Counterman v. Colorado

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-138

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Elena Kagan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

From 2014-2016, Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W., a local musician. Each time C.W. tried to block him, Counterman created a new Facebook account and resumed contacting C.W. Several of his messages envisaged violent harm. C.W. stopped walking alone, declined social engagements, canceled performances, and eventually contacted the authorities. Counterman was charged under a Colorado statute making it unlawful to repeatedly make any form of communication with another person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress, that does cause that person to suffer serious emotional distress. Colorado courts rejected Counterman’s First Amendment argument.

The Supreme Court vacated. In true-threat cases, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature.

The First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few areas, including true threats--serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence. The existence of a threat depends on what the statement conveys to the person receiving it but the First Amendment may demand a subjective mental-state requirement shielding some true threats because bans on speech have the potential to deter speech outside their boundaries. In this context, a recklessness standard, a showing that a person consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause harm to another, is the appropriate mental state. Requiring purpose or knowledge would make it harder for states to counter true threats, with diminished returns for protected expression.

Samia v. United States

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-196

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Clarence Thomas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Samia, Hunter, and Stillwell were tried jointly for the murder-for-hire of Lee, a real estate broker. The prosecution argued that Hunter had hired Samia and Stillwell to pose as buyers and visit properties with Lee. The court admitted Stillwell’s confession that he was in the van in which Lee was killed, but he claimed that Samia had shot Lee. Since Stillwell would not be testifying and the full confession implicated Samia, the prosecution introduced the testimony of a DEA agent, who described Stillwell’s confession in a way that eliminated Samia’s name while avoiding obvious indications of redaction. Before that testimony and again before deliberations, the court instructed the jury that the testimony about Stillwell’s confession was admissible only as to Stillwell and should not be considered as to Samia or Hunter. All three were convicted. The Second Circuit held that the admission of Stillwell’s confession did not violate Samia’s Confrontation Clause rights.

The Supreme Court affirmed. The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause forbids the introduction of out-of-court “testimonial” statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had the chance to cross-examine the witness previously but applies only to witnesses “against the accused.” Ordinarily, a witness at a joint trial is not considered a witness 'against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant. This rule is consistent with the Clause’s text, historical practice, and the law’s reliance on limiting instructions in other contexts. To mandate severance whenever the prosecution wishes to introduce the confession of a non-testifying codefendant in a joint trial would be “too high” a price to pay.

United States v. Hansen

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-179

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Amy Coney Barrett

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, White Collar Crime

Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U.S. citizenship through “adult adoption,” earning nearly $2 million from his fraudulent scheme. The government charged Hansen under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” The Ninth Circuit found Clause (iv) unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court reversed. Because 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Here, Congress used “encourage” and “induce” as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (capturing only a narrow band of speech) not as those terms are used in ordinary conversation. Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The context of these words and statutory history indicate that Congress intended to refer to their well-established legal meanings. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.”

United States v. Monson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1612

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of fifteen counts of an indictment charging sexual exploitation of children and distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography and his sentence of 480 months' incarceration, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions on each of the child exploitation counts; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement on the grounds that Defendant was not in custody at the time of his interrogation; and (3) Defendant's challenges to the district court's calculation of his Guidelines sentencing range were without merit.

US v. Alexander Treisman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4687

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: QUATTLEBAUM

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Before his trial on child-pornography charges, Defendant moved to suppress evidence related to the search of his van. Defendant argued that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required them to immediately enter the van without a warrant to see if anyone was in medical distress inside. He also argued that the officers did not have legal authority to tow the van. Last, he argued that the inventory search was a pretext for a warrantless criminal investigation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police discovered while searching his van without a warrant.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that warrantless searches of vehicles carried out as part of law enforcement’s community caretaking functions do not violate the Fourth Amendment if reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the court found no error in the district court’s determination that the officers searched Defendant’s van in exercising those community caretaking functions and not as a pretext for a criminal investigatory search. The court likewise concluded that the district court did not err in holding the search was reasonable.

USA v. Crandell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-60350

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Tax Law

Defendant is a medical doctor. He contracted with two hospitals, one in Mississippi and one in Alabama. He usually made $30,000 to $40,000 per month. Because he was a contractor, the hospitals did not withhold any wages for tax purposes— Defendant was solely responsible for satisfying his federal tax obligations. From 2006 through 2012, Defendant did not pay any income taxes or file any timely tax returns. A jury found him guilty of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7201. Defendant raised two claims on appeal: first, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for tax evasion under Section 7201; and second, that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if it was legitimate for Defendant to deduct IRS garnishments from his income, that does not explain why Defendant neglected to mention key assets on the form—such as the $50,000 gun collection and the corporate bank accounts that he used to pay personal expenses. Moreover, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting that he manipulated his wages to artificially depress his income at the time he submitted Form 433-A.
 
Further, even assuming that the district court was right to sustain the defense’s objection, Defendant offered no reason to believe that the questions incurably prejudiced the jury. Given the weight of evidence presented to the jury in this case, there is no “significant possibility” that these two questions had a substantial impact on the verdict.

USA v. Fults

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50808

Opinion Date: June 22, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant did not file a response.

The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court wrote that consistent with Crawley, it holds that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients.

USA v. Moore

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10412

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant has two state convictions for indecent exposure to children. The government contends that those convictions “clearly” relate United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit “to the sexual exploitation of children,” so Defendant should be subject to the enhancement. Defendant countered that “sexual exploitation of children,” in this context, applies only to offenses relating to child pornography, so his sentence is not subject to the enhancement.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e)’s use of the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” refers to any criminal sexual conduct involving children. Defendant’s convictions for indecent exposure to a child neatly fall within that broad category.

USA v. Urquidi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50164

Opinion Date: June 22, 2023

Judge: King

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendants were among 24 individuals indicted on various charges in connection with their involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel. Defendants were jointly tried during a 10-day jury trial. One defendant was convicted on five counts, while another was convicted on 12 counts. Each received concurrent life sentences for all counts on which they were convicted. Defendants raised various challenges to their respective convictions and sentences on appeal.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentences that exceed their respective statutory maxima and remanded the case for resentencing on those counts only. The court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for either Count IV—Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments or Count V— Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of any Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. Sections1956(a)(2), 924o. The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for Counts VI, VIII, or X—all VICAR convictions—is 10 years. Nevertheless, both Defendants were sentenced to concurrent life terms of imprisonment on Counts IV and V, and one defendant also received concurrent life sentences for Counts VI, VIII, and X. These sentences all exceed their respective statutory maxima. Therefore, the life sentences imposed for Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing on those counts only.

Amaya v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-1781

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Larsen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. 1958; using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, sections 924(c), (j); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Amaya to pay a statutorily required “special assessment” of $100 per count of conviction, section 3013(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Years later, Amaya filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on count two, arguing that after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding, his murder conspiracy charge was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for his 924(c) conviction. The district court invoked the “concurrent sentence doctrine” and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 2255 limits its reach to “prisoner[s] in custody ... claiming the right to be released.” Only prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody may challenge their sentences. Even if his motion were successful, Amaya would still be in custody on the two unchallenged life sentences and the $100 special assessment attached to Amaya’s challenged conviction did not warrant section 2255 review.

Corridore v. Washington

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1301

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Nalbandian

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, Corridore was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. He was sentenced to 19 months to 15 years in prison and became subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) via a permanent ankle bracelet and sex offender registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). By the time he filed a habeas petition in federal district court, he had been released from prison and discharged from parole. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that Corridore was no longer in custody and therefore could not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Corridore’s arguments that he is subject to lifetime sex-offender registration and electronic monitoring—requirements that he says satisfy the custody requirement. The collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack. The issue is whether a petitioner’s movement is limited because of direct government control and therefore amounts to a severe restraint on liberty. The LEM and SORA requirements, even combined, do not qualify.

