Clemente v. Lee

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-279

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: SACK

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On April 10, 2008, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree by a New York state-court jury. The court sentenced him to concurrent indeterminate prison terms of twenty years to life for the murder count and five to fifteen years for the weapon possession count. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent, the Warden of the facility in which Petitioner is imprisoned, moved to dismiss a subset of the claims in the petition on the ground that they were time-barred under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1). The district court agreed and entered an order supported by a memorandum decision granting the motion. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and sought a certificate of appealability. The Second Circuit granted a certificate of appealability. Petitioner contends that under Section 2244(d)(1), all the claims raised in his petition were timely because at least one claim asserted therein was timely filed within the applicable one-year limitations period.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that Section 2244(d)(1)’s statute of limitations requires a claim-by-claim approach. The court explained that Petitioner’s sole argument in support of his entitlement to equitable tolling is that his lawyer told him the wrong deadline for filing a habeas petition that included the arguments that he advanced in his direct appeal. But this argument has been squarely foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling and properly dismissed his claims as time-barred.

Griffin v. Carnes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1134

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The district court dismissed his complaint, concluding that Plaintiff was barred from proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) because he had accumulated three “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). At issue on appeal is whether (1) a res judicata dismissal and (2) a dismissal of an entire complaint on several alternative grounds—one of which qualifies as a strike under existing precedent—can constitute strikes under Section 1915(g).
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Section 1915(g) bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP, absent a showing of imminent danger, if on three or more occasions while incarcerated, he has brought an action or an appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The court reasoned that Section 1915(g) does not provide Plaintiff an opportunity to relitigate his prior cases. The court considered Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and concluded they are meritless. The district court correctly concluded that Griffin was barred by the PLRA’s three strikes provision from proceeding IFP, and, therefore, properly dismissed his complaint.

U.S. v. Aybar-Peguero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-1711

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841 and 846 and concealment money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). During his plea colloquy, speaking through a Spanish-English interpreter, Defendant repeatedly failed to acknowledge that he had intended to conceal the proceeds of his drug trafficking, an element of concealment money laundering. On appeal, Defendant contends that his conviction for concealment money laundering should be reversed because an insufficient factual basis existed for his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 
The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) conviction and sentence and remanded. The court explained that the district court’s error is “plain.” In this case, Defendant did not admit to a concealment purpose—an offense element—and the other evidence did not establish that intent either. Thus, it is clear and obvious that Rule 11(b)(3) was not satisfied. Second, the district court’s error prejudicially affected Defendant’s substantial rights. The court reasoned that it appears likely that Defendant would not have pled guilty to violating Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) had he understood its mens rea requirement and been told that he needed to state a concealment purpose. Defendant was consistent and persistent in maintaining that his purpose was otherwise. Last, the plain and prejudicial error seriously harmed the legitimacy of the judicial proceeding. The district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea without Defendant’s acknowledgment that he intended to conceal the source of his funds casts serious doubt upon the “fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”

US v. Jacob Ross

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4054

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: GREGORY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A, respectively, and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by identifying him for a key government witness after the witness was initially unable to make the in-court identification herself. Defendant also contends that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offenses in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it cannot infer that Defendant’s fifty-five-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offenses. The court reasoned that even if it assumes that his sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole,his child pornography offenses “are at least as grave as the drug offense in Harmelin, which the Supreme Court deemed sufficiently egregious to justify a similar sentence.” On multiple occasions, Defendant paid a woman in the Philippines not only to pose very young children in a pornographic manner, but also to molest them for his own sexual gratification. Defendant’s offenses, which directly facilitated the exploitation and sexual abuse of particularly vulnerable victims, are far from “one of the most passive felonies a person could commit.”

Nelson v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 17-70012

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the robbery and murder of a pastor. After exhausting his state remedies, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 and sought investigative services under 18 U.S.C. Section 3599. The district court rejected his petition for relief, concluded that investigative services were not reasonably necessary, and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Petitioner then petitioned this court for a COA. We granted that petition on a single issue: Whether Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase of the trial, two alleged accomplices’ participation in the robbery and murder.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Petitioner’s attempt to reframe his Sixth Amendment counsel ineffectiveness claim in federal court does not save it from the strictures of AEDPA review. The court explained that Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have recommended a life sentence had his trial counsel investigated the co-conspirators’ involvement and presented evidence about the same at sentencing. He was not prejudiced, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim would fail even if it were not assessed under the rigorous standards of AEDPA Section 2254(d).

