during various stages of a criminal proceeding.

Calvin v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0268

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied Respondent's petition for a writ of mandamus and sanctioned Respondent, an inmate in state custody, by directing the clerk of court to reject any future pleadings or requests for relief submitted by Respondent related to his second-degree murder conviction unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar, holding that Respondent's petition was frivolous.

Respondent was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender to life imprisonment. After the court of appeal affirmed, Respondent began demonstrating "a pattern of vexatious filing of meritless pro se requests for relief," including the instant mandamus petition. The Supreme Court denied the petition and directed Respondent to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further pro se requests for relief. The Supreme Court then sanctioned Respondent, holding that Respondent had abused the Court's limited judicial resources.

Green v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0746

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Carla Wong McMillian

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Tarus Green was convicted of felony murder in connection with the 2012 shooting death of Gregory Bivin. On appeal, Green argued: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the jury during deliberations to review cell phone records that were admitted as evidence but were neither published nor explained to the jury during the trial; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing admission of a witness’s alleged prior inconsistent statement without first affording the witness the opportunity to explain or deny the substance of the statement pursuant to OCGA § 24-6-613 (b). The Georgia Supreme Court found each of these claims failed and affirmed Green's conviction.

Kuhlman v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0699

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After the Georgia Board of Public Safety (“the Board”) denied Rick Kuhlman’s application for relief from the prohibition on the possession of firearms by convicted felons in OCGA § 16-11-131, Kuhlman sued the State of Georgia seeking a declaratory judgment “that he qualifies for relief” from that prohibition pursuant to subsection (d) of the statute. His complaint also included claims that the statute, as applied to him, violated his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State on all claims. In its order, the court ruled that Kuhlman’s statutory claim was barred by sovereign immunity, that he could not maintain his federal constitutional claim, and that OCGA § 16-11-131 did not violate the state constitution. Nevertheless, the superior court went on to rule in the alternative on the merits of Kuhlman’s statutory claim, but it failed to reach the merits of his federal constitutional claim. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the portion of the superior court’s judgment that was based on sovereign immunity, affirmed the court’s alternative ruling on the merits of Kuhlman’s statutory claim, vacated the portion of the judgment that related to Kuhlman’s constitutional claims, and remanded the case to the superior court for reconsideration of Kuhlman’s constitutional claims.

Ruthenberg v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0620

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Kaylynn Ruthenberg was convicted of malice murder and other crimes arising from the shooting death of James Jones and the robbery of Samuel Gallardo. Appellant contended the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his three prior misdemeanor convictions for simple battery under OCGA § 24- 4-418 and that the admission of this evidence violated OCGA § 24- 4-403. Because Appellant failed to carry his burden to show plain error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Scott v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0454

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Pinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Diontye Scott was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Antonio Veal. On appeal, Scott contended his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) request an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the stipulations to Scott’s prior felony convictions as proof of his status as a convicted felon; (2) request an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of Scott’s prior felony convictions to only impeachment; and (3) object to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly misstated the burden of proof. He also argued (4) these errors, taken together, deprived him of a fair trial. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded Scott’s ineffective-assistance claims had no merit. "Even assuming that his counsel erred by failing to object to the State’s closing argument, Scott failed to show more than one error, so we need not assess any cumulative prejudice. So we affirm his convictions."

Wilkerson v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0736

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Kentavous Wilkerson challenged his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Bradley Green and the non-fatal shooting of Rodney Greene. On appeal, Appellant contended: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motions for mistrial that he made following the prosecutor’s statements to the jury indicating that Appellant had been in jail for more than two years before trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Idaho v. John Doe

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49619

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

After methamphetamine was found on his person during a pat search, Appellant John Doe was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and two related misdemeanors under the Juvenile Corrections Act (“JCA”). Doe moved to suppress this evidence as the product of an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment, which the magistrate court denied. Doe then sought permission to appeal the magistrate court’s decision to the district court, sitting in its intermediate appellate capacity. When the magistrate court denied permissive appeal, an intermediate appeal was filed with the district court. The district court dismissed Doe’s appeal, concluding that a permissive appeal was not available to Doe because he had not yet been adjudicated of any violation under the JCA. Doe then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing: (1) he was “within the purview” of the JCA; and (2) Idaho Code section 20-528 permitted an appeal as a matter of right to a juvenile defendant whose motion to suppress has been denied. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the plain language of the statute did not permit a juvenile defendant to file this type of interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of John Doe’s interlocutory appeal.

