United States v. Andujar-Colon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1215

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of three counts of engaging in the business of dealing a firearm without a license and sentence of sixty months' imprisonment, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the district court's imposition of Defendant's sentence.

Defendant admitted to engaging in the business of illegally dealing firearms on three separate occasions over more than one year. The district court imposed a sixty-month sentence. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error as to the procedural objections and no abuse of discretion in the length of the sentence imposed.

United States v. Soler-Montalvo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1311

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction of attempting to persuade, induce, or entice a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, holding that the trial was tainted by the erroneous limitation of Defendant's expert testimony.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to convict him of the charged crimes and that the district court erred in barring his expert witness from testifying about whether Defendant's actions fit the mold of a sexual predator. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; but (2) erroneously excluded a portion of the testimony of Defendant's proposed expert, and the error was not harmless.

United States v. Jenkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-610

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: WILLIAM J. NARDINI

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Three Defendants (“Defendant 1” “Defendant 2” and “Defendant 3” collectively “Defendants”) were convicted of firearms, narcotics, and racketeering offenses following a jury trial at which Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 testified in their own defense. In a concurrently filed summary order, the court considered and reject nearly all of Defendants’ arguments except with respect to vacatur of Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s convictions on Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment. In this opinion, the Second Circuit held that, contrary to Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s arguments, the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the principles to use in evaluating the testimony of interested witnesses, including Defendants 1 and 2. The district court’s instruction did not assume the testifying Defendants’ guilt or otherwise undermine the presumption of innocence.

The court explained at no point did the court assume Defendants’ guilt by suggesting, directly or indirectly, that Defendants had a motive to testify falsely. The instructions here were guilt-neutral, not guilt-assuming. The district court even-handedly instructed the jury to consider Defendants testimony” just as you would the testimony of any witness with an interest in the outcome of this case.” The court did not equate biased or likely to be biased with a motive to testify falsely. Accordingly, the court found that the district court did not commit error (much less plain error) in instructing the jury on the principles to use in evaluating Defendants’ testimony.

United States v. Sainfil

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-778

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: WILLIAM J. NARDINI

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery; armed bank robbery; and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to 219 months in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on his counsel’s purported ineffective assistance in (a) failing to move to suppress Defendant’s pre-Miranda statement to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and (b) conceding to the jury that Defendant was outside the bank when it was robbed. Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to move for suppression of his pre-Miranda statement to the FBI, where he made a similar post-Miranda statement that was undisputedly admissible. Further, that Defendant’s counsel did not provide objectively deficient performance when he conceded before the jury that Defendant was outside the bank on the day it was robbed, in light of Defendant’s post-Miranda admission, and abundant witness testimony placing Defendant outside the bank as a lookout. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions and his sentence was procedurally reasonable. The district court did not clearly err in applying sentencing enhancements based on its conclusion that, given the circumstances in this case, it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendant’s co-conspirators would use physical restraints and body armor.

Coello v. DiLeo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2112

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: Thomas L. Ambro

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Messina filed suit, accusing Coello—who was dating Messina’s former boyfriend— of harassment. Coello pled not guilty and the charge was dismissed. Subsequently, private attorney Estabrooks requested an appointment to prosecute Messina’s complaint. New Jersey Court Rules permit courts to appoint a “private prosecutor to represent the State in cases involving cross-complaints.” This 2007 prosecution did not involve a cross-complaint and Estabrooks did not disclose that she was also representing Messina in custody and other civil actions against Coello’s boyfriend. Without recording any findings as to the need for a private prosecutor or the suitability of Estabrooks, Municipal Judge DiLeo approved her application. Irregularities continued at trial and post-conviction. Without addressing Coello’s lack of representation or her evidence, DiLeo reinstated her jail term based on a letter from Estabrooks.

In 2016, a New Jersey state court vacated Coello's harassment conviction. The prosecution, by then familiar with allegations of judicial misconduct against DiLeo, did not oppose the motion.

In 2020, Coello filed this federal civil rights action against Estabrooks, DiLeo, and municipal defendants. The district court dismissed most of her claims as untimely, reasoning that at the time of her trial and sentencing, Coello had reason to know of her alleged injuries. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal, citing the special timeliness rules governing her precise claims. Under Heck v. Humphrey, her claims all imply the invalidity of her criminal prosecution; she could not file suit until her conviction was vacated

US v. Ricky Runner

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-4085

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: FLOYD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), but reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his vehicle after officers visually observed a glass stem pipe in the console of his car. Appellant now makes that appeal, arguing the stem pipe was insufficient to trigger the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches.
 
In finding neither clear factual error nor an error of law in the district court’s reasoning the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that for the plain view exception to apply, the government must show that: “(1) the officer [was] lawfully in a place from which the object [could] be plainly viewed; (2) the officer ha[d] a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object’s incriminating character [wa]s immediately apparent.” United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1997).
 
Here, even though a glass stem pipe may be put to innocent uses—uses that continue to expand and should be taken into consideration—here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and in its totality, the plain view exception applies, and the search of the vehicle was lawful.

Prible v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-70010

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The jury convicted Petitioner and sentenced him to death. After a decade of federal proceedings, including extensive discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and granted him a new trial.

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling granting Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and denied him a new trial. The court explained Petitioner “possessed, or by reasonable means could have obtained, a sufficient basis to allege [the ring-of-informants Brady] claim[s] in the first petition and pursue the matter through the [state] habeas process.”. Contrary to the district court’s view, Petitioner did not rebut the state court’s findings on this point at all, much less by clear and convincing evidence as required by the federal habeas statute. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(e)(1). Petitioner, therefore, has not shown cause to excuse the default of these claims. And because he has not shown cause, the court wrote, it need not consider prejudice.

Tracy v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-40686

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Graves, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and his state habeas petition was also unsuccessful. Through state habeas counsel, Petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3599(a)(2), to assist him in preparing a petition for federal habeas relief. Petitioner identified specific attorneys he wanted to represent him. The district court granted Petitioner's motion for counsel, but appointed an attorney other than those requested by Petitioner. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion under Sec. 3599(a)(2), seeking to substitute his court-appoitned counsel. The district court rejected Petitioner's request, holding he had not offered a sufficient basis for substituting counsel because the court-appointed conflict-free counsel was competent to handle death-penalty matters. Petitioner appealed the court's interlocutory order.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The court noted that it routinely reviews challenges to the denial of a motion to substitute counsel on appeal from a final judgment. Thus, the judgment petitioner challenged did not trigger the court's jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine.