McCormick v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5587

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

McCormick pled guilty without a plea agreement to offenses involving drugs or guns. He received a below-Guidelines sentence and did not appeal. Ten months later, he moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his attorney performed ineffectively by failing to file a notice of appeal.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Review of an attorney's conduct is “highly deferential.” The district court’s finding that McCormick did not instruct counsel to file an appeal is “plausible on the record as a whole.” McCormick acknowledged telling his counsel that he wanted to appeal only if he lost at trial, or if he “didn’t feel like [he] was treated fairly” at sentencing. Neither condition was met. Counsel testified that McCormick expressed frustration with his sentence but never told him to file an appeal. The district court had to decide between two plausible stories, so its choice could not have been clearly erroneous. The court rejected McCormick’s claim that counsel was ineffective for consulting him before sentencing rather than after and was required to repeat his advice after sentencing. The Constitution does not impose any such obligation. The court’s colloquy ensured that the defendant understood his rights. McCormick may have expected an appeal, but the government did not promise that and did not breach its agreement.

Mercer v. Athens County, Ohio

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3904

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Mathis

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Ohlinger, booked into the jail (SEORJ) as a pretrial detainee for burglary, reported a history of bipolar disorder and depression and that she used intravenous heroin daily. She indicated no history of seizures and reported no signs of physical trauma or illness. In the following days, Ohlinger did not report any medical problems. On June 25, at 6:57 a.m., Ohlinger, walking in the common area, appeared to become disoriented and fell off a bench. Officers Lowery and Jarvis responded. Nurse Gray found no evidence to support inmates’ statements that Ohlinger had a seizure and hit her head. She was returned to her cell. At 7:07 a.m., Lowery and Jarvis responded to a call and, seeing Ohlinger had urinated on herself, escorted Ohlinger to the medical unit. Gray again examined Ohlinger. Lowery and Jarvis returned Ohlinger to her cell to await a blood test. At 9:12 a.m., an inmate discovered Ohlinger, unresponsive. Gray used a portable defibrillator and began CPR. At 9:28 a.m., paramedics transported Ohlinger to the hospital, where she died. An autopsy identified the cause of death as seizure activity due to a subarachnoid hemorrhage and subdural hematoma of undetermined etiology. There was no evidence of skull fracture or contusions.

In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Gray, Lowery, and Jarvis. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to Gray and otherwise affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that Gray acted recklessly, not negligently, in the face of unjustifiably high risk to Ohlinger’s health. Gray’s observations of Ohlinger, information provided by other jail officials and inmates, and SEORJ’s policies should have led Gray to seek care from a doctor or hospital.

Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1487

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: John K. Bush

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Spectrum contracts with Michigan to house children who are ordered to be detained in facilities “similar to a prison setting.” The children are completely restricted in their movements. The state requires Spectrum to monitor them on a 24/7 basis. A court ordered the detention of 15-year-old Quintana at Spectrum’s facility on August 24, 2018. Quintana struggled with depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, among other things. On September 11, 2018, Quintana took his life while alone in his bedroom. No one checked his room in the 45 minutes between the last time he was seen alive and when his body was found, violating a contractual requirement that Spectrum conduct “eye-on checks” every 15 minutes when the children are “outside of the direct supervision of staff.” Spectrum had a policy or custom of skipping many eye-on checks and falsifying supervision logs to reflect that the checks had been performed.

Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissed the dismissal of the suit. The complaint contains adequate facts to establish that Spectrum is a state actor. Spectrum was allegedly engaged in a public function similar to a correctional institution, a traditionally exclusive state function.

United States v. Morgan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1445

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Officer Zolnai, responding to a call, passed a parked, running Chevy Malibu. The driver, Morgan, “appeared to be passed out.” After assisting the caller, Zolnai drove back and again noticed the seemingly passed-out occupant in the Malibu. Suspecting an overdose or intoxication, Zolnai parked and turned on his body camera. He did not turn on the squad’s flashing lights. Zolnai noticed a civilian, potentially in the path of the vehicle. In his experience, intoxicated individuals might “hit the gas” if startled. Without first trying to arouse Morgan, Zolnai opened the car door and asked if Morgan was okay. Morgan's response was “groggy.” Zolnai asked Morgan for “ID.” Morgan moved his hand between the seat and the console. Worried that Morgan might be reaching for a firearm, Zolnai asked him to step out. Morgan refused. A struggle followed. Morgan reached for a cardboard box in the passenger seat. Other officers arrived. They eventually handcuffed Morgan. In searching Morgan, they found plastic bags containing fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine, and a semi-automatic pistol in the cardboard box.

The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress, citing the community-caretaking doctrine. Morgan conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Zolnai violated the Fourth Amendment when he seized and eventually searched Morgan by unreasonably opening his car door without warning in the absence of any exigency.

United States v. Petlechkov

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 22-6043, 22-6044

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Petlechkov was convicted of 20 counts of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Sixth Circuit vacated 17 counts, affirmed three, and remanded in 2019. The district court resentenced Petlechkov to 37 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release, referred him for deportation proceedings upon completion of his prison sentence, entered a money judgment against him, and awarded restitution. To satisfy the money judgment, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order that allowed the government—if needed—to seize and sell three substitute properties. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petlechkov was not making restitution payments. The government asked the court to add a provision to the final forfeiture order allowing it to sell the third property to pay the restitution award.

The district court entered the final forfeiture order with the requested provision, denied Petlechkov’s subsequent motions, and imposed a filing restriction. The Sixth Circuit vacated the filing restriction and the new forfeiture provision but otherwise affirmed. The district court did not offer any reason for imposing the new provision, cite any authority for adding the provision, or comply with any apparently available authority. The court erroneously held that Petlechkov lacked standing; he had standing to challenge the new provision.

Snowden v. Henning

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-1463

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Snowden, staying at a hotel, received a call asking him to visit the lobby to pay for the room. When Snowden arrived, DEA Agent Henning pushed him into a door and onto the ground. Snowden did not resist. Henning punched him several times. Snowden suffered two black eyes and a fractured left eye socket.

Snowden sued Henning, alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. The court construed the complaint to allege a “Bivens” claim (an implied damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations), then dismissed that claim, noting factual distinctions between Snowden’s case and Bivens–the location of the arrest, the presence of a warrant, and the number of officers involved. Bivens involved allegations concerning the rights of privacy implicated in an unlawful warrantless home entry, arrest, and search, the court reasoned, while Snowden alleged excessive force incident to a lawful arrest, and special factors weighed against recognizing a new Bivens context, including the availability of an alternative remedy.

The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Supreme Court has declined to extend the Bivens remedy beyond specific Fifth and Eighth Amendment contexts, Snowden’s claim does not present a new context. Agent Henning operated under the same legal mandate as the Bivens officers and is the same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer. Like Bivens, Snowden seeks damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The legal landscape of excessive-force claims is well-settled. Nor does allowing a Bivens claim here risk a “disruptive intrusion” into the “functioning of other branches.”

United States v. Leal

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1808

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

FBI agents created a profile for a fictitious individual, “Clay,” on the dating app “Grindr.” Grindr does not allow users under age 18, so the agent represented that Clay was 18. Agent Carter testified that he exchanged messages with Leal, telling him that Clay was 15 years old. Grindr deleted Clay’s profile. Carter created a new profile for “Corey.” Leal initiated contact with Corey. The ensuing discussion concerned a meeting, Corey’s age and the risk of going to jail, and condoms. When Leal arrived for the meeting, an officer pulled up behind the car Leal had described; the car accelerated. Officers stopped the vehicle and found Leal driving. Leal admitted to planning to receive oral sex from Corey—who he believed was under 18–and stated that he deleted the Grindr app as he was being stopped because he knew it was wrong to meet with a 15-year-old.

Leal was charged with attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). At Leal’s request, the district court charged the jury with the pattern instruction regarding the entrapment defense. The court also provided the jury with the pattern instruction regarding the permissibility of the government’s use of undercover and deceptive investigative techniques. Convicted, Leal was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instruction and the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to prove that Leal was not entrapped.

United States v. Anthony Jones, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2158

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of a six-count federal indictment -- carjacking resulting in death (Count 1); discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j) (Count 2); and two counts of witness tampering (Counts 5 and 6). The government agreed to drop Counts 3 and 4. The parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of 360 months imprisonment. Defendant timely objected to a statement in his presentence investigation report (PSR) that the sentence imposed for Count 2 must be consecutive to the other counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Defendant argued that violations of Section 924(c) and § 924(j) are separate offenses and that Section 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing. The district court overruled the objection, accepted the guilty plea but not the 360-month recommendation, and imposed a within-range sentence of 540 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court procedurally erred in imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence for Count 2 and that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Defendant’s disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal. Accordingly, the court held that, in light of the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes and lengthy criminal history, the district court was well within its substantial discretion in sentencing Defendant to a within-guidelines-range term of imprisonment.

United States v. Deonte Ellison

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2631

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of ammunition as a felon. The district court sentenced him to 296 months and one day of imprisonment.  Defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury forbids the district court to determine whether he committed three prior felonies on different occasion
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the district court sufficiently considered the statutory factors and made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. In varying upward, the district court considered Defendant’s extensive criminal history and concluded that his criminal history category understated the likelihood of recidivism and the seriousness of his criminal history. Defendant’s criminal history scored 24 points under the guidelines, well above the 13 points required for placement in the highest criminal history category. Giving deference to the district court as required by Gall, the court concluded that the one-level variance and the overall sentence is not unreasonable in light of Section 3553(a).

United States v. Gerald Cardwell, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1561

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of distributing a controlled substance, resulting in the death of R.L. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce evidence of Defendant’s prior drug arrests and convictions pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (3) the district court’s use of Defendant’s prior drug possession conviction to enhance his sentence is unconstitutional because it punishes Defendant more harshly than a drug distributor.


The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and drawing all reasonable inference in its favor, it held that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant distributed the drugs to R.L. Further, the court concluded that the record includes sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that fentanyl was the but-for cause of R.L.’s death. Finally, the court held that the First Step Act did modify Section 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). But it did not alter the language of Section 841(b)(1)(C), the crime under which Defendant was convicted.

United States v. Jeffery Moore

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2733

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted on four drug-related charges stemming from his involvement in a narcotics-distribution ring in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, which culminated in the overdose deaths of two individuals. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and two counts of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute heroin and 420 months imprisonment on each count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death, with all terms to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) that the district court erroneously admitted text messages between one of the victims and himself and (2) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on any of the three counts of conviction.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the night before her overdose, the victim texted Defendant—her primary if not only supplier of narcotics—at 6:58 p.m. “presumably to make arrangements to purchase heroin.” Per their typical arrangement, the victim then withdrew the necessary funds from an ATM and drove to Defendant’s house, texting him at 7:48 p.m. that she was in his backyard. Her subsequent text messages to family members reveal that she then went home. The victim’s body was found the next day. Under these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant distributed the fentanyl that resulted in the victim’s death.

United States v. Joshua Powell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2867

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 142 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. As two of the conditions of supervised release, the district court prohibited Defendant from possessing or using a “computer,” as the term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(e)(1), and from possessing or viewing visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct. On appeal, Defendant challenged both special conditions.
 
The Eighth Circuit vacated the special condition on computers and affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that the district court discussed how, in its experience, people who have Defendant’s addiction initially search for adult pornography, which eventually “leads back to” searching for child pornography. Defendant’s internet search history; and the connection between using the Internet and accessing pornography. In addition, the presentence report detailed how some videos tied to Defendant depicted adult pornography. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not plainly err. However, the court concluded that the district court’s findings do not adequately tie the special condition on computers to statutory purposes. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion, and therefore the court vacated the special condition discussing computers.

United States v. Luis Hernandez-Barajas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3763

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: STRAS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

While in prison for dealing drugs, Defendant continued to run his operation from behind bars. At one point, he arranged for a shipment of marijuana to a relative. But when black-tar heroin arrived instead, a co-conspirator, C.H. sold it on his behalf. To protect his family, Defendant pointed the finger at C.H. and passed along his address to their suppliers. C.H. continued to sell drugs, including what he received through Defendant. He eventually sold those drugs in controlled buys, which led to federal drug charges. Defendant, for his part, pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court gave him a two-level enhancement for “making a credible threat to use violence or directing the use of violence.” Defendant challenged the enhancement on appeal. At issue on appeal is whether providing a co-conspirator’s address to dangerous people “directs the use of violence” or itself conveys “a credible threat to use violence.”

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that once danger came knocking on his family’s door, Defendant redirected the suppliers’ anger toward the person who refused to pay. It was “reasonably foreseeable” that this simple act, given how dangerous they were, could have led to the use of violence against C.H. Accordingly, the court held that the record supports a two-level enhancement for “directing the use of violence.”

USA V. BENITO CASTRO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-30050

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Nguyen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The district court increased Defendant’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) based on a finding that Defendant’s prior Montana conviction for partner or family member assault (“PFMA”) under Mont. Code Ann. Section 45-5- 206(1)(a) is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.
 
The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. Applying the categorical approach, the panel held that PFMA is not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines because the definition of “bodily injury” incorporated into PFMA includes more conduct than the “use of physical force” required by U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)(1). Under Montana’s unusual definition, bodily injury “includes mental illness or impairment,” and Montana courts have concluded that one can cause “bodily injury” solely through the infliction of mental anguish unaccompanied by any actual or threatened physical violence. Because the court must determine whether PFMA categorically requires violent force—not whether Defendant actually used it in his prior offense—the panel held that PFMA is not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Hooper v. The City of Tulsa

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5034

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

Plaintiff-appellant Justin Hooper and the City of Tulsa disputed whether the Curtis Act, 30 Stat. 495 (1898), granted Tulsa jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by all Tulsa’s inhabitants, including Indians, in Indian country. Tulsa issued a traffic citation to Hooper, an Indian and member of the Choctaw Nation, and he paid a $150 fine for the ticket in Tulsa’s Municipal Criminal Court. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, Hooper filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over his offense because it was a crime committed by an Indian in Indian country. Tulsa countered that it had jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by its Indian inhabitants stemming from Section 14 of the Curtis Act. The municipal court agreed with Tulsa and denied Hooper’s application. Hooper then sought relief in federal court—filing a complaint: (1) appealing the denial of his application for post-conviction relief; and (2) seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 14 was inapplicable to Tulsa today. Tulsa moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion to dismiss Hooper’s declaratory judgment claim, agreeing with Tulsa that Congress granted the city jurisdiction over municipal violations by all its inhabitants, including Indians, through Section 14. Based on this determination, the district court dismissed Hooper’s appeal of the municipal court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as moot. Hooper appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the federal district court erred in dismissing Hooper's declaratory judgment claim because even if the Curtis Act was never repealed, it was no longer applicable to Tulsa. The Court also agreed with Hooper that the district court erred in dismissing his appeal of the municipal court decision as moot based on its analysis of Section 14, but the Court determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Hooper’s appeal from the municipal court.

United States v. Gallimore

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-6081

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Carson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Defendant Paul Gallimore pleaded guilty to committing three robberies on three consecutive days in different locations at age 16. These convictions pushed his criminal history category to VI under USSG § 4B1.4(c)(2) which, in turn, set his guideline imprisonment range at 188 to 235 months. The statutory range, because of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement, was fifteen years to life. The ACCA sentencing enhancement applied to defendants with three prior convictions for committing violent felonies on separate occasions. Defendant appealed the calculation of the sentence he received (200 months imprisonment), arguing he committed these robberies on one occasion (which would have reduced the range of his sentence). The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that the time between each robbery and their different locations both decisively differentiated "occasions" here.

United States v. Geddes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-4053

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant-Appellant Derald Geddes was convicted by a jury of tax obstruction, tax evasion, and three counts of
willfully filing false tax returns in the years 2011, 2012, and 2013. He was sentenced to five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay about $1.8 million in restitution. On appeal, he argued: (1) restitution was impermissibly ordered to begin during his imprisonment; (2) 16 conditions of supervised release not pronounced orally at sentencing improperly appeared in the written judgment; and (3) one of those 16 conditions, the risk notification to third parties condition, was invalid under United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687 (10th Cir. 2019). After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s imposition of restitution to the extent it was ordered to be paid outside the term of supervised release and remanded for the court to modify the written judgment. The Court affirmed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory conditions of supervised release in the written judgment and reversed the imposition of the discretionary standard conditions of supervised release. The case was remanded for the district court to conform the written judgment to what was orally pronounced in a manner consistent with the Tenth Circuit's opinion.

United States v. Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-5079

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Jeffrey Jones was convicted of sexually abusing his stepdaughters, K.B. and C.B., which resulted in three concurrent life sentences. On appeal, he challenged the testimony of two witnesses: (1) Crystal Jones, the mother of K.B. and C.B., who repeatedly testified as to her belief in the truthfulness of her daughters’ accusations about Jones’s actions, which she herself did not directly observe; and (2) government witness Janetta Michaels, an FBI forensic interviewer, who testified that C.B. was “forthcoming” in her forensic interview and “appropriate with her knowledge.” On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Jones argued the district court plainly erred by allowing both witnesses’ testimony about the credibility of K.B. and C.B. The Tenth Circuit rejected Jones’s contention that the district court plainly erred by admitting Ms. Michaels’s challenged testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, but agreed that the district court plainly erred in admitting Crystal’s challenged testimony under Rule 608. The convictions and sentences were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

United States v. Lee

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-6167

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Carson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The district court sentenced Defendant Kenneth Lee, but failed to apply U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1), which applied to Defendant and provided a downward sentencing adjustment if a defendant already served time for another offense that was relevant conduct to the offense at issue. The Tenth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. "We cannot say that the error here did not affect Defendant’s sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the district court said that although it was not inclined to vary downward fifteen months, it had no objection to the BOP giving Defendant credit—hardly a firm declaration that the district court would have imposed the same sentence either way. Because we do not know whether the district court would have imposed a different sentence had it applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1), we must vacate Defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing."

United States v. Maloid

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-1422

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Quindell Maloid pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Years earlier, he pleaded guilty in Colorado state court to conspiring to commit felony menacing with a firearm. Under commentary in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, conspiracies to commit crimes of violence count as crimes of violence and markedly increase a defendant’s advisory guideline range. After counting Maloid’s prior conspiracy conviction as a crime of violence, the district court sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the range. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was the weight to be given to this commentary from the U.S. Sentencing Commission. To this, the Court held that in the Tenth Circuit, the commentary in the Guidelines Manual governs unless it runs afoul of the Constitution or a federal statute or is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline provision it addresses. The Court elected not to extend Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), to the Commission’s commentary absent clear direction from the U.S. Supreme Court.

United States v. Phillips

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-5053

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Stephanie Kulp Seymour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Phillips was stopped by police officers who observed him driving recklessly without a seat belt and suspected he lacked a valid driver’s license. The officers searched his vehicle and recovered cocaine base. Following a failed motion to suppress, Phillips was ultimately convicted on one count of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. Phillips challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of his vehicle. He also contended he was entitled to a mistrial based on the officer’s trial testimony. After review, the Tenth Circuit held the district court correctly found that the officers reasonably suspected Phillips of committing traffic violations and had probable cause to search the vehicle. The Court also found that any error concerning the challenged trial testimony was harmless.

Kristen Colindres v. DOS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-5009

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: WALKER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Appellant applied for a visa to enter the United States. But the Government denied his application, fearing that he was part of a criminal organization. Appellant and his wife (collectively “Appellants”) — who is an American citizen — filed this suit to challenge that decision. But their suit faced an uphill struggle: With narrow exceptions, a court may not review the government’s decision to deny a visa. To show that their suit fits within an exception, Appellants pointed to a rule allowing American citizens to challenge visa denials that burden their constitutional rights. Appellant’s wife argued that the rule applies because denying her husband a visa interfered with her constitutional right to marriage. The district court rejected that argument and dismissed it.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that though marriage is a fundamental right, it does not include the right to live in America with one’s spouse. So the right is not burdened when the government denies a spouse’s visa application. Further, the court wrote that even if the exception applied, allowing us to review the Government’s visa denial, Appellant’s wife’s challenge would fail on the merits. To survive judicial review, the Government need only cite a statute listing a factual basis for denying a visa. It did that here.

Jenkins v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-1378

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Timothy B. Dyk

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Jenkins purchased a 1987 Oldsmobile and a 2001 Chevrolet and transferred the titles to his mother, Buchanan, retaining exclusive use of both vehicles. The DEA, investigating Jenkins for drug conspiracy crimes, seized the vehicles, which were towed to an impound lot. The DEA obtained a search warrant, which was executed in October 2012. In April 2013, Jenkins pled guilty and was sentenced to 252 months of imprisonment. In October, the impound lot sent letters to the address on file for Buchanan notifying her that the vehicles could be reclaimed upon payment of towing and storage charges. Buchanan did not receive the letters, having moved. No letter was addressed to Jenkins. Jenkins acknowledged that he “was informed" to pick up the vehicles. In February 2014, the impound lot sent final notices to Buchanan, who was incarcerated, then sold the vehicles, retaining the proceeds.

In 2017, Jenkins moved in his criminal case for the return of the cars (FRCP 41(g)). The government responded that the cars “are available for return.” The court dismissed the motion. In 2019, Jenkins unsuccessfully sought monetary compensation in excess of $10,000, then filed a civil action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), alleging a physical taking of his vehicles.
The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment. While the government’s police power may preclude liability for an initial seizure, there is no police power exception that precludes takings liability for the period after the property is not needed for criminal proceedings. The court noted a factual issue of abandonment and affirmed the dismissal of the due process clause for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice.

People v. Prudholme

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S271057

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Carol Corrigan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the appellate court reducing the length of Defendant's probation from three years to two, holding that Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) applies retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal.

On January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 became effective and reduced the maximum length of probation for most felonies to two years. While Defendant's appeal from his conviction and sentence was pending, the legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1950. The court of appeal agreed with Defendant that the probation limit applied to Defendant retroactively and that the proper remedy was remand to allow the trial court to allow the parties to renegotiate a resolution. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to all nonfinal cases; and (2) the proper remedy in this case is to modify the judgment to reflect a new probationary term of two years.

People v. Reyes

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S270723

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Goodwin Liu

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal with instructions to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings on Defendant's petition for resentencing, holding that the trial court erred in denying the petition.

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and street terrorism, as well as gang and firearm enhancements. Two years after Defendant was sentenced, the legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 to amend section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, "in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought." Thereafter, Defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing under what is now Cal. Penal Code1172.6, arguing that his murder conviction was based on the now-invalid natural and probable consequences theory. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendant's second-degree murder conviction, and to the extent the petition was rejected under a direct aiding and abetting theory, the trial court reversibly erred by misunderstanding the legal requirements of direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder.

P. v. Falcon

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F083577(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: MEEHAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Non-Profit Corporations

After shooting his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend, Defendant was convicted by a jury of the following: two counts of premeditated attempted murder; two counts of assault with a deadly weapon; one count of inflicting corporal injury on a prior dating partner; and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury also found true multiple enhancement allegations under section 12022.53. The trial court imposed the following sentence: two consecutive indeterminate terms of seven years to life for the premeditated attempted murder convictions (counts 1 & 4), plus two additional terms of 25 years to life for the respectively attached firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(d). All other enhancements attached to counts 1 and 4 were stayed under section 654. On appeal, Defendant argued the sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado).  
 
The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment but vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a resentencing hearing where further evidence and argument may be received regarding the sentence to be imposed. The court held that the trial court, in this case, made its sentencing decision in the absence of the new presumption against exceeding the middle term, and the record does not clearly indicate that the court would have imposed upper-term sentences had it been aware of the new constraint on its discretion. The court held that Gutierrez is binding and the appropriate remedy is to remand for the sentencing court to exercise its newly informed and circumscribed discretion in the first instance.

People v. Achane

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165968(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2020, Achane pleaded guilty to willfully inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (case 1); he was sentenced to an upper-term sentence of four years, suspended. On August 6, (case 2) Achane pleaded guilty to stalking and admitted violating probation in case 1. The court placed Achane on probation. On August 31, 2021, (case 3), Achane pleaded guilty to obstructing an executive officer. The trial court again placed Achane on probation. The probation department filed petitions to revoke probation in all three cases, alleging that in March 2022, Achane carried a loaded firearm in public, carried a concealed firearm, unlawfully possessed a firearm and ammunition, transferred an unmarked firearm, resisted arrest, and possessed a controlled substance while armed with a firearm.

The trial court revoked probation. A sentencing hearing was held in Achane’s absence after he told the court he did not wish to remain in the courtroom. The court acknowledged that the probation department recommended reinstating probation but ordered Achane to serve the case 1 suspended four-year aggravated term and consecutive eight-month, one-third middle terms in cases 2 and 3. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Achane’s argument that he was entitled to resentencing under legislation enacted after the initial imposition of sentence that limits courts’ discretion to impose an upper-term sentence and, in certain circumstances, creates a presumption in favor of a lower-term sentence. Achane forfeited those claims.

Yedinak v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E080685(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Nicholas Yedinak petitioned for mandamus relief, challenging the trial judge’s order denying him bail. Yedinak was charged with two counts of felony child abuse based on allegations he inflicted severe, nonaccidental injuries to his six-week-old son. For the two years and nine months after arraignment, Yedinak had been out on bail, making each court appearance and living in the community without incident. After his preliminary hearing, the judge issued a pretrial detention order based on a finding that other children in the community would probably not be safe if Yedinak were released pending trial, given the violent nature of the charged crimes. In support of his petition, Yedinak argued the order failed to satisfy the legal requirements for pretrial detention articulated in article I, section 12, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution, and In re Humphrey, 11 Cal.5th 135 (2021). The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court's order "fell short of the standard set forth in section 12(b)." The Court granted Yedinak's petition, ordering the trial court to vacate its pretrial detention order, and to reconsider the motion to set affordable bail.

Colorado v. White

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 43

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Samour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Thomas Mitchell was driving when a flat tire forced him to stop in the right-hand lane of traffic. While standing behind his car and removing items from his trunk, another driver, Eli White, struck him, pinning him between the two cars and severing his legs. A blood sample consensually provided by White at the scene of the crash later revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) in an amount seven times that which, under Colorado law, gives rise to a permissible inference that a person was driving under the influence (“DUI”) of one or more drugs. White was charged with class 4 felony DUI, and class 1 misdemeanor careless driving. White sought to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing, as relevant here, that by the time the officers requested a blood sample from him, his investigatory stop had turned into an arrest that was unsupported by probable cause. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion, finding that when the officers collected the blood sample from White, they lacked any indicia of drug intoxication and had already determined that they had no more questions for him and that the cause of the collision was his distraction from the road as he attempted to adjust the car’s climate control features. Therefore, the court concluded the officers' detention of White for the purpose of obtaining his consent for a blood sample was unconstitutional. And because the court believed that White’s consent was not sufficiently attenuated from what it viewed as his illegal arrest, it found that his consent was invalid. The State then brought an interlocutory appeal. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding the officers asked White if he would consent to a blood draw about thirty minutes into their investigation. "Further, there were substantial delays caused by White’s requests to consult with his mother about the possibility of providing a blood sample. The officers accommodated White’s requests and allowed him to speak with his mother by phone and, once she arrived on the scene, in person." Under the circumstances present, the Supreme Court held the officers did not exceed the scope and character of the investigatory stop so as to transform it into an arrest. And because the officers did not unreasonably detain White, his consent to provide a blood sample was not rendered invalid.

Khan v. Yale University

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20705

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Mullins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Education Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that absolute immunity attaches to statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and that while Jane Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity, a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault presented in the context of this case.

In disciplinary proceedings conducted at Yale University by the University-Wide Committee on Sexual Misconduct (UWC) Doe accused Plaintiff of sexual assault, resulting in Plaintiff's expulsion from Yale and criminal charges being brought against him. Plaintiff was acquitted. At issue in this appeal was whether Doe, who enjoyed absolute immunity in a subsequent civil action challenging her testimony given during Plaintiff's criminal proceeding, should likewise be afforded absolute immunity from suit for her statements made during the UWC proceeding. The Supreme Court held (1) absolute immunity attaches to statements in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) the USC's proceeding did not meet the conditions necessary to be considered quasi-judicial, and therefore, Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity; but (3) due to the public interest in encouraging the proper reporting of sexual assaults a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault at institutions of higher education.

Figueroa-Sanabria v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2021-1070

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Couriel

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of first-degree murder but set aside and his sentences of death for each murder, holding that Defendant was deprived of his right to "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense" when the trial court put him to an improper choice at the beginning of the penalty phase proceedings.

After the jury returned guilty verdicts for both first-degree murder charges the matter proceeded to the penalty phase. The jury unanimously recommended sentences of death. After a series of Spencer hearings, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case for a new penalty phase, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error in its evidentiary rulings during Defendant's guilt phase proceedings; (2) Defendant's convictions were supported by competent, substantial evidence; but (3) Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel during the penalty phase was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and Defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on the trial court's fundamental error in forcing him to abandon counsel during that phase.

Hill v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0178

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's rulings in criminal cases and a separate civil case, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be pro se barred for his repeated misuse of the Court's limited resources.

Petitioner, an inmate whose most recent conviction was for possession of a controlled substance, began filing petitions in the Supreme Court in 2018 pertaining to several different criminal cases and a dependency case regarding his children. Petitioner filed the instant prohibition petition challenging the trial court's denial of a motion and seeking to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court denied the petition and directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Supreme Court then sanctioned Petitioner, holding that Petitioner had abused the Court's limited judicial resources.

Steiner v. Dixon

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2022-1542

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and then sanctioned him, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be pro se barred.

In 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender on two counts of kidnapping, and the court of appeal affirmed. Since 2006, the Petitioner "engaged in a vexatious pattern of filing meritless requests for relief" in the Supreme Court pertaining to his convictions and sentences, none of which merited relief. In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner raised several claims relating to the circuit court's 2006 judgment and sentence. The Supreme Court denied the petition and directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Supreme Court sanctioned Petitioner as pro se barred, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his abusive conduct.

Caldwell v. Edenfield

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23A0260, S23X0261

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2009, a jury convicted David Edenfield for the 2007 sexual assault and murder of six-year-old Christopher Barrios, and the jury imposed a death sentence for the murder. Lead trial counsel, joined by other attorneys, represented Edenfield on direct appeal, and, in June of 2013, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Edenfield’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Edenfield subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting he was ineligible for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled and that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance during his trial in several ways, including by failing to present evidence of Edenfield’s alleged intellectual disability in the sentencing phase as mitigating evidence. He also contended that appellate counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court denied relief on all claims except for the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim concerning counsel’s presentation of evidence of Edenfield’s alleged intellectual disability as mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase. Based on that claim, the habeas court vacated Edenfield’s death sentence. The Warden appealed in Case No. S23A0260, and Edenfield has cross-appealed in Case No. S23X0261. In the Warden’s appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the habeas court’s decision to vacate Edenfield’s death sentence. In Edenfield’s cross-appeal, the Court affirmed in part; the Court conclude as to Edenfield’s claim regarding trial counsel’s alleged deficiency concerning certain allegedly mitigating circumstances that additional findings of fact and conclusions of law were required, and the case was therefore remanded to the habeas court for further proceedings.

Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S22G0527, S22G0617, S22G0618

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Three cases presented an opportunity for the Georgia Supreme Court to explore the scope and nature of the liability faced by premises owners, occupiers, and security contractors in cases involving personal injuries arising from third-party criminal conduct. Although the underlying appeals varied with respect to their facts and specific issues presented, the resolution of each appeal "necessitates consideration of fundamental principles of premises liability under Georgia law." The Court clarified that the reasonable foreseeability of a third-party criminal act is a determination linked to a proprietor’s duty to keep the premises and approaches safe under OCGA § 51-3-1, and that the totality of the circumstances informs whether a third-party criminal act was reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, the question of reasonable foreseeability is generally reserved to the trier of fact, but the trial court may resolve the issue as a matter of law where no rational juror could determine the issue in favor of the non-moving party.

Bahr v. Idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49305

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Brandon Bahr appealed a district court’s summary dismissal of his untimely petition for post-conviction relief. Bahr filed his untimely petition roughly two years after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. The State responded with a motion seeking summary dismissal. Bahr opposed dismissal, arguing the limitations period should have been equitably tolled based on his alleged lack of access to the Idaho courts while transferred to, and incarcerated in, Texas prison facilities. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal. Bahr argued on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court that the district court erred by denying him equitable tolling, and by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning whether Bahr lacked access to the Idaho courts while incarcerated in Texas. The Supreme Court affirmed: "Even if Bahr was denied access to the Idaho courts while in Texas, a fact which we have not determined, he is not entitled to equitable tolling because he failed to allege any diligent efforts to pursue his rights while in Texas."

Harris v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-CR-00165

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Goff

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court excluding certain testimony from the jury trial of Defendant's habitual offender status, holding that the trial court did not err by excluding the testimony.

The trial court excluded Defendant's testimony to the circumstances of his "most serious crime of conviction," his intent to rehabilitate himself, and his purported innocence of one of his prior, unrelated felonies as irrelevant to the issue of whether Defendant had accumulated the requisite convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's testimony was irrelevant because it did not tend to prove or disprove his convictions, and therefore, Defendant had no constitutional right to present the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's testimony was irrelevant because it did not tend to prove or disprove his convictions; and (2) Defendant had no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence.

Miller v. Patel, M.D.

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 22S-CT-00371

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Mark S. Massa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment for Appellant's mental health providers for not preventing his crime of voluntary manslaughter, holding that Defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating his responsibility.

Appellant pleaded guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter. Thereafter, Appellant sued his mental health providers, arguing that they were legally responsible for his act. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellees. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thus vacating the court of appeals' opinion, and affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was estopped from relitigating his legal responsibility under defensive issue preclusion; and (2) Appellees carried their summary judgment burden of establishing that Appellant's damages were not compensable.

State v. Lyons

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 23S-CR-00163

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Molter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court suppressing incriminating statements Defendant made immediately following a polygraph examination, holding that before excluding evidence as a Trial Rule 37 discovery sanction, a trial court must find that the exclusion is the sole remedy available to avoid substantial prejudice and that the sanctioned party's culpability reflects an egregious discovery violation.

Defendant was interviewed at the police department as part of an investigation as to whether he sexually abused a minor. Defendant agreed to sit for a polygraph and agreed that the results of the polygraph would be admissible if the State charged him with a crime. The State subsequently charged Defendant with child molesting. Defendant moved to suppress the polygraph results and his related statements, arguing that his statements were not voluntary or reliable. The trial court denied the motion. On the eve of trial, the deputy prosecutor disclosed that the officer who administrated the exams had unilaterally changed the exam to a "non-stipulated," inadmissible investigatory examination. The judge suppressed the incriminating statements as a discovery sanction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's order enforced Trial Rule 37 within the limits set forth in this opinion.

State v. Moncla

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125113

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's successive motion to correct an illegal sentence in this second appeal regarding the matter, holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's successive claim.

In 1995, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a hard forty sentence. The trial court also imposed restitution and fees. In 2013, Appellant brought a motion to correct an illegal sentence challenging the district court's procedure for ordering restitution. After the district court summarily denied the motion the Supreme Court affirmed. In 2019, Appellant brought the illegal sentence motion at issue in this appeal arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose restitution. The district court summarily denied the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata applied, thus barring relief on Defendant's illegal-sentence motion.

Louisiana v. Shallerhorn

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-KK-01385

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Crichton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was a matter of first impression: whether a defendant who is charged with first degree murder can elect a bench trial when the state has filed a formal notice that it will not seek capital punishment. The question presented involved the interpretation of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 780, specifically the meaning of the phrase “an offense other than one punishable by death.” In February 2021, defendant John Shallerhorn was arrested for several offenses, including on suspicion of first degree murder. The state filed notice that “for any charges for which the grand jury returns an indictment in [this] case, the State will elect to forego capital punishment.” Shallerhorn was ultimately indicted for first degree murder and armed robbery. Defendant filed a motion for a bench trial, seeking to waive his right to a trial by jury pursuant to the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. article 780. The state opposed this motion, and the trial court, agreeing with the state, denied it. The trial court noted that though the state was not currently pursuing the death penalty, “if something changes at the DA’s office and somehow death is back on the table,” then the defendant could not waive a jury and elect a bench trial. The Supreme Court held that after the state provides formal notice that it will not seek the death penalty, and thereby elects to prosecute the offense of first degree murder as a non-capital case, a defendant may waive a trial by jury and elect a bench trial.

Commonwealth v. Mcneil

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13379

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court answered a reported question in the affirmative and held that a "guilty-filed" disposition constitutes a predicate "offense" under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 30A.

Defendant was charged with shoplifting, third offense, in violation of section 30A. Defendant moved to dismiss so much of the complaint that alleged a third offense on the grounds that the disposition in one of the predicate offenses on which the Commonwealth relied in support of the third offense portion of the charge was a guilty-filed disposition after Defendant pleaded guilty. The district court judge reported to the appeals court the requisition of whether a guilty-filed disposition constitutes a predicate offense under section 30A, after which Defendant entered a conditional plea to shoplifting. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that a guilty-filed disposition constitutes an offense under section 30A.

Commonwealth v. Miranda

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13225

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the trial justice erred when he failed to instruct the jury on the impact of mental impairment and intoxication on whether Defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner, and this error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the death of a woman who died from multiple chop wounds from a machete. On appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred by failing to provide two jury instructions regarding mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial justice did not err by omitting Defendant's requested instructions on sudden combat but did err in failing to give an instruction on mental impairment as it related to extreme atrocity or cruelty, and the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

Turner v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00236-SCT

Opinion Date: June 22, 2023

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Leroy "Lucky" Turner (aka, "Chino") admittedly shot Jeffrey Johnson in the back following a confrontation outside a convenience store. At his trial for aggravated assault, Turner claimed he acted out of fear for himself and his sixteen-year-old nephew. But video surveillance and eyewitness testimony supported the State’s theory that Turner was the aggressor. A jury convicted Turner as charged, for which Turner was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment with three suspended. Turner appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Turner's conviction.

State v. Barton

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99886

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Paul C. Wilson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's motions to suppress evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest for a felony, holding that to the extent the decision was based on Defendant's claim that the Fourth Amendment is violated when an arresting officer was outside of the officer's jurisdiction unless the officer personally observed the crime, the decision was clearly erroneous.

Defendant was charged in two separate cases for his involvement in two robberies. Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after a warrantless arrest, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officer was outside of his jurisdiction. The circuit court sustained the motions to suppress. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's decision, holding that while Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015), requires both probable cause and that the crime be committed in the officer's presence for an arrest to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, when a warrantless arrest is for a felony, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the arresting officer has probable cause for the arrest, even when the felony was not committed in the arresting officer's presence.

State v. Forbes

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99658

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Zel M. Fischer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the circuit court's final judgment in this criminal case, holding that Defendant's appeal was untimely.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of financial exploitation of an elderly person by undue influence. The circuit court sentenced her to ten years in prison and ordered her to pay restitution as a condition of parole. The circuit court dismissed Defendant's appeal. Thereafter, the circuit court set the amount of restitution and purported to resentence her to fifteen years in prison plus $26,118.51 in restitution. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal, holding that Defendant's notice of appeal was untimely. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case with directions for the circuit court to vacate the second judgment and sentence, holding that when the circuit court orally sentenced Defendant to ten years in prison, it exhausted its jurisdiction to withdraw Defendant's sentence, resentence her, or add restitution to the judgment.

Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-61-21/A-7-22

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Stuart Rabner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether Facebook could be compelled to provide the contents of two users’ accounts every 15 minutes for 30 days into the future based only on probable cause, the ordinary standard for a search warrant, or whether the State must instead satisfy certain requirements and apply for a wiretap order, which required an enhanced showing -- one beyond probable cause -- because gaining access to private communications in real time is considerably more intrusive than a typical search. In the two matters under review, trial courts quashed the State’s request for prospective information based on a Communications Data Warrant (CDW), which was the equivalent of a search warrant and can be issued on a showing of probable cause.
The Appellate Division consolidated the cases and held that the State could obtain prospective electronic communications with a CDW, reasoning that the wiretap statute applied to the contemporaneous interception of electronic communications, not efforts to access communications in storage. The Supreme Court concluded that based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. "The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution."

Oregon v. Lee

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069654

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: James

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

An informant told law enforcement that a person named “Tom Collins” was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to utilize the informant in executing a controlled buy at the residence. However, rather than relying on the observations and results from that controlled buy to subsequently apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for, and obtained, a search warrant for the residence that anticipated that controlled buy. The State argued that the warrant at issue here was an “anticipatory warrant” of the type approved, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs, 547 US 90 (2006). Defendant disagreed, arguing that anticipatory warrants were incompatible with Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court did not reach the constitutionality of the issue presented. The Court determined that under ORS 133.555(2), a judge could issue a warrant only when “the basis of the record made before the judge” established that “there is probable cause to believe that the search will discover things specified in the application” and the warrant application satisfies the requirement in ORS 133.545(6) that it “particularly set[ ] forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that the objects of the search are in the places, or in the possession of the individuals, to be searched.” The affidavit in support of the warrant here failed to comply with the requirements of ORS 133.545(6). As a result, the warrant issued in defendant’s case did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, pursuant to ORS 133.673(1). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

State v. Leonard

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 21-71

Opinion Date: June 26, 2023

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of two counts of second-degree sexual assault, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motion to pass the case or his motion for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted after a trial. The trial justice denied Defendant's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to eight years of imprisonment for each count, with one year to serve and the remaining time suspended. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial justice abused his discretion in denying Defendant's motion to pass the case due to the prosecutor's allegedly improper comments during closing arguments. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion to pass the case; and (2) the trial justice did not erroneously admit evidence unduly prejudicial to Defendant, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to receive a new trial.

South Carolina v. Green

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28165

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: John W. Kittredge

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner Tappia Green's convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. During an in camera hearing, the parties offered competing evidence as to whether Green was given his Miranda warnings, with law enforcement officers claiming they did not Mirandize Green at the time of his arrest and Green asserting they did. The trial court found the State's evidence more credible, determining Green was not Mirandized and, therefore, a violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610(1976) did not occur. As a result, the trial court denied Green's motion for a mistrial. Nevertheless, the State did not further pursue Green's post-arrest silence. The court of appeals affirmed, focusing on the novel question of whether the State or the defendant had the burden of proof in a Doyle hearing and, ultimately, concluding the defendant had the burden to prove Miranda warnings were given and a Doyle violation occurred. The South Carolina Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify the proper procedure when a potential Doyle violation arises. "Care must be taken when the State seeks to impeach a defendant with his post-arrest silence." As the proponent of such impeachment evidence, the Court held the State bears the burden of proving the evidence is admissible and will not violate the defendant's right to due process as articulated in Doyle and its progeny. "In its role as the gatekeeper of admissibility, the trial court must evaluate the evidence and determine whether the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was not given his Miranda warnings." Here, the Court found the trial court properly fulfilled its role and issued a detailed ruling supported by a number of facts in evidence. The Court therefore held the trial court did not commit error in denying Green's motion for a mistrial. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed as modified and vacated in part.

State v. Dutton

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 S.D. 29

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court that Defendant's conduct violated the provisions of S.D. Codified Laws 22-3-5, holding that the circuit court did not err.

Defendant was convicted as an accessory to aggravated assault for intentionally harboring or concealing a juvenile, N.I., in the commission of a felony. Defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing, among other things, that she could not have committed the crime because N.I. was charged as a juvenile under the rules of civil procedure and therefore did not commit the principal felony necessary to sustain the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an individual may be prosecuted, tried, and punished as an accessory to a crime under section 22-3-5 when the principal felony is based on the act of a juvenile, regardless of the status of any prosecution against that juvenile; and (2) therefore, the circuit court properly concluded that Defendant's conduct violated the provisions of section 22-3-5.

State v. Shibly

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 S.D. 30

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Kern

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on seven counts of violating a no contact order, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for mistrial and judgment of acquittal.

During the underlying trial, the alleged victim became emotional in front of the jury while testifying. Consequently, the circuit court recessed the jury during her testimony and ordered the victim not to communicate with anyone during the recess. The victim, however, violated the order by speaking to her mother. Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, determining that Defendant had not spoken to her mother about the case. When the victim returned to the stand she was unable to continue and the court recessed the trial for the day. Defendant again moved for a mistrial and for a judgment of acquittal, without success. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's mistrial and acquittal motions.

Falls v. Goins

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: M2020-01510-SC-R11-CV

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Bivins

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Election Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment to the three named state official defendants in this complaint seeking a temporary injunction related to the August 6, 2020 election, holding that Plaintiff was required to comply with both Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. 40-29-202 before he could be re-enfranchised.

Plaintiff, a Tennessee resident since 2018, was convicted in 1986 of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia. In 2020, the governor of Virginia granted Plaintiff clemency, thus reinstating his right to vote in Virginia. Later that year, Plaintiff attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee but was denied. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of infamous crimes out of state when the governor or the appropriate authority of such other state restores that person's rights of citizenship. The chancery court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. 40-29-202.

Ex parte Danny Lane

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-90,084-01

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In an application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, Applicant Danny Lane challenged his 2007 conviction for failing to comply with sex-offender-registration requirements on five grounds: (1) actual innocence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) involuntary plea; (4) due process violation; and (5) no evidence. Though Applicant raised several grounds for relief, the underlying basis for all of his claims was the same: that, unbeknownst to him at the time of his guilty plea, he was not actually required to register as a sex offender because, although he was convicted of aggravated rape in 1982, that conviction was later “set aside” by the convicting court upon his successful completion of probation through a “judicial clemency” order. In support of his position, Applicant relied on a decision from the Sixth Court of Appeals, issued after his guilty plea in this case, interpreting the relevant statutes to mean that a similarly situated individual had no duty to register and thus could not be guilty of failing to register as a sex offender. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the habeas court's recommendation to grant relief based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel resulting in an involuntary plea, or under a theory of actual innocence / no evidence. The Court concluded that the law was unsettled as to whether Applicant had a duty to register as a sex offender following the trial court’s grant of judicial clemency. Thus, trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to further investigate that issue when further investigation would not have yielded any clear answer under the law. The Court concluded the governing statutes in Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 62 meant that Applicant’s 1982 aggravated rape conviction obligated him to register as a sex offender, notwithstanding the trial court’s order granting him judicial clemency under former Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12, Section 7. Relief was denied on all claims.

Ex parte Rodney Reed

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-50,961-10

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: McClure

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1998, applicant Rodney Reed was convicted by jury of the capital murder of nineteen-year-old Stacey Lee Stites. The indictment alleged that in April 1996, Reed strangled Stacey to death in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. In the years that followed, continuing through this proceeding, Reed has made multiple efforts to have his capital murder conviction overturned. He primarily advanced the theory that he was innocent of Stacey’s murder —specifically, that the biological evidence linking him to Stacey’s body was deposited there because he and Stacey were in a consensual sexual relationship and that Stacey was actually killed by her jealous and domineering fiance, Jimmy Fennell. After review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found Reed's latest attempts to overturn his conviction failed under Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), and procedurally under Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, the Court denied relief and dismissed any remaining claims as abuses of the writ.

Green v. Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0008-22

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, after Maria Delcarman Sosa-Esparza was indicted for a felony offense, she entered into a bail bond agreement with Appellant Maxie Green, doing business as A to Z Bail Bonds. Appellant paid a $25,000 bond so that Sosa-Esparza could be released from jail. A condition of the trial court in setting a bond amount was an assurance that Sosa-Esparza would appear for all of her court settings. But on March 1, 2019, Sosa-Esparza failed to appear for her pretrial conference. The trial court then signed a judgment nisi that provisionally forfeited the $25,000 bond. The judgment nisi stated that Sosa-Esparza’s name was “distinctly called at the courtroom door. Defendant was given reasonable time to appear after her name was called, but she did not appear.” The judgment nisi also provided that the judgment would be made final unless good cause could be shown for why Sosa-Esparza failed to appear. Appellant argued, among other things, that because the judgment nisi stated that the defendant’s name was called at the courtROOM door, the State’s evidence failed to conclusively establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her name was properly called at the courtHOUSE door. (emphasis added). The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether, for purposes of summary judgment in a bond forfeiture case, providing conclusive proof that the name of the defendant on bond was distinctly called at the door of the courtROOM establishes the element that “[t]he name of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door[.]” To this, the Court held that it did: "This holding is founded on well-established precedent from this Court and the courts of appeals recognizing that calling the defendant’s name at the courtroom door constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02."

King v. Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0330-22

Opinion Date: June 28, 2023

Judge: McClure

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On April 19, 2018 in Forth Worth, Appellant Terry King assaulted a twelve-year-old girl who was on her way to the school bus. At all times relevant to this case, Appellant was working as a truck driver, operating a semi-tractor trailor (hereinafter, “truck”) owned by his employer, John Feltman. Due to the nature of his work as a long-haul truck driver, Appellant lived out of the truck while working on the road. In July 2018, Appellant was arrested in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma near the truck he drove. On the same day, the Oklahoma police searched the truck pursuant to a warrant. During the search, detectives found Appellant’s cell phone and intended to seize it, but inadvertently left the cell phone in the truck. The gathered evidence, minus the cell phone, was transported to the Fort Worth Police Department. Upon realizing the cell phone was missing, Fort Worth Police Detective Pat Henz contacted the truck owner, Feltman, and asked him to retrieve the phone and send it to the police department. Upon receipt on August 9, 2018, a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone was issued and executed. Child pornography was found on the cell phone. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether an employee retained standing to contest a search or seizure in his work vehicle several days after he was arrested and after the vehicle was returned to his employer. To this, the Court responded "possibly." But based on the facts of this case, the Court found Appellant did not meet his burden to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy as would confer standing.

State v. Wood

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 15

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Petersen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this interlocutory appeal of the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress calls made by Defendant on the Salt Lake County Jail's telephones and recorded by the jail, holding that Defendant impliedly consented to the conditions the jail had placed on the use of its phones.

Defendant was charged with kidnapping and assaulting his wife and made hundreds of calls to his wife from the jail. The State moved to admit recording of several of those phone calls and filed new charges based on the recordings. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the recordings in both cases. The Supreme Court denied the motions, concluding that Defendant impliedly consented to the interception of the phone calls and that the calls were exempt under the law enforcement exception to Utah's Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code 77-23a-1 to -16. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant impliedly consented to the jail's recording of his phone calls, and therefore, the interception of Defendant's calls was authorized under the Interception Act's consent exception.

Tomlin v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 220223

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Kelsey

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult causing serious injury, holding that the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, rationally determined that Defendant's abuse and neglect of her mother caused the mother to suffer a "serious bodily injury" under Va. Code 18.2-369(B).

Defendant's mother required emergency medical care and hospitalization after lying in a squalid condition on the floor of her apartment for at least two days. The Commonwealth charged Defendant under section 18.2-369(B) and, after a trial, the court found Defendant guilty of the abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult causing serious injury. On appeal, Defendant argued that no rational fact-finder could conclude that her mother's bedsores constituted "serious bodily injury" under section 18.2-369(B)-(C). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's mother suffered a "serious bodily injury" under section 18.2-369(C).

State v. Debrow

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2021AP001732-CR

Opinion Date: June 23, 2023

Judge: Karofsky

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for second-degree sexual assault on the grounds that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial, holding that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial.

At issue was whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial after a witness stated during his testimony about his suspicion of Defendant that he "looked on CCAP" - a term that stands for consolidated court automation programs, which makes information about circuit court and appellate court cases available to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's mistrial motion.

State v. Green

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2021AP000267-CR

Opinion Date: June 29, 2023

Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the case against him with prejudice after a mistrial was declared, holding that retrial would not violate Defendant's right against double jeopardy.

Defendant was tried on one count of trafficking of a child. During trial, the trial court declared a mistrial on the basis that certain evidence was improperly admitted. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that retrial would violate his right under the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exercised sound discretion in ordering a mistrial based on manifest necessity and that retrial will not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy.

Anderson v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 65

Opinion Date: June 27, 2023

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, entered upon his conditional plea of guilty, of felony possession of methamphetamine, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle after law enforcement stopped him for failing properly to signal a left turn.

On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's interpretation of the applicable statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-5-217, arguing that he complied with the statute and that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument that this Court should interpret the statute to require no more than a turn be made safely ignored the rules of statutory interpretation.

Justia Legal Guides: Disability Law Center

Chris Skelton

A disability may cause financial concerns and create obstacles in many areas of life. However, people with disabilities have important legal protections. The Justia Disability Law Center discusses available benefits and their rights more generally.

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