United States v. Santiago-Lozada

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1661

Opinion Date: July 27, 2023

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to twenty-four months above the mandatory minimum of sixty months in an 18 U.S.C. 924(c) count arising from a carjacking, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the government in which he pled guilty to two carjackings and the offense of using and carrying a firearm in relation to the carjacking. The parties recommended a sentence of 123 months' imprisonment. The district court sentenced Defendant to a total of 162 months. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's procedural reasonableness claim failed; and (2) Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

United States of America v. Rechnitz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-1011

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in district court to conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud. Defendant’s underlying criminal conduct included facilitating a bribe that resulted in the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association (“COBA”), investing $20 million with Platinum Partners (“Platinum”), a hedge fund that ultimately declared bankruptcy amid government investigations into fraud. Following his guilty plea, Defendant’s case was reassigned to another district judge for sentencing. After his sentencing hearing but prior to his final restitution determination, Defendant moved to have his case reassigned to another district judge. His motion was premised on the recently discovered personal relationship between the district judge in his case and a defendant and a cooperating witness in the ongoing prosecutions against those involved in the Platinum fraud. The district court denied that motion and ordered Defendant to pay restitution to COBA for all of its remaining losses. On appeal, Defendant argued that his case should have been reassigned for resentencing or, in the alternative, that the district court erred in imposing restitution for all of COBA’s losses.
 
The Second Circuit remanded the case for reassignment to a different district judge and for plenary resentencing. The court held that the district judge erred in not recusing himself under Section 455(a). The judge not only had a close, near-paternal relationship with the witness, but he also advised the witness on how to proceed in his pending criminal case arising from the Platinum fraud. The judge’s relationship with the witness was sufficiently close, and his case was sufficiently related to Defendant’s case that a reasonable person would have questioned the district court’s impartiality.

Perez v. Borough of Johnsonburg

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2559

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Johnsonburg, Pennsylvania Officer Cuneo learned that the St. Marys Police Department had a search warrant to obtain a DNA sample from Perez. Cuneo knew Perez, a local with a history of illegal drug use. A log entry instructed officers who saw Perez to “hold” him and call St. Marys. Cuneo knew that Perez’s DNA had been found at the scene of a recent drug house burglary. Cuneo inferred—mistakenly—that a “body” warrant also had been issued. Later, sitting in his cruiser, Cuneo spotted Perez. The men stood on the sidewalk, having a “friendly conversation.” When Cuneo mentioned the DNA warrant and told Perez he needed to take him into custody. Perez said he was going home and sprinted away.

Cuneo pursued Perez. Perez says he was tased from behind without warning. Cuneo says he warned Perez to stop before tasing him. Perez fell forward, breaking his nose. Cuneo radioed for backup and medical assistance. Perez recovered; a physical altercation ensued. Cuneo repeatedly tased and struck Perez with his baton, then shot Perez in the back.

In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Cuneo asserted qualified immunity in defense. The court denied Cuneo’s summary judgment motion as to his use of his firearm and the unlawful seizure claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Cuneo did not seize Perez during their initial encounter. The court remanded so Perez’s excessive force claim for Cuneo’s use of his firearm can proceed.

US v. Casey Evans

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4307

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: RUSHING

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 1855 after he started a brush fire that burned 70 acres of the Nantahala National Forest in western North Carolina. Defendant asserted his innocence, claiming he did not act with a culpable mental state because he thought he was setting the fire on his family’s land, not on federal government property. His arguments required the Fourth Circuit to address the scope of Section 1855’s mens rea requirement.
 
The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded. The court concluded that specific knowledge of federal ownership is not required for conviction. Therefore, the Government did not have to prove that Defendant knew he was on federal land or intended to burn federal land. But the Government did have to prove that Defendant acted willfully, and an honest mistake of fact about whether he was burning brush on his own property would be a viable defense. The district court excluded testimony about Defendant’s belief that he was on his family’s property when he set the fire, thereby preventing him from presenting his primary defense to the jury. The court explained that the jury, not the Fourth Circuit, must assess the credibility of the proffered testimony and weigh it against the Government’s evidence to make the judgment regarding whether Defendant made a factual mistake sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the willfulness of his actions in setting the fire.

US v. Montes Miller

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4367

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: AGEE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appeald his conviction for two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He contends that his guilty plea was invalid and that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
 
The Fouth Circuit concluded that the district court did not plainly err when it accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. However, the court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing based on the Government’s concession that Defendant should not have received two criminal history points for being on probation. The court rejected Defendant’s other contentions of sentencing error. The court explained that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant’s guilty plea, in applying the U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement at sentencing, in finding that Defendant’s state conviction supported a base offense level of twenty under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), or in making certain factual findings at sentencing.

USA v. Capistrano

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10620

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Patrick E. Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A grand jury indicted a doctor and two pharmacists (collectively, “Appellants” or “Defendants”) for roles in a “pill-mill” operation. Prosecutors charged Appellants with three drug-distribution conspiracies that each spanned from 2011 to 2020. The pharmacists, who both owned pharmacies, were also charged with possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. At trial, the Government offered extensive evidence, including text messages, wiretaps, surveillance, cooperator testimony, and records from Defendants’ businesses and homes. The jury found Defendants guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced the doctor and one of the pharmacists to 240 months imprisonment and the other pharmacist to 151 months. Defendants timely appealed.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to draw reasonable inferences to support Appellants’ convictions. The pharmacist and doctor failed to make the showings necessary to warrant plain error reversal. The pharmacist’s refusal to be represented by her retained attorney amounted to a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. The pharmacist failed to show the necessary prejudice for her challenges to the denial of a continuance, as well as permitting a DEA agent to authenticate her signature as a lay witness. The Government’s closing argument was consistent with the evidence. The record is not sufficiently developed to evaluate the doctor’s IAC claim.

USA v. Choulat

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50056

Opinion Date: July 27, 2023

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received a sentencing enhancement for possessing a gun “in connection with” drug trafficking. Defendant raised two challenges to his sentence.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the Sentencing Guidelines and did not clearly err in its factfinding. The court explained that Defendant correctly received a four-level sentencing enhancement if he possessed a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. The court reasoned that a firearm is “automatically” connected to drug trafficking if it is found in close proximity to drugs or drug paraphernalia, and there is no serious dispute that Defendant’s firearm was in close proximity to his drugs, grinder and scale.
 