State v. Lampkin

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A20-0361

Opinion Date: August 23, 2023

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of felony domestic assault-harm under Minn. Stat. 609.2242, subds. 1(2), 4, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the district court erred by instructing the jury that Defendant could use reasonable force to resist an "assault against the person" rather than to resist any "offense against the person" but that the error was not plain and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) use of nonlethal self-defense under section 609.06, subd. 1(3) requires a person to resist an offense carrying the threat of bodily harm; (2) the district court's use of the phrase "assault against the person" in the jury instruction at issue was not error; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction.

State v. Thompson

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0192

Opinion Date: August 30, 2023

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant postconviction relief by ordering a substantive sentencing hearing, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, it would be manifestly unfair for the district court not to hold a substantive sentencing hearing in accordance with State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 1999).

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant was seventeen years old when he committed the offenses. The district court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive sentences of life in prison without the possibility of release. After Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided, the district court resentenced Defendant to two consecutive sentences of life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed his postconviction petition requesting a substantive hearing to consider whether, pursuant to the test articulated in Warren, his modified sentences should be served concurrently rather than consecutively. The district court granted the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unique circumstances of this case warranted the exercise of this Court's inherent supervisory powers to direct that the district court hold a substantive sentencing hearing in accordance with Warren.

Woodard v. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1483

Opinion Date: August 23, 2023

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court summarily denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Appellant was conclusively entitled to no relief on his claims even if the facts alleged were proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Appellant, who was imprisoned for first-degree premeditated murder, filed a petition seeking postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal. The district court summarily denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.

Dukes v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00670-SCT

Opinion Date: August 31, 2023

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Joshua Dukes was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life without parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Dukes appealed, contending: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to rebut Dukes’s alibi witness with a rebuttal witness who had not been disclosed as required by Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4; (2) his trial was rendered unfair when the State violated the trial court’s order in limine pertaining to his other crimes; and (3) hearsay rendered his trial unfair and denied him due process of law. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Dukes’ conviction.

State v. Galindo

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 1

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court that overruled Defendant's motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant's challenges to his convictions and the five death sentences he received for murders he committed during a bank robbery were unavailing.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of five counts of first degree murder, among other offenses, and sentenced to death for each of the five murders. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging prosecutorial misconduct claims, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and additional claims. The district court denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (2) denying relief for other alleged violations of Defendant's constitutional rights.

State, Dep't of Health v. District Court

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 28

Opinion Date: August 31, 2023

Judge: Bell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in this matter arising from district court orders holding Petitioner, the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health, in contempt for vacating competency court orders, holding that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief.

The competency orders were issued in relation to eleven criminal defendants in Nevada who were all deemed incompetent to assist in their own defense and ordered to psychiatric treatment (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss their cases or, alternatively, for Petitioner to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt after significant delays in accepting Defendants for treatment. The district court found Petitioner in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. Petitioner then filed the instant petition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hold Petitioner in contempt and did not manifestly or capriciously abuse its discretion in doing so.

New Mexico v. Begaye

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2023-NMSC-015

Opinion Date: January 12, 2023

Judge: Vargas

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Franklin Begaye was convicted of nonresidential burglary and breaking and entering. He contended these convictions violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. The district court determined that the nonresidential burglary and breaking and entering charges did not violate double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that its guidance in New Mexico v. Porter, 476 P.3d 1201, resolved the issue, this appeal indicated that confusion persisted within the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence warranting further clarification. The Court concluded here that Defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted for both breaking and entering and nonresidential burglary because the underlying conduct was unitary and, under the State’s theory, the burglary offense subsumed the breaking and entering offense. “[I]f we determine that one of the offenses subsumes the other offense, the double jeopardy prohibition is violated, and punishment cannot be had for both.” Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

New Mexico v. Romero

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2023-NMSC-014

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Thomson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Michael Romero alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because one of his jurors revealed during voir dire that he knew the investigator in the case. Defendant did not inquire into the juror’s potential bias during jury selection, did not challenge the juror for cause, did not use an available peremptory challenge on the juror, and did not otherwise object to the juror during jury selection. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the juror’s statements did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, and that Defendant both failed to preserve and waived any objection to the juror’s alleged bias.

