United States v. Dennison

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1727

Opinion Date: July 13, 2023

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment against him on double jeopardy grounds after the district court declared a mistrial based on complications brought about by the pandemic, holding that that there was no error.

Defendant was charged with transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce. During trial, the government's main witness and a case agent took a test that came back positive for COVID-19. The court ultimately ordered a mistrial and dismissed the jurors. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the steps taken by the district court leading to its declaration of a mistrial were within its discretion.

United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1137

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the two district court rulings at issue in this case, one granting Defendant compassionate release from incarceration and the other denying the government's ensuing request for reconsideration, holding that there was no error.

In 2020, Defendant motioned the court for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that his heightened health risks associated with the COVID-19 virus constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason to release him from prison. The district court granted the motion. The government moved to reconsider, arguing that because Defendant had been vaccinated, the release was not warranted. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction over the government's compassionate release appeal; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion or err in its compassionate release decision; and (3) there was no error in the court's conclusion that Defendant's release was appropriate in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors.

Aponte v. Perez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-2186

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: CALABRESI

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment in his Section 1983 suit arising from those portions of Plaintiff’s imprisonment that occurred as a result of an improper imposition of administrative post-release supervision (“PRS”) by New York State agencies, and subsequent improper imposition of PRS by a New York state court. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in limiting relief to $1 in nominal damages, denying him punitive damages as a matter of law, and granting summary judgment for Appellees on his false imprisonment claim.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court instructed the district court to consider further whether, under Vincent, compensatory damages may still be available to Plaintiff. Further, the court agreed with Plaintiff that material issues of disputed fact preclude summary judgment. Appellees’ Rule 56.1 statement stated that as of May 30, 2000, the maximum expiration date of Plaintiff’s sentence was February 13, 2008, and as of July 30, 2007, it was June 6, 2008. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s failure in the district court to object to Appellees’ statement of material facts does not preclude him from relying on inconsistencies in Appellees’ own evidence to identify a disputed issue of material fact that made it erroneous to enter summary judgment. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees on the false imprisonment claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s challenge to his post-resentencing confinement is precluded by Appellees’ qualified immunity defense.

United States v. Calonge

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-3089

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: PARKER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted on two counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C. On appeal, she argued that the government failed to prove that venue was proper in the Southern District of New York.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the government adduced evidence sufficient to prove that Defendant damaged a protected computer within that District and that venue was, therefore, proper. The court explained that the jury was entitled to conclude that Defendant’s actions impaired the availability of data on the JazzHR system on her supervisor’s computer. The fact that the deletion might also have damaged the Amazon servers located in Virginia and California makes no difference. Thus, the fact that the email addresses of some New Jersey residents were obtained from AT&T’s servers was merely a “circumstance element” that could not support the venue in New Jersey where the “essential conduct elements” of the crime all occurred in other states.

United States v. Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-1486

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: JOHN M. WALKER, JR

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of racketeering conspiracy (Count One); murder in aid of racketeering (Count Two); and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count Three). Defendant argued that his Count Three conviction must be vacated because his predicate offense of murder in aid of racketeering was not a crime of violence.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s contention that the VICAR murder statute is indivisible and held that the modified categorical approach applies to the court’s consideration of whether his conviction for murder in aid of racketeering, a substantive VICAR offense, constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of Section 924(c). The court explained that first-degree manslaughter, regardless of whether it may be completed by commission or omission, “can only be committed by a defendant who causes death—the ultimate bodily injury—while intending to cause at least serious physical injury,” necessarily requiring the use of physical force. The court wrote that to hold otherwise would preclude courts from recognizing even intentional murder as a categorically violent crime, an untenable consequence.

United States v. Hage (Mamdouh Mahmud Salim)

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2442

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: WILLIAM J. NARDINI

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant motioned the Second Circuit to consider his pro se filing in addition to his counseled brief and to supplement the record. Appellant’s underlying appeal arises from the government’s dismissal, on May 8, 2019, of several indictments against him. Those indictments had been pending since 1999 when Appellant was charged for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.
 
The Second Circuit denied Appellant’s motion for the court to consider his supplemental pro se brief and his motion to supplement the record. Further, the court granted the government’s motion or an extension of time to file its brief to a date three weeks after the date of resolution of Appellant’s motion. The court explained that Appellant’s motion to supplement the record does not explain why he did not submit them to the district court. Appellant asked the Court to draw factual inferences from the letter and the declaration—inferences the government contests—but a motion to supplement the record “is not a device for presenting evidence to this Court that was not before the trial judge.”

United States v. Hallinan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Dockets: 21-1362, 21-2623, 22-1953, 22-2328

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

For 15 years, Charles ran 26 payday-lending companies, violating state criminal laws against usury, charging fees roughly equal to 780% interest per year. The companies grossed nearly half a billion dollars. Charles was convicted of 17 counts, including two for RICO conspiracy. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison, fined $2.5 million, and had to forfeit $64 million in illicit gains from the RICO conspiracy. Charles had already given some of the forfeited property to his daughter Linda. After the forfeiture orders, Linda filed ancillary claims to recover her interest in the assets.

The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of her claims. For a RICO conviction, the defendant “shall forfeit” any interest in or proceeds from the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1963(a). Third parties may neither intervene in that forfeiture proceeding nor bring separate suits to assert their interests. Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in the forfeited property may bring an ancillary claim; the court can amend the forfeiture order if that party shows that she either was a bona fide purchaser for value or has an interest in the forfeited property that was vested or superior at the time of the crime. The third party cannot “relitigate” the underlying forfeiture order.

United States v. Jumper

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2085

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Porter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

Jumper, a securities broker-dealer, arranged financing on behalf of private investors for the purchase of a Pennsylvania fire-brick manufacturer. Jumper fraudulently obtained authority to transfer the company’s pension plan assets by forging the majority stakeholder’s signature on several documents. Between 2007-2016, Jumper transferred $5.7 million from the pension plan to accounts he controlled.

The SEC filed a civil complaint against Jumper for securities fraud in the Western District of Tennessee. The Department of Justice filed criminal charges against Jumper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Tennessee court entered a default judgment for the SEC and ordered Jumper to disgorge $5.7 million and to pay prejudgment interest of $726,758.79. In Pennsylvania, Jumper pleaded guilty to wire fraud and agreed to make full restitution; the parties stipulated a loss of $1.5-$3.5 million.

The district court considered Jumper’s request for a downward departure based on medical issues, discussed the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and denied Jumper’s requests, explaining, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is equipped to provide consistent, adequate medical care. The court sentenced Jumper to 78 months’ incarceration, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 78–97 months, and ordered him to pay $2,426,550 in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and principles of collateral estoppel and that the court improperly concluded that the BOP could treat his medical issues.

United States v. Rivera

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3293

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Roth

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rivera flew from Miami to Saint Thomas, where Customs officers selected her for extra screening and asked her to fill out a Customs Declaration Form. On the Form, and in statements to officers, Rivera claimed ownership of two suitcases that she had retrieved from the baggage claim. Later, she said she did not own one of them, although it had a baggage tag with her name on it. Rivera said the suitcase belonged to Nieves. The other suitcase had a baggage tag with Nieves’ name on it. Rivera said that Nieves asked Rivera to retrieve the bag for her. Officers searched both suitcases. Each contained six vacuumed-sealed bags of a green, plant-like substance. The bags were concealed by clothes. A DHS agent interviewed Rivera, who changed her story about who told her to pick up the suitcase. She said did not know it was in the suitcases, which were packed by someone else.

The Third Circuit affirmed Rivera’s convictions for conspiracy to possess, and possession, with intent to distribute, less than 50 kilograms of marijuana. The court rejected her argument under the 2018 Farm Act, which amended the Controlled Substances Act to exclude hemp from the definition of marijuana. The Act carved out an exception to marijuana offenses: Someone with cannabis possesses marijuana except if the cannabis has a THC concentration of 0.3% or less. The government need not disprove an exception to a criminal offense unless a defendant produces evidence to put the exception at issue.

United States v. Vepuri

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-1562

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Michael A. Chagares

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, White Collar Crime

Vepuri is the de facto director of KVK-Tech, a generic drug manufacturer. He employed Panchal as its director of quality assurance. KVK-Tech manufactured and sold Hydroxyzine, a prescription generic drug used to treat anxiety and tension. The government alleges that Vepuri, Panchal, and KVK-Tech sourced active ingredient for the Hydroxyzine from a facility (DRL) that was not included in the approvals that they obtained from the FDA and that they misled the FDA about their practices.

An indictment charged all three defendants with conspiracy to defraud and to commit offenses against the United States and charged KVK-Tech with an additional count of mail fraud.
The district court dismissed the portion of the conspiracy charge that alleges that the three conspired to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which prohibits introducing a “new drug” into interstate commerce unless an FDA approval “is effective with respect to such drug,” 21 U.S.C. 355(a).

The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a deviation from the approved drug application means that the approval is no longer effective. The approval ceases being effective only when it has been withdrawn or suspended. The indictment does not include any allegations that the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine manufactured with active ingredients from DRL had a different composition or labeling than the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine with the effective approval.

Anthony Juniper v. Melvin Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-9

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: WYNN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The jury convicted Petitioner of the four murders, and the court sentenced him to death.3 Id. at 475. On July 1, 2021, however, his sentence was commuted to life without parole after Virginia abolished the death penalty by legislation. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences, but the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the district court permitted the parties to engage in further discovery, during which Petitioner learned of additional evidence that he alleged was also Brady or Napue material. Petitioner appealed and sought a certificate of appealability on a single issue: “whether the suppression of evidence and knowing presentation of false and misleading testimony was cumulatively material” under a combined Brady and Napue analysis. The sole question on appeal is whether Petitioner can show that the evidence he cites as inappropriately suppressed under Brady and the testimony he cites as inappropriately offered under Napue was cumulatively material.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Petitioner cannot satisfy the Brady standard. The Brady and Napue evidence noted herein would have weakened certain aspects of the prosecution’s case but would not have undermined the core of the evidence against Juniper. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Brady and Napue evidence cannot “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” and that there is not “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

FTC v. Kristy Ross

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-2078

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: FLOYD

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law

Defendant victimized over a million Americans by furthering a country-wide “scareware” scam that tricked innocent computer users into paying for unnecessary software to remedy entirely fabricated issues purported to plague their devices. An apparent fugitive—having sought for years to evade paying even a cent of the $163,167,539.95 in restitution ordered for her role in the scheme—Defendant sought vacatur of that aging monetary judgment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that an arguable basis clearly supported the judgment imposed, and it cannot be said that there was a “total want of jurisdiction” or a “clear usurpation of power” such that any defect renders the judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Further, the court explained that Defendant’s aggregated circumstances are not extraordinary such that she is entitled to vacatur under Rule 60(b) catch-all, and the district court soundly exercised its discretion in denying her such relief. This outcome is wholly consonant with our directive to “delicately balance the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Thus, the court held that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant remained liable for $163,167,539.95 in restitution—an amount that would justly recompense the victims.

US v. Maurice Bailey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4134

Opinion Date: July 17, 2023

Judge: GREGORY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Shortly after witnessing a person leave Defendant’s home, Kannapolis, North Carolina police officer Jeremy Page discovered 0.1 grams of cocaine base during a search of Johnson’s vehicle. Officer Page then confronted Defendant about the cocaine sale and instructed him to turn over any drugs still in his possession. In return, Officer Page assured Bailey that he was “going to take it and . . . leave,” and everything would still be “squared away.” Prompted by Officer Page’s offer, Defendant handed over 0.7 grams of cocaine base. Defendant helped Officer Page locate and arrest an individual for whom the police had an outstanding warrant but did not otherwise aid in Officer Page’s investigations. Then Officer Page obtained two warrants for Defendant’s arrest. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should have granted his suppression motion because his arrest constituted a breach of Officer Page’s September 24 promise that all would be “squared away.”
 
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision denying Defendant’s motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction and remanded. The court concluded that if Officer Page did breach a promise not to arrest Defendant for either quantity of drugs recovered on September 24 in exchange for his cooperation, Defendant could seek to enforce that promise against the government. Further, the court wrote that a police officer is not entitled to arbitrarily breach these agreements, which have become a central feature of the many drug-related prosecutions that occupy our criminal legal system each year.

Johnson v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-70005

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant was indicted for intentionally causing the death of another by setting her on fire during a robbery. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, as alleged in the indictment. Appellant challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence in a state habeas proceeding, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. Appellant filed an application for a certificate of appealability and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to recuse.
 
The Fifth Circuit denied the application for a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The court explained that Appellant cited no governing legal authority recognizing the right to delay his briefing until the final day of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. On the contrary, it is firmly established that a district court has “the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” The district court noted that Appellant’s counsel might be acting contrary to Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires counsel to certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Given the district court’s explanation, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to recuse. Accordingly, the court held that these do not debatably give rise to a claim for relief.

USA v. Baez-Adriano

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-50118

Opinion Date: July 17, 2023

Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to drug offenses and assaulting or impeding U.S. Border Patrol agents. The district court sentenced him within the guidelines range to a total of 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $225 special assessment. Although Defendant’s presentence report (“PSR”) listed no conditions of supervised release, the district court, at sentencing, specifically imposed “the standard and mandatory conditions of supervision … including the conditions that the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of supervision.”
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the well-grounded and legally-sound procedure for imposing “standard” and “mandatory” conditions of supervised release listed in a court’s standing order is: 1. The probation officer should either include the court’s standing order in or append it to the PSR, or preferably both. 2. Defense counsel must review and explain the conditions in the court’s standing order with the defendant before sentencing. 3. The district court must (a) confirm with the defendant that he or she saw the standing order and had the opportunity to review it with defense counsel; (b) ask the defendant whether he or she has any questions about the conditions listed in the standing order; (c) orally pronounce that it is imposing the conditions detailed in a specific standing order, and (d) provide the defendant with an opportunity to object. Nonetheless, in this case, the district court did not plainly err in imposing the standard and mandatory conditions detailed in the court-wide standing order and two special conditions.

USA v. Gaulden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30435

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant, a rap artist as well as a convicted felon, owned a company that hired a videographer to film Defendant throughout his life for eventual use in a music video. One day, an anonymous 911 caller reported several men with “Uzis” and other guns walking down a residential street in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Police arrived, detained Defendant, the videographer, and others. Police seized a memory card from the videographer, as well as several firearms from the nearby area. There was a video on the memory card of Defendant holding a firearm.

The district court reasoned that Gaulden had a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the videos on the memory card, although he lacked a Fourth Amendment interest in the memory card itself. The court also found the warrant fatally defective. Accordingly, the court suppressed the footage of Defendant in possession of the firearms.

The Fifth Circuit reversed. Defendant's right to Fourth Amendment protection turns on whether he has a constitutionally protected property interest or a judicially conferred reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched or seized. To the extent Defendant can have a distinct property interest in the video footage, he never proved that he acquired such a right. Defendant himself did not testify and there was no written contract giving Defendant ownership of the video footage. And Defendant's company, not Defendant himself, hired the videographer. Thus, Defendant did not have an established property interest in the footage.

The court also held that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the footage.

Coopwood v. Wayne County, Michigan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1485

Opinion Date: July 17, 2023

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Coopwood has bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. She was institutionalized several times from 2010-2017. On August 13, 2017, Coopwood (six months pregnant) stopped taking her antipsychotic medications because of concerns about potential effects on the fetus. Coopwood fatally stabbed her mother and was ultimately found “guilty but mentally ill.”

In pretrial custody, Coopwood, not taking her antipsychotic medications, was repeatedly screened and denied any history of mental health treatment. Employees, aware of Coopwood’s history of inpatient psychiatric care, did not raise concerns. Coopwood alleges that, in August 2017, Jailer Watts dragged her to her cell and kicked Coopwood in the stomach, after which she suffered cramping with a bloody discharge from her vagina. She was hospitalized several times in August and September. On October 19, she was seen by a psychiatrist, Haddad, who determined that Coopwood had been psychotic for an unknown period and seemed unaware of her circumstances. On October 22, Coopwood, exhibiting bizarre behavior, was forcibly given antipsychotic medications. She was readmitted on November 8, reporting contractions. Labor was induced. Coopwood’s baby was stillborn. Coopwood contends that she attempted to file a grievance but that her verbal requests were ignored.

Coopwood’s suit, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her medical needs, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants failed to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Jail’s staff thwarted Coopwood’s attempts to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Balle v. Kennedy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2393

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A kitchen supervisor directed Balle, an Illinois state prisoner, to carry near-boiling water across a wet, damaged floor in a plastic five-gallon bucket. His foot caught in a hole, and he fell down. The water splashed on him and caused severe burns. Balle sued several prison officials, claiming they violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the dangerous kitchen conditions. The district court dismissed some of Balle’s claims at the pleading stage and granted summary judgment on the others.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The record lacks sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to the subjective knowledge of two defendants. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Balle, a reasonable jury could conclude that the kitchen conditions represented an objectively serious danger to inmates, but gaps in the record prevent a jury from inferring that the two actually knew about the conditions that made the kitchen seriously dangerous–that inmates had to carry scalding water across the damaged floor. The court reversed in part, reinstating the claim against the kitchen supervisor, who required the inmates to carry the scalding water. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to recruit counsel.

Grady v. Truitt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3162

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

When police responded to a shooting outside a casino, the victim was dead. They found Grady’s cell phone, which they used, along with surveillance video, to track him down and arrest him. They searched Grady’s apartment and discovered a gun. An expert witness later testified that it was the weapon that was used in the shooting. Grady and his roommate, Bronson, gave different accounts of what happened that night.

A state-court jury convicted Grady of first-degree murder. In response to a special verdict form, the jury found that the prosecution had not proved that Grady was the triggerman. Bronson was sentenced to 24 years, Grady to 60 years. Grady’s direct appeal focused on his sentence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of his ineffective assistance post-conviction petition, concluding that the evidence presented against Grady was “overwhelming” and Grady could not demonstrate the necessary prejudice under Strickland.

Contending that the special-verdict finding negated the prosecution’s sole theory of guilt, Grady sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, because his direct-appeal lawyer raised only two issues on appeal, both of which Grady regards as significantly weaker than the inconsistent-verdict argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s rejection of this contention was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.

Hunter v. Mueske

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1340

Opinion Date: July 17, 2023

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hunter was housed in a general-population wing of “Unit H” at Redgranite Wisconsin state prison. Patterson, Hunter’s cellmate March-December 2017, was regarded as a “lifer” and a “violent individual.” On multiple occasions, Patterson told Hunter that he would beat him while he slept. Hunter communicated Patterson’s threats to Mueske, the Unit H supervisor with authority over housing assignments. Hunter told Officer Walker about Patterson’s threats. At Walker’s suggestion, Hunter filled out an Inmate Complaint form, dated August 9. Walker typically notifies his superiors and drafts an incident report when he learns of threats between inmates, but he did not do so. Wilcox decided to move Patterson out of Unit H on December 6, 2017, but not due to Hunter’s complaints.

On the day of Patterson’s move, Hunter approached Patterson, purportedly to say goodbye. Hunter claims that Patterson flew into a rage, accusing Hunter of causing Patterson’s reassignment. Patterson testified that Hunter called him various derogatory terms, including the N-word. Patterson violently battered Hunter and stomped on his head, causing Hunter permanent injuries and triggering his PTSD from his time in the military. The altercation was captured on video. In Hunter’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Mueske and Walker summary judgment. Hunter offered no facts from which a reasonable jury could find that Walker acted with deliberate indifference or that Mueske’s conduct caused his injury.

Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, Illinois

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2958

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

At around 4:36 AM, Washington’s cellmate, Simmons, awoke to the sound of Washington, a pretrial detainee, gasping for breath. Simmons tried to shake Washington; he did not respond. At 4:37, Simmons pressed the intercom button, which triggers an audible ping and a flashing light at the control desk. Valentine, the control deck officer, did not answer for over one minute. Valentine claims he had trouble understanding Simmons and thought Simmons was referring to a plumbing issue. Valentine ended the call. For 30 seconds. Simmons tried to wake Washington. He used the intercom again around 4:47. Valentine did not answer for about 90 seconds. Other officers had joined him at the desk. This time, Valentine understood Simmons was reporting an emergency. The other officers ran to Washington’s cell, arriving at 4:50, issued an alert for medical assistance, and began CPR. A nurse with a defibrillator arrived around 4:52 and administered an electrical shock. At 5:00, EMTs arrived and continued CPR. Washington was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy concluded that sleep apnea caused Washington to go into cardiac arrhythmia, which caused Washington’s death.

In a suit under 18 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Valentine’s delay in obtaining treatment harmed Washington, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Valentine for lack of sufficient evidence to show causation.

Mata v. Baker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-3151

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Mata fired shots, killing two men and injuring another. Chicago police arrested Mata that evening. The following day, after receiving his Miranda rights and saying that he understood them, Mata gave a videotaped statement: Mata explained that he heard Mares calling his name. He turned around and saw two men holding Mares while other men surrounded him. Mata took out his gun and fired. The men backed away, but one man reached for his pocket. Mata fired five more shots toward the group, then ran toward his car. The men were walking with their backs to him when he fired; he never saw any of them with a weapon. An officer read Mata his Miranda rights again on tape. Mata said he understood his rights and wanted to make the statement; the police had treated him “well and fairly,” and he gave the statement “freely and voluntarily” without threats or promises by the police.

Defense counsel moved to suppress Mata’s statements, claiming that Mata was subjected to abuse by the police for two days before being given any Miranda warnings. No hearing was held on the motion. Convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm, Mata sought habeas relief, arguing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a hearing on the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Mata procedurally defaulted his claim and did not show cause to excuse the default.

United States v. Bicknell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2268

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Gilbert and his son Michael were charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gilbert pleaded guilty and sought “safety-valve relief” from the mandatory minimum 10-year sentence. While Gilbert was awaiting sentencing, Michael pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate including by providing information about Gilbert’s criminal conduct. The plea agreement itself was not entered into the court’s docket. The government never disclosed the agreement to Gilbert or his lawyer. At Gilbert’s sentencing hearing, Michael testified against his father. The prosecutor elicited false testimony that Michael had pleaded “open”—without the benefit of a written plea agreement. The court subsequently located the written plea agreement and informed the parties. Gilbert’s lawyer did not move to recall Michael for further cross-examination nor did he probe Michael’s motivations for testifying. The court denied Gilbert’s request for safety-valve relief and sentenced Gilbert to 156 months.

The Seventh Circuit “reluctantly” affirmed. To obtain relief for a “Brady” violation, a defendant must show that undisclosed information was “material either to guilt or to punishment.” While Gilbert was completely in the dark about evidence that would have been useful to impeach a witness who testified against him, that evidence would not have affected the outcome of his sentencing. The court described the prosecution’s conduct as “unsettling.”

United States v. Caraway

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2146

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eight drug couriers, under indictment, identified Caraway as the supplier of the cocaine and leader of the operation. The government communicated to Caraway’s attorney that Caraway would soon be indicted. Caraway voluntarily traveled to Illinois for a proffer interview, then returned to Houston. In September 2017, the government learned that Caraway committed a violent robbery in Houston and notified Caraway’s attorney that he would be indicted and was required to surrender by December 15, 2017. Caraway never responded. In January 2018, the government charged Caraway with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

U.S. Marshals began searching for Caraway 11 months later. In July 2021, a Texas state trooper stopped Caraway for speeding. After initially supplying a fake name, Caraway provided his real name and was arrested. Caraway pleaded guilty. The PSR recommended sentencing enhancements for being the leader and organizer of the conspiracy and for obstruction of justice, based on evading arrest for approximately 42 months. Caraway argued that the fact that the government could not find him was not evidence that he was evading arrest. After overruling the enhancement objections, the court calculated Caraway’s sentence range as 292-365 months; without the obstruction enhancement, the range would have been 235-293 months. After discussing the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, the judge noted that she would have imposed the same 360-month sentence without the enhancements.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly calculated the Guidelines range without the enhancement and tied the imposed sentence to the severity of the crime, Caraway’s role, relevant conduct, possible recidivism, and protecting the public.

United States v. Cruz-Rivera

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1325

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cruz-Rivera was convicted of first-degree rape and first-degree assault (stabbing) in 2001, having violently attacked two women who suffered from a mild mental disability. After his 2015 release from prison, he was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 34 U.S.C. 20901; he never did so. Cruz-Rivera lived and worked (for a staffing agency, including at a school) in Indiana and was convicted of two felonies—resisting law enforcement and auto theft.

Cruz-Rivera was convicted of failing to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The PSR recommended a condition of supervised release that required him to submit to the search of his person and property based on “reasonable suspicion” of a violation of a condition of supervision or other unlawful conduct. Cruz-Rivera unsuccessfully objected, arguing that his crimes did not provide a justification for the search of electronics and electronic communications. The Probation Office noted that the condition is imposed on all monitored offenders. “Searches are not conducted without probable cause and only after approval from the Deputy Chief and/or Chief Probation Officer.”

The court imposed a sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release after describing Cruz-Rivera’s criminal history and stating that it had considered his mitigation arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After a conscientious reading of Cruz-Rivera’s PSR, the district court reasonably concluded that the circumstances surrounding his criminal history made the imposition of the contested condition an important ingredient in stopping his antisocial behavior.

Dale Bookwalter v. David Vandergriff

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1722

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: ARNOLD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury in a Missouri state court found Petitioner guilty of statutory sodomy in the first degree, which a person commits if he "has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old." Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, rejecting the argument that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was less than fourteen years old. When Petitioner turned to the federal courts for relief, a magistrate judge1 denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable, though it did grant Petitioner a certificate of appealability. He now challenges the magistrate judge's determination.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the magistrate judge that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable. Though a reasonable juror might harbor some possible doubt that the victim was fourteen or older, the court wrote it is dubious that every rational juror would be compelled to harbor a reasonable doubt or would necessarily not "reach a subjective state of near certitude" that Petitioner was guilty. But a more critical point is that, under AEDPA, the court does not think that the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable or "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement."

Tiffany Janis v. United States of America

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2471

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant shot and killed her husband when she found him cheating. She pled guilty to second-degree murder in Indian country. A year later, Defendant moved to vacate her Section 924(c) conviction, believing that intervening Supreme Court cases rendered it unlawful. Specifically, she argued that federal second-degree murder could not be considered a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The district court dismissed her motion. She appealed.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that murder is the ultimate violent crime—irreversible and incomparable “in terms of moral depravity.” Malice aforethought, murder’s defining characteristic, encapsulates the crime’s violent nature. The court wrote that here, Defendant unlawfully killed her husband with malice aforethought. That was murder—a crime of violence. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction need not be vacated.

United States v. Bernard Manuel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2688

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed a 96-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant served that sentence and began supervised release in October 2018. In February 2020, the district court revoked supervised release based on a domestic violence incident. After serving an additional year in custody, Defendant began a new one-year term of supervised release in January 2021. On April 1, 2021, while serving this second term, Defendant was arrested by Kansas City police officers for possessing a firearm used in a shooting earlier that day. Defendant pleaded guilty to a new felon-in-possession charge. At a combined supervised release revocation and sentencing hearing in August 2022, the district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and imposed a 24-month sentence for the violations and a consecutive 96-month sentence for his new felon-in-possession conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing “the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable total sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment.”
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court’s focus on Defendant’s criminal history -- including his “aged-out” convictions -- was appropriate considering Defendant’s lengthy violent criminal record, combative behavior when arrested, and the fact that he committed the instant offense while on a second term of supervised release for a prior felon-in-possession conviction. And the court sympathetically acknowledged Defendant’s drug addiction problem, recommending that he participate in the Bureau of Prisons’ Residential Drug Abuse Program so he could better combat his addiction.

United States v. Cesar Cortez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3161

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was found with 890 fentanyl pills after Arkansas state troopers pulled him over. He admitted that the pills were his, that he had traveled to Arkansas from Texas to sell them, and that he had successfully done so before. He later pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court impermissibly varied upward based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines’ treatment of fentanyl.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a district court may vary from the guidelines based on its own policy disagreements with those guidelines. A variance need not be based on the court’s “individualized determination that [the guidelines] yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.” Moreover, the court tied its general policy disagreement to the specific aggravating circumstances of Defendant’s case: the quantity of fentanyl involved, the concealment of the pills as oxycodone, and the past drug sales for which Cortez was not charged. The court carefully weighed these against the mitigating factors and ultimately concluded that they warranted an above-guidelines sentence. The court found no abuse of discretion in that determination.

United States v. Eswin Lopez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3044

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A federal jury convicted Defendant of attempted sex trafficking of a minor after he responded to an advertisement, negotiated a price for sexual relations with a 15-year-old, and traveled almost an hour through a snowstorm to a designated meeting point with items requested by the purported minor. At the end of Defendant’s trial, he moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. On appeal, Defendant raised a limited sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, there is ample support for Defendant’s conviction. The evidence showed that Defendant responded to the undercover officer’s ad and, over five days, repeatedly expressed his desire to have various forms of sexual relations with the person advertised, even after learning and being reminded several times that she was only 15 years old. Defendant then extensively discussed his aversion to using condoms with the 15-year-old and negotiated a price and time to have sex with her. Defendant then drove almost an hour through a snowstorm to meet her at a prearranged meeting location and brought along both $100 in cash and the specific alcohol she requested that he bring to calm her nerves.

United States v. Jesse Neri

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2932

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Following a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigation, Defendant pled guilty to three counts involving methamphetamine: possession, distribution, and conspiracy. The district court1 sentenced Defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment on each count, all terms to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant raised three claims of procedural error and argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Here, the cout explained that the district court specifically stated that, “even if I had sustained some or all of [Defendant’s objections], I would have still imposed the same sentence . . . based on all the factors that I am required to consider under the law.” It then undertook the requisite Section 3553(a) analysis in which it highlighted the nature and circumstances of the offense and Defendant’s criminal history in explaining its ultimate sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment. Thus, the court held that any alleged procedural error was harmless. Further, the court held that Defendant did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion that justifies interfering with the district court’s wide latitude to assign weight to given factors. The district court thus did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.

United States v. Scott Nielsen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2965

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1), after law enforcement discovered 28 grams of methamphetamine following an inventory search of a vehicle Defendant had been driving. Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine. After the district court denied Defendant’s motion, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when officers conduct an inventory search according to standardized police procedures, the reasonableness requirement is generally met. This is true even when officers are afforded discretion to release a vehicle to a registered, insured driver instead of towing it, provided this discretion “is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” The court wrote that even if it assumes that the officer had an investigatory motive, it still holds that the inventory search was reasonable. Finally, the court explained that SCSD’s inventory-search policy requires officers to open all containers within the vehicle, whether open or closed, to inventory them for valuable items. The officer followed this policy in opening the binoculars case to determine whether there were any items of value inside. Such a policy is “unquestionably permissible.”

United States v. Victor Childers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2743

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. His conditional plea preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the ammunition recovered from his person and the firearms recovered from his vehicle. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress these preserved issues. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the high-risk felony stop protocol transformed an investigative stop pursuant to reasonable suspicion, or Terry stop, into a de facto arrest without probable cause; (2) the search of his person “exceeded the permissible scope and intensity” of a valid Terry stop; and (3) the search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the protective sweep doctrine.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In evaluating the relevant factors, the court explained that it was reasonable to believe that the persons they identified and approached might be armed and had recently unlawfully discharged a firearm. Thus, both factors justified a greater show of force in performing the Terry stop. Here, the officers had at least a reasonable suspicion that at least one of the suspects was armed or that a firearm was in the vehicle. The officers’ actions warranted placing Defendant in a separate secure location. Therefore, applying the court’s precedent to the instant facts, the court concluded that the officers’ methods were permissible and did not transform the Terry stop into an arrest.

USA V. YI-CHI SHIH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-50144

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: Hurwitz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, International Law

After Defendant was indicted for various offenses arising out of the export of semiconductors to the People’s Republic of China, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The district court subsequently entered a judgment of acquittal on one count. The government appealed that acquittal, and Defendant appealed his convictions on the other counts.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of acquittal, affirmed Defendant’s other convictions, and remanded. The court explained that The Export Administration Regulations (EARs), administered by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, impose controls on certain exports to “serve the national security, foreign policy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other interests of the United States.” After the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the EARs were continued pursuant to Executive Order 13,222, which declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The panel rejected Shih’s argument that Executive Order 13,222 was an improper invocation of presidential authority. The panel also rejected Defendant’s argument and argued that IEEPA violates the nondelegation doctrine. The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that this term requires post-manufacture, pre-export testing. The panel therefore ordered the reinstatement of the jury verdict on that count. Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to give his proposed jury instruction on the fundamental research exemption. The panel rejected this argument because other instructions given in their entirety cover the defense theory. The panel found no error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings because they were well within the district court’s discretion.

Demarcus Sears v. Warden GDCP

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-13467

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner sits on death row in Georgia following his convictions for kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery. He appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court and the Eleventh Circuit granted Petitoner’s certificates of appealability on nine combined issues.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The court explained that a review of the record compels the conclusion that Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claim II of his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court explained that after reviewing the entire record, the court has more than a “grave doubt” that the Sabel error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s death sentence. At trial, the mitigation evidence centered on the argument that Petitioner’s crimes were completely out of character and that a death sentence would have an adverse impact on his family. But the expert-related evidence developed during the habeas proceeding provided different and powerful mitigation arguments. In particular, once Petitioner’s postconviction counsel no longer feared the inequities that the Sabel rule imposed, they were able to procure critical expert evidence about Petitioner’s mental-health deficiencies and present that evidence to the state habeas court.

James Edward Barber v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 23-12242

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: BRANCH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff is an Alabama death row inmate scheduled to be executed by lethal injection on July 20, 2023. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 complaint asserting that the manner in which Alabama executes its lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he takes issue with the manner in which the execution team attempted to secure IV access in the inmates during the preceding three executions that occurred in 2022. Relatedly, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Alabama from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia. Plaintiff appealed the denial of that motion.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  The court focused its analysis on whether the district court clearly erred in determining that Plaintiff did not show that he faces a “substantial risk of serious harm” if executed by lethal injection. Plaintiff argued that Nance does not control and that the court should instead follow its unpublished decision in Smith. The court explained that the evidence established that since the allegedly “botched” executions, ADOC conducted a full review of its execution processes and procedures, and determined that no deficiencies existed with the protocol itself. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the intervening changes made by the ADOC “have disrupted the pattern discussed in Smith,” rendering Plaintiff’s claim that the same pattern would continue to occur purely speculative. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim.

Pablo Guzman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-14181

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: GRANT

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of attempted second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison. Defendant claimed that the jury instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter were incomplete because they lacked an explanation of “excusable homicide.” At issue is whether Defendant was prejudiced when his appellate counsel failed to make a particular argument. The district court recognized the change in the law and rejected Defendant’s Lucas-based arguments. When Defendant appealed, the Eleventh Circuit granted him a certificate of appealability on this issue. As stated by Defendant, “the determinative fact for this Court to consider is the applicability of Lockhart v. Fretwell” to his claim.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court explained that Fretwell establishes that the result of a defendant’s proceeding is neither unfair nor unreliable in the present when current law does not provide the right that the defendant seeks to vindicate. Further, both the Supreme Court and the court have reaffirmed Fretwell post-AEDPA with no mention of overruling or modification. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied Fretwell to this case.

People v. Carney

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S260063

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Jenkins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal concluding that the actions of Defendants Lonnie Mitchell and Louis Mitchell were sufficient to demonstrate that each proximately caused the victim's death, regardless of who actually shot the victim, holding that Defendants' deadly actions in this case constituted proximate cause consistent with the holding in People v. Sanchez, 26 Cal. 4th 834.

In Sanchez, the Supreme Court upheld the first-degree murder conviction of a defendant who had engaged in a shootout that left an innocent bystander dead. At issue in this case was whether Sanchez's analysis of "substantial concurrent cause" permitted Defendants' convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court, consistent with Sanchez, properly instructed the jury on substantial concurrent causation with respect to the victim's death.

California v. Gyorgy

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061567(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Motoike

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After the truck defendant-appellant Joseph Gyorgy was driving was pulled over for making an unsafe lane change, a police officer used his narcotics detection dog to sniff the truck’s exterior. The police dog alerted, signaling it detected the odor of narcotics inside the truck’s cab. In a subsequent search of the truck, officers found methamphetamine, a pipe, a handgun, and ammunition. Gyorgy twice moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his truck, arguing the search occurred during an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied his motions, and he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. His sole argument on appeal was that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress. Based in its analysis of of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the Court of Appeal agreed the court erred. "What began as a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment’s shield against unreasonable seizures when the officers detoured from the traffic stop’s mission by conducting the dog sniff and inquiring into matters unrelated to the traffic violation." The Court also rejected the California Attorney General’s alternative argument the stop was lawfully prolonged based on reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity.

California v. Kimble

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097389(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In November 2008, a California trial court sentenced defendant Kelly Kimble to 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement. In October 2022, defendant appeared for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified as Penal Code section 1172.75). At the hearing, the trial court struck defendant’s prior prison term enhancement, but otherwise left his sentence intact. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in resentencing him under Senate Bill 483 without applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)). To this the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the sentence.

California v. Marquez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080411(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant MaeReichelle Villamor Marquez appealed a court order directing her to pay restitution to the victim of her crimes. Marquez and two others fraudulently used the identities of 60 prisoners to obtain unemployment benefits from the Employment Development Department (the Department). The State of California charged Marquez with 21 felonies, some arising out of her participation in the fraudulent scheme and others out of her possession of controlled substances. Marquez and the State agreed to an indicated prison sentence range of four to seven years, and Judge Link granted the State's motion to dismiss all other charges. Marquez agreed “[r]estitution to [the Department] [would] be joint and several with co-defendants.” Appealing the restitution order, Marquez claimed the trial court breached the implied agreement under California v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749 (1978) that the same judge who accepted her guilty plea and sentenced her to prison would also determine the amount of victim restitution to be awarded. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

California v. Session

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G060536(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Keandre Session was convicted of five counts of residential burglary, street terrorism, and numerous enhancements. On appeal he argued: (1) the placement of a GPS surveillance device on his vehicle without a warrant was unconstitutional because the officer who did so did not offer specific testimony as to how he knew that defendant (who was, indeed, on parole) was on parole; and (2) due to changes in the law, he is entitled to a new trial where the gang counts are bifurcated from the other charges. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding: (1) the surveillance device argument had no merit because no case or statute has ever articulated such a requirement with respect to parolee searches; and (2) even if the change in the law should be retroactively applied, any error was not reasonably likely to change the outcome of the case.

P. v. Antonelli

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B321947(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: YEGAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant acknowledged that in 1991 he “was convicted of provocative act murder.” He appeals a post-judgment order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly Section 1170.95) petition to vacate the first-degree murder conviction.1 Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437). Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). Appellant claimed the trial court erred in denying the second petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argued he made a prima facie case for relief based on S.B. 775’s amendment of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to add the following ground for relief: the petitioner’s murder conviction was pursuant to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Appellant maintains he was convicted of provocative act murder pursuant to such a theory of “imputed” malice because he did not personally commit a provocative act. The provocative acts allegedly were committed by his accomplices.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that because Appellant was convicted of provocative act murder, as a matter of law, he is not eligible for section 1172.6 relief. The court explained that a conviction of provocative act murder cannot be premised on “malice that is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” The court further explained that the law of provocative act murder requires that the defendant personally harbor malice.

Harris v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 408, 2022

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Karen L. Valihura

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Deshaun Harris was convicted of first degree robbery, first degree assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, aggravated menacing, wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony, conspiracy, theft, aggravated intimidation, and breach of conditions of bond during Commitment. After Harris’s arrest, before trial, one of the victims was confronted by individuals who offered him money to sign papers stating that Harris was not the perpetrator of the attack. They threatened the victim, warning him that if he testified on the stand or identified Harris, they would kill his family and him. At trial, the State produced three documents purporting to be affidavits of the victim recanting his identification of Harris. Each document was in a different format — one was written in cursive, one was printed, and one was typed. The victim testified that he did not draft any of the documents, but that he signed the typed affidavit under the threat of being killed. During its investigation, the State found multiple prison phone calls between a person believed to be Harris and an unidentified woman. The State sought to introduce certain portions of the calls to corroborate the victim's testimony and to contextualize the three affidavits wherein the victim had recanted his identification of Harris. These recordings were admitted to the trial record over Harris' objection, and he appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court the trial court erred in so admitting them. The Supreme Court found no merit to the appeal and affirmed Harris’s conviction and sentence.

Kinderman v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 235, 2022

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Seitz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Seth Kinderman was convicted by jury for the murder of Jakeith Latham. Eventually, he pled guilty to second-degree murder, attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to a joint recommendation of thirty years of Level V incarceration. A few months later, Kinderman sought to withdraw his guilty plea. He claimed his plea counsel failed to advise him of the specific charges in the plea agreement and failed to conduct a mitigation investigation for use during plea negotiations. The superior court denied the plea withdrawal motion and sentenced Kinderman to thirty-seven years of Level V incarceration. Kinderman argued on appeal that the superior court erred in denying the motion to withdraw his plea because he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement, and the plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the superior court’s judgment: Kinderman did not show a “fair and just reason” to withdraw his guilty plea.

Idaho v. Miller

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49241

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Zahn

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Miller appealed his conviction for felony driving under the influence (“DUI”) and the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction for felony DUI within the previous fifteen years. On appeal, Miller argued: (1) the district court erred in dismissing the jury before it heard and determined the facts regarding the sentencing enhancement without first obtaining a valid waiver of Miller’s right to a jury trial; (2) the appropriate remedy for the error was to determine the sentencing enhancement did not apply; and (3) if the sentencing enhancement was still applicable to Miller, his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial on whether Miller should be subject to the sentencing enhancement. Given the State’s concession that the district court committed fundamental error, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the appropriate remedy was to vacate Miller’s sentence and remand for a new trial to determine whether the sentencing enhancement applied to Miller.

People v. Washington

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 127952

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Washington and Hood were arrested in 1993; they were charged with armed robbery and murder. Washington, 19 years old, had no criminal record. He claims Chicago police detectives, subordinates of infamous Chicago detective Jon Burge, handcuffed him to a chair, interrogated him, beat him, kicked over his chair while he remained handcuffed to it, and subjected him to psychological abuse. After being detained for more than a day and a half, Washington signed a prewritten statement, falsely confessing to the murder. After Washington’s mistrial, Hood was convicted and sentenced to a 75-year term. Washington then accepted a 25-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.

After a 2014 investigative article in The New Yorker about witness coercion, then-Governor Quinn commuted Hood’s sentence. In 2015, the state, on its own motion, moved to vacate both convictions, then nol-prossed the charges against both. Each filed a verified petition for certificates of innocence under 735 ILCS 5/2-702.

After a hearing, at which there was evidence of police abuse of the defendants in these and other cases and coercion of the witnesses, the Cook County circuit court denied Washington’s petition; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The statute does not impose a categorical bar precluding petitioners who pleaded guilty. This petitioner did not “voluntarily” cause his conviction by pleading guilty.

Rowe v. Raoul

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 129248

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: Mary Jane Theis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Pretrial Practices made multiple recommendations to “ensure defendants are not denied liberty solely due to their inability to financially secure their release from custody.” In 2021, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed, the Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act, revising the standards for police use of force, conferring new authority on the Attorney General concerning alleged civil rights violations by law enforcement, and imposing new requirements for correctional facilities.

The Act rebuilt Illinois’s statutory framework for the pretrial release of criminal defendants, 725 ILCS 5/110, establishing a default rule that all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release on personal recognizance subject to conditions of release, such as electronic monitoring or home supervision. Although the Act eliminates monetary bail it allows the court to order pretrial detention of criminal defendants in specified cases. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a defendant’s eligibility for pretrial detention.

The trial court rejected claims that the Act violated the state’s constitutional single-subject and three-readings requirements and was void for vagueness but entered summary judgment, finding that certain provisions violated the bail, crime victims’ rights, and the separation of powers clauses of the Illinois Constitution.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois Constitution does not mandate monetary bail as the only means to ensure criminal defendants appear for trials or the only means to protect the public. The Act’s pretrial release provisions set forth procedures commensurate with the balance between the individual rights of defendants and the individual rights of crime victims. The legislature has long regulated the bail system.

State v. Campbell

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123190

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing its order suppressing evidence found in the car that Defendant was driving on two separate occasions where law enforcement discovered drugs and other contraband, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reversing its suppression order but erred in admitting prior drug use.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of possessing methamphetamine and four counts of possessing drug paraphernalia with intent to use to distribute. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the district court erroneously allowed the State to introduce evidence relating to Defendant's prior convictions for similar crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in admitting prior drug crime evidence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion to reconsider its erroneous suppression ruling.

State v. Every

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2023 ME 39

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of burglary, entered following a jury trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that he should be granted an acquittal.

Defendant was indicted for various offenses, including burglary. During the jury trial, after the State rested, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the State had not proven that he was not licensed or privileged to be in the house at issue because he was legally present on the premises as a tenant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could find that Defendant knew that he lacked the right to possess or occupy the premises the night of the offense; and (2) therefore, Defendant was not entitled to an acquittal.

State v. McDonnell

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 36/22

Opinion Date: July 17, 2023

Judge: Shirley M. Watts

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals held that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in data contained on his hard drive and that the government conducted an unreasonable search by examining data without any authority to do so either by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.

At issue was whether the consensual creation of a copy of the hard drive of Defendant's seized laptop computer permanently eliminated Defendant's privacy interest in the hard drive. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion to suppress and ultimately convicted him of three counts of distribution of child pornography. The appellate court reversed, concluding that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the digital data within their computer and that Defendant's revocation of his consent to examine the data from his laptop precluded a forensic examination of the mirror-image copy of its hard drive without a warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the search in this case was unreasonable after Defendant withdrew his consent.

Commonwealth v. Bateman

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-10079

Opinion Date: July 17, 2023

Judge: Georges

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree for the killing of Brandy Waryasz on theories of premeditation and felony-murder and murder in the first degree for the killing of Dane Anthony Hall, on a theory of felony-murder, but reversed his conviction for armed robbery, holding that the conviction must be dismissed as duplicative of the felony-murder conviction.

Defendant attacked Waryasz while she was working at a gas station by tightly wrapping a ligature around her neck. Waryasz, who was seven months pregnant with Hall, died from a constricted airflow, killing her son within minutes of his mother. Defendant was indicted for two murders and armed robbery and convicted on all charges. Defendant later filed a motion for a new trial, which the superior court denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree but vacated and set aside the armed robbery conviction, holding (1) as to Defendant's murder convictions, he was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error, and there was no ground for granting relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E; and (2) the armed robbery conviction was duplicative of the felony-murder conviction for the killing of Hall and therefore must be dismissed.

Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13355

Opinion Date: July 17, 2023

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the trial judge reducing Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree to involuntary manslaughter pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2), as amended, holding that the judge did not abuse her discretion by reducing the jury's verdict.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree on a theory of felony-murder with arson as the predicate felony. Defendant later filed this rule 23(b)(2) motion. The judge granted the motion and reduced Defendant's conviction, concluding that the weight of the evidence showed that Defendant lacked the requisite intent and also taking into account mitigating circumstances constituted by Defendant's cognitive limitations and mental disorder. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the reduction in Defendant's verdict was not an abuse of discretion.

Michigan v. Guyton

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 163700

Opinion Date: July 18, 2023

Judge: Welch

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Candace Guyton pled guilty to one count of armed robbery. As part of the plea deal, the prosecution agreed not to pursue charges against defendant in an unrelated case and to recommend a sentence within the guidelines minimum range of 51 to 85 months in prison. The prosecutor also agreed to dismiss the supplemental information charging defendant as a third-offense habitual offender. However, the amended felony information wrongly classified defendant as a third-felony offender by counting a single prior conviction twice; in fact, defendant was eligible to be charged only as a second-offense habitual offender. The trial court sentenced defendant at the top of the agreed-upon guidelines range to 84 months to 60 years in prison. Defendant later moved to withdraw her plea, arguing that it was involuntary and unknowing given that defendant was told she was avoiding a third-offense habitual-offender enhancement. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the prosecution that defendant had received benefit from the plea despite the error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. After its review, the Michigan Supreme Court determined the misinformation regarding defendant’s habitual-offender enhancement rendered defendant’s guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Accordingly, the case had to be remanded to the trial court to give defendant the opportunity to elect to allow her plea to stand or withdraw her plea.

Michigan v. Yarbrough

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 161513

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Bernstein

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Robert Yarbrough, Jr., was convicted by jury of: kidnapping; assault with intent to do great bodily harm; felonious assault; and three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. During voir dire, the trial court informed counsel for both parties that neither party would be allowed to exercise peremptory challenges to excuse any prospective jurors other than newly seated prospective jurors who had replaced those prospective jurors who had been previously dismissed. Defense counsel objected to the court’s policy and requested a new venire, but the court overruled counsel’s objection and a jury was empaneled. Defendant appealed his convictions and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which initially held defendant’s application for leave to appeal in abeyance pending its decision in Michigan v. Kabongo, 507 Mich 78 (2021). Following its decision in Kabongo, the Court granted defendant’s application. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's policy was unconstitutional: "because the right to exercise peremptory challenges would be virtually eliminated by the application of that standard, automatic reversal is the appropriate remedy for the erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge when the error was preserved and no curative action was taken."

State v. Allen

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 663

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convincing Defendant of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence to sufficient to support the jury's verdicts; (2) there was no juror misconduct during deliberations when jurors allegedly discussed the reputation of the victim's family members and their potentially seeking revenge; (3) the trial court did not err by finding the averment of a juror about the disputed juror statements inadmissible under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-606(2) and finding that the exception for "extraneous prejudicial information" did not apply to the juror's testimony; and (4) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel.

In re D.J.

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-0560

Opinion Date: July 13, 2023

Judge: James P. Bassett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Juvenile D.J. appealed a circuit court's finding of delinquency based on a petition alleging that he committed harassment under RSA 644:4, I(b) (Supp. 2021). The victim told the juveniles that they were not supposed to be riding bicycles on the sidewalk. D.J. told the victim to go “f**k himself.” D.J. continued to yell at the victim, who testified that D.J. was “swearing, saying f**k this and f**k that and you’re nothing but an old man.” The victim yelled back at D.J. and asserted that he could do martial arts. D.J. got off his bicycle, provoked the victim to fight, and took off his shirt. The owner of a store across the street from this encounter observed the confrontation and, after it had gone on for approximately five minutes, she began to record it using her cellphone. The store owner also called the police. The incident lasted approximately eight minutes, until a patrol officer arrived at the scene. D.J. argued there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding, and that RSA 644:4, I(b) was unconstitutional as applied and on its face. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed.

Interest of G.R.D.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 135

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Juvenile Law

A.D. appealed on behalf of her son G.R.D., a court order placing him in the custody of the Division of Juvenile Services (DJS). In September 2022, G.R.D. was charged with committing simple assault on his mother. He was detained at the Grand Forks County Juvenile Detention Center and subsequently adjudicated as a delinquent child. He remained in his mother’s custody and was placed on supervised probation for 12 months and ordered to participate in drug court. In November 2022, G.R.D. was detained based on allegations he violated conditions of probation and committed new offenses. The juvenile court ordered that G.R.D. remain at the juvenile detention center and undergo diagnostic testing. On November 23, 2022, the juvenile court conducted an initial appearance on the probation revocation petition and ordered G.R.D to home detention in the custody of his mother. G.R.D. was alleged to have used methamphetamine within hours of being released into his mother’s custody. On November 28, 2022, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing and ordered that G.R.D. be detained for again violating his probation. After a detention review hearing on December 27, 2022, the juvenile court found G.R.D. remained a delinquent child and ordered him into the custody of DJS for up to 12 months. The court also ordered DJS to place G.R.D. in a treatment center as soon as possible. A.D. argued the juvenile court erred by granting the DJS custody of G.R.D. instead of her, and the court’s findings were based on stale evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order.

North Dakota v. Knight

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 130

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jeremy Knight appealed the denial of his motion to vacate the criminal judgment and for a new trial and a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. Jury deliberations began on the second day of trial around 11:30 a.m. Less than an hour into jury deliberations, the jury posed a number of questions to the district court. The court answered the questions without objection. A short time later, the jury had another question which the court answered without objection. At 1:34 p.m., the court received another note from the jury that made the court aware of a deadlocked jury on both counts. The handwritten note used the phrase “verdict form” and showed the numerical division of both counts being deadlocked at 8–4 and 9–3. The court then stated to the jury: "I’m going to indicate to the jury that I’m going to send you back into the jury room. You’ve got to continue to work to try and get to unanimous verdict. ... So I need you to go back, kind of review the evidence again and try and come to unanimous verdict and then we’ll move from there." On appeal, Knight argued the district court erred in instructing the jury to reach a verdict after learning of the numerical division of the deadlocked jury. He also argued the court erred in denying his motion to vacate judgment and for a new trial. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Redpaint v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 136

Opinion Date: July 19, 2023

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Darrell Redpaint appealed an order summarily denying his application for postconviction relief. In 1981, Redpaint was convicted of two counts of murder. The judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Redpaint applied for postconviction relief at least eight times prior to this application. In May 2022, he argued the court in his underlying criminal case lacked jurisdiction because he was a juvenile at the time of the crimes. The State answered, alleging his juvenile status did not preclude his convictions and the application was barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata. Redpaint opposed the motion, arguing an evidentiary hearing was necessary because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Redpaint received effective assistance of trial counsel and notice of the hearing transferring him from juvenile court in his underlying criminal case. The court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and summarily denied Redpaint’s application, concluding the application was untimely and barred by res judicata and misuse of process, and there were no genuine issues of material fact. Redpaint argues the district court erred in allowing the State to move for summary judgment “after the time for raising affirmative defenses had expired.” Finding no reversible error in the summary denial of the application, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Joseph

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 21-164

Opinion Date: July 20, 2023

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the superior court granting motions to suppress filed by Defendants Jerome Joseph and Voguel Figaro, holding that the hearing justice did not err in granting Defendants' suppression motions.

Figaro moved to suppress physical evidence seized as the result of a motor vehicle stop, arguing that the officer unconstitutionally prolonged the stop to perform a dog sniff. Joseph also filed a motion to suppress and joined the memorandum supporting Figaro's suppression motion. The hearing justice granted the motions to suppress, holding that reasonable suspicion did not support the prolonged traffic stop of Figaro's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly found that the state police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Defendants.

State v. Shackleford

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: E2020-01712-SC-R11-CD

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Page

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of criminal appeals reverting Defendant's aggravated robbery convictions to a classification lower due to the absence of a gang enhancement, holding that the court of criminal appeals erred in its decision.

Defendant was arrested for aggravated robbery as to four individuals. The indictment contained four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement and alleged that Defendant was a "Crips" gang member. A jury convicted Defendant as charged. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his gang enhancement conviction. The court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the gang enhancement statute does not require the State to specify in the indictment a criminal defendant's gang subset nor that the defendant is in the same gang subset as the individuals whose criminal activity establishes the gang's pattern of criminal gang activity; and (2) Defendant waived all other issues raised on appeal.

Vermont v. Colehamer

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 VT 39

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Carroll

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Theodore Colehamer appealed two convictions by jury: (1) felony driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense; and (2) misdemeanor eluding a police officer. He contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel the opportunity to ask a question of potential jurors at voir dire, that it made multiple errors on evidentiary rulings, and that it improperly selected a jury foreperson. He also argued the eluding conviction should have been vacated because he did not violate the statute’s plain terms. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion on any of the evidentiary or jury issues but agreed with defendant that he did not elude law enforcement as charged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the DUI conviction and vacated the eluding conviction.

Zapien-Galvan v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 70

Opinion Date: July 14, 2023

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' joint motion to suppress more than 300 pounds of marijuana law enforcement discovered during a traffic stop on Interstate 80 in Wyoming, holding that the district court did not err when it denied Appellants' motion to suppress evidence.

Appellants - Cristian Ramirez and Hector Zapien-Galvan - were pulled over by state troopers for an expired registration. Appellants refused to consent to a search of the car, after which a certified canine alerted to packages containing 320.6 pounds of marijuana. Appellants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's conduct in pursuing their vehicle without reasonable suspicion negated the subsequent probable cause for the search. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Appellants' motion to suppress because the underlying traffic stop was both objectively justified and reasonable at its inception and did not violate Wyo. Const. art. I, 4 or the Fourth Amendment.