Further, Defendant argued that the automatic enhancement prescribed by Application Note 14(B) is an unreasonable expansion of the Guidelines’ text under Kisor v. Wilkie. The court noted that first, the district court was entitled to find that Defendant committed a drug trafficking offense. Mere possession of a controlled substance with an intent to distribute qualifies as a “drug trafficking offense.” Moreover, Defendant alleged that he expressly told the officers at the traffic stop that the drugs were just for personal use. But there is nothing in the record to support that. Finally, Defendant reasoned that because he was homeless, he was less capable of trafficking. But the United States cites Defendant’s lack of gainful employment as evidence for trafficking—he had an obvious motive to turn drugs for profit.

USA v. Cortez-Balderas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30296

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court found the calculated guidelines range of 15 to 21 months to be “woefully unreasonable” and varied upwards to a total of 72 months of imprisonment, which consisted of a sentence of 36 months for the identity theft offense and a concurrent sentence of 72 months for the firearm offense. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the substantive reasonableness of the 72-month sentence for the firearm offense.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant has not shown that the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving significant weight to Defendant’s prior marijuana importation offense, which is the predicate offense for his firearm conviction, and to the statements of the victim of the identity theft. Finally, Defendant has not shown that the district court made a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors of Section 3553(a), and the court declined to reweigh those factors.

USA v. Vargas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-20140

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Duncan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). Defendant had two prior drug convictions for possessing amphetamine with intent to distribute it and conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to manufacture and distribute it. Because these and the instant offense were classified as controlled substance offenses, Defendant was deemed a career offender under § 4B1.1. Defendant appealed his career-offender designation.

On appeal, Defendant argued that conspiracies cannot qualify as controlled substance offenses because the guideline definition excludes inchoate crimes. A panel rejected his argument and then the Fifth Circuit granted en banc review.

The en banc court affirmed, finding that under Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), a guideline comment is "authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline," neither of which applied here. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit joined the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits.

USA v. Wright

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-40849

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence of the weapon, claiming that the gun was the fruit of an unlawful seizure because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a “Terry stop.” The district court orally denied the motion to suppress after a live hearing based on testimony from the officer and the tipster. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial. After the court entered a judgment of conviction, Defendant timely appealed.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant and thus lawfully obtained the incriminating evidence from his car. The court further affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court explained that the contemporaneous tip, the visual details that the officer confirmed, the high-crime area, and Defendant’s evasive response to police presence was enough to give an officer articulable suspicion that crime was occurring (or was about to occur). To conclude otherwise would raise the bar of reasonable suspicion and hamper law enforcement from engaging in essential investigatory actions.

United States v. Smith

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1055

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Chad A. Readler

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

D.B. left a Detroit and believed he was being followed by a silver sedan. At 1:41:01 a.m., a traffic camera captured D.B. driving through an intersection, followed by the silver sedan less than a minute later. Minutes later, about 2-½ miles away, an individual in a silver sedan shot D.B. Surveillance video captured muzzle flashes coming from a silver sedan described as “look[ing] like a Chevy Malibu.” The only silver sedan that could be placed in D.B.’s proximity around the time of the shooting was Smith’s Chevy Malibu. D.B. later picked Smith out of a photographic lineup as someone he had a “beef [with] in the past.”

Smith’s car was tagged in Michigan’s Law Enforcement Information Network, with a warning that the car’s occupants were armed. Days later, an officer stopped Smith’s car and frisked Smith for weapons. Smith stated there was a gun in a case in the car. The trooper performed a “protective sweep” of the areas within a driver’s reach and found a handgun with a chambered bullet and a baggie containing fentanyl and heroin. Smith unsuccessfully moved to have the evidence suppressed as fruit of an unreasonable search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Smith and perform a limited search.

Arce v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1694

Opinion Date: July 27, 2023

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Inmate Arce got a sharp knee in the thigh while he was playing soccer at Illinois’s Pinckneyville Correctional Center in June 2017. Since then, he has suffered from severe leg pain, which the prison’s medical providers (Wexford) ultimately concluded was attributable to a blood clot. Arce’s blood clot was successfully treated but his pain persisted. Arce sued Wexford and two of its employees, claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Arce claimed that he suffered from compartment syndrome and that failure to diagnose and treat this condition caused his long-term leg injury. But after five years and numerous visits to Wexford and non-Wexford health professionals, Arce has no evidence aside from his lay speculation that he experienced tissue necrosis in his thigh, the primary consequence of untreated compartment syndrome. Nor did Arce proffer any expert testimony or the results of any medical exam opining that his symptoms are consistent with untreated compartment syndrome. An orthopedist thought that he would benefit from further testing for that condition but Arce has not shown deliberate indifference in denying the recommended two-day follow-up appointment or that the denial was “a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.”

Booker v. Baker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2166

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Booker was convicted of first-degree murder and received a 55-year sentence of 55. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction, he tried a petition for postconviction relief. At the latter stage, he was represented by Illinois Assistant Appellate Defender Reyna. Booker wanted Reyna to argue that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Reyna declined. Booker filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Booker’s pro se brief because of the state’s rule against hybrid representation.

Booker then filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted, reasoning that Illinois courts did not violate any federal rule when they denied his attempt to raise the issue in a pro se supplemental brief. The court also held that Booker’s default could not be excused on actual innocence grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Booker must bear the consequences of his decision. Even if Reyna’s advice was not entirely accurate regarding his chances of success, Booker had proceeded pro se in the past and knew that he could do so again to ensure that his preferred arguments were raised, or he could hope that the court would make an exception to the rule against hybrid representation.

Howe v. Hughes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1368

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act authorizes the commitment and indefinite detention of individuals who are charged with a crime and found to suffer from a mental disorder "coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses.” The Act requires care and treatment for the committed person, "designed to effect recovery.” Once detainees are deemed “no longer dangerous,” the state must discharge them. The Supreme Court held, in 1986, that the Act, on its face, complies with the Due Process Clause, noting the lack of punitive intent, the availability of treatment, and the realistic possibility of release.

Every Big Muddy River Program detainee participates in a weekly core therapy group. Only detainees who have acknowledged their prior sexual misconduct participate in offense-specific and didactic groups. Big Muddy does not provide individual therapy. Therapists evaluate detainees semiannually and provide them with copies of their evaluations and treatment plans. Detainees may discuss their evaluations with the therapists only in group therapy, not one-on-one. The state contracts with Wexford to evaluate detainees for release. The plaintiffs alleged that Big Muddy’s treatment program was run in a constitutionally deficient manner.