Price v. Montgomery County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-6076

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: Chad A. Readler

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Officers discovered Brewer’s naked body tied to his bed frame; he had been shot twice. The case went cold for several years before an inmate told officers that Miller and Hall and two women had set up a threesome with Brewer in order to rob him. DNA found at the scene did not implicate either woman. The women implicated Martin. Officers knew the story was false but nonetheless interviewed Martin; the interview was not recorded. Martin, who claimed to have been "very high" on the night of the murder, waffled between denying any involvement and other stories. Officers falsely told her that her DNA was found at the scene and implied her children could be taken away. Martin failed a polygraph examination. Martin was told that “she’[d] walk” if she revealed the killer but that if she did not implicate anybody else, she would “go down.” Eventually, with a plea agreement, she implicated Miller. Martin repeatedly attempted to recant. Kentucky indicted Miller but eventually dropped the charges.

Miller filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, destruction of exculpatory evidence, due process violations, and conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Because the conduct at issue was in furtherance of genuine prosecutorial interests, the prosecutor has absolute immunity for his actions, including ordering the destruction of evidence and purported thwarting of a court order. The other defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Reed v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 21-6161, 22-5030

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tennessee law enforcement was alerted to a drug distribution operation and executed a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of over 200 grams of pure meth. Agents executed additional warrants and intercepted phone calls. Twelve individuals, including Reed and Brown, were charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of meth. According to trial testimony by the law-enforcement agents, Brown and Reed both admitted to purchasing meth on numerous occasions and named several others. Four co-conspirators testified at trial. The parties agreed, and the judge confirmed, that Brown should not be mentioned during testimony to avoid the possibility of incriminating him. An officer read directly from his report, inadvertently mentioning Brown before stopping midsentence. Brown’s counsel made no objection. A joint stipulation was entered regarding the quantity and purity of the meth seized from various codefendants. No meth was seized from either Brown or Reed, who asked the district court to instruct the jury that “a conspiracy requires more than just a buyer-seller relationship.”

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Brown and Reed but vacated their 360-month sentences. The defendants’ request for a buyer-seller jury instruction was appropriately denied. The district court procedurally erred when calculating the defendants’ Guidelines ranges; it provided no basis to conclude that at least 4.5 kilograms of the meth distributed was actual meth.

United States v. Otradovec

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1473

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Otradovec pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251, an offense subject to section 3014, which directs certain “non-indigent” sex offenders to pay a $5,000 special assessment within 20 years from the entry of a criminal judgment or their release from imprisonment. He argued that his financial condition rendered him indigent under section 3014 because he had spent the last of his money paying for a private attorney, although he qualified for appointed counsel. The government focused on his future prospects and underscored that his college degree, military service, and consistent work history would probably allow him to secure a job after his release. Without explaining how it considered Otradovec’s present and future financial condition, the district court imposed the special assessment and order Otradovec to pay $100 a month starting after his release, while acknowledging that Otradovec could not afford to pay other criminal fines.

The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. It is uncertain how the district court understood the term “non-indigent” and whether it considered Otradovec’s future earnings capacity within the appropriate boundaries. Indigency covers two things: eligibility for appointed counsel and the financial capacity to provide for oneself.

United States v. States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1477

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

As a Chicago gang member, States participated in drug trafficking and kidnappings. Officers went to his apartment to arrest him. States fired five shots through the door and hit an officer in the finger. A jury convicted him on 12 counts. The court sentenced him to life in prison, plus 57 years in consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)—two for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and one for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. States subsequently moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the reimposition of his sentence.

The Supreme Court subsequently held (Johnson) that the ACCA residual clause, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), was unconstitutionally vague. Section 924(c) has an analogous residual clause (later struck down). States filed a successive 2255 motion to vacate his 924(c) convictions. His predicate crimes of violence were Hobbs Act extortion and attempted murder of a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 1113–1114. The court vacated the extortion-predicate conviction but denied the motion with respect to the conviction predicated on attempted murder; then-controlling circuit precedent established that an attempt to commit a crime of violence is a crime of violence under 924(c)'s elements clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence--concurrent 20-year terms plus two consecutive five-year sentences for the 924(c) convictions. The district court correctly held that attempted murder of a federal officer is a crime of violence and that drug trafficking and kidnapping offenses could not be grouped.

Tiffany Janis v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2471

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner shot and killed her husband when she found him cheating. She pled guilty to second-degree murder in Indian country. She also pled guilty to discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. A year later, Petitioner moved to vacate her Section 924(c) conviction, believing that intervening Supreme Court cases rendered it unlawful. Specifically, she argued that federal second-degree murder could not be considered a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The district court dismissed her motion. She appealed.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that federal l murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an “unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” The statute lists the killings that qualify as first-degree murder.3 “Any other murder is murder in the second degree.” Second-degree murder thus has two elements: (1) unlawful killing of a human being; with (2) malice aforethought. Petitioner argued that killing a person “with malice aforethought” can be done without “using force against the person or property of another.” The court reasoned that the history and definition of “malice aforethought” demonstrate that federal second-degree murder satisfies Section 924(c)’s force clause. The phrase “malice aforethought” necessarily denotes the oppositional conduct that the force clause requires. Second-degree murder is thus a crime of violence.

