Dubin v. United States

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-10

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Sonia Sotomayor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Dubin was convicted of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347 after he overbilled Medicaid for psychological testing performed by his company. The prosecution argued that, in defrauding Medicaid, he also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft” under section 1028A(a)(1), which applies when a defendant, “during and in relation to any [predicate offense, such as healthcare fraud], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” Dubin’s fraudulent Medicaid billing included the patient’s Medicaid reimbursement number. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Dubin’s aggravated identity theft conviction.

The Supreme Court vacated. Under section 1028A(a)(1), a defendant “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal. Under the government’s view, section 1028A(a)(1) would apply automatically any time a name or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or billing used in the commission of a long list of predicate offenses. The Court concluded that the use of a means of identification must entail using a means of identification specifically in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of a payment or billing method. The inclusion of “aggravated” in 1028A’s title suggests that Congress contemplated a particularly serious form of identity theft, not ordinary overbilling offenses.

United States v. Munera-Gomez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1473

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Gelpi

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for attempting to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, holding that Defendant's first three challenges on appeal were unavailing and that his final argument was waived.

Specifically, the First Circuit (1) did not err by declining to order the government to provide use immunity to a defense witness; (2) the district court did not err or undermine Defendant's entrapment defense in its evidentiary rulings; (3) the district court did not err in refusing to apply safety valve relief at sentencing after finding that Defendant failed to meet the safety valve's complete and truthful disclosure requirement; and (4) Defendant's remaining argument on appeal was waived.

United States v. Saemisch

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1076

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court applying the so-called "turnover" statute, 18 U.S.C. 3664(n), in this case regarding the disposition of the funds held in Appellant's inmate trust account, holding that no additional fact-finding was required and that the turnover order was within the ambit of the district court's discretion.

Appellant was convicted of distributing child pornography. As part of Appellant's sentence, the district court ordered him to make $18,000 in restitution to the victims of his crimes. During Appellant's incarceration the government learned that his inmate trust account reflected a balance of $10,956 and successfully moved for an order authorizing the Bureau of Prisons to to "turnover" Appellant's funds to be used as payment towards his outstanding restitution obligation. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the turnover order was valid and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order.

United States v. Sheehan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1983

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the seizure of his cell phone and its refusal to suppress evidence of child pornography, holding that the warrant authorizing the search of Defendant's electronic devices containing the child-pornography evidence was unsupported by probable cause.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the police exceeded the scope of the first warrant by seizing his phone from his wife and that the application for the second warrant did not contain sufficient detail such that a neutral magistrate could determine whether there was probable cause that the alleged objects of the search were pornographic. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) there was no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights in the seizure of his phone under the first warrant; (2) fatal deficiencies in the second affidavit supporting the second warrant resulted in the second search warrant being issued without the required showing of probable cause; and (3) the good-faith exception did not apply, requiring suppression of the evidence.

United States v. Domenico Sandalo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-708

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: WESLEY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances after a search warrant was executed against his residence. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement seized from the search. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the district court’s decision. Defendant challenged the search warrant’s validity. He argued that the district court should have given him a Franks hearing because the warrant relies on knowingly false statements in the supporting affidavit.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not made a substantial preliminary showing that any of the three statements Defendant scrutinized were false material statements that the Officers knowingly or recklessly included in the search warrant affidavit. He succeeds only at identifying inconsistent statements—and discrete details within them—that is immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Further, Defendant impugns only the CI’s veracity, not the Officers’. Accordingly, the court held that he is not entitled to a Franks hearing.

Range v. Attorney General United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2835

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1995, Range pleaded guilty to making false statements about his income to obtain $2,458 of food stamp assistance. His conviction was classified as a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Range was sentenced to three years’ probation. Three years later, Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by the instant background check system. Range’s wife subsequently bought him a deer-hunting rifle. Years later Range learned that he was barred from purchasing and possessing firearms because of his welfare fraud conviction. He sold his rifle to a firearms dealer and sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The section prohibits firearm ownership by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—the federal definition of a felony.

In 2022, the Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit, reasoning that “the people” constitutionally entitled to bear arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” and that even if Range fell within “the people,” the government demonstrated that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition.

On rehearing, en banc, the Third Circuit reversed. Despite his false statement conviction, Range remains among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The government did not carry its burden of showing that the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation support disarming Range.

United States v. Dowdell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3251

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Somerset County officers were patrolling in response to recent gang-related crimes and shootings. Detective Gambino recognized a vehicle he had seen earlier parked in front of a known meeting place for the Bounty Hunter Bloods. Gambino followed the car, saw it turn without signaling, and radioed his supervisor, Sergeant Brown, to pull the car over for a traffic violation. Brown, driving with two other officers, initiated the traffic stop. Gambino arrived and shined his flashlight by the car's left rear door. Dowdell, whom Gambino knew from prior arrests to be a member of the Bloods, was sitting in the back seat. Gambino opened the left rear car door to “have a conversation.” Gambino saw a bulge in Dowdell’s jacket, ordered Dowdell out of the car, patted him down, and discovered a fully loaded semi-automatic firearm.

Dowdell, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), argued that Gambino violated his Fourth Amendment rights by “physically intruding on” the car door. The Third Circuit affirmed an order granting Dowdell’s motion to suppress evidence, rejecting the government’s arguments that the district court abused its discretion in finding that it had waived any argument that existing precedent should be extended to justify opening the car door and, alternatively, in not excusing the waiver. The government’s sole legal theory was that reasonable suspicion justified opening the door.

United States v. Garcia-Vasquez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2219

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: Bibas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Garcia-Vasquez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, came to the U.S. illegally. In 1999, he was convicted of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. After serving his prison sentence, he was removed. Garcia-Vasquez returned to the U.S. illegally. He was subsequently convicted in state court for distributing heroin and other drug offenses. New Jersey released him to immigration authorities. Garcia-Vasquez pleaded guilty to reentering the country illegally after having been convicted of an aggravated felony and removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). Based on his 1999 cocaine-conspiracy conviction the government advocated a 16-level enhancement under Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). The Guideline’s Application Note 5 extends that enhancement to inchoate crimes like conspiracy. Garcia-Vasquez argued that application notes may not extend the reach of the Guideline’s text and that, under the categorical approach, his federal conspiracy conviction did not count as a generic conspiracy because its elements did not require an overt act.

The district court applied the enhancement, sentencing him to 46 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the enhanced range. The Third Circuit affirmed. Garcia-Vasquez argued that his 1999 conviction was only for conspiring to traffic drugs, not actually trafficking them; only Application Note 5 names inchoate crimes expressly. The court rejected the argument. The plain meaning of “drug trafficking offense” includes drug-trafficking conspiracies so it is not necessary to resort to the application notes.