The district court concluded that the disparity between Big Muddy’s treatment program and professional standards amounted to a constitutional violation and issued an injunction, requiring that Big Muddy provide the plaintiffs a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week; reinstate inactive groups; and use independent evaluators for discharge evaluations.

The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging concern about whether Illinois is complying with its Fourteenth Amendment obligations. Detainees receive minimal treatment, raising serious questions about whether rehabilitation and release are realistically available. The district court, however, issued too broad an injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), which requires the least intrusive means available to correct the constitutional violation.

United States v. Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1192

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Brown was convicted of bank robbery. The court determined that he was a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, 4B1.2, with an advisory range of 210-240 months’ imprisonment.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Brown's 180-month sentence. Defendants are deemed career offenders if they have at least two prior felony convictions of a crime of violence. The 4B1.2(a)(1) “elements clause” defines a crime of violence as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Brown had a 2010 Illinois conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking; He “t[ook] a motor vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force,” carrying a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense.

The Seventh Circuit previously held that Illinois vehicular hijacking constituted a 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence. That precedent was not overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” decision, construing the term “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause, which is identical to 4B1.2(a)(1). The Court held that, under the categorical approach, an offense does not involve the use of physical force against the person of another if the offense can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. The Illinois statute implied an element of knowing or purposeful use or threat of force.

United States v. Evans

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1195

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Evans twice sold heroin to a confidential source (50 grams, 125 grams). Officers stopped Evans 30 minutes later and found cash from the controlled purchase, methamphetamine, two handguns, and ammunition. He was charged with two drug distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. 841, and two firearm counts, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 922(g)(1). Following conflicts with Evans’s first two lawyers, Sarm was appointed to represent Evans. After Evans withdrew a plea, prosecutors added another 924(c) count.

At trial, Sarm only subjected four of 11 witnesses to meaningful cross-examination and rested without presenting any evidence or calling any defense witnesses. Convicted, Evans was sentenced to 788 months; 50 years came from the 924(c) convictions, each of which carried mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences of 25 years because Evans had a prior qualifying 924(c) conviction. Nineteen days after the trial, Sarm overdosed on heroin. The district court appointed new counsel but, without a hearing, denied a motion for a new trial.

The Seventh Circuit vacated. Evans made a single choice to possess a firearm over a continuous 30-minute span that included a sale of heroin and the police finding methamphetamine and a gun in his car. The facts support one 924(c) conviction, not two. Evans faced serious charges with serious sentencing consequences; his appointed counsel had never tried a federal criminal case and was using heroin before, during, and after trial. Evans was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial.

United States v. Hendrix

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3287

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

After pleading guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Hendrix was sentenced to 78 months in prison, significantly more than the U.S.S.G. range of 46-57 months.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s sentence was well within its discretion. The court discussed and applied multiple 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in detail: it carefully considered Hendrix’s personal “history and characteristics” but found that this factor was mitigating in some respects and aggravating in others because Hendrix had a lengthy criminal history at age 23. The court also discussed the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” finding Hendrix’s conduct to be serious because Hendrix had possessed a firearm in connection with drug trafficking and had a prior firearms conviction. The court recommended that Hendrix be placed in a drug-abuse treatment program and provided a thorough explanation for its sentence. The court found no procedural error in the district court’s discussion of the prevalence of gun violence in Chicago at sentencing.

Benedda Cotten v. Ryan Miller

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2872

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiffs sued police officers under Sec. 1983 after the officers made warrantless entry into their apartment. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and Defendants appealed.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. While warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there is an exception when officers act with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and an objectively reasonable basis to believe that exigent circumstances exist.

Here, the officers were dispatched to the scene in response to a report of domestic violence. The report received by the officers explained that the 911 call came from a neighbor who thought “abuse” was occurring and heard a “verbal argument,” “someone being thrown around,” and “yelling and screaming” in the upstairs apartment. The neighbor stated that a woman, her boyfriend, and a child lived in the apartment. This created anm exigency, justifying warrantless entry.

United States v. Christopher Conrad

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3275

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. At sentencing, the district court determined a base offense level of 24 after concluding that Defendant had sustained two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The court sentenced Defendant to 96 months imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error when it calculated his base offense level and failed to follow the procedures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3).


The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence but remanded for correction of the court’s statement of reasons. The court explained that the district court was not required to resolve every disputed issue and to amend the presentence report accordingly. But Rule 32 does impose a duty either to resolve disputes or to determine that a ruling is unnecessary and then to append a copy of the court’s determinations to the report. Defendant requested, and the government does not resist, a remand for the district court to amend its statement of reasons to reflect that it did not resolve Defendant’s objection to the presentence report regarding gang affiliation. Accordingly, the court agreed that the remedy is warranted.

United States v. Jerry Wise

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3140

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by law enforcement while speeding in a construction zone. The driver admitted there was marijuana in the car. During the search, the driver tossed a bag to Defendant. The bag contained methamphetamine. Ultimately, the trooper seized both cell phones from the driver and Defendant.

Although the phone found in the center console was a “burner” phone without any identifying subscriber information on it, it contained evidence tying Defendant to the phone, including: (1) messages identifying the sender as Defendant; (2) a photograph of Defendant's bank card; and (3) text messages between a sender using the phone and Defendant's sister. At trial, prosecutors planned to call the trooper to authenticate the phone. The district court allowed the trooper's testimony over objection.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that direct evidence that the phone belonged to Defendant is not required and circumstantial evidence may be relied on to support authenticity.

United States v. Johnathan Brown

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2308

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a firearms offense. The district court sentenced Defendant to sixty months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by miscalculating his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the court did not err. The court concluded that we conclude that Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 575.150.1(1) is divisible into multiple offenses. Therefore, the court applied the modified categorical approach to determine the alternative under which Defendant was convicted. According to the charging document and judgment in Defendant’s Missouri criminal case, he pleaded guilty to resisting arrest “by using or threatening the use of violence or physical force.” Therefore, Defendant’s prior conviction was for a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Jose Sandoval

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2146

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was arrested for narcotics and firearms charges. Once in custody, he made several inculpatory statements. However, prior to trial, he fled to Mexico for eight years before being apprehended. The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on a lack of probable cause and, at sentencing, the district court applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement and rejected his request for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The information contained in the affidavit was provided by an informant who had a history of providing reliable information. And, although Defendant pleaded guilty, the court did not err in denying his request for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on Defendant's flight to Mexico.