Rudolfo v. Steward

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2023-NMSC-013

Opinion Date: June 22, 2023

Judge: Barbara J. Vigil

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Petitioner Mario Rudolfo of first-degree murder under a general verdict. The jury instructions contained two alternative theories for the jury to use as a basis for the first-degree murder conviction: (1) felony murder predicated on shooting at or from a motor vehicle and (2) willful and deliberate murder. Twelve years after Petitioner’s conviction, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued New Mexico v. Marquez, 376 P.3d 815, holding that “the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle may not serve as the predicate felony in support of a felony murder charge.” Appealing, Petitioner argued the Marquez holding applied retroactively and argued his conviction had to be vacated. The NEw Mexico Supreme Court held that Marquez announced a new substantive rule which applied retroactively. As a result, the Court set aside the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, vacated Petitioner’s first-degree murder conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial on first-degree murder.

State v. Abbitt

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 334A21

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Morgan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a portion of the decision of the court of appeals upholding the trial court's ruling that Defendants' proffered evidence that speculatively imputed blame for the charged offenses to other potential suspects could not be presented to the jury, holding that there was no error.

Defendants were charged with first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and assault with a deadly weapon. At issue was the refusal of the trial court to allow Defendants to introduce evidence that Defendants asserted would show that two other individuals, not themselves, had committed the crimes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the proffered evidence was relevant to the issues presented for the jury's resolution, the potential evidence for the jury's consideration was not admissible; and (2) the court of appeals correctly applied the pertinent legal principles in concluding that the exclusion of Defendants' proffered evidence did not constitute prejudicial or reversible error.

State v. Hicks

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 136PA22

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Earls

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's second-degree murder conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Defendant was the aggressor when she shot and killed the victim, and therefore, the trial court did not err in giving an instruction on the aggressor doctrine.

At issue was the proper application of North Carolina's castle doctrine statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-51.2(b). Defendant and the victim in this case had a tumultuous relationship, and on the day of the murder Defendant had warned the victim not to come to her residence. The victim came anyway and was shot and killed. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the aggressor doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury that if it found that Defendant was the aggressor, the presumption in section 14-51.2 was no longer available for her.

State v. McKoy

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 71A22

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Allen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction after determining that if the trail court erred in refusing to admit certain cell phone evidence the error was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial, holding that the trial court's decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to allow the jury to consider photographs and text messages found on the victim's cellular phone. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence and that admitting the disputed evidence almost certainly would not have changed the outcome of Defendant's trial.

State v. Richardson

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 272A14

Opinion Date: September 1, 2023

Judge: Morgan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict that Defendant was guilty of the first-degree murder of a young child as well as of first-degree kidnapping, sexual offense with a child and felony child abuse inflicting serious injury, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted at trial a full-body photograph of the victim during certain testimony, but the error was not prejudicial; (3) the trial court may have improperly allowed certain witnesses to testify about their emotional reactions to seeing the victim's injuries, but the evidence was not prejudicial; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's second motion to suppress a statement he made to law enforcement officers at a hospital, but there was no prejudice; (5) there was no cumulative prejudice; (6) there was no error in the trial court's rulings related to Defendant's attempt to establish a prima facie case of racial or gender-based discrimination; (7) North Carolina's death sentence system is constitutional; and (8) Defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding.

State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3080

Opinion Date: September 5, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Harry Barr, an inmate at the Grafton Correctional Institution (GCII), seeking to compel the warden's assistant at GCI to produce the job description for, and the certification or license held by, Jennifer Whitten, a GCI employee, holding that Barr was not entitled to the writ.

In addition to the writ of mandamus, Barr sought statutory damages and also filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction and other motions. The Supreme Court dismissed Barr's complaint for a TRO and a preliminary injunction, granted Barr's motion to amend the evidence and deemed the record supplemented, granted his motion to withdraw his motion for an order pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.4.01(A), and denied the writ of mandamus and his request for statutory damages, holding that Barr was entitled to some relief.

State ex rel. Duncan v. Driscoll

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3113

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Appellant to compelling the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney to join in the filing of a motion to vacate guilty pleas Appellant had entered in two criminal cases, holding that Appellant's claim was not cognizable in mandamus.

In his writ of mandamus, Appellant sought to compel the Clark County prosecuting attorney to join in the filing of a motion to vacate the guilty pleas that Appellant entered in two criminal cases. The court of appeals denied the writ on the grounds that Appellant had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law and that his claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Appellant's claim seeking to enforce an alleged contractual duty was not cognizable in mandamus.

State ex rel. Griffin v. Szoke

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3096

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court denied as moot Mark Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus and also denied Griffin's request for statutory damages, holding that Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus was moot.

