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United States v. Bentley
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
20-1691
Opinion Date: September 14, 2022
Judge:
Porter
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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In 2005, Bentley robbed a liquor store at gunpoint and was caught after a car chase. He confessed and was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Hobbs Act robbery, and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge carried a sentence of not more than 10 years but under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) a person convicted of that crime who has three or more prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” is subject to a mandatory sentence of “not less than fifteen years,” section 924(e)(1). Bentley pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and admitted he was subject to ACCA’s sentencing enhancement. The agreement listed prior convictions: first-degree reckless endangering (Delaware, 1991) and robbery and use of a firearm (Virginia 1988 and 1989). Bentley was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment.
After the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that ACCA’s “residual clause,” was unconstitutionally vague, Bently sought resentencing, arguing that the prior convictions mentioned in his plea no longer counted as strikes under ACCA. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The undisputed PSR documented six North Carolina convictions for breaking and entering as ACCA predicates. Any Johnson error would be harmless.
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US v. Mitchell Swain
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
21-6167
Opinion Date: September 14, 2022
Judge:
THACKER
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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Appellant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), which makes retroactive the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (the “Fair Sentencing Act”) that reduced sentencing disparities between cocaine and crack cocaine offenses. Appellant contends that pursuant to United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021), section 404 decisions must be procedurally and substantively reasonable, and the district court’s decision not to reduce his sentence was substantively unreasonable. In contrast, the United States (the “Government”) insists that Collington is distinguishable and limited to section 404 grants as opposed to denials. Therefore, the Government argues that the more circumscribed review for abuse of discretion applies to the district court’s denial of section 404 relief in this case.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Appellant’s section 404 motion and remand for reconsideration. The court concluded that the requirements outlined in Collington apply generally in the section 404 context -- that is, regardless of whether the district court grants or denies the motion. Here, although the district court’s order denying Appellant’s section 404 motion was procedurally reasonable, it was not substantively so.
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USA v. Rose
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
20-10463
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The government challenged the district court’s partial grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the evidence at issue was obtained following a constitutionally valid investigatory stop and thus did not warrant suppression on that account.
The court explained that all three of the Navarette factors favor the government. The tipster identified himself as an eyewitness to the events in the liquor store parking lot; he professed to describe those events as they unfolded, and the setting the officers found on their arrival five minutes later tended to support that timeline; and he used the 911 emergency system, which, as reflected by the record, both traced his number and recorded his call. Accordingly, to the extent that the factor concerning the informant’s reliability tends in any direction, it leans the government’s way. Second, the court wrote, that the information provided by the informant, despite his requested anonymity, was highly specific. Third, although some discrepancies were encountered, the information conveyed by the informant was mostly consistent with what the officers discovered when they arrived on the scene. Thus, having determined that all the factors weigh in favor of the government, the court concluded that, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, no reasonable view of it supports the district court’s ruling.
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Mwangangi v. Nielsen
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Dockets:
21-1971, 21-1576, 21-1577
Opinion Date: September 15, 2022
Judge:
Scudder
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Mwangangi provided roadside assistance around Indianapolis. He set out to jumpstart a car in his used Crown Victoria and activated clear strobe lights on the outside of his car. A driver that Mwangangi passed on the highway twice called 911 to report him as a police impersonator. Shortly after Mwangangi helped the stranded motorist, he found himself at a gas station surrounded by seven police officers. Mwangangi was ordered from his car, handcuffed, patted down twice, and arrested for police impersonation—charges that were not dropped until two years later, when everyone realized he had been telling the truth about his roadside assistance job.
The district court entered summary judgment for Mwangangi on many of his Fourth Amendment-based claims, denying some of the police officers the protection of qualified immunity. The court found for the city and officers on other claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Officer Nielsen had a “particularized and objective basis” to justify an investigatory Terry stop in the gas station and had the authority to ask Mwangangi to step out of his car to answer questions. Because of the context of the potential crime and surrounding circumstances, Officer Root’s decision to pat Mwangangi down did not amount to a constitutional violation. Officer Noland waived any challenge to the determination that his second pat down violated Mwangangi’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court stated that claims against officers for “bystander liability” required further factual development.
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United States v. Pace
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
21-2151
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Kenneth Francis Ripple
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Officer Crowder observed an SUV outside a closed business. Pace exited that vehicle. sta5int that he was lost and needed directions to Johns's house. Crowder knew of Johns's past methamphetamine use and had received complaints from Johns’s neighbors about traffic at her home. Crowder activated his emergency lights, and parked directly behind Pace’s SUV; nothing obstructed Pace’s ability to drive away. Shining his flashlight inside the SUV, Crowder did not see weapons or contraband but did see multiple musical instrument cases. Pace walked around his SUV and attempted to get one of the instruments. Pace’s behavior struck Crowder as odd and overly friendly, yet nervous. Dispatch confirmed that Pace’s license was clear and that he had no outstanding warrants but he had a history of drug possession including methamphetamine, narcotic instruments, and drug paraphernalia. Pace denied that he had weapons but declined to consent to a vehicle search. Crowder explained that Pace was not under arrest, but that he was going to place him in restraints during a canine sniff. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs in the SUV. Crowder searched the SUV and found methamphetamine and cannabis. Pace unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed that ruling, a 60-month sentence, and a finding that Pace was not eligible for relief from the five-year statutory minimum sentence under the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). The search was based on reasonable suspicion.
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United States v. Dreshon Frazier
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
21-2187
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
COLLOTON
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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Defendant appealed a sentence of 240 months imprisonment imposed by the district court after he was convicted of a drug trafficking offense and two firearms offenses. The district court determined that Defendant was a career offender under the sentencing guidelines and calculated his advisory sentencing range accordingly. On appeal, Defendant challenged the career-offender determination.
The Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded it for resentencing. The court explained that in light of intervening authority, the court concluded that one of Defendant’s prior felony convictions does not qualify as a crime of violence under the guidelines and that he is not properly classified as a career offender based on that conviction. Specifically, the court concluded that Defendant’s violation of Section 708.6(2) does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of another. The offense thus does not qualify as a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1).
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United States v. Robert Evans
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
21-3114
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
LOKEN
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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A jury convicted Defendant of possessing materials containing child pornography. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 also required the court to order restitution to the victims of Defendant’s child pornography offense. The government moved for an order directing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to turn over $2,084 from Defendant’s inmate trust account to pay the remaining balance of his restitution obligation. The district court summarily denied Defendant’s motion requesting a hearing and granted the government’s turnover motion. The court concluded that funds in an inmate’s trust account are not exempt from the payment of restitution. Defendant appealed, raising all these issues. The district court stayed the collection or payment of restitution pending the appeal.
The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s Order of September 2, 2021. The court held that the district court must determine on remand whether the victim has been fully compensated for the trafficking losses proximately caused by Defendant’s offense. If she has then amended Section 2259(b)(2)(C) states the governing rule: Defendant’s liability to pay the restitution set forth in his February 2014 Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case “shall be terminated.” The court left for the district court’s determination on remand Defendant’s requests for appointment of counsel and discovery.
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USA V. CYNTHIA MONTOYA
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
21-50129
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Lee
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant argued that she should be able to withdraw her guilty plea at the sentencing hearing because the district court “rejected” the non-binding sentencing recommendation under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). She asserted that the district court erred by not allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea because it supposedly treated her plea agreement as a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the criminal judgment. Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that Defendant had no right to withdraw her plea. Explaining that the district court’s use of “reject” in the context of Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement has no legal effect, the panel wrote that the “rejection” of a recommended sentence under a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) agreement could logically mean only that the court rejected the recommendation itself, and the district court thus did not plainly err in not providing Defendant an opportunity to withdraw her plea. The panel wrote that Defendant was permitted to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing only if she could show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal and that she has not done so. The panel held that Defendant’s remaining arguments fail. The magistrate judge’s failure to specifically mention a “jury” trial during the plea colloquy, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(C), did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The district court properly considered and explained its reasons for rejecting Defendant’s variance requests. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 100-month sentence.
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USA V. ERIC FOWLER
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
21-30172
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Miller
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law
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The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation have a cross-deputization agreement with the State of Montana under which the Tribes have agreed to commission state police to act as tribal police where there is a gap between their respective criminal jurisdictions. Defendant challenges the validity of the cross-deputization agreement, arguing that the Tribes lack the inherent sovereign authority to enter into a cross-deputization agreement with the State of Montana.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The panel emphasized that the cross-deputization agreement deputizes state officers to enforce tribal law, not state law, and emphasized that Congress has expressly provided for the Tribes’ authority to enter into such compacts.
Defendant also argued that the Tribes explicitly conditioned the cross-deputization agreement on federal approval, which they did not receive. The panel did not read the agreement’s use of the word “approve” as giving the Bureau of Indian Affairs veto power over the agreement.
The panel wrote that even if the lack of a signature from the BIA representative on the 2003 amendment to the agreement impaired the validity of the amendment, it would not invalidate the trooper’s commissioned status. The panel wrote that the trooper’s failure to carry an identification card was plainly a violation of the agreement. The panel noted, however, that none of the sovereign parties to the agreement appears to consider the violation sufficiently serious to seek any remedy for it.
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USA V. MONICO DOMINGUEZ
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
14-10268
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, White Collar Crime
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In a case in which the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision filed April 7, 2020, and reported at 954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020), the panel filed an amended order granting the government’s motion to reinstate portions of April 7, 2020, opinion, to the following extent:
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on Counts Four (money laundering) and Ten (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence). The panel affirmed—for the reasons explained in April 7, 2020, opinion—on all remaining Counts: One, Eight (conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery); Two (Hobbs Act robbery); Three (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence); and Nine (attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery). The panel remanded to the district court for resentencing consistent with United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. —, 2022 WL 2203334 (June 21, 2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.
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Pacheco v. El Habti
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
20-7002
Opinion Date: September 15, 2022
Judge:
Harris L. Hartz
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law
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Petitioner-appellant Delila Pacheco was convicted in Oklahoma of first-degree child-abuse murder. She petitioned for relief to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, filing an application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. While her application was pending, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), holding that a large portion of the State of Oklahoma was “Indian country” for purposes of the Major Crimes Act, which provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain enumerated crimes committed by Indians in “Indian country.” Pacheco, an Indian found to have committed a serious crime at a location since determined to be on an Indian reservation, sought to amend her application to assert a claim that the state courts lacked jurisdiction over the offense. The district court denied the request to amend on the ground that the new claim was time-barred. The Tenth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on this issue. Pacheco argued on appeal: (1) that the time bar to her jurisdictional claim should be excused under the actual-innocence exception; and, alternatively, (2) that the statute of limitations reset when the Supreme Court declared the underlying law in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), rendering timely her request to amend. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding Pacheco’s jurisdictional argument did not show actual innocence, and McGirt did not announce a new constitutional right.
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USA v. Noe Machado-Erazo (AMENDED)
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
15-3040
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
WILKINS
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, White Collar Crime
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Appellants were charged with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute and various other crimes. After a three-week trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to all three Appellants. Appellants now challenge their convictions and sentences on various grounds.
The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings finding none of Appellants’ challenges persuasive. The court explained that because “the factors upon which the probative value/prejudice evaluations were made are readily apparent from the record, and there is no substantial uncertainty about the correctness of the ruling,” reversal is not required. Further, the court found that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the Agent to testify regarding specific distances and ranges of distances because such testimony was neither disclosed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 nor vetted as required by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403. Nevertheless, because the error was harmless, reversal is not warranted.
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California v. Board of Parole Hearings
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
C093941(Third Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 15, 2022
Judge:
Elena J. Duarte
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In 1997, real party in interest and appellant Nathan Ramazzini was convicted of first degree murder with a special circumstance regarding a killing that occurred when Ramazzini was 16 years old. Pursuant to California Penal Code section 190.5 (b), enacted by Proposition 115 (the Crime Victims Justice Reform Ac), Ramazzini was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). At the time Ramazzini was sentenced, courts interpreted section 190.5 (b) as establishing a presumption in favor of LWOP. In 2012, the US Supreme Court concluded the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution barred mandatory LWOP sentences for minors. The California Supreme Court subsequently concluded that section 190.5 (b) conferred discretion on the sentencing court to impose either a sentence of 25 years to life or LWOP, but the presumption in favor of LWOP was inconsistent with Miller. In response to Miller, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 394 (2017- 2018 Reg. Sess.), which provided that those sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed when they were 16 or 17 years old were eligible for release on parole during their 25th year of incarceration. Ramazzini became eligible for a parole hearing in July 2021. Upon learning of that eligibility, the Colusa County District Attorney’s Office (Office), petitioned for writ of mandate seeking to invalidate Senate Bill No. 394 on its face and as applied to Ramazzini, and to enjoin the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) from enforcing its provisions. The trial court granted the Office’s writ petition as applied to Ramazzini. The Board appealed, contending the Office lacked standing to petition for writ of mandate, and Senate Bill No. 394 was lawfully enacted. Ramazzini also appealed, joining the Board’s contentions and separately contended that Senate Bill No. 394 was lawfully enacted because it did not amend Proposition 115’s alternative sentencing scheme for 16- and 17-year-old defendants. The Court of Appeal agreed the Office lacked standing to bring the writ petition, and invalidated the judgment invalidating Senate Bill No. 394 as applied to Ramazzini.
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California v. Bueno
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
D078700(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Cynthia Aaron
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant Alan Bueno, an inmate at the time of the offense at issue, arranged with a prison employee codefendant to obtain a cellular telephone. Bueno pleaded no contest to one felony count of conspiracy to violate California Penal Code section 4576(a), which barred possession with the intent to deliver or the actual delivery of a cellular telephone to a prison inmate. On appeal, Bueno contended he could not be convicted of conspiracy to deliver a cellular telephone to an inmate because he was the inmate to whom the cellular telephone was delivered. Bueno analogized the scenario in this case to cases involving drug sales, in which the “buyer-seller rule” precluded the purchaser from being held criminally liable for a conspiracy to sell drugs to himself. According to Bueno, this principle applied to preclude an inmate recipient of a cellular telephone from being held criminally liable for conspiring to commit the substantive offense of section 4576 (a). Alternatively, Bueno contended that the statutory scheme set out a tiered system of punishment for the different roles that an individual might play in a scheme to deliver/have delivered a cellular telephone to an inmate, and that this scheme evinced a legislative intent that the inmate who participates in such a scheme be punished by a loss of credits only, and not criminally prosecuted. The Court of Appeal concluded Bueno’s argument that he could not be convicted of conspiracy to violate section 4576 (a) was without merit. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment.
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California v. Fuller
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
E071794(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 15, 2022
Judge:
Menetrez
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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In this appeal, the State argued that a sentencing court’s discretion under California v. Tirado, 12 Cal.5th 688 (2022) was limited to imposing a lesser enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, so a court that strikes an enhancement under section 12022.53 cannot impose an uncharged lesser included enhancement under section 12022.5. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that under Tirado the sentencing court may impose an uncharged lesser included enhancement under section 12022.5 after striking a greater enhancement under section 12022.53.
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Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. v. Super. Ct.
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
E076778(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 15, 2022
Judge:
Carol D. Codrington
Areas of Law:
Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Between 2018 and 2020, Electric Frontier Foundation, Inc. (EFF) moved to unseal affidavits filed in support of executed search warrants requested by the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff) and issued under seal by the San Bernardino Superior Court between March 2017 and March 2018. EFF was a “non-profit civil liberties organization working to protect and promote fundamental liberties in the digital world.” According to EFF, cell-site simulators collected the digital data of innocent people. “EFF claims law enforcement authorities in San Bernardino County lead the state in the use of cell-site simulators. Because of its concerns about the use of cell-site simulators, EFF petitioned to unseal eight “search warrant packets” that contained warrants issued by the Superior Court between March 2017 and March 2018 that allowed the Sheriff to use cell-site simulators. The Sheriff and the San Bernardino County District Attorney (collectively, the County) did not object to the unsealing of one warrant packet (SBSW 18-0850), but opposed the unsealing of portions of the seven other warrant packets. Specifically, the County argued the returns to the executed search warrants and the so-called “Hobbs affidavits” in support of the warrants should have remained sealed indefinitely, because they contained sensitive information about confidential informants and “official information.” The trial court denied EFF’s motion and ordered the affidavits to remain sealed. EFF appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court.
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In re M.A.
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
H049482(Sixth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 12, 2022
Judge:
Lie
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
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The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over M.A. upon his admission that he had committed a felony sexual battery (Penal Code 243.4). The juvenile court granted him probation for one year. At the recommendation of the probation officer—who noted that sexual battery was among the offenses referenced in section 29805—and over M.A.’s objection, the court ordered “[t]hat [M.A.] shall immediately surrender any and all firearms … and refrain from possessing, owning, or controlling any and all firearms until his . . . 30th birthday.” Under Penal Code 29820, a minor adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for certain offenses—including “an offense enumerated in Section 29805”—shall be prohibited until age 30 from possessing firearms. Under section 29805, adults convicted of certain misdemeanors are subject to a 10-year prohibition against possessing firearms.
The court of appeal affirmed the order. The prohibition against firearms for certain juvenile offenders applies to M.A. because he committed an offense that is “enumerated” in section 29850; to the extent M.A. challenged the imposition of the prohibition as a probation condition, the prohibition against firearms is statutorily authorized and required under section 29820. The term “enumerated” must be interpreted as including both felony and misdemeanor violations of the statutes listed in section 29805.
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People v. Garcia
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
A161579(First Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Wiseman
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The defendants were charged with murder and kidnapping. Scott was also charged with robbery and a special circumstance of felony murder in the course of kidnapping, with a special allegation that he personally, intentionally discharged a firearm that caused death. Garcia was charged with the commission of an offense in which the principal was armed with a firearm, with a special allegation that he was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Following their trial, the jury was scheduled to return on March 17, 2020, for closing arguments. Because of COVID-19 shelter-in-place orders, court proceedings were canceled. The trial resumed on June 8. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial based on the delay. The jury found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and kidnapping but did not find true the firearm allegation; found Scott guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery; and found true the kidnapping special circumstance and the firearm allegation.
The court of appeal affirmed. Under the unique circumstances of this case--the timing of the continuance, the relative lack of complexity, and the court’s communications with and instructions to the jury--there was no error. Recent amendments to Penal Code 654.1 apply retroactively but did not grant the court discretion to essentially “strike” the special circumstance finding and reduce Scott’s sentence to less than life without the possibility of parole. The court rejected Scott’s contentions that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated his right to equal protection and Garcia’s arguments that his inability to accept a package plea deal violated his due process rights and that the verdict was coerced.
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People v. Salvador
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
H048162(Sixth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Greenwood
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Salvador, charged with sexual penetration of a person under the age of 16 by a person over 21, lewd or lascivious act on a child aged 14 or 15, felony false imprisonment, sexual battery, and annoying or molesting a child, pleaded no contest to felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor sexual battery. The trial court granted a three-year term of probation and imposed, among others, conditions requiring Salvador to consent to searches of his electronic devices, and restricting his use of social media and the Internet. Salvador challenged the probation conditions.
The court of appeal struck the restriction on Salvador’s use of the Internet as unconstitutionally overbroad but upheld the remaining conditions. There is nothing in the record to support a restriction on Internet access more generally, as compared with the restriction limited to social media. The search and monitoring conditions are tailored with sufficient specificity to avoid unconstitutionally intruding on Salvador’s Fourth Amendment right. Because Salvador used social media to text the victims, the nexus to that condition, while attenuated, is sufficiently established such that imposition of the condition is not an abuse of discretion under California precedent. Any burden on Salvador’s use of social media is reasonably tempered by his ability to obtain prior approval; the use of social media is not so necessary to the activities of daily living that this requirement would unduly burden Salvador’s rights.
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People v. Sifuentes
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
A162225(First Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Brown
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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In 2003, Sifuentes was convicted of first-degree murder under a felony-murder theory; his co-felon killed Deputy Monego during a 1998 restaurant robbery. The jury found not true the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations against Sifuentes (Penal Code 190.2 (a)(17)(A), (G)). In 2019, after the amendment of the felony-murder law, Sifuentes sought resentencing under former section 1170.952. The parties agreed Sifuentes could not be convicted of felony murder under current section 189(e). The trial court found that the peace officer exception in section 189(f) applied and denied the petition because the prosecution established beyond a reasonable doubt that Monego was a peace officer who was killed while in the course of his duties, and Sifuentes knew or reasonably should have known that Monego was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties.
The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court used the wrong legal standard to assess whether Sifuentes knew or reasonably should have known that Monego was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties. Substantial evidence supported the finding that Sifuentes had the requisite knowledge. The jury’s not true findings on the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations did not require the court to grant the petition after Sifuentes established a prima facie case.
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People v. Thompson
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
H044699(Sixth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: September 12, 2022
Judge:
Bamattre-Manoukian
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder for a San Jose shooting death (Pen. Code 187(a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (29800(a)(1)), with a finding that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the murder (12022.53(d)). The court found true the allegations that Thompson had a prior juvenile strike adjudication and had served a prior prison term and sentenced him to 76 years to life, imposed various fines and fees, and ordered victim restitution.
The court of appeal upheld the conviction, rejecting claims concerning evidence of intimidation, the admission of evidence about internet searches, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court remanded for resentencing, for the trial court to strike the prior prison term enhancement and consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement or to impose a lesser enhancement, based on changes in the law, and to vacate the portion of the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee that remained unpaid. On remand, Thompson may raise his inability to pay the fines and fees and his claim that he is entitled to the reimbursement of any portion of the criminal justice administration fee that he has already paid.
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Gorostieta v. People
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Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 CO 41
Opinion Date: September 12, 2022
Judge:
Gabriel
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Colorado Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify what prosecutors had prove to establish a defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a prior crime when the defendant’s conviction of that prior crime was an element or sentence enhancer of the present offense (e.g., in cases involving a charge of possession of a weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”) or a charge under the habitual criminal statute). The Court concluded that in order for the prosecution to prove a defendant’s identity in such a case, the prosecution must establish an essential link between the prior conviction and the defendant. "This, in turn, requires the prosecution to present some documentary evidence combined with specific corroborating evidence of identification connecting the defendant to the prior felony conviction." The question thus became whether the prosecution satisfied this standard here and therefore carried its burden of proving that Enrique Gorostieta was convicted of the prior felony alleged in this case. Like the division below, the Supreme Court believed that the prosecution could and should have done more to carry its burden. Nonetheless, under the relatively lenient standard of review that applied to sufficiency of the evidence challenges, the Supreme Court concluded the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Gorostieta had been convicted of the prior felony at issue here.
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Colorado v. Raider
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Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 CO 40
Opinion Date: September 12, 2022
Judge:
Brian D. Boatright
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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At issue in this case was whether Colorado's prohibition against forced specimen collection in DUI-related offenses applied to all searches of people suspected of DUI, or only to warrantless searches. A Fort Collins police officer responded to a call about an unauthorized car in a disability parking space. When the officer approached the car, he found Charles Raider sitting in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. The officer noticed various signs of visible intoxication; Raider denied having consumed any alcohol. When the officer asked him to perform roadside maneuvers, he declined. The officer then arrested Raider for DUI and, pursuant to the Expressed Consent Statute, gave him the choice of a breath or blood test. Raider initially didn’t respond, but ultimately, he refused. After learning that Raider had several prior DUI convictions, another officer applied for a search warrant to conduct a blood draw. Again, Raider refused to cooperate, so hospital personnel put him in a four-point leather restraint, and several officers held him down while his blood was drawn. Testing revealed that his blood alcohol content was well above the legal limit. The trial court denied Raider’s pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the blood test, concluding that the Expressed Consent Statute’s prohibition against forced specimen collection does not apply when, as here, a blood draw is authorized by a warrant. Ultimately, the jury found Raider guilty of felony DUI. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the statute only contemplated warrantless searches. Therefore, the Court held that the Expressed Consent Statute’s prohibition against forced specimen collection had no bearing on searches executed pursuant to a valid warrant. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals which held to the contrary.
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State v. Mekoshvili
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Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Docket:
SC20442
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Mullins
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment the trial court convicting Defendant of murder, holding that a specific unanimity instruction was not required in this case.
In affirming Defendant's conviction, the appellate court read this Court's precedents to mean that, although a jury must unanimously reject a self-defense claim before it may find a defendant guilty, there is no requirement that jurors agree on which specific factor of Connecticut's four-factor test for self-defense the state has disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a specific unanimity instruction was not required in this case; and (2) there was no reasonable possibility that Defendant's conviction resulted from the jurors' misunderstanding of the self-defense instruction, which the trial court reiterated several times and in various ways.
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Mosley v. State
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Court: Florida Supreme Court
Docket:
SC20-195
Opinion Date: September 15, 2022
Judge:
Couriel
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court held that John F. Mosley, who was resentenced to death for the murder of his ten-month-old son after a second penalty phase trial, was entitled to a new Spencer hearing and sentencing hearing but was not entitled to a new trial.
Mosley was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. When Mosley sought postconviction relief, the Supreme Court decided that a new penalty phase was required under Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 466 (2016). After a second penalty phase trial, the jury found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to impose the death penalty. Mosley filed a motion for a new penalty phase trial. Before the ensuing Spencer hearing, Mosley filed a motion to represent himself pro se. The trial court failed to address Mosley's motion and appointed a public defender as Mosley's appellate counsel. The Supreme Court vacated Mosley's death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to address Mosley's motion to represent himself at his Spencer hearing.
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Idaho v. Fox
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Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
Dockets:
45832, 45833, 45834, 45835
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Zahn
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Matthew Fox appealed his convictions for robbery, aggravated battery, possession of marijuana, and possession of methamphetamine. Charges arose from an incident in 2017 in which Fox allegedly pistol whipped his victim demanding money allegedly owed for methamphetamine. The victim drove to a nearby school's parking lot, "hysterically trying to get someone to call 911." A parent leaving his child's concert at the school noticed the victim and called 911. Officers responding to the victim used his description of the incident to find Fox's car and arrest Fox. The search netted (1) a briefcase with methamphetamine, marijuana, and other drug paraphernalia, (2) the victim's cellphone, and (3) a Smith & Wesson handgun. The same day as Fox’s arrest, Fox’s former fiancé, Nicole Walker, called the Kootenai County Sheriff’s department to report that her 9mm handgun was missing. Walker went into the police station the next day and identified the Smith & Wesson handgun found in Fox’s car as hers. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Fox's convictions and sentences.
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Commonwealth v. K.W.
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Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-13153
Opinion Date: September 8, 2022
Judge:
Georges
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the Boston Municipal Court denying K.W.'s petition for expungement and remanded this matter to the municipal court, where an order shall enter allowing the petition for expungement and for further review, holding that the judge abused his discretion in concluding that expungement was not "in the best interests of justice."
K.W. filed a petition seeking to have expunged two sets of criminal records involving charges or convictions of possession of an amount of marijuana that since has been decriminalized. The municipal court judge denied both petitions on the ground that it was not "in the best interests of justice" to expunge the records at issue. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) petitions for expungement that satisfy Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 100K(a) are entitled to a strong presumption in favor of expungement; and (2) petitions for expungement in such cases may be denied only if a significant countervailing concern is raised in opposition to the petition.
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Commonwealth v. Melendez
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Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-12889
Opinion Date: September 12, 2022
Judge:
Cypher
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and denied his motion for a new trial, holding that there existed no grounds for reversal and that there was no reason to exercise the Court's authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce the verdict.
Defendant's first two trials ended in mistrials. At his third trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the murder conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress certain evidence, but no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred; (2) the trial judge did not err in his evidentiary rulings; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.
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State v. Brown
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 MT 176
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Beth Baker
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual abuse of children for sending text messages to his stepdaughter encouraging her to engage in sexual activity if he agreed to pay her cellular phone bill, holding that there was no reversible error in any of Defendant's claims.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give Defendant's proposed jury instruction that a violation of privacy in communications was a lesser-included offense of sexual abuse of children; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (3) the district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing statutes were correct.
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State v. Gudmundsen
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 MT 178
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
James A. Rice
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the sentence imposed by the district court follow revocation of Appellant's suspended sentence, holding that the district court erred by denying credit for elapsed time served on probation without basing the denial on specific probation violations.
At issue was whether the district court violated Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-203(7)(b) by denying credit for elapsed time served on probation without basing the denial on specific probation violations. The Supreme Court answered the question in the positive, holding that the district court erred by denying Defendant's requested elapsed-time credit under Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-203(7)(b).
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State v. James
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 MT 177
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Edward F. Shea
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence related to Defendant's accuser's pending DUI charge in another county; (2) the district court did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him or present his defense by limiting cross-examination of Defendant's accuser regarding alleged leniency she may have received related to her pending DUI case in return for her testimony against Defendant; and (3) the chief prosecutor’s prior representation of Defendant did not deprive the entire Lake County Attorney’s Office of authority to prosecute Defendant.
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New Hampshire v. Verrill
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Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Docket:
2021-0093
Opinion Date: September 14, 2022
Judge:
Gary E. Hicks
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Defendant Timothy Verrill appealed a superior court order denying his motion to dismiss his pending indictments with prejudice after his unopposed motion for a mistrial had been granted. He contended the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions prohibited his retrial because of the State’s discovery violations. A grand jury indicted defendant on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of second degree murder, and five counts of falsifying evidence. In the middle of trial and during the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel informed the court that the State had not disclosed two emails sent to the New Hampshire State Police Major Crimes Unit (MCU) by a friend of a witness. Though the prosecutors informed the court and defense counsel that they had no prior knowledge of the emails, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments with prejudice based on the State’s failure to disclose the discovery before trial. Before the court issued an order, MCU initiated an audit of the investigation to ensure that all discovery was disclosed. The audit continued as the trial progressed, and additional undisclosed discovery was unearthed. Defendant then asked for a mistrial, and then filed a second motion to dismiss the charges pending against him. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination that the State and Federal Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses did not bar defendant’s retrial. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's declination to make additional findings and remanded the case for the trial court to determine what remedies, if any, should have been imposed for the State's discovery violations.
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Pope v. Bracy
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Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2022-Ohio-3190
Opinion Date: September 14, 2022
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Appellee, the warden of Trumbull Correctional Institution, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition.
After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to a prison term of thirty-six years to life. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to relief because the jury's verdict was not unanimous. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law law by way of direct appeal to raise his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by which to raise his jury-unanimity claim; and (2) the trial court's judgment was not void for lack of jurisdiction.
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State ex rel. Foster v. Foley
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Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2022-Ohio-3168
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly found the petition to be procedurally defective under Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C) and 2725.04.
Appellant was convicted of five counts of aggravated rape and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of twenty years to life. After he was released, Appellant was arrested by his parole officer for violating the conditions of his parole and found guilty of the charged violations. Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that his parole revocation hearing had been untimely. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to comply with the requirements of sections 2969.25(C) and 2725.04. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal was proper in this case.
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State v. O'Malley
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Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2022-Ohio-3207
Opinion Date: September 15, 2022
Judge:
Fischer
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court ordering forfeiture of Appellant's 2014 Chevrolet Silverado, holding that there was no equal protection violation and that, as applied to Appellant, the vehicle forfeiture did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Appellant entered a plea of no contest to one charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). Because Appellant had two prior OVI convictions within the preceding ten years, his vehicle was seized pending the completion of the proceedings. After a forfeiture hearing held pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4503.234 the trial court ordered Appellant to forfeit his vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory classification contained in Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(c)(v) does not violate constitutional equal protection guarantees; and (2) the forfeiture of Appellant's vehicle was not grossly disproportional and was thus not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant.
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State v. Wilson
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Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2022-Ohio-3202
Opinion Date: September 14, 2022
Judge:
Brunner
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court held that in order for a person whose license is suspended for an offense for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OVI) to be guilty of driving under an OVI suspension, the person must cause movement of a motor vehicle on the public roads or highways within this state during the period of the suspension.
Because Defendant was in the driver's seat while a parked car was running and her license was suspended due to an OVI offense, the officer cited her for driving under a suspended license. The charge was later amended to reflect a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4510.14 for driving under an OVI suspension. The trial court found Defendant guilty of driving under an OVI suspension. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, in order for the state to prove the element of "operated" under section 4510.14(A), it must present sufficient evidence showing some movement of the vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in order for a person whose license is suspended for an OVI offense to be guilty of driving under an OVI suspension, the person must cause or have caused movement of the motor vehicle on the public roads or highways within this state.
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Richardson v. Twenty Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-One, U.S. Currency
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Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
Docket:
28113
Opinion Date: September 14, 2022
Judge:
James
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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Travis Green presented a facial challenge to South Carolina's civil asset forfeiture statutory scheme following law enforcement's seizure of cash and contraband during the execution of a search warrant. The circuit court concluded sections 44-53-520 and -530 of the South Carolina Code (2018) were facially unconstitutional under both the Excessive Fines Clause and the Due Process Clause of the federal and state constitutions. An undercurrent of this case was Green's claim that the civil forfeiture process is ripe for abuse. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order because Green failed to overcome the high threshold for finding a statute facially unconstitutional. Green answered the Solicitor's petition and demanded a jury trial. The circuit court considered and ruled upon the constitutionality of the forfeiture statutes in the very early stages of this litigation. The case was therefore remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
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State v. Loeschke
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Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 S.D. 56
Opinion Date: September 14, 2022
Judge:
Kern
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of one count of aggravated assault and two counts of simple assault, holding that the circuit court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to sever or in admitted statements contained in recorded phone conversations while Defendant was in jail.
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault and two counts of simple assault arising from a stab wound inflicted on Melissa Greenwalt on February 20, 2019 and was also charged with the same offenses arising from an assault inflicted on Greenwalt with fists, leaving her with a broken jaw. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to sever the charges based on the dates of the offenses a jury convicted him on the assault charges arising from the 2019 stabbing but acquitted him of the charges from the 2018 broken-jaw incident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to sever; and (2) did not err in admitting portions of the recorded phone calls made by Defendant to Greenwalt.
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State v. Enix
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Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Docket:
E2020-00231-SC-R11-CD
Opinion Date: September 13, 2022
Judge:
Bivins
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of criminal appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.
After he was convicted Defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging that four instances of improper prosecutorial closing argument, which he failed to object to at trial, constituted reversible error. The court of criminal appeals affirmed after reviewing Defendant's claims under the plain error doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) plain error review was the appropriate standard in this case; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief via the plain error doctrine.
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In re S.D.
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Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 VT 44
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Cohen
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
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The State of Vermont appealed a family division court's dismissal of three juvenile delinquency petitions against S.D. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The State argued the family division retained jurisdiction to transfer them to the criminal division even after S.D. reached the age of twenty years and six months. S.D. argued 13 V.S.A. § 7403 did not provide a right for the State to appeal the dismissal of a delinquency petition. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with S.D. and dismissed this appeal, overruling precedent to the contrary in In re F.E.F., 594 A.2d 897 (1991).
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Fallon v. State
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 WY 110
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Fenn
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and that the district court did not err when it instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. The jury acquitted Defendant of the charge and found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. It also found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault and battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, and there was the minimal evidentiary support necessary to show Defendant acted in a sudden heat of passion; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
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Rodriguez v. State
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 WY 109
Opinion Date: September 9, 2022
Judge:
Kate M. Fox
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant, after a jury trial, of second-degree murder and domestic battery, holding that the prosecutors' statements during opening and closing argument did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial.
A jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder and domestic battery. The district court entered judgment upon the verdict and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of seventy years to life for the murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutors committed misconduct during the State's opening statement and during its closing argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the challenged statements did not prejudice Defendant.
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