United States v. Melroy Johnson, Sr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1332

Opinion Date: July 27, 2023

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant argued judgment of acquittal or a new trial and in calculating the drug quantity for purposes of sentencing.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the magistrate judge, after hearing testimony from the officer, concluded that his conduct in drafting the affidavit amounted to negligence. But to prevail here, Defendant “must show more than negligence or an innocent mistake.” And the court agreed with the district court that the officer did not act recklessly in his efforts to obtain a search warrant, despite the time pressure. The record does not indicate that the officer entertained serious doubts about or had obvious reasons to question the accuracy of his statements. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to suppression under Franks. Further, the court held that the information included in the warrant affidavit, the officers’ good-faith reliance on the search warrant for Defendant’s home, was objectively reasonable. Moreover, the court wrote that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the Gentry evidence been produced. Finally, the court saw no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation.

United States v. Michael Welker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1096

Opinion Date: July 27, 2023

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted for committing mail and wire fraud against his spouse and National Life Insurance. He moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, which the district court1 denied. Welker appealed.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the indictment included allegations about Defendant’s intentional concealment of material information from and misrepresentations to R.W., supporting that he had the “intent to defraud” her. And it alleged that he used the mail and wire in furtherance of his scheme. These allegations were sufficient to apprise Defendant of the nature of the accusations against him and to enable the district court to determine that the facts stated were adequate in law to support a conviction. Further, the court wrote that Defendant provided no support for the proposition that an indictment must sufficiently allege a violation of state law to sufficiently state a federal mail or wire fraud offense. Ultimately, the court held that the indictment charging Defendant is not “so defective” that it fails to charge him for mail and wire fraud under federal law.

United States v. Nicholas Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1816

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Law enforcement organized controlled buys using a confidential informant. Initially, Defendant was not the target of the investigation; however, events that transpired during the controlled buys led the MINE Task Force to suspect Defendant and his wife were involved in illegal drug activity, and they became the primary targets of the investigation.

Based on information from the controlled buy, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search Defendant's home, ultimately seizing $154,000, firearms, ammunition, marijuana, and handwritten notes apparently detailing narcotics sales.

Defendant sought suppression of the physical evidence, arguing that the warrant failed to establish probable caused and that it was based on false information. Defendant's motion cited inconsistencies with the affidavit. The district court rejected Defendnat's arguments, finding that, even if the statement were inaccurate, there was still enough to establish probable cause.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the court agreed that the inaccuracies were concerning, when removed from the analysis, there was still probable cause for the warrant to issue.

NORA PHILLIPS, ET AL V. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-55768

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Ikuta

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiffs sought to expunge records that were created by several federal agencies as part of a surveillance program in 2018–2019, arguing that the collection and retention of these records violated their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek expungement.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the government. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ central argument that the government’s retention of illegally obtained information about them was per se an injury-in-fact. Under Supreme Court precedent, the retention of records alone does not constitute a concrete injury, and Plaintiffs must assert that such retention gives rise to a tangible harm or material risk of future tangible harm or bears a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the government’s retention of records allegedly obtained in violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights constituted a concrete and ongoing injury under that framework.
 
The evidence did not show that the government was using or will use the records to investigate plaintiffs or prevent them from crossing the border or that a third party will obtain the records and use them to Plaintiffs’ detriment. Plaintiffs had not shown that retention of the type of information contained in the records could give rise to a common law tort claim. Finally, plaintiffs failed to explain (or identify supporting authority) why retention of the records was an ongoing violation of their constitutional rights.

ROBERT LEEDS V. PERRY RUSSELL, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-16813

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Paez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2006, a Nevada jury convicted Leeds of first-degree murder. Although Petitioner resided at the house where the murder occurred, the prosecution presented a felony-murder theory at trial, alleging that Petitioner committed the murder during the course of a burglary because he entered the home’s garage as he struggled with the victim. Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to argue that a person cannot burglarize his own home. The jury’s general verdict form did not specify whether the jury relied on the felony-murder theory or the State’s alternative theory of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder to convict Petitioner of first-degree murder. Petitioner later sought state habeas relief, but his postconviction counsel failed to allege in the petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Petitioner could not burglarize his own home. The claim was, therefore, procedurally defaulted under Nevada law. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which the court ultimately granted. The State of Nevada appealed the grant of Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Petitioner established a basis to excuse the procedural default of his claim because (1) Petitioner’s trial counsel IAC claim is substantial and therefore satisfies Martinez’s prejudice requirement; and (2) Petitioner’s postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland, meeting the Martinez cause requirement. The panel held that Petitioner is entitled to relief on the merits because (1) the trial counsel’s failure to raise the objectively important burglary argument constituted deficient performance, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Meek v. Martin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-7021

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Jerome A. Holmes

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner Jerry Meek, an Oklahoma state prisoner convicted of first-degree murder, appealed a district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued the district court erroneously determined the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law related to his sufficiency-of-the-evidence, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel, and cumulative-error claims. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief.

United States v. Kepler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5006

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

Defendant-Appellant Shannon Kepler appealed his conviction for causing death by discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. Kepler and his wife Gina Kepler both worked as officers for the Tulsa Police Department. During the summer of 2014, the Keplers began to experience conflict with their 18-year-old adopted daughter, Lisa. Kepler gained access to Lisa’s Facebook account to monitor her activity. Eventually, the Keplers kicked Lisa out of their home and dropped her off at a homeless shelter. Kepler continued to monitor Lisa’s Facebook account and discovered she was dating a man named Jeremey Lake. Using police department resources, Kepler obtained Lake’s address, phone number, and physical description. On the same day he obtained this information, Kepler armed himself with his personal revolver and drove his SUV to Lake’s address. He spotted Lisa and Lake walking together near the residence. Kepler stopped the SUV in the middle of the road, rolled down the window, and called out to Lisa. Lisa refused to talk to him and walked away. Kepler exited the vehicle to follow her.
At that point, Lake approached Kepler to introduce himself and shake his hand. Kepler drew his revolver. Lake tried to run away. Kepler shot him, once in the chest and once in the neck. Kepler then turned and fired shots in the direction of Lisa and Lake’s half-brother, M.H., who was 13 years old. Kepler then fled. Witnesses called 911. Paramedics arrived and declared Lake dead. Later that night, Kepler turned himself in to the Tulsa Police Department. At trial, Kepler admitted he shot Lake. He did not contend that he acted out of anger, provocation, or passion. Instead, he said he responded in self-defense to Lake’s threatening him with a chrome pistol. He entered into evidence the pistol discovered in a nearby trashcan and suggested that one of the witnesses took the pistol from Lake’s body and smuggled it into the police station. The jury rejected Kepler’s self-defense argument, leading to the conviction at issue here. Though Kepler argued second-degree murder was not a "crime of violence" and not a predicate offense for his conviction, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Kepler's convictions and sentence.

