Smith v. United States

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 21-1576

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Smith was indicted in the Northern District of Florida for theft of trade secrets from StrikeLines’ website. Smith moved to dismiss the indictment, citing the Constitution’s Venue Clause and the Vicinage Clause. Smith argued that he had accessed the website from his Alabama home and that the servers storing StrikeLines’ data were in Orlando, Florida. The Eleventh Circuit determined that venue was improper and vacated Smith’s conviction, but held that a trial in an improper venue did not bar reprosecution.

The Supreme Court affirmed. The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Except as prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, when a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be retried. Nothing in the Venue Clause suggests that a new trial in the proper venue is not an adequate remedy for its violation. The Vicinage Clause—which guarantees the right to “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” concerns jury composition, not the place where a trial may be held, and concerns the district where the crime was committed, rather than the state. The vicinage right is one aspect of the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial rights and retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights.

The Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated by retrial in a proper venue. A judicial decision on venue is fundamentally different from a jury’s verdict of acquittal. Culpability is the touchstone; when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s criminal culpability had not been established, retrial is prohibited. Retrial is permissible when a trial terminates on a basis unrelated to factual guilt. The reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses, even when called a “judgment of acquittal,” does not resolve the question of criminal culpability.

United States v. Fagan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1758

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence showing that Defendant was carrying heroin with the intent to distribute it, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found during the underlying traffic stop.

Defendant was stopped for unsafe operation of a vehicle. The stop resulted in more than an hour of questioning and in Defendant relinquishing thirty-seven grams of heroin that he was carrying on his person. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was illegal and that the ensuing questioning violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant pleaded guilty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.

United States v. Garcia-Nunez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1419

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Burroughs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, holding that the district court did not err.

Defendant was charged with two counts related to his possession of a gun and other items suggestive of drug trafficking and pled guilty to one of the counts. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that he was legally and factually innocent and that the government's evidence did not support his conviction. The district court denied the motion and proceeded to sentence Defendant to seventy-two months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

United States v. Lauria (Molina)

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-2598

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: REENA RAGGI

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on multiple counts of substantive and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery and of the brandishing of a firearm during two crimes of violence (i.e., the charged robberies). Defendant argued that the district court erred (1) in relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine to deny his motion to suppress evidence obtained through warrants supported by concededly defective affidavits and (2) in charging the jury that a gun constitutes a firearm and refusing to give his requested jury instruction.
 
The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s firearms convictions. The court agreed with Defendant that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply in the circumstances of this case, and because the conceded misstatements in the affidavits were material to the issuing magistrate judges’ probable cause determinations, remand is required for the district court to conduct a hearing to determine if the challenged evidence was admissible under the standard identified in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). As to the jury charge, the district court erred in instructing the jury that a gun is a firearm. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that this error was harmless as a matter of law.

USA v. Abid Stevens

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2044

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: KRAUSE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant and co-defendants were tried in connection with the armed robbery of a Philadelphia convenience store. The district court instructed the jury that each defendant could be convicted of Hobbs Act robbery under three alternative theories of liability: direct, aiding and abetting, or for participation in a Pinkerton conspiracy. The district court further instructed that defendants could be convicted under Section 924(c) based on either a direct or an aiding and abetting theory. The jury found all parties guilty on all counts in a general verdict, and the district court denied their motions for judgment of acquittal. Appellant argued that his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery must be vacated because the district court failed to charge the jury on those elements, and the Government failed to prove them.
 
The Third Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly charged the jury on the elements of Hobbs Act Robbery. The court explained the district court did not err in giving this jury instruction, and Appellant concedes that a reasonable jury, following this instruction, could have concluded that he aided and abetted co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery by intending to “facilitate the taking of the gun from the clerk.” Further, the court held that Appellant committed a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). The court wrote that Appellant indisputably brandished his firearm during co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery, and while the jury’s general verdict obscures whether Appellant’s Hobbs Act robbery conviction was based on an aiding and abetting or a Pinkerton theory of guilt, under either theory he is liable for committing a crime of violence.

Calvin Currica v. Richard Miller

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-7638

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: DIAZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. He claimed that his guilty plea wasn’t voluntary because he didn’t know that Maryland’s sentencing guidelines were merely advisory. But a Maryland court denied his request for postconviction relief, finding that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, including his maximum sentencing exposure. The district court held that the Maryland court’s decision denying Defendant postconviction relief was reasonable.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that AEDPA forecloses habeas relief unless the PCR court’s decision was “based on” an erroneous finding, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(2), and Defendant doesn’t make that showing. Further subsection (d)(1) corrects only the most “extreme malfunctions.” Here, the PCR court’s decision wasn’t “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent because it didn’t “arrive at a result different from” a Supreme Court case with “materially indistinguishable” facts. Nor was the PCR court’s decision an “unreasonable application” of principles announced by the Supreme Court. Here, the PCR court concluded that Defendant couldn’t reasonably believe that the guidelines were mandatory or that he was entitled to a sentence between 30 and 51 years. That’s because the plea court correctly advised him that each of his charges carried a possible sentence of 30 years. So this isn’t a case in which Defendant was clueless about the endpoints of his sentencing exposure.

US v. Bruce Sturtz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4322

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: NIEMEYER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), the district court sentenced him to 120 months imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. That range was determined, in part, by the district court’s conclusion that Defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment that is required by Section 2252A(b)(2) when a defendant has a prior conviction for a qualifying sex offense. The district court found that Defendant’s prior conviction under Maryland law for a sexual offense in the third degree qualified as a predicate for the Section 2252A(b)(2) enhancement. Defendant then sought a review of the district court’s ruling that his prior Maryland conviction qualified as a predicate conviction under Section 2252A(b)(2), which triggered the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence.
 
The Fourth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court agreed with the government that Defendant waived his right to appeal that issue in his plea agreement. The court explained the indictment’s allegation that a 120-month minimum sentence applied because of Defendant’s prior Maryland conviction and the limitations that Defendant’s plea agreement placed on his right to challenge that allegation, as well as Defendant’s broad waiver of his right to appeal any determination that the district court made on that issue, preclude the present appeal. And this is confirmed by Defendant’s express waiver of the district court’s determination of the applicable sentencing guidelines range.

US v. Francisco Villa

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-4297

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: RUSHING

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the United States after an aggravated felony conviction. He challenged his conviction on numerous fronts, claiming vindictive prosecution and violations of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial, due process, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate that the presumption of vindictiveness applies. The presumption of regularity that attends a prosecutor’s pretrial charging decision, therefore, remains in place. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial on the aggravated reentry charge attached when the government obtained the indictment charging him with that offense, the second indictment in this case. Because Defendant does not argue that the time between the second indictment and his trial—just short of 6 months—is presumptively prejudicial, he has not met the threshold requirement for evaluating the remaining Barker factors. Finally, the court held that Defendant has not shown that officers arrested and fingerprinted him for an investigative purpose; therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of his second suppression motion.

USA v. Hoffman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-30323

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant, his wife, and another were indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The parties jointly owned Seven Arts Pictures Louisiana, LLC (Seven Arts), through which they purchased a dilapidated mansion at 807 Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans with the goal of converting it into a film postproduction facility. To offset the costs of the project, Seven Arts applied for film infrastructure tax credits offered by the State of Louisiana. The Government alleged that the parties “submitted fraudulent claims for tax credits, mostly by (1) submitting false invoices for construction work and film equipment or (2) using “circular transactions” that made transfers of money between bank accounts look like expenditures related to movie production.” The jury convicted Defendant on all charged counts. Defendant moved for a new trial as well as for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial but partially granted his motion for acquittal. Specifically, the court entered judgments of acquittal for Hoffman on five counts of wire fraud.
 
The Fifth Circuit held that the panel does not agree with the judgment that should be rendered in this case. Judge Jolly would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety. Chief Judge Richman would dismiss the appeal, concluding the notice of appeal was not timely. Judge Dennis would remand for an evidentiary hearing and resentencing. The net effect is that the sentence imposed by the district court stands, and the case is not remanded to the district court. The district court’s judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court.

USA v. Lopez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40121

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Cory T. Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He challenged his sentence on several grounds, particularly the district court’s imposition of a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The linchpin of this case is whether Defendant’s repeated instances of being a felon in possession of a firearm were relevant conduct justifying the enhancement.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court thoroughly analyzed the factors for relevant conduct— similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity—and concluded the evidence weighed in favor of the Government. Here, Defendant was sentenced to 70 months—well below the 10-year statutory maximum. The district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, in its analysis. Further, the court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines do not generally prohibit double counting. The Guidelines permit the district court to consider a defendant’s prior felony convictions in calculating both his offense level under Section 2K2.1(a) and his criminal history category. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in calculating Defendant’s sentence on this basis.

USA v. Scott

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-30501

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A federal jury convicted a former law enforcement officer (Defendant) of multiple counts of falsifying government documents, obstruction of justice, perjury, and property conversion. Defendant was sentenced to 160 months in prison. He appealed his convictions and sentence.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s two document-falsification counts were supported by sufficient evidence. First, Defendant argued that his misrepresentations on the forms were immaterial to the DEA’s administration. The court disagreed, citing the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1519, which contains no “materiality” element. Moreover, the prosecution produced evidence that Defendant knowingly gave the DEA false information, concealing that he seized the informant’s truck outside of his jurisdiction and that he instructed the informant to purchase the truck. An expert testified at trial that, had it known these details, the DEA would not have approved the seizure. Additionally, the court explained that the record is replete with evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant used the confiscated property for his own use. Defendant also contested both enhancements by pointing to Section 1B1.5(c). Even if the district court erred in applying these two enhancements, the error was harmless. The district court carefully explained that it would have imposed the same 160-month sentence for the same reasons even if it erred in calculating Defendant’s offense level.

Curt Russell Cannamela

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5035

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.


The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty.

United States v. Richard Austin Williams

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5002

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: SUTTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.
 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show.

United States v. Smith

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-5811

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: John K. Bush

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

While Smith was hiding in the woods, with an outstanding parole violation, police arrested him with a loaded gun in his possession. Smith was charged with illegally possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Despite advice from his attorney and the judge, Smith declined to stipulate his status as a felon and his knowledge of the same to preclude the government from introducing evidence of his prior felony convictions. At trial, the government introduced evidence of Smith’s 11 prior felony convictions: three convictions for grand larceny, one for forgery, two for robbery, four for escape, and one North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and infliction of serious injury. A jury convicted him. The district court sentenced him to 235 months in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s argument about the alleged unfairly prejudicial taint of evidence of his 11 prior felony convictions. Smith’s North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury qualified as a predicate violent felony under ACCA because it requires purposeful or knowing conduct and is categorically a violent felony.

United States v. West

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-2037

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions.

United States v. Walker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 21-3382, 21-2874, 21-3056

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Granger, King, and Walker were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and methamphetamine and firearms offenses. The judge sentenced Granger and King to 360 months’ imprisonment and Walker to 330 months.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the court should have struck Juror 70 for cause after the defendants exhausted their peremptory challenges. Juror 70 had raised his hand when the judge asked whether any potential jurors thought that a law enforcement officer’s testimony should receive extra weight. Juror 70 was a retired police officer with 30 years of service, and said “I’m inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt” but that he would have an open mind and respect the presumption of innocence. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a district judge may take into account everything a potential juror says when deciding whether that person can be impartial. Juror 70 recited the correct standard and the judge was entitled to find that he possessed enough self-awareness and honesty to carry out his promises.

The court vacated Walker’s sentence. In holding him accountable for all drugs that the conspiracy as a whole distributed during Walker’s time as a participant, the judge did not address what conduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to Walker.

USA v. Elvin Saldana-Gonzalez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1289

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the parties and the district court agreed that the appropriate guideline range based on Defendant's prior criminal history was 37 to 46 months.

Citing the fact that he accepted responsibility for the crime and his traumatic upbringing, Defendant sought a 37-month sentence. Defendant also claimed he carried the weapon for protection, given his gang history. The government, citing Defendant's lengthy criminal history and multiple firearms convictions, sought a high-end 46-month sentence. The court sentenced Defendant to 78 months in prison. Defendant appealed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

In front of the Seventh Circuit, Defendant argued that the district court improperly relied on its own personal fears in fashioning an above-the-guidelines sentence. While "[t]he district court trod on dangerous ground" in personally expressing its own fears, its remarks did not rise to the level of “extraneous and inflammatory.” The Seventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's challenge that the district court disregarded the applicable guideline range.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Defendant's claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable as it "failed to address his offense conduct, juvenile history, and the general lack of evidence surrounding deterrence." The court noted that the district court adequately considered Defendant's upbringing within the context of the offense, and that Section 3553(a)(2)(B) specifically permits judges to consider general deterrence when sentencing.

USA v. James Snyder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2986

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant, a former mayor of Portage, Indiana, arranged a public bidding process to determine where the city was going to purchase new garbage trucks. Defendant put his long-time friend in charge of the bidding process. Ultimately, the company that won the bid ended up paying Defendant $13,000 less than three weeks after receiving the contract.

In November 2016, a federal grand jury indicted Snyder for federal funds bribery and obstructing the IRS. He went to trial in January and February 2019. The jury convicted on one count of federal funds bribery and one count of obstructing the IRS. Defendant appealed, challenging decisions on motions to dismiss, jury instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence. The court rejected all of Defendant's claims on appeal and affirmed his conviction and sentence

United States v. Christopher Hester

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3007

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law

Claimant claimed $34,918 found in his car during a traffic stop. When he failed to fully respond to the government’s special interrogatories, the district court sanctioned him by striking his claim and entering a default judgment forfeiting the money to the government. Claimant appealed, arguing that the district court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Rule G(8).
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that an individual cannot “fail to comply” with an unknowable obligation. A party fails to comply with discovery obligations after a court order defines those obligations. Thus, Rule G(8) authorizes striking a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule G(6) only if the claimant has reason to know of and violates Rule G(6) special interrogatory obligations. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that Claimant knew or should have known that Rule G(6) obligated him to provide more information than he had provided. Claimant articulated a facially reasonable belief that the bank records and check receipts he supplied “firmly established” his relationship to the cash by “showing where the money comes from, [and] where the money was transferred and sent.” He claimed that additional documents requested by the government exceeded the scope of Rule G(6). Nothing in the record indicates that Hester had actual or constructive knowledge of additional obligations—the district court neither found that he should have known he was violating the Rule nor issued an order compelling him to respond to interrogatories.

United States v. Deshonte Dickson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2002

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

At sentencing, the district court, varying upward from the advisory guidelines sentencing range, imposed a sentence of 120 months imprisonment plus four years of supervised release upon Defendant. Defendant appealed. He argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for resentencing. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court agreed with Defendant that the district court committed procedural sentencing error when it adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and, without adequate notice varied upward for reasons that contradicted the PSR’s factual findings. However, the court found that the jury was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, the court did not disturb the jury’s credibility findings on appeal. Similarly, the court concluded that there is sufficient evidence to uphold Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court wrote that it cannot conclude that the inconsistencies between the PSR findings and the findings on which the district court based its upward variance, combined with the lack of prior notice, resulted in procedural sentencing error that was harmless.

United States v. Elizabeth Pounds

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2112

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. In the district court, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop of a vehicle that she was driving. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant reserved the right to appeal that ruling.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that there was no error in denying the motion to suppress. The court explained that the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant as she drove away from the residence on August 24. Officers had abundant reason to believe, based on informant reports and surveillance, that the owners were distributing methamphetamine from their residence. Police seized drugs from four short-term visitors who were stopped shortly after leaving the residence in June. As of August 24, investigators had reliable information that the owners were distributing a shipment of methamphetamine that arrived two days earlier, including a quantity that was seized from a downstream customer that very morning. A detective saw Defendant enter the residence at 10:00 p.m. and depart six minutes later. Although Defendant was previously unknown to investigators, her short-term visit to the suspected drug house conformed to the pattern of the drug trade and gave police reasonable suspicion to believe that she was carrying drugs as she departed. Accordingly, the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in criminal activity as she departed the residence, so the traffic stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. George Gordon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2605

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed a sentence of ninety-six months’ imprisonment imposed by the district court after Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by miscalculating his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has held that second-degree robbery under this Missouri statute is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the offense requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Because Defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1), the district court did not err in determining a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the court held that there was no procedural error.

United States v. Gregory McCoy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2412

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging: (1) the admission of evidence (field tests and a photograph); (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) the sentence (an adjustment and an enhancement).
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence was not inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial. Further, the court explained that the jury saw the pistol and photographs of it. An ATF agent, testifying as an expert, testified that it met the federal definition of a firearm. The pistol and the testimony are sufficient to prove that the pistol was a firearm. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence sufficiently proved that Defendant’s .45-caliber pistol was a firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sections 921(a)(3) and 922(g). Finally, the district court found that Defendant was a drug dealer—not merely a drug user—due to the packaging of the drugs, the evidence found in the search and police investigations, and his own testimony that he intended to distribute drugs. As such, the district court did not err in applying the sentencing enhancement.

United States v. Isaac May

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3344

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

I.M. and J.R. (collectively, “Appellants”) were convicted by a jury of charges alleged in a ten-count superseding indictment for offenses committed as part of a large drug conspiracy. The district court sentenced them to 360 and 336 months in prison, respectively. On appeal, I.M. challenged both the denial of his motion for severance and his sentence; J.R. challenged the denial of his motion for recusal, the denial of his motions to suppress wiretap and video surveillance recordings and his convictions.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained I.M. has given the court no reason to conclude that this was not an adequate safeguard in his case or that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to sever. Thus, the denial of I.M.’s severance motion was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the district court’s statement that I.M.’s “criminal history consists of violent acts and possession of firearms” did not mischaracterize his criminal history. Thus, the district court did not commit procedural error.
 
Moreover, the court held J.R. has failed to point to any facts establishing that the district judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The district judge’s issuance of some of the warrants, in this case, does not, of itself, require recusal. Any other challenges to the wiretap recordings are also waived because J.R. has failed to meaningfully explain why his motion to suppress should have been granted.

United States v. Kieffer Simmons

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2179

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: KOBES

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted co-defendants K.S and T.H of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Both challenged several district court rulings, and T.H. appealed his conviction.


The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that K.S. argued that, instead of co-Defendant’s testimony, the court should have admitted co-Defendant’s letter under the residual hearsay exception. The court explained the residual exception is to “be used very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” To fall within the exception, the statement must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.” The district court concluded that the letter was not trustworthy. Although the court did not explain how it reached its conclusion, its “discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence is particularly broad in a conspiracy trial.”
 
T.H. argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The evidence established that the middleman bought methamphetamine from K.H. and sold it to the CI. The CI testified to arranging the buy, and the middleman’s phone records showed calls with T.H. on the day of the purchase. After the middleman bought methamphetamine from someone in the white S.U.V., officers identified T.H. as the driver. The plastic bag the middleman later sold the CI had fingerprints from all three men. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from K.T. and D.S. that T.H. sold drugs in the same car and the same location as the controlled buy. This evidence was sufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction.

United States v. Patrick Webb, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3830

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of distributing a controlled substance near a protected location, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant to 380 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury and challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically requested separating the protected location element—Proposed Instruction No. 15—from the remainder of the elements of Count 1—Proposed Instruction No. 12. Defendant then filed objections to certain instructions but failed to object to either Instruction No. 12 or 15 prior to trial. He further failed to do so at trial or in his post-trial motion. Defendant “cannot complain that the district court gave him exactly what his lawyer asked.” Further, the court wrote that Evans controls here. Henderson’s interpretation of the career offender enhancement was “neither unexpected nor indefensible” and “had a rational basis.” The district court did not err in applying this enhancement. The court also explained that “when a district court varies downward and sentences below a presumptively reasonable Guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further.” Here, Defendant offered no convincing reasoning to rebut this presumption.

United States v. Robert Harrison

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1537

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 84 months imprisonment. Harrison appealed, challenging the admission of evidence of his prior firearm conviction.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s knowledge is at issue here because he did not plead guilty. Thus, Defendant’s prior conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was relevant to prove knowledge. Further, Defendant’s conviction was not too remote in time. Although it occurred 8 years before his arrest in this case, he was incarcerated for more than 3 of those years. Therefore, based on its compliance with the requirements of Oaks, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior firearm conviction.

United States v. Sylvester Cunningham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1080

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He argued that evidence should have been excluded from trial due to an unlawful search and seizure, that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.
 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that none of the contentions has merit and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the officer’s action was permissible under the Fourth Amendment on at least two bases: as an investigative search based on reasonable suspicion of crime and danger and as a search for evidence-based on probable cause under exigent circumstances. Further, the court held that the longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is constitutional, and the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the court wrote that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Finally, the court explained that a rational jury could have found that the firearm was placed strategically in a location where it was hidden from view but readily accessible to one who was seated in a wheelchair and carrying drugs in his undergarment.

United States v. Tracy Jones

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2776

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). Arrested on November 17, she was detained for 37 days before appearing before a magistrate judge on December 23. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress her statements from a post-arrest interview. The district court denied both motions.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the 37-day delay between Jones’s arrest and her initial appearance before a magistrate judge violated Rule 5(a). However, to determine whether a delay in presentment violates substantive due process, this court determines whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the government’s conduct “offends the standards of substantive due process” and “shocks the conscience.” Defendant asserted that law enforcement officers in South Dakota have a “pattern” of delaying defendants’ initial appearances, citing two cases where defendants moved to dismiss indictments based on delays in their initial appearance. However, the court held two mistakes do not establish a pattern of outrageousness sufficient to show deliberate indifference and support a due process violation.
 
Further, Defendant argued that her Miranda waiver was involuntary because the agent’s pre-warning statements were an unlawful two-step interrogation under Missouri v. Seibert and that her confession was involuntary under United States v. Aguilar. The court held the district court properly concluded that these brief, narrow-scope pre-warning statements were not a two-step interrogation in violation of Seibert and that Defendant’s statements were voluntary.

ROBERT YBARRA, JR. V. WILLIAM GITTERE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-99012

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Tallman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The State of Nevada sentenced Petitioner to die for brutally raping and murdering a 16-year-old in 1979. Petitioner pled not guilty by reason of insanity but was convicted by the jury after a trial in the District Court for White Pine County in Ely, Nevada. Petitioner argued that he is intellectually disabled and, therefore cannot constitutionally be executed under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Nevada trial court found he was not intellectually disabled, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which is subject to the restrictions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner argued that the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that he is not intellectually disabled is unreasonable under Section 2254(d)(2).
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argued that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably found that a 1981 IQ test was of “little value”. The panel wrote that first, the Nevada Supreme Court explicitly rejected Petitioner’s argument that the trial court had erred in crediting the 1981 IQ test over another expert’s testing. The second reason was that the record as a whole portrays Petitioner as a person who does not have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.” Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court said that it “need not decide the relevance, if any, of” the Flynn Effect, which causes average IQ test scores to inflate over time, “and the necessity of adjusting the 1981 IQ score” because that test occurred well after Petitioner turned 18.

USA V. FRANCISCO LUCAS, JR.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-50064

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: Wallace

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed the district court’s sentencing order, which imposed a heightened base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B).
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s sentencing order and remanded for resentencing on an open record. The court explained Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) applies if the offense involved a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.” Application Note 2 to Section 2K2.1 defines such a firearm as one: that has the ability to fire many rounds without reloading because, at the time of the offense (A), the firearm had attached to it a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition; or (B) a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition was in close proximity to the firearm. Because the parties assumed that Application Note 2 applies, the panel deemed waived any arguments concerning whether Application Note 2 is inconsistent with the Guideline or whether Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) is ambiguous so as to defeat resort to Application Note 2. Because these issues were waived, the panel applied Application Note 2 for the purposes of this appeal.
 
The panel held that the district court clearly erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Defendant’s magazine could accept more than 15 rounds, where the government did not physically produce or inspect the firearm or the magazine, and, without physical evidence, the government largely relied on its expert agent, who was, at most, equivocal.

USA V. MIGUEL ALANIZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-30141

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Gutierrez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After a grand jury indicted Defendant, he pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to three counts of cocaine distribution and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). At sentencing, the district court concluded that the two-level Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applied but found—albeit deeming it a “close call”—that Defendant was entitled to safety valve relief under Section 2D1.1(b)(18). It also found that Section 2D1.1(b)(1) was well-supported by a historical tradition of Second Amendment regulation and rejected Defendant’s constitutional objection. Calculating a total offense level of 15, the court sentenced Defendant to a below-Guidelines term of 15 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the constitutionality of U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) under Bruen.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Applying the two-part test adopted by Bruen, the panel assumed, without deciding, that step one is met—when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. At step two, however, the panel found Section 2D1.1(b)(1) constitutional because it clearly comports with a history and tradition of regulating the possession of firearms during the commission of felonies involving a risk of violence.

United States v. Freeman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-2039

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Zechariah Freeman was convicted by jury of one count of sexual abuse. Appealing, Freeman argued: (1) the evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction; (2) the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense; and (3) the district court erred by denying his request to use his peremptory challenges allotted by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b)(2) to strike prospective alternate jurors. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Spaeth

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-3096

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Matthew Spaeth sought to have his conviction and term of imprisonment vacated, or to have the sentence for his admitted participation in an extensive conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine reduced. He argued the government obtained and allegedly listened to recordings of telephone calls that he made from a pretrial-detention facility to his counsel. The Tenth Circuit found the record reflected that Spaeth’s guilty conduct was firmly established long before his arrest and that he received a very favorable sentence under a binding plea agreement. Even so, and despite his unconditional guilty plea, the Court found the law allowed Spaeth to challenge his conviction and sentence if his counsel’s deficient performance led to an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea when he otherwise would have chosen a trial. Though the Court condemned the conduct of the Kansas U.S. Attorney’s Office, Spaeth still needed to prove his claim for post-conviction relief, which the Tenth Circuit concluded he had not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed denial of relief.

California v. Farias

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C094195(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Harry E. Hull, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant inmates Jesse Farias and Fernando Miranda were found guilty of various charges stemming from their attack on a fellow inmate. Defendants, their counsel, and the State then agreed to allow the trial court to determine the truth of allegations that they had previously been convicted of crimes that constituted both serious felonies under Penal Code section 667(a), and strikes under Penal Code sections 667(e)(2) and 1170.12(c)(2), without their appearances. The trial court expressly found the prior convictions were for serious felonies under section 667 (a), but made no mention of the allegations under sections 667(e)(2) and 1170.12(c)(2). However, at the sentencing hearing, the court imposed sentences on the defendants as if it had found the strike allegations to be true. Had all parties attended the hearing on the priors, the Court of Appeal surmised someone in the group would have requested the court clearly make an oral record of its findings. Instead, the record was silent "with little way to know if the error was purely clerical in nature or if the trial court, in fact, failed to consider the strike allegations at all." On appeal, both defendants argued the court could not impose a strike sentence here, because it made no strike finding. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed a strike sentence was not appropriate, and vacated the sentence without prejudice for the trial court to correct the record. In addition to joining Farias’s challenge to the strike sentence, Miranda also challenged the trial court’s finding that two of his prior convictions were for serious felonies on grounds that those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. While the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding on one of the two subject prior convictions, the Court agreed with Miranda that, considering changes to the law governing gang offenses, the trial court lacked substantial evidence to support its finding that his prior conviction under section 186.22(a), was for a serious felony as contemplated by section 667(a). Both Defendants argued that amendments to Penal Code section 654 made after the trial court entered its sentence applied here; to this the Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the amended law.

California v. Ocegueda

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061077(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: Kathleen E. O'Leary

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Darrick Ocegueda was convicted by jury for first degree murder. He contended on appeal that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the theory of provocation as it related to the premeditation and deliberation elements of the offense and, relatedly, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a clarifying pinpoint instruction. Ocegueda argued the combination of some of the standard instructions given (CALCRIM Nos. 521, 522 & 570) might have misled the jury to believe that provocation could negate the elements of first degree murder only if it satisfied an objective, “person of average disposition” standard. Additionally, Ocegueda claimed the evidence was insufficient to support the elements of premeditation and deliberation. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

People v. Waqa

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A163761(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: Humes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Waqa was convicted of forcible rape after he sexually assaulted a woman in a public restroom. Because Waqa moved the victim from the restroom’s small stall to its large stall before raping her, the jury also found true an aggravated kidnapping circumstance under the One
Strike law, Penal Code section 667.61, requiring a sentence of 25 years to life in prison for the rape. Waqa argued there was insufficient evidence of the aggravated kidnapping asportation element, which requires that “the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense.”

The court of appeal modified the sentence to a 15-year-to-life term. The One Strike law requires a term of 15 years to life for qualifying sexual offenses if the defendant commits a simple kidnapping of the victim. By finding the aggravated kidnapping circumstance true, the jury necessarily determined that Waqa committed a simple kidnapping, a finding that was supported by substantial evidence. Where there is insufficient evidence of a circumstance supporting a 25-year-to-life term under the One Strike law but sufficient evidence of a lesser included circumstance supporting a 15-year-to-life term, an appellate court may reduce the sentence to the lesser term.

Rodas-Gramajo v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166375(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Rodriguez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal denied a writ of mandate sought by Petitioner to compel the superior court to dismiss the allegation that he committed various crimes "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members," holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the writ.

While Petitioner awaited trial, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 altering the requirements for imposing the gang enhancement by altering the proof necessary to establish the existence of a criminal street gang. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to dismiss the gang allegation against him. The trial court denied the motion and, instead, reopened the preliminary hearing to allow the People to offer additional evidence to satisfy the new gang enhancement statute. The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner's mandamus petition, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reopening the preliminary hearing to permit the People to address the amended gang enhancement elements because the defects in the evidence were minor errors of omission under section 995a.

Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 33

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The State of Colorado charged Dennis Chirinos-Raudales with, among other crimes, sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust, which prohibits sexual contact with persons under eighteen, but whose penalty escalates from a class 4 felony to a class 3 felony if the victim is under fifteen. The question presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the “subject of the action” was the subsection that applied when the child is under eighteen or the subsection that applies when the child is under fifteen. To this, the Court held that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense rather than the sentence enhancer. Therefore, because the substantive offense applies when the child is under eighteen and the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute.

Colorado v. Smiley

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 36

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: William W. Hood, III

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A man was found dead in Thornton, Colorado, and police suspected homicide. Thornton detectives identified defendant Thorvyn Bullcalf Evan Smiley as the sole suspect and, after tracking him down in New Mexico, brought him to a police station there to collect certain samples from him pursuant to a court order. Seeing Smiley’s obvious concern, they repeatedly reassured him that he wasn’t in trouble and that he’d be leaving the police station that day. The detectives then advised Smiley of his Miranda rights. Smiley signed a waiver and agreed to speak with the detectives. During the subsequent interrogation, Smiley confessed to killing the alleged victim. One of the questions before the trial court was whether the prosecution had proved that Smiley voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded the answer was no, and it suppressed the statement. The Colorado Supreme Court found no reversible error in that judgment and affirmed.

Orellana-Leon v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 34

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jose Leonel Orellana-Leon sexually abused his girlfriend’s daughter, L.V., from the time she was seven or eight years old until she was fifteen. When L.V. was fifteen years old, she told her father and stepmother about the abuse; as a result, a forensic interview was conducted. The State subsequently charged Orellana-Leon with sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust. Before trial, the State gave notice it intended to admit statements L.V. made to her father, stepmother, and the forensic interviewer under the child hearsay statute. Over the defense’s objection, the trial court granted the State's request. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on what happens when a defendant is charged under a statute that references two different ages. In the companion case, Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado, 2023 CO 33, ¶ 21, __ P.3d __, the Court concluded that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense, which applied when the child was under eighteen, rather than the sentence enhancer, which applied when the child is under fifteen. Applying that holding to this case, the Court concluded that because the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute.

Pellegrin v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 37

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner Trevor Pellegrin and the victim began dating, moved in together shortly thereafter, and later became engaged. During the parties’ relationship, Pellegrin took private, intimate photos of the victim in various stages of undress. The relationship subsequently ended, but several months after it did, Pellegrin and the victim spent three or four days together. At about that time, Pellegrin learned that the victim had started seeing someone else. This information upset Pellegrin, and over the next few days, he repeatedly called and texted the victim. In the course of these communications, Pellegrin called the victim names, sent nude photos of her that he had taken during their relationship, and threatened to post the nude photos online and send them to her younger brother. The victim received over one hundred text messages and photos from strangers, including messages with photos of naked men, messages saying that unknown people were driving by her home, and messages soliciting sex. At some point, the victim learned that these text messages were in response to two Craigslist advertisements that Pellegrin had placed. Upon becoming aware of these advertisements, the victim contacted the police, who arrested Pellegrin at his home. The State subsequently charged Pellegrin with, as pertinent here, one count of stalking, two counts of posting a private image for harassment (one count for the Facebook posting and one for the Craigslist posting), and one count of harassment. The case ultimately proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Pellegrin on all counts. He was sentenced to jail time, probation and participation in a domestic violence evaluation, and compliance with that evaluation's recommendations. Pellegrin appealed, arguing that harassment was a lesser included offense of stalking, so the two crimes should have merged. Pellegrin further argued that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not the trial judge, to determine whether the crimes for which he was convicted included an act of domestic violence. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Pellegrin's arguments on appeal and affirmed his sentence.

Rios-Vargas v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 35

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Monica M. Márquez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

There was no reason to believe defendant Nora Hilda Rios-Vargas did not commit the burglary with which she was charged: at trial, she argued the crime was committed by a nonparty alternate suspect, Sylvia Villalobos, who knew when the owner would be away, knew the location of the items that were stolen, had unique reasons for wanting those items, and had a motive for framing Rios-Vargas. Even the victim suspected Villalobos. Despite the strength of the connection between Villalobos and the burglary, and even though Rios-Vargas’s defense hinged on this connection, the jury was not allowed to see or hear from Villalobos. The trial court accepted Villalobos’s blanket invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and ruled that Rios-Vargas could not call her to the stand. It further prohibited defense counsel from informing the jury why Villalobos did not testify. As a result, the prosecution was able to tell two conflicting narratives. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review to decide whether a defendant could call to the witness stand a nonparty alternate suspect who intended to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and if not, what the jury may be told about the alternate suspect’s failure to appear. The Court held that a defendant is entitled to question a nonparty alternate suspect in the jury’s presence under the circumstances and procedures set forth in this opinion. Because the trial court erred in accepting Villalobos’s blanket Fifth Amendment invocation without holding a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and because that error was not harmless, the Supreme Court reversed Rios-Vargas’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

Owen v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2023-0819

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding Defendant sane to be executed, holding that the record contained competent, substantial evidence to support the circuit court's determination that Defendant was sane to be executed.

After considering all the evidence, the circuit court concluded that Defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was insane to be executed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding Defendant sane to be executed; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a continuance.

People v. English

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 128077

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Neville

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court dismissing Petitioner's appeal from the denial of his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, holding that the notice of appeal filed by Petitioner was untimely.

Petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to seventy years' imprisonment for murder. Petitioner later filed the pro se motion for leave to file the successive postconviction petition at issue on appeal, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court that was file-stamped on September 10, 2020, but the envelope containing the notice of appeal had a postage meter stamp dated September 1, 2020. The appellate court concluded that the postage meter stamp was insufficient to prove that Petitioner mailed his notice of appeal before the deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sole means of establishing the "time of mailing" under Rule 373 in the case of a pro se incarcerated litigant is by certification as described in Ind. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

People v. Sneed

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 127968

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Overstreet

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the decision of the circuit court finding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented the State from compelling Defendant to provide the passcode for his cell phone, holding that the foregone conclusion doctrine applied as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege in this case.

Defendant was charged with two counts of forgery stemming from the discovery of two false paychecks made payable to him. The police applied for and obtained a warrant to search Defendant's cell phone but could not execute the warrant because the phone was passcode protected. The State then filed a motion to compel production of the passcode. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that compelling Defendant to provide the passcode would constitute compelling incriminating testimonial communication and that the foregone conclusion did not apply as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the foregone conclusion applied in this case.

People v. Urzua

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 127789

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Neville

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting the State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's appeal of the second-stage dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, holding the appellate court erred in part.

Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to forty-eight years of imprisonment. Petitioner later filed a pro se postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court advanced the petition to second-stage rulings under the Act and then granted the State's motion to dismiss. In reversing and remanding for further proceedings, the appellate court concluded that Petitioner did not receive effective assistance of retained postconviction counsel at the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the appellate court's judgment reversing the circuit court's judgment of dismissal, holding that postconviction petitioners have a right to reasonable assistance of counsel under the Act; and (2) reversed the appellate court's judgment directing the circuit court to appoint new counsel, holding that the circuit court can only make one statutory appointment.

Martin v. Tovar

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 21-1072

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: McDermott

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the City of Muscatine on claims seeking to hold the City vicariously liable for a former police officer's sexual assault, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief as to her allegations of error.

Plaintiff, who was drunk, was offered a ride to a hotel by a police officer. The officer followed Plaintiff to her room and raped her. The officer was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of an incapacitated person. Plaintiff later sued the officer and the City alleging several tort causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, determining that Plaintiff failed to prove that the assault was within the scope of the officer's employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Plaintiff's sexual assault fell outside his scope of employment; and (2) this Court declines to adopt Plaintiff's proposed aided-by-agency theory to impose vicarious liability on the City.

State v. Taylor

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 123005

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals panel upholding a restitution plan imposed by the district court in connection with Appellant's plea of guilty to aggravated robbery of a vehicle, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden to prove that the restitution plan in his case was unworkable.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant plead guilty to aggravated burglary of a vehicle. The district court imposed a 100-month prison sentence and ordered $1,954 in restitution payable to the victim. Under the court's restitution plan, the amount was payable in monthly installments of $15. On appeal, Appellant argued that the $15 monthly payment was unworkable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant presented to evidence showing that he would be unable to make his $15 monthly payments while incarcerated Appellant did not meet his burden to prove the restitution plan to be unworkable.

Alderson v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0071-MR

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and his sentence of thirty years' imprisonment, holding that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to present victim impact testimony during the guilt phase of Defendant's trial, and the error affected Defendant's substantial rights.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the admission of testimony about how the alleged sexual assaults affected the victims in the merits phase constituted impermissible victim impact testimony, and this error impacted Defendant's substantial rights, requiring remand for a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Melton

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-SC-0427-DG

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Nickell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding evidence of a guardianship order in a prior criminal prosecution against Defendant for custodial interference and other related charges, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the proper Ky. R. Evid. 403 analysis.

Defendant allegedly broke into a residence where her child lived with the child's father and his girlfriend, assaulted the girlfriend, and fled with the child. Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to the guardianship order at issue, asserting that it would be unduly prejudicial. The trial court granted Defendant's motion and excluded the guardianship order. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in determining that evidence in the guardianship order would unduly prejudice Defendant by confusing the jury and that the guardianship evidence was vital to the Commonwealth's case.