United States v. Mujera Lung'aho

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3168

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: STRAS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant faced 13 federal charges. Included among them are three counts of arson: “maliciously damaging or destroying]” by “fire or an explosive,” a “vehicle . . . owned or possessed by . . . an institution or organization receiving” federal funding. The arson charges are also the driving force behind three counts of possessing a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” Under the government’s theory, the Molotov cocktails were destructive devices, and the three counts of arson were crimes of violence.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing three destructive device counts against Defendant. The court held that arson is not a “crime of violence.” The court explained that the differences between recklessness, malice, and knowledge come down to a sliding scale of probabilities. From “substantial and unjustified” (recklessness), to a “likelihood” (malice), to “practical certainty” (knowledge), each requires more risk and culpability than the last. In many cases, there may be “little difference” between these mental states. But little does not mean none. The court explained that consciously creating a “likelihood” of harm to property does not satisfy the force clause, despite the high risk involved. In short, the arson counts cannot support the charges for using a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.”

USA V. ARMANDO OROZCO-BARRON

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-50298

Opinion Date: July 3, 2023

Judge: Ikuta

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.
 
The Ninth Circuit amended (1) a May 22, 2023, opinion affirming Defendant’s conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation and (2) Judge Christen’s dissent in a case in which the majority held that the district court, in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act, did not clearly err in excluding periods of delay resulting from ends of justice continuances granted due to events caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The focus of the parties’ dispute was on whether the period from August 14, 2020 (the day after the information was filed) until December 1, 2020 (a total of 110 days) was excluded from computing the time within which the trial had to commence under the Speedy Trial Act. The panel concluded that the district court complied with the applicable statutory requirements. Citing United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2023), the panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court erred by not dismissing his information on the ground that 8 U.S.C. Section 1326 violates the Equal Protection Clause.

USA V. JERRAMEY ROPER

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-30021

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Ezra

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The district court applied a “career-offender enhancement” to the sentence on the drug offense, which the Sentencing Guidelines recommend if, among other things, “the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Over the next decade, intervening case law disqualified three of Defendant’s prior convictions as predicates for the career-offender enhancement. Defendant moved for sentence reduction in 2021. Although the district court concluded that Defendant’s Guideline range would be reduced to 140 to 175 months if he were sentenced at the time of his motion, it denied relief.
 
The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial and remanded for the district court to consider the motion anew. The panel held that district courts may consider non-retroactive changes in post-sentencing decisional law affecting the applicable Sentencing Guidelines when assessing whether a defendant has established the requisite “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The panel wrote that the logic of United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022), which rested on Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022) applies with full force when the relevant change in sentencing law is decisional. The panel wrote that considering decisional law in the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons inquiry does not circumvent habeas, as Defendant does not claim that his original sentence violated the Constitution or federal law and does not seek to correct sentencing errors.

USA v. Deunate Tarez Jews

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10502

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: NEWSOM

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant who pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm in violation of federal law, was sentenced to 60 months in prison based on a Guidelines range of 70–87 months. In calculating Defendant’s range, though, the district court concluded that an earlier Alabama youthful-offender adjudication constituted an “adult” conviction within the meaning of the applicable Guidelines provisions. Defendant contends that the court erred in doing so.
 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s Alabama YO adjudication wasn’t “adult” under either U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1 or Section 4A1.2. His Guidelines range of 70–87 months was thus wrong in two respects. The court explained that the Pinion factors favor Defendant, indicating that his YO adjudication wasn’t “adult.” The sentence-length and time-served factors, the court held, yield to the stronger indications of the classification and nature factors: Because of the defendant’s age, Alabama law doesn’t even treat YO adjudications as convictions, let alone adult convictions. And the law further shields YOs “from the stigma and practical consequences of a conviction for a crime.” Alabama’s YO system differs from the adult system from stem to stern, in both substance and procedure.

California v. Fletcher

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E077553(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Raphael

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After a joint trial, defendants and appellants Larry Fletcher and Eric Taylor, Jr. were convicted of several crimes stemming from a shooting outside of a convenience store. At trial, an expert opined that both Fletcher and Taylor were members of the Four Corner Hustler Crips gang. The jury found appellants guilty on all charges and enhancements. The trial court then found the allegations on the prior convictions to be true. Given their strike priors, Fletcher was sentenced to 56 years and four months to life, and Taylor 100 years to life. One of the issues presented on appeal was one of first impression: whether, and to what extent, appellants were entitled to relief under California Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Session), which narrowed the applicability of certain punishments for offenses involving a criminal street gang. Although the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill 333 required the Court to reverse the conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang (count 2) and the gang enhancements (counts 1, 5, and 6), the Court held that the new law did not apply to the findings on serious felony and strike priors. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected several of appellants’ other challenges to their convictions and sentences, reversed on various counts and findings based on other new laws, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