United States v. Sago

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5011

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Harris L. Hartz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

Defendant Kyle Sago appealed murder convictions committed in Indian country and causing death by use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (namely, first- or second-degree murder). The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and self-defense. On appeal Sago argued the district court plainly erred in providing model jury instructions on first- and second-degree murder that inadequately defined the required element of malice. Specifically, he argued the instructions omitted the mitigation defense referred to as “imperfect self-defense:” the instructions were defective in that they failed to inform the jury that it could not find that Sago acted with malice unless it found that he was not acting in the sincere belief (even if the belief was unreasonable) that the use of deadly force was necessary. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: a mitigating circumstance instruction negates the malice element of first- and second-degree murder and must be accompanied by a lesser-included-offense instruction to inform the jury of the offense on which it could convict the defendant in light of the mitigating circumstance. And here, Sago did not request a relevant lesser-included-offense instruction for involuntary manslaughter. Therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to instruct on the mitigating circumstance.

United States v. Vannortwick

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7034

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Kyle Vannortwick appealed the federal sentence he received for second-degree murder. The sentencing judge allegedly erred in calculating the guideline range. On its face, the alleged error wouldn’t have changed the guideline range. But Vannortwick argued that without the error, he could have obtained a lower sentence. Because this argument rested on speculation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence.

United States v. Walker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5005

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

Craig Morrison and Amanda Walker brought Walker’s three-year-old son, R.T., to the emergency room and told doctors that R.T. had jumped off his bed and hit his head on his scooter. After examining R.T., doctors discovered bruising across most of R.T.’s body - injuries the doctors determined did not line up with Morrison’s and Walker’s story. The doctors contacted the police, who initiated a child abuse investigation, ultimately leading to a grand jury indictment of Morrison for two counts of child abuse, under the Assimilated Crimes Act, and of Walker for two counts of enabling child abuse, under the Assimilated Crimes Act. They were tried in a joint trial and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. In separate sentencing proceedings, the district court granted the Government’s motions for upward variances from United States Sentencing Guidelines sentences for both Morrison and Walker. Morrison and Walker filed separate appeals, collectively raising ten challenges to their convictions and sentences. Because Morrison and Walker were tried in one trial, and each joined several of the other’s arguments on appeal. Determining none of their arguments were meritorious, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Morrison’s and Walker’s convictions and sentences.

USA v. Larry Lynn Gary

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-13249

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling sentencing Defendant to 180 months e for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). In May 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant’s PSR assigned him a base offense level of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2). Defendant appealed his 180-month sentence arguing that his sentence was erroneously enhanced because his prior conviction for aggravated assault under Florida law does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e).
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction under Fla. Stat. Section 784.021(1)(b) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA because, as our precedent in Somers III confirmed, Florida’s aggravated assault statute requires an intentional threat to use violence against another person, regardless of whether it is committed under Section 784.021(1)(a) or (b). See id. at 892, 894, 896. Therefore, Defendant has the requisite three predicate offenses under the ACCA, and the district court did not err in sentencing him as an armed career criminal.

Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1097

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: PAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, International Law, Military Law

Petitioner served as the personal assistant and public-relations secretary to Usama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda and mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States. Members of a military commission convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes. The members sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for life, and the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”) affirmed. On Petitioner’s first appeal to the DC Circuit, the court upheld the conspiracy charge but vacated the other convictions as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The CMCR subsequently reaffirmed Petitioner’s remaining conspiracy conviction and life sentence twice. Petitioner asked the court to vacate his conspiracy conviction or, alternatively, to remand his case for resentencing by military commission members.
 
The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Petitioner could have raised the change in law, or other similar objections, in his initial appeal to the CMCR or during the extensive proceedings since then. He did not. On the most recent remand to the CMCR, he questioned the admissibility of the statements in his opening brief but did not argue that Section 948r barred their admission until his reply. Accordingly, the court wrote that it declined to revisit its prior ruling that the convening authority is an inferior officer because the intervening Supreme Court case cited by Petitioner does not clearly dictate a departure from the circuit’s precedent. The court also upheld his sentence of life imprisonment.

USA v. Louis Wilson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-3074

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: CHILDS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A). First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, Section 602(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)). He argued that intervening changes in law, in combination with other factors, warrant that his motion be granted.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of Appellant’s motion for compassionate release. The government maintains that Appellant failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies as to these additional grounds such that the court may not consider Appellant’s contentions on the merits. The court held that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional because Congress did not use express language to make it so. The court explained that Appellant’s change in law arguments cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, whether alone or in combination with other factors.

California v. Leal

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096463(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Robie

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Here, a police officer received information via a radio broadcast from another officer that a juvenile on probation with a firearm restriction likely placed a firearm under the front passenger seat in defendant Hilario Leal, Jr.’s car before defendant got into his car and drove away. Defendant’s car was under constant surveillance from the time of the alleged firearm placement until the searching officer conducted the search. When a search of the passenger compartment of defendant’s car yielded no firearm, the searching officer decided to search the trunk, where he discovered a firearm. Defendant was charged with several offenses and filed a motion to suppress the firearm; the trial court denied the motion. Defendant ultimately pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The question presented was whether the search of defendant’s trunk was justified under the automobile exception. The Court of Appeal concluded it was not. "[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the passenger compartment of a vehicle (as compared to having probable cause to believe it will be found somewhere in the vehicle), and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk, an officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress, enter an order granting the motion, and allow defendant to move to withdraw his plea.

California v. Lopez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E080032(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Oscar Lopez was convicted of multiple crimes including: first degree murder and willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. He was sentenced to 141 years to life. In his direct appeal, the Court of Appeal modified the sentence; the Court also reversed conditionally and remanded with directions to consider striking defendant’s prior serious felony conviction enhancement and firearm enhancements. On remand, in October 2022, the trial court struck the prior serious felony enhancement but refused to strike the firearm enhancements. It resentenced defendant to 101 years to life. Defendant appealed again, contending that at resentencing, the trial court erred under various amendments to the Penal Code, all of which went into effect on January 1, 2022. In the published portion of the Court's opinion, the Court addressed his contention that under section 186.22 — as amended by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) — there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement to count 5 (unlawful possession of a firearm). To this, the Court held that, because the judgment against defendant was not final, he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of A.B. 333. However, because the Court reversed solely with respect to the sentence and directed the trial court to resentence defendant, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider the gang enhancement. "A.B. 333 was simply irrelevant to anything the trial court had jurisdiction to do." In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court found no other error.