Gasaway v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-SC-0457-DG

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Nickell

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for possession of heroin, holding that the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's admission of certain evidence and by affirming the trial court's decision allowing a certain witness to testify.

Here, the Supreme Court adopted the reasonable test for determining whether the warrantless search of a parolee's vehicle is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, as announced in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and overruled its decision in Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2014) to the extent it held that the conditions of parole imposed by state law are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court also held that the court of appeals (1) did not err in affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his truck; (2) erred by affirming the trial court's admission of evidence of methamphetamine for which Defendant had been acquitted and evidence of marijuana for which he had been found guilty; and (3) erred in affirming the trial court's decision to allow a witness to testify regarding events he did not perceive in real-time.

Johnson v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-SC-0541-MR

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Conley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of theft by unlawful tasking, burglary in the third degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, and imposing a total sentence of twenty years in prison, holding that the trial court erred in part.

The Supreme Court vacated the conviction as a persistent felony offender and remanded this action, holding (1) the instructions given in this case were erroneous because it could not be determined whether the jurors were unanimous in concluding that Defendant committed a single act satisfying the instruction, but the error was not palpable; (2) there was palpable error in Defendant's conviction as a persistent felony offender; and (3) Defendant's motion for directed verdict was properly denied.

Payne v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0120-MR

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Nickell

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of twelve counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and other sex-related offenses and his total sentence of seventy years in prison, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the seizure of his cellphone and password because Defendant voluntary consented to the search; and (2) the trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury as to the effect of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110(1)(d) on the jury's discretion to recommend consecutive and concurrent sentences.

Spalding v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-SC-0503-MR

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Conley

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second or greater offense and its sentence of twenty-seven years in prison, holding that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him by permitting three witnesses to testify via Zoom and erred by permitting the Commonwealth to join three indictments for trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it joined the three indictments for trial; and (2) erred when it permitted three witnesses to testify remotely, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Stieritz v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0085-MR

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Nickell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of complicity to attempted murder, complicity to second-degree assault, and tampering with physical evidence and his sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the complicity to attempted murder charge, the complicity to second-degree assault charge, or the tampering with physical evidence charge; (2) the trial court properly denied a mistrial; (3) Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on menacing; and (4) the trial court properly excluded irrelevant evidence during the penalty phase.

State v. Cummings

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2023 ME 35

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of gross sexual assault but vacated his sentence of eight years' imprisonment to be followed by eight years of supervised release, holding that there was no error in Defendant's conviction but that the sentencing analysis used by the trial court resulted in obvious error that required correction.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed obvious error in its treatment of a note from the jurors during jury deliberations and because of prosecutorial error. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) Defendant waived any objection to the court's response to the note; (2) there was no prosecutorial error or impropriety; and (3) the lower court had the authority to impose what was a lawful amended sentence, but the sentencing analysis employed by the court required that this Court vacate the sentence and remand for a de novo sentencing hearing.

Commonwealth v. Correia

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13223

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and his sentence of ten to twelve years in prison, holding that the trial errors detected in the underlying proceedings did not, either individually or in combination, create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree and, after a jury trial, convicted of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argued that rap lyrics he had written were erroneously admitted at trial, that the Commonwealth improperly commented on his rearrest silence, that one of the deliberating jurors was not fair and impartial, and that the jury instructions misstated the law on self-defense. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was error in the trial court's decision to admit Defendant's lyrics, but Defendant was not prejudiced; (2) referencing Defendant's pre-arrest silence was error, but there was no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice; but (3) in the context of the entire trial, there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Commonwealth v. Delossantos

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13351

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of carrying a firearm without a license and his sentence of eighteen months in a house of correction, holding that the Commonwealth did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and Defendant did not waive this issue.

In a pretrial motion, Defendant filed a motion to suppress based on the alleged inadequacy of the Miranda warnings provided to him in Spanish. The motion judge denied the motion after finding that Defendant was given "the full complement of Miranda warnings" in English and in Spanish. After he was convicted and the convictions were affirmed on appeal Defendant filed a postconviction motion for a new trial, which the motion judge denied following a hearing. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the conviction, holding (1) Defendant did not waive the issue of whether Miranda warnings were properly given to him in Spanish; and (2) the admission of Defendant's post arrest statements was error.

Chisholm v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-KA-01254-SCT

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

William Chisholm killed his former girlfriend, Dr. Shauna Witt, by shooting her to death. Dr. Witt had broken up with Chisholm and recently obtained a restraining order against him. She was examining a patient at her optometry office in Starkville, Mississippi when Chisholm barged in. He opened the office’s front door, walked through the hall to an interior exam room, and overpowered Dr. Witt, forcing his way into the exam room. He then pulled out a pistol. Dr. Witt was able to squirm past Chisholm and out of the examination room into the hall. But as she ran for her life, Chisholm opened fire—shooting her in the back and in the back of her head. Eyewitnesses saw the shooting. And surveillance video footage captured the audio of shots being fired. It also showed Chisholm pacing between the optometry office and Wal-Mart Vision Center—with pistol still in hand—immediately after he killed Dr. Witt. A jury convicted Chisholm of capital murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Chisholm appealed his conviction, but finding no reversible error in the trial court proceedings, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Chisholm's conviction and sentence.

Clanton v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-KA-01159-SCT

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Ishee

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, Officer Latayvin Taylor stopped defendant Dekara Clanton for not having his license plate illuminated. During a subsequent search of Clanton’s vehicle, Officer Taylor found a bag of multicolored pills behind the radio. Clanton was indicted for the intentional possession of a quantity of twenty dosage units but no more than forty dosage units of methamphetamine. Clanton was tried and convicted in late 2019. He was sentenced to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) with the potential to be released after eight years and placed on five years of post-release supervision. Clanton appealed his conviction, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by allowing photographs and testimony about money taken from Clanton’s person; (2) the trial court erred by allowing photographs and testimony about marijuana; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Officer Taylor to testify that he thought he found ecstasy in Clanton’s vehicle; (4) the trial court erred by overruling Clanton’s objection to the State’s alleged misstatement of evidence in its closing argument; and (5) the verdict was not supported by the evidence and was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Upon review of the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Clanton’s conviction.

Harvey v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00660-SCT

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Beam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Edward Harvey was indicted for aggravated domestic violence and kidnapping. Following a jury trial, Harvey was convicted of aggravated domestic violence and acquitted of kidnapping. He was sentenced to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Harvey appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by: (1) prohibiting him from presenting relevant defense evidence; and by (2) allowing an improper jury instruction regarding prior-bad- act evidence. After review of the trial court record, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no merit to either issue and affirmed Harvey’s aggravated domestic violence conviction.

P.D.E. v. Juvenile Officer

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99896

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Ransom

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal of his delinquency adjudication, holding that Juvenile's appeal of the issue of whether he "knowingly and voluntarily" admitted to the conduct alleged in the juvenile officer's amended petition was untimely.

The juvenile officer filed an amended petition alleging that Juvenile committed second-degree burglary, first-degree trespass, and two counts of second-degree property damage. After a restitution hearing, the juvenile division set restitution at $4,000. Juvenile appealed, seeking review of the adjudication hearing and order of disposition. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal, holding that the appeal was untimely.

State ex rel. Johnson v. Vandergriff

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100077

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Mary R. Russell

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the required "substantial threshold showing of insanity" and that his mental illness claims were procedurally barred.

On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court issued a warrant for Petitioner's execution. One month later, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he was incompetent to be executed under the standard set forth in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and because he was severely mentally ill. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim and filed a motion for a stay of execution while his incompetency claim was adjudicated. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's habeas petition and overruled as moot his accompanying motion for a stay of execution, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the substantial threshold showing of insanity required by Panetti and Ford.