US v. Troy Skinner

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4131

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, International Law

Defendant a citizen and resident of New Zealand, carried on an online relationship with a thirteen-year-old girl in Virginia that involved several sexually explicit video calls. A federal grand jury charged him with nine counts of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). He entered a conditional guilty plea to one of the counts and was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. Defendant challenged both his conviction and sentence on appeal. He first argued that his conviction involves an impermissible extraterritorial application of Section 2251(a) because he was in New Zealand when the unlawful images and videos were produced. Second, he contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because he lacked adequate notice that the victim was underage. Third, and finally, he challenges his sentence on the grounds that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for offenses involving “sexual contact.”
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conviction stands as a permissible domestic application of Section 2251(a) because the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in Virginia, where the visual depiction that forms the basis of Defendant’s conviction was produced and transmitted. Further, the court held that although Defendant argued otherwise, the fact that a violation of Section 2251(a) carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence does not give him a due process right to a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense. Finally, the court held that because Defendant admitted to masturbating during the video calls,it was appropriate for the sentencing court to apply the two-level enhancement.

Ficher v. Bickham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-30750

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: James C. Ho

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A Louisiana jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder. In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel erred by failing to contact an eyewitness who would’ve supported his defense. He has twice been denied state postconviction relief. He sought federal habeas relief for a second time. The district court held the petition untimely and dismissed it with prejudice.
 
The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded so that the district court can rule on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the first instance. The court explained that courts of appeals may reach an abandoned timeliness defense when the waiver or forfeiture results from a mistake—but not when the state’s decision to focus exclusively on the merits of the habeas claim is based on a deliberate judgment call. And that is especially so where timeliness is complex, but the merits are straightforward. But rather than decide the merits of Petitioner’s claim in the first instance, the court concluded that remanding the case back to the district court is appropriate.

USA v. Campos-Ayala

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-50642

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Priscilla Richman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendants appealed their convictions of possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.
 
The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated their convictions. The court held that the jury could not reasonably conclude, based on the available evidence, that either Defendant had possession of the marihuana with intent to distribute. The court explained that Defendant’s statement that he rearranged the bundles while showing more than mere presence does not establish an adequate nexus sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find possession. The co-Defendant’s statements that he “just helped” and “understood” he was in possession after the Agent explained the charges to him are similarly insufficient for a reasonable jury to find he possessed the marihuana. Further, the court found that it would be unreasonable for the jury to infer Defendant had possession with intent to distribute based on his statement to the Agent that he “just helped.” Second, Defendant’s statement made to DEA Agents after the Agent explained the charges against him was not a confession.

USA v. Mendoza-Gomez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50611

Opinion Date: June 1, 2023

Judge: Jacques L. Wiener, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to assaulting, resisting, or impeding various officers or employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 111(a)(1) and (b). Defendant appealed the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018).
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a primary issue, in this case, is whether a court may apply Section 3C1.1 when a defendant obstructs another person’s arrest, which in this case is that of Defendant’s brother. The court wrote that when Defendant assaulted the agent, he violated Section 111 and triggered the base offense level in Section 2A2.4. Then, when Defendant physically prevented the agent from arresting another member of Defendant’s group, he obstructed the administration of justice in an offense that was closely related to his instant offense of conviction. In other words, there is a sufficient nexus between Defendant’s relevant conduct and his conviction for the assault of a federal officer. It is, therefore, plausible, in light of the record as a whole, for the district court to have found that Defendant’s conduct is properly categorized as an obstruction of justice under Section 3C1.1.

United States v. Carter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3699

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

After drunkenly beating his wife and threatening to shoot her with a handgun, Carter pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Carter had a prior conviction for felony robbery under Ohio law. The district court held that Ohio robbery is a crime of violence and calculated an enhanced Guidelines range of 37–46 months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); 4B1.2. Considering the harm Carter caused his wife, the district court suggested the sentence would be the same even without the enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Carter’s 38-month sentence. The elements of Ohio robbery are “the same as, or narrower than,” the Guidelines’ elements of extortion. The court rejected Carter’s argument that because the crime he was convicted of is called robbery it could only be compared to Guidelines robbery.

VanPelt v. City of Detroit

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-1680

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.

VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.”

Bell v. Hepp

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2819

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two sisters accused Bell, a family friend, of sexually assaulting them. There was no physical evidence. Bell did not testify. Bell’s attorney sought to undermine the sisters’ credibility, suggesting that the girls had motives to lie, highlighting the younger sister’s admission that she had been drunk and had lied to police about her inebriation, and noting that the older sister’s account had changed. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that jurors who voted to acquit would “have to believe” that the sisters were lying and that if someone lies, “they’re going to have a reason.” The judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence; and the jury should disregard any arguments suggesting facts not in evidence.

The jury convicted Bell. Because of his prior sexual-assault convictions, the court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected Bell’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments shifted the burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Bell’s federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), stating that under de novo review, "the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause,” but under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Stacy v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2003

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2014, Stacy was convicted of bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and ordered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 in restitution jointly and severally with a codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the government forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims. When Stacy entered federal custody he suffered from pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems worsened and he sought treatment through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. Stacy did not receive the procedure while incarcerated. Stacy filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the federal prison was negligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The government settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability but agreeing to pay him $75,000. The government expected the Treasury Department to offset the $75,000 settlement for application to Stacy’s restitution debt.

The district court rejected Stacy’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law authorizes the government to offset Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it has been past due since the time of sentencing.

United States v. Baird

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1877

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

FBI Agent Wainscott posted an ad on Craigslist that hinted at an opportunity to engage in sexual activity with a minor. Baird responded to Wainscott, who posed as the father of a 10-year-old girl with whom Baird could have sex. Graphic emails and texts followed, indicating Baird's desire to have sex with the girl. In discussing where and when to meet, Wainscott suggested that Baird bring gummy bears as a gift for the child. Baird agreed to buy the candy, then drove to the address that Wainscott gave him. Agents arrested Baird and found three packages of gummy bears in his car.

Baird was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court concluded Baird had attempted to “knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” a minor, because he “inquired into what this child liked sexually, indicated what he liked and what he would do sexually to this child, requested photographs of the child, and continued to engage the father in conversations about the child.” The messages—although conveyed to Wainscott posing as the girl’s father—still fell within the scope of section 2422(b) and the intended gift was significant evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considered as a whole, the evidence established that Baird took a substantial step toward the completion of the offense and intended to influence the minor to submit to sexual activity.

United States v. Salazar

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2696

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Salazar, at a Peoria bar, posted a video of himself online, which Peoria police officers saw. Salazar had an active arrest warrant for traffic violations. Officers went to the bar. Security cameras and body-worn cameras captured the subsequent events. Salazar was sitting at the bar with a black jacket on his chair. Draped over an empty chair to his left was another jacket with a Purple Heart insignia. As Salazar stood between the chairs, an officer cuffed his hands behind his back. Salazar claimed that the black jacket was not his but that the Purple Heart jacket was his. Police found a gun and a wallet containing Salazar’s identification in the black jacket on Salazar’s chair.

Salazar was charged with possessing a firearm illegally. Salazar unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The district court ruled that the police had conducted a valid search incident to arrest because Salazar could reach the jacket (and gun) and, in any event, had abandoned the jacket. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search was a lawful search incident to Salazar’s arrest. The court declined to address whether it matters that an arrestee is secured.

United States v. Catrell Green

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1350

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: STRAS

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant received a 108-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. He challenged the base-offense-level calculation, a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, and the overall length of the sentence. At issue on appeal is whether the crime of assault while displaying a dangerous weapon is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that each of the three ways of committing assault in Iowa requires intent. Thus, contrary to Defendant’s contention, the holding in Borden v. United States is of no help to Defendant. Further, beyond the base offense level, Defendant believes that he did not deserve a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.” The court held that there is Defendant’s guilty plea, which necessarily required him to admit that he possessed the gun. Second, there was a video of him wielding what appeared to be the same gun just days earlier, which shows that he had “authority” and “control” over it. Third, no one disputes that the gun’s location under the front passenger seat placed it within arm’s reach of him. On these facts, the court could not say the district court’s finding that he was “armed” was erroneous. Finally, Defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his 108-month prison sentence. The court held that given the 12-month downward variance he received, “it is nearly inconceivable” that the district court “abused its discretion in not varying downward even further.”

United States v. Christopher Chappell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2503

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: GRUENDER

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. While in jail, prior to pleading guilty, he sexually assaulted multiple corrections officers. Later, following his guilty plea, jail personnel discovered him with a six-inch metal shank. At sentencing, one of the assaulted corrections officers testified. She described how Defendant, without her consent, rubbed her thigh and buttocks with his hand while she was serving breakfast. Another jail employee testified about the shank. Based on these accounts, the district court concluded that Defendant did not qualify for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and in determining that the attempted aggravated-assault offense is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s deviant behavior while incarcerated—molesting corrections officers and carrying a shank—is hardly emblematic of a “sincerely remorseful defendant.” Further, the court wrote that Defendant does not dispute that if the assault offense is a crime of violence under the guidelines, an attempt to commit that offense qualifies as well. Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault of a police officer with a deadly weapon was a conviction for a crime of violence that raised his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).

United States v. Dywan Conley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2282

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: KELLY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A handgun was found in Defendant’s jacket pocket while he was being treated in a hospital emergency room for a gunshot wound. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Conley conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued on appeal that because the Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) protection officers’ restraint of him in the stabilization room amounted to an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, evidence of the handgun found in his jacket pocket must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that under the balancing test, “the greater the intrusion on a citizen, the greater the justification required for that intrusion to be reasonable.” Noninvestigatory seizures are reasonable if they are “based on specific articulable facts” and the “governmental interest” in effectuating the seizure in question “outweighs the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary government interference.” The court explained that here the HCMC protection officers’ seizure of Defendant in the stabilization room was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Further, Defendant voluntarily brought himself to HCMC’s emergency room to seek treatment for a gunshot wound that medical staff considered potentially life-threatening. Given those circumstances, Defendant should have reasonably expected the sort of intrusions that are inherent to the provision of emergency medical care, including the removal of one’s clothes to facilitate treatment and—if compelled by the need to maintain a safe environment—even temporary physical restraint.

United States v. Edell Jackson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2870

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. He argued that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of the offense and when it responded to two questions from the jury during deliberations. He also contended that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury on the first element of the offense. Further, the court held that the instructions provided that in making the determination about knowledge, the jury may consider whether Defendant reasonably believed that his right to possess a firearm had been restored. The instruction allowed Defendant to argue and a jury to find that he lacked the requisite knowledge due to a belief that his rights had been restored. Further, the court concluded that the district court was correct that Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant based on his particular felony convictions. The court explained that legislatures traditionally employed status-based restrictions to disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms. Whether those actions are best characterized as restrictions on persons who deviated from legal norms or persons who presented an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, Congress acted within the historical tradition when it enacted Section 922(g)(1) and the prohibition on possession of firearms by felons.

United States v. Francis Kistler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1514

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant, a former sheriff’s deputy, on six counts: attempting to induce a minor to produce child pornography, enticement of a minor, and transferring and attempting to transfer obscenity to a person under the age of 16. Defendant pleaded guilty to a superseding information charging him with the conduct underlying Counts 3 and 4 under a single count. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the original indictment. The parties also agreed to recommend a sentence of 120 months imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court sustained Defendant’s objection to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). Defendant challenged his sentence’s length.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court emphasized that the Guidelines did not adequately account for the seriousness of Defendant’s offense and the need to send an accurate message to the community. Given the clarity of the district court’s rationale for its variance, any procedural error in the upward departure was harmless. Accordingly, even if the district court erred procedurally in its departure analysis, any error is harmless considering the court’s rationale for its alternative variance. The court wrote that Defendant has shown no likelihood that his sentence would be more favorable should he be resentenced based on the alleged error.

United States v. Garrett Waters

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-1887

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Defendant challenged the jury instructions, an evidentiary ruling, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.
 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court first wrote that Defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can show that the error affected his substantial rights. To meet that prong of the plain-error analysis, Defendant must show a reasonable probability that the erroneous instruction affected the verdict. The court saw no reasonable probability that the jury would have found Defendant not guilty of touching C.W.’s genitalia if the instruction had excluded the extraneous terms. Further, Defendant contended the jury could have mistaken C.W.’s sexualized behavior for his own. Here, the district court reasonably declined to exclude the evidence under Rule 403. C.W.’s testimony about age-inappropriate sexual behavior was not presented in the abstract; she connected it directly to Defendant by explaining that she learned the behavior from him. Viewed in that context, the testimony was prejudicial to Defendant but not unfairly so. C.W.’s testimony, if believed, gave the jury reason to conclude that Defendant had sexually abused her. Finally, the court wrote that no physical evidence was required: “A victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.”

CLINTON ELDRIDGE V. CATRICIA HOWARD, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-15616

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: Schreier

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition in district court. In the amended petition, Petitioner challenges, among other things, the United States Parole Commission’s 2019 decision to issue a three-year “set-off,” the time he must wait until his next parole hearing. The district court for the District of Columbia transferred the case to the District of Arizona, where Petitioner was incarcerated. That court dismissed Petitioner’s petition as an impermissible second or successive petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and denied Petitioner’s motion to reconsider.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The panel held that Petitioner need not obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of the instant petition because Congress did not define or include the District of Columbia Superior Court as a “State court” in 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c), where it had expressly done so in that and other statutes. The panel held that Section 2253(c)(1)(A)’s language, “in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court,” does not include the District of Columbia Superior Court. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing the petition as an abuse of the writ when Petitioner could not have possibly raised the same claims in prior petitions. Thus, because no court has addressed Petitioner’s three-year set-off claims regarding his 2016 parole denial, he did not abuse the writ by raising the 2019 denial issue in his instant habeas petition.

JEREMY PINSON V. MICHAEL CARVAJAL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-55175

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Bade

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In these consolidated appeals, federal prisoners (collectively “Petitioners”) challenged the dismissals of their habeas corpus petitions in which they asserted that their incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Eighth Amendment and sought release from custody. The district court dismissed the petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Petitioners were challenging conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of confinement, and thus their claims did not properly sound in habeas.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments. Given Petitioner’s transfer from USP Victorville prior to the court’s review of her habeas petition, the panel addressed its jurisdiction. The petition sought relief in the form of release from USP Victorville and an injunction requiring that facility to protect USP Victorville inmates from COVID-19. Because the panel could no longer provide Petitioner’s requested relief, the panel held that she fails to present a live case or controversy, and Article III, therefore, prohibits jurisdiction over her petition.
 
The panel explained that Hernandez did not instruct federal prisoners to bring claims related to the conditions of their confinement under Section 2241; rather, Hernandez states that challenges to “conditions of a sentence’s execution” may properly be brought under Section 2241. The panel concluded the district court was not required to convert Petitioners’ habeas petitions into civil rights actions and declined the invitation to remand to the district court to perform this conversion in the first instance.

LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-16142

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Murguia

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for habeas relief after being held in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. A district court judge granted Petitioner’s petition for relief and ordered the Government to provide her with a bond hearing on statutory grounds, relying on Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government appealed on the ground that Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law.
 
The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s remaining constitutional argument. The court explained that t Jennings’s reasoning is “clearly irreconcilable” with Casas-Castrillon’s detention-shifting framework and held that Jennings abrogated this portion of Casas-Castrillon. Next, the panel explained that Subsection A provides the Government with authority to detain noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and that Jennings provides that Subsection C authorizes detention during the same period as Subsection A, but does not define that period. The panel looked to Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008), and held that detention authority under Subsection A continues through judicial review. The panel held that the authority under Subsection C likewise continues through judicial review. Finally, the district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question in the first instance.

USA V. CHRISTIAN ESTRELLA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-10027

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant was arrested after two officers discovered a handgun concealed in his vehicle. At the time of this encounter, Defendant was a registered gang member on California state parole and was subject to a suspicionless search condition that has been upheld by the Supreme Court. After entering a plea of guilty and preserving his right to appeal, Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the officers did not have advance knowledge that he was on parole at the time of this encounter.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The panel held that a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to believe that a person is on active parole before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition. Consistent with case law and with general Fourth Amendment principles, the officer must possess advance knowledge of an applicable parole condition before they may detain or search a parolee. The officer need not be absolutely certain, with ongoing day-by-day or minute-by-minute awareness of the subject’s parole status. Instead, it is sufficient for the officer to find that the individual to be searched is on active parole and an applicable parole condition authorizes the search or seizure at issue. Applying this standard, the panel concluded that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that Defendant remained on active parole when he was detained and searched. The panel further held that this encounter did not violate California’s independent prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches.

Thomas Dale Ferguson v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-12727

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: WILSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner is an Alabama prisoner serving a death sentence following his jury convictions on four counts of capital murder. After pursuing a direct appeal and post-conviction relief in the Alabama state courts, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his federal habeas petition, arguing that the district court did not apply the proper standard for intellectual disability as required by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and erred in finding Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. He also contends that the state court’s determination that his counsel was not ineffective during the pretrial and penalty phases was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. The court also found that the ACCA’s determination that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The court explained that the trial judge “was well aware of the mitigation evidence presented at trial” yet found that the circumstances of Petitioner’s childhood did not amount to a mitigating factor given his age, marriage, and employment. In light of the trial court’s determination, the court explained it cannot find the ACCA unreasonably applied Strickland by concluding that Petitioner did not provide enough evidence to undermine the ACCA’s confidence in the trial judge’s decision to override the jury’s recommendation of life.

USA v. Clifford Laines, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 20-12907, 21-11535

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: WILLIAM PRYOR

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant challenged his drug- and firearm-related convictions as well as his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Defendant argued that insufficient evidence supports two of his convictions and that he is entitled to a new trial based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).


The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The court explained that sufficient evidence supports Defendant’s convictions. He has also not established that it is reasonably probable that a new trial would result in a different outcome as required by Brady, nor has he provided any evidence of perjured testimony as required by Giglio. Finally, Defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the district court erroneously sentenced him because his earlier cocaine conviction under Florida law does not constitute a serious drug offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Further, Defendant identified no precedent that would make it “'obvious’ or 'clear under current law’” that the Florida definition of cocaine is overbroad. Thus, the court held that the district court did not plainly err in sentencing him.

Warren King v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-12804

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: WILLIAM PRYOR

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner, a Georgia prisoner sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contends that the Georgia courts unreasonably adjudicated his objection that the prosecutor exercised discriminatory strikes during jury selection, unreasonably concluded that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel in the investigation and presentation of his mental health and mitigation evidence, and unreasonably rejected his challenge to the procedure for establishing intellectual disability in capital cases. Petitioner also argued that the district court erred when it ruled that he forfeited any further claim based on his alleged intellectual disability.
 
The Eleventh Circuit denied his petition. The court held that the state court did not apply the wrong standard. Counsel’s investigation before trial “need not be exhaustive” but only “adequate.” Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 997. So “to determine whether trial counsel should have done something more in their investigation, we first look at what the lawyers did in fact.” The superior court correctly considered Petitioner’s criticisms of his counsel’s performance in the light of counsel’s actions and not based on Petitioner’s suggestions of an ideal trial strategy. Further, the court held that contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the superior court did not reach its conclusion based on an unreasonable categorical rule against affidavit evidence. The court weighed those affidavits against the live testimony of Petitioner’s counsel that they could not have secured further mitigation or mental-illness witnesses and chose to give trial counsel’s testimony greater weight.

USA v. Ivan Robinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-3039

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: SENTELLE

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Appellant appealed his criminal convictions for forty-two counts of prescribing a controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a) and two counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957. Appellant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. He contends that each of his actual patients included in the indictment, despite the fact that they were ultimately pill-seekers addicted to oxycodone, had real ailments to which he properly responded in good faith, and the government did not prove otherwise. He also argues that the two undercover DEA agents presented real MRIs with real injuries, leading Appellant to believe he was treating them appropriately.
 
The DC Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentencing. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the court affirmed the district court on its Napue and expert testimony rulings. However, the court reversed the district court on its Brady decision and remand this case for a new trial due to the government’s suppression of the favorable and material Pryor Reports and CCN Report. The court explained that although the Brady error is dispositive of this appeal, the remand will open the possibility of a new trial, and Appellant’s remaining arguments as to the evidentiary questions in the case are likely to arise again on retrial.

USA v. Matthew West

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 18-3063

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: RANDOLPH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2005, after a jury convicted Appellant of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)), the district court, relying on the Armed Career Criminal Act, sentenced Appellant to 18 years imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. The Supreme Court’s Johnson decision came down in 2015. Within a year Appellant brought a Section 2255 habeas petition, seeking to have his sentence vacated or corrected. The district court used the preponderance of evidence standard in determining that Appellant failed to show that it was more likely than not that his sentence relied on the residual clause.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing in the record indicates whether Appellant’s sentence rested on the residual clause, or on the elements clause, or both. The government’s sentencing memorandum, the presentence report, and the court’s statements indicate only that Appellant’s prior convictions were violent felonies and therefore subjected him to the sentencing enhancement. Further, Appellant contended that after his sentencing, there were cases suggesting that a crime with a mens rea of recklessness would not qualify as a violent felony. The aggravated assault statutes punish attempts to cause or causing “bodily injury purposely” or with “extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such” injury. The New Jersey statutes thus required not mere reckless conduct but extreme recklessness. The circuit courts considering “extreme” or “depraved heart” recklessness, as in the New Jersey statutes, have concluded that elevated recklessness satisfied the elements clause.

State v. Luviano

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CR-21-0329-PR

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Beene

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that felony resisting arrest constitutes a single unified offense, thus affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony resisting arrest and other offenses and sentencing him accordingly.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's instruction regarding the elements of resisting arrest under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2508(A)(2) improperly conflated subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2). The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-2508 is ambiguous because it may be reasonably read as setting forth a single unified offense or distinct crimes, and this Court concludes that subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) are alternative means of committing one offense; (2) this Court's interpretation of section 13-2508 comports with the Sixth Amendment; and (3) because the two subsections set forth a single unified offense the jury instruction regarding this crime did not constitute error.

Hogan v. Payne

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 99

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his sentence was illegal and that an amendment to the information was to vague to suffice as an amendment, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The jury sentenced Appellant as a habitual offender to a total of 125 years' imprisonment, and the court of appeals affirmed. Appellant later filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the State's oral amendment to the information was deficient. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had authority to sentence Appellant as a habitual offender, and his sentence was within the range authorized under Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-501(b).

Mitchell v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 101

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Womack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting and sentencing Defendant for first-degree battery and failure to appear on a felony, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to substitute counsel and that there was substantial evidence to support Defendant's conviction for first-degree battery.

After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant of first-degree battery and failure to appear but acquitted him of second-degree battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant was indigent he was not entitled to the counsel of his choice, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to substitute counsel; and (2) the State introduced substantial evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for first-degree battery.

People v. Braden

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S268925

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: Carol Corrigan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the trial court's denial of Defendant's request for a pretrial diversion made for the first time after the jury returned its verdict, holding that a defendant must request a pretrial diversion under Cal. Penal Code 1001.36 before attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first.

After a trial at which Defendant represented himself, a jury found Defendant guilty of resisting an executive officer with force or violence and having two prior qualifying felony convictions under the "Three Strikes" law. Before sentencing, Defendant's newly-appointed counsel moved to have Defendant considered for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. The trial court denied the motion as both untimely and moot, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Legislature intended to require that a defendant request pretrial mental health diversion before attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of a guilty or not contest plea, whichever occurs first.

People v. Wilson

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S189373

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Carol Corrigan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of death, following resentencing, in connection with his convictions of first degree murder, two counts of forcible rape, and enhancements for personal use of a firearm, holding that any error in the resentencing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

When Defendant was convicted in 2000 the jury found true special circumstances for committing murder during a kidnapping and intentional infliction of torture and set the penalty at death. The Supreme Court upheld the guilt judgment but reversed the penalty verdict on the grounds that the trial court erroneously dismissed a juror during penalty phase deliberations. After a retrial, Defendant was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) double jeopardy principles did not bar Defendant's penalty retrial; (2) the penalty retrial did not violate due process; (3) Defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of California's death penalty statute were unavailing; and (4) any error brought about by retroactive application of Senate Bill 1437 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

P. v. Hodges

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323199(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In May 2022, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the basis that the 230 years to life sentence was unauthorized because his three prior violent or serious felony convictions under the “Three Strikes” law all arose from the same underlying case. Consequently, appellant contended he should only be sentenced as a second strike offender. The court construed this as an application for writ of habeas corpus and denied relief.

Subsequently, Defendant appealed the order denying post-conviction relief. Because courts have the discretion to initiate an independent review of the denial of a post-judgment motion, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's petition.

P. v. Odell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B319448(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a gun. The jury also convicted him of second-degree murder, finding he had personally and intentionally discharged a gun causing death. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the felon-in-possession law violates the Second Amendment.

The Second Appellate District rejected Defendant's argument. Relying on dicta from various opinions, including District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 592, the court found that all constitutional rights have limits and the Second Amendment right to bear arms is not offended by a statute prohibiting individuals who have been convicted of felony offenses from possessing a firearm. The court also rejected Defendant's jury instruction claims.

Raju v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164736(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Whitman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The complaint, filed in September 2021, alleged that “San Francisco’s criminal legal system is in a state of crisis,” as over 400 criminal defendants had cases pending past their statutory deadline for trial. Of the defendants, 178 were in jail, typically locked in cells for 23 hours a day.

The trial court dismissed, reasoning that, under the “Ford” decision, one department of a superior court may not restrain the implementation of a judgment entered by another department. On appeal, the defendants challenged the plaintiffs’ taxpayer-standing cause of action based on Penal Code provisions that impose a duty on the courts (and others) to expedite criminal proceedings, including by prioritizing them over civil cases, and to follow specific procedural steps before a criminal trial may be continued beyond statutory time limits.

The court of appeal reversed. Ford is not relevant; the plaintiffs did not seek to review, revise, or reverse any decision in an individual criminal case. The court rejected the defendants’ alternative legal challenges, noting that courts must implement calendar management procedures, in accordance with local conditions, to ensure that criminal cases are assigned before the last day permitted for trial. With respect to standing the court stated that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded “waste” or “illegal expenditure” of public funds and did not impermissibly challenge a discretionary act.

Colorado v. Kelley

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 32

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: Berkenkotter

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Noelle Kelley was taken by ambulance to the hospital after she was involved in a car accident in which another person was injured. At the hospital, an officer investigating the accident asked Kelley if she would release her medical records to the police. She refused. After Kelley was charged with vehicular assault, careless driving, and driving under the influence, she pled not guilty and endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. The State moved the trial court to conclude that Kelley’s endorsement of involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense constituted an implied waiver of her physician-patient privilege and thus the State was entitled to the disclosure of her medical records. They further asked the court to determine that Kelley’s refusal to release her medical records was admissible at trial. The trial court granted the State's motion as to both issues. Kelley then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction for review. Kelly argued: (1) when she endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, she did not impliedly waive her physician-patient privilege; and (2) even if she did waive the privilege, the trial court’s order requiring the release of her medical records was too broad. Kelley also argued that her refusal to release her medical records was inadmissible because she cannot be penalized for exercising her Fourth Amendment right to refuse a warrantless search. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) a party impliedly waives the physician-patient privilege when they assert the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, limited to those medical records related to the affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court’s disclosure order here was not overbroad because it was carefully limited to those medical records that related to Kelley’s endorsement of the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Because the parties did not have the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of the admissibility of Kelley's refusal to release the records, the Supreme Court declined to address it.