Estrada v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B325769(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: ZUKIN

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s denial of her peremptory challenge. The Second Appellate District denied the petition for failure to demonstrate a prima facie case entitling her to extraordinary relief. After Petitioner filed a petition to review, our Supreme Court stayed all further proceedings pending its review. The court ultimately granted the petition and transferred the matter back to the court with directions to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate and issuing an order to show cause. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the peremptory challenge because the subsequent lower court proceeding, specifically the subject hearing, constitutes a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2).
 
The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court explained that there is no indication, despite the constitutional and practical distinctions between a new trial and the subject hearing, that the Legislature intended such a hearing on remand be considered a new trial under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). To the contrary, the legislative history of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) “does not support the assertion that the Legislature intended to permit a [peremptory] challenge at any hearing on remand in a criminal case.” Thus, section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), was not intended “to counter every possible situation in which it might be speculated that a court could react negatively to a reversal on appeal.” The court concluded that the hearing conducted after a reversal and remand of a trial court’s order denying a petition for resentencing is not a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2).

P. v. Pickett

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B320892(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: ROTHSCHILD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from an order summarily denying his petition to vacate his murder conviction and be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6.
 
The Second Appellate District agreed with the trial court that Defendant has not made a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. The court explained that although Defendant’s petition is facially sufficient and thus entitled him to the appointment of counsel, it is devoid of factual allegations concerning the killing of the victim. Defendant does not deny that he was the actual killer, nor does he assert that another person fired the shot that killed the victim or that he acted without the intent to kill. He merely states the legal conclusion that he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes made to the law of murder under Senate Bill No. 1437. Under these circumstances, where Defendant alleged no facts concerning the murder to which he pleaded guilty, the People introduce without objection uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript showing that the Defendant acted alone in killing the victim, and Defendant does not put forth, by way of briefing or oral argument, any factual or legal theory in support of his petition, Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6.

People v. G.A.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164980(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2001, G.A. was charged with lewd acts with a child, sexual battery by restraint, and false imprisonment. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court committed G.A. to the Redwood Regional Center. G.A. never regained competency but was released and received services through the Center until 2008. In 2010, G.A. was charged with kidnapping with the intent to sexually assault, rape, annoy, or molest a child under the age of 10 and sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court again committed him.

A 2021 petition to extend G.A.’s commitment alleged that G.A. suffers from developmental disabilities and that he represents a danger to himself or to others. A psychologist, who evaluated G.A. several times, calculated G.A.’s I.Q. at 42 and testified that G.A. poses a danger to himself and to others, particularly children. The court continued the commitment.

The court of appeal dismissed an appeal because the commitment order has expired. The court found that Welfare and Institutions Code 6500 does not violate due process by dispensing with the need for proof of a recent overt act of dangerousness but that substantial evidence did not support the finding of G.A.’s danger to others--it was based on the testimony of an expert witness who relied on unsupported assumptions of fact about G.A.’s offenses. The court noted significant ambiguity as to the meaning of “danger to self.”

Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20621

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Ecker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court dismissing Petitioner's appeal, holding that unpreserved claims challenging the habeas court's handling of the habeas proceeding are reviewable under the plain error doctrine and State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 832 (Conn. 1989), if the petition can demonstrate that the unpreserved claims meet the criteria set forth in Simms v. Warden, 646 A.2d 126 (Conn. 1994)(Simms II).

Petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Petitioner later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. The habeas court dismissed the petition after a hearing, concluding that there was no good cause to proceed because Petitioner filed outside of the applicable time limits. The appellate court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, concluding that the certification requirement in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-470(g) barred appellate review of unpreserved claims in uncertified appeals under Golding and the plain error doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and remanded for further considerations, holding that plain error and Golding review is available to challenge the habeas court's handling of the habeas proceeding despite denying a petition for certification to appeal if the appellant can demonstrate that the unpreserved claims meet the criteria set forth under Simms II.

Willis v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 253, 2022

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Karen L. Valihura

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Diandre Willis appealed his conviction following an 18-count indictment for rape, home invasion, kidnapping, intimidation, terroristic threatening, bribery, malicious interference of emergency communications, and breaching the conditions of bond and release. A jury found Willis guilty as to 17 of the 18 charges after the State nolle prossed one count of Kidnapping First Degree. Willis raised one issue on appeal: his constitutional right to due process was violated when the trial judge failed to recuse himself from the trial where that judge previously had signed and approved a search warrant at an earlier stage of the investigation. With respect to this sole issue on appeal, both sides agreed that there were no facts in dispute. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded the superior court judge did not err in determining that his recusal was not required. Therefore, the superior court's judgment was affirmed.

State v. Abdullahi

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2023 ME 41

Opinion Date: July 27, 2023

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs and falsifying physical evidence, entered after a jury trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as the result of what Defendant argued was an unlawful arrest; (2) there was no obvious error in the admission of lay opinion testimony by law enforcement officers on certain matters; (3) the record evidence was sufficient to justify the trial court's giving a permissible-inference instruction; and (4) there was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of Defendant's motion for new trial and for judgment of acquittal.

Woodlin v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 22/22

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Eaves

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Petitioner's conviction for child sexual abuse and other related sexual offenses, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.

At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in granting the State's pre-trial motion to introduce evidence of Petitioner's 2010 conviction for sexual assault against another individual under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. (CJP) 10-923, which permits the admission of certain circumstances of prior sexually assaultive behavior in prosecutions for child sexual offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no factor that circuit courts must consider in every case when conducting an analysis under CJP 10-923(e)(4); (2) the motions judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the probative value of Petitioner's 2010 conviction was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and (3) Petitioner waived his remaining argument.

Commonwealth v. Fernandes

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-11668

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Georges

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's convictions, holding that Defendant's convictions on three charges of assault by means of a dangerous weapon were duplicative.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, motion for an evidentiary hearing, and motion for further discovery; (2) there was no prejudicial error in Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree, three charges of armed assault with intent to commit murder, and carrying a firearm without a license; (3) Defendant's three convictions of assault by means of a dangerous weapon were duplicative of his three convictions of armed assault with intent to murder; and (4) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error; and there was no reason to grant extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.