California v. Hilburn

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080175(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: McConnell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Seth Hilburn was charged with first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, first degree robbery, and carjacking, with allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of all three offenses. Before trial, Hilburn entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the first degree robbery charge and the related firearm enhancement in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a maximum sentence of 13 years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the court considered aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed an eight year sentence, consisting of the middle term of four years for both the first degree robbery conviction and the admission of the firearm enhancement allegation. Hilburn appealed the sentence, asserting the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing the middle, and not low terms, on the charges. Hilburn argued recent changes to the sentencing laws required the court to impose the low terms for the crimes he pleaded guilty to because the aggravating factors relied on by the court were not stipulated or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Hilburn also argued the court abused its discretion by imposing the middle terms because the aggravating factors did not outweigh those in mitigation. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and sentence, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

In re D.L.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164432(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: Markman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The juvenile court found that at a 2020 neighborhood party, 17-year-old D.L. shot and killed a six-year-old boy and shot an adult twice. Video footage showed D.L. running down a hill seconds after the shooting, stumbling, and then running. Officers recovered a handgun in a dirt-filled hole where D.L. had stumbled. DNA swabbed from the handgun was a match with D.L.’s DNA. D.L. admitted to several felonies prior to the incident, including assault, robbery, and theft in 2018, and burglary in 2019. D.L. appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm in San Francisco. (Pen. Code 25850(a)), arguing that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” holding section 25850 must be facially unconstitutional based on its relationship to California’s laws for obtaining a concealed-carry license.

The court of appeal affirmed. Before Bruen, California required an applicant for a concealed carry license to show “good cause,” usually by establishing a specific need to carry a gun for self-defense. D.L. argued that the requirement was substantially similar to the “proper cause” requirement for a New York unrestricted firearm license, struck down in Bruen. California’s “good cause” requirement did not survive Bruen but is severable from the other requirements for obtaining a concealed carry license, saving California’s regulatory framework for gun possession and preserving D.L.’s conviction.

P. v. Gaines

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F083168(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: HILL

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendants B.G. and D.R. were making a purchase at a convenience store where they exchanged words with a man who was accompanied by his girlfriend and her two young children. A short time after leaving the store, B.G. stopped his vehicle in the street near where the man, girlfriend, and children were walking on the sidewalk while D.R. exited the vehicle and shot at the individuals multiple times. Defendants were convicted of premeditated attempted murder and related charges and were sentenced to terms of seven years to life plus 10 years (as to B.G) and seven years to life plus 49 years and eight months (as to D.R). Defendants challenged their convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle and permitting someone to discharge a firearm from a vehicle because Ross was not in the vehicle when the shooting occurred. Defendants argued that recent amendments to the sentencing law require we remand their cases for resentencing.
 
The Fifth Appellate District vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing in accordance with section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill 567. The judgments are otherwise affirmed. The court explained that when a court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, “the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record 'clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion. After reviewing the trial court’s comments and sentence in this case, the court was unable to conclude that the trial court would not exercise its discretion to impose different sentences.

P. v. Hernandez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B315243(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 3, 2023

Judge: STRATTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant.

P. v. Newell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B320195(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: GILBERT

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant attempted to appeal the denial of his petition for resentencing based on Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 483). In 2012, Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 49 years to life. He claims his current sentence is invalid due to recent legislative changes involving sentencing enhancements.
 
The Second Appellate District dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides: “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in the law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” The court must appoint counsel for the defendant and hold a resentencing hearing unless a hearing is waived. Section 1172.75 contains no provision for an individual defendant to file the type of petition Defendant has filed. The court wrote that Section 1172.75 simply does not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or motion.” Defendant has not shown that the DCR did not comply with its statutory duty.

People v. Campbell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A162472(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anthony drove the car in which four defendants fled after they shot and killed the brother of a rival gang member. Two bystanders were hit and killed during the ensuing vehicle chase, resulting in two second-degree murder convictions for each defendant. The trial court granted three defendants (not Anthony) relief from the second-degree murder convictions under Penal Code section 1172.6, which provides persons convicted of murder before the 2019 amendments to the murder statutes to seek relief from such convictions if they could not be convicted of murder under the current murder statutes. The defendants argued the court should also have granted them relief from their Vehicle Code section 2800.3 conviction arising out of the bystander killings and erred by failing to explicitly strike the multiple-murder special circumstance found true by the jury as to each of them. They also sought resentencing on the Vehicle Code convictions based on recent legislation constraining sentencing decisions about whether and when to impose upper, middle, and lower terms of imprisonment.

The court of appeal remanded for the trial court to strike the multiple murder special circumstance as to the three defendants; affirmed the denial of relief for the Vehicle Code convictions; remanded for resentencing based on an amendment to section 1170(b); reversed the gang-murder special circumstance and the 25-years-to-life sentences resulting from the gang enhancement and the life without parole sentences resulting from the gang-murder special circumstance.