Garcia v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 30

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: William W. Hood, III

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Cristobal Garcia, was found guilty of one count of attempted extreme-indifference murder, a form of first degree murder that requires that the defendant “evidenc[e] an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally.” Garcia argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court wasn’t required to define “universal malice” for the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court.

State v. Langston

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20734

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Andrew J. McDonald

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that a trial court can properly consider conduct related to a charge of which a criminal defendant was acquitted when the court sentences the defendant on other charges of which the defendant was convicted but that courts should be extremely cautious in relying on such conduct in sentencing.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for robbery in the first degree and other offenses. Defendant later filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence arguing that the sentencing court violated his constitutional rights by considering conduct underlying a charge for which he was acquitted - assault. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a sentencing judge may consider a broad range of conduct so long as the sentence falls within the statutory range and the conduct does not serve as grounds to enhance the sentence; and (2) the sentencing court in this case did not violate Defendant's right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment or his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by considering the conduct underlying his assault charge.

Alahad v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2021-1450

Opinion Date: June 1, 2023

Judge: Jorge Labarga

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress eyewitness identifications resulting from an out-of-court police procedure, holding that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion review and that the court of appeal correctly analyzed the merits under that standard.

In denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the court of appeal applied the abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court's ruling on the out-of-court identification by the eyewitness. On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed "[d]ue to the abuse of discretion standard of review." The Supreme Court approved the decision below, holding (1) abuse of discretion review is the proper standard; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the out-of-court identification.

Idaho v. Anderson

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48985

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Zahn

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Sean Anderson appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault on a police officer. Anderson argued on appeal: (1) the district court erred by instructing the jury on a different theory of assault than what was alleged in the charging Information; (2) the district court erred by refusing to give his proposed jury instruction on the misdemeanor offense of discharge of a firearm aimed at another; and (3) the district court imposed an excessive sentence. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Anderson’s judgment of conviction, finding that the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.

People v. Pinkett

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 127223

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: O'Brien

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Pinkett was charged with aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer after he failed to stop his motorcycle in response to police sirens and lights and traveled more than 21 miles per hour over the speed limit. Pinkett was ultimately arrested inside a Walmart. In opening statements, the prosecutor said that officers would testify that at Walmart Pinkett did not ask why he was being detained. Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. At trial, the issue was whether Pinkett was aware of the officers attempting to stop him; there was testimony about noise levels, Pinkett's earplugs, and the lack of a rear-view mirror on his motorcycle. The arresting officer testified that he told Pinkett, 'We need to walk out the store without making a scene,’ and he did it with no problem.” In closing arguments, the prosecutor said: “[Pinkett] doesn’t ask why he’s being detained. ... [Pinkett] has the right to remain silent … Don’t you think a normal person would say what’s this all about.”

The appellate court reversed Pinkett's conviction, finding that the circuit court erred in denying Pinkett’s motion for a mistrial because evidence of Pinkett’s silence during and after his arrest was only admissible for impeachment purposes whether the silence was before or after Miranda warnings. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was not so overwhelming that the error was harmless.

Owen v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 21S-LW-00333

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder, felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, and two counts of criminal confinement and his sentence of life without parole for the murder conviction, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

Defendant, a gang leader, supervised and participated in the torture and brutal killing of member of the gang that other members believed was a police snitch. Once the victim was dead, Defendant oversaw cleaning up the crime scene and then hid the body. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence both to find that Defendant was a "major participant" in the victim's murder and to support two of the statutory aggravators; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury as proposed by Defendant; and (3) the record supported the other aggravating factors not relating to the life without parole sentence.

Commonwealth v. Samia

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12023

Opinion Date: June 1, 2023

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation but vacated his conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, holding that the felony-murder conviction was improper.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony. In this appeal, consolidated with the appeal of his motions for a new trial and for reconsideration, Defendant argued, and the Commonwealth conceded, that the conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder was improper because the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping did not exist at the time of the killing. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's felony-murder conviction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's conviction of felony-murder lacked sufficient evidence to support it; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error.

Commonwealth v. Wittey

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13239

Opinion Date: June 5, 2023

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of both deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that there was no error in the underlying proceedings or in the verdict.

On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant following a police trooper's examination of Defendant's vehicle, which was visibly parked in the driveway leading up to his house. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant's vehicle was not parked within the curtilage of his home the trooper's observations of the vehicle did not constitute a search for constitutional purposes; and (2) there was no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.

Garcia v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CA-01214-SCT

Opinion Date: June 1, 2023

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Alberto Garcia confessed to savagely raping a five-year-old girl and leaving her lifeless body, hanged by the neck, in a filthy trailer. He pled guilty to capital murder. And he waived his right to appeal his conviction. He also waived his right to jury sentencing. The trial judge sentenced him to death. Garcia appealed his sentence, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Garcia filed two separate petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR): one with the trial court seeking to set aside his guilty plea; the other with the Supreme Court seeking to set aside his death sentence. The trial court denied Garcia's petition aimed at his guilty plea. The appeal before the Supreme Court here was the trial court's denial of his guilty-plea PCR. In his petition, Garcia contended his mental-health issues—in particular his new- claimed suffering from autism—rendered him incompetent and unable to plead guilty voluntarily. He also suggested his trial counsel was ineffective for not ensuring his psychological expert was sufficiently independent and for encouraging him to plead guilty. Following a hearing, the trial court issued a lengthy order explaining why Garcia had failed to sufficiently show he was entitled to post-conviction relief. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief.

Welch v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-00457-SCT

Opinion Date: June 1, 2023

Judge: Michael K. Randolph

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Martezzarien Welch was convicted by jury of statutory rape. Welch was identified by the victim, and his DNA matched semen found on the victim. On appeal, Welch argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to determine whether Welch’s father’s or great uncle’s DNA may have matched the semen found on the victim. He pointed out that both men were present at the home when the rape occurred. And he argued that because they were all related and shared DNA markers, it was possible that their DNA samples, had they been collected and tested, also would have matched the semen. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the record affirmatively showed counsel’s decision not to collect and test Welch’s father’s and great uncle’s DNA was reasonable trial strategy and was not deficient performance. Additionally, Welch was not prejudiced by his counsel’s decision. Therefore, the Court denied his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim with prejudice, and the Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.

State v. Alkazahy

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 406

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury and his sentence to an eighteen-month term of imprisonment, eighteen months of post-release supervision, and revocation of his driver's license, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the results of a breath test administered to him using a DataMaster instrument and by imposing an excessive sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting the results of the DataMaster test; and (2) Defendant's sentence, which was within the applicable statutory range, was not excessive.

State v. Lorello

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 385

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, holding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions.

During the underlying jury trial, the prosecution presented various forms of circumstantial evidence connecting Defendant to the shooting death of the victim int his case. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in admitting "manipulated video surveillance from multiple sources in [an] attempt to match the walking pattern of the individuals in those videos to a video depicting [Defendant] walking." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence; (2) the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

State v. Ramirez

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 314 Neb. 419

Opinion Date: June 2, 2023

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's resentencing for the eight felony crimes he committed when he was seventeen years old, holding that there was no merit to Defendant's arguments that the district court imposed an excessive aggregate sentence or an unlawful de facto life sentence.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and related crimes. The court sentenced Defendant to mandatory life imprisonment for each first degree murder conviction and to twelve to fifteen years of prison for each remaining conviction, with all sentences to run concurrently except the sentences for weapon convictions, which were to run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony conviction. The Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court resentenced Defendant to a combined sentence of 128 to 180 years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing Defendant.

New Hampshire v. Boudreau

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2021-0350

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Ian Boudreau was convicted by jury on fourteen counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). He argued on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) improperly responding to a jury question during its deliberation concerning the State’s burden of proof; and (2) allowing the State to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief of the defendant’s pre-arrest refusal to speak to the police. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded: (1) the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion in responding to the jury question; and (2) though the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence in the State’s case-in-chief, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

New Jersey v. Berry; Daniels; Burnett

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-8-22

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Douglas M. Fasciale

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury found defendants Kenneth Daniels, Levell Burnett, and Barry Berry guilty of being leaders of a drug trafficking network, known in New Jersey as the “kingpin” offense. As to the four material elements of the kingpin offense, the jury asked whether it was “possible” to be a supervisor (the third element), but not to occupy a high-level position (the fourth element). The New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the judge’s response to that question was error capable of producing an unjust result. The Court also considered the Appellate Division’s determinations that the trial judge should have modified element four of the model kingpin charge by adding language from New Jersey v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563 (1994), to further explain what constituted a “high-level” member of a conspiracy and that the judge needed to tailor the kingpin charge to the evidential proofs admitted against each defendant, as well as its determination that Berry’s motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. The Supreme Court held that judges are encouraged, when practical, to respond “yes” or “no” to unambiguous and specific questions posed by juries during deliberations. Without concluding he should have answered “yes,” the Appellate Division determined that the trial judge failed to adequately address the “fundamental import of the jury’s question.” It found that the trial judge should have modified element four of the model kingpin charge by adding language from Alexander, and it determined that the judge needed to tailor the kingpin charge to the evidential proofs admitted against each defendant. The Appellate Division therefore reversed the kingpin convictions as to defendants Kenneth Daniels and Levell Burnett. As to defendant Barry Berry, however, the appellate court reversed an order denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and vacated his conviction. The Supreme Court held the trial court was under no obligation either to mold the charge sua sponte by factually addressing the varying levels of authority that each defendant played in the conspiracy or to modify the model charge by adding further definitional language from Alexander. And the Court concluded the trial judge properly denied Berry’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. The Court therefore affirmed as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment to vacate the kingpin convictions as to Daniels and Burnett; and it reversed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial judge’s denial of Berry’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. The case was remanded for a new trial against all defendants on the State’s kingpin charge.

Etemad v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 108

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Bejan Etemad was convicted by jury of terrorizing. He applied for post-conviction relief, arguing there were errors in the jury selection process that constituted a reversible error. Etemad’s application was summarily dismissed by the district court, finding Etemad’s application was a “meritless, misuse of process and untimely.” To the North Dakota Supreme Court, Etemad argued the district court erred in summarily dismissing his application for relief because he wasn’t afforded notice and an opportunity to support his application. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dmissal.

Glasser v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 111

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Andrew Glasser appealed a district court’s denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Glasser pled guilty to child abuse, tampering with evidence and possession of child sexual abuse materials. Glasser filed several character reference letters for the district court to consider at sentencing. Unknown at the time, three of the letters were forged. Glasser was also charged with and ultimately pled guilty to three counts of class A misdemeanor forgery for submission of the letters. On appeal, Glasser argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to appeal his convictions and gave him incorrect advice regarding his guilty pleas and sentencing. He also argued he received an illegal sentence. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Glasser did not receive an illegal sentence or ineffective assistance of counsel.

North Dakota v. Lonechild

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 112

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Evan Lonechild was charged with escape after being placed in the Lake Region Residential Reentry Center (“Reentry Center”) following a probation violation and subsequently failing to return to the facility while exercising work release privileges. Appealing the escape conviction, Lonechild argued he was not in “official detention” as defined by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06(3)(b) because he was on probation when he left the Reentry Center. The North Dakota Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Lonechild’s conviction.

O'Neal v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 109

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jason O’Neal pled guilty to attempted murder and was sentenced to fifteen years incarcerated. He applied for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition, and O’Neal appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion by denying his application, and he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and receive newly appointed counsel for a new trial. Finding no abuse of discretion or any other reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial.

South Carolina v. Lawrence

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28156

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Donald W. Beatty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Travis Lawrence was convicted by jury of attempted murder following a brawl at the home of a friend, Clayton Baxter. At trial, Lawrence argued that he acted in self-defense. To support this, he subpoenaed his co-defendant present at the scene, Terell Bennett. Bennett, however, invoked his Fifth Amendment right while awaiting his own, separate trial. Bennett's in camera testimony tended to show that he and Lawrence traveled to Baxter's house that day to purchase marijuana. Bennett's version of events established that Baxter attacked Lawrence first. The trial court was made aware of the nature of Bennett's testimony; in asking for the court to conduct the in camera examination, Lawrence's counsel stated "[the State] know[s] that the alleged co-defendant has come in and told them this was an act of self-defense." The trial court clarified: "I just want to make sure I understand the full breadth of what you're saying so I know whether or not you can invoke your right as far as implication. You're putting yourself at the scene of this alleged crime; do you understand that?" Bennett's counsel then argued that any questioning by the State would reveal incriminating information. Lawrence argued on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court that the hazards of self-incrimination from Bennett's testimony were not openly apparent because the purported crime, the purchase of marijuana, was never completed. Lawrence maintained that Bennett's testimony would show he and Lawrence acted in self-defense. Conversely, the State contended that the hazard of self-incrimination was openly apparent because Bennett was awaiting trial on indictments resulting from the same incident and there was "obvious potential" for any answers to be incriminating. The court of appeals concluded the hazard of incrimination was openly apparent, and the Supreme Court concurred, affirming the trial and appellate courts.

State v. Cavin

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: E2020-01333-SC-R11-CD

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of criminal appeals ruling that the restitution order at issue on appeal was not a final and appealable order under Tenn. R. App. P. 3, holding that a criminal restitution order is final and appealable when it directs a defendant to pay a set amount of restitution without payment terms.

Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and theft. As a condition of his probation, Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $5,500 during his supervision. Defendant appealed the restitution order, but the court of criminal appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the restitution order was not a final order because it failed to include either payment terms or a payment schedule. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the restitution order resolved all issues and was a final order under Rule 3; and (2) the trial court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay $5,5000 in restitution over his two-and-a-half-year probationary period.

State v. Gevedon

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: M2020-00359-SC-R11-CD

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of criminal appeals dismissing Defendant's appeal from the trial court's order for restitution and vacated the restitution order itself, holding that the restitution order was a final order but that the trial court erred by failing to consider Defendant's ability to pay in setting the amount of restitution.

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. Defendant was later arrested for driving on a revoked license. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation, ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement, and ordered restitution in the amount of $30,491. The court of criminal appeals dismissed Defendant's ensuing appeal from the restitution order, concluding that it was not a final order because it did not contain payment terms or schedule. The Supreme Court reversed the court of criminal appeals and vacated the restitution order, holding (1) because the order resolved all the issues in this case it was a final order under Tenn. R. App. P. 3; but (2) in setting the amount of restitution, the trial court erred by failing to consider Defendant's financial resources and ability to pay restitution.

State v. Chadwick

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 UT 12

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Matthew B. Durrant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this ongoing sexual abuse of a child case the Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion filed under rule 4-202.04 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration seeking access to F.L.'s therapy records that the trial court sealed after its in camera review, holding that the balance of interests weighed in favor of keeping F.L.'s therapy records sealed during appellate review.

Defendant was charged with four counts of sexual abuse of a child, F.L. In preparing his defense, Defendant requested that the trial court order in camera review of the records of multiple entities that had provided mental health services to F.L. and that the record contained references "to this incidents alleged to have occurred" in his case. The court authorized in camera review of the records, provided Defendant with relevant portions of the records, and then sealed them. After Defendant was convicted on one count, he appealed. The court of appeals unsealed the therapy records, and Defendant used them to prepare his appellate brief. F.L. requested that the court of appeals re-seal her records, which the court did. The Supreme Court denied Defendant's request to access the records, holding that the interests favoring the records' closure outweighed those favoring Defendant's access.

In re Pers. Restraint of Sargent

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Dockets: 100,552-1, 100718-3

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: G. Helen Whitener

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

These cases concerned whether bail may be denied under article I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution for defendants charged with a class A felony. Patrick Sargent was denied bail and was in custody pretrial for charges of first-degree attempted murder, domestic violence, and felony harassment, domestic violence. As charged, and based on his offender score, Sargent faced a determinate sentence of about 20-25 years. Sargent appealed, alleging he was unlawfully restrained because he was unconstitutionally denied bail. He claimed his crimes, as charged, were not punishable by the possibility of life in prison. The Court of Appeals held that article I, section 20 applied to all class A felonies because all class A felonies carried a statutory maximum sentence of life. In the consolidated case, Leonel Gonzalez was similarly denied bail and was in custody pretrial for first-degree felony murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. As charged, he faced about 34-46 years. In denying bail, the trial court relied on Sargent and the plain language of article I, section 20, concluding that because Gonzalez was facing a class A felony with a maximum of life in prison, the trial court could constitutionally deny bail. Gonzalez appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in Sargent’s case and denied Sargent’s personal restraint petition (PRP). In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in Gonzalez’s case. The Court agreed with the State and lower courts that the plain language of the constitution focused on whether the offense in general, not as charged, could possibly be punished by life in prison. The cases were remanded to the trial courts for further proceedings.

Washington v. Teulilo

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,385-0

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Johnson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Interlocutory review was granted to challenge a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion of evidence observed during a warrantless entry into a dwelling. The trial court concluded that the entry was justified, applying what cases characterized as the “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement, based on rendering emergency aid and conducting a health and safety check. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court whether the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case, Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021), required the Washington Court to reevaluate the state constitution article I, section 7 cases recognizing exceptions to the warrant requirement. Petitioner Ului Lakepa Teulilo argued that the United States Supreme Court invalidated the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement as applied to the home, and therefore, under the supremacy clause, Washington state cases recognizing a health and safety check exception under the same doctrine were invalid. To this, the Washington Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the trial court.

State v. Barnes

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2018AP002005-CR

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that any error during the underlying proceedings that may have violated Defendant's right to confrontation was harmless.

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of delivering more than fifty grams of methamphetamine. In his postconviction petition, Defendant argued that the admission of certain testimony was hearsay, and therefore, his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment was violated. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that if any error occurred it was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, assuming without deciding that Defendant's confrontation right was violated, the error was harmless.

Hembree v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 57

Opinion Date: June 6, 2023

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on one count each of stalking in violation of a protective order and criminal entry, holding that the prosecutor did not make improper comments in closing argument and that the district court did not plainly err in defining "spying distance."

On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct in closing by commenting on Defendant's silence and that the district court erred in allowing the State's witness to discuss "spying distance," a term not referenced in the stalking statute. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded the case for correction of the date in the judgment and sentence, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish plain error as to his first two arguments on appeal; and (2) the district court did not plainly err when it allowed the State's witness to testify regarding his understanding of the definition of "spying distance."

Skoric v. Park County Circuit Court

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 59

Opinion Date: June 8, 2023

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question by concluding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-11-303 expressly grants circuit courts jurisdiction to address the competency of a person charged with a felony and suspend preliminary hearings before the person is bound over to the district court.

Defendant was charged with two felonies. Before the preliminary hearing, defense counsel moved for a competency evaluation under section 7-11-303. The circuit court granted the motion and, after an evaluation, found Defendant fit to proceed. Thereafter, a preliminary hearing was held, and the matter was bound over to the district court. While the competency evaluation was pending the prosecutor filed an action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to hold a preliminary hearing. The circuit court certified the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that the plain language of section 7-11-303(a) confers jurisdiction to circuit courts to address the competency of a person charged with a felony before they are bound over to the district court.

Tarzia v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 58

Opinion Date: June 7, 2023

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district courts denying Appellants' separate motions to suppress, holding that the Wyoming Constitution does not require that an exterior canine sniff of a vehicle be supported by probable cause.

Appellants in these cases were both subjected to an extended investigative detention, and both Appellants were arrested after a canine sniff of their vehicles. On appeal, Appellants argued that the canine sniffs had to be supported by probable cause under Wyo. Const. art. I, 4. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Wyoming Constitution does not require probable cause for an exterior canine sniff of a vehicle; and (2) Appellants were not entitled to relief on their remaining allegations of error.