Commonwealth v. Morris

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12835

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Wendlandt

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions other than his unlawful possession conviction, which the Court vacated in light of its recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 (2023), holding that Defendant's rights under the Second Amendment and his due process rights were violated as to this conviction because the jury was not instructed that licensure was an essential element of the crime.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statement at the police station on the grounds that police officers impermissibly recorded it without his express consent and that he was not informed promptly of his right to make a telephone call; (2) the prosecutor did not improperly refer to omissions in Defendant's statement to police officers; (3) there was no reason to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial; and (4) in light of this Court's recent opinion in Guardado, Defendant's unlawful possession of a firearm conviction must be vacated.

In re Parole of Richard Allen McBrayer

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 164311

Opinion Date: July 24, 2023

Judge: Brian K. Zahra

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Macomb County Prosecutor sought to appeal the Parole Board’s grant of parole to Richard McBrayer, a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The Parole Board intervened. In 1994, McBrayer pleaded guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving his stepdaughter when she was 12 to 14 years old. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 to 40 years in prison; the minimum sentences represented the top of the then-controlling judicial sentencing guidelines range. McBrayer became eligible for parole in January 2010 after accumulating disciplinary credits through the years. In 2011, 2015, and 2018, the Parole Board granted McBrayer parole, but the board’s grant of parole was overturned each time after the victim, or the prosecutor, appealed. In 2020, the board again considered McBrayer for, and granted him, parole. McBrayer’s parole-guidelines score of +11, indicated a high probability of parole, and the board found facts to support the grant. The prosecutor again appealed the board’s decision. After reviewing the evidence in the record, the court reversed the board’s grant of parole, reasoning that there had been no improvement in McBrayer’s circumstances from the time he was last considered for parole. In a split unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, reasoning that there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the parole guidelines—namely, the heinous nature of the crimes, the impact of the crimes on the victim, skepticism about McBrayer’s rehabilitation, and concerns with the efficacy of his parole plans. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals majority applied the wrong analysis and ignored the discretion that the Legislature has assigned to the Parole Board. Applying the proper analysis, the Supreme Court concluded the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Parole Board’s grant of parole.

Allwine v. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1378

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's second petition for postconviction relief, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the denial of Appellant's initial petition for postconviction relief. Thereafter, Appellant filed another postconviction petition. The postconviction court summarily denied the petition and denied Appellant's motion to compel discovery. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was conclusively entitled to no relief.

State v. Gilleylen

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0303

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: G. Barry Anderson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder following a jury trial, holding that the district court erred in entering a conviction for the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder.

After the trial, the district court entered judgment of convictions for both first-degree and second-degree murder but only imposed a sentence for the first-degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of premeditation for the first-degree murder offense; (2) assuming, without deciding, that the district court erred by failing to identify a certain individual as an accomplice, the failure did not affect Defendant's substantial rights; (3) the district court did not commit any other reversible error in managing the trial and the jury instructions; and (4) the entry of a judgment of conviction for the second-degree intentional murder offense violated Minn. Stat. 609.04, subd. 1.

State v. Daly

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 142

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, holding that, while the State did not show a valid reason for the over 1,300-day delay in bringing Defendant's case to trial, Defendant was not prejudiced.

On May 23, 2017, the State charged Defendant with felony criminal distribution of dangerous drugs and felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute. On February 10, 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, and the remaining charge was dismissed. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its balance of the speedy trial factors and in concluding that Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial.

State v. Johnson

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 143

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Shea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court imposing sentencing conditions limiting Defendant's ability to access the internet or possess certain electronic devices, holding that three conditions were overly broad.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual intercourse without consent for communicating with the victim through text messaging and Snapchat. The district court sentenced Defendant to a twelve year term of incarceration and imposed the conditions at issue on appeal regarding technology use. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's imposition of the three challenged conditions, holding that, in their current incarceration, the conditions failed to consider the multiple legitimate purposes for internet usage, but that, as modified by the Court, the conditions provided Defendant the change to rehabilitate outside of the prison setting and the community protection from future criminal activity.

Haynes v. Neb. Dep't of Correctional Services

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 771

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding the decision of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Appeals Board (Appeals Board) upholding the decision of the Institutional Disciplinary Committee (IDC) to sanction Appellant for drug use while in prison, holding that there was no plain error.

Appellant, an inmate incarcerated under the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS), was issued a misconduct charge for "Drug or Intoxicant Abuse" in violation of an NDCS rule. After a hearing, the IDC found that Appellant had violated the rule. The Appeals Board upheld the decision, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit plain error in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the IDC's finding that Appellant violated the rule at issue.

Young v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Mark Gibbons

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction as to all counts except count two and reversed and remanded for the district court to strike count two from the judgment and enter an amended judgment, holding that the district court gave an incorrect jury instruction as to the larceny-from-the-person charges, and therefore, Defendant's conviction under count two must be reversed.

Defendant was convicted of twenty counts of burglary, larceny, and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not erroneously admit evidence of uncharged bad acts; (2) erred in admitting a certain detective's statement, but the error was not reversible; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial and by not excusing a seated juror for his expression of sympathy to victims who testified during trial; and (4) misstated the law in instruction number ten, and therefore, the conviction for count two should be reversed.

Olmsted Township v. Ritchie

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2516

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals construing the language of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.25(D)(4) as prohibiting the trial court from ordering a jail term for a violation of a condition of community control exceeding the maximum jail term imposed on the misdemeanant at sentencing, holding that the court's construction of the statute was incorrect.

At issue was whether subsection 2929.25(D)(4) authorizes a trial court to impose a jail term for a violation fo a condition of a community-control sanction when the original sentence was directly imposed under subsection 2929.25(A)(1)(a) and no suspended jail time was reserved as contemplated under subsection 2929.25(A)(1)(b), regardless of whether notice has been provided under subsection 2929.25(A)(3)(c). The Supreme Court held that the limit on the total length of time that a misdemeanant may be incarcerated for both a misdemeanor offense and a violation of a condition of a community-control sanction imposed for that offense is the statutory maximum jail term for the offense, as set forth in section 2929.24, and this limit does not change based on the length of the jail term imposed at sentencing.

State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2536

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against the Hamilton County clerk of courts (Appellee) to compel the production of public records and awarded him $700 in statutory damages, holding that Appellant failed to prevail on his claims.