People v. Jackson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164649(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Fineman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2017, Jackson was convicted through a no-contest plea of felony second-degree burglary and was sentenced to five years of probation, including less than a year in jail. In July 2020, he was charged with having committed probation violations in July and October 2019. In August 2020, the court summarily revoked probation pending a formal hearing. In January 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 took effect, amending Penal Code sections 1203a and 1203.1 and decreasing the maximum period of felony probation (with certain exceptions) to no more than two years. Sections 1203.2 and 1203.3, relating to probation violations, were not amended. In August 2021, Jackson unsuccessfully moved to terminate probation. In February 2022, the trial court sustained two probation violations, one involving a robbery for which Jackson had been charged and convicted in Alameda County. While declining to impose additional jail time, the court revoked and terminated Jackson’s probation as unsuccessful.

The court of appeal reversed. AB 1950 applies retroactively, in cases not yet final when the bill took effect, to prevent a court from finding a violation of probation based on misconduct that occurred more than two years after a defendant’s probationary term began, but before the bill’s effective date. The court noted that the California Supreme Court has accepted the issue for review.

People v. Madrigal

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H046577(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Greenwood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Madrigal was among several men who got out of a van and beat a man, robbing him of $25-30. One attacker stabbed the victim with a knife. The victim died soon thereafter. A jury found Madrigal guilty of first-degree murder and second-degree robbery but acquitted him of participation in a criminal street gang. The court imposed an aggregate term of 100 years to life consecutive to 12 years in prison. Madrigal argued that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 1437, which added elements to the definition of felony murder, required the reversal of the first-degree murder conviction and that after defense counsel subpoenaed audio recordings of the van driver’s jailhouse phone calls, the court erred by refusing to review the calls or release them to the defense.

The court of appeal vacated the first-degree murder conviction, conditionally reversed the robbery conviction, and remanded. A rational juror could have a reasonable doubt whether Madrigal was subjectively aware of a grave risk of death when he participated in the attack; it was not impossible for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdicts without also making the 39 findings that would support a valid theory of liability. The error was not harmless. Once Madrigal showed good cause to release the documents, the court erred by refusing to release them on the ground it could not review them quickly and easily; it is impossible to assess prejudice from the error.

Price v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E078954(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 3, 2023

Judge: Fields

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Ahmad Raheem Price petitioned for a writ of prohibition, directing the superior court to grant his motion to set aside the information charging him with the 2019 first degree, premeditated murder of Jovany R., and unlawfully possessing a firearm on the same day. The information further alleged Price personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the death in count 1, and that Price had two prior serious felony convictions and two prior strikes. At the preliminary hearing and as part of his section 995 motion to set aside the information, Price moved to quash, traverse, and suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to 11 search warrants for electronic information, including a geofence warrant to Google, LLC (Google). In the suppression motion, Price claimed that the geofence warrant and several of the other 10 warrants for electronic information: (1) failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements; (2) had to be traversed based on material factual omissions in their affidavits; and (3) violated the particularity and notice requirements of the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA). Price also moved to suppress evidence that the gun used in the shooting was found in Price’s vehicle during a January 2020 parole search. Price claimed that the gun evidence was fruit of Price’s unlawful detention for being lawfully parked on a private driveway. The suppression motion was denied in its entirety. In the writ petition to the Court of Appeal, Price renewed his arguments made to the magistrate court. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the geofence warrant satisfied the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and was not overbroad; the good faith exception to the warrant requirement precludes the suppression of the geofence warrant evidence and its fruits, even if the geofence warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment; and CalECPA did not require the suppression of the geofence warrant evidence despite the government’s violation of CalECPA’s notice provisions. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected Price’s claims concerning the other 10 warrants and the gun evidence.

Arbelaez v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Dockets: SC2015-1628, SC2018-0392

Opinion Date: May 25, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to the writ.

Appellant was convicted in 1991, following a jury trial, of first-degree murder and kidnapping. Decades later, Appellant filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Appellant claimed that Chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, created a substantive right that must be retroactively applied under the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that this Court had consistently rejected as without merit the claim that chapter 2017-1 created a substantive right that must be retroactively applied, and Appellant's arguments did not compel departing from precedent.

Calhoun v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2022-1286

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the circuit court denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and Appellant's request for additional public records filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(i), holding that there was no error.

In 2012, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The circuit court later vacated Appellant's death sentence based on Hurst v. Stat, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2020), and ordered a new penalty phase. While Appellant's appeal in Calhoun II was pending, Appellant filed the successive postconviction motion at issue, raising a newly discovered evidence claim based on a purported jailhouse confession. On remand from Calhoun II, the circuit court denied Appellant's successive postconviction motion and his motion seeking additional public records. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denials of Appellant's successive postconviction motion and of his request for additional public errors, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.