State v. Hamby

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99554

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Powell

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree statutory sodomy, incest, first-degree child molestation, and one count of first-degree attempted rape, holding that the circuit court's jury instructions did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence presented at trial included multiple allegations of abuse related to each count of sexual misconduct and that five separate verdict directors violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury instructions violated Defendant's right to a unanimous verdict.

State v. Onyejiaka

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99871

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Ransom

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of possessing a controlled substance, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 579.015.1, and unlawfully using a weapon while in possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.030.1, holding that Defendant's convictions did not infringe upon his right to be free from double jeopardy.

On appeal, Defendant argued that his convictions violated double jeopardy protections because they arose from the same conduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no double jeopardy violation existed because the plain language of the states combined with fundamental principles of statutory interpretation clearly demonstrated the legislature's intent to authorize multiple punishments under sections 579.015 and 571.030.1(11).

State v. Vandergrift

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99913

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Zel M. Fischer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of three counts of child molestation in the first degree and three counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

In this case, the Supreme Court was required sua sponte to determine whether Defendant's appeal was timely, whether a written judgment of conviction in the proper form had been entered of record, and whether the Court was stripped of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held (1) this Court had jurisdiction of Defendant's appeal; (2) Defendant did not establish a right to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; and (3) the circuit court did not plainly error in failing sua sponte to exclude certain testimony.

Wilmoth v. Director of Revenue

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99655

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Patricia Breckenridge

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the director of revenue to suspend Defendant's driver's license pursuant to Mo. Stat. 302.505, holding that the circuit court did not err in admitting testimony that a preliminary breath test was greater than 0.08 percent or in finding that Defendant was arrested upon probable cause for an alcohol-related offense.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the result of a preliminary breath test is a numerical percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood of the test person, and section 577.021.3 allows a court to admit the result as evidence of probable cause to arrest; (2) because the numerical result in this case was known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest the circuit court was allowed to consider it in determining that the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (3) the judgment was supported by substantial evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence.

Broadwater Co. v. Release of Confidential Criminal Justice Information

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 112

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: James A. Rice

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court requiring Broadwater County to provide to Helena Independent Record (IR) or other interested persons redacted videographer and documentation records pertaining to Jason Ellsworth's May 2021 stop by and encounter with a Montana Highway Patrol officer, holding that there was no error.

Ellsworth pleaded guilty to an obstructing a peace officer. Thereafter, a reporter with the IR requested from Broadwater County a copy of Ellsworth's investigative file. Petitioner, a county attorney, determined that the file contained confidential criminal justice information and filed a petition seeking a declaratory ruling to clarify and enforce the rights of recovery to redacted confidential criminal justice information (CCJI) contained in the file. Petitioner also filed a separate motion for leave to deposit the investigative file under seal. The district court (1) concluded that Ellsworth's criminal case had been completed and that the declaratory action was ripe for decision; and (2) held that Ellsworth's privacy rights outweighed the public's right to know regarding certain information irrelevant to the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ellsworth was given a proper opportunity to participate, and his due process right was not infringed regarding the release of the CCJI.

State v. Gibson

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 109

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault with a weapon and his commitment to the Department of Public Health and Human Service (DPHHS) for the duration of his twenty-year sentence with ten years suspended, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, and the parties agreed to recommend that Defendant be committed to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) for the duration of his sentence. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to twenty years in DPHHS's custody with ten years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court unjustly resumed his criminal proceedings due to the lengthy period between his arrest and the date he regained fitness to stand trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss because resuming Defendant's criminal proceedings was not unjust.

State v. Hardy

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 110

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for two homicides and two attempts to solicit a third homicide, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide and two counts of solicitation to commit deliberate homicide and sentenced to serve four concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State's use of jailhouse informants did not violate Defendant's right to counsel; (2) the jury was fully and fairly instructed as to the applicable law; (3) any error on the part of the trial court in limiting defense counsel's ability to comment on a missing prosecution witness during closing argument; and (4) this Court will not exercise plain error review to consider whether Defendant's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and other trial errors deprived him of a fair trial.

State v. Hinman

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 116

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the State's felony charge against him for failure to register as a sexual offender, holding that the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA), as amended since 2007, was punitive in nature.

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in 1994 and served and discharged his sentence. At the time, SVORA, known then as Montana's Sexual offender Registration Act, required Defendant to maintain registration for ten years. When the legislature amended SVORA, it included more onerous steps and applied them retroactively to previously convicted registrants such as Defendant. In 2019, Defendant was charged with failure to register. Defendant appealed, arguing that the amended SVORA requirements rendered the statute an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment for his earlier crime. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) SVORA as amended is punitive in nature; and (2) therefore, the requirements brought on by those amendments could not retroactively be applied to defendants whose convictions predate the amendments.

State v. Ammons

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 433

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court denying Appellant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that the court of appeals erred by granting relief on a claim that Appellant did not present to the district court.

Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief asserting that his failure timely to appeal his convictions was due to the ineffective assistance of his counsel. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court did not err in finding that Appellant did not direct counsel to file an appeal but that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult with Appellant as to whether he wished to appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant did not allege in his postconviction motion that trial counsel failed to consult with him about whether he wanted an appeal; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred by reversing the district court's decision on that basis.

State v. Muratella

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 463

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Michael G. Heavican

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court overruling Defendant's motion for a new trial under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2101 to 29-2103 and his motion to withdraw his plea under the common-law procedure recognized in State v. Gonzalez, 830 N.W.2d 504 (2013), holding that Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements for such relief.

Defendant pleaded no contest to and was adjudged guilty of one count of attempted delivery or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and sentenced to an eight-to-twelve-year term of imprisonment. Later, in response to the indictment of Nebraska State Patrol evidence technician Anna Idigima, Defendant applied for a new trial and moved to withdraw his plea. The district court overruled the motions after holding hearings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in overruling the motions because Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements for a new trial under section 29-2101 and the common-law procedure for withdrawing a plea after conviction.

People ex rel. E.S. v. Superintendent, Livingston Correctional Facility

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 03298

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court denying Petitioner's N.Y. C.P.L.R. 70 habeas corpus petition and dismissing the proceeding, holding that the Sexual Assault Reform Act's (SARA) mandatory restriction prohibiting a person who is serving a sentence for an enumerated offense against a minor victim and is released on parole from coming within 1,000 feet of school grounds applies to youthful offenders.

Petitioner was eighteen years old at the time he pleaded guilty to the attempted second-degree rape of a thirteen-year-old victim and was adjudicated a youthful offender. The Board of Parole granted Petitioner an open date for release subject to numerous conditions, including SARA's school grounds condition. Unable to obtain suitable housing and still imprisoned, Petitioner brought this proceeding alleging that, as a youthful offender, he was not subject to the school grounds condition. Supreme Court denied the petition, but the appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the legislature did not mean to exclude youthful offenders from SARA's school grounds condition.

People ex rel. Rivera v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 03299

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Singas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's conclusion that the application of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) to Petitioner violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution when applied to offenders whose crimes predated the 2005 amendments to the Act, holding that the effect of SARA's school grounds condition, as codified in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), was not punitive.

In 1986, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree and other crimes. Petitioner was unable to locate SARA-compliant housing before his open release date and therefore remained in custody until he could locate suitable housing under SARA's school grounds condition prohibiting him from living within 1,000 feet of a school. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that SARA's residency restriction violated ex post facto principles. Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application and ordered his release. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the condition does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

People v. Weber

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 03301

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Halligan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate court reversing a county court order designating Defendant a level three sex offender and remitting the matter for consideration of whether an upward departure was warranted, holding that, under the circumstances, the appellate division had the authority to remit for consideration of an upward departure.

Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the first degree. After Defendant's probation was revoked and prior to his subsequent release, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders deemed Defendant a level three sex offender. County Court adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division reversed based on Defendant's risk factor point assessment and remitted the case for further proceedings. On remittal, County Court again adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division had power to remit for consideration of a departure request after it reversed the order determining Defendant's risk level.

People v. Worley

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 03300

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Jenny Rivera

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the conclusion of the appellate division that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) court acted within its discretion by upwardly departing to level three in determining Defendant's risk level classification, holding that the SORA court deprived Defendant of basic due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Defendant's convictions required him to register under SORA. At the SORA hearing, the court noted that Defendant would normally be required to register as a level two sex offender but upwardly departed to level three due to Defendant's "extensive prior disciplinary history." The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proceeding failed to comport with due process because Defendant was provided no notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard in response to the District Attorney's request for an upward departure.

Oregon v. Turay

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S068894

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Flynn

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Ahmed Turay, Jr. was convicted of compelling prostitution, based in part on incriminating images and text messages that law enforcement found pursuant to a warrant to search his cell phone for nine categories of information (search categories). Defendant challenged the warrant, and his challenge presented an opportunity for the Oregon Supreme Court to consider the constitutional requirement that search warrants “particularly describe” the place to be searched or thing to be seized in the context of warrants that authorize law enforcement to search for digital data. It was undisputed the warrant in this case contained some search categories that failed to particularly describe the evidence sought; the Supreme Court also considered whether and to what extent those unlawful search categories require suppression of evidence obtained through the search of defendant’s phone. The Court concluded here that five of the nine search categories set out in the warrant to search defendant’s cell phone failed to satisfy the constitutional particularity requirement and, thus, those categories failed to authorize a lawful search. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the inclusion of those unlawful search categories in the warrant did not necessarily require suppression of all evidence found on defendant’s phone: (1) defendant has established a minimal factual nexus between a constitutional violation and the challenged evidence; and (2) that minimal factual nexus undermined the presumption of validity that ordinarily attends warrant-based searches and therefore required suppression unless the State could establish the challenged evidence was not tainted by the constitutional violation. The Court remanded the case for the trial court to develop a factual record and for the trial court to make the required factual findings under the correct legal standard.

State v. Davis

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 21-337

Opinion Date: June 13, 2023

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that there was no error on the part of the trial justice in denying Defendant's motion to correct his sentence.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling house. As part of his sentence and as relevant to this appeal, Defendant received a ten-year nonparolable sentence enhancement as a habitual offender to be served consecutively to his first sentence. Defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his habitual offender sentence enhancement was illegal. The trial justice denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial justice correctly complied with the habitual offender statute.

Lewis v. South Carolina

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28159

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: James

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner Justin Lewis represented himself at trial and was convicted of distribution of heroin. Lewis timely filed an application for post- conviction relief (PCR), alleging pretrial counsel was ineffective in several respects. The PCR court summarily dismissed Lewis' application, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted his petition for certiorari review of the PCR court's order. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR court's order in part and remanded for a hearing on Lewis's claims that pretrial counsel failed to adequately investigate the criminal charge, failed to communicate with material witnesses whose testimony would have allegedly been favorable to the defense, failed to advise him of the right to appeal, failed to provide the necessary information for filing a notice of appeal, and failed to file a notice of appeal on his behalf.

In re Texas, ex rel. Wice

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-93,089-01

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Judge George Gallagher, elected judge for the 396th District Court in the Eighth Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, was specifically assigned by Presiding Judge Mary Murphy of the First Administrative Judicial Region to preside over Texas v. Paxton in the 416th District Court in the First Administrative Judicial Region in July 2015. The issue before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, on mandamus, was whether Judge Gallagher had the constitutional and statutory authority to preside over Texas v. Paxton when he granted a change of venue to Harris County in April of 2017. To this, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that he did, regardless of any other assignment orders that were issued by Presiding Judge David Evans. The Court, therefore, conditionally granted the State’s petition for writ of mandamus.

State v. Jackson

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 21-0738

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Bunn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's four felony convictions stemming from an incident resulting in a shooting death, holding that the admission of certain evidence prejudiced Defendant, requiring remand for a new trial.

At the time of the underlying shooting Defendant was on parole from a previous felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, the charges against him included the status offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by refusing to accept his stipulation to his prior felony conviction on the grounds that Defendant offered it during the trial because, in fact, Defendant offered the evidence after the court refused the prosecutor's earlier attempts to obtain the stipulation. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that because the court's refusal permitted the State to admit evidence of the name and nature of Defendant's prior, similar offense, and the admission of this evidence prejudiced Defendant, the circuit court abused its discretion and unfairly prejudiced Defendant by refusing his offered stipulation.

State v. Kessler

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 21-0674

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Walker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the sentencing Petitioner consecutively to a definite term of forty years' imprisonment for first-degree robbery, one to ten years' imprisonment for grand larceny, one to fifteen years' imprisonment for burglary, and one to five years in prison for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, and conspiracy to commit burglary, holding that there was no error.

On appeal, Petitioner argued, among other things, that the circuit court committed reversible error during sentencing by admitting testimonial evidence of her prior criminal charge over her objection because the State presented no evidence establishing how the charge related to her current case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Petitioner's prior criminal charge under W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b), and Petitioner did not open the door to the evidence; but (2) the prior-act evidence, while inadmissible, had no prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case and did not warrant a new trial.

State v. Reeder

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 21-0554

Opinion Date: June 12, 2023

Judge: Bunn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question that a jury's failure unanimously to decide the recommendation of mercy does not allow the circuit court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment required for a conviction of first-degree murder pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-2-2.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and conspiracy to commit murder. After the mercy phase of the bifurcated trial the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to mercy. The court ultimately discharged the jury and certified the question at issue to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) in a first-degree murder trial, the jury deciding whether the defendant receives mercy must reach a unanimous verdict; and (2) if the jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict then the trial court must declare a mistrial and impanel a new jury to determine whether Defendant should receive mercy.

State v. Ward

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 21-0806

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Armstead

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's conviction of attempted murder in the second degree and other crimes, holding that the principles of double jeopardy were violated by Defendant's convictions for brandishing a deadly weapon and wanton endangerment involving Deputy Coty Pierson.

Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, two counts of wanton endangerment, one involving Deputy Pierson and the other involving Jeffrey Barnhouse, and brandishing a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) the jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer should not be set aside; (2) it was plain error for Defendant to have been convicted and sentenced for brandishing and wanton endangerment of Deputy Pierson because those crimes were lesser included offenses of the offense of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer; and (3) the trial court did not favor the State during Defendant's trial.

State v. Fermanich

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2021AP000462-CR

Opinion Date: June 14, 2023

Judge: Hagedorn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that Defendant was not entitled to sentence credit on a Langlade County charge for time served in the Oneida County Jail, holding that, under State v. Floyd, 606 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2008), Defendant was entitled to credit on the Langlade County charge for which Defendant was untimely sentenced.

During the course of two hours Defendant stole and drove three trucks in Langlade County and was arrested after driving the third truck over the border in Oneida County. The State brought charges against Defendant in Oneida County. While Defendant remained in the Oneida County jail the State brought charges in Langlade County. The two cases were consolidated in Langlade County. Defendant pled guilty to no contest to three charges, one from Langlade County and two from Oneida County. Defendant later filed a motion to modify the judgment of conviction, arguing that he was entitled to sentence credit on his Langlade County charge for time served in the Oneida County jail. The circuit court agreed and awarded Defendant 433 days of credit. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to credit for time spent in custody in the Oneida County Jail.

Hurtado v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 63

Opinion Date: June 15, 2023

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for possession and delivery of methamphetamine, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(b).

Defendant was charged with five felony offenses related to possession and delivery of a controlled substance and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to one count of possession and one count of delivery of methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Defendant to five to seven years on the possession charge and a consecutive sentence of ten to fifteen years on the delivery charge. Defendant later filed her motion for sentence reduction, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not elaborate on its reasons for denying Defendant's motion for sentence reduction and that there was no other error in the proceedings.

State v. Ward

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 60

Opinion Date: June 9, 2023

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, holding that the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct in the underlying proceedings.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct in the way he referred to and used the testimony of a forensic interviewer in his opening statement and closing argument. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that the prosecutor's statement violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (2) there was no plain error in the State's closing argument.

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