Griffin, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution, submitted a public-records request to Allan Szoke, a warden's assistant at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Griffin later brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling production of the records and an award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) because Griffin had received the requested records, his request for a writ of mandamus was moot; and (2) Griffin was not entitled to statutory damages because he did not clearly and convincingly show that Szoke denied his public-records request or otherwise failed to fulfill his duties under the Public Records Act.

State ex rel. Mitchell v. Pittman

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3114

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the trial court's motion to dismiss this complaint brought by Appellant seeking an order requiring the trial court to issue a final, appealable order regarding two criminal convictions, holding that the court of appeals did not err.

Appellant, who pleaded guilty to the lesser offenses of gross sexual imposition and burglary, brought a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that because there was no entry that disposed of the original charges of rape and aggravated burglary, no final, appealable order had been issued, and seeking a final appealable order that complied with Crim.R. 32(C). The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, and therefore, he was not entitled to relief in mandamus.

State ex rel. Smith v. Triggs

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3098

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Relator's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to vacate his conviction and sentence for certain felony offenses, holding that Relator failed to show that he was entitled to the writ.

In his petition, Relator sought a writ of prohibition to, among other things, prohibit and vacate the transfer of his criminal case from one judge to another. The court of appeals granted the judges' motion to dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relator failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a writ of prohibition, as he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, and the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction.

South Carolina v. Price

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28177

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Few

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a common-law writ of certiorari to review a "sealed" order of the circuit court reducing the prison sentence of Jeroid Price and releasing him from prison after he served only nineteen years of his thirty-five-year sentence on his murder conviction. The Court previously issued an order unsealing all documents in the case. Here, the Court vacated the order because: (1) the circuit court did not have the authority to reduce the sentence because the solicitor and the circuit court did not comply with any of the requirements set forth in the applicable statute; and (2) the circuit court did not have the authority to close the proceedings to the public or seal the order. The Court remanded Defendant to the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

Huggins v. Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0590-21

Opinion Date: September 6, 2023

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Noel Huggins pled pro se guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced by the trial court to 18 years in prison. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeal granted review to decide whether his right to counsel was violated. Appellant’s state-jail, possession charge was enhanced with two prior felonies. Appellant doubted the validity of the enhancement allegations, and that doubt helped fuel his on-again/off-again self-representation. He represented himself at the beginning and the end of his case, but he was otherwise represented by two attorneys appointed in succession during most of the approximately 22 months that his case was pending in the trial court. After his trial date was reached during his second period of self- representation and while a venire was standing by, he announced that he would plead guilty and asked for representation again, but the trial court refused to appoint a third attorney. Appellant argued that his two waivers of counsel were not made knowingly and intelligently because the trial court did not admonish him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and the trial court denied him his statutory right to withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.051(h). The court of appeals said the trial court was not required to admonish Appellant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation because he did not contest his guilt. The court then looked at whether Appellant’s waiver of counsel was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that it was. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant's right to counsel was not violated.

Washington v. Westwood

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 100,570-9

Opinion Date: September 7, 2023

Judge: Johnson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Dahndre Westwood entered A.B.’s house around 4:30 a.m. A.B. saw Westwood standing in her hallway and holding a knife in his hand. Westwood told her to get undressed and threatened to kill her if she did not cooperate. A.B. screamed for help and pleaded for her life; she clawed at Westwood and knocked the knife out of his hand. During the struggle, Westwood nicked A.B. with the knife, leaving a scar on her cheek. Westwood choked and suffocated A.B. to muffle her screams for help and hit her repeatedly on the head. Several cars passed A.B.’s house while this transpired, and the headlights shone in the window. Westwood stopped his assault after the second or third set of headlights passed. He threatened A.B. that if she told anyone about the assault he would come back to kill her. Westwood then ran into the living room and out the front door. A.B. called 911 and was taken to the hospital by first responders shortly after. A jury convicted Westwood of attempted rape in the first degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and burglary in the first degree. At sentencing, Westwood argued that his convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct for scoring purposes. The State disagreed and asked the court to apply the analysis from Washington v. Chenoweth, 370 P.3d 6 (2016). The trial court determined that the three convictions did not constitute the same criminal conduct because each of the crimes required a different statutory intent. Westwood appealed, arguing that Washington v. Dunaway, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987) controlled. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether the convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct under the analysis of Dunaway. Some lower courts found conflict between the analysis in Dunaway and that in Chenoweth. The Washington Supreme Court took the opportunity to provide guidance on the relationship between these cases and found no conflict existed. Here, the objective statutory intent analysis was the proper test. The Court affirmed the sentencing court’s decision and reversed the Court of Appeals.