Cruz v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2021-1767

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of death imposed by the trial court following the Supreme Court's reversal of his original death sentence and remand for resentencing, holding that relative culpability review could not provide a basis for vacating Defendant's death sentence.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court overturned the death sentence on the ground that the trial court improperly relied on extrarecord facts and remanded for the limited purposes of resentencing and a new sentencing order. On remand, the trial court again sentenced Defendant to death. On appeal, Defendant argued that relative culpability review required that his sentence be reduced to life imprisonment because his equally culpable codefendant was sentenced to life imprisonment by the same judge. At issue was whether relative culpability review survived Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court's relative culpability review was a corollary of its comparative proportionality review, which Lawrence held to be violative of the Florida Constitution; and (2) therefore, relative culpability review was rendered obsolete by the Lawrence decision and could not provide a basis for vacating Defendant's death sentence.

Owen v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0732

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's motions in this criminal case in which Appellant was under a death warrant, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.

Defendant was convicted of the murders of two women and sentenced to death. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review in 1992. After the governor signed a death warrant for one murder and scheduled the execution for June 15, 2023 Appellant sought relief in the circuit court, without success. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) summarily denying Defendant's fourth postconviction motion under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851; (2) denying Defendant's motion for competency determination; and (3) denying Defendant's motion for MRI and PET scan. The Court also denied Defendant's motion for stay of execution.

Allen v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0436

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Sean Allen appealed his conviction for felony murder for the 2021 shooting death of Daquan Gillett. Allen argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to grant him immunity from prosecution based on self-defense; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by limiting his ability to argue the law of self-defense in closing argument; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Middleton v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22G1050

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Patrick Middleton moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search by Officer Amanda Graw of the Kingsland Police Department (“KPD”), arguing that she did not have authority to stop or search him because she was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the KPD. Officer Graw claimed that she did have authority to perform the stop and search because she had been deputized by the Camden County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) seven years earlier. After the trial court granted the motion to suppress, the State appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Officer Graw had presented sufficient evidence of her deputization. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion with direction that it vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court with direction to clarify its basis for ruling that the search and seizure of Middleton was unlawful.

Wood v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0637

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Bobby Wood, Jr. was convicted of felony murder in connection with the 2020 shooting death of Aaron Skinner. On appeal, Appellant contended: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying him the opportunity to cross-examine the State’s expert witness about Skinner’s alleged arrest for criminal trespass on the day before the shooting; (2) the trial court violated his right to due process by denying him access to certain physical evidence post-trial; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s redirect examination of the State’s expert witness as outside the scope of redirect examination; and (4) the cumulative effect of the alleged errors committed by the trial court and trial counsel deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Members of the Medical Licensing Bd. v. Planned Parenthood Great Northwest, Hawai'i, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 22S-PL-00338

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Molter

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law

The Supreme Court vacated a preliminary injunction granted by the trial court preliminarily enjoining the State from enforcing Senate Bill 1, which broadly prohibits abortion but makes exceptions in three circumstances, holding that Plaintiffs could not show a reasonable likelihood of success on their facial challenge.

Plaintiffs, several abortion providers, brought this lawsuit seeking to invalidate Senate Bill 1 on the grounds that the law materially burdened a woman's exercise of her right to "liberty" under Ind. Const. Art. I, 1. The trial court agreed and granted the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to contest the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1; (2) Senate Bill 1 was judicially enforceable; (3) Article 1, Section 1 protects a woman's right to an abortion that the extent that it is necessary to protect her life or to protect her from a serious health risk, but, otherwise, the General Assembly retains legislative discretion in determining the extent to which prohibit abortions; and (4) the record in this case did not support a preliminary injunction.

State v. Bailey

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124636

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Eric S. Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment the district court ruling against Defendant on his "Motion to Void Restitution, Reimbursements for Indigent Defense Services and Court Cost and Fees and Witness Fees" based on the law-of-the-case doctrine, holding that there was no error.

Defendant, who was serving a life sentence for felony murder, challenged the district court's order of restitution in the amount of $37,521. The court concluded that the State had wrongly been collecting restitution from Defendant's prison account based on a clerical error and ordered it corrected. Defendant further requested that he be refunded $3,347 already improperly collected from his account. The court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. While his appeal was pending, Defendant filed the motion at issue, repeating an earlier argument that the restitution order was dormant and therefore void. The district court denied the motion, citing the law-of-the-case doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in ruling against Defendant based on the law-of-the-case doctrine.

State v. Buchanan

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123100

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Marla J. Luckert

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for several crimes after he intentionally set a fire that damaged several apartments, holding, among other things, that the Kansas Legislature has defined the unit of prosecution for aggravated arson as each damaged building or property in which there is a person.

Defendant intentionally set fire in the stairwell in front of his daughter's apartment, leading to his conviction, following a jury trial, of six counts of aggravated arson, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of animal cruelty. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court judge violated his right to be free from double jeopardy by sentencing him on six counts of aggravated arson when the arsonist started only one fire. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy was not violated; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions for attempted first-degree murder; and (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's untimely motion for a new trial.