Appellant, an inmate, sent public records requests to the clerk, who informed Appellant that his requests were subject to approval from the judge who sentenced him or their successor according to Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B)(8). Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the clerk's response. The petition was dismissed, but the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, Appellant filed a motion for default judgment. The court of appeals denied both Appellant's motion for default judgment and his petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed and awarded statutory damages, holding that Appellant had prevailed on his claims to the extent the law allowed.

State v. Hacker

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2535

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Deters

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that indefinite sentencing under the "Reagan Tokes Law," which became effective in March 2019 and requires that for certain felony offenses a sentencing court impose on the offender an indefinite sentence consisting of a minimum and a maximum prison term, is not unconstitutional.

The two appellants in this case - Christopher Hacker and Danan Simmons - were both subject to sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law. On appeal, Appellants argued that Ohio Rev. Code 2967.271, which allows the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to maintain an offender's incarceration beyond the minimum prison term imposed by a trial court, violates the separation of powers doctrine, procedural due process, and the right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to rebut the Reagan Tokes Law's presumption of constitutionality in their facial challenge.

State v. Li

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 21-153

Opinion Date: July 27, 2023

Judge: Prata

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the superior court granting Defendants' motions to suppress evidence of approximately ninety-four pounds of marijuana seized from one defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop, holding that the trial justice erred in granting Defendants' motions to suppress.

Junjie Li was operating a vehicle and Zhong Kuang was in the passenger seat when a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop. While conversing with Li, the officer noticed Li began to exhibit nervous behavior and detected an order of marijuana coming from inside Kuang's vehicle. After a dog sniff, officers discovered marijuana. Li and Kuang moved, individually to suppress the marijuana. The trial justice granted the motions to suppress, holding that the extension of the traffic stop beyond its original scope was unreasonable because the officer did not have independent reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's orders, holding that the trial justice erred in concluding that the officer did not possess reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop based on the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Savard

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 20-229

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Long

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, death resulting, and operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, personal injury resulting, holding that there was no error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial justice properly exercised her judgment, did not overlook or misconceive the testimony in evidence, and provided adequate reasons supporting her denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence; and (2) Defendant's argument that the trial justice erred by admitting evidence from an electronic data recovery system obtained from one of a tow truck involved in the underlying automobile accident was waived.

South Carolina v. Perry

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28167

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Beatty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Respondent John Perry, Jr. was convicted by jury of the attempted murder of a police officer. During deliberations, the jury requested a recharge on intent. Over the defense's objection, the trial court instructed, "When the intent to do an act that violates the law exists motive becomes immaterial." The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding the statement improperly instructed the jury on general intent for the crime of attempted murder. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in giving the jury this recharge, the Supreme Court believed the error was harmless. Accordingly, it reversed the decision of the court of appeals.

State v. Banks

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 S.D. 39

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree manslaughter, holding that the circuit court did not err in excluding polygraph evidence in its sentencing consideration.

Defendant, who pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter, sought to introduce evidence of a polygraph examination regarding his role in the crime prior to his sentencing hearing. The circuit court denied the request and sentenced Defendant to eighty years' incarceration with twenty years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered polygraph evidence.

State v. Long Soldier

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 S.D. 37

Opinion Date: July 26, 2023

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree robbery and sentencing him to forty years' imprisonment, holding that the circuit court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Defendant entered a casino where seventy-six-year-old Helga Harris was working by herself as a cashier and held Harris at gun point. Defendant pulled Harris behind the counter, struck her on the head with his pistol, and tried to open the cash register. Finally, Defendant took Harris's purse and ran from the casino. After the jury convicted him of first-degree robbery Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of insufficient evidence. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sufficient evidence supported the conviction.

Vermont v. Boyer

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 VT 40

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Waples

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Joshua Boyer challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence gathered in a consented-to search of his residence. In April 2018, M.B. complained to police that defendant had sexually assaulted her multiple times, including the previous day. M.B. resided in the house where the alleged assaults occurred with defendant, his wife, and other children. Defendant was arrested and released on conditions, including that he should not return to the family home where M.B. was then residing. Several days later, a police detective and an investigator from the Department for Children and Families (DCF) met with M.B. at a friend’s home where she was temporarily staying and asked if there might be DNA evidence present in M.B.’s family home. M.B. said that defendant might have disposed of a condom in her bedroom wastebasket and used a pair of her underwear to wipe himself off after the assault. Knowing that defendant and his wife would likely be away from their home to attend defendant’s arraignment, the detective asked M.B. if she would be comfortable returning to the house to locate this potential evidence. M.B., the detective, and the DCF investigator then went to the home. M.B. went outside and opened a trashcan by the exterior of the house, which she noted “had been gone through.” The detective seized the trashcan. The police later searched the trashcan pursuant to a warrant, which revealed a condom wrapper, stained paper towels, pharmacy receipts, and a rug. M.B. identified the rug as from her bedroom, and a subsequent forensic analysis confirmed the presence of defendant’s semen on the rug. Appealing the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found at the house, defendant argued fourteen-year-old M.B. lacked authority to consent to the search. Defendant also argued his constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated. Because the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the search was lawful and that defendant’s speedy-trial rights were not violated, it affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Dillard v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 73

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for sentence reduction and motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying either motion.

Defendant entered an Alford plea to two counts of sexual abuse of a minor child in the third degree and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of three to five years' incarceration. Defendant later filed his second motion for sentence reduction and a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The district court denied both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for sentence reduction and his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Greene v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 72

Opinion Date: July 21, 2023

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion seeking presentence time served credit against his felony drug sentences, holding that Defendant was not entitled to presentence confinement credit against the sentences in the felony drug possession docket.

In 2014, Defendant was sentenced on two felony counts of DUI. In 2020, Defendant was arrested and charged with five felonies, including probation violations in his two previous cases. Defendant admitted to the probation violations and pled guilty to two felony drug possession counts. After he was sentenced Defendant filed a pro se motion for time served in presentence incarceration, arguing that he should have received credit for the time served after his arrest and before sentencing. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant, who received presentence confinement credit against the sentences in his probation violation cases, was not also entitled to presentnence confinement credit against the sentences in the felony drug possession docket.

Thunder v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 74

Opinion Date: July 25, 2023

Judge: Kautz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of four counts of aggravated assault and battery, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's aggravated assault and battery convictions.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of four counts of aggravated assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-502(a)(iii). The district court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate term of forty-two to 108 months' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found a reasonable doubt all elements of Defendant's conviction.

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