USA v. Porter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10817

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Don R. Willett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this sentencing appeal following a child pornography conviction, Appellant asked the Fifth Circuit to disturb the district court’s revocation judgment, claiming the judge (1) relied on unsworn statements by the prosecutor, and (2) announced conditions of supervised release that conflicted with the written judgment.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record belies both claims. For one, ample evidence supported the prosecutor’s comments—precluding any legitimate claim of plain error. Second, the record reveals that the challenged discrepancy produced nothing more than ambiguity that is resolved by the district court’s clearly expressed intent: reimposition of the original conditions of supervised release.

USA v. Sheperd

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-20073

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Don R. Willett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant the owner of a home health agency was convicted of Medicare fraud. On appeal, she complained that her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated. Turns out, Defendant’s pretrial counsel was also representing one of the Government’s star witnesses. The Fifth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Defendant’s lawyer’s conflict of interest—a conflict the Government knew about— adversely affected his representation, and the district court answered: yes.

The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that as the Government admits, it never offered Defendant a plea deal while she was represented by her conflicted pretrial counsel, or after. So there is no rejected plea deal to measure Defendant’s harm against. The court explained the constitutional right to counsel is “perhaps the central feature of our adversarial system,” as it “helps make real the Constitution’s other criminal procedure promises. The court wrote that the Government’s proposed remedy— to keep the convictions intact but remand for new plea negotiations— wouldn’t neutralize the taint of the constitutional violation.

Wallace v. State of Mississippi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-60098

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Petitioner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Following a state trial court’s Judgment of Conviction based on guilty pleas and a much later Order of Sentence (collectively the judgment), Petitioner, under state law, could not take a direct appeal to a state court. Nor did he seek direct review by the Supreme Court of the United States.
 
He contends the judgment did not become final until the 90-day period expired because Mississippi law prohibited his seeking direct state-court review of his guilty-plea convictions and sentence and, therefore, he instead could have pursued direct review by the Supreme Court of the United States (finality issue).
 
The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on this finality issue, Petitioner did not assert in district court, or in his pro se motion to our court for the COA, that the judgment became final only upon the 90-day period’s expiration. The threshold question before the Fifth Circuit considering this finality issue is whether Petitioner preserved it.
 
The court held Petitioner’s judgment became final upon the 90-day period’s expiration; and, therefore, his petition was filed timely. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider Petitioner’s alternative equitable tolling issue, including whether to expand the COA.
 
In regards to whether Petitioner’s habeas petition was timely. The court explained that the first three steps of plain-error review are satisfied, thus the district court’s error requires reversal because it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Mitchell v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-6031

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Readler

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court vacating its previous judgment, in which it granted Defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion and vacated his sentence, and reinstating Defendant's original sentence, holding that the district court did not enjoy the discretion to resentence Defendant de novo.

More than a decade ago, Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. In part because Defendant had prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated burglary the district court designated sentenced Defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Defendant later moved to vacate his sentence under section 2255, arguing that his prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated burglary did not constitute violent felonies given recent developments in Armed Career Criminal Act jurisprudence. The district court granted the motion and vacated Defendant's sentence. Due to intervening Supreme Court caselaw decided before resentencing, the district court vacated the order granting Defendant's section 2255 motion, denied the motion, and reinstated the original sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant lacked any viable section 2255 claim.

Stein v. Gunkel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-6118

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: McKeague

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, two jail officers, and dismissing Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that Defendants caused his injuries, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that either defendant violated his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff was booked into Boone County Detention Center on nonviolent drug charges and was placed in a cell with Jordan Webster, a fellow detainee. Webster attacked and beat Plaintiff during the night. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from the risk of harm posed by Webster. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm by failing to protect him from Webster.

United States v. Fields

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-5521

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: Helene N. White

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Fields was charged with possession of 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The indictment alleged that Fields had two prior Kentucky “final conviction[s] for . . . serious drug felon[ies]” for which he served over a year in prison and was released within 15 years of the instant offense: “Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the First Degree,” and “Unlawful Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor and Persistent Felony Offender,” The trial was bifurcated into two phases to prove the substantive drug offense and to prove that Fields had previously been convicted of two serious drug felonies.

The Sixth Circuit vacated Fields’ 25-year mandatory-minimum enhanced sentence, rejecting one of the “serious drug offense” predicates. Kentucky’s meth-precursor statute applies when a defendant was not yet capable of manufacturing methamphetamine and does not “necessarily entail” manufacturing under section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The court rejected challenges to the procedure used to impose the enhancement, including arguments that 21 U.S.C. 851(b), which governs procedures for imposing the enhancement, facially violated the Fifth Amendment by compelling defendants to testify regarding previous convictions and that section 851(c) facially violates the Sixth Amendment by requiring judges to determine facts—the length and recency of incarceration—that the Constitution requires to be decided by a jury.

United States v. Ozomaro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-1329

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Donald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ozomaro was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. After competency proceedings and the withdrawal of appointed counsel, the court allowed Ozomaro to proceed pro se, with standby counsel. Ozomaro repeatedly asserted that he would not attend his trial and submitted incoherent jurisdictional arguments. On the day set for trial, Ozomaro refused to leave his holding cell. The court adjourned until October 20. On October 20, Ozomaro appeared. The court empaneled 12 jurors and two alternates. After a day of deliberations, a juror informed a court staff member that she observed a juror drinking alcohol during lunch and that “the same individual hates the Government and doesn’t believe anything they say.” Another juror called to ask if “it was legal to drink on lunch break,” stating that “a juror openly admitted bias to the Government.” The court separately questioned each juror. Most of the jurors verified the allegations about Juror 109, who was excused and replaced with an alternate juror. The jury was told, “start completely brand new.” Following a guilty verdict, Ozomaro was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a sufficient factual inquiry from which to find good cause and conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that the discharge stemmed from Juror 109’s views of the case. The court upheld the application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Ozomaro’s refusal to appear.

United States v. Stevenson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 21-3856

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Siler

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to suppress, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the circumstances of this case.

Defendant entered a conditional plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant subsequently brought this appeal challenging the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop leading to the search of his car and unconstitutionally prolonged the stop. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to warrant a prudent person in believing Defendant had violated 4511.431(A); and (2) the officer had probable cause to detain Defendant, investigate the source of a marijuana odor, and continue search the entire vehicle for marijuana.

Wallace v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-5764

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that the district court erred by denying Defendant's request to vacate his 18 U.S.C. 924(j) conviction.

Defendant pled guilty to discharging a firearm during a crime of violence that resulted in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(j), and illegally possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the Court should vacate his crime-of-violence conviction under section 924(j) because of the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). The Sixth Circuit agreed and vacated that conviction, holding that, given Davis, Defendant did not violate section 924(j) because his attempted robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under the constitutional portion of section 924's definition.

United States v. Davis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3091

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Kirsch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Police arrested Davis, a convicted felon, on a state warrant for three counts of aggravated battery by discharge of a firearm, just outside of his residence. While being arrested, Davis stated that there were children in the house. Officers entered the house to conduct a limited sweep of areas where a person could be hiding, finding an eight-year-old child and a 19-year-old. An officer observed a rifle, upright in plain view, in an open bedroom closet. About 45 minutes later, after the sweep had concluded, Antionette, a woman with whom Davis was living and the owner of the house, arrived and gave the officers oral and written consent to search the home, acknowledging that she had been advised of her rights.

Davis, charged with illegally possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle on the basis that no valid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry or the later search. The district court found that three separate exceptions applied: a protective sweep following Davis’s arrest, exigent circumstances because a child was in the home, and Antoinette's voluntary consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Davis did not dispute that Antoinette’s consent was voluntary and not tainted by the initial entry into the house.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-3272

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of federal drug offenses in a two-count indictment and sentencing him to 180 months' imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.

While on federal supervised police, Defendant agreed to cooperate with local police, and his cooperation was allowed by a federal judge. The district court later issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest for violating the conditions of his supervised release. A federal grand jury subsequently indicted him on two counts of distributing a controlled substance. Defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he had received federal immunity from prosecution for the drug offenses through his cooperation agreement. The district court denied the motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's first motion to dismiss based on federal immunity; and (2) did not err in denying Defendant's second motion to dismiss the indictment as a discovery sanction.

United States v. Settles

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-2780

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence Defendant received for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that any error in the district court's methodology in arriving at the sentence was harmless.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed a sentence of eighty-seven months in prison, which was less than the statute maximum of 120 months requested by the government. On appeal, Defendant challenged the procedures used by the district court in arriving at his sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) any error in the district court's methodology was harmless; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error.

United States v. Anthony Hall

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2541

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated bank robbery, and the district court sentenced him to mandatory life imprisonment under the federal “three strikes” law. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. On appeal, Defendant argued that (A) the district court erroneously admitted evidence of his flight from the second traffic stop; (B) the jury’s verdict lacked sufficient evidence; and (C) the three strikes law is unconstitutional.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  The court held that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in concluding any danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value. Here, evidence of Defendant’s flight from the second traffic stop helped establish the government’s narrative that Defendant continually evaded police for ten days following the robbery. It also helped the jury understand why the police found Defendant, as well as incriminating evidence, in another state. Further, Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that he was mistakenly identified as the robber. But overwhelming evidence indicates his identification was not a mistake. Finally, the court explained that based Defendant’s criminal history outlined earlier, he has proven he remains a danger to the public despite being given a second and third chance to show otherwise. The sentence imposed here was not grossly disproportionate to Defendant’s crime.

United States v. Anthony Robinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2929

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant, a federal inmate, appeals an order of the district court directing the Bureau of Prisons to turn over all funds in Defendant’s inmate trust account for payment toward an outstanding restitution obligation.

The Eighth Circuit concluded that the order is not adequately supported, and therefore vacated the order and remand for further proceedings. The court reasoned that the district court cited Section 3613(a) only for the proposition that Defendant’s funds were not exempt from enforcement. The court did not assert that 3613(a) is a self-executing means to enforce a lien, and did not rely on 3613 as authority to order that the funds be turned over to the clerk of court. Rather, the court cited restitution provisions in 3664 as the basis for turnover and collection. The court, therefore, declined to affirm the order based on 3613 alone and does not address on the record what authority is available to a district court under that section.

United States v. David Allen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3060

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: MELLOY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle search. The district court denied the motion. Defendant proceeded to trial, where a jury found him guilty. He appealed and raised four arguments: (1) the district court should have granted his motion to suppress; (2) the district court should have admitted impeachment evidence; (3) the district court should have given additional jury instructions; and (4) the evidence was not sufficient to convict.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress because the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. At trial, any error in excluding defense Exhibits S and T was harmless because the impeachment information was admitted through the officer’s testimony. The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Defendant’s proposed jury instructions because the instructions it gave fairly and accurately set forth the law. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.

United States v. Donte Kent

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3879

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: MELLOY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that Defendant was a career offender under Section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because he had at least two prior convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s conviction for interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury constitutes a crime of violence. Defendant argued that interference with official acts causing bodily injury can be committed recklessly. If it can, under Borden, it no longer qualifies as a crime of violence. The court held that the offense cannot be committed recklessly. The court explained that reckless conduct is not sufficient. Because interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury cannot be committed recklessly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden has not abrogated Malloy. Interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury is a crime of violence under the force clause. Defendant, therefore, qualifies as a career offender under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.1.

United States v. Drake Banks, Sr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2781

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of a firearms offense after police seized evidence during a traffic stop. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of forty-eight months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the conviction and sentence on several grounds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed discerning no reversible error.
 
The court explained that an officer’s observance of a traffic violation, no matter how minor, gives the officer probable cause to initiate a stop. Here, the officer reasonably concluded that the driver’s following distance was not reasonable and prudent. He thus had probable cause for a traffic stop, and the district court properly denied the motion to suppress. Further, the court wrote that the district court abuse its discretion in concluding that a jury reasonably could infer that Defendant sought to flee the patrol car because he recognized that officers were on the brink of discovering his unlawful possession of firearms in the trunk of the rental car. Defendant’s efforts to escape coincided with the officer’s search of the Altima’s trunk and with Defendant’s anxious statements about that search. Thus, the evidence was properly admitted.
 
Further, Defendant objects that much of the evidence is “merely circumstantial,” but circumstantial evidence can support a conviction, and the combination of direct and circumstantial evidence here was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the district court’s finding that he constructively possessed the guns is not clearly erroneous in light of the record as a whole.

United States v. Jeremy Robinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2396

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. He appealed the district court’s conclusion that his prior Arkansas burglary convictions were separate offenses, rendering him an armed career criminal subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant who has been convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon following “three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another[.]” 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1) In determining whether prior convictions are separate and distinct, at least three factors are relevant: “(1) the time lapse between offenses, (2) the physical distance between their occurrence, and (3) their lack of overall substantive continuity, a factor that is often demonstrated in the violent-felony context by different victims or different aggressions.” United States v. Pledge, 821 F.3d 1035.
 
Here, Defendant committed three residential burglaries—each on different days, in different locations, and against different victims—over an approximate three-week span. The court held that these offenses qualify as separate and distinct criminal episodes committed on occasions different from one another.

United States v. John Beridon, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2979

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: LOKEN

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual). 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A). He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 96 months in prison. Defendant appealed arguing the court procedurally erred by denying a mitigating role adjustment, see USSG Section 3B1.2, and abused its discretion in imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the sentencing record established that Defendant was “deeply involved” in the possess-with-intent-to-distribute offense to which he pleaded guilty. He helped arrange for cross-country travel from his home in California to Nebraska with instructions to pick up and hold a large quantity of methamphetamine. As in United States v. Garcia, he offered no evidence establishing the relative culpability of participants other than his cousin. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant was not “substantially less culpable than the average participant” and therefore did not warrant a mitigating role adjustment. Further, Defendant’s “dissatisfaction with a district court’s balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors does not indicate that the district court abused its discretion.”

United States v. Mar'yo Lindsey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2930

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 70 months imprisonment followed by 3 years supervised release. Defendant appealed asserting that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers during the search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, as well as evidence obtained under subsequently secured search warrants.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as a general matter, mere passengers, such as Defendant, who have no ownership rights in a vehicle lack standing to challenge a search of the vehicle. However, Defendant contends that he has standing to challenge the search because it was the direct result of his illegal seizure by officers. In this case, however, the officer had probable cause to detain the vehicle and Defendant, a passenger, based upon traffic violations alone, because any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.

Defendant also contended that the affidavits in support of the search warrants for his DNA and the two cell phones did not allege facts sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrants. The district court found the affidavits constitutionally adequate but alternatively concluded that suppression was inappropriate in any event because the officers acted in good faith in executing the search warrants. Thus, the court affirmed the district court based on this alternate reasoning.

United States v. Omar Taylor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 20-2756

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: ERICKSON

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 280 months’ imprisonment on the sex trafficking offenses and a consecutive 120 months for committing a felony involving a minor while a registered sex offender, for a total imprisonment term of 400 months. Defendant raises four claims on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the sex trafficking convictions; (2) the district court erred when it instructed the jury that a “happy ending massage” was a commercial sex act; (3) the district court abused its discretion when it admitted prior bad act evidence; and (4) a conviction on Count One—sex trafficking of a minor—violated the double jeopardy clause because it is a lesser included offense of Count Two—sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the testimony at trial was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the women were directed and encouraged by Defendant to digitally stimulate clients' genitalia in exchange for money—conduct that satisfies the statutory definition of a “commercial sex act.” Next, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant participated in a venture by knowingly receiving money acquired from his massage business, which included assisting, supporting, and facilitating sex trafficking. Further, the testimony offered by the women working in Defendant’s massage business, if given credence by the jury, is sufficiently strong for the court to conclude that the 2005 conviction, even assuming it was improperly admitted, did not have a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.

United States v. Robert Ivers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3478

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: MELLOY

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant alleges that during the third revocation hearing, the district court violated his right to due process because it forced him to proceed either with an incompetent attorney or without any attorney at all.

The Eighth Circuit reversed finding that Defendant was denied the right to counsel. The court explained that to show his waiver of the right to counsel was involuntary, a defendant must show the district court forced him to choose between inadequate representation and self-representation.

Here, Defendant has shown he was justifiably dissatisfied with his attorney. This is not a case where the evidence shows a defendant who disagrees with his attorney’s strategy or wants to delay the hearing. Instead, the evidence shows an attorney who was not prepared to handle a revocation of supervised release hearing. Further, the attorney’s comment regarding “the big house or the nut house” demonstrates he did not know the factual background of the case or the potential consequences that Defendant was facing. Because Defendant was forced to proceed with either this unprepared attorney or no attorney at all, Defendant’s decision to waive his right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary and his right to due process was violated.

United States v. Salvador Nunez-Hernandez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-1981

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: STRAS

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Defendant believes that the statute criminalizing reentry into this country after removal violates his equal-protection rights. See 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(a), (b). He did not raise this issue before the district court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied the pending motion for judicial notice.
 
The court explained that even constitutional arguments can be forfeited. Forfeiture occurs when a party has an argument available but fails to assert it in time. The court wrote that failure to raise an equal-protection challenge before the district court is a classic example of forfeiture. During the six months before he pleaded guilty, Defendant filed more than a dozen motions raising all sorts of issues, but not one of them questioned the constitutionality of the illegal-reentry statute or mentioned equal protection. Had he done so, the district court would have had an opportunity to potentially correct or avoid the alleged] mistake in the first place.
 
The court explained that under these circumstances, Defendant’s constitutional argument receives, at most, plain-error review. Here, to succeed, Defendant’ had to show, among other things, that there was a clear or obvious error under current law. In this case, there is one district court case on his side, see Carillo-Lopez, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 1001, but at most it shows that the issue is subject to reasonable dispute. The court explained that picking one side of a reasonable dispute cannot be clearly or obviously wrong.

United States v. Timothy Beston, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2186

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of malicious mischief, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1363, 1153, for driving a stolen vehicle into a lake on the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation in North Dakota. The district court sentenced Defendant to 21 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release, and it ordered him to pay restitution totaling $30,845.50. On appeal, Defendant challenged the restitution amount as violative of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) and asserts that the government breached his plea agreement. The government moved to dismiss his appeal, citing the waiver of appellate rights in the plea agreement.

The Eighth Circuit denied the government’s motion and vacated the order of restitution. The court explained that the district court erred by failing to properly follow the procedure set forth in the MVRA, albeit under the leading of the government. The MVRA denies courts discretion as to “the point in time when property should be valued,” requiring that a district court review the value of the property either on the date of damage or the date of sentencing. Because the relevant conduct serving as the basis for Defendant’s offense was him receiving the stolen vehicle and driving it into the lake, the district court should have considered the value of the vehicle when he received the stolen vehicle and before he drove it into the lake, not when the vehicle was originally stolen from the dealership lot by someone else. The record, however, provides no indication that the district court used these relevant dates when determining the vehicle’s value.

CURTIS FAUBER V. RONALD DAVIS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 17-99001

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Bress

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1988, a California jury sentenced Petitioner to death for murdering another person with an ax. The California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and later denied his state habeas petition. Petitioner now seeks federal habeas relief. He argues that the state prosecutor improperly vouched for a witness’s credibility, that his attorney was ineffective in not objecting to the vouching, and that the state trial court, in the penalty phase, improperly excluded the prosecution’s earlier plea offer to Petitioner as claimed mitigating evidence.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The court that no clearly established federal constitutional law holds that an unaccepted plea offer qualifies as evidence in mitigation that must be admitted in a capital penalty proceeding. The court held that regardless, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. The court wrote that given the extreme aggravating factors that the State put forward coupled with Petitioner’s already extensive but unsuccessful presentation of mitigating evidence, there is no basis to conclude that the jury would have reached a different result if it had considered Petitioner’s unaccepted plea.

RICHARD MONTIEL V. KEVIN CHAPPELL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 15-99000

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Friedland

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and later summarily rejected “on the merits” Petitioner’s state habeas petition. Petitioner argued primarily that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Petitioner argued that the Ninth Circuit should review his Strickland claims de novo, because the California Supreme Court’s four-sentence denial of his claims “on the merits,” without issuing an order to show cause, signifies that the court concluded only that his petition did not state a prima facie case for relief such that there is no “adjudication on the merits” to which this court owes deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), in which the Supreme Court afforded AEDPA deference to the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of a habeas petition raising a Strickland claim. The court, therefore, applied the deferential AEDPA standard, asking whether the denial of Petitioner’s claims “involved an unreasonable application of” Strickland.

The court held, however, under AEDPA's highly deferential standard of review, that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails under the second prong of Strickland. The court wrote that comparing the mitigation evidence that was offered with what would have been offered but for Petitioner’s trial attorney’s alleged errors, the state court could reasonably have decided that there was not a substantial likelihood that the jury would have returned a different sentence if the attorney had not performed deficiently.

STEVEN HARTPENCE V. KINETIC CONCEPTS, INC.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-55823

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Collins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Kinetic Concepts, Inc., and its indirect subsidiary KCI USA, Inc. (collectively, “KCI”) submitted claims to Medicare in which KCI falsely certified compliance with certain criteria governing Medicare payment for the use of KCI’s medical device for treating wounds. The district court granted summary judgment to KCI, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the False Claims Act elements of materiality and scienter.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court agreed that compliance with the specific criterion that there be no stalled cycle would not be material if, upon case-specific review, the Government routinely paid stalled-cycle claims. In other words, if stalled-cycle claims were consistently paid when subject to case-specific scrutiny, then a false statement that avoided that scrutiny and instead resulted in automatic payment would not be material to the payment decision. The court concluded, however, that the record did not show this to be the case. The court considered administrative rulings concerning claims that were initially denied, post-payment and pre-payment audits of particular claims, and a 2007 report by the Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The court concluded that none of these forms of evidence supported the district court’s summary judgment ruling.
 
The court held that the district court further erred in ruling that there was insufficient evidence that KCI acted with the requisite scienter and that the remainder of the district court’s reasoning concerning scienter rested on a clear failure to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

USA V. JOHNNY MAGDALENO

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-10390

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Clifton

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of racketeering conspiracy and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. At sentencing, the district court imposed a special condition of supervised release set forth in the parties’ plea agreement that prohibited Defendant from associating with any member of the Norteño or Nuestra Familia gangs. On appeal, Defendant argues that this condition violates his fundamental right to familial association because it does not exclude his siblings who might be gang members.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of the special condition. The court The declined the Government’s invitation to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the invited error doctrine. The panel wrote that the record does not suggest that Defendant either caused the alleged error intentionally or abandoned a known right. The court therefore treated the right as forfeited, as opposed to waived, and reviewed the district court’s decision to impose the gang condition for plain error.

The court wrote that Defendant’s relationship with a sibling or half sibling does not inherently constitute an “intimate relationship” with a “life partner,” child, or fiancée, and thus does not give rise to a “particularly significant liberty interest” that would require the district court to undertake additional procedural steps at sentencing.

The court rejected Defendant’s contention that the condition is substantively unreasonable. The panel explained that given Defendant’s history of coordinating and executing violent gang attacks, a prohibition on gang association does not constitute an unreasonable deprivation of liberty.

United States v. Cortez-Nieto

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-3184

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Harris L. Hartz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendants Orlando Cortez-Nieto and Jesus Cervantes-Aguilar were convicted by a jury of four methamphetamine offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a playground. After their convictions Defendants moved for judgment of acquittal. The district court granted the motions in part, setting aside the convictions on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that any of the offenses of conviction occurred within 1,000 feet of a playground, but entering judgments of conviction on lesser-included offenses (the four offenses without the proximity element). In their consolidated appeal, Defendants argued: (1) that a jury instruction stating that the jury should not consider the guilt of any persons other than Defendants improperly precluded the jury from considering that two government witnesses were motivated to lie about Defendants to reduce or eliminate their own guilt, and the prosecutor improperly magnified this error by explicitly arguing that the jurors could not consider the witnesses’ guilt in assessing their credibility; (2) the district court should not have imposed judgments of conviction on the lesser-included offenses after determining that the original charges had not been proved because the jury had not been instructed on the lesser-included offenses; and (3) remand was necessary to correct a clerical error in the judgment forms. The Tenth Circuit determined only that the clerical error warranted correction. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-2058

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Moritz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Nathaniel Johnson was arrested on a Greyhound bus after an encounter with Special Agent Jarrell Perry. Law enforcement found two packages of methamphetamine in Johnson’s backpack, and Johnson gave several incriminating statements. The district court denied Johnson’s motion to suppress the physical evidence and his statements. Johnson appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court determined Perry had probable cause to arrest Johnson and to seize the bundle of clothing and backpack. But while seizing the items from the bus, Perry conducted an illegal search of the bundle by reaching inside Johnson’s open backpack and feeling the bundle in an exploratory manner. Then later, at the DEA office, still without a warrant, Perry conducted a second illegal search of the backpack and the bundle. And contrary to the government’s position, the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement could not apply because at neither point in time were the contents of the bundle or backpack a foregone conclusion.

United States v. McDonald

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-7052

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Guy McDonald was arrested and charged for dealing methamphetamine. He pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws at the federal district court in Eastern Oklahoma. He received a sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment. McDonald appealed, arguing the district court erred in calculating his base offense level and in applying three sentencing enhancements to his sentence. Specifically, McDonald argued the district court improperly relied on facts alleged in his presentence investigation report given the objections he raised at the sentencing hearing. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

USA v. Danyel Michelle Witt

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-10557

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: NEWSOM

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant was indicted tried, convicted, and sentenced to 28 months imprisonment for her part in a broader scheme to defraud the federal government out of relief funds intended for farmers affected by drought and fire. She challenged both her conviction and her sentence. As to her conviction, she contends that the evidence preponderated against a guilty verdict such that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial. As to her sentence, she asserts that her bottom-of-the-Guidelines term of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Neither did it abuse its discretion when it imposed a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment. The court explained that allowing the verdict to stand in the face of an arguable inconsistency—of which the jury was made aware, and which doesn’t bear on an element of the conviction—is not a miscarriage of justice. Further, the court reasoned that the weight of the evidence does not preponderate against a guilty verdict in this case. Finally, the court explained that Defendant never mentioned the Section 3553(a) factors or explains how the court committed reversible error when it considered them. Accordingly, she has failed to carry her burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both the record and the factors in Section 3553(a).

USA v. Timothy Jermaine Pate

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-10545

Opinion Date: August 10, 2022

Judge: LAGOA

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant filed various false liens against John Koskinen, the former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and Jacob Lew, the former Secretary of the Treasury. There is no dispute that Pate filed the false liens to retaliate against Lew and Koskinen for acts they performed as part of their official duties. Defendant filed the false liens after Lew and Koskinen had left their positions with the federal government.

The Eleventh Circuit was therefore presented d with the following question: Does Section 1521 apply to false liens filed against former federal officers and employees for official actions they performed while in service with the federal government? The court concluded that the answer to this question is yes—the plain language of Section 1521 covers both current and former federal officers and employees. The court explained that a reading of the statute’s plain language—“any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance”—does not suggest that its protection ends at some ascertainable point in time. Like the language regarding a federal officer or employee, the language regarding a person who lends assistance to a federal officer or employee has both a temporal qualification on liability. Thus, the court affirmed Defendant’s convictions predicated on violations of Section 1521.

USA v. Charles Morgan, Jr.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 18-3045

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: SRINIVASAN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant was indicted for transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, attempted production of child pornography, and commission of a felony involving a minor by a person required to register as a sex offender. After a bifurcated jury and bench trial, Appellant was convicted on all counts.
 
On appeal, Appellant brings three challenges to his convictions. First, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the government’s expert testimony concerning the approximate locations of Appellant’s and the transported minor’s cell phones on the night of their meeting. Second, Appellant argues that the government should have been required to prove not just that he transported a minor to engage in sexual activity, but that he knew she was underage. Third, Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Act that required him to register as a sex offender.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed Appellant’s convictions. The court held that the district court, in this case, did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert’s testimony under Rule 702. The court explained that the district court justifiably concluded that concerns about the specific distances the expert drove should be considered by the jury in assessing the weight of the expert’s testimony and not by the court in its threshold admissibility determination. Further, the court explained that in light of the probative value of the expert’s testimony and the deference the Circuit Court affords district courts in making determinations under Rule 403, it cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to hear from the expert.

People v. Morelos

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S051968

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Groban

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the trial court finding Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, except as modified to strike an enhancement under former Cal. Penal Code 667.5, subdivision (b), and affirmed the judgment of death but vacated the prison sentence, holding that remand was required.

After a guilt phase of the bench trial held in this case Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. The trial court found true two prior serious felony enhancements and two prior prison term enhancements. After a penalty phase, the trial court returned a verdict of death and imposed a consecutive prison term of fifteen years. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed under former section 667.5, subdivision (b) and remanded for resentencing, holding that the enhancement was unauthorized; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects.

People v. Strong

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S266606

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: Kruger

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437, holding that certain special circumstance findings did not preclude him from making out a prima facie case for resentencing.

In 2014, Appellant was convicted of felony murder. The jury found true felony-murder special-circumstance allegations that Appellant was a "major participant" who acted with "reckless indifference to human life" under Cal. Penal Code 190.2, subdivision (d). Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided People v. Banks, 61 Cal. 4th 788 (2015) and People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016), which provided guidance on the meaning of the statutory phrases "major participant" and "with reckless indifference to human life." In 2018, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill 1437. Appellant then petitioned for resentencing. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) findings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437; and (2) because Appellant's case was tried before both Banks and Clerk, the special circumstance findings did not preclude him from making out a prima facie case for resentencing under section 1172.6.

California v. Vang

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C090365(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law

Defendant Jerry Vang was convicted by jury for multiple crimes against two different victims, including: kidnapping first degree felony murder with a special circumstance, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, making criminal threats with firearm allegations, and firearms possession by a felon. Defendant had a long history of domestic violence, had an argument with his wife. After she fled in her car, defendant followed, eventually forced her to stop, and coerced her (through force or fear) into his vehicle. As defendant was driving away, his wife opened the door and jumped from the moving vehicle, resulting in her death. Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution to proceed on a legally inadequate theory of felony murder. He contends that under the current felony-murder rule, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), he could be liable for felony murder only if he was proven to be the “actual killer.” Because the evidence showed that his wife jumped from the vehicle of her own volition, defendant contends he was not the actual killer and therefore his conviction for first degree felony murder with a special circumstance rested on a legally invalid theory. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed that conviction as to first degree felony murder. The judgment and convictions were affirmed in all other respects.

Needham v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G060670(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 8, 2022

Judge: Marks

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The State petitioned to commit Nicholas Needham California under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). Preparing for trial on the petition, the district attorney retained a psychological expert to evaluate Needham and testify at trial that he qualified as an SVP. Needham moved to exclude the expert’s testimony at trial, but the trial court denied his motion.
Needham appealed, seeking a declaration that the SVPA did not permit the State to call a privately retained expert to testify at trial. The Court of Appeal granted relief: “[G]iven the obvious dangers to essential liberty interests inherent in the SVPA, it must be carefully implemented and applied only where there is a high degree of certainty that it is warranted.” The Court found the statutory scheme deliberately limited when an SVP petition could be filed and brought to trial, as well as the evidence available to the prosecution. In light of this system, the Court concluded the expert-witness provisions of the Civil Discovery Act did not apply and that the State had no right to retain an expert witness to testify at trial.

People v. North River Insurance Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H047426(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Grover

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Bonds posted a $200,000 bail bond for Quinones-Arias. North was the surety and guaranteed the defendant’s appearance. Quinones-Arias did not appear at a plea hearing on December 17, 2018. The court declared the bond forfeited and issued a $200,000 bench warrant. A notice of forfeiture was mailed to the companies, advising that the forfeiture would become final on July 14, 2019 (180 days plus five days for mailing) unless the defendant is surrendered. On July 8, 2019, Bonds moved to toll the 180-day period based on temporary disability (Pen. Code 1305(e)), or alternatively to extend the time to return Quinones-Arias to court. (1305.4), arguing that Quinones-Arias’s detention and deportation constituted a temporary disability. A bail agent is entitled to tolling during a period of disability and for a reasonable time thereafter. The prosecutor stated that the Department of Homeland Security indicated that Quinones-Arias was not deported but voluntarily departed. The court denied the motion, finding that Quinones-Arias had voluntarily left the country and the bail agent had made no effort to return or surrender Quinones-Arias, or request his extradition.

The court of appeal reversed, noting the state’s concession that Quinones-Arias was under a temporary disability when he failed to appear and the disability continued throughout the 180-day appearance period.

State v. Bowden

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20488

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Kahn

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and other crimes, holding that any error in the trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant was harmless.

On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his cell phone, arguing that the application for the warrant authorizing the search lacked a particular description of the items to be seized and that the affidavit supporting the application failed to establish probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State met its burden of showing that any error in the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Patterson

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20349

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: D’Auria

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-54a, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct, namely, two prior shootings involving the alleged murder weapon, to prove identity and means.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was not relevant or material to identity and that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that, given the manner in which the testimony was limited and the numerous cautionary instructions given to the jurors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the uncharged misconduct evidence.

State v. Samuolis

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20299

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Keller

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder, assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm, and attempt to commit assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in this case.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his father on the grounds that the police officers' warrantless entry into the residence home under the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement was justified. Alternatively, the court deterred that, even if the initial entry was unlawful, Defendant's shooting of the victim sufficiently attenuated that unlawful act from the subsequent lawful search and seizure of the evidence at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude that there was an emergency justifying their initial entry into the residence; and (2) in light of this conclusion, the subsequent entries were similarly justified.

State v. Smith

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20600

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Kahn

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial convicting Defendant of various crimes arising from five criminal cases, which included first degree robbery, second degree arson, and attempt to commit murder, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

At issue on appeal was the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his cell phone and evidence obtained from his cell phone service provider. Specifically in question was whether the warrants authorizing those searches were supported by probable cause and whether they particularly described the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the information obtained from the execution of both warrants; and (2) this error was harmless with respect to some, but not all, of the crimes alleged in the indictment.

Bridges v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0773

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Arleshia Bridges appealed her convictions for malice murder and related crimes in connection with the 2010 shooting death of Anthony Rankins, Jr. On appeal, Bridges argued the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial based on the general grounds and in striking three prospective jurors. for cause. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Carter v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0432

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Woodrow Carter was convicted in 2016 for the death of James Mills. On appeal, Carter contended the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, and the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Carter’s conviction.

Dugar v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0707

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Rita Dugar was convicted for shooting Jon Townley at her ex-boyfriend’s home. She claimed she attempted to fire a warning shot because the boyfriend and Townley had been fighting. On appeal, Dugar raised four enumerations of error, all relating to her waiver of a jury trial. But finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Dugar’s conviction.

Ellington v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0477

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Vincent Ellington was convicted by jury for the 2016 shooting death of Jeremy Fulton. On appeal, Ellington challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and argued the trial court erred when it limited his cross-examination of one of the State’s witnesses. Finding only that the Ellington’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony should have merged for sentencing purposes into his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of a felony, the Georgia Supreme Court remanded this case for recalculation of Ellington’s sentence. His convictions were otherwise affirmed.

Harris v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0675

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Juan Harris was convicted by jury of murder and related crimes in connection with the 2001 death of Tony Morris. On appeal, Harris argued the trial court should have granted him a continuance to call missing witnesses, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for reasons relating to witness preparations and for withdrawing requests for jury charges. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Jones v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0815

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Reginald Jones appealed his convictions for malice murder and related crimes in connection with the 2017 death of his girlfriend Faith Bittinger and her unborn child. On appeal. Jones argued: (1) the trial evidence was insufficient to establish he killed Bittinger with malice aforethought; and (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for calling Jones’ neighbor as a character witness, because in doing so, the State was then permitted to introduce prejudicial character witness. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Mathews v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0670

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Following a joint trial with co-defendant Shelton Jackson, Jarvis Mathews was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony for the 2001 fatal shooting of Grant Reynolds, and the non-fatal shootings of Larentae and Robert Mumphery. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Moore v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0583

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Nikita Moore appealed her conviction for malice murder arising out of the 2010 death of her two-year-old son, Ma’Kel Moore-Tompkins. On appeal, Moore claimed the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her murder conviction because it failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than her guilt. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Moore’s conviction.

Payne v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0469

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Lorenzo Payne appealed his conviction for the 2005 shooting death of Quartez Armour. Armour was shot for allegedly cheating Payne in a putative drug deal. Payne argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no errors, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Payne’s conviction.

Phillips v. Jackson, et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0503

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A municipal court judge believed Carey Phillips’s traffic citation gave rise to “quasi-bond” conditions that it could — and did — modify in order to restrict Phillips’s driving privileges. Phillips disagreed, but instead of appealing the municipal court judge’s order, he sought pretrial habeas relief against the municipal court judge and the City of Atlanta Solicitor. Counsel for the respondents did not attempt to defend the judge’s order on the merits, arguing only that Phillips’s habeas petition was procedurally improper on several grounds. The habeas court denied relief, partly on the ground that Phillips had an adequate remedy at law and so could not seek habeas. To this the Georgia Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, though identifying a different legal remedy than did the habeas court.

Ruff v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0709

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Colvin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tahj Ruff was convicted of felony murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Lynwood Williams. Ruff appealed, but the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Ruff’s convictions. The matter was remanded to the trial court, however, to correct the calculation of Ruff’s sentence.

Walker v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0737

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Shaun Walker was convicted by jury of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Antonio Ferguson. On appeal, Walker argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Walker’s convictions.

Wright v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22A0588

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Shakur Wright pleaded guilty to the malice murder of Benjamin Thompson and to other related offenses. Ten days after sentencing, Wright, through new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion was timely filed in the same term of court as his conviction. Wright argued that his plea counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to inform him before sentencing of the more stringent “manifest injustice” standard for withdrawing a guilty plea after sentencing. After the court denied Wright’s motion, Wright appealed, arguing that his plea counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance resulted in an “unnecessary burden” on him. Finding no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s ruling, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed its order denying Wright’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

State v. Yamashita

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-20-0000075

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Michael D. Wilson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting and sentencing Defendant but reversed with regard to the issue of Defendant's ability to pay a crime victim compensation (CVC) fee under Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-605(6) and 351-62.6, holding that Defendant's inability to pay the CVC fee mandated waiver of the fee.

Defendant was convicted of various drug, theft, fraud, and property crimes. In addition to a five-year term of incarceration, the circuit court ordered Defendant to pay a CVC fee and a drug demand reduction (DDR) assessment under Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-650. Defendant appealed, arguing that both the CVC fee and the DDR assessment constituted unconstitutional taxes. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment as to its imposition of the CVC and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) the circuit court erroneously imposed the CVC fee upon Defendant because he was unable to pay the fee; and (2) the CVC fee and DDR assessment were not unconstitutional taxes.

Idaho v. Blancas

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48357

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jesus Blancas was stopped by Idaho State Police Sergeant Chris Elverud. Elverud suspected Blancas of driving under the influence and administered four breath tests, but only one produced a valid result. That test indicated that Blancas’ blood alcohol content (BAC) was nearly three times the legal limit. Elverud then took Blancas to a hospital to collect a blood sample for testing. Blancas refused to consent to the blood draw, and Elverud attempted to reach an on-call magistrate judge to obtain a warrant. After failing to reach the on-call magistrate judge, Elverud instructed hospital staff to draw Blancas’ blood under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that warrantless blood draw violated Blancas’ Fourth Amendment rights because the State failed to prove there was insufficient time to obtain a warrant, and therefor, failed to prove exigent circumstances justified the blood draw.

State v. White

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 122039

Opinion Date: August 5, 2022

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court's exclusion of polygraph evidence did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to present a complete defense; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to amend the information; (3) although the admission of Defendant's videotaped confession to a previous offense may have been inflammatory, any error was harmless; and (4) cumulative error did not deny Defendant a fair trial.

Garcia v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 62/21

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Eaves

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals ruling that it is possible for an accessory before the fact to aid, on impulse and without premeditation, another in the commission of a homicide with the intent to kill, holding that a defendant may be liable as an accessory before the fact to second-degree murder.

After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that an accessory before the fact to second-degree intent to kill murder cannot be guilty of second-degree murder because he necessarily deliberates and premeditates the murder. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, based on the Court's holdings in Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130 (2001) and Apostoledes v. State, 323 Md. 456 (1992), an accessory before the fact does not necessarily premeditate.

Rainey v. State

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 54/21

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Hotten

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and related gun offenses, holding that it was not reversible error for a circuit court to give a destruction or concealment of evidence jury instruction based on evidence that Defendant cut off his dreadlocks between the time of the crime and the arrest.

At the time of the shooting leading to Defendant's convictions, Defendant wore dreadlocks. One month later, a witness recognized Defendant with a very short, close-cropped haircut and called 911. Defendant was arrested, charged, and convicted. The court of special appeals affirmed, ruling that there was sufficient evidence to generate a destruction or concealment of evidence jury instruction, but it would have been preferable to have customized the jury instruction to describe with specificity the cutting of hair between the time of the crime and the arrest. The court then ruled that any instructional error was harmless. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it would have been more precise for the circuit court to have tailored the consciousness of guilt instruction specifically describe a change in appearance instead of a destruction or concealment of evidence, but any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Fan

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13207

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that a defendant may be convicted of human trafficking under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 50(a) only if the jury finds that the defendant knowingly trafficked another person, whether or not that person is specifically identified.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of five counts of human trafficking, five counts of deriving support from prostitution, four counts of keeping a house of ill fame, and three counts of money laundering. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial just did not err in denying Defendant's motion to sever her trial from that of her codefendants; (2) the trial judge did not err in declining to allow the introduction of testimony by two women before the grand jury; (3) the judge did not err in allowing the introduction of certain testimony; and (4) there was no prejudicial error in the jury instructions.

Commonwealth v. Grier

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-11386

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm, holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal were without merit.

Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's determination that the defense had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection; (2) there was no prejudicial error in the jury instructions; (3) the judge did not abuse her discretion in excusing a juror based on decades-old charges; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in this case; and (5) there was no error or other reason warranting relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.

State v. Mathis

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2022 MT 156

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Appellant of incest for the sexual abuse of T.N. and sentencing her to 100 years in prison, holding that there was no error or abuse of proceedings in the proceedings below.

Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's "right to access witnesses" in denying her motion to to conduct pretrial interviews with T.N. and J.M.; (2) the State's failure to lodge with the district court forensic interviews from a different case did not violate Defendant's right to a fair trial, and Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on this ground; and (3) based on the totality of the evidence, this Court declines to employ the doctrine of plain error to review Defendant's claim that the district court should have given a specific unanimity instruction.

State v. McNeal

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2022-Ohio-2703

Opinion Date: August 9, 2022

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision to overrule Defendant's motion for leave to move for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for leave to move for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of rape and sentenced to eleven years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for leave to move for a new trial, asserting that certain undisclosed evidence was exculpatory. The trial court overruled the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's motion for leave was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's motion for leave to move for a new trial should be granted because he was unavoidably prevented from timely moving for a new trial within the time specified in Crim.R. 33(B) due to the state's suppression of evidence.

State v. Yontz

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2022-Ohio-2745

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Maureen O'Connor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Appellant's appeal of the denial of his motion to modify the terms of his intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction (ILC) supervision was moot and declining to address the merits, holding that the court erred.

Appellant was charged with aggravated possession of drugs and requested ILC under Ohio Rev. Code 2951.041. The trial court granted the request. Appellant later moved to modify the terms of his ILC supervision. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that the order denying the modification of the conditions of ILC was not a final appealable order.

Oregon v. Hershey

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S067825

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Duncan

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In September 2017, Klamath County Animal Control impounded 22 dogs, three horses, and seven chickens from Petitioner Kenneth Hershey’s property. The state subsequently charged Hershey with three counts of second-degree animal neglect, one count for each type of animal. under ORS 167.347. As relevant here, that statute provides that, when an animal is being held by an animal care agency pending the outcome of a criminal action for mistreatment of the animal, a district attorney, acting on behalf of the animal care agency, may file a petition in the criminal action asking the circuit court to order the forfeiture of the animal unless the defendant in the criminal action (or another person with a claim to the animal) pays a security deposit or bond to cover the agency’s costs of caring for the animal. The question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court by this case was whether, under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution, a party has a right to a jury trial in a proceeding brought under ORS 167.347.
The circuit court ruled that a party did not have such a right. The Court of Appeals affirmed, in a divided opinion. The Supreme Court concurred with the lower court decisions and affirmed.

Hill v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 210569

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Kelsey

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding Appellant in violation of probation and sentencing him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence, holding that there was no error.

On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence because the period of suspension had lapsed before his probation violation. The court of appeals disagreed, upholding the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's order was consistent with, not violative of, the revocation power authorized by Va. Code 19.2-306(A).

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 98340-2

Opinion Date: August 11, 2022

Judge: Barbara Madsen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Petitioner Antoine Davis was 21 when he was convicted of first degree murder and second degree attempted murder. He received a standard range sentence of 767 months. Davis filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) more than one year after his judgment and sentence finalized, contending it was. timely for two reasons: (1) In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) constituted a significant, material, and retroactive change in law that applied to his de facto life sentence; and (2) recent advances in neuroscience for late-aged adolescents qualified as newly discovered evidence. The Washington Supreme Court found: (1) Monschke applied to 19- and 20-year-old defendants; and (2) Davis did not satisfy any of the statutory criteria that exempted his petition from the one-year time bar.

What Does it Mean for Other Institutions to “Defy” or “Check” the Supreme Court? Not What the Court Invites Those Institutions to Do

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone respond to a recent column by New York Times columnist David Leonhardt, arguing that neither of the recent high-profile developments after the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision is an example of “defying” the Court or “checking” judicial power. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that while neither the abortion vote in Kansas nor the pending federal marriage-equality proposal may fairly be characterized as “defying” or “checking,” some political reactions to Supreme Court rulings in the past arguably have involved defiance or disobedience of the Court.

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