State v. Johnson

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124064

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of a panel of the court of appeals reaching the merits of Defendant's appeal of his conviction and sentence, holding that this Court expressly overrules its prior opinion in State v. Duncan, 243 P.3d 338 (Kan. 2010), and to the extent that the panel relied on Duncan to reach the merits of the appeal the court of appeals erred.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a child. The court of appeals affirmed, thus rejecting Defendant's argument that his sentence was illegal because he was not advised of and did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial on the upward departure aggravating factors. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the appeal, holding (1) a claim challenging the constitutional validity of a waiver relinquishing the statutory right under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6817(b) to have a jury determine the existence of upward departure aggravating factors falls outside the definition of an illegal sentence; and (2) absent a valid illegal sentence claim under section 22-3504, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a sentence resulting from an agreement between the State and the defendant that the court approves on the record.

Commonwealth v. Armstrong

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13134

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Wendlandt

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and sentence of life without parole, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error and that there was no reason to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence from the police officers who arrested him; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's request for a mental impairment jury instruction; (3) testimony by the Commonwealth's fingerprint analysis expert was not improper; and (4) this Court discerns no reason to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.

Franklin v. Evans

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-1378

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that Minnesota's continuing predatory-offender registration requirements violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions, holding that there was no error.

More than a decade after he pleaded guilty to second-degree assault and was required to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. 243.166, subd. 1b Plaintiff brought this action. The district court concluded that the statutory limitations period of six years under Minn. Stat. 541.05, subd. 1(5) barred Plaintiff's section 1983 claims and that the continuing-violation doctrine does not apply to predatory-offender registration requirements. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the continuing-violation doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims.

Johnson v. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1609

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Thissen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, holding that Appellant's sentence of life imprisonment was mandated by Minn. Stat. 609.185(1).

Appellant pleaded guilty to an amended count for first-degree intentional murder while committing a kidnapping and second-degree intentional murder. The district court ultimately convicted Appellant of first-degree premeditated murder and dismissed the second-degree murder count. In this action arising from Defendant's third motion to correct his sentence Defendant argued that the district court violated his due process right by sentencing him to a longer sentence than that recommended in the sentencing worksheet completed for the charge of second-degree murder. The district court concluded that the failure to file a sentencing worksheet for the charge of first-degree murder does not cause a defendant's sentence to be unauthorized or a defendant's due process rights to be violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error.

State v. Craft

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 129

Opinion Date: July 5, 2023

Judge: Shea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's request to provide a jury instruction on th lesser-included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide and the ensuing sentencing order and judgment for felony deceptive practices, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction of deceptive practices.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erroneously refused his request to provide a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide and that insufficient evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict as to his felony deceptive practices conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's first claim of error was unavailing; and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to convict Defendant of felony deceptive practices, and therefore, acquittal on this count was proper.

State v. Boone

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 622

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to criminal charges against him after he was sentenced but before the time to file a direct appeal had expired, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Defendant's motion.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to manslaughter and use of a weapon to commit a felony. After sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his pleas on, among others, the grounds that his prior counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to enter into the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant did not show that withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not have the authority to allow Defendant to withdraw his pleas.

New Hampshire v. Jordan

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-0605

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Michael Jordan appealed a superior court order denying his motion for earned time credits. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred when it declined to approve the recommendations made by the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections that the defendant receive several 60-day reductions of his minimum and maximum sentences. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that courts have broad discretion to consider all relevant factors in their decision to grant, or decline to grant, approval for earned time credit, and that the court was free to consider either the crime for which the defendant was convicted or the degree of harm suffered by the victims when it exercises this discretion. Finding no abuse of such discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's order.

S.D. v. N.B.

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0114

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant N.B. appealed a final civil stalking protective order entered for the protection of plaintiff S.D. Plaintiff and Defendant knew each other since high school, but never had a personal relationship. Sometime after high school, Defendant developed a fixation with Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that Defendant began to contact her via the internet sometime in 2017. Defendant agreed that he had made postings regarding Plaintiff, but testified that they began in 2019. The postings about Plaintiff included sexual suggestions and threats. The trial court held a final hearing on the stalking petition on February 8, 2022, and found that Defendant had stalked Plaintiff. Defendant argued that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he stalked Plaintiff; and (2) the court’s protective order violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.

New Jersey v. Amer

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-9-22

Opinion Date: July 3, 2023

Judge: Anne M. Patterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Rami Amer moved to dismiss his New Jersey indictment for offenses related to a series of burglaries, alleging a violation of his speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Defendant was arrested in New Jersey in November 2016 in connection with seventeen burglaries. He was arrested the next month in Pennsylvania in connection with a series of burglaries committed in that state. In October 2017, defendant pled guilty to the charges pending against him in Pennsylvania and was incarcerated there. On February 23, 2018, the State received defendant’s notice under the IAD, in which he requested the prompt disposition of his New Jersey charges. Defendant was transported from Pennsylvania to New Jersey the same day. On May 21, defendant filed two motions to suppress, which were denied on July 13. During jury selection on July 24, the trial judge informed counsel that after July 31, the trial would resume on September 13. Neither party objected to that proposed schedule, but when jury selection resumed the next day, defense counsel stated that the IAD required the trial to begin on August 22, 2018, and argued that defendant’s rights under the IAD would be violated if, for example, the court began a trial but “put it off [for] six months.” The trial court ultimately entered an order stating that trial had commenced for IAD purposes on July 24, 2018, when jury selection began, and that the IAD’s 180-day time period had been tolled between the filing and the denial of defendant’s motions. In an August 28, 2018 letter, defendant contended that the trial court had violated his rights under the IAD. Treating defendant’s letter as a motion to dismiss his indictment, the trial court denied the motion. In October 2018, the jury convicted defendant on four counts. The Appellate Division affirmed on that issue. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights under the IAD, and it properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The Court did not agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights under the IAD. But the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s other determinations: that the IAD’s 180-day time period was tolled during the pendency of defendant’s pretrial motions, and that defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began prior to the deadline.

State ex rel. Atakpu v. Shuler

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2266

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus but denying his requests for statutory damages and court costs, holding that there was no error.

Appellant, an inmate, sent a public-records request to Appellee, an employee of a private company that contracts with the state of Ohio to house state prisoners. Dissatisfied with the ultimate response, Appellant filed the current action asking for a writ of mandamus ordering Appellee to produce the records requested. The court of appeals granted the writ to a limited extent and denied Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs.

State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2263

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Ohio Parole Board and the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (collectively, the State) and denied Appellant's motions to strike the State's merit brief in whole or in part, holding that there was no error.

Appellant was found guilty, after a jury trial, of the rape of two women, one of whom he impregnanted, kidnapping, and attempted rape. Appellant subsequently appeared before the parole board eight times and was denied parole each time. Appellant later filed an original action of writs of prohibition and mandamus arguing that the parole board improperly denied parole. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motions to strike, holding that Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to relief.

Houllahan v. Gelineau

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Dockets: 21-32, 21-33, 21-41

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims in favor of Defendants in accordance with Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-51 (the act), as amended, created a class of criminal actors beyond the scope of actual perpetrators as set forth in the act.

Plaintiffs filed separate actions alleging that they were sexually molested as minors by priests at the Roman Catholic Diocese of Providence. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants' actions rose to the level of criminal aiding and abetting, thus constituting improper conduct. The trial justice granted Defendants' motions to dismiss all claims in all cases, holding that because Defendants were non-perpetrators, the actions were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants could not be found culpable as aiders or abettors; (2) even if Defendants' actions constituted a violation of a criminal statute, they were non-penetrators and the claims were time-barred; and (3) there was no other error.

State v. White

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 21-216

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting and committing Defendant on one count of first-degree sexual assault after a jury trial, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to thirty-eight years at the Adult Correctional Institutions. On appeal, Defendant challenged the ruling of the trial justice permitting the State to introduce into evidence testimony given by a nurse concerning what the complaining witness told her about the alleged sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's arguments on appeal were properly before the Court; (2) the was no error in the discretionary decision of the trial justice to admit the nurse's testimony; and (3) certain portions of admitted statements were erroneously admitted, but the evidence was clearly harmless cumulative evidence.

Prease v. Clarke

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 220665

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Cleo E. Powell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ directed to the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections ordering that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner was entitled to relief on his claim that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted murder that, if awarded, would result in his immediate release from incarceration.

In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner argued that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Virginia Department of Corrections misinterpreted Va. Code 53.1-202.3(A) and, as a result, miscalculated his release date. The Supreme Court agreed, granted Petitioner's petition, and ordered that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner established that he was entitled to relief.

Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd.

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2021AP000373

Opinion Date: June 30, 2023

Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the State Claims Board awarding Appellant $25,000 in compensation after finding Appellant was innocent of a crime for which he was imprisoned, holding that Wis. Stat. 775.05(4) does not compel the Board to make a finding regarding adequacy.

Appellant pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide and spent approximately twenty-six years in prison. After his second guilty plea was vacated Appellant petitioned the State Claims Board for compensation, seeking more than $5.7 million. The Board awarded the maximum under Wis. Stat. 775.05(4). Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that the Board should have made a finding regarding the adequacy of the amount awarded. The circuit court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals grafted onto the statute a process the legislature did not sanction.

McHenry v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 68

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Kautz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas of no contest to voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated robbery, and four counts of interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest pleas.

Defendant pleaded no contest to the charges against him pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. Before he was sentenced, Defendant moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that defense counsel did not provide effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant according to the plea agreement. That Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas.